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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MYTH FOR CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

The University of North Carolina at Greensboro

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MYTH FOR CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

by

Sara McClendon Stohler

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Education

Greensboro
1981

Approved by

David E. Purpel
Dissertation Adviser
This dissertation explores the question of whether myth represents a kind of knowledge and a way of knowing useful to children at particular stages of development. The question is approached through an examination of theories about the potential significance of myth as an element in and shaper of modern consciousness. Myth as a way of interpreting reality is contrasted with the scientific rationalism of our age and is defined as a way of assigning meaning through narratives and symbols that create a unified concept of nature and human life.

The study found that the importance of myth in the learning process is different at different stages of development. At all stages, attention to myth in education supports the values of imagination, meaning, and community; but in childhood the main contribution is to developing the imagination and in adolescence, to establishing meaning.

To explore the value of myth for culture and education, an examination is made of works of several writers who suggest that myth continues to be important to people who no longer live in primitive or closed religious societies. Concerns central to this study, such as myth in an age of science, myth as an expression of universal characteristics of the psyche, the role of myth in developing the imagination, the effect of myth on our understanding of the individual in
relation to community, and the importance of myth to cultural symbols, are examined from the writings of Carl Jung, Joseph Campbell, and Northrop Frye.

Studies are examined that support the idea that children of our century and culture have a significant relation to and need for myth that directly influences their educational development. Recent studies are reviewed that point to the correspondence between Piaget's early findings about the mythic elements in child thought and Bettelheim's theories about the child's close connection with fairy tales. An examination of these writings concludes that there is strong evidence that traditional stories reflect the child's conception of reality and emotional needs more accurately than do realistic stories. These findings are applied to Egan's theory of curriculum that defines the first stage of education development as the "mythic stage," as well as to concerns about educating the imagination.

Investigation into the educational needs of adolescents focuses on the importance of philosophic ideas for this age and interprets this interest as a need to construct a myth that organizes knowledge and establishes personal meaning. Erikson's writings about the importance of ideology to the adolescent task of identity formation and Piaget's observations about the philosophic abilities and needs of adolescent thinkers provide the basis for the argument that myth in its ideological function is of primary importance to youth. Educational theory and strategies are suggested that focus on
the student's need to think philosophically about cultural and personal myths.

The perspective of myth introduces community as an important value in culture and in education. The analysis of education and community from this perspective poses some fundamental value conflicts over issues such as individualism, materialism, and progress. This study uses Oliver's perspective on community as a traditional form that meets human needs better than utilitarian, corporate organization models. The argument is made that myth and community are mutually dependent and that education that focuses on the need for myth must be supportive of the student's need to understand and identify sources of community.

Suggestions are made about areas for further study, in particular the implications of this study for approaches to children's reading, to science curricula and to moral education.
This dissertation has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

Dissertation Advisor

Committee Members

Date of Acceptance by Committee

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INTRODUCTION

The focus of this study is the pedagogical function of myth, involving such questions as: Is there a form or content in myths that teaches in a way appropriate to children? Do myths represent a way of knowing and certain values that are missed when attention is focused on reason and empirical investigation? Do myths give a different way of viewing reality that is both useful and valid? My approach to these questions has been to examine some of the major writings about the meaning of myth from a contemporary perspective and to investigate theories supportive of the hypothesis that myth represents knowledge and a way of knowing useful to school-aged children.

It may also be important to state what I am not including in this study. This is not an investigation into how to incorporate the great myths of the world in a humanities curriculum. Little is said here about the use of Greek, Norse or Indian mythology at different levels or the value of studying those or other particular myths. One will look in vain for names like Zeus, Athena, Balder, Homer, Bullfinch. But neither is this study concerned with the examination of modern myths, those themes or ideologies that represent the stories and visions by which secular cultures in our day interpret their goals and values, although the significance
of both modern and ancient myths is discussed at various points. Rather the focus is on the function of myth in human development and the significance of a "mythic perspective" on educational issues.

Jacques Ellul (1975) observes that the attention being given to myth in our time appears to be something of an anachronism. The movement of western civilization over the past several centuries has been away from myth and towards science, technology and rationalism as the dominant modes of thought. In fact, in the 19th century intellectual world myths seemed to belong to the past, Ellul observes. But the work of depth psychology gave new meaning to myths as the expressions of deep and complex human tendencies, first in a negative sense by Freud and then in a positive role by Jung. Our attitude toward myth is changing:

By a strange reversal, what now seems childish is not the imaginary myth but the rationalistic philosophy which called it in question through a failure to understand it. Cicero is seen to be more simplistic than Homer. (Ellul, 1975, p. 89)

In discovering that myths are more than the interesting but inaccurate way that prescientific peoples explained natural phenomena, anthropologists, psychologists, theologians and literary critics, in particular, have developed new theories about the place of myth in human consciousness and its role in human society. I do not find much evidence that these theories have made an impact on educational ideas and they may not so long as the social and political climate
continue to insist that the schools' main function is to prepare students to meet the needs of an industrial society. The underlying conflict between the mythic mode of thought and the current modes in Western culture is one of the considerations of this study.

**Defining Myth**

In this investigation, I have had to struggle constantly with the problem of setting limits on the term "myth," of maintaining some reasonably consistent definition. The problem has not been with the common misuse of "myth" to refer to mistaken and discarded ideas. That popular use of "myth" comes from the 19th-century attitude, which still prevails, that mythic perceptions are erroneous ones. However, it is easy enough to make a distinction between the use of "myth" to refer to a misconception and the use of the term to refer to those philosophic stories and themes that humans always have and continue to create. The problem with definition is the question of whether, or to what extent, modern ideologies and cultural themes are the extension of myth or are a related but different conceptual form. In working with the idea of myth I have found that its value to us lies as much in its ancient symbolism as in its schematic qualities, and thus modern forms that do not draw on that body of symbolism in any significant way may be only partially mythic. Consequently, I have sought a definition that is specific enough in giving attention to the body of mythological stories but also broad enough to suggest an ongoing
process. The following definition provides that kind of balance but is not quite complete:

Myth is to be defined as a complex of stories—some no doubt fact, and some fantasy—which, for various reasons, human beings regard as demonstrations of the inner meaning of the universe and of human life. Myth is quite different from philosophy in the sense of abstract concepts—consisting of vivid, sensually intelligible narratives, images, rites, ceremonies and symbols. (Anderson & Groff, 1972, p. 42, quoted from Alan Watts, Myth and Ritual in Christianity)

Anderson and Groff (1972) add to that definition the idea that a myth is a story that operates on the assumption that there is order, meaning, design, and a life force behind nature by which the myth creates a "holistic, all-encompassing picture of nature and of man" (p. 43). Thus the essence of myth is, they suggest, that it "endows nature with life and purpose" (p. 54). We can say, then, that a myth is a way of assigning meaning and order to the universe and human life through narratives and symbols that create a holistic picture of nature and man.

This way of defining myth is no problem when we are considering the ancient myths or those that people not influenced by modern thought continue to live by. But what does it mean for people in the West whose vision of wholeness, if they ever had one, is seriously challenged by a naturalistic conception of the physical world and a deterministic conception of human nature? Once the animism is gone, how does one again "endow nature with life and purpose"? Once one has seen the world as absurd and has looked into the
void, how can s/he talk about order and meaning in the universe? It is understandable that many will argue that to talk about myth again in our age is to talk about regression or engage in hopeless fantasy.

There are, I suggest, two different ways that the person today is connected with myth: one is the ties we continue to have with the original form of myth and the other is the continuation of myth-making in forms altered by the social and intellectual changes of the last centuries.

There are several ways that people today are linked with myths more closely than is usually recognized. Our dreams participate in the themes and symbols common to all of the great myths, as Jung has demonstrated (see Chapter I). At a subconscious level the dream-myth world is one with which we are deeply involved. Also the world of childhood is more closely akin, both cognitively and emotionally, to myth than has usually been acknowledged. To be a child, or to work with children, I will argue below, is to be related to myth. The adult's relationship to myth is primarily through religion and art, for the aesthetic and the religious are both expressions of the inner world that works with mythic images and patterns to create meaning and order. Also, myth influences our culture through metaphors we have derived from the stories. Thus Prometheus represents the struggles of the humanist and the liberator against orthodoxy; Sisyphus, the Existentialist's concept of the dilemma of being human; and
Oedipus, the psychological complexity and tragic dimension of human sexuality.

However, in modern, secular societies the need to have common themes and goals that give a common purpose to the social order is being met more by modern ideologies than by myths. It appears that ideology is the form that the mythic impulse for order and meaning takes in cultures that have broken from their identity with a particular religion or myth. To a large extent, ideologies are the transmuting of mythic themes into a more philosophical and self-conscious mode that can accomodate economic and political ideas, as well as scientific knowledge and rational discourse. In the same way that ideologies are more suited to the forms of thought and the growth of knowledge in our age they are also limited to expressing those modes of thought and thus lack the psychological and spiritual depth of myths. In that ideology and myth share the same function of giving an ordered and meaningful interpretation of history and events for a society, ideology is considered in this study as a part of myth. But it is also distinguished from myth, lacking the strong narrative, the large repertoire of universal symbols and patterns (archetypes), and the close tie between the human and natural world—all of which give to myth its distinctive form and function. Ideology, then, I shall treat as a quasi-myth.
The Mythic Perspective

A basic premise of this study is that in addition to providing useful forms of knowledge for children, myths represent a kind of perspective on reality that should inform our theories about education. There are two aspects of a mythic perspective. One dimension is what the myths of the world tell us, in their amazingly consistent themes and images, about human nature and the kind of meaning humans make of their relationships with each other and with nature. To mention a few insights, myths tell us of the need to project an ideational world beyond the actual world, e.g., that we live between a lost paradise and a yet unattained Nirvana or Holy City that makes of "the time being" not just today but a pilgrimage, trial or endurance. In continually establishing connections between the patterns of human life and those in the natural world they express the importance to the human psyche (and perhaps to the survival of life) of living in an interrelated way with nature and the universe. Basic to myth is the importance of the spiritual world, either in the sense of a relationship of the divine to the human or in cultivation of spirituality as an inward state. According to myth, the order of the world is moral and thus instruction in what is good and what is evil and learning the balance between opposing forces is of critical importance. Myths often reveal the tragic dimensions of human nature, the destructive conflicts between passion and reason, the fatal flaws within the best of persons.
The other aspect of a mythic perspective lies in the recognition of the role of the mythic themes and symbols that are present to all people regardless of whether they have heard mythic stories. Here I refer to Jung's findings about the consistency with which certain mythic ideas and symbols recur in dreams and art. Whether one accepts Jung's theory that the mythic content is inherited or the conclusion of others that myths arise spontaneously due to common psychological experiences of being human, there is the phenomenon of certain mythic ideas and images that appear across cultures. What is represented by the artifacts of myth found in children, in dreams, in art and in religion is, I suggest, universal and representative of a depth in the human psyche that is not addressed by either rational inquiry nor the ideas of modern philosophy.

The mythic perspective, I suggest, exists in all persons but often in a diminished form because in our culture we have little access to the modes of its expression, e.g., stories, symbols, rituals, dance, traditional communities.

To be concerned about myth in the development of children, as well as in the life of the culture, is to take a position regarding values and trends in Western thought. For instance, it is to oppose the momentum technology has gained because of the impact it is making on the social and natural environments, changing our way of viewing people and the earth. Instead of the intricate web of interrelatedness that myth
portrays, we have in technology a set of possibilities for manipulating conditions to the material benefit of the industrial nations. It is to be as concerned for the cultivation of the imagination and a sense of moral responsibility as much as for the achievement of intellectual skills and mastery of a given body of knowledge. It is to be more concerned with teaching cooperation and building community than with developing competitive instincts and satisfying the personal goals of individuals. Finally, it is to suggest that the mind is to be regarded and trained for intuitive and symbolic modes of knowing and expression, as well as for rational and analytic modes.

How these values and ideas related to myth fit into the education of the child, more specifically how they relate to the child's development and the curriculum we use, is the concern of this study.

The Plan of Study

The order of the chapters is the order of the inquiry which developed a step at a time. My initial investigation was into writings of this century about myth. The work in anthropology had to be excluded because it is vast and is a whole conversation in itself. I chose Jung as the beginning point because his work has been responsible, more than anything else, for the modern perspective on myth and because almost every writer on the subject has been influenced by his theory of the mythological heritage carried in the
collective unconscious. I then turned to Joseph Campbell because he is one of the great students of the world's myths. Campbell has also developed theories about how the modern person relates to myth and has written on the need to continue to know and construct myths in our age. Finally, I made a study of Northrop Frye's theory about the significance of myth in educating the imagination, a theory based on his extensive study of how myth is the structural form of literature.

When I began my investigation into how myth relates to the development and learning styles of school-aged children, I discovered two important sources: the educational theory of Kieran Egan (1979) and the early writings of Piaget, both outlining in detail the mythic characteristics of the young child's thinking. These writings provided a picture of the child's cognitive needs that corresponded to the description of the child's emotional needs in Bettelheim's *The Uses of Enchantment*. These perspectives reinforced the growing recognition by people in the area of children's literature and reading interests of the strong appeal of fantasy, tale, and myth.

All of these sources, however, argued that the mythic world ceases to be important once the child outgrows certain modes of thinking and resolves the kinds of emotional conflicts portrayed in fairy tales. By age ten or 12, the child is through with the mythic mode and ready to deal with the real world through logic, reason, scientific investigation.
My argument, however, is that the mythic mode does not vanish but takes on a different function, i.e., giving order and meaning to the universe and establishing one's relationship to that schema.

In earlier work with Erikson's writings I had been impressed by the importance he placed on ideology in the development of identity in adolescence. From my study of myth I now recognized that ideology serves one of the functions of myth in our age, that of providing a meaningful structure or as Erikson says, "establishing the larger framework." Indeed, the way in which Egan describes the adolescent's need for philosophy suggests that it is the need to construct a myth rather than any abstract philosophical system that he is dealing with in his analysis. Thus my study of the educational needs of the adolescent focused on the importance at that age of constructing a myth designed to organize knowledge and establish personal meaning.

From my examination of these and other faces of myth as it relates to education, I concluded that myth offers a different perspective on reality, a different way of knowing and of deciding what is important knowledge. Maxine Greene (1978) alluded to that difference when she wrote (with some dismay) about young people preferring mysticism or sensuality, "magic, ancient myth, orphic wisdom, or astrology" (p. 8), as an escape from discursive thinking, on the one hand, and the depersonalization of technology on the other. Exploring
what a mythic perspective, as opposed to a rationalistic or technologically oriented perspective, might be for education, I found that three ideas were prominent: the importance of the imagination, the importance of personal meaning, and the importance of community. The study of myth and the child led to some insights about the importance of developing the imagination and the function of myth is accomplishing that. At the adolescent level, the main contribution of myth was found to be in focusing on ways of learning that help establish personal meaning. This left me with the concern for community, a theme which had repeatedly presented itself from the beginning of the investigation of myth and a theme which is very important to me and which, in part, had led me to the study of myth and education in the beginning. The final step of the inquiry, then, was to explore how we understand education and community from the perspective that myth offers.

The analysis of education and community is based on a critique of values and problems in modern culture that, perhaps, will not be as readily accepted as the conclusions about the child's and the adolescent's need for myth in their education. Community, like myth, is a very old form that represents some of the trade-offs our culture has made in order to accommodate new knowledge, the benefits of the industrial age, and the rise of the individual. In focusing on community, as well as on myth, I am suggesting that we
need to seek a new balance, where possible, between some of our old and our new values and modes of thinking.

Overview

Chapter I is an exploration of modern theories about myth, with particular attention to the ways myth continues to be significant in contemporary thought and what function it serves vis-a-vis scientific and rational modes of thought.

Chapter II examines several studies of the thought and interests of the child that describe and interpret characteristics related to myth. Piaget's early research on the primitive characteristics of child thought is examined and its implications for education are explored in theories of curriculum development, psychological needs, and interest patterns.

Chapter III focuses on the role of myth in the adolescent's task of identity formation, with Erikson's writings about youth, identity, and ideology forming the basis of the study. Attention is given to the implications of the adolescent need for myth or ideology for curriculum development.

Chapter IV is an examination of one of the primary values derived from a mythic perspective for education, the value of community. Distinguishing the perspective of myth from that of rationalism and technicism, I examine the implications of that perspective for an understanding of education and community.
CHAPTER I
MYTH AND MODERN CONSCIOUSNESS

In order to explore what value myth has for culture today, and thus for education, I have examined works of 20th-century writers who have suggested that myth continues to be important to people who no longer live in primitive or closed religious societies. From this area of scholarship I have chosen three writers whose theories seem to provide a fairly solid and broad base from which to establish a viewpoint useful to curriculum theory: Carl Jung, Joseph Campbell, and Northrop Frye. If space and time permitted, the inclusions of Mircea Eliade's perspective from religion and Claude Lévy-Strauss' perspective from anthropology (to name only two of many possibilities) would give a more complete picture. However, from the three examined we have access to many of the major ideas in the area and also a perspective from which further studies might develop.

Concerns central to this study, such as myth in an age of science, the role of myth in the development of the imagination, the effect of myth on our understanding of the individual in relation to community, and the kind of consciousness that myth characterizes, are addressed here in different ways by each writer. Instead of arranging the material topically, I have chosen to treat the viewpoints separately because
their ideas are best represented within the framework of their main concerns and theories. Because each is a prolific writer, I can only give a partial perspective and have sought to emphasize those ideas about myth, modern consciousness, imagination, and community that offer the theoretical perspective needed for a theory about myth and education.

First in this study is Carl Jung who has, more than anyone else, created a new interest in myths and dreams as positive forces in the psyche. From a depth psychology perspective he approaches myths as expressions of the inward life, of psychic depths and structures closely linked to dreams and artistic symbols. For Jung, myths are of particular significance as the bearers of our moral and spiritual traditions, as well as the protectors of these from what he considers the dangerous one-sidedness of our scientific, rational and individualistic culture.

Next I will discuss Joseph Campbell who, from a literary and historical perspective, examines mythologies both for what they as a body say about the meaning of myths and for what they reveal about the role of myth in human society and individual consciousness. Resolving the myth-science conflict, finding the universals in the myths of the world, and finding ways to express and create myths beyond the dogmas of religion are some of his concerns.

Northrop Frye developed his theories about myths from his work in literary criticism. In particular, his studies of Blake led him to examine mythology as the source of literary
structures and the keystone of literary criticism. From his study he concludes not only that myths were originally essential in the development of literary forms but also that they continue to be vital in the education of the imagination and the projection of ideals in a time when realism tends to limit our social imagination.

All of these writers address the issue of what scientific and rational thinking have done to the modern consciousness and thus the ambiguity and hostility that characterize much of the Western attitude toward myths. They all imply that one of the most critical problems of modern life, alienation, stems from the break with the mythological heritage and the community-oriented perspective it held. It is not to deny the gains in terms of individual freedom and the growth of knowledge that came from that break, but to try to discover new ways to relate to the mythological heritage that they are concerned when they write about the value of myth in our time.

Carl Jung

As scientific understanding has grown, so our world has become dehumanized. Man feels himself isolated in the cosmos, because he is no longer involved in nature and has lost his emotional 'unconscious identity' with natural phenomena. These have slowly lost their symbolic implications. Thunder is no longer the voice of an angry god, nor is lightening his avenging missle. No river contains a spirit, no tree is the life principle of a man, no snake the embodiment of wisdom, no mountain cave the home of a great demon. No voices now speak to man from stones, plants, and animals, nor does he speak
to them believing they can hear. His contact with nature has gone, and with it has gone the profound emotional energy that his symbolic connection supplied. (Jung, 1968, p. 85)

What do myths mean to us as inhabitants of the "modern Aristotelian city/Of darning and the eight-fifteen" (Auden)? This question includes both the concern for whether the mode of thought represented in mythic thinking is made useless by the scientific rationalism of our age. Without mythologies, Jung (1968) suggests, life is without a broader meaning than meeting of basic needs and the acquiring of goods. Our Western civilization is suffering the loss of its beliefs and mythic consciousness to a degree we scarcely understand and with consequences beyond our present considerations. Our pursuit of the scientific and our belief in rationalism have resulted in a disorientation and dehumanization:

Modern man does not understand how much his 'rationalism' (which has destroyed his capacity to respond to numinous symbols and ideas) has put him at the mercy of the psychic 'underworld.' He has freed himself from superstition (or so he believes) but in the process he has lost his spiritual values to a positively dangerous degree. His moral and spiritual tradition has disintegrated, and he is now paying the price for this break-up in world-wide disorientation and dissociation. (Jung, 1968, p. 84)

It is this belief that myths express our moral and spiritual traditions and are an expression of our search for meaning, the positive integration of self and world, that characterizes Jung's approach to the study of myths. The understanding of myths begins, for him, with the study of the psyche.
Central Psychological Concepts

In writing about the layers of human consciousness, Jung defines three levels of the psyche and their contents which are summarized as follows:

(a) conscious—that which seems to come to us through sense-perceptions and is known to us through thinking or reflection,

(b) personal unconscious—those things that are lost from consciousness because they lose their intensity or are repressed, as well as sense impressions not strong enough to enter consciousness, and

(c) collective unconscious—the images and patterns laid down from earliest times that form a stratum common to all people and reflecting the primitive interpretation of phenomena. (Progoff, 1953, pp. 66-68)

It is with the first and third of these that Jung is most interested, and the concept of the "collective unconscious" is perhaps his most definitive and provocative contribution to psychology. Progoff (1953) observes that Jung rejects Freud's concept of the unconscious as those drives that are suppressed because they are destructive and unacceptable and posits, rather, a rich and profitable realm of the psyche, the contents of which may be beneficial to the individual who can be in touch with them through dream, myth, and art. Indeed, the full maturing and realization of creative potential is dependent on an integration of the conscious with the unconscious.
Jung (1963) finds evidence of an unconscious that is more than personal or cultural experience and history in the universal motifs that appear in dreams, myths, and art. It is the phenomenon of universality that leads him to posit a collective unconscious, a stratum of the psyche that is common to all people. The deeper one goes into the psyche the closer one gets to the universals and to the biological/animal dimension of man, and the more one finds unity and less differentiation. Thus he suggests that the universals are much like inherited instincts that reach backwards to man's most primitive life. The origin of these patterns is the imprinting on the psyche of regular physical events (such as the body's need for a system of functions for adapting), an imprinting that is fantastic or distorted because the primitive mind did not make the distinction between subject and object we make now. Progoff (1953) suggests that "collective" is a word to contrast with "personal"; the development of individuality requires an emergence from the collective. The collective is also prior to and more fundamental than the individual. Myths are, Jung thinks, the primordial images and motifs projected from that collective unconscious.

The universals are expressed symbolically in archetypal images that arise from the collective unconscious. Jaffe (1971) points out that Jung first wrote about the archetypes as "primordial images," "deposits," or "inherited pathways," but later decided that they were not laid down or accumulated
through history but original, "the timeless constants of human nature" (p. 17). The archetypes are themselves the forms or the potentialities in the psyche, or in Progoff's (1953) words, "the symbols that represent psychic processes, generic to the human species" (p. 58). However, they are manifest only in contents that are tied to historical experiences and thus they appear in many forms in the lives of individuals and in myths. The evidence for the archetypes Jung finds in the patterns of symbol formation in myths and in dreams of people of all cultures; thus his definition of archetypes:

forms or images of a collective nature which occur practically all over the earth as constituents of myths and at the same time as autochthonous, individual products of unconscious origin. (Progoff, 1953, p. 69)

Anti-mythic Dimensions of Modern Thought

Looking at civilized man of this age, Jung (1963) sees the development of consciousness as an evolutionary product that has gone to a dangerous extreme, the correction of which is inevitable. There are both promising and threatening signs of the reassertion of the suppressed subconscious energies, but the necessity of restoring a balance between the conscious and unconscious dimension of the psyche is unquestioned. It is this concern for regaining a balance, for correcting a modern tendency, that is the background for Jung's warnings about the dangers of stressing individuality and keeping the unconscious and collective in the background. Progoff (1953) comments on Jung's concern over this imbalance:
a main contention regarding the 'diagnosis' of the condition of modern man is that consciousness has been overstressed to the point where an unbalanced situation has developed in the psyche. (p. 78)

He quotes Jung on the danger in the modern attitude that "entirely forgets that it carries the whole living past in the lower stories of the skyscraper of rational consciousness" (p. 78). The conscious will threatens to take over to the point of losing contact with the archetypes and thus insuring its own collapse.

In the essay, "The Psychology of the Child Archetype," Jung (1963) writes that the increase of freedom and rationality is at the risk of man loosing touch with "the laws and roots of his being." The conscious mind is by nature one-sided, its effort being "to concentrate on relatively few contents and to raise them to the highest pitch of clarity" (p. 81).

This capacity to train the will to attain what in his consciousness and rationality man desires is deemed progressive, but it is also potentially destructive:

This assertion of the will means, on the one hand, the possibility of human freedom, but on the other it is a source of endless transgressions against one's instincts, like the animal, is characterized by fear of novelty and adherence to tradition. To our way of thinking he is painfully backward, whereas we exalt progress. But our progressiveness, though it may result in a great many delightful wish-fulfillments, piles up an equally gigantic Promethean debt which has to be paid off from time to time in the form of hideous catastrophes. . . . Our differentiated consciousness is in continual danger of being uprooted; hence it needs compensation through the still existing state of childhood. (Jung, 1963, p. 82)

In this article Jung (1963) points out that such "compensation" appears to reflect a timid and conversative mode,
but in fact is both a protective and moral stance that seeks to keep the psyche rooted and thus whole:

But inasmuch as man has, in high degree, the capacity for cutting himself off from his own roots, he may also be swept uncritically to catastrophe by his dangerous one-sidedness. The retarding ideal is always more primitive, more natural (in the good sense as in the bad), and more 'moral' in that it keeps faith with law and tradition. The progressive ideal is always more abstract, more unnatural, and less 'moral' in that it demands disloyalty to tradition. . . . The more differentiated consciousness becomes, the greater the danger of severance from the root-condition. (p. 82)

Jung thus gives us a radically different perspective on the meaning of community to the individual from that of Freud. The cultural heritage is not just an inevitable part of the psychological make-up but, essentially, a positive life-giving, fruitful source for the individual, a bearer of the images, patterns and rootedness that are necessary for depth. History and civilization are the sources of powerful psychic energy that is essential for self-realization, creativity, integration, individual expression; not, as in Freud, the necessary but negative forces containing our baser drives. However, as we shall discuss below, his is not an unqualified endorsement of a culture, a status quo; in fact, he writes in an almost contradictory way of the importance of the individual as an active moral agent transcending the limits set by society.

The Individual and the Collective:

The Mythic Perspective

Individuality is, in Jung's view, but one aspect of the self, a tip of the iceberg, which can be given too much
attention. In thus diminishing the importance of individuality in the totality of the human psyche and in giving direction to human history Jung goes against the mainstream of Western thought. He claims that the individual person as one conscious of his/her individuality is a rather recent occurrence in human development and that the psyche is still largely a product of the "primitive" experience which does not differentiate between self and world.

In discussing Jung's analysis of the individual's relation to society, Progoff (1953) observes that Jung departs from the usual psychological approach that understands society as a generalization of the individual by asserting that man's social dimension is inherent in his nature. Thus Jung opposes the liberal idea that society is made up of individuals in a social contract. Rather the psyche must have culture, a position that Jung comes to, Progoff thinks, from the greater influence of sociologists like Durkheim and Burckhardt than that of psychological writers and from his conclusion that the deeper levels of the unconscious are derived from mankind's great communal experiences, not from individual experiences. Progoff concludes that Jung sees individuality as a derivative of society and social experiences as the main source of content for the individual psyche. And since Jung understands the social as "essentially the unconscious, and more particularly the deeper layers of the Collective Unconscious," (p. 163), Progoff thinks we can draw a parallel between consciousness emerging out of the unconscious and
the individual becoming differentiated from society. Jung (1976) makes this parallel in his essay "Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious":

We shall probably get nearest to the truth if we think of the conscious and personal psyche as resting upon the broad basis of an inherited and universal psychic disposition which is as such unconscious, and that our personal psyche bears the same relation to the collective psyche as the individual to society. (p. 93)

On the other hand, Jung continues in the essay as if he were in the mainstream of Western liberalism in his assertions that personality and individuality must continually assert their independence from and superiority over society and over forms of collective thinking. The drive toward personality which has been a major dynamic in history since the flowering of Greek civilization is always threatened by invasion of the collective psyche:

Collective thinking and feeling and collective effort are far less a strain than individual functioning and effort; hence there is always a great temptation to allow collective functioning to take the place of individual differentiation of the personality. (p. 98)

And there is the greater danger, he suggests, that discovery of the collective through the analysis of the unconscious will bring not only an unhealthy fusion of the personal psyche with the collective but also an effort to enforce

... the demands of his unconscious upon others, for identity with the collective psyche always brings with it a feeling of universal validity -- 'godlikeness' -- which completely ignores all differences in the personal psyche of his fellows. (p. 99)

Jung (1976) goes on in this essay to describe the collective or the social in its most destructive potential,
setting up the individual as the source of the moral. In particular, it is the large community or State that disregards the individual and perpetuates mediocrity:

The element of differentiation is the individual. All the highest achievements of virtue, as well as the blackest villainies, are individual. The larger a community is, and the more the sum total of collective factors peculiar to every large community rests on conservative prejudices detrimental to individuality, the more will the individual be morally and spiritually crushed, and, as a result, the one source of moral and spiritual progress for society is choked up. Naturally the only thing that can thrive in such an atmosphere is sociality and whatever is collective in the individual. Everything individual in him goes under, i.e., is doomed to repression. . . . It is a notorious fact that the morality of society as a whole is in inverse ratio to its size; for the greater the aggregation of individuals, the more the individual factors are blotted out, and with them morality, which rests entirely on the moral sense of the individual and the freedom necessary for this. Hence every man is, in a certain sense, unconsciously a worse man when he is in society than when acting alone; for he is carried by society and to that extent relieved of his individual responsibility. (p. 100)

The different statements in which Jung locates morality in the action of the free individual making conscious choices, on the one hand, and in the tradition-bearing community upholding values and laws, on the other hand, are not harmonious. What we see, rather, is the tension in which Jung perceives the dimensions of the psyche, consciousness, and their correspondents, individual and society. Consciousness, and thus personality, is a fragile state. In Man and His Symbols, Jung (1963) speaks of it as still in an "experimental state," "still a doubtful affair," (p. 8) that can be easily disrupted
and overwhelmed. Society and the unconscious care little, if at all, for the individual and even find this differentiation a threat; thus the need to support and sustain the emergence of the personality. Yet to the extent that such self-knowledge and differentiation are dependent on separation and denial of the rootedness in the collective unconscious, the movement toward the individual threatens both the full realization of the self and culture.

If Jung, then, warns our age of the dangers, on the one hand, of the individual slipping back into the collective thought (an easier state) and thus loosing freedom to choose the good, and, on the other hand, of carrying our drive for freedom too far to an individuality that cuts us off from the depths within ourselves and in the past whose traditions carry our common symbols, he is leading us to acknowledge the poles of a dialectic—the individual and the collective—the dangers and powers of each we ignore to our peril. Individuation is the synthesis toward which both self and, we can speculate, culture strive. It is a process of realizing the inter-connectedness of conscious and unconscious. Or as Progoff (1953) defines it, an inter-weaving relationship:

The archetypes of the collective experience, which are the symbols of the society, must be expressed through individuals; on the other hand, individuals must rely on collective material for the basic content of their personalities. This inter-weaving relationship, coming together from opposite directions, is at the heart of the interpretation of the individual in society. (p. 176)
Myth and the Search for Wholeness and Depth

Essential to that integration is finding a new stage of interpretation for the archetypes in each age "in order to connect the life of the past that still exists in us with the life of the present, which treatens to slip from it" (Jung, 1963, p. 76). Myth and dreams are central to making that reinterpretation and finding the connections. That "rootedness" from which modern man is being cut off is more comprehensivey represented for us in mythology, but it is also made known to the individual in dreams.

The relationship of dream to myth is explained by the archetypes which are found in both, for the archetypes are the symbols and motifs that arise autochthonously from patterns in the psyche. Jung's experience with the dreams and revelations of his patients led him to believe that the correspondence of images and motifs was due to an inner source:

... one could almost say that if all the world's traditions were cut off at a single blow, the whole mythology and the whole history of religion would start all over again with the next generation. (Jung, 1976, xiii)

Jung (1976) writes that the collective unconscious "appears to consist of mythological motifs or primordial images, for which reason the myths of all nations are its real exponents." He goes on to assert that "the whole of mythology could be taken as a sort of projection of the collective unconscious" (p. 39). He concludes that we can study the unconscious either through examining mythology or the dreams and fantasies of individuals.
So long as consciousness is in control the possibilities of being in touch with the depth of the psyche and thus with a broader, richer vision of both self and world are greatly reduced. Modern man, by increasing powers of conscious thought and rationality, has made great gains but, Jung (1968) says, "at the price of enormous losses, whose extent we have scarcely begun to estimate" (p. 36). Mythologies originate in times and among peoples that had not developed concentration and intensity of consciousness, and fantasies/visions occur today for people when they are in a "state of reduced intensity of consciousness" so that "hitherto unconscious material streams, as though from opened side-sluices, into the field of consciousness" (Jung, 1963, p. 74). That myth and fairy tale correspond to our dreams and that all have a certain antagonism to reason but also a deep meaning for us is a phenomenon made plausible by Jung's analysis. What we gain by paying attention to expressions of the unconscious as well as of the conscious is, suggests Jaffe (1971), a movement in the direction of "wholeness and a unitary picture of the world" (p. 25).

Kerenyi and Jung (1963) produced several related articles which they published together as Essays on a Science of Mythology. In the opening essay, Kerenyi writes about the impact of science on myth and on our mode of thinking. By providing explanations to us, Kerenyi contends, science seemed to give us something better than immediate experience
itself. And it has given us a truth about our world, a freedom from falsehood we cannot do without. But in the process we have:

... lost our immediate feeling for the great realities of the spirit—and to this world all true myths belong—lost it precisely because of our all-too-willing, helpful, and efficient science. (pp. 1-2)

What we need now is to be able to find a "feeling of intimacy between ourselves and scientific objects" (pp. 1-2), a task which science must help us do. The use of science in the exploration of mythology and the unconscious is a means to that end.

It is, then, in providing a way to discover a foundation, "a way back to primordial times," that myth serves man in the search for authenticity. The journey into myth is, Kerenyi (1963) writes, "a kind of immersion in ourselves that leads to the living germ of our wholeness." Such immersion enables us to see those images that come from the "ground" of our being, "the mid-point about which and from which our whole being organizes itself" (p. 9). From this perspective mythology tells us both what we were and what we still are.

Mythic Archetypes and Developmental Stages

Of particular interest to those concerned with education and child development is an application of Jungian analysis of myths to a description of archetypes that represent a development pattern from childhood to adulthood. This explanation by Henderson, one of a group of co-authors with Jung of *Man and His Symbols*, in his essay in that book, "Ancient
Myths and Modern Man," suggests a rich area for study of mythic stories and motifs that relate to stages of child development.

The hero myths represent, Henderson thinks, the universal pattern of the development of ego-consciousness, of evolutionary stages that are repeated by each individual in the development of personality. Taking as a representative mythology that of the North American Indians, particularly the Winnebago, he discusses the archetypal figures that characterize each stage. First in this sequel is Trickster, usually an animal like Brer Rabbit or Reynard the Fox, "a figure whose physical appetites dominate his behavior; he has the mentality of an infant" (p. 103). Starting at a point of pure gratification of needs and mischievous exploits, he usually shows progress in the direction of physical maturity.

The stage following Trickster is represented by Hare, or the Transformer, an animal form who offers something to human society (e.g., the Hare who gives the Winnebago their important Medicine Rite and is thus a savior as well). Thus, Henderson notes, Hare marks a progress beyond Trickster: "One can see that he is becoming a socialized being, correcting the instinctual and infantile urges found in the Trickster cycle" (p. 105).

The third figure in the sequel is Red Horn, a human with superhuman powers who must prove himself through tests of strength and courage: "With Red Horn we have reached the world of man, though an archaic world, in which the aid of superhuman powers or tutelary gods is needed to ensure man's victory over
the evil forces that beset him" (p. 106). The growth of this archetypal figure is marked by the departure of the hero-god, who is assisted, leaving Red Horn and his companions to face the danger as that which comes from themselves and which they must deal with themselves.

Finally, there are the Twins, representing the two sides of human nature, reflection and action (introvert and extrovert) who are powerful humans that overcome the monsters but are unable to stop when the danger is destroyed and thus threaten with destruction of their own. This hubris requires the death of the hero, bringing about an equilibrium in human nature again, or the liberation of the mature person (the conscious ego) from the necessary excesses of adolescent idealism and from the pull of the unconscious to return to the security of the childhood state.

Essential for that transition and the maintenance of the mature consciousness, in Henderson's interpretation, is the existence of a social group to replace the parent archetype that must be destroyed in the initiation to adulthood. Henderson sees this process operating in the contemporary primitive societies in the initiation rites that take the child from parents into the clan:

But in making this break with the childhood world, the original parent archetype will be injured, and the damage must be made good by a healing process of assimilation into the life of the group. . . . Thus the group fulfills the claims of the injured archetype and becomes a kind of second parent to
which the young are first symbolically sacrificed, only to re-emerge into a new life. (pp. 120-21)

Henderson characterizes the journey of the developing self as going from the sense of completeness of the childhood state that is characterized by unconsciousness or lack of differentiation between self and other, good and evil, through the emerging forms of self-awareness or consciousness that destroy that unity to an adult sense of completeness "achieved through a union of the conscious with the unconscious contents of the mind," the latter represented by symbols of transcendence. There is in this process, Henderson finds, a tension between the opposing forces of liberation and containment, our predicament of "needing freedom and security" (p. 156).

Examining myths from this perspective could give direction to the selection of myths appropriate to particular ages. It appears that myths might be used for moral development stories in a curriculum using the Kohlberg approach to moral education. For instance, the comparison of Trickster stories with the next level Transformer stories could help generate the kinds of questions and dilemmas needed by children moving from pre-conventional to conventional moral reasoning. The value of mythic stories over real-life dilemmas might be that they more readily engage the child's imagination and also fit the kind of moral polarity that characterizes the child's thinking (an argument developed in Chapter II). In
addition, the myth goes straight to the heart of the moral struggle, without the many other concerns that so often distract a child's attention from the central moral dilemma that the real-life story is meant to portray.

From this brief analysis of themes, we see that from a Jungian perspective, myth is one of the keys to our past and present, to the symbols that express the universal and thus, also, that which is most basic in our nature. Myth emerges from the shadow of historical relics to a place of importance in our study of man, his development and his psychic make-up. Through Jung's interpretation we are encouraged to find there a deeper understanding of the human as capable of transcending collective thought and morality but always rooted in the communal and bearer of the values of both a people and all people.

Joseph Campbell

Man, apparently, cannot maintain himself in the universe without belief in some arrangement of the general inheritance of myth. In fact, the fullness of his life would even seem to stand in a direct ratio to the depth and range, not of his rational thought, but of his local mythology. . . . (W)hen-ever men have looked for something solid on which to found their lives, they have chosen, not the facts in which the world abounds, but the myths of an immemorial imagination. (Campbell, 1960, p. 20)

Joseph Campbell has not only collected myths from cultures around the world, but he has also done the important literary work of finding corresponding themes, images, and patterns of the world's mythologies and the philosophical work of seeking the meaning behind the art of myth-making.
and the impact of changes in civilization on forms of consciousness. Thus he gives us not only a rich, detailed picture of the mythic mind but also a way of thinking about that heritage from our own point in history.

The loss of our traditional myths and the demise of the inclination to mythic thinking is variously described by Campbell as both a poverty of Western culture and a necessary condition for going beyond inadequate myths toward the creation of deeper and richer ones. This is perhaps the uniqueness of his perspective, for from the long and broad view gained by his study of myths from all ages and cultures he can see a necessity in the deterioration or transformation of myths that are no longer concordant with knowledge and experience and also the necessity of mythic symbols for human community and creative expression. Campbell refuses to see science as the destroyer of the mythic impulse and consciousness, but rather posits it as the other half of the sphere of knowledge and thus ultimately complementing but not competing with myth, dream, and religion. While man must pursue knowledge in both spheres, it is, Campbell believes, from the probing of the human psyche that the greatest discoveries are to be made and energy and creative power released to allow a new civilization to flower.

Nature and Function of Myth

Campbell (1972) agrees with Jung that myths represent universal impulses and experiences derived from the structure of the psyche, or from the ancient and perpetual condition of
man's being in the world. The three central conditions that drive man toward myth are the recognition of mortality (and the need to transcend it), the realization of the endurance of the social order, and the need to understand the universe and how it relates to man's existence. Because all peoples deal with these conditions there are universals and a common unity in myths, but because their experiences differ (e.g., ways of death and forms of survival) there is differentiation. From his exhaustive study of myths (especially the many volumened, The Masks of God) he draws together the themes and patterns that demonstrate both the unity and diversity of themes and images.

There are, Campbell (1970) suggests, four functions of mythologies. These are:

(a) mystical or metaphysical: "reconciliation of consciousness to the precondition of its own existence," response to the mystery of life,

(b) cosmological: to bring the image of the cosmos in accord with the scientific knowledge of the times,

(c) sociological: "validating and maintaining some specific social order, authorizing its moral code", and

(d) psychological: "shaping individuals to the aims and ideals of their various social groups" (pp. 139-140).

In the course of time with the advances in knowledge and technology the cosmological and sociological dimensions of myth have changed, he concludes. This is because effective
myths must give a current view of the universe and reflect morally and intellectually valid concepts of society and nature. However, the psychological problems, because they are rooted in the biology of the species, have been constant and have controlled the myths and rites to the extent that common strains run through all myths. The sequence of these psychological problems are (a) dependency that comes from the human being born too soon and needing protection for 12-14 years, (b) the necessity of becoming an adult (suddenly in many cultures and over a very long period of time in our society) and taking on a social role, and (c) the preparation for bearing the aging back to nature. It is, Campbell concludes, from the metaphysical and psychological dimensions of mythology that we derive significance for the renewing of our civilization and the recovery of valid symbols. Ancient myths and contemporary art can both serve us in that both speak to the same core of being and depth of human experience.

For those who view myths through these lenses they are not reflections of a passing age but, Campbell (1969) writes, "a permanent spiritual legacy, symbolic of the very structure of the psyche" (p. 130). If we accept that mythological cosmologies do not reflect so much the world of facts but dreams and visions, can these former representations of the macrocosom now be restored as "a universal revelation of the microcosom" (p. 130)? If such microcosmic universals exist they must, Campbell thinks, relate in some mysterious way
to the macrocosm, and thus an universal order not limited to the human experience. In focusing now on the inwardness of the psyche he is not excluding from importance man's relationship to the universe but suspending that task as one for which we are not ready, that we are as yet unable to explore.

The sciences of comparative ethnology, philosophy, philology, history, folklore and art have showed us the rich source of our common heritage and pointed us in the direction of our unity, but it remains for poetry and the arts, Campbell (1949) suggests, to give birth to those symbols necessary for a creative mythology to emerge, a mythology for the planet as one community. We need a transmutation of the whole social order, Campbell contends, so that in all of secular life the image of the universal god-man may be brought to consciousness. Consciousness cannot itself invent or predict this transformation, for it occurs on another level. And the manifestation will be a variety of symbols, but we must learn to see beyond the diversity, "to recognize the lineaments of God in all of the wonderful modulations of the face of man" (p. 390).

Modern Consciousness--The Decline of Mythic Thinking

The loss of mythic consciousness, symbols and rituals has had a negative impact on our civilization. Since 1914, Campbell (1972) writes, there has been:

... an increasing disregard and even disdain for those ritual forms that once brought forth, and up
In *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* he describes our culture as a waste land (frequently referring to Eliot's poem), whose inhabitants lack both outer doctrine and inner depth and thus feel the desperation of being lost in a labyrinth. The high instance of neuroticism in our culture may come from the lack of spiritual aid that myth and rite have always given, "the symbols that carry the human spirit forward, in counteraction to those other constant human fantasies that tend to tie it back" (p. 11). We are fixated in our infancy and lack the inclination, direction to carry us to adulthood. The gods are dead, the bondage to the past is shattered, we have emerged from ancient ignorance, but we are without symbols:

(T)he democratic ideal of the self-determining individual, the invention of the power-driven machine and the development of the scientific method of research, have so transformed human life that the long-inherited, timeless universe of symbols has collapsed. . . . (T)he ancient human heritage of ritual, morality, and art is in full decay. (pp. 387-388)

Without working symbols, Campbell (1972) argues elsewhere, "the individual cracks away, becomes dissociated and disoriented" (p. 88).

However, he does not believe that a shoring-up of the old belief systems is either possible or desirable. In *Myths to Live By*, Campbell argues that the dominant mythology of the West, the biblical mythology embodied in the Hebrew and Christian religions, is totally inadequate both in its
cosmological and sociological functions. Like the North American plains Indians, we are forced to turn inward because our "public religious symbols (have) lost their claim to authority and passed away" (p. 90). Through history, astronomy, biology and all the other intellectual explorations, the claims of Christianity and Judaism, he asserts, have been disqualified. Campbell is strong and unremitting in his denunciation of biblical religion as a dogma; it has been a wrong-headed approach to man's spirituality, insisting on authority, dualism, and historical revelation rather than on spirituality, unity of all life, and psychology. However he would not have modern man disassociate himself from its rites and symbols but only from the dogma and verbal interpretations that the priest and rabbi perpetuate. The drama of the ritual and the magic of the symbols, the affective dimension of each, is what can bring us in touch with the magic and depth of "what is always and forever" (p. 97). It is the dogmatism that divides (peoples from each other and the psyche from its depths) and the mystic experience that unites.

In Campbell's (1972) view the importance of ritual and myth for the person in the modern world is in one respect the same as it has always been and in another respect distinctive to our time. To link the individual to the group and to the cosmos has always been a central function of myth and ritual:

The characteristic effect of mythic themes and motifs translated into ritual, consequently, is
that they link the individual to transindivial purposes and forces. (p. 57)

The ritual procedure takes one out of the self in conduct that is not personal but of the species, of society. This movement beyond self is necessary, he contends, not only for society's cohesion but also for the individual in developing an awareness of his/her humanity. Campbell (1949) contends that group identification has, however, too often in the past required the loss of self, the subordination of personal experience to group role in our history (especially as peoples moved from a hunting to an agricultural society). In recent times, however, society has shifted from an emphasis on the group to a focus on the individual, thus reversing the problem that existed in the stable periods when great mythologies emerged: "Then all meaning was in the group, . . . none in the self-expressive individual; today no meaning is in the group. . . all is in the individual" (p. 388). Instead of community, the individual has become the center of our concern:

In our present day—at least in the leading modern centers of cultural creativity—people have begun to take the existence of their supporting social orders for granted, and instead of aiming to defend and maintain the integrity of the community have begun to place at the center of concern the development and protection of the individual—the individual, moreover, not as an organ of the state but as an end and entity in himself. (Campbell, 1972, p. 24)

Emergence of the Individual

Campbell's perspective on the emergence of modern consciousness, especially the discovery and celebration of the
individual, is a complex one. He writes about our civilization as one endangered by the culmination of one of its great discoveries: the importance of the individual and the focus on man instead of the cosmos. And yet, he finds in this liberation of the individual from a fixed social role and the consequent humanism the potential for a new birth accompanied by mythic symbols that can give awareness of mankind's wholeness.

The individual was first significant in the Greek myths, Campbell (1949) observes, and the titans of the late Middle Ages and Renaissance who defied the authoritarian God and state were indeed heroes who through science and art brought us to contemplate humanitas. He suggests that the heroes needed today are ones who will carry us further in that quest, not in a pursuit of individual liberation from society or from our ground in a common unity but in search of a new consciousness of self as a part of the cosmos.

The tension between the individual understood as the hero who embarks on his quest and charts an unknown way to the deeper experience and the individual as a being incomplete in himself, "locked in the narrowness of the self-centered ego" (1949, p. 19) is maintained in Campbell's writings. The resolution of what often seems a contradiction in his treatment of "the individual" is achieved when it is understood that the goal of the individual quest, the inward journey, is a "transpersonal centeredness" (p. 20). In a dialectical pattern, the hero withdraws from society and its conventions
and makes the journey inward to clarify, eradicate and break through to experiences of the archetypal images, and returns to be reintegrated with the community, bringing spiritual energy, new or renewed symbols. The hero is one who battles past the personal and singular to the generally valid, bringing insight and energy from the source through which society is reborn.

Impact of Science

In his essay, "The Impact of Science on Myth," Campbell (1972) discusses the fact that science has had at least a temporarily destructive impact on myths. But he finds no inherent contradiction between the two modes of knowing represented by each because they are quite distinct in their functions. Our knowledge gained through science and rational thought has led us irrevocably beyond the Occidental world view of a three-storied universe, a personal and authoritarian God, a moral order based on fixed laws. Our particular mythic framework has been shattered, but science does not take over mythic functions, for myth is always concerned with the unknown and unknowable, while science is concerned with what can be known and does not attempt to give the truth of the great mysteries. Campbell separates the knowledge gained from facts (science) from knowledge gained through the imagination or mystical religious experiences or through dreams, for the latter is the knowledge of the psyche, a separate system containing its own order and universals, though one
not unrelated to the physical world. That there is some ultimate unity in the design of the psyche and design of the cosmos he has little doubt, but it is a unity that as yet, and perhaps ultimately, can only be experienced and symbolized as a mystery or the unknown.

In his essay Campbell discusses several influential theories. Frazer and Freud both erred, in his judgment, in viewing mythological thinking as a negative manifestation of consciousness. Frazer believed science would put myth behind us because it is magical, non-rational (like religion). In directing his concern to myth's function in controlling the outward world Frazer ignored its relation to inward life. Freud saw both myth and religion as public dreams manifesting repressions, fears, and delusions. It is Jung who has showed us, Campbell asserts, the positive end that myth and religion serve, one not in competition with the findings and domain of science:

They [myths] are telling us in picture language of powers of the psyche to be recognized and integrated in our lives, powers that have been common to the human spirit forever, and which represent that wisdom of the species by which man has weathered the millennia. Thus they have not been, and can never be, displaced by the findings of science, which related rather to the outside world than to the depths that we enter in sleep. (p. 14)

The rejection of science and reason through some orthodoxy can only impoverish a culture's mythology because there can then be no interplay between the mind's discoveries and the symbols of the civilization. In the modern Western world, a
continuity of growth, an organic flowering, has been due to the "open-hearted and open-minded guest of a few brave men" (p. 57), thus bringing the new and not some "canonized" truth. Campbell closes this essay with a parable that suggests that our scientific and intellectual probing has brought us, temporarily, negative results in terms of the loss of cohesion mentioned above, but that if we can absorb that danger we can go deeper to realize more profound benefits. Thus Campbell goes beyond the pessimism that usually accompanies discussions of the impact of science on myth or religion, rejecting neither but celebrating both, seeing the loss of mythic unity in the modern consciousness as a challenge, not a tragedy.

Mythology and the Development of Creativity

The first function of art is, Campbell (1970) writes in the essay, "Mythological Themes in Creative Literature", the same as the first function of myth, "to transport the mind in experience past the guardians—desire and fear—of the paradisal gate to the tree within of illuminated life" (p. 168). However the artist as hero who fashions living myths cannot simply descend into himself and reflect a private experience but must also be a scholar who can relate inward experience to the present world. Examples for Campbell of the artist as such a hero who can formulate works of the stature of myth are Joyce and Mann:

It is an important characteristic of both James Joyce and Thomas Mann, that, in developing their epic works, they remained attentive equally to the facts and contexts of the outward, and the feeling systems of the
inward, hemispheres of the volume of experiences they were documenting. They were both immensely learned, furthermore, in the scholarship and sciences of their day. And they were able, consequently, to extend and enrich in balanced correlation the outward and the inward ranges of their characters' spheres of experience, progressing in such a way from the purely personal to the larger, collective orders of outward experience and inward sense of import that in their culminating masterworks they achieved actually the status, the majesty, and validity, of contemporary myth. (p. 169)

The inward journey is, then, the means to creative mythology in our day, according to Campbell (1969), but it has as both context and goal the deeper integration of the individual in the community that is accomplished through "some arrangement of the general inheritance of myth" (p. 20), an arrangement informed by the mythic consciousness and symbols from the past but fashioned to incorporate the knowledge of our age.

While it is the poet and artist who will fashion the symbols of creative myths, the crisis we are experiencing of the decay of the old mythologies and the challenge of science must be a concern of education. How, Campbell (1972) asks, is the conscientious teacher to respond who is as concerned with moral as well as intellectual growth when caught between the "supporting myths of our civilization" and "the 'factualized' truths of his science" (p. 11)? The main question now in teaching or bringing up children, Campbell asserts, is, "is there not some point of wisdom beyond the conflicts of illusion and truth by which lives can be put back together again?" (p. 12). The best answer, he suggests, will come from psychology and the study of myths, examining and comparing
until it becomes clear that they are not accounts of history but "universally cherished figures of the mythic imagination that must represent facts of the mind" (p. 12). Finding the unity beyond the divisions of objective truth and subjective experience and their manifestations in dreams, myths, and religion is probably not something that can be realized in the near future. But to take myth seriously, to attend to its structures and symbols, especially in childhood when modes of thought are developing and there is a closer correspondence (the animism and fantasies of the child's imagination), and to see it as a possible key to the mystery of the human psyche and the eventual reintegration of individual with the community, (both local and universal), is something we can be doing.

Northrop Frye

Myth is the structural principle of literature that enters into and gives form to the verbal disciplines where concern is relevant. Man's views of the world he wants to live in, of the world he does not want to live in, of his situation and destiny and heritage, of the world he is trying to make and of the world that resists his efforts, forms in every age a huge mythological structure, and the subjects I have just listed form the main elements of it. (Frye, 1970, p. 18)

The education of the imagination is Northrop Frye's central pedagogical concern. For it is the imagination that makes it possible for persons to do more than adjust to the social mythology of their particular time and place. The imagination is developed from encounters with the arts,
especially literature, which provide those universal images (archetypes) and structures of thought and provide a vision of the world as we want it to be. Thus through the imagination, Frye (1964, 1970) contends, we see a more real, a more universal (though not abstract) and a better human society than the one the prevailing social mythology has created and would have us believe in. The education of the imagination is, then, social and moral development as much as aesthetic, and it is based on the theory that the structures of myth are the essential elements of the imagination.

The focus of Frye's literary criticism is the relationship of literature to mythology. Rejecting historical, biographical, sociological, and new criticism as too limited, Frye (1957) concludes that it is from within the body of literature as a whole that a theory must be found. The emergence of literature from primitive myths offers a key both to the origin of genres and to the abiding similarities in literary forms. He argues that literature reflects neither life as we experience it nor the poet nearly so much as it reflects the "artificial" or constructed world of literature. And the conventional literary patterns derive their form from the patterns of mythology.

Frye establishes a theoretical framework for a curriculum in literature that is based on the study of myths and of certain forms of literature (comedy, romance, tragedy and irony) that express aspects of the mythic vision appropriate
to that stage of development. His concern is not primarily better readers or more sophisticated literature students (i.e., those well-versed in the "best" works), but the liberation of the imagination from an adjustment mythology, the capacity for a vision of a different and better social order.

Having summarized the main ideas from Frye's work that I am here concerned with, I want to look now at how he understands imagination and mythology, how literature is related to mythology, and what the social and educational import of his theory of literary criticism is.

**Imagination**

Frye (1963) defines imagination in the essay, "The Imagination and the Imaginary" as one of two social contexts of the mind: imagination and sense. "Sense" is that attitude of the mind that man adopts in dealing with his environment, the world of nature, to distinguish what is, what exists and what is feasible; it is the basic starting point for the scientist and the psychiatrist (and closely akin to "reason" but less theoretical). The imagination or the creative is a different attitude that creates a vision of what might be, a model of what is desirable but non-existent, and it is employed most by the arts, love, and religion. The imaginative power of the mind has created the city out of nature; through desire it continues to strive to realize the forms it has the potential for, to separate what is wanted from what is not. Imagination is not itself the unlimited vision but, Frye suggests, a perspective between the poles of sense,
which says what is possible, and vision which is uninhibited desire. Some peoples are more controlled by sense, others more by vision. He notes that the Hebrews in response to their oppression developed a soaring vision, in contrast to the Greeks who imposed firm limits on the aspirations of gods and men.

The world of nature was thought for a long time to be identical with the mythologically structured universe, but particularly since the 17th century there has been a process of separating mythological concepts of space and time from the physical events. This process, Frye (1976) suggests, has given back to the imagination the mythic world it once created. Thus through the arts man can once again reformulate the mythic structure and so emancipate and regenerate culture (pp. 114-115).

Again and again Frye returns to the concept of imagination as the power and instinct of the mind to create a world other than the one that is, to fashion from desire on the one hand and sense on the other, the world we want to live in. Thus the works of the imagination have the capacity to promote social progress but do not necessarily do so. In The Educated Imagination, (1964), he makes this limitation clear when he notes that writers may express out-dated or even repressive political notions. The relevance of literature is based on its belonging to the world of imagination, a world constructed not out of the actual world but out of the human passions which are universal and archetypal and expressed through image and stories, not through philosophical debate. Most specifically, the imagination strives to create or
participate in a world where our lost identity is regained, where there is a vision of wholeness or oneness (e.g., the City, the Lost Paradise). These images of wholeness are predominantly images of community.

**Mythology and Literature**

If development of the powers of the imagination and freeing them from the restraints of a particular social mythology is central to Frye's pedagogic concern, the clarification of the function of myth in the history and interpretation of literature is central to his theory of criticism. Frye uses the word "mythology" to refer both to the bodies of specific myths developed early in the life of a people to explain the origin of the world, the activity of the gods, the place of man, and the phenomena of nature and to the ideologies by which people interpret their world today (such as "the American way of life," Marxism).

In all of his writings Frye asserts that literary criticism begins with an understanding of the relation of literature to myth. In *The Educated Imagination* (1964), he defines this relationship:

> (I)n the history of civilization literature follows after a mythology. A myth is a simple and primitive effort of the imagination to identify the human with the nonhuman world, and its most typical result is a story about a god. Later on, mythology begins to merge into literature, and myth then becomes a structural principle of story-telling. (p. 48)

Literature being derived from myth and myth from those common experiences that are shaped by the imagination leads to the
phenomenon of "all themes and characters and stories that you encounter in literature belonging to one big interlocking family" (p. 53). The most essential story, the framework of all literature, Frye concludes, is the story of "how man once lived in a golden age or a garden of Eden or the Hesperides, or a happy island kingdom in the Atlantic, how that world was lost, and how we some day may be able to get it back again" (p. 131). The mythic framework and themes are significant not only in providing historical perspective on the development of literary forms but also in forming the imagination by restoring "the primitive perspective that mythology has" (Frye, 1963, p. 18), essentially the association of the human and natural worlds and a feeling of a lost paradise.

The structure that myth provides for literature has two sources—the natural world and the inward world of dreams or the subconscious. It is through analogy, Frye (1964) writes, that parallels are made between human life and the world of nature:

Myth seizes on the fundamental element of design offered by nature—the cycle, as we have it daily in the sun and yearly in the seasons—and assimilates it to the human cycle of life, death, and (analogy again) rebirth. (p. 110)

But the world as it is, is not as man desires it and thus a dialectic is developed between the world as it is and as it is desired, a hell and a heaven. That second structure is the vision that comes from the desire for something better and it is essentially a product of the inward world.
The search for the origin of the genres or "literary anthropology," which is a search for archetypes, takes us to the preliterary forms such as ritual, myth, and folktale, according to Frye (1963), that inform and structure literature now, not just in its beginnings. Ritual is the origin of narrative, for in ritual we have the conscious effort to bring all human events into harmony with the natural cycle:

All the important recurrences in nature, the day, the phases of the moon, the seasons and solstices of the year, the crises of existence from birth to death get ritual attached to them, and most of the higher religions are equipped with a definitive total body of rituals suggestive, if we may put it so, of the entire range of potentially significant actions in human life. (p. 18)

From these cycles myth "constructs a central narrative around a figure who is partly the sun, partly vegetative fertility and partly a god or archetypal human being" (Frye, 1957, p. 171). The work of Jung and Frazer has caused literary critics to recognize the importance of this myth, but Frye (1957) finds that the application to literature has not been sufficiently comprehensive or systematic to show the significance of the relationship.

If the stuff of rituals is what narrative derives from, the origins of imagery lie in oracular material or epiphanies where a correspondence between human life and the natural world is made. The epiphany originates in the subconscious, the dream world, the source of imagination: "The human cycle of waking and dreaming corresponds closely to the natural cycle of light and darkness, and it is perhaps in this correspondence that all imaginative life begins" (p. 18). He interprets
the work of art as an effort to bring the inner desire and the outward circumstance into some kind of union, creating a vision of the "end of social effort, the innocent world of fulfilled desires, the free human society" (p. 19). This vision is a community, which constitutes the essence of the comic vision. He suggests that comedy and romance are the forms of literature that educate the imagination most appropriately in the younger or pre-adolescent child and that tragedy cannot begin to be understood until into adolescence.

The four basic structures of literature—comedy, tragedy, romance, irony—come from the incorporation of the natural cycle in myth, specifically, from the mythic images of how the human, animal, vegetable, and mineral worlds correspond to the four seasons:

The absorption of the natural cycle into mythology provides myth with two of these structures; the rising movement that we find in myths of spring or the dawn, of birth, marriage and resurrection, and the falling movement in myths of death, metamorphosis or sacrifice. These movements reappear as the structural principles of comedy and tragedy in literature. Again, the dialectic in myth that projects a paradise or heaven above our world and a hell or place of shades below it reappears in literature as the idealized world of pastoral and romance and the absurd, suffering, or frustrated world of irony and satire. (Frye, 1970, p. 31)

This concept of the literary structures being derived from the natural cycles, as well as having the vertical component created by the imagination of a better or worse world (a heaven and a hell) is developed in Anatomy of Criticism (1957). Following is a brief summary of each genre and its mythic basis.
Comedy is the mythos of spring, for its goal is birth or rebirth, a new society forming around the hero at the end. From the confusion and mistaken identities that are part of a society controlled by habit and arbitrary laws, comedy moves through illusion toward reality, a reality that has to do with what ought to be rather than what is. Thus Frye (1957) notes that "civilizations that stress the desirable rather than the real, the religious as opposed to the scientific perspective, think of drama almost entirely in terms of comedy" (p. 208). It is a vision of an "omnipotent personal community beyond an indifferent nature, of innocence and 'the unfallen world,' the archetype of images of symposium, communion, order, friendship and love" (p. 223).

Romance, the mythos of summer, and also of noon and heaven is, like comedy, the quest for the ideal but it focuses more on the hero and the conflicts of his journey. It is best understood in contrast to its opposite, irony, and over against realism. In The Stubborn Structure (1970), Frye develops the poles of romance and irony, represented by heaven and hell, noon and night:

The romantic vision is of the heroic, the pleasurable, the ideal, of that which one feels impelled to identify oneself. The ironic vision is the vision of the anguished, the nauseated, and the absurd. (p. 34)

The romantic vision does not point toward a utopian society but to the festive occasion, the victory or marriage which brings the human community together in an event of rejoicing.
Tragedy is the mythos of fall, of decline and dissolution. The tragic figure is one who has risen to heights (like the sun at noon or the year in full growth), whether it be a human with almost godlike stature or power or a god who is nonetheless vulnerable to fate, and who does not check the use of his/her powers, thus upsetting the laws of nature. Because this balance must right itself the hero is brought to ruin, even if his/her moral intentions were not evil (e.g., Hamlet). This necessity Frye (1957) refers to as "an epiphany of law, of that which is and must be" (p. 235), the law of nature. The disintegrations that belong to tragedy are parallel to the unions and reunions of comedy; in place of births and marriage and feasts, there are deaths, separations and famine. However, the disintegration is not of the same order as that found in irony because there is in tragedy a measure of hope and a sense of the wrong or excess being purged as the laws of nature reestablish themselves at the end.

Irony and satire are, Frye (1957) suggests, the completing of the natural cycle, the mythos of winter. It is essentially a parody of romance, "the application of romantic mythical forms to a more realistic content" (p. 223). The ironic vision, which is dominant in literature today, Frye finds, is of the social hell created by the loss of communication, of commitment, of love and involvement. Through irony and satire the artist tries to give form to the ambiguities of unidealized life, employing an implicit moral
standard but also expressing cynicism about philosophies or norms.

While comedy and romance are the more appropriate forms for children and the way they can come to know the structure of myth, these literary forms are neither childish nor insignificant. Indeed, Frye (1964) argues that our society has a great need for romance, not in order to escape from our problems (as many would suggest) but in order to break out of the limitations of realism and its essential conservatism. Frye (1976) believes that the Christian and Platonic influence on our concept of the function of literature has been to cause us to seek, mistakenly, the value of literature in its correspondence with what reason discovers about the world outside literature, thus pushing literature in the direction of realism. The tradition of romance is, Frye thinks, the pole toward which literature should move because it shows a world that is better than our everyday world, that the imagination can create or discover through the conventions of literature and myth. Tolkien and adult fantasy, Frye (1957) cites as hopeful signs of our turning away from the preoccupation with realism. Myth as a literary design is at an opposite pole of realism. In myth is depicted a fictional world, usually one where the gods and "the imitation of actions are near or at the conceivable limits of desire" (p. 136). Realism, in contrast, attempts to focus on content over structure, portraying the world as it is. In that realism tends to accept society as it is, it has an essential conservatism.
However, Frye (1976) contends, romance tends to put the world of dreams in the place of everyday experience and thus becomes a kind of psychological quest for a better world often related to the unconscious, dealing not with the plausible but with the archetypes of experience. (pp. 53-57)

Comedy and romance, then, are for the child a way of giving shape to the visions of the imagination, of thinking about the world as we want it to be rather than as it is. This imagined world, which is basically a mythic world, is more real, Frye (1964) argues, than many of the illusions of the world we see: "It is the real world, the real form of human society hidden behind the one we see" (p. 151).

Social Function of Myth

In The Critical Path (1971), Frye discusses the social function of myth from a somewhat different perspective, defining two myths that have come to us out of our tradition and the place of each in shaping our consciousness: the myth of concern and the myth of freedom (or congruence).

The myth of concern refers to the way all the elements that identify a culture—belief, language, history, stories—come together through myth to hold society together and to express its major concerns. What is true and what is real is, from the perspective of the myth of concern, socially established. Religious and social conservatism tend to characterize the myth of concern and to influence literature in a similar way: "the influence of social concern on
literature is to make it intensely traditional, repeating the legends and learning which have most to do with that concern" (p. 37). In oral cultures the myth of concern is dominant and its influence in literature is seen in various ways: e.g., the poet is seen as a teacher and spokesman passing on shared beliefs; the greatest danger is seen as the break-down of community (self-isolation is seen as abnormal).

The mental habits that developed with a writing culture modified concern, according to Frye. With it came the "lib­­eral" elements: objectivity, tolerance, respect for individuality, philosophy based on logic and dialectic, continuous prose, loss of a high level of anxiety about community. With these modes of thought, fostered primarily by scientific and philosophic activity, there developed a concern for congruence, for belief based on reason, evidence and repeatable experiments. This concern for congruence Frye calls the "myth of freedom" (p. 130) whose context is the environment of physical nature and thus an alienating environment.

In our culture we experience a tension between these two myths, but it is Frye's contention that we must have both, not either/or. This tension is felt in the conflict over authority, with "concern" pointing to the social establish­­ment and "freedom" to reason and scientific evidence. Positively, what comes from this conflict is "the sense of an imaginative world as forming the wider context of belief, a total potential of myth from which every specific myth of
concern has been crystallized" (p. 131). Thus it is, Frye concludes, that the "imaginative world opens up for us a new dimension of freedom, in which the individual finds himself again, detached but not separated from his community" (p. 131). An aspect of freedom is that it releases the language of concern but cannot supplant it, and much of the vision and energy that concern generates leaks "away through the openings of critical and analytical attitudes" (p. 137). The tension must remain, argues Frye, and, indeed, it is for us a productive one if freedom is informed by a vision from culture:

The only genuine freedom is a freedom of the will which is informed by a vision, and this vision can only come to us through the intellect and the imagination, and through the arts and sciences which embody them. (p. 133)

Myth and Education

Frye's theories about the role of myth in the curriculum range from specific to general, including both structure and content. They are not the subject of any one work and exist more as sketches of a design.

In The Stubborn Structure (1970), Frye states that educational theory has, as its central concern, transforming society, moving it toward an ideal order or a just state. Having discussed theories about the meaning of labor and leisure in the social order, he gives a powerful definition of education:

Education has nothing to do with this vicious circle of labour and idleness: it begins in that moment of genuine leisure in which Adam is neither tilling the ground nor going fishing and leaving the real work to Eve, but remembering his lost Paradise.
Even as late as Milton, articulating the dream of a lost Paradise is still the definition of education. More prosaically, we may say that education is the product of a vision of human society that is more permanent and coherent than actual society. (p. 6, emphasis mine)

Frye goes on then to expand this definition by saying that education is concerned with two worlds: "the world that man lives in and the world he wants to live in" (p. 18). While these two worlds cannot be clearly separated out as the areas of science and of humanities/arts, it is through the latter, literature in particular, that education is directed toward the concern of the world we want, as well as the world we do not want, which concern "forms in every age a huge mythological structure" (p. 18).

Thus Frye establishes his central pedagogical principle, that education is not concerned to prepare children to find their place in some passing form of the social order (the present reality) but to develop their imaginations to be able to envision a better social order, a vision that is expressed in many ways in that "huge mythological structure" embodied in the arts and humanities. A theory of society is, in fact, at the heart of a theory of education:

We cannot discuss educational theory simply in relation to an existing society, for no educational theory is worth anything unless it can be conceived as transforming that society and, at least to some extent, assimilating it to its own pattern. (Frye, 1970, p. 7)

Generally, the education of the child in the schools, as well as in the larger world outside, is primarily in the basic
social mythology, the American way of life, and its purpose is "to create the adjusted, that is, the docile and obedient citizen" (Frye, 1970, p. 20). The concern for society is strong but it may not be profound or well articulated. The education that literature and myth provides should enable the child to discover a deeper, more significant level of concern and give expression to that vision that is within himself, embryonically, and in the tradition, expressed in myth, literature and the other arts. It is only by such a stronger vision that the child will have the power and freedom to conceive of the world in terms other than adjustment to what is. The power to fulfill possibilities and transform the social order is the basis of true freedom and is derived from "the continuing vision of a continuing city" (p. 21).

Central to Frye's concept of how literature should be taught is his theory that "any effective teaching of literature has to recapitulate its history and begin, in early childhood, with myths, folktales and legends" (1963, p. 33). In The Educated Imagination, Frye develops an approach to teaching myths. He suggests that education begin with the most comprehensive and central myth that incorporates the central theme of a lost identity that is still sought. That myth he finds in the Bible. Thus the Bible is the beginning point, the "lowest stratum" for teaching literature: "It should be taught so early and thoroughly that it sinks straight to the bottom of the mind, where everything that comes along
can later settle on it" (p. 110). It is not for its language, religious instruction, or great stories (all of which have validity) but its mythic qualities that Frye sees the Bible as a foundation:

The fact that it's a continuous narrative beginning with the creation and ending with the Last Judgment, and surveying the whole history of mankind, under the symbolic name of Adam and Israel, in between. (p. 111)

The second layer of instruction would be classical mythology which is more fragmentary but has the same imaginative framework. Its special contribution is the myth of the hero "whose mysterious birth, triumph and marriage, death and betrayal and eventual rebirth follow the rhythm of the sun and seasons" (p. 112). It is important, he thinks, that such story themes as Hercules, Theseus, Perseus get into the child's mind early. Following this, instruction should be concerned with an understanding of the basic structure of the main literary forms—comedy, tragedy, romance, and irony. The primary two for younger children are comedy and romance because of their relative simplicity and their idealized conception of human relations and the correspondence between nature and man. These structures are more important, Frye concludes, than the literary quality of the works read. Also at this level it is important for the child to hear stories, and read or hear them purely as stories:

The art of listening to stories is a basic training for the imagination. You don't start arguing with the writer: you accept his postulates, even if he
tells you that the cow jumped over the moon, and you don't react until you've taken in all of what he has to say. (pp. 116-117)

Junior or senior high school is the time to begin a systematic study of mythology, Frye (1970) concludes, learning the archetypes, the cyclical and dialectical structures that are the structures of all literature. Myth provides a diagram of what literature is about, "an imaginative survey of the human situation from the beginning to the end, from the height to the depth, of what is imaginatively conceivable" (p. 102).

Frye (1970) makes a strong argument for literature and the mythology that informs it as an essential part of education in a democracy because of the role it plays in educating the imagination. He contends that "in a modern democracy a citizen participates in society mainly through his imagination" (p. 104). The power to fight against adjustment to the prevailing social mythology comes from knowing the "real" society that exists beyond the "phantasmagoria of current events." The imagination is even more important than the reason in a perverted society, for only the imagination can see "reality as a whole" and provide a better vision to correct the present order (p. 105).

Conclusions

All of these writers contend that man perceives the world in terms of mythology, that our psychic and social worlds
are deeply embedded in mythic concepts and structures. The modern effort to deny the mythic and emphasize the rational has been in error in its one-sidedness. Recognizing the power and function of myth in shaping consciousness, particularly in developing a social vision, is argued, in different ways, by each writer.

Both Jung and Campbell warn that rationalism destroys those moral and spiritual traditions that myths embody and that we lose those traditions to our peril. Jung, to some degree, but Campbell, even more, recognize that we are faced with a contradiction to which we have found no solution. The dissolution of myths has freed individuals from the tyranny of dogma and a closed society, allowing them to discover more about the world through scientific inquiry. But those very achievements have severed us from the mythic heritage that expresses our most fundamental human identity. Campbell offers perhaps the best response, which is to accept the difficulty of this transition and seek ways to revitalize and reconstruct our mythic inheritance, recognizing that temporarily, at least, science and myth will represent different ways of knowing and different kinds of truths.

While Jung emphasizes the psychological wholeness that can come from integration of the mythic inheritance into consciousness, Frye is concerned with the imaginative use of the mythic inheritance for creating new social ideals. Campbell shares both concerns, although with perhaps more
emphasis on the social need for reformulated mythologies. But the concept of the archetypes bridges that gap between individual and cultural concerns, for it represents the idea that the most essential concerns of the individual are also the common concerns of the species. Indeed, the universality of mythic symbols and patterns is the feature that makes mythology a potentially progressive rather than regressive force in our time. The archetypes of myth, freed from dogma (but not necessarily freed from religious content) may be more useful than the structures of reason, these writers suggest, in forming concepts by which different cultures might begin to conceive of common goals, or common images of how to dwell on our planet. Concentration on the personal, on the rational, on realism and on scientific inquiry has led to an imbalance that needs to be corrected by attention to community and imagination.

In various ways these writers contend that humans are profoundly involved in myth and that human society cannot maintain itself without what Campbell calls "some arrangement of the general inheritance of myth" (1970, p. 19). But at the same time they think that it is critical that we get beyond our inadequate myths to the deeper ones available to us. As Frye suggests, education's goal should be to free students from obedience to the prevailing social mythology by helping them know the universal dimensions of mythology.

The educational significance of mythology comes from a consideration of how the symbols and archetypes of myth operate
in our conception of the world—whether they are artifacts from our past that no longer serve our needs and are a retarding element that thwarts the development of rational and moral thought; or whether they enlarge and deepen our perception of reality in ways both personally and culturally beneficial. I have attempted to establish, through the above writers, the significance of the latter option as a basis for contending that myth, broadly understood, is an important element in curriculum theory and development.
CHAPTER II
MYTH AND THE CHILD

Frye leads us to consider the importance of educating the imagination of the child, particularly through attention to how myth conveys the basic framework and images with which the imagination functions. His suggestion that a curriculum for children give a significant place to some of the more important and comprehensive mythologies goes against the modern emphasis on realism and relevance to contemporary life in developing materials for children. This issue leads us to ask one of the questions in the introduction: do children in our age relate to mythic stories and images and do myths fit their cognitive and emotional needs?

Support for the idea that children of our century and of our culture relate to myth comes from several sources and it is these sources I want to examine. Two recent studies, Travers (1978) and Favat (1977), have noted the correspondence between Piaget's (1926, 1928, 1929) early findings about the mythic elements in child thought and Bettelheim's (1976) theories about the child's close connection with fairy tales. Both studies conclude that traditional stories reflect the child's conception of reality and the child's emotional needs more accurately than do realistic stories. Egan (1979)
develops a curriculum theory based on stages of development and in it draws heavily on the ideas about child thought found in the early Piaget works to define his first stage of educational development, the "mythic stage." It is these sources—Piaget, Bettelheim, Egan, Travers—that I examine now to develop the dimensions of the child's mythic consciousness and the implications of these findings for education.

A Cognitive Perspective: Piaget

In three of Piaget's early works—The Language and Thought in the Child (1926), Judgment and Learning in the Child (1928), and The Child's Conception of the World (1929)—there are descriptions of characteristics of child thought that seem to have important implications for curriculum but that have been largely ignored. Flavell notes that in these early works Piaget had not yet explicitly developed the "mathematical and physical model" that was to dominate his work (1963, p. 269). What we have here, rather, are descriptions of the prelogical thought of the child and, particularly in The Child's Conception of the World, descriptions of the mythic qualities of child thought.

In a critique of Piaget's early writings, Flavell (1963) observes that the central concept Piaget was studying in these three early works was child egocentrism and its gradual replacement by socialized thought. That egocentrism is manifested in forms of thinking very similar to those found among "primitive" (Piaget's term) or myth-oriented people, particularly
as Piaget understood that perspective from the anthropological work of Levy-Bruhl. It is not an egocentricism that comes from thinking about the self first or from self-consciousness but from a perception of events that does not distinguish self from the world, the absence of subject-object distinction, the absence of self-consciousness. And it is an egocentrism that comes from the child's attributing his own kind of thought/feelings to animals and inanimate objects. Flavell (1963) notes that in the study of causality in Judgment and Reasoning in the Child, Piaget found that children do not use connectives like "because," "although," "therefore" much because they tend to juxtapose things, not connect them by the logic of cause and effect, seeing causality rather as a psychological event of motive or duty:

Thus the child's questions about the causes of physical events reveal expectations of an answer couched, not in terms of impersonal, physical-causal forces, but in anthropomorphic, quasi-intential terms. (p. 274)

Having examined the form and function of child thought in the two previous works, Piaget turned to an analysis of the content of child thought in The Child's Conception of the World (1929) and there described the kind of egocentric, anthropomorphic ideas, the notions of reality and causality, the child has. He asked children questions designed around three characteristics of "primitive" thought: realism, animism, and artificialism. For realism questions were asked to reveal whether distinctions were being made between the internal and
external world (e.g., "Where is the name of the clouds?"). Animism, that tendency to give life and consciousness to non-human things, was explored with such questions as: "Is the sun alive? Is the bicycle alive? When is it not?" Artificialism is the belief that there is a tie between one's own actions and natural phenomena and is seen in response to questions such as "Where did the sun come from? Why does it shine?" In summarizing his findings concerning these characteristics of the content of child thought between the ages of five and 12, I will focus on two things: what constitutes each concept and how it changes as the child moves from mythic to scientific ways of explaining natural phenomena, or as greater accommodation is made to physical laws.

The significance of these early studies for curriculum development I will discuss below, but two points regarding their value should be made here to help focus our discussion. First, I suggest that the findings of these studies have been overlooked because educators have had so great a concern to foster rational thought and the early acquisition of knowledge that accords with scientific explanations of phenomena. Were we to shift the focus in our culture more toward the value of imagination, creativity, and moral development we would view the mythic content of the child's thought quite differently. Secondly, I suggest that if we recognize the value of making use of the knowledge that the child already has (both as a way of assimilating more knowledge and as a
basis for learning that leads to accommodation of new ideas) then we need to learn to make use of the realism, animism, and artificialism that characterize much of child thought. The following summary of Piaget's discoveries and conclusions about these forms of child thought are from The Child's Conception of the World (1929).

Realism

Piaget's approach is to ask children the kinds of questions he has determined through previous research that children spontaneously ask themselves. The first set of questions seeks to reveal the child's notion of reality, whether the child sees the external world as external the way adults do and can distinguish the self from it and what boundaries the child draws between the external and internal world. Asking children questions about where thoughts come from, how things get their names, the nature and origin of dreams, he found that until about age seven or eight they made no distinction between internal and external, between the sign and the thing; that between ages eight and ten they recognized that the thought, the name, or the dream is somehow separate from the thing in which it manifests itself but is still a material thing located somewhere; and that after age ten or 11 they begin to see a sign or dream as something immaterial or originating in the mind, thus eventually making a clear distinction between internal and external. This characteristic of child thought, the absence of a clear distinction between
internal and external, is called realism (to be distinguished from objectivity) and consists in "ignoring the existence of self and thence regarding one's own perspective as immediately objective and absolute" (p. 34).

Thus the egocentricity of the child is not, Piaget concludes, to be understood as consciousness of self but, to the contrary, unconsciousness of self as distinct from the universe. The child is as conscious of his/her thought as the adult is but does not know its source and thus confuses the physical and psychical. Consequently, many things that come from the mind have a magical appearance to the child and what happens to him, he assumes, happens to everyone. The early years, what Piaget calls the "primitive stage," are when the child thinks his/her own point of view is absolute.

The child thinks the sun follows him, that the clouds follow him. . . . He believes himself the center of the world, whence follow a whole group of finalistic, animistic and quasi-magical conceptions" (p. 127).

A sense of selfhood begins when experience brings contradictions and disillusionments that start the break-up of the primitive consciousness.

In addition to lack of consciousness of self, Piaget discusses realism as the basis of the primitive sense of participation and magical effects. Participation is the belief that two beings or things have a direct influence on each other where there is no discernable cause-effect relationship, such as the belief by the child that his walking causes the sun to
follow him. "Magic" refers to "the use the individual believes he can make of participation to modify reality" (p. 132). Piaget concludes that the child constructs myths and romances or uses animistic and artificialist concepts as a way of trying to explain, when asked, that intuitive sense of connection between things. The sense of participation begins at the point when the child starts to make a differentiation of self and the external world, with the self taking on magical powers and other beings and things being attributed consciousness and life.

Animism

Animism is the belief that many or all objects are living and have a will; this belief is due to the child's tendency not to set limits between the self and the external world: "The primitive property of mind which consists in the complete lack of differentiation between conscious action and mechanical movement" (p. 231). In studying animism in the child, Piaget sought answers to three problem areas: (a) Is consciousness attributed to things and how? (b) What does "life" mean to a child? and (c) Does the child see natural laws as coming from moral or physical necessity?

As regards the question of consciousness, he found that there is a progression from seeing everything active as having consciousness to the limitation of consciousness to animals. (Before ages four or five there is implicit animism, i.e., everything has purpose and conscious activity.) Having not
made a distinction between thought and physical objects, the child cannot realize "that there can be actions unaccompanied by consciousness" (p. 177). Activity is, by its nature, to the child purposeful and conscious—clouds, sun, moon, rivers, fires, bicycles all know and feel, but benches and walls do not. However experience begins to teach the child that bicycles do not move on their own, and so the child restricts consciousness to those things that can move by themselves. Thus wind or the clouds are said to feel things but bicycles do not. Even when children begin to doubt that streams and clouds are alive, they persist in believing the sun and moon to be alive because these bodies have spontaneous and controlled movement. Eventually, usually age 12 or later, the child limits consciousness to animals.

The notion of "life" is closely linked to that of consciousness, having to do with activity and purpose, with the expectation of movement being of great importance. As with consciousness, there is a progression through stages from the notion that all things that move have life to the idea that only those things that cause spontaneous movement or have force are alive. Thus children ages five through nine give these responses:

Is a bicycle alive?—No, when it doesn't go it isn't alive. When it goes it is alive.—Is a mountain alive?—No.—Why not?—Because it doesn't do anything.—Is a tree alive?—No; when it has fruit it's alive. When it hasn't any, it isn't alive. . . . Is a lamp alive?—Yes, it shines.—Is the moon alive?—Yes, it sometimes hides behind the mountains. . . . Are you alive?—Yes.—
Why?—I can walk and I go and play. Is the moon alive?—Yes.—Why?—It guides us at night.—Is the lake alive?—Not always.—Why not?—Sometimes there are waves and sometimes there aren't any. (pp. 199-200)

By age 11 or 12 most children understand life as spontaneous movement on the part of plants and animals.

Another expression of animism in child thought Piaget finds in the attribution of moral necessity to things or events in nature. Asking questions to explore whether children think of nature as "a collection of physical laws" or "a well-regulated society," Piaget found that children think in moral rather than psychological or physical terms and endow "things with consciousness principally in order to explain their obedience to a hierarchy" (p. 224). Children to age eight generally think that everything acts out a necessity to obey a moral law that regulates everything to the greatest good of man. After this age they begin to think of physical determinism in some things such as water, clouds, but the idea remains subservient to the moral law until age 11 or 12. Typical of this view of nature as acting in accord with moral law to serve man is this response:

Can the clouds do what they like?—No, because all they do is to show us the way.... Can it (the sun) stop?—No.—Why not?—Because it has to shine for some time.—Why?—To warm us. (p. 226)

Artificialism

The essence of child artificialism, like primitive artificialism, is "regarding things as the product of human creation, rather than in attributing creating activity to the things themselves" (p. 258). As with realism and animism, Piaget
finds three stages in the child's growth from an artificialist perspective to a view of natural events as explained by physical laws: (a) children ages seven through eight think that humans or divine persons made the sun and moon, (b) children ages nine through ten think the sun and moon are made partly by natural processes and partly by humans or gods, and (c) children ages 11-12 drop human agency as a factor.

Piaget suggests that the artificialist idea comes from feelings of participation; the child makes up myths to explain vague feelings of participation. The young child's basic thought is that the moon gets bigger because we do or is alive because we are alive. For the child the connection is not just an analogy but a matter of causality that is related to a universal plan and order: "The universe is a society of like beings living according to a well-ordered code of rules" (p. 262). The essence of artificialism, as differentiated from animism, is "the tendency to believe that human beings control the creation and conduct of other beings" (p. 263). Piaget suggests that myth comes, for the child, from the need, put to him by others, to be precise.

Piaget notes that some explanations of creation or origin may reflect religious or other adult teachings but that the child assimilates this instruction in his/her own way. One example is the way a child transforms what s/he is taught about clouds to fit it to personal experience: clouds are vapors and vapors are produced by boiling water, thus clouds come
from saucepans. Or on the evaporation of water from the sea to make clouds, a child concludes that clouds are "water that's been heated in the houses, when the windows are open" (p. 302). Children often will repeat the formulas they have learned in school about the origin or nature of a substance, only to then add their own spontaneous explanations that show a more "primitive" or artificial understanding, Piaget suggests.

The essence of artificialism is that of animism, that everything exists for a purpose and that purpose centers around man:

The child behaves as if nature were charged with purpose, as if chance or mechanical necessity did not exists, as if each being tended, by reason of an internal and volitional activity, towards a fixed goal. . . . But this (purposiveness) involves commands and above all commanders, to serve whom is precisely the raison d'être of things. (p. 357)

This need to serve man is an expression of the blending, or lack of distinction between, the physical and moral law, for the moral law assumes there are those who give orders and those who obey and it is humans (the parents being the prototypes) who give the orders.

It is in the second stage of ages seven or eight to nine or ten of artificialistic thinking that the child shifts from a diffuse sense of everything having the kind of relations that exist between himself and parents to a more systematic effort to explain origins, a stage of "mythological artificialism" (p. 371), Piaget calls it, when the answers children
give to questions or origins resemble the myths of origins of primitive peoples. After this stage the child begins to give technical explanations derived from his/her observations and studies of nature and how things work, and thus mythological answers cease, Piaget observes. Physical determinism begins to explain events rather than moral laws, although there remains a sense of imminent artificialism in the idea that nature has a purpose and that sun, moon, were made for man. If the child has been taught a religion, the artificialism will be transferred to God and will remain in explanations of creation of the world, while physical phenomena will be attributed to natural processes.

**Mythic Qualities of Child Thought**

By way of summary of these findings discussed from Piaget's work, I suggest that all of the major characteristics are closely paralleled in myths and provide a basis for saying that the child is a mythic thinker having the following characteristics:

(a) lack of self-consciousness, unaware of self as distinct from the universe and thus not separating external from internal events. Thus many things which come from within like dreams, visions, appear to be magical and the child thinks what happens to him/her happens to everyone;

(b) an intuitive sense of connection between things, the sense of participation, that leads the child to think s/he has magical powers to cause things to happen, such as the
moon moving when s/he does, and that all things which move do so, like himself, out of intentionality;

(c) a belief that everything that moves has consciousness and feelings and that all activity is purposeful. Those things which move do so out of obedience to moral laws and in accord with a divine necessity that all should serve the good of man; and

(d) a belief that humans are the creators and controllers of those things in nature that move, particularly those things that serve man like sun, water, because to serve humans is why those things exist. In the second stage this idea shifts to a more systematic explanation of creation and purpose, attributing divine will and activity to the place and function of all things, but there continues to be a moral, not a physical, necessity that guides all activity.

Favat (1977) reviewed the research that followed up on Piaget's conclusions about the child's animism, artificialism, and realism and found that the general configuration of Piaget's hypotheses is confirmed. Some of these studies suggest what I would think to be true for many American children of this generation, that the ages suggested for the different stages may be too old and that children begin to take physical laws into account earlier than Piaget suggested. The increased exposure to scientific facts and explanations and the decreased exposure to folk or mythic ideas and tales would, I think, force earlier accommodation to the different stages.
What is more significant, however, than the fact that the few studies done to test Piaget's hypotheses support his conclusions, is the fact that this early work of Piaget has been largely ignored. Because Piaget himself was primarily concerned in his subsequent works with how children develop logical thinking, most of his work focused on the structures of thought and their place in the schema of development that leads to formal operations. Most of what has been written about "Piaget in the classroom" has been concerned with how logical thought can be fostered at various stages. Those taking a Piagetian approach to education view the prelogical thought of the child as a problem, a kind of temporary handicap to be overcome and that curricula should be designed to build on those tasks the child can do correctly and to ignore the areas of confused thought that we cannot do much about until the child through accommodation and assimilation moves on to new tasks. It appears that most educators seeking to apply Piaget to curriculum development would say of Piaget's findings concerning the mythic quality of child thought that they reveal a bottle half-empty, what is missing and problematic. I am suggesting that the prelogical thinking described shows a bottle half-full of rich and useable concepts that indicate a different and interesting approach to shaping curriculum materials for the elementary school.
A Curriculum Perspective: Egan

How these findings about the mythic character of child thought can be used in developing an approach to curriculum has been outlined in Egan's *Education Development* (1979). Even though Egan acknowledges an indebtedness to Piaget and Erikson for his stage theory, he does not cite any specific works. It seems obvious, however, that he is quite indebted to Piaget's early writings in formulating his concept of the mythic stage (the first of Egan's four stages). Although other writers have suggested guidelines or rationale for the study of myths in elementary schools (most notably Frye and Steiner), Egan is, to my knowledge, the first to focus on the structures of thinking represented by myth as a form for writing curriculum materials. In order to understand what he means by a "mythic stage" we need to look first at his general theory.

Egan is concerned to develop an educational theory of development rather than try to sketch out the educational implications of developmental theories from other disciplines. He argues that educational research and theory need to move beyond the current domination by psychology in order to deal with questions about thinking and development to the end of attaining information that "yields principles for engaging children in learning, for unit and lesson planning, for curriculum organizing" (p. 6).

He contends that educational development follows stages and that principles for learning are derived from the
characteristic of each stage:

At each stage we make sense of the world and experience in significantly different ways and that these differences require that knowledge be organized differently to be most accessible and educationally effective at each stage. From the defining characteristics of the stages are derived principles for organizing learning and teaching. (p. 7)

Thus we see that, like Piaget, he is concerned with how the child derives meaning from the world, how and what the child can learn, or has available to learn with, at different stages. It is the structures, the categories that frame a child's interest, and not the content, that is the primary concern.

Taking two basic principles of curriculum building—what knowledge the child has access to and what information is relevant to a child's needs—Egan suggests that child-centered advocates have made some incorrect assumptions. They have answered these questions in terms of content and thus assumed the child knows best what is closest at hand and that what is relevant is what the child sees and does in the external, everyday world. Consequently, they build curricula that focuses on the familiar (my home, my school, grocery shopping, etc.) and then expands outward to lesser known places—the "expanding horizons" concept. (pp. 17-18)

The alternative to this approach is, Egan suggests, to see the categories children use at different ages to make sense of stories and games, to look at what they are interested in. The kinds of stories young children are interested in (fairy tales) suggest that they "know best the most profound
human emotions and the bases of morality: love, hate, joy
fear, good, bad" (p. 10). Through their inner worlds chil-
dren have "direct access to the wildest flights of fantasy
... to anything in the world that can be connected with
basic emotions and morality" (p. 11). The inherent struc-
tures that shape a child's interest and ability to learn,
emotions and morality, are not from the environment but a
form of heredity, coming either through the common situation
of being born into a family (Freud) or through the human con-
dition itself (not unlike Jung's collective unconscious).

The Stages

These interests just described are central to Egan's
conception of the first of four stages of education develop-
ment: (a) mythic (ages four/five to nine/ten), (b) romantic
(eight/nine to 14/15), (c) philosophic (14/15 to 19/20), and
(d) ironic (19/20 through adulthood).

The mythic stage. The first stage of educational de-
velopment is termed "mythic" because of the similarity be-
tween the thought of the child and the stories of myth-using
people.¹ There are at least four characteristics of mythic
thinking as derived from myths found in the child:

(a) A need for intellectual security through absolutes
and through significance assigned to all events,

¹Egan, like Piaget, suggests a correspondence between the
developmental progress of Western civilization and the pattern
of a child's intellectual growth, the idea that the child
recapitulates the stages of the culture.
(b) a lack of sense of otherness and thus of history and change; myth provides "the eternally valid charter for things as they are" (p. 12),

(c) a lack of a sense of the world as autonomous and objective, and

(d) stories based on binary opposites.

These features manifest themselves in the child's orientation, Egan says, as a difficulty in finding meaning in ambiguous and complex ideas, as the lack of experience with which to understand change and historical causality, as a tendency to see and interpret the outer world in terms of personal feelings and imaginative inner life, and as a tendency to understand things in terms of basic oppositions such as "big/little, love/hate, security/fear, courage/cowardice, good/bad" (pp. 12-13). Two of the characteristics listed, (b) and (c), are among those Piaget found in the studies discussed above, and (a) is implied in the child's artificialism. The fourth, the need for binary opposites, is the need for a moral law, a hierarchy, that Piaget discussed.

From these characteristics Egan suggests that we can find directions for how to teach children in the mythic stage. Thus the teacher or curriculum writer's job is not to take materials written from an adult perspective and simplify them but to use qualitatively different forms based on the child's grasp of emotional and moral polarities and lack of distinction between the inner and outer as a basis for building connections with the outside world. In this way children
can learn to use the outside world to think with from their own perspectives, with the result, Egan thinks, or modification and growth as their own categories are altered by this interaction:

True learning at this stage must involve their being able to absorb the world to the categories of their own vivid mental life and to dialectically use the world to expand the intellectual categories they have available. The most effective teaching will be that which provides best access to the world, by organizing what is to be known in terms that children can best absorb and use. (pp. 15-16)

Stories provide us with the best clues, Egan suggests, for organization, and the stories that interest children most are fairy tales. The story form itself is essential, he thinks, because it fixes meaning and that is a requirement for children if they are to absorb, not just repeat, knowledge. Thus Egan proposes that most teaching at this stage should make use of the story form, casting countries, events, movements as characters in a drama with beginning, middle, and end. Even science should concentrate on the story of how people make discoveries, not on doing isolated experiments unless the game form can be used, the game being the other form besides story that this age can relate to, according to Egan.

Egan does not give any evidence or theory for his assertion that children learn best from the story form, but if we accept the parallel of child thought with premodern thought (as outlined above with Piaget), we can suggest that for the most of human history the story was used as the vehicle for teaching most important knowledge. The conception
of all life as a part of a purposeful plan to serve man (the artificialist concept) leads one to expect that everything has its story: the story fixes meaning because it explains an event as a segment of life with intentionality, action and consequences. Pushing each answer back to its predecessor with a succession of "why's", the child seeks the whole story, the link between each thing. For the young child it means nothing to say that a rock falls down the hill because a tree fell on it; s/he needs to know why the tree wanted to fall and make the rock roll down. Often adults fail to get the point: the moral necessity that the child expects to lie behind all events. It is the story that explains the moral necessity.

The first question an educator should ask when organizing material for children at this stage is, according to Egan, "What is mythic about this?" (p. 20). The task, then, is to find the "two most powerful and conflicting forces in our topic" (p. 20) and to personify those forces. Instead of being understood as false later on, the student will understand such personifications as metaphors. Successful teaching at this level, Egan argues, requires a repertoire of story plots and ways to put knowledge into these stories.

This mode of learning not only gives children access to knowledge that might otherwise be out of reach conceptually and/or boring, but also develops the imagination through enabling children to connect their rich inner life
with the outer world and create an appetite for more of such wonderful knowledge of the world. Children know about the conflict between survival and destruction, Egan points out, and thus it is more meaningful for them to understand culture as a defense against destruction than to have bits and pieces of information about shelters, clothing and food. Those bits and pieces, which are the subject matter of much of the elementary school social studies curriculum, constitute the essence of what Egan calls "the tyranny of provincial knowledge and experience over so many modern Western children's minds" (p. 24).

The mythic stage is, then, the time for developing confidence that the world can be meaningful, that the outer world can be related to one's inner world. The content of learning should not, according to this perspective, be information about the everyday world but the life and death struggles that myths and fairy tales represent. These and other fictional stories should be central in the curriculum, fostering the development of imagination, of language rich in contrasts, and of a sense of the drama and mystery of existence. The main threat to educational development, in Egan's theory, is a curriculum that suppresses "children's vivid forms of thinking in local detail and trivia." Life is not about "the secure surface of daily routine and local custom" but the great struggles. Thus the first task is "to destroy the tyranny of this local knowledge over children's imaginations by introducing them to knowledge about the world
that is, in its dramatic power and human significance, analogous to their own earlier inner struggles" (pp. 121-122).

I want to describe the next stage in Egan's schema because it shows how mythic thinking is changed by the child's experience and learning, but still retains many mythic themes. The pattern fits the development that Piaget found of the increasing accommodation of thought to physical laws, but a perspective that has not lost all of its mythic features.

**The romantic stage.** The primary characteristic of the shift from the mythic to the romantic stage, as Egan describes it, is seen in the way the child views the world. For now the world is viewed as more than an extension of the self; it is rather a realm distinct from the inner world, filled with strangeness, wonders, and extremes. The opposites within which reality exists are still prominent but now they are conceived in terms of the limits of reality, thus there is a "sudden fascination with the extremes of what exists and what is known" (p. 31). It is an age characterized by The Guinness Book of Records and Ripley's Believe It or Not. At this stage myth is confined to the real world but pushes against its boundaries, Egan suggests.

The student at this stage has two primary tasks: (a) finding a new relationship and connectedness to a now autonomous world in order to deal with its threatening aliveness, and (b) developing a sense of identity. Connection and identity with the world are made at this stage, Egan finds,
not through learning about the familiar but by making romantic associations with the most powerful and transcendent, and often the more remote. Thus it is a time for identifying with heroes, through the transcendent human qualities of courage, honor, faithfulness, creativity. It is this identification which glorifies and gives security to the emerging ego and provides a means of access to knowledge.

Egan emphasizes the desire to explore the limits of reality at this age. Students have a desire to get a feel for different ways of living, to explore the strangeness of other worlds, cultures and times, to get a sense of the scope of things in the universe. The everyday environment is boring and often alienating, Egan thinks, unless the student is exploring some facet of knowledge in infinite detail.

The implications of curriculum development for students at the romantic stage are similar in several ways to those for the mythic stage. The educator should, Egan suggest, avoid the rational, logical, everyday, provincial, "relevant," and look instead for story forms, the polarities, and an unsophisticated approach. More specifically, s/he should look to the unusual or bizarre person in history or literature whose life expresses some great theme (e.g., creativity vs. security) and to whom the student can relate by means of identification with the person's courage, nobility, ingenuity.
We find here echoes of what Frye says about the importance of romance to the development of the imagination, especially for children. Romance, as we recall, expresses the limits of desire, the world at its extremes of good and evil (heaven and hell). From romance the child begins to form a sense of the limits of human aspiration and degradation and the models who embody it, the heroes and villains. Thus, it is significant in forming a moral sense of the world and a vision of the ideal, the world we want rather than the world we presently live in.

The romantic view is, I suggest, what the child retains of the mythic perspective during a time when experience is teaching him/her about the physical laws that supplant the magic and animism of nature and events. The imagination keeps alive those images of the strange, the extreme, the wonderful and the terrifying, the good and evil. It is from this accumulation of symbols and archetypes that the student will draw ideas as s/he begins to develop a philosophy, a vision of a better world. The philosophic stage, the third in Egan's educational schema, will be examined in the next chapter.

A Psychological Perspective: Bettelheim

What Piaget and Egan reveal about the cognitive needs of the child is paralleled by Bettelheim's theories about the psychological needs of the child in The Uses of Enchantment (1976). In the introduction I discussed the idea that in
many respects myth and tale partake of the same characteristics, while maintaining some obvious differences. Given the close relationship between these two kinds of ancient tales, it is not surprising to find that much of what Bettelheim says about children's interest in fairy tales bears a strong resemblance to what Egan writes about the interest in mythic materials. In his study, *Child and Tale*, Favat (1977) refers to the reality of the child described in the early works of Piaget and that in the fairy tales as being essentially the same. Indeed, we can say that although Piaget talks about the correspondence between what he discovered about child thought and the thought of myth-bound people, we could establish most, if not all, the same parallels between child thought and folk/fairy tales. I want to show here that Bettelheim's description of how fairy tales match and serve the child's psychological world complements the picture of the child's view of reality established above and thus gives us a more complete picture of the child's need for and interest in mythic materials, in this case an emotional need that corresponds to and supports a cognitive need.

In *The Uses of Enchantment* (1976), Bettelheim develops the thesis that what children need and want most for their psychological development that can be gained from books

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2Bettelheim dislikes myths and tries to make a sharp distinction; however, his distinction, I suggest, is based more on the religious and potentially dogmatic characteristics of myths than on the kind of reality depicted or the themes involved.
and stories is found in fairy tales. He has found through his clinical experiences that their great interest in these tales is quite sound. They are seeking, unconsciously, the stories that tell them what they most need to know: how to deal with inner conflicts created by social relationships, mainly the family setting, and how to project hope and meaning into their present struggles.

Bettelheim is interested in the structure and form stories provide for the child's thought, particularly the adequacy of the structures to bring unconscious material into consciousness so that the conflicts can be worked through and the imagination expanded and enriched. Contemporary stories, both realism and simplified fantasies, are not able, Bettelheim thinks, to promote the development of imagination that psychological growth requires because these stories are based on false assumptions. They are stories that yield to modern parents' beliefs that we ought to be truthful with children, that too much fantasy will lead to neglect of reality, that the world already has too much that is frightening in it without giants and beasts, and that children's ambivalent feelings about parents should not be encouraged. He argues that such persons miss the purpose of stories and the nature of psychological problems. There is a need to see that fairy tales deal with a truth more important than literalism, the truth of the imagination, that reality threatens fantasy because fantasy is a way of bringing emotions in line with
reality, that tales do not add monsters to the child's thought but give a way to deal with the fierce stuff there anyway, and that it is quite helpful to portray parent-child conflict in stories that bring it to a happy conclusion.

Bettelheim views the child's inner world and development in Freudian categories of certain basic, universal struggles and suggests that the structure the emerging psyche needs is one that allows these conflicts to be expressed and resolved. Fairy tales are expressions of these psychological struggles and offer not only a vicarious way of expressing them but also reassurance that they are okay and can be resolved successfully, even that it is an attractive venture to be engaged in. The structure of the tales matches the structure of the child's mind—a clear polarization of moral and emotional concepts (good/evil, happy/sad, etc.). This polarization is necessary, he argues, for the comprehension of the concepts; complexities and subtleties are understood only much later (also Egan's argument). The child learns morality through identification with the hero and thus learns goodness and its desirability because of the hero's attractiveness or learns to desire success or achievement because of the hero's success and great reward.

Bettelheim contends that the child's thinking is qualitatively different from the adult's to a greater degree than Piaget does. He contends that while Piaget describes the animistic character of child thought, he still often tries
to understand a child's thinking from a rational framework and thus does not see the child's point (p. 119). The child works from the inner world out toward reality; learning to bridge the "immense gap between inner experiences and the real world" (p. 66) is the developmental task. Reasoning is, at this point, still too immature, he thinks, to give form and meaning to the "rapidly expanding collection of often ill-assorted and only partially integrated impressions" (p. 61). Attempts to explain phenomena in objective terms and scientific reasoning about the sun, moon, gravity fail to reach children even though they may be able to give it back verbally. Scientific explanations, Bettelheim thinks, are lonely and isolating images to children whose way of imaging the world is according to the family setting. Some realism can help the emerging rationality, but it is fantasy that gives the form by which the child gains order and meaning out of the inner needs and the demands of reality. He projects a recapitulation theory for the intellectual and emotional pattern of the development of the child's thinking:

What seems desirable for the individual is to repeat in his life span the process involved historically in the genesis of scientific thought. For a long time in his history man used emotional projections—such as gods—born of his immature hopes and anxieties to explain man, his society, and the universe; these explanations gave him a feeling of security. Then slowly, by his own social, scientific, and technological progress, man freed himself of the constant fear for his very existence. . . . From there man's childish projections dissolved and more rational explanations took their place. (p. 51)
Growth toward maturity is facilitated best, Bettelheim thinks, by the development of the imagination. And it is through fantasy that the imagination is fostered. He writes that "the ability to spin fantasies beyond the present is the new achievement which makes all others possible" (p. 125). Because fantasy is the way of projecting hope into the future beyond the disappointments of the present it makes it possible for the child to take on new achievements even though each step in growth is threatening. Without such projections development is arrested. The fairy tales are, Bettelheim thinks, the kind of fantasy that best facilitates this development of the imagination because they use stock characters and "universal symbols that permit the child to choose, select, neglect, and interpret the tale in ways congruent with his state of intellectual and psychological development" (p. 130). The implication of his theory is that the development of an imagination rich enough in images and stories to assist with conflict and growth throughout life is what is most needed in the child's education and that is what fairy tales do best.

Bettelheim gives a rationale for the child's emotional need for mythic images and stories (assuming, as we are here, that fairy tales are derived from myths and express many of the archetypes) that parallels Piaget's and Egan's findings about the child's cognitive needs. The basic assumption is that the child's conception of reality is qualitatively different from the adult's and thus the simplifying of adult
ideas will not produce the kinds of ideas and materials needed by the child. The child relates best to stories in which basic concepts like good/evil, happy/sad are polarized and where events are portrayed not in naturalistic but in personalized terms. It is not to deny the importance of experiences and learning that bring to the child an ever clearer sense of how the physical world operates to say that the child also continues to need expressions of the more "primitive" ideas and emotions that are his/her inheritance. In terms of emotional development, Bettelheim finds that the fairy tales have the great advantage of strengthening the child's imagination and hope through the projection of personal victories over difficult or fearful situations paralleled in the stories.

Patterns in Children's Interests: Travers

The significance of myth/tale materials for curriculum is extended by the theory Robert Travers has developed about the link between interests and stage-related intellectual and emotional needs. Travers brings together Piaget and Bettelheim in his analysis of why fairy tales are of great interest to children.

In the monography, Children's Interests (1978), Travers examines the cognitive basis of interests which he has explored in collaboration with four other educators. He suggests that most studies of interests have been based on the theory that hedonism is the basis of motivation and have thus missed
the major motivation for learning—the need to structure knowledge. His thesis is that interests are tied to cognitive development and thus are best understood for curriculum in terms of developmental theory and the universalities of children's interests rather than individual differences.

Following Piaget's assumption that interests are part of the survival need to know about the physical environment, he suggests that the curriculum becomes important, interesting to the child when it fosters the assimilation of the knowledge the child needs at that point and helps improve the organization of knowledge. Essential to this approach is a recognition that the child grasps knowledge in a different way from the adult and needs a different kind of knowledge, thus that interests are stage-related.

Since in Piaget's findings, cognitive tasks are universal, then interests, according to Traver's theory, are universal because they are motivated by these tasks and follow the pattern of cognitive growth even though cultural characteristics will restrict some more than others. Travers thinks such patterns of interest are evident and characterize human behavior: "there is a permeating picture of an inherent interest pattern that is peculiar to the human species and which becomes the very foundation of the humanness of the human" (p. 30). It is from such universal patterns of interest that the best curriculum can be developed, he thinks, on the assumption that the "growing individual seeks structure, and that the discovery of structure is highly energizing to behavior" (p. 76).
While the emphasis in Piaget is more on the need to understand the physical environment, Travers suggests that the deeper need of the child is understanding his/her social world and the way the social needs help determine an understanding of the physical. For example, the study of flight may be an extension of the wish to fly, a desire to find the magic.

Travers focuses his study of social interest in the elementary school age child on the strong interests in stories. Noting what a number of persons have found concerning the strong interest in fairy tales between ages five and ten, he suggests that the beginning of that interest lies in the need to interact with adults and then focuses on these particular stories because of the simple structure with which the child can identify. However, this does not in itself explain the strong appeal of stories that appear to be so different from other interests that the child shows, such as environmental phenomena, concrete relationships within the family. Following Bettelheim, Travers suggests that the fairy tales reflect the inner world of the child and the way childish conceptions construct reality:

Yet the child probably sees in the fairy tale a deep similarity to the real world because of his childish conception of the world. The fairy story is told through symbols and refers to a world different from that which he knows through his contact with reality; yet it is close enough to his reality that he can understand it. For the first time, the child becomes interested and preoccupied with an ideational world. (pp. 88-89)
Thus he is in agreement with Bettelheim about the importance of fairy tales for helping the child to understand and give form to relationships with others, "a symbolic form of structure for the child's social world" (p. 93).

Travers concludes that there is an impressive "overlap" between the Bettelheim and Piaget concepts of how children gradually evolve an understanding of the physical world and how they ascribe meaning to their social relationships, beginning from the egocentric perspective that does not clearly distinguish between properties of people and those of objects and sees all things as directed to personal needs. For both Bettelheim and Piaget the process of assimilation is essential for learning and growth, Travers notes, and assimilation is dependent on the child's being able to use the intellectual structures s/he has:

The child's intellect places great limitation on the interpretation he can give to his social world. His intense interest in fairy stories results from the fact that they suggest ways of viewing the social world which he can understand at his intellectual level and ways with which he feels empathy at the emotional level. (p. 99)

Not only is the fairy tale an appropriate form for giving structure to the social world for the child's intellect, but it also introduces the child to metaphorical language which will continue to be used as a medium for describing complex family, human relationships into adulthood, Travers thinks. Thus he suggests that while science is the language for comprehending the physical world, metaphor is the language for the social world. (p. 100)
Travers concludes that the search for an understanding of interests that will help in the developing of curriculum should be neither in the subject matter areas (for these are adult forms that do not relate to the cognitive needs of the child) nor in the influence of individual differences which is where Americans want to look because they tend to reject the idea that humans are very much the same. Rather the key to interests can be found in those universal characteristics of the developing intellect as it moves through stages. Through these we should seek what knowledge the child needs and can use to understand the physical and the social world.

My only argument with Travers is that he gives too much attention to the fairy tales as a structure for the social world and too little to the way tale and myth provide structure for relating to the natural world as well. He implies a greater distinction between how the child understands the social and physical worlds than I think is appropriate in the light of what Piaget reveals about the mythic qualities of the child's thinking about the physical world. It is, I suggest, that strong link between the human and physical worlds, that unified picture of a moral universe where all events are connected and purposeful, that makes the tale and myth so powerful for the child. These natural events always mirror the human (or divine) action; fish, tree and wind all participate on one side or the other, assisting or threatening the human venture. As the child learns more about the
laws of nature, s/he must give up this magical view, but the images and the sense of a lost world remain in the imagination. Favat (1977) argues quite plausibly that the reason many children around age ten have a brief but intense renewed interest in the fairy tales they had about stopped reading is that they recognize they are leaving that worldview behind and are reluctant to do so.

Conclusions

An important feature of myth, then, for the child is that it provides an order with which to begin to arrange the many bits and pieces of information about the world. P. Farmer (1977) suggests that myth is essentially about creating order:

... ordering—ordering experience, both in order to make tolerable the immeasurable vastness of the universe that the myth-makers encountered all about them..., and to come to terms with its more intolerable events. That way, taking your cue from the god, you in your own way recreate the world. (p. 181)

Apparently the child's view of the world is quite similar to that in myth and folktale, and thus the child can use these materials to understand his/her experiences, to create order.

The story form is also an important part of the child's need to create order, as Egan suggested above. Higgins (1970) writes that the world of story is closer to the child than the world of science and is important as a means of organizing knowledge:

A story artfully told is perhaps the best model of organizing actions that a child can find amidst the confines of the visible and apprehensible world.
Story offers the child another key to the understanding of the universe. (p. 50)

The importance of the story form for children's learning is one of the interesting insights these writers offer. It suggests that for children, knowledge to be assimilated needs to be about something, connected to a kind of plot that has meaning. While the importance of using existent stories, especially traditional ones, is discussed, Egan also suggests the value of teachers constructing stories out of the information they want to teach, giving it not just drama but also significance by using those mythic characteristics of polarizing good-evil, strong-weak, happy-sad.

The importance of moral categories to the child is seen in the tendency to ascribe moral necessity to the way things operate in the natural and the human world. Gaining a clear sense of good and evil, not moral ambiguities, is important to the child, Bettelheim and Egan argue, as well as learning that one can prevail if on the side of good. This view runs counter to the kind of reasoning that currently influences much of the realistic fiction being written for children, the idea that children need most those stories and characters that show people and events the way they really are—both good and bad, strong and weak, sometimes right and often wrong, not heroes but real people.

Educating children in the stories and images of myths and tales, we can conclude, gives them access to forms of tacit knowledge, as well as to the central ideas and images
of the culture. The world of myth is not a strange and alien world, but a pattern from the most essential experiences that the child intuitively understands. As Frye makes clear, the essential structures and images of myths are drawn from the cycles of nature and the dialectic of day and night in order to establish analogies between the human and natural world. Lacking a clear distinction between the subjective and objective world, children intuitively understand those analogies for they project onto the natural world their own feelings and motivations. Higgins (1970), in writing about fantasy in literature that children read (both traditional and modern), observes that fantasy reflects the child's world in which "the material and the spiritual are so intricately entwined that they are one" (p. 49). This dimension of child thought has been neglected, Higgins notes, because of a negative attitude toward what has been labeled "superstition" and "imagination." But now it needs to be recalled, "psycho-analyzed back into being when its spark is snuffed out" (p. 3).

Such an education also begins to develop the imagination. Myths and tales embody the ideas and images that humans have always used to interpret their reality. The child is a "natural myth-maker," Anderson and Groff (1972, p. 54) claim, and can begin learning, as Framen says above, to "recreate the world." The purpose in educating the imagination, Frye contends, is to liberate the child from an adjustment
mythology by enabling him/her to do that kind of recreation, and it begins with knowing the mythic stories in childhood.

A major contribution of myth-based stories and tales is that they provide the child with a great repository of mythic images and themes at a time when they can be assimilated easily. The child learns to manipulate the symbols and patterns of mythical thought and thus use an important part of his/her cognitive and emotional world that is not evoked by realistic fiction and rational inquiry. The plots, characters and images of mythic stories are the basic "tools" of the artistic, literary, and political imagination which the child needs as much as the tools of grammar and arithmetic.
CHAPTER III

ADOLESCENCE: FINDING A MYTH TO LIVE BY

At the philosophic stage, contentious value issues, ideologies, metaphysical beliefs are properly not just inconvenient incidentals, but rather the central focus of education. (Egan, 1979, p. 78)

In this chapter, I draw again on Egan's curriculum theory, as well as on some of Piaget's conclusions, this time as regards the cognitive needs and abilities of the adolescent. Also I examine Erikson's theories about the psychological tasks and needs of youth. Together these viewpoints suggest that the main motivation or task for adolescents is finding a philosophy, ideology or myth around which to organize learning so that their education serves their primary goal of establishing an identity and finding a meaningful place in a world that itself has meaning. In the final part of the chapter I develop some suggestions for how curriculum can be developed that meets the student's need for myth and ideology.

In this analysis I will use several terms that in this context refer to the same general idea, even though each differs in some significant ways. Thus we need definitions for what is meant by each term, particularly as it relates to myth. **Ideology** is a modern concept that refers to an ideational or belief system of a culture or a sociopolitical
system. An ideology is more abstract than a traditional myth, but it does have something of a story line which interprets those essentials of a meaning system that are found in a myth. An ideology is often called a quasi-myth, performing many functions of myth but not being as comprehensive, detailed, or bound to a people's everyday life as a myth. Instead it is more concerned with economics, historical trends, and social theories. The term philosophy is used here in the sense of "a philosophy of life," rather than as an academic discipline, and thus is similar to myth and ideology in that it represents an attempt to deal with the great metaphysical questions of meaning and purpose. The term story is used for cultural and personal narratives that, like the myth, explain the meaning and direction of a society or an individual, e.g., one's story is one's personal myth. Myth shares with these terms the common idea of a schema that orders and explains existence, or some aspect of it, in a meaningful way.

From the rites of passage or initiation ceremonies of traditional cultures to the recognition of idealism and commitment to causes in Western cultures, adolescence is known to be a time of fixing beliefs, of commitment to the ideals of the community, and of impatience with compromise, but many of the values and attitudes of the modern world work against such a commitment. The youth of modern Western societies are seldom offered a firm, clear myth, a powerful
story about what it means to become an adult. What has been lost in terms of fixed meaning and a strong community has been compensated for, to some degree, by a new freedom to find what one chooses to affirm and by liberation from the community's fixed roles and expectations.

The possibility of being free from having to live out of a particular myth and from being bound to a community is a characteristic of this age celebrated not only in the academic world but, increasingly, in the popular culture. But we are beginning to see, particularly in the youth of the past decade, that the experience of freedom and liberation may often lead not to greater fulfillment but to drift, alienation, or hedonism. In the 1960's there was much said about freeing youth from authority and tradition so that they could use reason to see what is needed in the world and thus bring about social and political change. But we have seen that a recognition of social problems, a rational critique of needed change, has not been sufficient to bring commitment.

The rapid changes brought by technology, the loss of roots in particular communities, the acceptance of cultural pluralism and the ideology of progress are all aspects of modern life that have undercut the basis for commitment to common goals (although these same changes have made possible some new alliances for social and political action and thus are not viewed as negative in all their implications). As Novak (1971) describes it, the absence of a story or myth to
live by is the basis of the alienation of the young:

In a pluralistic culture, in which many stories are simultaneously and powerfully presented to the young, a certain confusion, malaise, and loss of confidence often result. No one story commands allegiance. Action, therefore, lacking a story to give it significance, seems pointless. Why bother to do anything at all? What is worth trying to become? The young often begin to sleep a lot. Not to have a story to live out is to experience nothingness.

(p. 52)

Freedom "from" community norms and authority has meant a liberation from fixed roles but it has not been sufficient in terms of the individual's need for meaning. The synthesis that we now need, I suggest, between the poles of individual freedom and social solidarity is expressed in the phrase, "freedom for," which refers to choosing one's commitment, willing one's participation in community. It is in that sense that I suggest that the adolescent's need for a myth or philosophy for identity and for giving purpose to learning is not a regressive idea.

The Adolescent Need for Ideology: Erikson

In *Identity: Youth and Culture* (1968), Erikson defines the central task of adolescence as the formation of a personal identity, and contends that this cannot take place without affirming some ideology. It is this study of adolescence that is considered in the following discussion.

Adolescence begins with the "crisis" of identity, by which Erikson means the recognition of the task of establishing an identity as the most essential work of that period of
development, and it continues through various events of testing out possibilities until the time of adolescence ends with the attainment of a firm sense of identity. How difficult this process is will depend, in large measure, on the ideologies the culture offers for establishing one's relationship to the culture. In some periods of history some individuals more than others feel alienated from the dominant ideology and develop a negative identity, while others prolong the resolution through a moratorium, an extended time of searching for an acceptable and meaningful self-image. The failure of psychology to take into account the environment, particularly the ideological possibilities the culture has to offer at a particular time in history, is one of Erikson's themes in describing the task of identity-formation.

The culture is, Erikson asserts, one of the two central dimensions of the identity process, the other being the self. Identity is, he writes, "a process 'located' in the core of the individual and yet also in the core of his communal culture" (p. 22). The culture offers the system of meaning that gives purpose, a role, to the individual and thus a direction and focus: in adolescence "the ideological structure of the environment becomes essential for the ego, because without an ideological simplification of the universe the adolescent ego cannot organize experience" (p. 26, emphasis mine). In other words, without some form of myth a young person cannot "find himself."
While the interaction of youth with the ideology of the culture is essential for the individual, it is also important for renewal and even change of the cultural myth. Contrary to Freud's interpretation of the role of culture as necessary but repressive, Erikson suggests an essential, often positive, and somewhat flexible relationship between the individual and the culture: the cultural ideology is the "guardian of identity" (p. 26), but the youth of the society also contribute to the change of the culture and its ideology by supporting those aspects that feel true and rejecting those that do not (see pp. 133-134).

Erikson finds that for the current generation of youth the dominant ideology, technology, is more implicit than explicit but nonetheless a powerful influence on both those youth who affirm it and on those who reject or are rejected by it. Adolescence is easiest now for those youth who are, Erikson writes, "gifted and trained for technological pursuits" (p. 130). The machine age has produced an ideology that many youth identify with, and for these youth it can be an exciting time because the present and the future seem both assured and full of opportunity. These are the youth often overlooked by cultural analysts, Erikson observes, the youth who do not rebel against their parents or the system:

If the majority of young people, therefore, can go along with their parents in a kind of fraternal identification, it is because they jointly leave it to technology and science to carry the burden
of providing a self-perpetuating and self-accelerating way of life. (p. 259)

Erikson suggests that those who are not willing or able to let technology be the primary shaper of life-style and values are, on the one hand, the "new humanists" and, on the other, those from minority and poorer families where there is limited access to the jobs and benefits of the technological age. It is characteristic of revolutionary times, Erikson notes, that the over-privileged and the under-privileged form a bond against the majority (p. 36). The humanistic youth respond to those ideas in the culture that are concerned with an ethic to guide and check what science and technology can do. They identify with those seeking a universal order, a world-wide identity, transcending the group-based identity that cultures have always offered to each generation. Seeing technology as a false or evil ideology, they respond strongly to anti-technology causes and heroes, identifying with "naked heroism anywhere in the world where 'machine' threatens to crush man's will" (p. 37). These youth who do not respond to the implicit ideology of technology and who are unsatisfied by the complex and uncertain goals of contemporary democracy have to search for an explicit ideology, Erikson writes, "some inspiring unification of tradition or anticipated techniques, ideas, and ideals" (p. 130). They need persons and ideas to have faith in, "men and ideas in whose service it would seem worthwhile to prove oneself trustworthy" (pp. 128-129).
While it may be that adults can go beyond ideology, and Erikson thinks that our hope lies in doing just that in the formation of an ethical view of historical reality, youth need to have a belief system, to have "the larger framework settled" which accounts for "the acceptance by youth of mythologies and ideologies predicting the course of the universe or the historical trend" (p. 247, emphasis mine). Erikson thinks that youth do not come to such tasks empty-handed but with a history that started in childhood with the good and evil prototypes from such sources as fairy tales and parental teaching. And they enter upon their first efforts at philosophic thinking in a particular historical context that limits, sometimes severely, the possibilities. In particular, Erikson observes, the historical era limits the real and fictitious people with whom the child can identify. For each generation the task is to "find an identity with its own childhood and with an ideological promise in the perceptible historical process" (p. 258). If what they bring from their own childhood or what their culture offers in terms of economic, ethnic, and religious foundations is weak or inadequate, a positive identity will be more difficult to attain.

Erikson also points out that some forms of delinquency and refusals to "grow up" are a response to the inadequacy of the ideology with which they are asked to identify. The moratorium on establishing an identity that many humanistic youth declare is to be understood largely in these terms;
"they will certainly take their time, and take it with a vengeance, until they are sure whether or not they want any of the identity offered in a conformist world" (p. 26).

Focusing on adolescent development as a process dependent on the ideological potential of society, Erikson establishes a rationale for what I want here to term the need for myth. He suggests that there are basically two ideological responses in our time. One is the acceptance of the "myth of the machine," the belief that civilization will now be carried forward toward a better society for all through the production of more and better goods, the increase of harvests through use of scientific methods, the eventual eradication of disease and finally the end of wars through the elimination of economic ills. The other is the belief in the re-establishment of human primacy over machines, the limitation of technological development so that individual freedom and cultural values can be maintained. The latter being more explicitly ideological, the more mythical, and with ties to our past that technology does not have, it avails itself more of the stories and images of the hero defying the anti-human or evil forces. These two dominant ideologies or myths that Erikson identifies, technology and humanism, may not adequately cover the possibilities but they provide one good starting point for helping students think about the ideologies with which they can identify.

The psychological need in adolescence to embrace an ideology, in our terms here, to find a myth to live by,
corresponds with the developing cognitive skills during this
time. Building theoretical systems and developing a life plan
are the appropriate intellectual tasks of the youth as for­
mal operations are attained, Piaget contends, and Egan ex­
tends that theory to argue that developing a philosophic sys­

tem is the main educational task of the adolescent.

The Importance of Philosophic Thinking:
Piaget and Inhelder

In the concluding chapter of The Growth of Logical Think­
ing: From Childhood to Adolescent (1958) Piaget and Inhelder
write about "Adolescent Thinking," citing the change in role
and thinking as the distinctive events marking adolescence
rather than the onset of puberty. Adolescence, they contend,
is when the young person begins to take up adult roles, seeing
himself as an equal and able to judge adults. The ability to
see oneself in an adult role is a sign of a change in mode of
thinking, i.e., the shift into formal operations. Formal
operations is characterized by the ability to handle abstract
concepts, to think of possibilities, to think beyond the pre­
sent, and to fit these projections into larger designs or
systems: "the adolescent is the individual who begins to
build 'systems' or 'theories,' in the largest sense of the
term" (p. 339). The adult role requires that such a life­
plan be developed, even though crude and subject to change.

It is the adolescent thinking as a philosopher or theo­
retician that Piaget and Inhelder describe. They have observed
that somewhere between the ages of 14 and 19 most youth develop political and social theories, seeking explanations and reforms for world problems, engaging in philosophic speculation, re-examining religious beliefs and seeking a universal system: "adolescence is the metaphysical age par excellence" (p. 340). Even though the concepts or philosophies formed may be oversimplified and unoriginal, their effort enables youth to see and to integrate social values and to assert themselves over against adults in a creative way.

This new ability to form concepts of the possible is the basis of the idealism that is characteristic of adolescence, the writers suggest. At first the power to create a new world seems unlimited and the egocentricity of thought prevents youth from distinguishing their own point of view from that of the people they would like to reform. If the idealism that forms the adolescent's philosophy is naive as a plan for social action, it does serve the individual in beginning to have a life plan, course of action, a set of values to which s/he submits his/her ego. They note that adolescent systems/theories are most often plans for personal action in which the individual sees him/herself as having a significant role in effecting change and achieving goals. Thus by setting a life plan the young person brings emotions into harmony with intellectual framework, consolidating personality and preparing to assume a role in society, not in a passive sense, but as someone new, doing something better or different (p. 350).
The Philosophic as an Educational Stage: Egan

Drawing on Piaget and Erikson, Egan in Educational Development (1979) describes adolescence as a time when the central educational task is to construct, utilize, and test out a philosophical position. It is a time when the guiding interest is in finding general truths, forming schemas into which particular knowledge will fit, developing hierarchies for the organization of information.

At about age 14 or 15 most students enter a new stage in their learning, Egan finds, when they begin to realize that the bits and pieces of the world that have fascinated them—heroes, great events, true but strange facts (of the Ripley's and Guiness Records variety), collectable items—are no longer what is most important to know because now they are beginning to see that there are laws of nature and human nature, systems operating that influence and to some degree determine their own lives. Thus romantic connections dissolve in light of the "growing realization that their proper connection to the world is by means of enormously complicated causal chains and networks" (p. 51). As students begin searching for their place in the scheme of things they seek both knowledge about human psychology, the laws of history, and social forms as well as a context to fit this information into, an ideology like Marxism or liberal progressivism. Learning particulars, a concern and often an obsession at the romantic stage, now seems trivial compared to the search for great
truths, which search, Egan thinks, becomes the motivation for developing abstract intellectual tools.

Egan concludes that it is learning itself, not just physical maturation, that is responsible for the shift in perspective at this new stage and for keeping philosophical inquiry going. Through the accumulation of a sheer amount and variety of information the student becomes aware of the world as a much more complicated place, which recognition, coupled with a new subjective sense of oneself that begins with adolescence, creates the feeling that there needs to be some philosophy to explain the world and give one a purposeful place in it. Whether the student's philosophy is adequately developed depends a lot on the wealth of knowledge the student brings to it, Egan contends.

The learning process at this stage is, Egan argues, a dialectic between the philosophical position and the particular knowledge that continually must be assimilated to it or alter it:

The more knowledge the student acquires, the more likely it is to generate anomalies, and so require revisions in the general scheme, which in turn will require further inquiry, the accumulation of yet more knowledge, which in turn will contain further anomalies, which will lead to increasingly sophisticated general schemes. (p. 39)

The teacher's need is, on the one hand, to help students find knowledge that aids in the development of their schema and, on the other hand, to expose them to more information and ideas that do not fit, i.e., anomalies, so that they must
expand and alter their views and not close themselves within a crude and inadequate ideology.

Students are not motivated to organize knowledge just in order to know about the world but rather they are motivated by the need to find their own place, to know what will influence them, to find meaning for their lives. The educational task at this stage is to recognize and assist the emerging capacity and need for ideologies and metaphysical schemes in order that students may use these to organize their learning. Egan argues the need to recognize this source of interest:

The students are interested in psychology, sociology, literature, religion, women's studies, ethnic studies because they are looking, not for the particulars that interest scholars, but the essences, the regularities, the general order that tells them about the world and their place in it. (p. 63).

The teacher needs, on the one hand, to help students find knowledge that aids development of their schemas, and on the other hand, to help them see anomalies that then require further revisions of their ideas.

On the whole, teachers and curriculum developers will not be comfortable with this approach, Egan thinks, because the notion of encouraging ideological commitment runs counter to most thinking in education today. Humanistic thinking about education has encouraged teachers to think that they should not interfere in any way with students' development of values and beliefs, but, Egan says, such a notion misses the essence of education: "To believe that it is possible to
educate in a value-free way is like believing it is possible to be in love unemotionally" (p. 78). Educators need, Egan thinks, to recognize that intellectual growth for adolescents is directly linked to their need to deal with ideas, values, and beliefs, and to deal with these in the simplistic way that thinking at this stage often requires. The teacher's task is not to show students where their ideas are false but to help them discover the additional knowledge that will keep the dialectic described above going. Egan suggests also that curriculum and teaching need to be prepared to make use of the story form which continues to be important for learning, although in a less recognizable form. What is important for students at this stage is that their philosophical schemes have both a beginning and a projected end, history being a single process toward some goal or resolution. In this sense the story form fixes meaning. In the terms I am using in this study, the student needs a philosophy in the form of an ideology or a myth that imposes order on human events and thus interprets them in a meaningful way.

In Erickson, Piaget and Egan we see the common emphasis on the adolescent's need to find an organizing principle, a system that gives meaning to the larger world of which s/he is now becoming aware. The psychological need for identity and the new intellectual ability to think abstractly and form systems converge at this time on the task of finding a philosophy, a myth to shape one's sense of self and organize
one's learning. But the value of acquiring a myth or ideology beyond meeting certain psychological and intellectual needs of a particular stage of development is less certain. Somewhat cynically, Egan (1979) suggests that it does not matter what schemas students use because if they continue to grow intellectually they will learn that there is no universal pattern, no truth, only little truths that come from careful observations of the external world. The educator, Egan maintains, makes use of the student's drive to find meaning in order to further the student's education. Erikson (1968), on the other hand, sees the need for ideology as something that binds human communities and that is not outgrown, except in the belief that there is some universal truth or way of living in the world that supercedes the limited ideologies of the various cultures.

Frye's argument that education in the great myths is a way of educating the imagination to envision a different and better social order than the present social mythology that calls itself reality suggests that adolescence myth-making can be a way of breaking out of an adjustment mythology. Myth for the adolescent is different from the myth for the child. The primitive kinship of thought has receded and the supernatural events are now understood as metaphors (unless they are part of religious belief). Fairy tales are put aside, although their influence continues at a subconscious level because they are not just about children's problems but the essential human dilemma.
Educational Strategies

A curriculum that focuses on the student's need for myth needs to provide both for the interpretation of myth and the construction of the student's personal myth. There are different ways of learning from the different kinds of myths: the traditional/religious and the modern/ideological. I will discuss ways that each can be approached to meet the kinds of educational, personal needs outlined above, and then look at what it might mean to construct a personal myth or story.

Ancient/Religious Myths

The most common rationale for studying mythology in high schools is that it gives the students a foundation for the study of literature. The emphasis is mostly on Greek and Roman mythology, particularly on those stories and themes that have been most influential in our literary tradition. Sometimes Hebraic mythology is studied indirectly in a course on the Bible as literature. While these studies have their validity, I think that the significance of these myths, along with the Indian, African, Asian which are seldom considered, lies in their philosophic and psychological perspectives, in how they help students envision the possibilities of ways of being in the world. Thus I suggest three other approaches to the study of the ancient/religious myths.

The approach of studying myths and religions suggested by Barbour in *Myths, Models, and Paradigms* (1974) is to find
the model within the myth, those basic components that make of the myth a systematic organization of ideas. A model is, he points out, a symbolic representation, "an imaginative tool for ordering experience, rather than a description of the world" (p. 6). The model is the systematic, structural component of the myth, the abstract form derived from reflection on a myth, and thus the means by which the myth can be critically analyzed and evaluated. Barbour seems to suggest that while the appeal of the myth may depend a lot on the affective qualities of the story, the value of the myth in cognitive and moral terms can be judged by examining the model it provides for ordering reality. Discerning the model also helps one transcend the particularity of the myth and find the commonality of several myths. A single model can be derived from a number of myths, Barbour finds: "models summarize the structural elements of a set of myths" (p. 27).

While models lack the richness and appeal of the myths themselves, they give us a way to talk about the truth and value of myths without having to deal with the issues of whether particular events in the story actually did or could happen (a level beyond which discussion of a myth often never goes). In addition the models give us a way of comparing myths. Seeking the model within the myth allows us to deal with living religious myths as well as ancient or secular myths because it does not require that we deny the unscientific elements of the myth the way demythologizing does, thus
raising questions of literal truth. It leaves the myth intact but gives a means for critiquing and understanding its implications.

Thus by asking what kind of worldview or cosmic framework is embodied in a myth, what kind of identity and personal involvement it offers, what ideal state it envisions and how that can be attained, what ethical patterns and moral norms are defined (Barbour, 1974, pp. 21-21), the value of the myth as a model for human existence can be examined and compared with other models. While these elements of the mythic model are drawn from traditional religious myths, most of them are present also in modern secular philosophies like Marxism and evolutionary naturalism, Barbour observes.

What can be learned through a study of the models embodied in myths are some different ways of being in the world, as well as developing some critical perspective on the kinds of social visions human cultures have created. The effort of man as myth-maker to order and explain the universe, to answer the important questions of meaning and destiny, speaks to the young person's interest in such philosophic issues.

A second approach is to study myths as representations of universal characteristics of the human psyche. As was discussed in Chapter I, the renewed interest in myth in our time has focused largely on the way the ancient stories use the same themes and symbols, which is interpreted to mean
that they depict not the outward world so much as inward reality. Thus the student of myth who looks at the stories comparatively can begin to see not so much a strange conception of the world but a more familiar landscape of the mind. While some aspects of such a study will be beyond the ability of many junior and senior high school students, some initial exploration of the recurring archetypes and symbols could prove both valuable and interesting, particularly as these may be related to their own dreams. The importance of coming to understand and give some expression to one's subjectivity is something that a curriculum for adolescence needs to consider; the study of myth from a Jungian perspective would be one possible approach. Such an approach is based on the idea that, as Campbell suggests, there is, in the whole body of mythology, a philosophia perennis of the human race. Learning to identify and relate one's own experience to some of those universals is what I am talking about here as a way the curriculum can foster self-knowledge and identity.

A third approach is one suggested by Frye in The Educated Imagination (1964) and involves both a study of ancient/religious myths, particularly the Old and New Testaments and Greek and Roman mythology, and our literature, which has evolved out of the myth. What we learn from the myth and literature is a vision of the ideal, Frye contends, a reality created by the imagination. Once we recognize that the society we live in is not some unchanging reality but a
particular social mythology (middle-class, 20th century) that will change, we may also realize that there is another world, one we want to live in, "a vision inside our minds, born and fostered by the imagination, yet real enough for us to try to make the world we see conform to its shape" (p. 151). What Frye is suggesting is that from our myths and our cultural expressions we can begin to construct a vision of the world as it might be and thus have a perspective on the inadequacies of the social mythology we live in—this constitutes the education of the imagination. Such a perspective could come only from a curriculum that placed a strong emphasis on mythology, literature, and cultural history through a number of grades, but it could have interesting political, as well as intellectual, consequences. Those who decry the idealism of envisioning the world as it might be are often those who have most to defend in the status quo, those who want education to be concerned with the real world, i.e., the current social mythology.

Modern/Ideological Myths

The older myths, unless they are part of a living religious tradition that has continually modified them, even when interpreted symbolically, do not reflect the knowledge and experience of recent centuries and thus cannot provide an adequate philosophy for us now. In particular, they leave us without a way to understand economic forces, historical trends, scientific discoveries. Societies, and individuals,
have continued to construct all-encompassing stories and schemas to interpret our new knowledge and experience. These quasi-myths or ideologies serve some mythological functions well, particularly defining the purpose of history, man's role vis-a-vis nature, social patterns and organization, but they often ignore the inner (or spiritual) self and the importance of rituals. Thus a modern ideology may be linked by the individual or the society to a religious myth (e.g., Christian or Buddhist Marxists). There was a time when the central myth of the Old Testament, God's leading His people out of slavery and into the Promised Land, was the basis for the American Dream. Theologian Michael Allen tells of how his grandmother used to intermingle the stories of the Old Testament and the stories of their ancestors settling this country in such a way that he never quite knew where the Bible left off and the American story of his relatives took up.

Developing specific ways to learn about modern myths and how they influence our lives both personally and collectively is not within the scope of this study, but I suggest that any approach needs to recognize that these secular ideologies are another form of man's myth-making and that they are significant to students both as myth and as ties to the communities to which they belong or with which they wish to be identified. While the relative merits and various dimensions of an ideology can be examined intellectually, it is at the
point of a search for identity and for meaning that students are concerned to understand and accept or reject them. Balancing one's approach between the objectivity of scholarship and consideration for the commitment that goes with deeply held beliefs is one of the educator's tasks. Also an approach should consider that for some students who feel alienated from family or lack ties to political/social goals, any system or philosophy will be dismissed as nothing more than propaganda; such alienation and skepticism seems to be manifested in an ever younger population.

There is a concern in our society that the schools teach something about the major ideologies in the world. From the right side of the political spectrum schools are expected to teach young people about communism and its propaganda in order that they may learn to hate it and to teach them the values of capitalism or "the American way" so that they will promote and defend it. From the left or liberal constituency schools are urged to teach young people the major ideologies in order to understand and learn to be critical of the nationalistic ideologies; the implied goal is to get beyond all ideologies and myths to a place where only reason prevails. Thus to develop a curriculum that includes a study of modern ideologies is to become involved in political issues. I do not think that the teacher can or should encourage the student to develop a philosophical position without much regard to its implications for the student in the context of the larger
community, as Egan seems to suggest. A student's philosophy or mythical perspective is an expression of his/her ties to real or potential communities, and it is to this dimension of myth as an activity of constructing a personal myth that I now turn.

**Personal Myths or Stories**

The term "personal myth" can only be understood from a modern perspective and it still is a questionable label because a myth in a true sense of the word belongs to a people, to a community; it is the expression of a collective vision and of the values of a people. Perhaps a better term to use is Novak's "personal story."

Novak (1971) writes about a person's "story" as that which "ties a person's actions together in a sequence . . . (and) unites past and future" (p. 60). One does not invent but discovers his/her story out of his/her personal uniqueness, on the one hand, and, on the other, out of the cultural stories inherited. While one's story ought to allow for realizing one's own potential, it also ought to be "appropriate to the stories of those to whom I am bound by family, friendship, community" (p. 61). These stories are larger than any set of principles and more than any particular situation—they give perspective on both one's past and one's future. As Novak describes it, the story is both one's philosophy and one's ethical system; it is how the person defines his/her own life in relationship to those myths and communities of which s/he is a part.
The modern person, being influenced by more than one myth and, theoretically, having the freedom to accept or reject all or parts of any of these, can rarely immerse him/herself in a single myth. Thus the act of developing one's own narrative, making a story out of those various perspectives that have meaning in one's life becomes crucial. The student today finds it necessary to construct a personal myth, in the sense of a story that pulls together fragments of older myths and the modern ideologies that have personal meaning, although one main myth (often a religious one) will most likely give one's story its basic shape. While that act of construction is difficult and charts an uncertain course through the Scylla of totalitarian ideologies and the Charybdis of meaninglessness, it is a way of making meaningful one's education and of staying in touch with one's roots, as well of taking a stance that is open to new experience and new knowledge. I am, obviously, talking about a story that is continuously in the making, that is, for all its indebtedness to other stories, an act of creation.

What goes into the personal story and how education facilitates this activity are difficult questions. Some students will have some rich resources while others have very few; some will find that their various myths reinforce a common story while others will find conflicting ones. For one student his Jewish faith's myth of suffering and deliverance is reinforced by the family's commitment to political activities and groups that work on behalf of politically oppressed people.
For another student her Southern heritage has created a myth that justifies slavery and unequal racial status that conflicts with her Christian myth of all persons being the same in Christ. A black student is caught between the myth that his grandparents and great-grandparents lived by, that of taking risks for the deliverance of their people, and his parents' belief in the American success story where each gets what s/he can.

The myths of religion, family, region or country, racial or ethnic group all contribute to the student's story but not always in a mutually supportive way. Finding a common theme, or choosing one theme out of several, is necessary for a clear sense of identity. Moral education will help the student weigh the relative merits of a particular viewpoint. Thus if the student from the South attains a fairly mature sense of justice, s/he will reject the Southern racial myth in favor of the religious one. Another way to approach this aspect of constructing one's story is to help the student find other mythic themes that are presently hidden in those traditions and communities to which s/he belongs. For example, there is a pacifist tradition in both Judaism and Christianity, even though it is ignored by the dominant theologies of those religions. By coming to know this tradition the student who rejects war need not be alienated from the whole religious tradition. Another example would be the student from the South who, in an inquiry into the past, finds ancestors who rejected slavery while living in the midst of it. Such a
discovery makes it more possible to maintain both family and regional ties while being a critic of the region's history. Such a discovery also enriches the student's potential story as one who can act on a principle that is rejected by the peer culture.

I am suggesting that helping students find ties to particular myths while also learning to make judgments about the validity and morality of their inherited myths is a more positive way to help them toward identity and a personal philosophy than through attempting to create a critical distance between them and their parochial views. This position is based on the premise of this study that myth, and the communities to which myths link us, are valuable and something we destroy to our peril. Myths need not be static nor accepted authoritatively. They can be an act of creation that we are involved in collectively, and to some degree, individually. It is toward re-mythologizing instead of demythologizing that we can direct the inquiry of students as they are engaged in that central task of finding an identity.

Strickland (1978), writing about developing social studies curricula, discusses the shift in young people's interest in history away from analytic studies of large movements and toward the more personal and immediate concerns. Students are responding much more to the new attention in history to ways of establishing personal ties to the past, finding the stories that link anonymous or ordinary people to their
"roots." This approach to history, writes Strickland, reflects the human need for "the personal, the private, the concrete and, ultimately, the mythic dimensions of the past" (p. 28, emphasis mine). This "Roots phenomenon" is basically a healthy reaction, he thinks, to the abstract, analytical, and anti-parochial character of much history, a reaction that expresses the need for personal meaning and continuity with the past.

This kind of shift from treating the "mythic dimensions of the past" as errors to be corrected by education to a recognition of their potential as a source for education that is personally meaningful is one of the curriculum changes that I would suggest.

Bruner's essay on "Myth and Identity" (1962) underscores my main argument in this chapter about the role of myth in adolescent development and points to the link between myth and community that is the concern of the last chapter. He points out that myth provides a pattern and a set of possibilities that direct the growth and identity of the young person:

One may speak of the corpus of myth as providing a set of possible identities for the individual personality. It would perhaps be more appropriate to say that the mythologically instructed community provides its members with a library of scripts upon which the individual may judge the play of his multiple identities. (p. 36)

However, at this point in history, Bruner observes, our "mythologically instructed community" (Campbell's phrase) is itself fractured and the search for identity often becomes
a lonely, internal affair. He suggests that in the transition from old myths to new ones the inward journey, the "Culte de moi" may be inevitable. The importance of myth for establishing identity is underscored by Bruner. He also points to the importance of the community for providing and validating mythic themes. Identity, he suggests, needs both myth and community, and where these are not available in the society the search goes inward, fostering subjectivity and individualism.

Once again we encounter Frye's theme of the importance of educating the imagination in such a way that it is empowered to think more adequately of a potential world, to create new myths in order to create better ideas about the social order, the human community.
CHAPTER IV
MYTH AND COMMUNITY

I have discussed the importance of myth in a developmental perspective of the education of the young child and the adolescent. One can, at this point, draw different conclusions about what part myth might play in the perspective of the adult. One view would be that the child, like the species, has a need for myth until s/he becomes a mature person able to view the world rationally and empirically. Mythic polarities, animism, stories that explain creation and history, identification with a metaphysical plan--these all serve their developmental purposes and then are shed, like an old skin, to allow the growing mind to attain the mature knowledge that the only truths are those that are empirical and material. This is the conclusion of Egan (1979), for the final stage of development in his schema (the adult perspective) is the ironic stage.

The other conclusion is that the importance of myth continues into adulthood, once again changed in form, but still carrying some of the childhood and adolescent insights, e.g., a sense of good and evil, a connection with the natural world, a vision of an ideal world, a sense of order and destiny, heroic images and metaphysical or archetypal symbols. As
suggested in the first chapter, the mature learner is not necessarily the one who has outgrown the need for myth but may be the one who understands its functions and cognitive value in a deeper way. Mythic thinking, I have tried to show, has not gone away nor does it remain only in the immature or in enclaves that civilization and education have not touched, but is present to us often in hidden or disguised form. Indeed, we often do not see the child's mythic ideas because we tend to look for the emergence of reason, and we do not see the significance of the adolescent's need for myth because we see it as immature idealism.

I want to suggest in this chapter that there is a mythic perspective, a way of viewing reality that is informed by the great human myths as well as by those mythic themes that are part of the psychic contents of people, that needs to inform our curriculum theory. One of the main contributions of this perspective is to direct us toward a reconsideration of the importance of community. As both Jung and Campbell argue, myth always points us away from the individual and back toward the community. What the hero does in the myth defines who the people are; his/her actions are never singular in significance. Myths are the collective consciousness of a people, and when the myths are destroyed the whole fabric of the society is altered, sometimes destroyed. Modern societies that have ceased to place much significance in their religious myths have, nonetheless, ideologies, mythic themes
that provide some of that function of defining the collective character of the people, or of groups within the larger society. Without exploring further what is a complex relationship, the nature of which is much debated (especially in anthropology), we can say that myth and community exist symbiotically and that a curriculum concerned to give attention to the mythic dimension of human thought and development will also need to concern itself with how education relates to community.

Myth and community are terms that refer to a conception of human existence different from the kind of social relations most evident in the Western industrialized societies. Under the influence of the Industrial Revolution and the Enlightenment we have created modes of inquiry and forms of living together that have sought to replace our older dependence on myths and the close bonds of traditional communities. These new forms have addressed well our material needs, our need to find liberation from fixed roles and political control, and our need to discover, invent and know. But as rational inquiry has come to dominate our intellectual life and the needs of an industrial system to shape our social forms we are beginning to discover that by ignoring forms of knowing and of social organization that evolved over the centuries of human history we have created an imbalance in the human psyche and inadequate forms of community. We are in danger of destroying the ecology of social relations that, like the great
swamps and deserts of the world, has proven to be more intricate and essential than we thought. We are discovering that humans need rituals, neighborliness, intimate connection with the sources of their material goods and their work, stories and metaphors of common significance, and a place to call home just as much as they need to read, to express their own ideas, material comforts, the hope of being successful, the experience of liberation, scholarly inquiry, freedom of association, and the chance to go somewhere new and begin again.

In order to understand a "mythic" perspective on community as it relates to education, I want to clarify what "mythic" means by contrasting it with two other perspectives, those derived from rationalism and from technology.

**Mythos, Logos, and Technicism**

I am using the terms *mythos*, *logos*, and *technicism* as a way of distinguishing what I suggest are the main philosophical perspectives operating in our culture. I am taking the terms *logos* and *mythos* from an essay by Underwood, "Myth, Dream, and Contemporary Philosophy" (1970), in which the author develops a helpful perspective on the renewed interest in myth and dream and the role of philosophy in our age. He suggests that the role of myth in relationship to contemporary philosophy is to restore a balance in modern consciousness by bringing to attention aspects of existence and consciousness which have been neglected by a prolonged attention to
reason and logic. Philosophy itself, Underwood claims, was a birth of a new kind of consciousness, the emergence from unconscious participation in the natural and political order as defined by myths to conscious reflection about how we think and exist in the world. This he calls the movement from mythos to logos. While this was a development that contributed positively and significantly to human development for many centuries, it now contributes to an imbalance and narrowness in our philosophy. In the way the ancient world was in the grip of mythos, we are now in the grip of logos, or in Husserl's terms, a "mistaken rationalism," Underwood contends (p. 244). He concludes that the task of philosophy today is to help give birth to a new consciousness that once again puts us in touch with what is common and lifegiving, with the depth and fullness of being:

If the vocation of Greek philosophy can be understood as a movement from mythos to logos, then perhaps we can understand the vocation of contemporary philosophy as a movement from logos to mythos. (pp. 244-45)

Thus myths, dreams, and symbols become for us important signs for the direction of a new philosophy or perspective and for helping us understand better who we are.

Logos, then, represents the position of the rationalists that emphasizes the value of logic over the senses and the emotions, the control humans can have over themselves and their environment through increased knowledge about human nature and physical laws, the priority of the individual over
the collective, a belief in human perfectability. Technicism is both an extension of rationalism and a turning away from it. The great discoveries made through reason and science developed technology and the freedom from the taboos of myth allowed us to use that technology to change radically the forms of our social existence.

The meteoric rise of technology and the organizational forms developed for industry that are now applied throughout the society, e.g., the corporate organization model and the systems approach, threaten to leave not only mythos but also logos behind as archaic perspectives. The philosophical impact of technicism was noted earlier in Erikson's observation that an increasing number of youths are bypassing the need for explicit ideologies because they find in technology a way of being at home in the world that offers both an identity and a new universalism. The argument is made that technology itself is neutral and that it is only human decisions that make of the use of it something helpful or destructive (i.e., that is only an extension of rationalism). But this view tends to disguise the fact that technology not only has a way of creating its own demands but also of fostering ways of thinking about values and goals that perpetuate a need for and dependence on modern technology. The way we relate to nature, to work, and to each other has been profoundly changed by technology; it is, increasingly, creating its own reality and placing not thinkers or priests but technicians in control.
If **logos** represents that development of Greek philosophy that introduced reason and freedom (or individual autonomy) as concepts and that had its major cultural impact beginning with the European Renaissance, then we can contrast it with **technicism**, that way of thinking initiated by the Industrial Revolution that focuses on the application of scientific discoveries and industrial organizational patterns to achieve greater material benefits and more control over society and that is achieving its greatest influence in this century in the West. One sign of **technicism** supplanting **logos** or rationalism is when a society is driven by its capabilities to create those things which reason knows are not needed or in the best interest of human existence, things such as nuclear weapons, baby formula for marketing in impoverished countries, as well as endless gadgets and luxuries. Obviously, it is not just because we know how to make such things that we do it but because they serve the economic or political interests of those with power. But our society accepts these uses of technology in part, at least, because we have come to pride ourselves in our technology more than in our use of reason. Thus as **logos** replaced **mythos**, **technicism** is now replacing **logos**. I am suggesting this pattern of ascendancy at different historical times, but it is important to note that all three continue to exist in our time and to provide alternative ways of viewing what is important and good. Most of us operate, to some extent, out of all three perspectives. Although
we least recognize the mythic, it continues to be a powerful shaping force, both through the unconscious in the Jungian sense and through the unrecognized impact it has had on how we think about the world, particularly in the images and symbols carried in our language.

**Education and Community: An Overview**

Writings about and discussions of community reflect our ambivalence about a social form that seems to be rapidly declining. We seem to be unable to restore community or to live full lives without it; thus we seek cautiously for ideas because we are uncertain about what would constitute meaningful community or for what we can realistically hope. Part of the dilemma is the conflict between developing a sense of community with other positive goals. Keyes (1975) points out that we cherish mobility, privacy and convenience—all of which undermine community. In order to have community, he points out, we must sacrifice some individuality. Those things that foster individual freedom in the sense of pursuing one's own interests, cultural diversity, equality of the sexes, racial integration are often destructive of community because they involve such things as severing ties with a particular place, changing lifestyle, supplanting local with centralized control or guidelines. For example, in regard to schools, the black community has probably lost more in terms of community from integration and busing than most white neighborhoods or towns—a point that is not often discussed. Even so,
South Boston has become the most poignant example of the struggle between the value of community and the value of racial integration. In this instance as with others, like the Kanawha County, West Virginia, controversy over the language in books, most liberal commentaries have failed to recognize the dilemma because they have looked for the values of freedom of speech and integration but failed to see the issue of community.

We need, I suggest, to get beyond the fear of labels like "conservative" and "liberal" in order to examine the impact of social change and to recognize the losses that accompany many of our important gains. The dismantling of traditional social forms may, on the one hand, provide opportunities for liberation but, on the other, it also may leave people more vulnerable to the values and control of a more diffuse but powerful ethic, such as the individualism and consumerism of the American success ideal. To work out of the tension between progressive and traditional values is to work in an uncertain and difficult, but creative, area. To seek images and models of community that can exist without denying cultural diversity, equality for women, racial justice is one of those tasks.

There are several different educational approaches to the relationship between curriculum and community, the main difference being in how "community" is interpreted. In order to distinguish the different concepts I suggest three categories:
community as a geographic unit, community as a created event, and community as a traditional social form. The following brief discussion of each approach is to help clarify the concept of education and community developed below.

What "education and community" means from the geographic perspective is how the school relates to the local political structure, to other institutions, to the adults who live in the city, town, neighborhood, and how the school can extend its services to adults in the area. Education as a life-long event (adult classes) and use of school facilities for shop work, recreation, child-care and public meetings are some major examples. The other side of this approach is finding ways to include more community people in the school instructional program. Artists, business persons, skilled laborers and professionals are invited to teach mini-courses, talk with students about careers, etc. Some plans combine both aspects to gain maximum interaction between the school as place or as institution and people of the area, but the school itself is the place where the events take place. A different approach within this same perspective is to find ways for students to learn from institutions and persons in the community, leaving the school building for a small or large part of their school day (e.g., Philadelphia's "Schools Without Walls"). In all of these plans the concern is to make education more a part of the total life of an area, integrating life and learning, child and adult, school and community.
A very different concept of community, what I will call the "created" community, often referred to as "a sense of community," refers to that feeling of belonging that can be developed among any group of people who share something meaningful or that develops within a person because of a network of significant relationships. The school itself can become such a place of community, some suggest, by the way it plans the curriculum, establishes policies and sets goals. Activities to bring students close to each other and to teachers, shared decision-making about rules and courses of study activities beyond the school building and inclusion of parents and other adults in the life of the school are all a part of making a school a community. Kohlberg's work to create a "just community" in a high school by a plan to develop shared decision-making in policies and their enforcement is one example of an effort to make the school an experience of community.

Historically, communities have been both specific geographic areas and groups to which the members felt a strong sense of belonging. It is a measure of the degree of social change in our times that so many people seek community, asking if where I live is also where I belong or how I can be connected to the people with whom I live and work. The third approach to education and community is what I call the traditional concept. It focuses on ways that students can learn from adults the way children did when the town was a community.
Tyler (1975) points out that young people used to learn adult roles, jobs, character development, moral principles and the economic and political structure of society just by the regular activities of life in a community. Now that they are cut off from so many of these immediate contacts and experiences the school needs to find ways to re-institute these kinds of educative activities by planning student participation in adult work and activities outside the school. While this idea is similar in several respects to those programs mentioned above of letting students learn from places of work in the town or city, it differs in that its primary concern is that students learn values and a way of relating in ways that community has traditionally performed that function.

I share with all the varied efforts to link education with community a concern over how much schools have become isolated and isolating institutions, segregating school age children from adults, from the work place, and from the life of the town. And I think that all of these efforts in some way have the potential to help restore a child's belonging to meaningful groups. But the efforts to increase contact between students and the people who live in their area will not establish the kind of ties and sense of belonging that are needed because that "community" out there is rapidly ceasing to be community and has less to offer once the interaction is established than we would hope. The creation of communities within schools is very difficult both logistically
and philosophically, but where it can be done it will be an important experience that will, temporarily at least, overcome much of the isolation and alienation that students and teachers and parents experience with regard to school. There is, however, a serious limitation to the school's potential to be a place of community, as Oliver (1976) points out below, and that is its lack of a diversity of ages that is one of the essentials of a community, in the traditional sense. Community in its traditional form is most significant, I suggest, for meeting human needs. I want to discuss one approach to education and community that develops this concept of community.

**Education and Community: The Theory of D. Oliver**

I have focused on Oliver's *Education and Community* (1976) because his analysis is related to the function of myth in education, although this link is more implicit than explicit in this work. However he does comment on the importance of myth in another work that will be considered later. What is important is that his theory of education and community gives us insight into curriculum questions from the perspective of myth and community.

Oliver locates his analysis of community and education in the context of a choice between two conflicting theories of society: the corporate organization theory and the community theory. These ideologies correspond to two of the perspectives described above, corporate organization being a technic model and community a mythic model. Although Oliver
does not often use the term "myth" in *Education and Community*, he describes community as a form that has evolved out of and is still expressive of primitive or premodern social forms, as a people bound together not only by place and economics but by belief and ritual as well. Thus, from Oliver's analysis, when we consider community as a value to be concerned with in education we are not talking about how to change the patterns within school walls or how to spend more time in the town or city, but how to educate children to see society differently and to seek certain values or activities by relating to places of genuine (or traditional) community beyond the school.

His educational recommendations, like his theory of social forms, expresses a fundamental argument with our present social order and with much of the thinking about how education should help students relate to their communities. While those who point to the great social changes as evidence of how much catch-up work the school has to do in order to adapt itself and help students adapt to the new order, Oliver argues that the new social structures are the problem and that the task of educators is to help students gain a different perspective both in their studies and in their experiences.

The corporate organization theory, an expression of utilitarian perfectionism, now dominates the thinking of social planners in Western countries, Oliver argues, primarily because the technical order has replaced the moral order in our
culture. Even though the social planning that is based on this ideal has a concern to see that the material needs of all persons are met, this is an inadequate and finally de­structive system, Oliver believes, because it replaces the rituals that express meaning from a moral order with material gains and thus strips away those patterns of living that in the past gave life significance. He interprets this ideology as resting on several beliefs: material well-being is society's prime goal; man is not only at the center of things but also can, through technology, separate himself from many of his dependencies on the natural world; through reason and science man is perfecting not only the environment but also his own nature (progress); personal freedom includes liberation from previous cultural patterns that bound individuals to groups. Indeed, utilitarian perfectionism has linked its view of man to a belief in the "necessity of rapid technological growth" (p. 33) with the consequence that technology and the corporate model now provide the patterns that man must fit into. This is a social theory, Oliver concludes, that fails to understand human nature and thus cannot sustain the quality of life that humans are capable of, even though it can, through meeting physical needs and providing tem­porary solutions, keep a society going.

Some of the consequences of the dominance of the corporate­technological model in our society are, Oliver argues, a great deal of social stress, alienation, loss of such tendencies as cooperation, play, generosity, feeling of purpose, as well
as the institutionalization of the young, old, and abnormal. To meet these new conditions our society has created the "helping professions" which operate on the assumption that by rational planning, research, and better systems these human needs can be met by institutions or professional services.

Oliver's argument is that Western culture has developed a social form and a symbol of man that are expressions of social, economic and symbolic development of the past few centuries but that ignore the more significant social patterns that were developed over a much longer period of time. The idea that we could make radical changes in forms of work and patterns of living together and make human changes to fit the new social forms has been an erroneous one. No amount of refinement, he contends, can correct the weaknesses of the corporate organization model.

His choice of the community model over the corporate organization model is an ideological one based on the following assumptions: humans are not perfectible and thus their differences are not a basis for segregation from the group to which they belong; human society is intricately bound to the natural environment and thus exploiting nature destroys a vital relationship; humans have a complex set of social and biological needs that can best be met by belonging to a "band" or group with a common set of practices and beliefs. For their development children need a range of people and
experiences that the current primary social groups—nuclear family, school, and corporation—do not provide.

The two key factors in Oliver's concept of community seem to be diversity and parochialism. A community must be, to some degree, an in group that shares, in addition to a common space, a history, experience, set of beliefs and myths. But it must also have diversity in ages, types of personalities, education, and income. He finds the nuclear family too limited in range of persons (as compared with the extended family), the school too limited in age range, and the corporate organization having neither the common beliefs and rituals nor the age/personality diversity to be places of community. For characteristics of community he looks to our evolutionary past where living in bands was understood as a basic, primitive social need and from these he derives the following characteristics of community:

--commitment to care for all humans born into the group, the aged, sick, and poor
--absence of control by a centralized elite
--attachments, work, celebrations, decisions woven together by symbol, ritual, and religion
--nuclear family less critical; extended family gives greater range of adults to relate to early in life
--sense of home, place one will always be sheltered and accepted
--variety of human differences accepted or tolerated. (pp. 23-24)

The community is unified not just by shared beliefs in the sense of ideas, myths, or religion but also by the ties of a common experience that reaches back into time, the
connections of kinship, territory, and history. It is that connectedness to a number of elements in life that once were taken for granted that civilization now threatens. The evolutionist's concern, Oliver says, is not to return to primitive life or abandon civilization but to try to restore a balance between our older and our present social form.

Oliver does not believe that public schools can be themselves communities because they are required to minimize difference and be accepting of pluralism (which tends to reinforce relativism rather than belief), and because of the dominant utilitarian philosophy that requires preparing children for life in a business-oriented society. This kind of emphasis tends to draw children away from parochial beliefs and the specialness of their families, religions, and ethnic identities. Because the corporation does not need or value diversity of skills and originality and uses a singular, linear measure for competency, the schools are expected either to prepare people to take a place in the organization or to be a member of a helping profession to work in or through institutions to care for those who, because of age or being different, do not fit into the system. Traditionally, the main reason for schooling was to transmit a common culture, but in the absence of such a common life, Oliver contends that the goal has been reduced to promoting instrumental self-interest or obedience to authority. As schools have lost touch with the "common life of communities" there has been
a decrease in the variety of kinds of schools. Even alternative schools which have sought a different model have often failed, Oliver suggests, in large part because they have lacked myths to give common meaning to life.

Within existing school settings there are, however, at least two approaches that Oliver outlines that educators can take toward shifting the emphasis from utilitarian philosophy and the dominance of corporate life structures in the direction of an evolutionary perspective and recovering community. One is to seek out and teach from a different ideological perspective, particularly the evolutionary perspective, so that in history, biology, and other areas, a different emphasis and different questions are dealt with. This would mean not attempting the almost impossible job of changing the institution but revising the curriculum one is responsible for: "Revising curricular content so as to stop glorifying the utilitarian perfectionist view of nature, man and society; and creating a new view of how man might inhabit this planet" (p. 49). The other approach is to find different kinds of learning activities and to help make administrative/bureaucratic changes that stand in the way of doing them. Oliver envisions such activities as working with neighborly places that have the potential for community: parent-run day care centers, food co-ops, church-sponsored community programs.

What Oliver suggests for education at first seems minimal. However, his first option is, I think, more powerful
than it may appear. Decisions about the way we design and
teach social studies, the goals and materials we choose for
reading, the way we teach and use science vis-a-vis nature
and the environment are curricular choices of real signifi-
cance. Extending this analysis we see other ways that the
practices in schools could be altered to support the value
of community: not minimizing but supporting the diversity in
the student's interests and beliefs; not attempting to sep-
arate the students from their community ties and traditions
by creating intellectual disdain for regional, ethnic, or
religious values unless there are moral issues involved;
career counseling that does not focus narrowly on the stu-
dent's interests but includes the community's needs; class-
room practices that foster cooperation, and school policies
that allow parents and relatives to have a more significant
relationship to the school. These suggestions by themselves
are not adequate as moral guidelines. Considerations of com-
munity always need to be made along with attention to meaning
and moral vision.

In summary, Oliver contends that in replacing the moral
order with the technical order in our society, schools have
increasingly shifted from education in a common culture that
is tied to our past, to a concern to educate children for a
business-oriented life. Concern for instrumental self-interest
and obedience, values compatible with the corporate organi-
zation, now dominates. To restore a balance in our culture
between the need for parochialism, shared beliefs, the ties of symbol and ritual, shared histories, on the one hand, and the demands and benefits of technology on the other, is what Oliver is advocating. His argument that human consciousness and social forms are evolutionary products that we cannot alter quickly without great peril is quite similar to Jung's contention that modern consciousness is but the tip of an iceberg that reaches deep into a common past that we must not ignore. Community, like myth, is an ancient form that tells us much about our humanity that we tend to ignore in an age of reason and technology.

Oliver speaks of the importance of myth to education more directly in an article with Bane (1976) about the problems they experienced in efforts to do moral education through the rational inquiry approach. Their conclusion is that structured discussions or rational responses to moral dilemmas become "another schoolroom game" that students do not relate to personally. It is, they suggest, the "nonrational moral sensitivities" (p. 349) of the students that the curriculum needs to be dealing with, including the dark and tragic side of human nature:

Perhaps a sensitivity to paradox and tragedy in human nature is a far more powerful force in the expression of man's inherent humanity than the use of reasoning strategies in the development of flexible moral principles. (p. 349)

Those virtues of principled reasoning and impartiality in judgment are not what are needed most for creating a moral community, Oliver and Bane conclude. Rather the curriculum
of moral education needs to be directed toward, on the one hand, a better understanding of and greater sensitivity to the tragic dimension of human weakness, and, on the other hand, to seeking a way to create or recover myth:

We somehow need to create myths and celebrations by which we can project the common joys, sorrows, and compassions that we share simply by the fact that we are human. (p. 360)

For this task they suggest that educators work with theologians and others to find "a kind of powerful metaphor with which our Christian heritage once provided us" (p. 360). They suggest that one of the ways such a curriculum can be developed is through finding new ways to teach the humanities, getting away from the organization imposed by academic disciplines and including movies and television, along with art and literature, to try to understand a deeper and broader range of human experiences. Young people need not so much to discuss decisions about events in the world, they argue, as the "opportunity to project themselves in rich hypothetical worlds created by their own imaginations or those of dramatists" (p. 368, emphasis mine).

This analysis suggests that to educate by relying on reason to the exclusion of the mythic is often to fail to engage students personally and imaginatively at a level where significant understanding can take place. It also points to the significance of myth, along with ritual, as the way we have of focusing on our common life, of drawing us into community.
Community: The Need for a New Myth

Oliver and Bane's proposal that educators join with theologians to find a powerful metaphor by which we can reconceptualize our way of being together in the world is one that has much promise. Gibson Winter, a theologian has provided us with just such a critique of our dominant metaphor and its destructive impact on community. However, because I find that Winter's suggested new metaphor, the work of art, to be problematic, I want to discuss here only his analysis of the problem.

In a paper presented to educators, Winter (1979) focuses on the centrality of symbols in human society and the impact of the mechanistic model on the West, particularly the degree to which it has fostered individualism over community. It is Winter's view that people always live according to a symbol system that is interpreted through myth, story, forms of work, etc. and that our efforts to make needed social changes should involve re-interpretation of our symbols and finding new metaphors to represent our life together. Our need in Western culture is to shift away from the mechanical metaphors that emerged with the Enlightenment because they have led us to an individualism and privatism that do not serve us well. However, at the time the mechanistic metaphor was introduced it offered, Winter observes, a way to liberate thought from the authority of state and church and from the idea that decay always followed growth according to the organic metaphor.
Winter (1979) points out that the mechanistic conception derived from the idea of a rational order based on universal laws and became the basis for two important concepts: individual autonomy and freedom from traditional authority. We have gained, he concludes, some important values from the mechanistic age: "freedom of inquiry, economic development, political motivation, moral relativity, and religious liberty" (p. 7). But the rationality and freedom which laid the basis for an industrial society have been in turn stifled by economic production because the control of production has been concentrated in the hands of a few. Thus, Winter observes, "the flight from family and community into the liberated world of industrial work has proved to be a chimera for some and a bad dream for others" (p. 9). With the individual as the only entity, communities become merely aggregates of individuals and negotiation replaces belonging. At a time when culture is pushing individuals to optimize their interests, the family is viable only so long as it meets one's interests. Winter argues that freedom in this context means autonomy, "doing as I wish with my own powers, pursuing my own trajectory" (p. 10). Thus the mechanistic symbolization has ceased to be life-giving and is destructive in that it now fails to "open horizons of creativity in dealing with environmental, economic, international and spiritual tensions" (p. 14).

Education in the mechanistic age has been primarily through schooling that is aimed toward liberation from family
and tradition and preparation for the discipline and skills needed for the industrial work place, "conformity to the imperious system of production" (p. 10), Winter (1979) writes. Alienation and loss of community have been the effect of mechanization and the economic system on school and society:

Schooling and work became a path to alienation and subordination. Meanwhile, the fabric of human communities was being torn by the mobility and fragmentation which the productive system generated. The techno-economic drive to rational control sun-dered personal bonds in local communities and within the economic order. This degenerative process eroded the fabric of urban life, reducing every bond to a cash nexus. (p. 10)

Winter (1979) observes that many individuals have turned to a private world of consumerism and "life-style" because they have lost a sense of freedom, as well as community. The economic system benefits from this privatism by creating goods that foster the life-style. Other persons have sought belonging and meaning through communal living, some expressions of which are healthy attempts to rediscover community, Winter thinks, while other communities are a dangerous regression to authority (such as Jonestown). Our need is to recover from our heritage symbols that give meaning to our common life, metaphors that can reinterpret and renew our heritage and allow us to find community in positive, life-giving ways. The concept of community that we need is not the idea of solidarity that sacrifices freedom nor peer group support for personal goals, but that "shared work of disclosure of decency, moral responsibility, personal contribution in which each person is
called to contribute to an enrichment of the quality of life in which we are dwelling" (p. 15). Winter suggests that each tradition has within it archetypal symbols of our common humanity on which we can draw for resymbolization.

Winter, like Oliver, understands our need for community as a need to reestablish our links with our mythologically based past in order to recover and renew images of wholeness and connectedness that have been shattered by the mechanistic age. Neither thinks that efforts in this direction need to sacrifice individuality. Rather the pursuit of individual interests needs to be balanced by a concern for the common good, for our wholeness is not just a matter of self-realization but also of belonging.

**Political Implications for Education for Community**

In order to understand why it is difficult to establish community as an educational theory we need to recognize some of the ways that the present economic system works against it. Communities and the myths that informed them have not vanished just because they have been expressions of primitive social relations, I suggest, but at least in part because they do not encourage individualism or conformity to the values of the corporate order such as intra-group competition and social mobility. As Winter (1979) points out, it is in the best interest of business to foster the idea of freedom as the expression of personal interests and life-style dependent on consumerism. It is commonly recognized that the mobility
of our society has been accelerated by corporate practices such as moving employees and closing plants in one place only to rebuild in another in order to save costs. Much has been written about how schools have adopted the administrative and organizational practices of business with the result that stratification, competition, measures of productivity (grades, standardized tests), obedience to authority, class and school size based on economic efficiency have all become accepted practices in American education. The value conflict between individualism and community is deeply rooted in our political and economic structures.

A socialist critique of American education helps us to see why community is such a hard value to try to promote in our schools and curriculum. Even though one may not share fully the socialists' vision of the good society or all of their educational goals, their analysis of the conflict between the value of individualism and of community in our culture is most helpful. In the area of educating for community, socialist schools in some countries are helpful models, particularly in encouraging cooperation and in doing tasks that are needed by the village or city. But I would also contend that the Marxist perspective is, in itself, too materialistic and too narrow, eclipsing the significance of imagination and spiritual depth that characterize human achievements and goals at their best. Myth directs us to aspects of human consciousness and to values that a socialist pedagogy does not include.
In the article, Individualism, Collectivism, and Radical Educational Reform, Cagen (1978) gives a socialist analysis of how the individualism in American culture is a barrier to achieving the goals of self-realization, community, and improving society, an analysis that identifies some of the political implications of placing a high priority on community.

The most distinctive characteristic of American culture is individualism, Cagen claims. Personal liberty, individual initiative and the private search for happiness are deeply rooted values. While these are in themselves positive values, they have become the legitimation for selfishness and for placing individual concerns over group needs. In the place of moral commitment, we increasingly appeal to a personality ethic that evaluates actions by how they meet personal needs and desires, a "morality of individual whim" in Becker's terms (p. 230). The growing concern with "healing psychic wounds and liberating persons from oppressive guilt" has led to a more negative perspective on family and community life and a down-playing of such values as responsibility, loyalty and caring (p. 230). While individualism in America has always been strong, Cagen suggests, religion restrained it in earlier times and helped maintain those values that promote the common good. But with the decline of religion, individualism in its more destructive forms has flourished.

Responsible for this growing self-centeredness and isolation is our economic and political order, Cagen argues.
Individualism is not incompatible with conformity, and indeed, our mass institutions often promote both, particularly through a materialistic, consumer orientation that a free enterprise system promotes. Reacting against the conformity and dehumanizing settings of our institutions, many persons withdraw and declare their own independence. But such a stance is neither a way to self-realization nor to social change and solidarity, Cagen points out. Indeed, it is the economically privileged who can withdraw and seek their own way to self-realization. What is needed, she argues, is a commitment to economic and social changes that will liberate all classes, one that is based on a sense of solidarity and a moral commitment to a better society for all. Cagen criticizes radical, free school educational reforms for having ignored how selective, class-based, and individualistic their concepts of liberation are and for omitting concerns for cooperation, ways to work for social change, and altruistic attitudes.

Cagen advocates a pedagogy that goes beyond the idea that personal liberation and social responsibility are antithetical, proposing one that is founded on the idea that it is human nature to live in a social context, that self-realization takes place in community. With a concept that human development is concerned both with individuality and community, an educational theory can maintain a dialectic between authority and personal values. She notes that while free schools are one-sided in the direction of personal values, collectivist
education tends to be one-sided in direction of authority. Cagen is particularly concerned that we develop educational models that give an important place to cultivating behavior and attitudes reflecting concern and respect for human beings and commitment to social action:

The goal of collectivist education . . . is to make moral ideas into moving forces, to educate and raise children whose sympathies for other human beings become as important in determining their actions as their ability to use reason and intellect. (p. 248)

While Cagen seems to be too sanguine about the heavy hand of authority in socialist schools and, for me, too dogmatic in Marxist rhetoric, she nonetheless articulates well the concern that individualism has overpowered community in our society and in our schools and that most concepts of educational reform give too little attention to the need for altruism, community, and commitment to work for the common good. Cagen, Giroux (1980), Bowles and Gintis (1976) and others from this perspective make clear that we cannot talk effectively about a concern for alternative values and structures in education without becoming aware ourselves and helping students develop a critical consciousness about how the social, political, and economic forces influence those structures and have a vested interest in maintaining them.

Recognition that the loss of community and its values is closely linked to our economic system is essential, I suggest, for any significant understanding of why community is a difficult value for Americans in this century to achieve.
However, we do not have to turn to some ideology outside our tradition, like Marxism, because there are significant community themes (such as "We the people" of the Declaration of Independence and truly democratic political models), other versions of the American myth, as well as religious traditions, that offer an alternative to the dominance of our social and economic life by the concerns of the capitalist system. Indeed, I find that the social vision of Marxism is not adequate, even though it offers a profound critique of the weaknesses of our society. Human solidarity based on class struggle and common economic concerns is not sufficient for a lasting or comprehensive community. Based on the idea that social existence creates consciousness, Marxism tends to reduce the human spirit and imagination to materialistic concerns. A more complete vision of human community is the kind seen in the Polish workers' strike where men and women joined in solidarity to gain both their economic and political rights and their right to maintain their mythic heritage, i.e., their Christianity.

Without seeing the mythic dimension of human consciousness and community, an education that seeks to develop in students a critical awareness of the economic and political powers that shape and control their institutions runs the risk of alienating youth from their families, traditions and places of community. While some degree of alienation is probably necessary and inevitable, the mythic perspective
suggests that to be fully human is to be deeply rooted in the common life of a people and to share visions of common goals that are broader than economic and political concerns, but that include these concerns in a significant way. The task is to educate the imagination for such visions, to discover through art, literature and even the metaphors of science the potential world as well as the real world.

**In Conclusion**

The problem of alienation is the most serious social and educational problem which community addresses. Attention to the value of community requires that we re-examine some of the fundamental liberal principles, suggesting that they may not be wrong so much as incomplete or one-sided. While much of the alienation in our society is due to the impact of the corporate organization on our institutions and social forms, some of it is also due to our movements toward liberation. The "liberated" woman is very often alienated from her family, the liberated black person is frequently alienated from the black community, and the liberated student is quite often alienated from the ideas and values of his/her parochial world. The dilemma of liberation vs. commitment suggests that we need to direct more attention to ideas and models that represent a synthesis, ways to overcome alienation without simply abandoning the idea of self-realization contained in the movement toward liberation.
Maxine Greene (1978) addresses the concern for overcoming the alienation that often accompanies learning through helping students recover their own "primordial landscape." Drawing from the writings of Merlou Ponty, Greene explores the importance of finding one's own ground, a lived reality, the space out of which the self emerges. An example of this kind of process she finds in Wordsworth's *Prelude*, in which the poet returns to his homeplace to begin to shape a meaningful world. In this process of regaining "the primordial landscape," Greene writes, "he feels present to himself, in touch with himself as never before." His learning, his self-knowledge, takes place "against an awareness that rooted him in a landscape and provided an enduring ground" (p. 15). This perspective could not be gained from a disembodied, abstract exploration, she concludes. The goal of such a process is to locate one's being in a context and then to transcend through reflection and analysis to the creation of the self, not abstracting oneself from the background but finding a range of perspectives that help one create a network of relationships that make being in the world not an isolated and random event but a direction of possibility and responsibility.

Becoming reconnected with one's background, with the primordial landscape is very similar, I think, to the concern expressed above for education that helps students to find and, if necessary, to reinterpret ties with their own
mythological inheritance and communities. While this is an individual task, it is also a communal task, for it will be through the discovery or creation of common symbols that students will begin to be able to talk with each other about common tasks and meanings. This seeking of the deep connections is what myth is concerned with, both in a psychological sense and in the social realm of shared history and rituals. The image of being rooted and grounded in a given landscape exists in tension with the image of transcendence; together they suggest the poles between which the student searches for an education that is personally meaningful. A curriculum that is designed for liberation alone risks alienation, while one designed for accommodation to tradition and authority sacrifices self-realization and moral criticism.

Education and community sounds like a good, safe issue, and it is if we accept the superficial interpretation often given to community. However, when we understand that community is a social form that is not compatible with the values encouraged by our economic system we realize we are talking about the need for political confrontation. When we find that what supports community conflicts with some of our other personally held values, we realize that we are dealing with a classic human dilemma—there is not a right answer.

Besides seeking some changes in curriculum material, changes in attitudes toward what we are educating students for, and changes in how we view the school's relationship to
the community, there is another kind of task we can be involved in at a theoretical level that is the major sort of shift for which we would hope. That task is the search for a new metaphor or a new story that will symbolize for us a way of dwelling together that represents the human dimensions of community and myth and overcomes the isolation of our mechanistic metaphors. Approaches to community that do not include the mythic dimension, that search for common metaphors or stories, are without the depth that a meaningful concept of community requires. What Jung, Campbell, Frye and other writers about myth tell us is that we have a rich common stratum of images from which to draw.
EPILOGUE

This investigation into the various dimensions of myth and education has stopped short of making many specific suggestions for curricula in specific areas. How some of the ideas developed here could be applied to decisions about what is to be taught in schools is an area for further inquiry. I want to suggest several directions such investigations might take. In doing this I want to make clear that these suggestions do not represent the main goal or primary concern of this study. Indeed, I hope that the main ideas about how myth is related to learning at different developmental stages and how it helps us to focus on the significance of imagination, meaning, and community in curriculum development have already been established.

The recognition of the importance of myth and fairy tale to the child's cognitive and emotional development can provide a new perspective on what literature we select and encourage for children. Not only does it suggest that the traditional stories are important, but it also indicates that fantasy is as "relevant" to the child's needs as realism. In recent decades there has been a great flowering of children's literature, including a large outpouring of both contemporary realistic fiction and modern fantasy. While most approaches to children's literature suggest that children need
both kinds of fiction, too little attention has been given to how these different forms help shape or are matched with the child's conceptions of the world and how to strengthen the developing imagination and ego.

Advocates of realistic fiction argue that children will deal with their own problems better and be more sensitive to others' needs if they can read about people like themselves going through similar difficulties. This idea seems to be based more on adult logic than on what we know about how children think and how they deal with emotional conflict. Also, I find that realistic fiction runs the danger of being didactic, showing children how they should adjust to modern life, as well as carrying strong messages about personal and social values that are current but, I think, often superficial and at times destructive of the confidence and hope children need in order to want to grow up.

Fantasy, on the other hand, because it offers experiences and images more universal and related to needs at a level often below consciousness, strengthens the child's ability to use the imagination to organize knowledge and to deal with problems in a way more flexible and meaningful. Because of the flux and relativity of their everyday world, children need, as much as ever, experiences of an ideational world where ideals, absolutes, and firm values exist and where tragedy is not senseless but takes place in a context of meaning. The strong appeal of myth-based fantasies, starting with
Tolkien and C. S. Lewis and continued by other good writers, is indicative of the significance of this kind of fiction for children.

The importance of fantasy to adolescents is a phenomenon that has been more difficult to understand. Why do teen-agers read Tolkien, play Dungeons and Dragons, read and create comic books based on ancient legends and myths? Because these interests are strongest in youth who identify with what is left of the "counter-culture," it indicates that they are part of the rejection of one myth the culture offers and the seeking of another.

I am suggesting that more study is needed to explore how the literature children read relates to the development of the ego and the imagination and how it corresponds to the knowledge children can use. Also, more investigation is needed into Travers' theory that it is not from individual interests but from those patterns of interest that indicate universal characteristics of children's needs and the conceptual framework at particular ages. Such investigation can help us understand the role of fiction in child development at a deeper level than it is usually treated.

Approaches to teaching science need to be examined from this perspective. The way younger children relate to natural phenomena is, as we see from the Piaget study, not detached or scientific. Instead of teaching younger children to use the scientific method, it may be more appropriate and
meaningful to allow them to explore the natural world and express their discoveries and questions in terms of the animism and artificialistic modes with which they think. The child's sense of connectedness with natural phenomena is the basis of metaphor and the sense of belonging in the world that could be reinforced rather than weakened by what is taught in a science curriculum. Questions to be asked might be: What basic metaphors about the natural world do we want our children to think with, Earth as Mother or Home, or Earth as a gold mine or a factory producing goods? What might be the long-range consequences of establishing mythic and organic metaphors rather than mechanistic metaphors?

For adolescents the approach to science will shift. Children, having gradually replaced their mythic sense of participation in nature and events, have learned many of the facts of the physical world. During adolescence more than the facts become important, for now students seek to know the laws and systems that govern the natural world. However, the approach developed here suggests that it is also a time when raising philosophical and ethical questions is important. This suggests that learning about the moral and ideological choices made in regard to science and its applications in technology should be an important concern of a science curriculum at this level.

In the area of moral education there is the need for more investigation of ways to address the problems Oliver and
Bane (1976) found with the approach that focused on the rational discussion of principles. Their suggestion that attention shift from seeking principles to understanding human dilemmas and seeking common myths is a concern addressed also by Novak (1970):

> Contemporary studies in ethics, in Anglo-American circles, concentrate upon logic and language; I wish, instead, to concentrate upon the drive to understand and upon myths and symbols. My reason for doing so is that men seldom, if ever, act according to principles and rules stated in words and logically arranged. They act, rather, according to models, metaphors, stories, and myths. Their action is imitative rather than rule-abiding. Prior to their attention to obey sets of rules, they are trying to become a certain type of person. Rules are to myths what single words are to sentences. The same word may have different meanings in different sentences; the same rule may be obeyed differently by men living out different myths. (p. 23)

Greene (1978) also contends that moral education needs to direct more attention to the identity students are trying to work out and the kind of communities they want to be linked with and less to the consideration of principles:

> Moral education, it would seem, must be as specifically concerned with self-identification in a community as it is with judgments persons are equipped to make at different ages. It has as much to do with interest and action in concrete situations as it does with the course of moral reasoning. It has as much to do with consciousness and imagination as it does with principles. (pp. 47-48)

This task of "self-identification in a community" is, as I attempted to show above, a part of the function of myth.

Finding modes of moral education that focus on the myths and stories, as well as the communities with which students
want to identify, and seeking ways to make moral choices as regards those myths, is an important area for study.

Beyond specific curriculum areas, attention needs to be directed toward what the school symbolizes by the kinds of studies and kinds of space for learning that are provided. For example, Charity James (1980) recommends that schools think about other kinds of centers than just skills centers, such as a "myth center" where students can reflect on and be in touch with that level of consciousness where myths reside. Time and space for art and dance are also ways that the school says to the students that mythos as well as logos is important.

It is my general conclusion from having done this study that myth refers not to just some rather vague feelings about a deeper level of consciousness, or to a retreat from the modern world into "primitive" ways of thinking and living, or to any narrow conception of the religious experience. Rather I see it as itself a kind of metaphor for ways of knowing and organizing knowledge, as well as for kinds of knowledge inherent in different forms at certain stages of development. At times the mythic way of knowing stands in opposition to the rational way of knowing, but this conflict is one that can often be resolved or understood differently when we recognize the ideological conflicts that usually underlie commitment to the rational versus the mythic, or individualism versus community. What knowledge is important
is, we know, as much a political as an objective decision. Attention to myth will, I hope, help us to reexamine some of our social and political assumptions about education, as well as allow us to look in a new way at the world of the child and the dilemma of the adolescent in our society.

Bruner and Campbell both suggest that while we seek myths as external and communal images of our identity, we may be forced in our time to turn inward in our search in an effort that is lonely and not complete because the common myths and communities are present only in fragmented ways. But neither suggests that we abandon the effort to know and explore the mythic, and Campbell is optimistic that beyond this period of fragmentation we can achieve more adequate myths than those we are being forced to leave behind. That kind of hope gives the study of myth in our time integrity.
References


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