Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements
- ASU Author/Contributor (non-ASU co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
- Dave McEvoy Ph.D., Associate Professor (Creator)
- Institution
- Appalachian State University (ASU )
- Web Site: https://library.appstate.edu/
Abstract: We examine the consequences of costly enforcement on the ability of voluntary agreements with industries to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. A voluntary agreement can be more efficient in reaching an aggregate emissions target than a conventional emissions tax, but only if: (1) profitable voluntary agreements in which members of the agreement pay for its enforcement exist; (2) members of a voluntary agreement actually bear the costs of enforcing the agreement; (3) the agreement is enforced by a third party, not the government, and (4) this third-party enforcer has a significant advantage in monitoring technology and/or available sanctions over the government.
Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements
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Additional Information
- Publication
- McEvoy, David and John K. Stranlund. (2010). Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements. Environmental and Resource Economics, 47(1): 45-63. Published by Springer www.springer.com (ISSN: 0924-6460). DOI: 10.1007/s10640-010-9364-7.
- Language: English
- Date: 2010