Dave McEvoy Ph.D.

There are 13 included publications by Dave McEvoy Ph.D.:

TitleDateViewsBrief Description
Cooperation in and out of markets: An experimental comparison of public good games and markets with externalities 2013 624 Experimental studies have compared cooperation across different nonmarket social dilemma settings, but the experimental literature has largely overlooked comparing cooperation across market and nonmarket settings. This paper reports the results from ...
Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements 2010 699 We examine the consequences of costly enforcement on the ability of voluntary agreements with industries to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulator...
The Effects of ITQ Management on Fishermen’s Welfare When the Processing Sector is Imperfectly Competitive 2009 782 In this paper we use a general model of imperfect competition to predict welfare changes within an open-access fishery after it transitions to individual transferable quota (¡TQ) management. Although related research has explored the effects of marke...
Endogenous Context In A Dictator Game 2016 30 The early characterization of humans as narrowly self-interested agents has unraveled in recent decades due to advances in the behavioral sciences. There is convincing evidence that peoples’ preferences and decisions are shaped by their relationship ...
Endogenous Minimum Participation In International Environmental Agreements: An Experimental Analysis 2015 51 Almost all international environmental treaties require a minimum number of countries to ratify the treaty before it enters into force. Despite the wide-spread use of this mechanism, little is known about its effectiveness at facilitating cooperation...
Enforcing Compliance with Environmental Agreements in the Absence of Strong Institutions: An Experimental Analysis 2012 1050 This paper uses laboratory experiments to evaluate the performance of a deposit-refund mechanism used to enforce compliance with voluntary public-good commitments made in the absence of strong regulatory institutions. With this mechanism agents decid...
Enforcing compliance with international environmental agreements using a deposit-refund system 2013 931 Whether nations are able to cooperatively manage shared resources through international environmental agreements (IEAs) depends on whether compliance with voluntary commitments can be enforced. Given that nations are sovereign enforcing compliance wi...
Loss Aversion And Student Achievement 2016 92 We conduct a field experiment to test if loss aversion behavior can be exploited to improve student performance in an undergraduate statistics course. In one treatment (gains), student grades were reported as points gained, and in the other treatment...
Not it: Opting out of voluntary coalitions that provide a public good 2009 642 Most coalitions that form to increase contributions to a public good do not require full participation by all users of the public good, and therefore create incentives for free riding. If given the opportunity to opt out of a voluntary coalition, in ...
Paying to Punish on a free ride: member and nonmember punishments in voluntary coalitions 2012 662 We explore public good experiments in which players have the opportunity to form cooperative coalitions. The decision to join a coalition is voluntary as is a member’s decision to comply with the terms of the coalition. An informal enforcement mechan...
The problem of maintaining compliance within stable coalitions: experimental evidence 2011 776 This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to violate their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-...
The Prospects For Paris: Behavioral Insights Into Unconditional Cooperation On Climate Change 2016 57 Recent survey evidence from the United States suggests that most Americans support domestic policies to address climate change, and this support is not conditional on other countries’ commitment levels. The finding is somewhat perplexing because clim...
Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements with Costly Monitoring for Compliance 2008 761 Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have often employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to such an agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The conce...