Political Competition, Constitutional Arrangements, and the Quality of Public Policies in Costa Rica

UNCG Author/Contributor (non-UNCG co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
Fabrice Lehoucq, Associate Professor (Creator)
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG )
Web Site: http://library.uncg.edu/

Abstract: This article explains why Costa Rica, by the mid-twentieth century, began to depart from the all-too-common mixture of political instability and economic stagnation characteristic of much of the developing world. The article argues that this country has benefited from better-than-average public policies, a conclusion based on a major comparative ranking of state policies. It further argues that interminable political stalemates gradually democratized the struggle for power and laid the groundwork for an innovative constitutional framework, one that allocates the technical functions of government to a set of autonomous institutions. A central implication of this argument is that institutional design is the backdrop for development-enhancing public policies.

Additional Information

Language: English
Date: 2010
Costa Rica, politics, political competition, Latin American politics, history, public policy, constitutional arrangements

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