Strategic Behavior At The Certiorari Stage Of The Supreme Court Of The United States
- ASU Author/Contributor (non-ASU co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
- Aaron Walker (Creator)
- Institution
- Appalachian State University (ASU )
- Web Site: https://library.appstate.edu/
- Advisor
- Ellen Key
Abstract: The Supreme Court of the United States is the most insulated institution in the federal government. Scholars suggest that justices on the Court engage in strategic behavior, rather than sincere judicial behavior. The certiorari stage is a particular point of interest for scholars that believe justices engage in strategic voting. However, prior research has not included cases that were denied, in which strategic behavior is also evident. A logistic regression of individual justice votes to grant or deny certiorari in 499 cases during the 1986-1993 Rehnquist Court terms shows that justices routinely engage in strategic behavior at the certiorari stage. They are responsive to both institutional and external factors when deciding to vote to grant or deny certiorari.
Strategic Behavior At The Certiorari Stage Of The Supreme Court Of The United States
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Created on 9/16/2016
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Additional Information
- Publication
- Thesis
- Walker, A (2016) "Strategic Behavior At The Certiorari Stage Of The Supreme Court Of The United States" Unpublished Honor's Thesis. Appalachian State University, Boone, NC
- Language: English
- Date: 2016