|The acceptability of efficiency-enhancing environmental taxes, subsidies and regulation: An experimental investigation
||Public opposition to efficiency-enhancing policies is a significant barrier to addressing many environmental challenges. We use a market experiment to explore the acceptability of three types of instruments: Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, and quantit...
|The appropriation of endogenously provided common-pool resources
||Because game theory suggests that the origin of a common-pool resource should not affect appropriation behavior, experimental studies of appropriation from common-pool resources generally presume resources are exogenously provided. However, behaviora...
|Cooperation in and out of markets: An experimental comparison of public good games and markets with externalities
||Experimental studies have compared cooperation across different nonmarket social dilemma settings, but the experimental literature has largely overlooked comparing cooperation across market and nonmarket settings. This paper reports the results from ...
|The development and deployment of low-carbon energy technologies: The role of economic interests and cultural worldviews on public support
||Large-scale deployment of low-carbon energy technologies is crucial to mitigating climate change, and public support is an important barrier to policies and projects that facilitate deployment. This paper provides insights to the origins of public op...
|Do you not like Pigou, or do you not understand him? Tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab
||Tax-aversion reduces the likelihood that price rationing can be a politically viable tool for environmental protection. We examine the case of the classic Pigouvian tax to control a negative externality, and consider how recycling the revenues, label...
|Enforcing Compliance with Environmental Agreements in the Absence of Strong Institutions: An Experimental Analysis
||This paper uses laboratory experiments to evaluate the performance of a deposit-refund mechanism used to enforce compliance with voluntary public-good commitments made in the absence of strong regulatory institutions. With this mechanism agents decid...
|Heterogeneity, Coordination and the Provision of Best-Shot Public Goods
||In a best-shot public good, where the provision level is determined by the highest contribution instead of the sum of all contributions, there is potential for waste and underprovision due to coordination failure. These failures are exacerbated when ...
|Individual and Institutional Determinants of the Male Female Wage Gap Among U.S. Economics Faculty
||This paper provides new evidence on the male female wage gap in academia. Using unique data from the economics
discipline, we estimate a human-capital based model to explore the nature of wage differentials among male and
female economics professor...
|Pigouvian Tax Aversion and Inequity Aversion in the Lab
||We use an experimental market with externalities to test whether inequality aversion could help explain the popularity
of earmarking tax revenues. We find that voter opposition is not fully explained by material self-interest: Results
|Sleeping with the enemy: The economic cost of internal environmental conflicts
||This paper extends the literature on collective rent-seeking by introducing the possibility that a competing group may be a subset of another. We develop a model that incorporates the potential for some individuals to be party of both sides of a conf...
|Social programs as positive inducements for tax participation
||A significant amount of non-compliance with the personal income tax is due to individuals who have not filed a tax return and so who are not “in the system”. We use experimental laboratory methods to examine the effect of positive inducements for fil...
|Taxpayer information assistance services and tax compliance behavior
||The traditional “enforcement” paradigm of tax administration views taxpayers as potential criminals, and emphasizes the repression of illegal behavior through frequent audits and stiff penalties. However, an important trend in tax administration poli...