Control enhancing corporate governance mechanisms: Family versus non-family publicly traded firms.

UNCG Author/Contributor (non-UNCG co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
Esra Memili, Associate Professor of Entrepreneurship (Creator)
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG )
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Abstract: In this dissertation, Essay 1 draws upon agency theory and corporate governance to classify control enhancing corporate governance provisions and to examine the use of these provisions within the context of publicly traded family firms. I argue that publicly traded family firms will differ from publicly traded nonfamily firms in terms of the frequency of the use of different types of control enhancing governance provisions. Specifically, I argue that family ownership will influence the frequency of the use of provisions and family management will moderate the relationships between family ownership and the frequency of the use of governance provisions. I develop and test the hypotheses on a sample of 386 of S&P500 firms. Findings do not support the hypothesized relationships. A rationale for the non-significant relationships is also provided. In Essay

Additional Information

Language: English
Date: 2010
family business, corporate governance, government provisions, small business, entrepreneurship, publicly traded firms

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