A Plea for Accuses

UNCG Author/Contributor (non-UNCG co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
Michael Zimmerman, Professor and Philosophy Pre-Law Concentration Advisor (Creator)
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG )
Web Site: http://library.uncg.edu/

Abstract: Ever since J. L. Austin's famous "plea for excuses," if not before, the standard account of the distinction between a justification and an excuse has been this: one has a justification for what one has done just in case one did not do wrong in doing it; one has an excuse, just in case one lacks a justification (that is, one did do wrong), but is nonetheless not to be blamed for what one did.1 There is an excuse, then, if there is reason or grounds for not imputing blameworthiness despite the presence of wrongdoing. There is an analogue to this concept of an excuse that has strangely escaped the notice of all but a few.

Additional Information

American Philosophical Quarterly, 34(2) (1997): 229-243
Language: English
Date: 1997
J. L. Austin, justification, excuse, blameworthiness, wrongdoing

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