The New NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Median Voter Model, and a Robin Hood Rent Redistribution
- ASU Author/Contributor (non-ASU co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
- Peter Groothuis Ph.D., Professor (Creator)
- Institution
- Appalachian State University (ASU )
- Web Site: https://library.appstate.edu/
Abstract: In this article, it is suggested that the new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in the
National Basketball Association (NBA) redistributes rents from the superstars back to the
median voters. In particular, it is suggested that portions of the new agreement, such as
salary caps, are designed to improve the rather skewed distribution of salaries in the
NBA. Evidence from a Lorenz curve analysis of the first 2 years under the new contract
suggests that all players with salaries below the median wage gain from the new agreement,
and those with salaries closest to the median wage gain the most. The analysis suggests
that skewed salary distributions may lead to CBAs that redistribute the rents from the
rich (superstars) to the poor (median voters).
The New NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Median Voter Model, and a Robin Hood Rent Redistribution
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Created on 4/23/2012
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Additional Information
- Publication
- Hill, J.R. and Groothuis, P.A. (2001), The New NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, The Median Voter Model and a Robin-Hood Rent Redistribution. Journal of Sports Economics, 2(2): 131-144 (May 2001). Published by SAGE. doi:10.1177/152700250100200203
- Language: English
- Date: 2001