Moral Responsibility, Freedom, and Alternate Possibilities

UNCG Author/Contributor (non-UNCG co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
Michael Zimmerman, Professor and Philosophy Pre-Law Concentration Advisor (Creator)
Institution
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG )
Web Site: http://library.uncg.edu/

Abstract: The paper opened with a story about Peter, Paul, and a locked door. Certain rough morals were seen to be perhaps derivable from the story. But the morals were too rough and required refinement. When they were refined, it became clear that the original story required refinement also. Then, given the modified story, five main positions were seen to be available for adoption with respect to this story's effect on principle P1' and, through this, on the traditional debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Which position is the correct one was left open to question, although I noted my tendency to subscribe to that position captured in claim (v). The important point to note is that all of these five positions (and others too) are available for adoption, for this seems to me to be a point that has been overlooked in recent discussion of the issue. Indeed, the issue is, I believe, clarified to a certain extent merely by noting this point.

Additional Information

Publication
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 63 (1982): 243-254
Language: English
Date: 1982
Keywords
moral responsibility, freedom, morals, compatibilists, incompatibilists

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