Entrenchment in Publicly-Traded Family Firms: Evidence from the S&P 500
- UNCG Author/Contributor (non-UNCG co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
- Esra Memili, Associate Professor of Entrepreneurship (Creator)
- Institution
- The University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG )
- Web Site: http://library.uncg.edu/
Abstract: Family involvement in corporate governance through ownership, management, and board membership presents a unique dilemma for understanding the strategic impetus and costs of entrenchment decisions. The presence of shared family ties and the family-centered goals of firm principals call to question the applicability of extant agency arguments regarding the nature and antecedents of managerial entrenchment. Exploring this, we develop and test a model of family firm-specific determinants (i.e., family ownership and family's involvement in management and governance) of entrenchment in publicly traded firms by drawing upon principal-principal agency theory. Findings of the empirical analysis of family owned S&P 500 firms suggest family firms are motivated to entrench managers when doing so supports the pursuit of family-centric goals. However, the extent to which entrenchment supports such goals varies at different levels of family ownership.
Entrenchment in Publicly-Traded Family Firms: Evidence from the S&P 500
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Created on 8/13/2018
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Additional Information
- Publication
- Long Range Planning
- Language: English
- Date: 2017
- Keywords
- Entrenchment, Family governance, Agency theory, Family firm heterogeneity