Enforcing Compliance with Environmental Agreements in the Absence of Strong Institutions: An Experimental Analysis
- ASU Author/Contributor (non-ASU co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
- Todd Cherry Ph.D., Professor (Creator)
- Dave McEvoy Ph.D., Associate Professor (Creator)
- Institution
- Appalachian State University (ASU )
- Web Site: https://library.appstate.edu/
Abstract: This paper uses laboratory experiments to evaluate the performance of a deposit-refund mechanism used to enforce compliance with voluntary public-good commitments made in the absence of strong regulatory institutions. With this mechanism agents decide whether to join an agreement and pay a deposit prior to making their contribution decisions. If an agreement receives sufficient membership to form, members then make their contribution decisions and compliant members are refunded their deposits. If an agreement does not form, then deposits are immediately refunded and a standard voluntary contribution game is played. We find that the deposit-refund mechanism achieves nearly full efficiency when agreements require full participation, but is far less effective, and in some cases disruptive, when agreements require only partial participation. As the mechanism does not require the existence of strong sanctioning institutions, it is particularly suited for enforcing compliance with international environmental agreements.
Enforcing Compliance with Environmental Agreements in the Absence of Strong Institutions: An Experimental Analysis
PDF (Portable Document Format)
288 KB
Created on 10/1/2014
Views: 2505
Additional Information
- Publication
- Cherry, Todd and David McEvoy. (2013). Enforcing Compliance with Environmental Agreements in the Absence of Strong Institutions: An Experimental Analysis. Environmental and Resource Economics 54(1): 63-77. Published by Springer www.springer.com (ISSN: 0924-6460) DOI 10.1007/s10640-012-9581-3
- Language: English
- Date: 2012