A Key Predistribution Scheme for Sensor Networks Using Deployment Knowledge

UNCG Author/Contributor (non-UNCG co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
Jing Deng, Assistant Professor (Creator)
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG )
Web Site: http://library.uncg.edu/

Abstract: To achieve security in wireless sensor networks, it is important to be able to encrypt messages sent among sensor nodes. Keys for encryption purposes must be agreed upon by communicating nodes. Due to resource constraints, achieving such key agreement in wireless sensor networks is nontrivial. Many key agreement schemes used in general networks, such as Diffie-Hellman and public-key-based schemes, are not suitable for wireless sensor networks. Predistribution of secret keys for all pairs of nodes is not viable due to the large amount of memory used when the network size is large. Recently, a random key predistribution scheme and its improvements have been proposed. A common assumption made by these random key predistribution schemes is that no deployment knowledge is available. Noticing that, in many practical scenarios, certain deployment knowledge may be available a priori, we propose a novel random key predistribution scheme that exploits deployment knowledge and avoids unnecessary key assignments. We show that the performance (including connectivity, memory usage, and network resilience against node capture) of sensor networks can be substantially improved with the use of our proposed scheme. The scheme and its detailed performance evaluation are presented in this paper.

Additional Information

IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 62-77, January-March 2006.
Language: English
Date: 2006
Wireless sensor networks, Network security, Key predistribution

Email this document to