

## CITIZENSHIP IN THE EMPOWERED LOCALITY: An Elaboration, a Critique, and a Partial Test\*

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### **Abstract:**

Although liberal and communitarian interpretations of citizenship differ profoundly, they nevertheless offer essentially similar prescriptions in support of empowered localities. The authors argue, instead, that the rejected alternative of consolidated government better promotes both interpretations of effective citizenship. They develop this argument by more fully specifying the behavioral implications of the two views of citizenship and theoretically linking those behaviors to fragmented and consolidated urban institutions using the Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect model introduced by Lyons and Lowery in 1986. They then test the central proposition derived from that analysis using a comparison group design.

### **Article:**

*The plea for gargantua is not an attack against neighborhoods, against the importance of "moral integration" or against the need for fellowship and companionship. It is simply a plea against confusing these socially desirable qualities with the prerequisites of good government, against equipping neighborhoods with political prerogatives.*

— Robert C. Wood (1961b: 191-92)

### **TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF URBAN CITIZENSHIP**

In "The City and the Future of Democracy," Dahl (1967) discussed the appropriate locus of democratic citizenship as a problem of Chinese boxes, showing that any unit thought to have special legitimacy is but one box nested in others of equal legitimacy. Dahl then concluded that "there is not necessarily a single kind of unit, whether it be the city-state or the nation-state, in which majorities have some specially sacred quality" (p. 959). But in the end, Dahl, like Tocqueville before him, identified the city as the primary locus of democratic citizenship. Because cities provide for direct participation on issues of vital concern to citizens and thereby offer numerous opportunities for "educating citizens in civic virtue" (p. 959), cities are the most important box in an interlocking arrangement of democratic boxes. Yet, the meaning of such primacy is unclear, with two questions requiring consideration. First, just what does urban citizenship entail? Second, if some agreement can be forged over the meaning of citizenship, how shall the Chinese boxes of the city be constituted to best promote it?

The classical liberal and communitarian interpretations of citizenship, as seen at the top of Table 1, offer sharply different answers to the first—a divergence that is inherent in their respective understandings of the foundations of the civic community and its relation to society. In the classical liberal tradition, citizenship is founded on individual and property rights that enable citizens to address problems of interdependence via exchange (Buchanan 1975, 21-22; Galston 1988). Thus citizenship entails contracting to establish a civil entity both to provide agreed-upon public goods and services and to enforce the contractual arrangement (Buchanan 1975, 162-63). Given the prior status of rights and the contingent nature of the contract, liberals insist upon a sharp delineation of public and private spheres, with the latter having priority (Galston 1988). Accordingly, citizenship does not require active participation, although citizens must be alert to potential infringements of their rights by closely monitoring the representative process.

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Communitarians reject this "thin" conception of citizenship, as Barber (1984) termed it. Instead, they start with the Greek understanding of citizenship as "the prideful participation of the free citizen in a community whose life is fashioned to achieve the ethical self-realization of its citizens" (Long 1962, 177). Democratic citizenship, they claim, must be more "thickly" rooted in empathy, affect, and common struggle over common problems (Barber 1984, 219; Elkin 1987, 109, 152). Thus they argue that there can be no independent constitution of the social and political communities. As Barber (1984, 155) noted, "To be a citizen is to participate in a certain

**TABLE 1: Summary of Conceptual, Behavioral, and Structural Implications of Liberal and Communitarian Notions of Citizenship as Applied to Metropolitan Governance**

Major Theoretical Conceptions of Citizenship	LIBERAL		COMMUNITARIAN	
Basic conception of citizenship	Rooted in social contract theory viewing government as contractual entity to provide goods and services and to enforce terms of contract  Stresses notion of individual and property rights		Rooted in Greek conception of prideful participation in community to achieve self-realization and collective goals  Stresses notions of empathy, affect, and common good	
Variations on the themes	WATCHDOG LIBERALISM	VIRTUOUS LIBERALISM	STRONG DEMOCRACY COMMUNITARIAN	REPRESENTATIVE COMMUNITARIAN
Preferred behavior in problem solving	EXIT	LOYALTY	VOICE	VOICE
Secondary behaviors in problem solving	VOICE to make exit credible	EXIT as a last resort  VOICE has a positive role but not essential	—	LOYALTY is expected when VOICE is not feasible

**TABLE 1 Continued**

Undesirable behaviors in problem solving	LOYALTY NEGLECT	NEGLECT	EXIT LOYALTY NEGLECT	EXIT NEGLECT
Metropolitan structural/ institutional implications	Classic Tiebout Model	A range of institutions from fragmented to metropolitan, justifiable depending on their efficiency in service provision	Classic neighborhood government model	Two competing scenarios: Metropolitan federation with strong emphasis on neighborhood empowerment <i>or</i> metropolitan government

conscious fashion that presumes awareness of and engagement in activity with others.... Indeed, from the perspective of strong democracy, the two terms participation and community are aspects of a single mode of social being: citizenship" (emphasis in original). Thus participation both defines and is the product of community.

Surprisingly, these very different views are sometimes used to promote similar answers to our second question of how to promote urban citizenship. Although the liberal understanding of citizenship has been related to a host of institutional forms, usually those associated with representative democracy, the set of urban institutional analyses most conducive to its aims is the public choice literature on local government structure (e.g., Tiebout 1956; Bish and Ostrom 1973; Bish 1971; Ostrom, Bish, and Ostrom 1988). By contrast, the communitarian alternative seems to fit best with the set of institutional analyses found in the neighborhood movement literature of the 1960s and early 1970s (e.g., Kotler 1969; Fredrickson 1973; Zimmerman 1972). Although rarely mentioned together, both literatures contain the argument that governmental consolidation undermines meaningful citizenship by substituting managerial governance for popular control (Elkin 1987, 30, 143; Schwartz 1988, 123-24; Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961, 837; Ostrom, Bish, and Ostrom 1988, 63-71).<sup>1</sup> Moreover, there are similarities between the alternatives to consolidation that they offer.

The liberal view of citizenship, as noted earlier, is flexible in terms of the kinds of institutional reforms it may be compatible with. Even public choice scholars, who ascribe to the most extreme liberal interpretation, do not prefer a single institutional arrangement. They prefer as many different boxes for as many scales of problems as face a metropolitan area. But such complex arrangements inevitably entail variations in the degree of democratic control. That is, one could arrange the boxes so that the citizen exercises direct democratic control over the largest-scale government and only indirect control over the subordinate units addressing smaller-scale problems, as is done in consolidated governments. Or the boxes can be arranged so that direct democratic control is exercised at the lowest scale, and broader-scale issues are addressed by councils of governments [COGS] or special districts over which the citizen generally exercises less direct control.<sup>2</sup> In their consistent preference for the latter (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1987; Ostrom, Bish, and Ostrom 1988), public choice scholars clearly view the basic unit of democratic control to be the independent municipality found in governmentally fragmented metropolitan areas.

Although some communitarians view such fragmentations as troubling (Dagger 1981) and most eschew the language of balkanization, they nevertheless propose essentially the same alternative in their extensive reliance on the institutional recommendations of the neighborhood movement literature. To communitarians, the empowered neighborhood— of 5 to 25,000 citizens (Barber 1984) — is the ideal vehicle for developing citizenship. What makes these proposals similar in effect is the communitarians' insistence that neighborhood assemblies must be more than debating societies; they must be given genuine authority and responsibility (Barber 1984, 264). Such empowerment is expected to engender the strong democracy of amateur government and to direct communal self-help (Barber 1984, 152, 269)—the very preferences of public choice liberals (Ostrom 1977, 35-36; Whitaker 1980). Such empowerment, at least implicitly, would have the same fragmenting effect as in the public choice alternative in that the metropolitan area would now consist of many separate units of governance, each with considerable independence. Indeed, one neighborhood movement analyst (Perry 1973, 85) went so far as to suggest that their goal is "the shifting of the suburban model of community resources to the inner city." In short, despite profound differences in their underlying interpretations of citizenship, neighborhood movement communitarians and public choice liberals share at least an implicit preference for the highly fragmented metropolis made up of largely independent, empowered localities.

We believe, however, that both the public choice liberals' and the neighborhood movement communitarians' perspectives on the relationship between urban institutions and citizenship may be wrong—that the rejected alternative of consolidation promotes both conceptions of citizenship far better than the empowered locality. In the next section of the article, we develop this argument by theoretically specifying the behavioral implications of several variants of the two views of citizenship and linking those behaviors to urban institutions. In the following section, we outline a metropolitanist critique of citizenship in empowered localities using this theoretical framework. We then illustrate how the central propositions derived from the fuller conceptual analysis may be tested using data from a comparison group design.

## CITIZENSHIP AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE METROPOLIS


Before we can consider the metropolitanist case for citizenship in the consolidated city, we need to specify better the arguments of those advocating the empowerment of localities. We do so in two steps using the Exit, Voice, Loyalty, Neglect (EVLN) model of Lyons and Lowery (1986, 1989).

## MODES OF CITIZEN PROBLEM SOLVING AND CITIZENSHIP

Given that we cannot directly observe the affective content of behavior, how can we determine whether institutions influence the exercise of citizenship? To communitarians, the answer lies in examining patterns of reliance on different "modes of social problem solving" (Elkin 1987, 5, 95). This focus should be equally appropriate from a public choice perspective, for how interdependent individuals resolve competing needs is what distinguishes liberal government from anarchy and the leviathan (Buchanan 1975). We need, then, a typology of problem-solving modes to define the universe of responses citizens might take to collective problems. Unfortunately, political scientists seldom conceptualize urban "political participation as a problem solving act" (Orbell and Uno 1972, 475).

Recently, however, Lyons and Lowery (1986, 1989) reinterpreted and organized much of the urban political behavior literature in their EVLN model. The model consists of four types of responses, arrayed on active-passive and on constructive-destructive dimensions, that individuals can invoke when facing a problem. Thus exit is an active-destructive approach to problems in that it involves an explicit severing of the relationship between city and citizen. The most characteristic expression of exit is, of course, the Tiebout (1956) response of voting with one's feet. Voice, including most of the behaviors usually studied under the rubric of participation (e.g., Milbrath and Goel 1977, 18-19), is active and constructive effort to improve conditions giving rise to dissatisfaction. Loyalty involves passively, but constructively, responding to problems by optimistically waiting for conditions to improve, and it includes many of the less active regime-supportive attitudes and behaviors studied in the standard participation literature. Finally, neglect is a passive-destructive response to problems by withdrawal into alienation, cynicism, and distrust (Finifter 1972). Figure 1 summarizes the four types of responses to problems along with the dimensions on which they are arrayed and provides examples of the forms of behavior associated with each.

How would liberals and communitarians interpret effective citizenship in terms of these four models of problem solving? Our answers to this question are less clear than they might be because neither view is articulated in a single voice. Indeed, the extensive literatures on liberalism and communitarianism offer any number of fine distinctions between their respective sects, sub-schools, and factions. More to the point, though our interest is in the public choice institutional recommendations as an embodiment of a liberal conception of citizenship, the public choice reforms certainly do not exhaust the structural implications of liberal political thought. Also, although there is a



**Figure 1: EVLN Dimensions of Response to Dissatisfaction, Response Types, and Illustrative Behaviors**

somewhat greater correspondence between the institutional recommendations of the neighborhood movement literature and the communitarian understanding of citizenship, that correspondence is not complete. Therefore, we need to consider at least two interpretations of each view of citizenship.

The first, as seen in Table I, which we denote as watchdog liberalism, is based on the most extreme public choice interpretation of citizenship—the one that has been most vigorously pilloried by communitarians. In this view, citizenship is defined by contractual arrangement to establish a government and/or to provide a particular collective good or service (Buchanan 1975, 162-63; Barber 1984, 220). When contract problems arise, as seen

in Table 1, two modes of problem-solving responses would be appropriate. Initially, voice behaviors might be used to call the parties to the requirements or terms of the contract. But if the problem is not resolved, the appropriate mode of response for the effective citizen is to sever the contract—to exit the relationship. Indeed, voice behaviors are considered effective only if backed up by the threat of exit. In the urban political behavior literature, this is best represented by the Tiebout model (Tiebout 1956; Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961; Lowery and Lyons 1989), which posits a quasi-market of jurisdictions from among which citizens "vote with their feet" to select the preferred package of taxes and expenditures and stand ready to move again if dissatisfaction redevelops.

What of the other modes of problem solving? Neglect has two distinct meanings to watchdog liberalism. In the Whig tradition of Buchanan's (1975) liberalism (Bailyn 1967), neglect as distrust and alienation is an admirable orientation toward government, even when it means adhering to its contractual obligations, if only because the state is ever poised to trample individual rights. But our concern is with neglect as a passive-destructive problem-solving behavior. As a response to dissatisfaction, neglect clearly represents a failure of citizenship; it would mean that leviathan government has redefined the terms of the contract, leaving the citizen with no recourse but disaffection and alienation. More interesting, under this strict interpretation of liberal citizenship there is little room for the problem-solving activity of loyalty—passively, but constructively and optimistically, waiting for conditions to improve. Political loyalty would be analogous to brand loyalty in private consumption in that it disrupts efficient operation of the market (Hirschman 1970).

In this view, then, effective problem solving for the citizen is limited to contract management through exit or the threat of exit; nothing more is required of citizenship than eternal vigilance to ensure that all parties adhere to the contract. To communitarians, this is dreadful. As Barber (1984, 220) noted, "When the citizenry is a watchdog that waits with millennial patience for its government to make a false move but that submits passively to all other legitimate governmental activity, citizenship [as communitarians interpret it] very quickly deteriorates into a latent function." To watchdog liberals, however, this is the only meaningful form of citizenship behavior open, given the leviathan's omnipresent threat to individual rights.

Although communitarians have (with some justification) explored the limits of this conception of citizenship (Elkin 1987, 196-99), watchdog liberalism holds somewhat less sway over public choice theory than it did in the era of Tiebout (1956) and Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961). Recognizing the large transaction and information costs of exiting (Oakerson, Parks, and Bell 1987), many public choice proponents have begun to rely more heavily on a rich, older understanding of the public virtues of a liberal regime that allows for a broader range of appropriate problem-solving behaviors (e.g., Ostrom 1977).

Galston (1988, 1982; also see Thigpen and Downing 1987) argued that under virtuous liberalism, as we will call our second type of citizenship, the citizen must do more than simply respect others' rights and obey the law, as required in Buchanan's (1975) contractual view. To Galston (1988), the citizen must be truly tolerant of fellow citizens, and, in regard to society, the virtuous citizen must exhibit loyalty—"the developed capacity to understand, to accept, and to act on the core principals of one's society" (p. 1282). In relation to one's government, the virtuous liberal citizen is "moderate in demands and self-disciplined enough to accept painful measures" (p. 1282). Just as important, citizens cannot be detached from public life, even if they have no duty to participate actively in governmental affairs. "Because liberalism incorporates representative government, the liberal citizen must have the capacity to discern the talent and character of candidates vying for office, and to evaluate the performance of individuals who have attained office" (p. 1282). Liberal leaders must possess certain virtues as well, including "the capacity to forge a sense of common purposes against the centrifugal tendencies of an individualistic and fragmented society" (p. 1282). Thus, although still adhering to the dichotomy of public and private life, advocates of virtuous liberalism argue that the liberal tradition embodies civic virtues that go far beyond Buchanan's (1975) watchdog citizenship.

As seen in Table I, this view of liberalism legitimates a broader behavioral definition of citizenship. Assuming that leaders are virtuous and merit popular trust, loyalty becomes a valid and valued response to problems by

virtue of its resonance with the liberal virtues of temperance, tolerance, and patience. Indeed, if exit is a costly and still the ultimate sanction, loyalty becomes the most highly prized form of problem-solving behavior. Voice also becomes more important. It is no longer simply a preliminary to exit, as seen in the increased intrinsic importance assigned to participation in the recent public choice literature (Oakerson, Parks, and Bell 1987). Still, there is no special emphasis on the exercise of voice as the defining behavior of citizens. As Galston (1988, 1284) noted, "In a liberal polity there is no duty to participate actively in politics, no requirement to place the public above the private." Virtuous liberalism, then, would downplay, though not dismiss, exit, and it would recognize voice as a legitimate form of citizenship behavior. Yet, it is loyalty that is given a special place among the characteristic behaviors of effective citizens.

What of the communitarian interpretation? The position of Barber (1984) and Elkin (1987), which we will denote as strong democracy communitarianism, is very clear: Only broad and deep political participation—voice behaviors—constitute effective democratic citizenship. According to Barber (1984, 152),

The strong democratic solution to the political condition issues out of a self-sustaining dialectic of participatory civic activity and continuous community-building in which freedom and equality are nourished and given political being. Community grows out of participation and at the same time makes participation possible.

And according to Elkin (1987, 169), democratic citizenship can only develop when citizens engage in active struggle and debate. In the absence of such constructive problem solving, strong democracy communitarians argue, citizens can neither constitute a true community nor integrate their social, economic, and personal lives into an encompassing political existence.

According to strong democracy communitarians, and as seen in Table 1, neither of the passive forms of problem solving constitutes effective citizenship. Indeed, they would draw little distinction between loyalty and neglect; both are evidence of an atrophying of citizenship. Even more ineffective is exit. If one is embedded in a social community and the civil and social communities are mutually defined through active participation in problem solving, then exit from the civil community is tantamount to abandoning one's social community. Exit would not be severing a limited contractual relationship but would entail destruction of the social fabric.

Although the strong democracy understanding of communitarianism dominates the communitarian literature to the exclusion of almost all else, we think it reasonable to recognize another form of communitarianism, one that moderates strong democracy's exclusive emphasis on participation as evidence of meaningful citizenship. The starting point for this account of citizenship is the realization that there are very real practical limitations on participation in even the most democratic of settings (Schwartz 1988, 731; Dahl 1967). Even under the institutional reforms advocated by Elkin (1987) and Barber (1984), it would simply be impossible for all citizens to participate actively on all issues at all times, and they admit that some elements of representative democracy, however undesirable, will of necessity survive in the communitarian polity.

Until recently, however, communitarians have not given much attention to the democratic foundations of representation. However, in *The Blue Guitar: Political Representation and the Community*, Schwartz (1988) developed a controversial communitarian justification for representation. She started by arguing that realistic communitarianism must accommodate larger-sized communities, given the need for sufficient social diversity in establishing meaningful frames of citizenship (p. 73)—a point that will become important later. This fourth view, then, can be identified as representative communitarianism.

What are the implications of at least some compromises in strong democracy communitarianism's commitment to complete and constant participation? Most important, and as seen in Table 1, loyalty must play at least a small, supplemental role in the representative communitarian's approach to problem solving. An individual must participate actively on some issues—and preferably on many issues—to be a fully engaged citizen. But on those issues in which direct participation is not possible or is mediated through the selection of representatives, loyalty will be a valid indicator of citizenship. Although passive in comparison to voice, however, the loyalty of

representative communitarians still has stringent requirements. Citizens must conscientiously deliberate over issues and candidates and monitor representative deliberations; simply voting and turning inward toward one's private life, as a liberal might, is not sufficient. In any case, loyalty is only supplemental; voice in other arenas and on other issues is still required.

Without knowing the affective content of any given behavior or the linkages individuals make between their public and private lives, it may initially appear difficult to distinguish empirically between virtuous liberalism and representative communitarianism. Although both value voice and loyalty, there are differences. To the virtuous liberal, voice is a supplement to the more characteristic response of loyalty. To the representative communitarian, the reverse is true; loyalty as a problem-solving mode is valued only when voice — direct and active participation — is not possible. Moreover, exit would be an appropriate mode of problem solving to only the virtuous liberal — and then in a considerably diluted form in comparison to the watchdog liberal.

#### INSTITUTIONS AND MODES OF PROBLEM SOLVING

Having specified how the four models of citizenship view the elements of the EVLN model, we next consider the way in which institutions influence reliance on the modes of behavior. Lyons and Lowery (1986, 1989) hypothesized that three variables govern how citizens select among the four responses to dissatisfaction. First, prior satisfaction, having been satisfied in the past, is expected to encourage use of the constructive responses of voice and loyalty and discourage reliance on neglect and exit. Second, social, psychological, and tangible (e.g., home ownership) investments in the community are hypothesized to enhance the use of constructive responses: loyalty and voice. In the absence of investments, there is little cost to invoking exit or neglect, the destructive modes of problem solving. Third, the availability of alternatives, having a Tiebout type of local institutional environment, is expected to enhance the use of the active responses of exit and voice. Simply put, one cannot vote with one's feet if there is nowhere else to go. Further, based the work of Hirschman (1970), Lyons and Lowery (1986, 1989) suggest that alternatives are necessary to make voice credible. In the absence of alternatives, then, citizens must rely on more passive responses. Given these considerations, both the neighborhood movement and public choice models must recognize that institutions can have direct as well as indirect influence on the play of citizenship.

The direct effect of institutions inheres in how they generate alternatives; institutionally fragmented metropolitan areas offer a large number of alternative civic communities to the dissatisfied citizen. Thus, given the EVLN specification of how alternatives influence reliance on the four modes of problem solving, fragmenting the metropolis into empowered localities can be expected to increase the use of the active responses of exit and voice and to diminish use of the passive responses of loyalty and neglect.

How does this outcome meet the expectations of our four models of citizenship? For watchdog liberals, the increased possibility of exit associated with fragmentation would be indicative of enhanced citizen control of popular government. The same would be true for communitarians and virtuous liberals in regard to the increased use of voice behaviors expected to result from fragmentation. Beyond this, the direct effects are rather grim for several of our schools of citizenship. For communitarians, increased exit would be indicative of the demise of organic social communities. For representative communitarians and virtuous liberals, the diminution of loyalty associated with fragmentation must be troubling. In short, at least three of our four citizenship models, all but watchdog liberalism, would be less than satisfied with the probable direct effects of their preferred institutional arrangement.

Clearly, virtuous liberals and communitarians must base their preference for fragmentation on more than their direct impact in generating exit alternatives. The indirect role of institutions, they might suggest, is found in one part of the investment component of the EVLN model. More specifically, each of these three models implies that citizens are very attached to their localities and that this deep psychological attachment is an important resource that their empowered localities can call upon to encourage use of the constructive problem-solving modes of loyalty and voice. This hypothesized attachment has two sources.

First, citizens are assumed to be very attached to their local communities because it is there that they most immediately struggle with important issues affecting their lives. Virtuous liberals and communitarians might then argue that empowered localities, therefore, will be better able to activate constructive problem solving than would more remote governments addressing less vital issues. Thus Elkin (1987, 153) argued that "struggle and debate over the public interest must be connected to the day-to-day vital interests of citizens." Ostrom, Bish, and Ostrom (1988, 25) similarly attributed the "energy and enthusiasm," "robust power," and "animation and effort" of local government to its posing of issues directly important to the daily lives of citizens.

Second, citizens are assumed to be more attached to localities because they provide networks of personal relationships that are missing when the locus of involvement moves outside the neighborhood. This form of investment provides an important resource that empowered localities can rely upon to encourage constructive problem-solving behavior. As Elkin (1987, 153) noted, "The second motive to be harnessed is the deep interest that each of us has in enjoying the esteem of others." To communitarians, though probably not to virtuous liberals, the importance of this motive implies that civil society must be firmly rooted in the face-to-face relations of private society. As government becomes more remote from the day-to-day life of the citizen, those roots become more tenuous. Thus larger jurisdictions cannot rely on the esteem rising from personal affect to encourage greater reliance on loyalty and voice.

In sum, our application of the EVLN model to the several conceptions of citizenship suggests that the indirect impact of institutions on the use of modes of political problem solving rests on the relationship between localized institutions and attachment of the community. Thus virtuous liberalism and representative communitarianism implicitly assume that citizens residing in empowered localities will exhibit higher levels of loyalty and voice and diminished reliance on exit and neglect than would their neighbors in the cities. This indirect link provides the basis for the strong democracy communitarians' hope that empowered localities will lead to exclusive use of voice.

#### THE METROPOLITANIST CRITIQUE

The metropolitanist critique of these hypotheses is not new. Indeed, it was fully articulated by H. G. Wells for the Fabian Society as early as 1904 (Wells [1904] 1961). Metropolitanism is composed of a set of institutional recommendations — those supporting the elimination of institutional fragmentation through creation of metropolitanwide governments — and the arguments used to support those recommendations. But does metropolitanism include a particular model of citizenship? Like public choice theorists, metropolitanists rarely discuss citizenship explicitly and instead focus on the efficiency of service delivery in their campaigns for metropolitan consolidation (e.g., Wood 1961a). Yet, although rarely explicated, this concern implies something of a liberal understanding of citizenship in its focus on the contractual relationship between governors and governed. In the main, metropolitanism is imbued with a "good government" version of virtuous liberalism. Within the virtuous liberal's understanding of citizenship, then, and as seen at the bottom of Table 1, the choice between fragmented governmental institutions and metropolitanwide government hinges on their relative efficiency advantages.

There is another strain of metropolitanism, however, best represented by Long (1962) in *The Polity*, that justifies metropolitan government on an almost communitarian view of citizenship. As Long wrote,

The apostles of metropolitanism are coming to realize that the vision they are seeking is something more than a better means of moving traffic, an improvement in the plumbing, or even an increase in the competitive position of the local economy. It is the possibility of attaining a shared common goal of a better life. The recreated city of the metropolitan area offers the hope of a significant manageable field of civic action in which a warmer sense of fraternity can be realized. (P. 183)

Yet, the very structure of metropolitanwide government almost necessarily precludes the immediate, close, and continued contact among citizens required of strong democracy proponents. Instead, Long's understanding of citizenship most closely resembles that of representative communitarianism, although probably even weaker in its adherence to core communitarian norms.

This communitarian strain of metropolitanism prescribes a strikingly different set of institutions than those discussed earlier under the topic of representative communitarianism, as seen at the bottom of Table 1. Rather than metropolitan federation with a strong emphasis on neighborhood empowerment as a compromise between the ideals of the classic neighborhood government model and the practicalities of participation, the communitarian metropolitanists offer full-scale metropolitan government as the best vehicle to achieve communitarian goals. In developing their understanding of the relationship between institutions and citizenship, metropolitanists do not question the importance of the indirect relationship between institutions, psychological attachment to the community, and varying patterns of reliance of the modes of problem solving posited earlier. Instead, they question the locus of community attachment arising from (1) social embeddedness and (2) citizens' concern for vital issues. We consider each issue in turn.

On the first, metropolitanists dismiss as nostalgia the notion that social identity can be embedded in localized settings. In the modern metropolis, the social lives of citizens become fragmented. Wood (1961a, 179-80) noted that "as the metropolis extends ... [d]iscrete local communities disappear; friendships become scattered randomly throughout the area; associations made in the course of work are different from those developed in residential neighborhoods." The older boundaries do not disappear, but they no longer encompass an integrated social community. As Wells ([1904] 1961, 146) noted, "It is no longer the case that all who dwell in these old limits are essentially local inhabitants and mutually interdependent as once they would have been. A large proportion of our population, a large and increasing proportion, has no localized interests at all as an eighteenth century person would have understood locality." Because of mobility within and among metropolitan communities, citizens are unlikely to give their neighborhood or suburb their primary political or social allegiance. Even if one rejects Dahl's (1967, 961) comment that "the village probably never was all that it is cracked up to be," its tattered remnants in suburbia and urban neighborhoods hardly constitute communities like those of times past.

To metropolitanists, social fragmentation is dangerous (Long 1962, 18485; Wood 1961b, 180). Rather than proposing to recreate the village, however, they propose new institutions that will encompass citizens' expanded social lives. As Wells ([1904] 1961, 147) noted, "It is not that all of these people do not belong to a community, but that they belong to a larger community of a new type which your administrators have failed to discover and which your working theory of local government ignores." Indeed, metropolitanists suggest that existing boundaries preserve social fragmentation, because "without regional institutions, no loyalty to a higher order is possible... So regional problems find no vehicle for their solution and the capacity ... to awake a regional consciousness is lost" (Wood 1961a, 17980). Thus, like the previous communitarian models, communitarian metropolitanists believe that social embeddedness can lead to attachment, which can then function as an incentive for constructive civic involvement. However, they reject the notion that such embeddedness can be built on empowered neighborhoods. For metropolitanists, the best way to link citizens' social and civic lives to promote use of the constructive problem-solving modes of loyalty and voice is to create an encompassing urban government "great enough and fine enough to revive the dying sentiment of local patriotism" (Wells [1904] 1961, 154).

Their spatially expanded attachment is clearly something other than the older social attachments to small, organic communities. Yet, at the same time, they are not totally dissimilar in origin and makeup. Thus "Chicagoland," whether from Chicago, Skokie, or even Chesterton in nearby northwest Indiana, share the tragedy of the Cubs and such cultural icons as Ernie Banks and George Halas. Although their "strong talk" is less personal than communitarians would desire, it is no less real when broadcast over Wally Phillip's morning program on WGN radio or late-night talk shows on WBBM. Similarly, being an "Angelino" has little to do with living in Los Angeles, Anaheim, or North Hollywood but, rather, with identifying with a social community, albeit a large one. A few analysts (e.g., Long 1962, 156-64) believe that this new locus of attachment has become more important than the older ties central to the hypotheses of public choice liberals and neighborhood movement communitarians.

The second element of the communitarian and public choice attachment hypotheses is that communitarians and public choice theorists assume that the most vital interests are those that are local in the sense of the independent town or city or empowered neighborhood. Again, the metropolitanists do not question the importance of considering, discussing, and debating important issues to stimulate attachment to the political and/or social community. Instead, they question whether the locus of such issues is still the small independent town or neighborhood. Rather than encouraging debate over vital issues, they suggest that for several reasons, such communities more often than not stifle openness and "democratic talk."

Although metropolitan areas as a whole exhibit substantial diversity, the homogeneous character of specific empowered localities reduces the diversity of perspectives needed for rational resolution of conflict over vital issues. The most characteristic trait of metropolitan demographic patterns is the segregation of citizens into what Bellah et al. (1985, 73) identified in *Habits of the Heart* as "life-style enclaves" (see also Harrigan 1989, 250). Wood (1961b, 190) argued that such communities evolved to avoid meaningful consideration of many important issues, that the suburbanite can "abjure political discussion and debate by joining a constituency which shares his values, and his tensions, anxieties, and uncertainties are relieved." Thus the same homogeneity that makes such communities so "neighborly" deprives them of the diversity needed to generate meaningful discussion of vital public issues. (For a contrasting view, see Schneider and Logan 1982.)

It is not as if such people do not have the same vital concerns as those in Elkin's (1987) imagined empowered neighborhood. But many of the concerns of this type, which are listed by Elkin (p. 153) as potential topics to be addressed in the empowered locality, arise outside the locality of residence. For example, the empowered locality of residence will offer an inadequate venue for discussing work-life issues if they arise in the altogether different locality of employment (Wood 1961b, 179). The scale of many issues of personal vital concern to residents of empowered localities is inappropriate for that venue because social existence is now scattered across localities (Long 1962, 190).

Also, a vital issue may be transformed by the parochial nature of enclave communities into forms hardly anticipated by communitarians or public choice proponents. Thus race and land-use questions are often redefined from asking how authority might be used to promote equality in the provision of services or promote equitable land use to asking how to keep certain groups from entering the neighborhood or town. Moreover, the civil independence of the empowered locality provides the necessary tools of zoning restrictions and land-use controls to enforce de facto segregation (Danielson 1976; Hamilton, Mills, and Puryear 1975; Mills and Oates 1975). Thus many observers (Harrigan 1989, 284-302; Wood 1966, 95-98; Fainstein and Fainstein 1980, 259) have concluded that the empowered localities exhibit a "politics of exclusion." Discussion of these redefined issues may be as energetic and enthusiastic as communitarians could want, but their substance will often entail an exclusionary logic, substituting the language of not-in-my-back-yard NIMBYism for the languages of community or social contract.<sup>3</sup>

If empowered localities are demographically organized to avoid and/or narrowly redefine many important issues, what vital concerns remain on which to base a community of strong talk? The answer, it seems, is that they are empowered only for the mundane tasks of service delivery. Although important, these are not the sort of issues considered to be of vital personal concern to citizens on a day-to-day basis. For this reason, Long (1962, 179) concluded that the principal limit to meaningful local citizenship is the "sheer lack of significance at the local level." The organizations of the political community around life-style enclaves precludes the kind of constructive conflict, debate, and discussion of vital issues that neighborhood movement and public choice proponents themselves take to be important (Wood 1961b, 191). If addressing vital issues is important to developing the community attachment needed to activate recourse to the constructive behaviors of loyalty and voice, consolidation— not fragmentation— is required.

#### AN ILLUSTRATIVE TEST

To sharpen the debate between metropolitanists and supporters of empowered localities, we have developed, using the EVLN model, a sharper and more delineated behavioral understanding of each approach's

interpretation of effective citizenship. This enabled us to uncover both unexpected similarities and highly detailed differences among the several schools of thought. Although we hope that the many implications of our analytic framework will generate further theoretical and empirical work, the full range of concepts and their linkages described until now obviously cannot be fully tested within this venue.

Still, it is important to demonstrate that our framework is uncovering something more than distinctions without a difference. Therefore, we illustrate the utility of our framework by empirically examining what we believe to be the central citizenship-related issue underlying the debate between metropolitanists and supporters of empowered localities: the issue concerning the relationship between institutions, community attachment, and modes of citizen problem solving. To liberal public choice proponents and communitarian neighborhood movement advocates, citizens residing in empowered localities should exhibit higher psychological attachment to their community, which should facilitate use of their respective preferred patterns of problem solving. To metropolitanists, consolidation is more likely to foster the community attachment needed to encourage voice and loyalty.

#### RESEARCH DESIGN, SITES, AND MEASUREMENT

To test these hypotheses, we surveyed citizens in five types of neighborhoods in two metropolitan areas. Kentucky's Jefferson County, containing Louisville and having a 1980 population of 685,000, contains more than 90 units of general-purpose local government (i.e., incorporated municipalities). It is, therefore, typical of the kind of fragmented environment favored by public choice proponents. Many of the small, independent municipalities are essentially empowered neighborhoods relying on amateur citizen government of the type proposed by communitarians as well. On the other hand, Kentucky's Lexington-Fayette County, having a 1980 population of 204,000, has a two-decade-old consolidated city-county government (Lyons 1977).

Using available tract and block census data, we identified and conducted independent surveys of five distinct, spatially defined communities in each of these two urban areas that varied in terms of such factors as socioeconomic status, race, age, and levels of familism versus nonfamilism. The only major difference is that the boundaries of the five social communities in the Louisville-Jefferson County setting happen to correspond to the boundaries of an incorporated municipality, whereas in Lexington, their demographic "mirror images" are located in a larger consolidated government that embraces a wide variety of social communities. The five pairs of research sites located in each of these two urban areas, as well as their defining characteristics, are identified in Table 2. Further detail on sampling procedures and evaluation of the quality of the matching procedures can be found in Lyons and Lowery (1989).

**TABLE 2: Summary of Survey Site Households, Telephones Surveyed, and Response Rates**

<i>Consolidated (CON)/ Fragmented (FRA)</i>	<i>Government Research Sites</i>	<i>Characterization</i>	<i>N of Households with Listed Phone Number</i>	<i>N of Households with Valid Phone Number</i>	<i>N of Completed Interviews</i>
CON: Blueberry		Moderate to low SES, more	310 <sup>a</sup>	259	211 (81.5)
FRA: Minor Lane Heights		familistic, younger, mostly white	307 <sup>a</sup>	240	157 (65.4)
CON: Chinoe		Moderate to low SES, elderly,	753 <sup>b</sup>	329	225 (68.4)
FRA: Beechwood Village		less familistic, mostly white	497 <sup>b</sup>	303	188 (62.0)
CON: Stonewall		Moderate to high SES, middle-aged,	661 <sup>b</sup>	319	254 (79.6)
FRA: Barbourmeade		more familistic, mostly white	290 <sup>a</sup>	254	173 (68.1)
CON: Crestwood/Shadeland		Moderate to high SES, elderly,	858 <sup>b</sup>	316	253 (80.1)
FRA: Windy Hills		less familistic, mostly white	657 <sup>b</sup>	301	181 (60.1)
CON: Green Acres		Moderate to low SES, younger,	302 <sup>a</sup>	268	208 (77.6)
FRA: Newburg		more familistic, mostly black	891 <sup>b</sup>	278	166 (59.7)

NOTE: Parentheses indicate the percentage of valid telephone numbers called that resulted in a completed interview.

a. Indicates that all households with telephone numbers listed in the municipal directory were defined as a universe to be surveyed.

b. Indicates that a random sample of approximately 300 households was drawn from the list of all households with telephone numbers listed in the municipal directory.

We have three sets of variables to measure: government structure, citizen problem solving, and psychological attachment to the community. The first concerns the fragmented/consolidated government status of the metropolitan area. Given our research sites, this is tapped by the simple distinction between the Louisville-Jefferson County and Lexington-Fayette County respondents.

Three of the modes of problem solving are measured by indices made up of responses to several questions. VOICE, for example, as seen in Appendix A, is constructed with six standard indicators of political participation, with reference to local government (reliability alpha = .69). Specifically, the items focused on the respondent's prior activities aimed at solving local problems, including attending meetings, belonging to neighborhood organizations, contacting officials, signing or circulating petitions, and talking to neighbors. Of course, we do not mean to imply that participating just in these ways is sufficient to satisfy the communitarian's requirement for effective voice. Participation for communitarians includes many more forms of, and deeper levels of, participation. At the same time, though, if citizens engage in "full communitarian" participation, they will certainly be involved in the kinds of activities included in our VOICE index. Our measure, therefore, should enable us to assess differences broadly in the overall levels of participation associated with different institutional structures and levels of attachment.

Five items were used to tap feelings of LOYALTY. As noted in Appendix A, the five items included feelings of trust, a willingness to defend the local government, faith that problems will work out, a belief in the honesty of local officials, and a feeling that citizens are often too quick to blame local officials when things go wrong (reliability alpha = .72). Each reflects the passive-but-constructive orientation of the EVLN definition of loyalty.

Four items reflecting the destructive-passive character of our conceptualization of neglect—belief that one cannot fight city hall, not caring what happens in local government and politics, thinking it is not worth paying attention to local issues, and believing that it is useless to complain to officials — were combined to form our NEGLECT index (alpha = .69).

EXIT is a dichotomous indicator derived from responses to three questions. First, all respondents were asked how likely they were to move within the next two or three years. Those indicating "definitely will move" or "probably will move" were then asked if the move would entail leaving their current local governmental jurisdiction. Those answering yes to this question were then asked, "What are the two or three most important

reasons you will or might move out of [name of local government]?" Those making any mention of taxes, local government services, or anything pertaining to local government were coded as "regime-government" reasons for moving. All other reasons (e.g., job, divorce, health, retirement, or to get closer to or further away from relatives) were coded as "personal-economic" reasons. To be coded as an "exiter," a respondent had to give a yes response to the first two questions and a mention of a regime-government reason in response to the last question. This is admittedly a much more stringent measure of EXIT than used in any other study of which we are aware, including those by Sharp (1984) and Orbell and Uno (1972). However, it has the great advantage of tapping precisely the conditions that underlie the notion of exit as set forth by Tiebout (1956).

To test the EVLN model, Lyons and Lowery (1989) employed a general INVESTMENT measure that included both psychological attachment and social investments. To assess the hypothesized impact of attachment directly, we disaggregate that measure into two separate indicators. Two of the five items of INVESTMENT ( $\alpha = .53$ ), focusing on degree of attachment to the community and how sorry the respondent would be to leave the city, were used to construct PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTACHMENT. The remaining items, addressing social ties to the community (i.e., number of friends in the community) that have little directly to do with the affective relationship between citizens and their communities, were combined to create a separate indicator of SOCIAL INVESTMENT.

### FINDINGS

We suggested earlier that institutions can directly influence problem solving by opening or foreclosing alternatives, thereby shifting problem solving on the active-passive dimension. This relationship was examined in Lyons and Lowery (1989) and in Lowery and Lyons (1989) and need not be considered in more detail here. The ALTERNATIVES variable, indicating high and low levels of Tiebout-like alternatives, was found to generate weak and inconsistent coefficients. Thus the direct impact of institutions, as hypothesized by the EVLN model, is not very strong, providing little support for this part of the analysis of proponents of empowered localities.

To examine the indirect impact of institutions as exercised through psychological attachment, we reestimated the complete EVLN models using separate indicators of PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTACHMENT and SOCIAL INVESTMENT. This respecification changed little else from the results reported by Lyons and Lowery (1989). The coefficients and standard errors of the remaining EVLN (ALTERNATIVES, CURRENT DISSATISFACTION, SOCIAL INVESTMENT, and HOME OWNERSHIP) and control variables (GENERAL EFFICACY, RACE, INCOME, EDUCATION, AGE, and GEN-




Figure 2: Mean Levels of Exit by Levels of Psychological Attachment

DER) were generally similar (for a description of these variables, see Lyons and Lowery 1989, 855).<sup>4</sup> We discuss here, therefore, only the results specific to the PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTACHMENT variable (see Appendix B for the full results). When that variable was regressed on the remaining independent variables in

the EVLN model, the resulting  $R^2$  value was only .24, suggesting that collinearity will not inhibit interpretation of these coefficients. As in the earlier tests, largely consistent results were found across all five matched sets of communities when they were estimated separately; therefore, we present the EVLN results for the full sample including all 10 surveys.

The PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTACHMENT coefficient from a probit estimate of the EXIT model was negative and significant as expected ( $b = -.352$ ,  $SE = .078$ ,  $t = -4.517$ ,  $p < .01$ , one-tailed test,  $x^2 = 972.57$ ,  $n = 1,497$ ), indicating that those who are weakly attached are more likely to consider invoking the active-destructive response of leaving the jurisdiction. However, the response is not neatly linear, as evidenced by the simple relationship between the two variables. The mean levels of EXIT reported for each of the five levels of PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTACHMENT are reported in Figure 2. The high mean level of EXIT found for the lowest level of ATTACHMENT (.098) drops off very sharply when one moves up the scale of ATTACHMENT. Thus EXIT is the response of the very unattached. We reestimated the model using the squared value of PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTACHMENT. The resulting coefficient ( $b = -.085$ ,  $SE = .022$ ,  $t = -3.867$ ,  $p < .01$ , one-tailed test,  $x^2 = 1,015.31$ ,  $n = 1,497$ ) generated no stronger results, however.





Figure 3: Mean Levels of Neglect by Levels of Psychological Attachment


Our expectations were also met in regard to the NEGLECT model. The ATTACHMENT coefficient in the NEGLECT model was also negative and significant ( $b = -.316$ ,  $SE = .039$ ,  $t = -8.105$ ,  $p < .01$ , one-tailed test,  $R^2 = .235$ ,  $n = 1,233$ ), indicating that those who are weakly attached are more likely to use the passive-destructive response to problems of withdrawal and alienation. This is also illustrated by looking at the simple relationship between the variables, as seen in Figure 3. The mean levels of NEGLECT reported for each of the five levels of ATTACHMENT decline consistently from 5.226 to 3.546 as one moves up the scale of ATTACHMENT. Thus high attachment inhibits NEGLECT.

As expected, the ATTACHMENT coefficient in the EVLN VOICE model was positive and significant ( $b = .070$ ,  $SE = .043$ ,  $t = 1.637$ ,  $p < .10$ , one-tailed test,  $R^2 = .180$ ,  $n = 1,233$ ), but only at the .10 level, indicating that those who are strongly attached are more likely to invoke the active-constructive response of VOICE to problems. However, the weakness of these results is evident in the simple relationship between the variables, as seen in Figure 4. The mean levels of VOICE reported for each of the five levels of ATTACHMENT increase only slightly as one moves up the scale of ATTACHMENT and even declines slightly for the highest attachment level (2.809). So, although attachment does promote VOICE, its impact is neither very strong nor entirely consistent.

LOYALTY was found to be strongly associated with attachment. The ATTACHMENT coefficient was positive and significant ( $b = .622$ ,  $SE = .054$ ,  $t = 11.585$ ,  $p < .01$ , one-tailed test,  $R^2 = .363$ ,  $n = 1,233$ ), indicating that the



**Figure 4: Mean Levels of Voice by Levels of Psychological Attachment**



**Figure 5: Mean Levels of Loyalty by Levels of Psychological Attachment**

weakly attached are far less likely to use this passive-constructive response. This is evident in the simple relationship between the variables, as seen in Figure 5. The mean levels of LOYALTY reported for each of the five ATTACHMENT levels increase sharply and consistently from 5.584 to 9.461 as one moves up the ATTACHMENT scale. Thus high attachment strongly promotes the LOYALTY response.

Our first set of hypotheses is therefore supported. PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTACHMENT is positively related to the constructive responses of VOICE and LOYALTY and negatively related to the destructive problem-solving modes of NEGLECT and EXIT. Yet, the real controversy between metropolitanists and proponents of empowered localities lies not in these hypotheses but in their respective hypotheses about the relationship between structure and attachment.

To test these different expectations, difference of means tests were conducted on PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTACHMENT for the five matched pairs of communities. As seen in Table 3, the empowered locality expectations were not supported. Mean attachment is considerably higher in each of the Lexington-Fayette neighborhoods than in their corresponding Louisville- Jefferson independent cities, and four are significant at the .01 level. The respondents living in the fragmented governments are less psychologically attached to their cities than are their counterparts in the consolidated jurisdiction.<sup>5</sup> Because of these differences in psychological attachment and given the earlier results on the relationships between attachment and the four modes of problem solving, the use of the constructive responses to problems of VOICE and, especially, of LOYALTY should be

greater among consolidated respondents, and use of the destructive responses of EXIT and NEGLECT should be more pronounced in fragmented cities.

### CITIZENSHIP IN URBAN COMMUNITIES

Our theoretical analyses and partial empirical test clearly provide little support for the attachment hypotheses of neighborhood communitarians and public choice liberals. Given the observed differences in attachment, the institutions of the metropolitan reformers appear to promote use of the constructive problem-solving behaviors better than empowered localities. But what of citizenship more generally? The greater attachment-induced reliance on destructive modes of problem solving (EXIT and NEGLECT) found for the empowered localities is compatible with only the most extreme form of the watchdog liberalism understanding of citizenship. Heavy reliance on exit is a form of citizenship that can be pleasing to only the most extreme public choice liberals.

Supporters of the other three interpretations of citizenship also must find the patterns of problem solving in the fragmented communities disconcerting; empowered localities do not seem to provide much of a home for their preferred citizenship behaviors of voice and/or loyalty. Nor would communitarians of either stripe find much solace in our results for the consolidated

**TABLE 3: Psychological Attachment Difference of Means Tests for Alternative Institutional Arrangements – Matched Lexington (LEX) and Louisville (LOU) Sites**

<i>Consolidated/Fragmented Government Matched Sets</i>	<i>Mean Attachment</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Difference of Means</i>	<i>t Value</i>
LEX: Blueberry LOU: Minor Lane Heights	2.64 1.86	(1.09) (1.49)	215 152	-.78*	-5.56
LEX: Chinoe LOU: Beechwood Village	3.32 3.21	(1.05) (1.14)	218 181	-.11	-.96
LEX: Stonewall LOU: Barbourmeade	3.08 2.49	(1.11) (1.22)	249 170	-.59*	-5.01
LEX: Crestwood/Shadeland LOU: Windy Hills	3.35 2.88	(1.00) (1.14)	242 163	-.47*	-4.31
LEX: Green Acres LOU: Newburg	2.74 2.03	(1.20) (1.36)	200 157	-.71*	-5.18

\* $p < .01$ .

government of Lexington-Fayette County; only a marginal increase in the use of voice was found for its citizens despite higher levels of attachment to it.

Only virtuous liberals would find the attachment-induced enhancement of loyalty to be entirely satisfying. If, as Elkin (1987) suggested, city institutions play a formative role in citizenship, then the empowered locality tends to create watchdog liberals. In contrast, the consolidated governments of the metropolitanists would compose the school of virtuous liberals.

These conclusions, of course, are subject to several caveats. First, one should not attempt to generalize too broadly from these results. We were not able to explore empirically all of the nuances of our EVLN interpretation of citizenship and institutional structure.<sup>6</sup> Even more generally, the Lexington- Louisville findings need to be replicated in other settings.

Second, public choice proponents might object that all of this is irrelevant to assessing the merits of consolidation and fragmentation since the proof lies in the efficiency of service delivery. Further, they assert that on this score, the evidence supports fragmentation (Ostrom, Bish, and Ostrom 1988). The evidence is more ambiguous than they admit (Harrigan 1989, 321-23), and to the extent that efficiency differences exist, their models imply that the differences result in part from variations in responses that citizens invoke when

dissatisfied under alternative institutional structures (e.g., Oakerson, Parks, and Bell 1987) — precisely the behaviors we have examined. Thus the argument underlying this potential objection to our analysis attempts to salvage the purported efficiency advantages of the public choice institutional recommendations by abandoning at least some of the means alleged to produce them.

Third, communitarians might claim that we have failed to test the full complement of reforms needed to engender real participation. Barber (1984, 263), for example, suggested that communitarian reforms cannot be evaluated except as a complete package. This argument, however, only serves to insulate the communitarian view from empirical assessment of even its most basic causal claims. But even if we grant the argument for the moment, our findings add a new burden of proof to the communitarian campaign for neighborhood government. We have found that for at least the beginning of the continuum running from settings totally supportive to those completely nonsupportive of communitarian aspirations, the relationships between institutions, attachment, and behavior run counter to those suggested by Barber. Communitarians must now explain why institutions producing one set of results at one level of institutional reform should produce the opposite at some hypothetical threshold level.

Finally, what is the role of nonlocalized attachment in enhancing citizenship? It is clearly a more shallow and diffuse attachment based on shared symbols of metropolitan pride and shared experiences of metropolitan life. As such, it cannot replace the attachments associated with rural villages and ethnic neighborhoods of years past. This poses problems for strong democracy communitarianism, with its exclusive focus on empowered localities; the older attachments are gone, and their newer analogs are too weak to bear the demands of communitarian citizenship. Barring some rather drastic remaking of the social community, such as Elkin's (1987, 193) proposal to restrict mobility or Dagger's (1981, 733) option of dispersing citizens from the cities into smaller, presumably heterogeneous, sites, strong democracy cannot be built on metropolitan attachment of the type noted by metropolitanists.

For virtuous liberals and, to a lesser extent, representative communitarians, however, such attachments, when coupled with appropriate institutions, offer the prospect for better realizing their understandings of citizenship. Though they often focus on empowered localities as their preferred instruments, they, unlike the other two views of citizenship, are not conceptualized in a manner that strictly requires empowered localities. Virtuous liberalism, in comparison to watchdog liberalism, is far less tied to the public choice literature on fragmented institutions. The prospects for representative communitarianism, however, are less clear; though Schwartz's (1988) controversial understanding of communitarianism is certainly compatible with nonlocal institutions, as indicated by Long's (1962) rationale for metropolitan government, it is also a view that many communitarians do not consider to be "communitarian enough." In any case, metropolitanists would be on solid ground if they were to say to supporters of both schools that to the extent that their understandings of citizenship depend on community attachment, they should look to the modern metropolis and not to the past of parochial localism.<sup>7</sup>

## APPENDIX A Multi-Item Variables

VOICE is a 7-point index, ranging from 0 to 6, made up of responses to the following questions, for which yes responses were coded 1 and no responses were coded 0:

- Have you ever attended a meeting or meetings called to discuss problems in your neighborhood or local community? Yes/No
- Have you ever belonged to any organization attempting to solve problems in your neighborhood or local community? Yes/No
- Have you ever helped to organize a petition drive regarding problems in your neighborhood or local community? Yes/No
- Have you ever telephoned or written to an elected official of agency of (Name of Local Government) regarding problems in your neighborhood or local community? Yes/No
- Have you ever signed a petition regarding any particular problem in your neighborhood or local community? Yes/No
- Have you ever met informally with neighbors to work on solving problems concerning local government services in your neighborhood or local community? Yes/No

LOYALTY is 16-point index, ranging from 0 to 15, made up of responses to the following questions, for which high loyalty responses were coded 3:

- Generally speaking, how much do you trust the officials of (Name of Local Government) to do the "right thing" about problems that may arise in the community? Almost always/Most of the time/Only sometimes/Almost never
- If someone criticized the overall performance of the (Name of Local Government) during a conversation, how strongly would you defend the government? Very strongly/Somewhat strongly/Not very strongly/Not defend at all
- Problems with public services in (Name of Local Government) usually work themselves out. Strongly agree/Agree/Disagree/Strongly disagree
- People are too quick to blame local officials when things go wrong in (Name of Local Government). Strongly agree/Agree/Disagree/Strongly disagree
- As far as people like me are concerned, the best thing to do is to believe in the honesty and wisdom of those who run (Name of Local Government). Strongly agree/Agree/Disagree/Strongly disagree

3: NEGLECT is a 13-point index, ranging from 0 to 12, made up of responses to the following questions, for which high neglect responses were coded

- When there are problems like garbage in the streets or potholes in the roads, it is useless to complain to officials of the (Name of Local Government). Strongly agree/Agree/Disagree/Strongly disagree
- The (Name of Local Government) doesn't care about people like me. Strongly agree/Agree/Disagree/Strongly disagree
- I don't care what happens in the (Name of Local Government) as long as things are OK for me and my family. Strongly agree/Agree/Disagree/Strongly disagree
- It's not worth paying attention to issues facing the (Name of Local Government) because all the local politicians care about is serving their own interests. Strongly agree/Agree/Disagree/Strongly disagree

PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTACHMENT is a 5-point index, ranging from 0 to 4, made up of responses to the following questions, for which high investment responses were coded 2:

- Suppose that for some reason you had to move away from the area you now live in, how sorry or pleased would you be to leave? Very sorry/Somewhat sorry/Not sorry at all
- Do you feel a Strong, Moderate, or Weak attachment to living in (Name of Local Government)?

**APPENDIX B**  
**Probit and OLS Estimates of EVLN Models**

Variable	Responses to Dissatisfaction			
	EXIT <sup>a</sup>	VOICE <sup>b</sup>	LOYALTY <sup>b</sup>	NEGLECT <sup>b</sup>
<b>EVLN variables</b>				
Relative dissatisfaction	.012 (.071) <sup>c</sup>	.364*** (.045)	-.979*** (.057)	.281*** (.041)
Psychological attachment	-.352‡ (.078)	.070† (.043)	.622‡ (.054)	-.316‡ (.039)
Invest-social	.021 (.073)	.219*** (.039)	.054 (.048)	.056 (.035)
Invest-home	-.091 (.272)	.664*** (.159)	.146 (.199)	-.098 (.145)
Alternatives	.167 (.193)	-.011 (.098)	.522*** (.123)	-.208** (.089)
<b>Control variables</b>				
Education	-.112* (.062)	.210*** (.033)	-.147*** (.041)	-.047 (.030)
Income	-.005 (.054)	.121*** (.027)	-.037 (.033)	-.017 (.024)
Age	.001 (.006)	.006* (.003)	.013*** (.004)	-.001 (.003)
Gender	-.059 (.084)	.006 (.094)	.241** (.118)	.141 (.086)
Race	.197 (.245)	-.011 (.139)	.287* (.174)	-.275** (.127)
Local efficacy	.076 (.082)	-.084* (.043)	.001 (.054)	.356*** (.039)
Constant	3.679	-1.162	7.645	4.196
$R^2$	—	.18	.36	.24
$\chi^2$	972.6	—	—	—
$N$	1,497	1,233	1,233	1,233

\* $p < .10$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ ; two-tailed test.

† $p < .10$ ; ‡ $p < .01$ ; one-tailed test.

a. Estimated with Probit.

b. Estimated with OLS regression; coefficients are unstandardized.

c. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

**NOTES**

1. Curiously, "citizenship" is not noted in the indexes of either *Local Government in the United States* (Ostrom, Bish, and Ostrom 1988) or *The Limits of Liberty* (Buchanan 1975).
2. Most citizens have little knowledge about, and less control over, special districts and COGS, because they represent cities rather than citizens and are incapable of overcoming the veto power of constituent units (Harrigan 1989, 345-47).
3. Communitarians usually sidestep this issue via the sometimes unstated and usually weakly supported — for example, Elkin's (1987, 183) inadequate reference to Crenson (1983)— assumption that enough diversity exists. Public choice proponents simply assert that segregation has nothing to do with fragmentation per se and suggest that it be handled by a higher level of government, thus failing to recognize that fragmentation provides the ability to segregate.
4. The apparent differences are due to our reversed coding of GENDER, RACE, and GENERAL EFFICACY in comparison to their use in Lyons and Lowery (1989).
5. Given that much of the neighborhood power literature, though not the more general communitarian literature, gives special attention to this difference in black communities (Kotler 1969, 89-94; Fredrickson 1973), it is interesting to see that the two largely black communities in our study, Green Acres and Newburg, exhibit the same patterns as the predominantly white sites.

6. We have examined only fragmentation versus consolidation, the most gross level of institutional detail. Numerous other institutional variations bearing on citizenship remain to be examined using the EVLN framework. Indeed, although rarely acknowledged by public choice analysts, there are variations even within gargantua in district versus at-large representation, neighborhood organizations, little city halls, service districts, and such.

7. Despite this somewhat optimistic ending in regard to the relationships between non-localized attachments, consolidation, and the several modes of citizenship behaviors, we remain pessimistic about the utility of these arguments in actual consolidation campaigns. As noted earlier, nonlocalized attachment and its link to effective citizenship are rarely the issues upon which consolidation campaigns are based. We do not believe this is accidental. In contrast to the more typical claims of greater efficiency in service provision (e.g., Lyons 1977), metropolitan-wide attachments are probably too thin a reed upon which to build support for consolidation when confronted with the more highly charged negativism of localized attachments characteristic of a "politics of exclusion," especially so when such politics is founded on race. The substantial differences in the intensities between positive nonlocalized attachments and negative nonlocalized attachments make the latter a far better campaign issue. Thus, barring a disappearance of racial politics in the metropolis and the appearance of someone as skillful with the language of community as H. G. Wells ([1904] 1961), we view the citizenship-enhancing effects of mobilized nonlocalized attachments as a potential benefit of successful consolidation campaigns, not as a campaign issue useful in making consolidation campaigns successful.

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