A Neo-Searlean Theory of Intentionality
- ECU Author/Contributor (non-ECU co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
- Nicholas Georgalis (Creator)
- Institution
- East Carolina University (ECU )
- Web Site: http://www.ecu.edu/lib/
Abstract: I present Searle’s theory of intentionality and defend it against some objections. I then significantly extend his theory by exposing and incorporating an ambiguity in the question as to what an intentional state is about as between a subjective and an objective reading of the question. Searle implicitly relies on this ambiguity while applying his theory to a solution to the problem of substitution in propositional attitudes, but his failure to explicitly accommodate the ambiguity undermines his solution. My extension of his theory succeeds. I also indicate how the new theory can be deployed to resolve other outstanding problems.
Additional Information
- Publication
- Other
- Georgalis, N. (2021). A Neo-Searlean Theory of Intentionality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 51(7), 475-495. doi:10.1017/can.2022.8
- Language: English
- Date: 2023
- Subjects
- Searle;intentionality;intentional object;Crane;thought;thought-token
| Title | Location & Link | Type of Relationship |
| A Neo-Searlean Theory of Intentionality | http://hdl.handle.net/10342/10612 | The described resource references, cites, or otherwise points to the related resource. |