Development of honesty in repeated signaling games

UNCG Author/Contributor (non-UNCG co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
Michael I. Leshowitz (Creator)
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG )
Web Site:
Jan Rychtár

Abstract: In a plant-pollinator system, plants have a multitude of potential signals, both visual and olfactory. Some signals are a by-product of pollen and nectar, while other can be positively correlated through pollinator conditioning. Successful pollinators are those able to cross reference signals with prior experiences to determine the integrity of their sender. An honest signal is defined as a signal correlated with an underlying characteristic; in this study: rewards. We examine honest signaling a system where high-yield and low-yield plants compete for visitation of pollinators. We model the scenario as a repeated Sir Philips Sidney game and conclude that honest signaling, in which only high yield plants signal, cannot be a Nash equilibrium because pollinators lose potential resources if they choose to skip over plants during their foraging flights.

Additional Information

Language: English
Date: 2017
Evolutionary Game Theory
Game theory
Evolution $x Mathematical models

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