The evolution of cooperation: a recreation of Axelrod’s computer tournament

UNCG Author/Contributor (non-UNCG co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
Victoria Hayes (Creator)
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG )
Web Site:
Jan Rychtár

Abstract: The iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is a commonly studied game in Game Theory. Many real life situations, such as trench warfare during World War I, can be modeled by such a game. Robert Axelrod implemented a computer tournament in order to determine the best strategy during repeated interactions. Various entries, ranging from very simple to very sophisticated strategies, competed in his tournament. We recreate the tournament using a programming language Matlab and examine the results. Although our results are not entirely identical to Axelrod’s results, we confirm Axelrod’s general findings. In particular, in order for a strategy to be successful, it should be nice, forgiving, relatively easy to understand by its opponents and also retaliatory.

Additional Information

Language: English
Date: 2017
Game theory, Prisoner's dilemma
Game theory
Prisoner's dilemma game
Cooperativeness $x Mathematical models

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