Enforcing compliance with international environmental agreements using a deposit-refund system

ASU Author/Contributor (non-ASU co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
Dave McEvoy Ph.D., Associate Professor (Creator)
Appalachian State University (ASU )
Web Site: https://library.appstate.edu/

Abstract: Whether nations are able to cooperatively manage shared resources through international environmental agreements (IEAs) depends on whether compliance with voluntary commitments can be enforced. Given that nations are sovereign enforcing compliance with IEAs cannot rely on the presence of a strong sanctioning body. Nonetheless, enforcement provisions must be effective in the sense that they will deter noncompliance and credible in the sense that they will actually be imposed. In this paper, we address the problem of enforcing compliance with IEAs by examining one promising mechanism—a deposit-refund system—that exhibits the necessary features for effective enforcement. We analyze a simple model to demonstrate the desirable properties of the mechanism and then consider the effects of imperfect monitoring, uncertainty, partial participation and reputation on the effectiveness of a deposit-refund system.

Additional Information

McEvoy, David. (2013). Enforcing Compliance with International Environmental Agreements using a Deposit-Refund System. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 13(4): 481-496. Published by Springer www.springer.com (ISSN: 1567-9764) DOI: 10.1007/s10784-013-9209-2
Language: English
Date: 2013

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