
“I am among other things a farmgirl living in the midst of the hurlyburly or such paltry hurlyburly as we have in the desert, not unaware that there is a hole between my legs that has never been filled, leading to another hole never filled either” (Coetzee 41). J.M. Coetzee writes In the Heart of the Country as the diary of his main character, Magda. She is a single, white, South African woman who lives at home with her father. My paper, “Corporeality and Positionality in J.M. Coetzee’s In the Heart of the Country” explores Coetzee’s descriptions of bodies, space, and place in the text. By grounding these descriptions in the historical role of white women in pastoral, apartheid-era South Africa, I demonstrate that Coetzee’s descriptions of physical bodies and the actions they perform reflect their place in the colonial order and the spaces they are allowed to occupy. Through this reading, Magda’s refusal to acknowledge the black servant characters as individuals despite her own criticism of the place and space she and other single, white women are allowed to inhabit becomes legible. This illuminates Coetzee’s larger claims about the failure of the colonial project.
The United States 2016 presidential election left citizens of the U.S. and the world bewildered, regardless of political affiliation. The Republican candidate, Donald J. Trump, was marketed as a viable option because of his lack of political experience. He continually referred to himself as a candidate from “outside of the establishment.”

Tangentially, U.S. liberals frequently referred to Trump’s rhetoric about people of color, immigrants, women, and the disabled as unprecedented. Many Democrats in the United States discussed Trump as someone who was unqualified because of that same lack of political experience and wrote him off as an unintelligent person who did not use his words with intention (this argument is frequently used by those who read his Twitter).

In my essay, “Making America Great Again: Trump’s Rhetoric of Nation-Building and American Exceptionalism,” I examine Trump’s campaign rhetoric and argue that it does have historical precedent. I first turn to the work of Jeremy Engels to examine the ways Thomas Jefferson used rhetoric to write rebellious slaves in the U.S. as enemies to the unified nation. He repeatedly used tactics of fear to make white U.S. citizens view black people as the dangerous Other. Similarly, Donald Trump’s campaign named many enemies who threatened the essence of great and safe Americanness. He eventually named his political/public opposition as the dangerous enemy, too. I explore this creation of enemies through Donald Trump’s naming of women, Hispanic people (particularly Mexicans), black Americans, and Muslims. Throughout the course of his campaign and beyond it, Trump mobilized his largely white supporters by instilling fear, denying
animacy to his enemies, and insisting on the validity of United States exceptionalism. I rely on Mel Y. Chen’s theory of animacy and Jasbir K. Puar’s work on U.S. exceptionalism and homonationalism to make the historical precedent for Trump’s strategy legible.
CORPOREALITY AND POSITIONALITY IN J.M. COETZEE’S

IN THE HEART OF THE COUNTRY

AND

MAKING AMERICA GREAT AGAIN: TRUMP’S RHETORIC OF
NATION-BUILDING AND AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM

by

Caitlin O’Hara

A Thesis Submitted to
the Faculty of The Graduate School at
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

Greensboro
2017

Approved by

Alexandra Schultheis Moore
Committee Chair
This thesis, written by Caitlin O’Hara, has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of The Graduate School at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

Committee Chair  Alexandra Schultheis Moore
Committee Member  María Sánchez
Committee Member  Jennifer Feather

April 7, 2017
Date of Acceptance by Committee
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Firstly, I would like to thank my advisor Dr. Alexandra Schultheis Moore without whose time, support, and expertise, this project would not exist. Because of her patience, immense knowledge, and dedication, I was able to create better work than I ever imagined I could. It was an honor to work with her guidance, and the amount of inspiration I found in her own work (in her research and presence in the classroom) is immeasurable.

Besides my advisor, I would like to thank the rest of my committee: Dr. María Sánchez and Dr. Jennifer Feather. Thank you for showing me what professionalism looks like and for contributing all that you have to my work, to the students in your classes, to each woman who has had the pleasure of meeting with Women in English, and to our department as a whole.

Thank you to each professor who has taught me in my time at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. I particularly want to thank Dr. Nancy Myers for introducing me to the study of rhetoric and teaching me invaluable information about pedagogy, both through scholarship and by example. I also want to acknowledge Dr. Anthony Cuda who encouraged me to keep going when I felt certain I did not belong here.

My sincere thanks also goes to my fellow students and dear friends who endured this program with me. I have learned so much from each of you and would not have made it through this move, this program, or this project without your emotional support and
countless edits. Thank you for every piece of advice, for every proofread, for every shared piece of scholarship, and for every reminder that I could do this.

Finally, I want to thank my family, my partner, and my friends beyond this department. Thank you for taking interest in my work and for emotionally supporting me. Thank you for believing I would make every deadline, for never doubting the quality of my scholarship, and for reminding me there is life beyond academia.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CORPOREALITY AND POSITIONALITY IN J.M. COETZEE’S <em>IN THE HEART OF THE COUNTRY</em></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORKS CITED</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAKING AMERICA GREAT AGAIN: TRUMP’S RHETORIC OF NATION-BUILDING AND AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORKS CITED</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CORPOREALITY AND POSITIONALITY IN J.M. COETZEE’S
IN THE HEART OF THE COUNTRY

“I am among other things a farmgirl living in the midst of the hurlyburly of nature, or such paltry hurlyburly as we have in the desert, not unaware that there is a hole between my legs that has never been filled, leading to another hole never filled either” (Coetzee 41). Magda, the narrator of J.M. Coetzee’s *In the Heart of the Country* (1977), repeatedly writes connections between her body and her position as a single woman in the colonial project of apartheid-era South Africa in her “locked diary” (Coetzee 3). She lives with her father, the image of colonial power, and has almost no other human connection besides that which she has with their servants. Magda has no experience beyond the confines of the farm, and because Coetzee writes the novel in the first person, the reader’s perspective is limited to the confines of the farm as well. Many critics who have undertaken *In the Heart of the Country* analyze Magda’s tale as an allegory for the irreconcilable relationships created by colonization. However, it is necessary that we consider the particularities of her character and ask ourselves why Coetzee would write from such a position. Additionally, the suggestion that Magda and the servants symbolize the colonizer and the colonized, respectively, oversimplifies the many factors at play when considering structures of power. The novel illuminates the flawed, complicated ways in which individuals deny subjectivity to others in different positions. In this work, Coetzee also demonstrates that these positions are static and separate from the individual subject.
I read Magda’s descriptions of physical bodies in correlation with her understanding of place in the colonial order. This reading reveals the relationship between corporeality and positionality. It also makes legible that one cannot escape the position in which they were born and that it is inextricable from one’s reading of the world. Coetzee meticulously demonstrates Magda’s failure to fulfill her role in the family and in the colonial project, rendering her a “useless” body that must fight in order to claim space and place within her farm, country, and world. As I explore further in this essay, white, South African women of the apartheid era and beyond it, particularly those who lived in the farmlands, were expected to reproduce white sons. That is to say, their success in performing their responsibility to their community was measured quite literally by their bodies. Magda is not only without child, she is without love interest. Coetzee writes her resistance to the position of wife and mother through her descriptions of herself as infertile, unattractive, and a body capable of violence rather than nurturing. While she desires to deconstruct the boundaries of which bodies can perform which tasks, which bodies can exist in which physical spaces, and which bodies can interact freely with others, she negates her own intentions and desire for freedom from prescribed place throughout the novel; this is most visible in her descriptions of the black characters and her unwillingness to grant them the same agency and individuality she desires for herself. She cannot escape the ideology into which she is born, and thereby, she cannot escape her perceptions of bodies succeeding, or not succeeding, in their places. We must bear the question in mind, what does Coetzee accomplish by exploring a white woman’s desire for a sense of belonging and the right to occupy space in apartheid South Africa? I argue that
by writing Magda’s corporeal descriptions, Coetzee reveals her perspective of the characters’ place in the colonial order. Her descriptions of people’s bodies and mannerisms continually reflect the limits of their respective places. Coetzee writes Magda’s descriptions in such a way that it becomes clear she views gender-based oppression as more debilitating than oppression grounded in race. Despite her own desire to escape from her designated space and place, Magda is incapable of seeing how these same structures affect the servant characters in the text. This illuminates the multi-faceted, systemic nature of the power structures at play, as well as their inescapability. Additionally, the slippages in Magda’s descriptions illuminate the way no individual fits neatly into their prescribed place.

Gender and race have intertwined and deeply rooted histories in South Africa. Understandably so, the question of gender has frequently been neglected in favor of discussions of race, both in reality and fiction. MJ Daymond writes that South African writing typically focuses discussions of power on race instead of gender, leaving women of both races struggling to form a “community of purpose” (Daymond qtd. in Wright 12). Laura Wright asserts that many South Africans have resisted the term “feminist” and are reluctant to write explicitly about gender because of how pervasive issues of race are in the country (12). Iris Berger expresses a similar sentiment in her statement that the social, political, and historical situation of South Africa “has made a particular aspect of identity the main determinant of individual lives and consciousness” (Berger 285). It is important here that I recognize the role race plays within discussions of feminism in South Africa. As in many areas of the world and throughout concepts of global feminism, the focus has
often been centralized on issues of white (especially European and American) women.

While I do not wish to diminish the struggles of white women, it is important that these struggles be understood as applicable to some South African women and not to all. Ronit Frenkel aptly writes that

one of the challenges of South African feminism has been to rid itself of such racialised stereotypes and practices, where in this context white women have sometimes been charged with usurping the voice of black women within the name of gendered empowerment. (Frenkel 3)

In my effort to examine Magda’s situation in this text, I aim to acknowledge that Magda’s desires are not necessarily those of Klein-Anna, a black servant girl, and that Magda is incapable of interpreting Klein-Anna as a subject with desires. Additionally, I reveal the ways in which Magda writes Klein-Anna’s ability to elevate herself in the familial and colonial context as a direct threat to Magda’s own place. Through this reading, the ways in which Western feminism has in many ways historically failed women (and all people) of color become legible through literature.

Magda’s position as both a beneficiary of colonization and an oppressed individual under the patriarchal order further reveals the deeply-ingrained yet constructed nature of oppression based on categories such as race, gender, and class. Coetzee accomplishes this by revealing Magda’s self-conscious position as an individual struggling for power and choice and her simultaneous inability to imagine the servants on her farm as complex individuals. He reveals the freedoms she is denied through her descriptions of occupying her body and physical space while she simultaneously denies the black servants these same freedoms. This reading speaks to popular critical claims,
such as those from Nadine Gordimer and Tony Morphet, that Coetzee’s work does not “uncover the structures that are at the base of personal oppression” (Marques 157). While Coetzee’s explicit claims about institutional sexism and racism in South Africa are rare in this text, his choice to connect Magda’s physical body to her institutional place implicitly uncovers these structures—as does her incongruent treatment of the servants and her awareness of her own oppression.

Laura Wright offers some insight into the question of why Coetzee would write from the position of a white, female narrator with her assertion that white South African women “find themselves in between, stranded on literal and figurative islands as both colonial dominators (white) and subjected, second-class citizens (women)” (Wright 11). Not only does this claim connect social place to material space, it highlights a tension that has neither been adequately explored in history nor in literary criticism. Wright goes further to say:

These two conflicting tensions serve, if not to effectively cancel each other out, to create a tension around the act of testimony that serves to silence a white South African feminist agenda—and South African author JM Coetzee’s female narrators, Magda in In the Heart of the Country (1977), Susan Barton in Foe (1986), and Elizabeth Curren in Age of Iron (1990), through the presentation of their continually self-negating narratives, serve to illustrate such a position. (12)

Coetzee writes Magda in such a way that this silence becomes legible. I take Wright’s claim a step further by arguing that Magda’s liminal position and Coetzee’s choice to write her descriptions of bodies and place as intertwined reveal the underpinnings of colonization, not simply the white South African woman’s position within it. Sheila Roberts claims that “colonization of the female by a masculine culture differs, however,
from that grounded in race and geographic exploitation by being more thoroughgoing and more natural-seeming” (Roberts 22). While I am unwilling to commit to this claim, I include it here to acknowledge that different systems of oppression function differently and at once, even in the same physical space. Through my reading of the novel, it is clear that Magda believes that the oppression of female South Africans is more all-encompassing than the oppression of black South Africans, and she sees the potential for black mobility as a direct threat to her own place. While I do argue that Magda’s voice offers insight into the positionality of the servant characters, Coetzee accomplishes this by writing her as a racist white woman who critiques conventional gender roles. The black characters are still very much silenced, only to be translated through Magda’s unreliable narration.

Coetzee’s intentions and effectiveness in creating a feminist work are wildly contentious. Some critics are skeptical about a male author’s ability to write a female character who empowers women, especially a mentally unstable and physically unappealing character in the context of a work designed to mobilize tropes of South American femininity. It is useful to examine Coetzee’s statements in interviews and prose as well as *In the Heart of the Country* as a piece of his oeuvre before examining this novel’s characterization as a feminist text. It is clear from Coetzee’s statements that he is adamantly against absolutism in any context; in his own words, “let me simply say that I am not enamored of the Either-Or. I hope that I don’t simply evade the Either-Or whenever I am confronted with it” (“An Interview with J.M. Coetzee” 107). This statement conveys beneficial information when acknowledging the stereotypical,
arguably cartoonish nature of Magda’s descriptions of body and self. Magda is an individual who quite consciously does not fit into her prescribed societal role and a character written by a man who publicly refuses to claim binaries and absolutes. Magda is not simply the colonizer or the colonized; she does not simply desire or reject the place history and ideology have designated to her. An awareness of Coetzee’s position on absolutes makes it all the more important that his readers approach this work with a sensitivity to the many conflicting descriptions.

Laura Wright’s essay, “Displacing the Voice: South African Feminism and JM Coetzee’s Female Narrators,” helps us to see Coetzee’s feminist efforts across a larger scheme by comparing In the Heart of the Country, Foe, and Age of Iron. She claims that “Coetzee’s female narrators . . . attempt to fulfill the role of mediator often occupied by white women as both colonised and colonising” (Wright 14). While I will further complicate the role of “mediator” in my close reading of Magda’s interactions with both her father and the servants on the farm, I agree with Wright’s statement that Magda functions as both colonized and colonizing. Wright goes on to say that “Coetzee’s project can be read as an attempt to resurrect a feminine ethos repressed by patriarchal colonial politics; in fact, the trinity of Magda/Susan/Elizabeth [the respective female narrators] constitutes the archetypal matriarchal triad of virgin/mother/crone” (Wright 14). While the portrayal of Magda is not flattering, hopeful, or realistic, Coetzee uses this extreme, unreliable, and desperate character to illuminate the depth of patriarchal oppression as well as the inability of this character to acknowledge the oppression of black South
Africans. On a larger scale, this inability illuminates the exclusionary nature of Western feminism in regard to people of color as well as the inextricable nature of ideology.

Coetzee’s choice to write Magda’s conflicting narratives and statements of intention reveals her unwillingness (and arguably, her inability) to participate successfully in her role as white woman and in her social community. It also reveals her conflicting desires—both to belong and to reject. This choice illuminates the complexities not only of Magda but of the driving desires for domination. To maintain domination is to keep control of the situation and thereby guarantee one’s own place. Hena Maes-Jelinek writes that “a vision of history inspired by a conviction that truth is complex and mysterious naturally leads to a questioning of, and inquiry into, the apparent reality and goes together with a transformation of the traditional forms of fictional exploration” (Maes-Jelinek 89). It is clear from Coetzee’s interviews and public statements that he approaches history and art with the conviction Maes-Jelinek describes. It is also clear from my reading of In the Heart of the Country that the text destabilizes representations of desire and domination. Coetzee leaves his reader no choice but to examine participation in ideology and structures of power outside of the typical binary model. Indeed, as Daniella Coetzee claims, “it seems that attempts to eradicate gender discrimination in any society will not succeed without first identifying deep-rooted structures of domination that serve to perpetuate the ideology of patriarchy” (Daniella Coetzee 300). Coetzee uses his voice to identify and complicate these structures.

The Great Trek, beginning in 1835, had a direct and profound impact on popularized ideals of white South African womanhood. As colonizers from London
moved to South Africa by the thousands, they required land and pastures (Lapierre 22). They began to spread and encroach on the land occupied by the Dutch settlers. In an effort to avoid conflict with a group much larger and stronger than they, the Dutch settlers decided to explore the interior of the country, which they believed was largely uninhabited (Lapierre 23). Many Dutch settlers died during this excursion, and as a result of the danger and difficulty, it became a point of pride in the nation’s history. These travelers, known as Voortrekkers, were glorified, and a monument to the Great Trek stands south of Pretoria to this day. Liese Van der Watt argues that at the center of the notion of South African family is the “volksmoeder ideal—an ideology which emerged in the first half of the twentieth century and dominated Afrikaners’ perceptions about Afrikaner women” (Van der Watt 92). The volksmoeder, or “mother of the nation,” was to possess “kindness, gentleness, care, frugality, discipline and conformity” (Brink). It was the task of these gentle women to maintain the nation and protect racial purity and purported superiority; “Symbol of her racial purity, the white complexion of the Boer woman—despite exposure to the African wilderness” was highlighted through literature of the time and beyond it (Brink). This is the ideal that Magda is expected to uphold but does not.

Bodies and place play a central role in my discussion of both postcolonial feminism and In the Heart of the Country. Michael du Plessis writes that there has been a link between the female body and feminine sign since the “very origins of sociality” (du Plessis 118). This can be seen in Victorian literature and earlier, where the mother was often silenced, “her body obscured” (Roberts 23). This silence is evident in Coetzee’s
text and rooted in the body and physical space; most obviously, Magda’s father commands her to be silent and locks her in her bedroom. The relationship between space and place must necessarily be established. Each character can take up a certain amount and certain kinds of space as a direct result of their ‘place’ (I use place to mean one’s social position, one created by many factors, including but not limited to her/his race, gender, class, and age). Through Magda’s descriptions of bodies and physical acts, she illustrates the ways those with a more elevated place experience fewer spatial limits. Michael Keith and Steve Pile explore this relationship: “New spaces of resistance are being opened up, where our ‘place’ (in all its meanings) is considered fundamentally important to our perspective, our location in the world, and our right and ability to challenge dominant discourses of power” (Keith and Pile 6). It is because of Magda’s failure to thrive in her place that she must turn to physical violence to occupy physical space. Coetzee asserts that Magda has more desire and ability to challenge these dominant discourses than Hendrik or Klein-Anna by writing her as the murderer of her father, but he also illuminates the ways in which Magda perceives the allocation of power as hinging more on gender than race. Discussing space and place in apartheid-era South Africa is particularly illuminating because of the intensely material segregation of the nation at this time. Coetzee writes Magda’s blindness to this segregation through her hyper-awareness of her own physical limitations.

The role of bodies and their relationship to the Afrikaner woman’s place in colonial order are historically connected. The Afrikaner woman, especially the pastoral one, was to uphold the domestic sphere, to take care of “trivial” tasks for her husband
(e.g., drawing his bath, removing his boots), and above all else, to use her body as a vessel with which to bear more sons. Roberts argues that because Magda is deprived of a mother, she lacks an example to follow and cannot shift her focus to the father/husband in an adult way (23). Magda describes her mother’s physicality in vague and uncertain terms. She describes her as a “faint grey” figure, a “frail gentle loving” mother who “died under her husband’s thumb,” “huddled on the floor,” “patient, bloodless, apologetic” when the doctor arrived” (Coetzee 2). Magda’s lack of role model leaves her incapable of making the shift; however, her limited imagination of her mother as wife and mother is not a positive one. Her mother failed to provide a son for her father and died because of it: “She was too frail and gentle to give birth to the rough rude boy-heir my father wanted, therefore she died” (Coetzee 2). This quotation is a prime example of physical descriptions mirroring a character’s place. Magda describes her mother as frail and gentle; while gentleness is a key component of the volksmoeder ideal, frailness is not a desirable trait for a woman meant to trek the countryside. The “rough rude boy-heir [her] father wanted” represents the next generation of colonizer—one that Magda’s mother could not produce. Because of her failure to perform her colonial role, or successfully act in her place, she physically cannot continue to live. Magda’s descriptions of her mother also suggest a consciousness that the rigidity of these roles is unhealthy, destructive, and ammorally limiting. Further, it is damaging to read Magda’s inability to fulfill her place as some sort of deficiency. Magda’s mother adds evidence to the negative nature of predetermined gender roles, not to Magda’s failure to become this idealized image.
Magda describes herself and her fellow “spinsters . . . lost to history, blue as roaches in our ancestral homes, keeping a high shine on the copperware and laying in jam” as “wooed when we were little by our masterful fathers, we are bitter vestals, spoiled for life. The childhood rape: someone should study the kernel of truth in this fancy” (Coetzee 3). This quotation is packed heavily with corporeal descriptions and images of competing positionalities. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the vestal virgin as follows: “n. one of the priestesses (originally four, subsequently six in number) who had charge of the sacred fire in the temple of Vesta at Rome.” Magda directly compares the vestal, whose responsibility was to maintain the sacred fire, a representation of the life and soul of the city of Rome, to her fellow single Afrikaner women. The role of volksmoeder, imposed on the Afrikaner girl at birth, charges her with the task of solidifying the future of the nation; she does not ask to participate in this order, but she is impregnated with the purpose as a child. “The childhood rape” in this context can also be read as the domination of these girls and the forcing of the belief that their fathers and all white men are rightful masters. Coetzee demonstrates the impossibility of escaping this ideology by writing that she is “spoiled for life.” Finally, Coetzee’s image of cockroaches is worth mentioning. The cockroach is known for creeping through low spaces of a home. They are unwanted, just as Magda feels unwanted in her space.

Magda is a figure whose predetermined role in her culture leaves her with few material options for social or political gain. Her conflicting language throughout the text leaves Coetzee’s reader to question if she would escape the ideology if she could. This is a crucial understanding to bring to this text because, as previously stated, Coetzee is
adamantly against the notion of binaries and absolutes. Magda uses descriptions of bodies to reveal the boundaries of place in the dominant culture. An example can be readily seen after Magda’s first attempt to kill her father. Magda describes her father as the “dark father” and he and his new wife as “antagonists” who benefit from colonial power (Coetzee 3 and 1). The “dark father” is congruent with other descriptions of her father as overbearing—casting a shadow over all those he encounters. This is representative of the domination he enacts as colonizer. She describes him as pacing and stamping through doors (Coetzee 9). In every case before Magda’s acts of violence, her father serves as a heavy, oppressive figure who maintains the order of the house and has “relentless sexual demands,” demands driven by his desire for a son (Coetzee 12). In this sense, her father is one whose body and physical acts mirror his position as a white man in apartheid South Africa. As I demonstrate later, however, these descriptions are not consistent.

The idea of Magda’s displacement from her social and cultural place is not a new one. Wright, for instance, notes, “Dominic Head claims that as an allegorical phenomenon and literary subject, Magda is an ‘anomaly because she finds herself in a literary genre (pastoral) to which her passion does not belong’” (Head qtd. in Wright). In a material sense, the dislocation of Magda’s passion for becoming an individual in history is in union with the dislocation of her body on the farm. These dislocations produce a sense of what Magda identifies as absence. This absence further illustrates the notion of a silenced female body, one silenced by the father:

I was absent. I was not missed. My father pays no attention to my absence. To my father I have been an absence all my life. Therefore instead of being the womanly
warmth at the heart of this house I have been a zero, null, a vacuum towards which all collapses inward. (Coetzee 2)

Coetzee consciously pairs this description of absence with Magda’s failure to perform the duties of volksmoeder. Because Magda is unable to perform her duties as a white woman, it is as though she ceases to exist in the eyes of her father, and thereby, those in positions of power. This quotation illustrates Wright’s claim that “Magda becomes the symbolic manifestation of white female desire in South Africa, ignored and self-negating, complicit with and critical of apartheid, a motherless daughter in a political framework that would prefer her to be a son” (Wright 18).

Coetzee includes many descriptions of Magda’s body that are explicitly critical. These descriptions are perhaps the most constant, unchanging element of the text. As stated above, she repeatedly describes her body as an absence (first seen on Coetzee 2). Magda claims that she lives “inside a skin inside a house” (Coetzee 10). This statement illustrates a separation from her sense of self and her body as well as the relationship between self, body, and allocated space. This separation magnifies the role of body in place and Magda’s inability to inhabit hers successfully. While Magda’s existence is limited inside the home, she simply does not exist beyond it. Similarly, she has no purpose within her social context other than what can be performed by her body. Magda expands on her claims that she does not fulfill her prescribed role: “labouring under my father’s weight I struggle to give life to a world but seem to engender only death” (Coetzee 10). While this statement foreshadows Magda’s attempts at murder, it also allows us to conceive of her lack of child-bearing as an act against patriarchal colonial
control. Magda represents a person who does not participate in her obligation to further the colonial project by producing and nurturing white sons. However, Coetzee’s word choice complicates the notion that Magda merely does not participate. Magda writes that she cannot participate, because she is either too unattractive for a man to desire or is potentially infertile: Magda refers to her “slumbering eggs” and wonders “who would attend my childbed?” (10). On the other hand, Magda makes clear statements that she desires more freedom of choice than women in her culture possess:

Men’s talk is so unruffled, so serene, so full of common purpose. I should have been a man, I would not have grown up so sour, I would have spent my days in the sun doing whatever it is that men do, digging holes, building fences, counting sheep. What is there for me in the kitchen? The patter of maids, gossip, ailments, babies, steam, foodsmells, catfur at the ankles—what kind of life can I make of these? (Coetzee 21).

Coetzee’s choice of gendered activities posits men as those who exist outside, not only occupying space but controlling it by digging into it and constructing boundaries. Women are confined to the kitchen where they chatter and nurture the family. Magda acknowledges that she is not interested in the life she is meant to make. I argue that Coetzee’s choice to write Magda as so deeply conflicted about her desires and place in community reveals the inescapable nature of the desire to occupy space and place—even if that space and place are limited. Magda wants to belong in some way, and the only way she can envision belonging is by subscribing to conventional gender roles. She would need to marry, have a child, and bring warmth to the home, to occupy the limited physical space of the kitchen, or to become a man instead. Only then could she enjoy life
outside of the home and use her voice freely. Any other sense of place is unfathomable to her.

As early as the first page, Coetzee uses language that traps Magda in limited space: “I am the one who stays in her room reading or writing or fighting migraines. The colonies are full of girls like that, but none, I think, so extreme as I” (Coetzee 1). This expands the scope of the critique from the personal to the systemic, criticizing the colonial project rather than solely Magda or her father. Despite Magda’s inability to fit the role of the fertile volksmoeder, she remains confined to the home. However, rather than maintaining the kitchen, the predetermined site of the wife and mother figure, Magda seems to take up as little space as humanly possible. She confines herself to solitary activities in a solitary space, again illustrating the way a lack of place materializes in a lack of occupiable space. Coetzee shows this by continually writing Magda as a hole: “I am a hole crying to be whole” (Coetzee 41). This yonic image evokes not only that of an objectified female body destined for reproduction but one that is nothing but lack. She envisions herself a hole without lover, a hole without child to bear, and a hole in the colonial situation she lives within yet does not uphold. Again, Magda continually perceives herself as an absence and a vacuum. She not only takes up little space in the home, she refers to herself as a physical absence of space. In terms of her existence outside of the home, Magda laments, “I seem to never have been anywhere” (Coetzee 17). Coetzee writes this quotation in comparison to Klein-Anna after describing how Hendrik purchased her from her father. Because Klein-Anna is a desirable wife and mother, Magda perceives that she has physical and social mobility. Even someone who is
treated as an object for purchase, in Magda’s mind, is in a better position than she. Coetzee’s formulation of Magda highlights her belief that the worst struggle one can endure is existing outside of place. It also highlights Magda’s inextricability from her culture’s ideology as well as white feminism’s blindness to the struggles of people of color. Further still, Coetzee reveals through Magda’s perception of Klein-Anna that this system relies on a sense of self-preservation. Those who assert control over others, misguided as they are, do so to protect their own space and place.

Magda’s descriptions of other bodies also coincide with the spaces those bodies may occupy. Though I have touched on descriptions of her father already, I explore them further here. As I have stated, Coetzee writes Magda’s father as a powerful figure who monitors the farm, makes commands, and maintains order. He can occupy any and all spaces; not only does he live throughout the house with no restriction, he has a life outside of the farm that Magda can scarcely conceptualize. The first sentence of the novel exhibits his ability to have life and relationships beyond the farm, as he returns with his new wife “drawn by a horse with an ostrich-plume waving on its forehead, dusty after the long haul” (Coetzee 1). However, Magda’s physical descriptions change considerably after her violent attacks on her father:

The sex is smaller than I thought it would be, almost lost in a bush of black hair straggling up to the navel: a pale boy, a midget, a dwarf, an idiot son who, having survived for years shut away in the cellar, tasting only bread and water, talking to the spiders, singing to himself, is one night dressed in new clothes, set free, made much of, pampered, feasted, and then executed. Poor little thing. It is not possible to believe I came from there, or from whatever that puffy mass is below it. (Coetzee 69)
This description is in stark contrast to her father as master of the house. Because of her action, Magda is able to see her father not as the presence she is accustomed to, but as a vulnerable, individual person. Much like she separates him from his place as white male colonizer, she separates his body parts here and can find pity for them. Here, Coetzee asserts that Magda’s father is as inextricable from his place as she is to her own. She characterizes him as a son, revoking his status as patriarch. This is another of Coetzee’s veiled moves that expose the constructed nature of systems of power. Even the powerful white male can be removed from his position as master.

Coetzee makes clear that Magda perceives the categories of female and male as equally separate as those of black and white, if not more so. But she is incapable of or unwilling to understand the unjust, racialized nature of oppression in her country. This comparison is most notable in her descriptions of Hendrik, as he, too, has a life beyond the farm. She imagines him returning, like her father did, with his new bride: “in the donkey-cart, dusty after the long haul from Armoede” (Coetzee 17). While her father wore “his black swallowtail coat and stovepipe hat” and came in a dog-cart drawn by a decorated horse (Coetzee 1), Hendrik returns wearing “the black suit passed on to him by [her] father with an old wide-brimmed felt hat and a shirt buttoned to the throat” (Coetzee 17). Hendrik still has the agency to leave the farm and take property—in this case, Klein-Anna. Magda also makes clear that she perceives Hendrik as having a position of power:

In the old days, the bygone days when Hendrik and his kind followed their fat-tailed sheep from pasture to pasture, the golden age before the worm arrived, on the wings of the howling storm no doubt, and decamped at the very spot where I sit, what a coincidence, perhaps then, when Hendrik was a patriarch bowing his knee to no one, he took to bed two wives who revered him, did his will, adapted
their bodies to his desires, slept tight against him, the old wife on one side, the young wife on the other, that is how I imagine it. (Coetzee 18)

Magda’s use of the phrase “Hendrik and his kind” is particularly striking in comparison to her assertions of her own individuality: “I am I. Character is fate. History is God” (Coetzee 5). In contrast to her description of Hendrik as a male with agency, Magda makes clear that she does not see him as a whole person: “Can brown skinned people blush?” she wonders, as Hendrik expresses embarrassment when she dresses her naked father (Coetzee 69). She is aware that he has emotions, but when treating “blush” as the physical signification of responding to a breech in what is socially appropriate, Magda separates Hendrik from that order. Coetzee continually writes the ways Magda dictates others’ place in her diary while she laments her inability to occupy her own place. Magda’s Othering of the servants becomes clearer in her descriptions of Klein-Anna.

Klein-Anna, the young woman who comes to the farm as Hendrik’s wife and ultimately has an affair with Magda’s father, fulfills her role in the colonial/patriarchal order perfectly, in Magda’s eyes. Still, Magda perceives that Klein-Anna lacks agency: “Locked in sleep she lies all night at Hendrik’s side, a child still growing, now a fraction at the knee, now a fraction at the wrist, the proportions always suave” (Coetzee 18). Magda continually infantilizes Klein-Anna, both in name and description of body. Klein-Anna too occupies space beyond the farm, but she occupies this space as a possession. Hendrik “had bought her from her father for six goats and a five-pound note, with a promise of five pounds more, or perhaps of five goats more, one does not always hear these things well” (Coetzee 17). She finds mobilization because she fulfills the purpose of
wife and future mother. Coetzee’s choice to write Magda as unclear on the details of this purchase highlight Magda’s detachment from Klein-Anna’s positionality and suggests that the material amounts of exchange matter less than the reality that this human is treated as a commodity. The most corporeal description of Klein-Anna is written through Magda’s imagination of her father’s perspective: “for the first time sees through his heavy field-glasses the red kerchief, the widest eyes, the pointed chin, the sharp little teeth, the foxy jaw, the thin arms, the slender body of Hendrik’s Anna” (Coetzee 25). Magda portrays Anna as sexual, fragmented, childish, plotting, and most consistently, a possession.

While Magda focuses her introduction of Klein-Anna on the purchase and transportation of her body, Magda describes her step-mother’s outfit in a congruent scene: “a wide-brimmed sunhat and a white dress tight at waist and throat” (Coetzee 1). This is in direct contrast to the description of Klein-Anna who is “clutching her shawl, exposed and apprehensive” (Coetzee 17). Magda perceives her step-mother as a reproductive glutton, a woman who purely benefits from her positionality in the colonial order: “the new wife is a lazy big-boned voluptuous feline woman with a wide slow-smiling mouth” (Coetzee 1). Unlike Magda who “even decades of mutton and pumpkin and potatoes have failed to coax from me the jowls, the bust, the hips of a true country foodwife, have achieved no more than to send my meagre buttocks sagging down the backs of my legs,” her step-mother unapologetically takes up space, a rounded woman with stereotypically fertile features (Coetzee 21). The step-mother, unlike Magda and her biological mother, is free to enjoy life’s pleasures. Magda writes, “she sleeps and eats and
lazes. She sticks out her long red tongue and licks the sweet mutton-fat from her lips. ‘Ah, I like that!’ she says, and smiles and rolls her eyes” (Coetzee 1). Unlike Magda, the step-mother’s body is portrayed as one that takes up space without reservation and inhabits her beneficial place in the colonial order without complication.

To Magda, it appears that the true separation is between those who successfully occupy a place and those who do not. As someone who does not serve a purpose, she is able to recognize the flaws in an absolute system. As someone excluded from place, she is able to critique it, but she cannot escape her desire to belong. She also cannot escape the influence of ideology on her own desires and personhood, and as I illustrate further in the following sections, Magda views those who do have place, particularly Klein-Anna, as a direct threat to her ability to occupy it.

I now turn to explore place through descriptions of these bodies acting on one another. This section contains two parts that are deeply interrelated and therefore alternate: Magda’s exploration of physical relationships that uphold place and create unity, and Magda’s exploration of physical relationships that disrupt boundaries of designated space and place. I first examine this through Magda’s descriptions of her father and step-mother’s sexual acts: “Hand in hand they stroke her womb. They twine; she laps him in her flesh; they chuckle and moan. These are fair times for them” (Coetzee 2). The language centers around the step-mother’s ability to reproduce, but also on the connection between step-mother and father. Because of her fertility, the step-mother has a place in the master bedroom and a viable place in relationship to the father. Magda continues to ground her descriptions of sexual acts with a focus on reproduction: “They
sweat and strain, the farmhouse creaks through the night. Already the seed must have been planted, soon she will be sprawling about in her mindless heat, swelling and ripening, waiting for her little pink pig to knock” (Coetzee 10). The act of sex itself fills the space of the entire farmhouse. From Magda’s perception, the step-mother and father experience no limits in their ability to permeate space, and this is most evident when they perform the act of sex, the prerequisite to a white son. Coetzee’s descriptions of the step-mother complicate the notion of place by denying her any of the characteristics of volksmoeder besides fertility.

Immediately following the quotation above, Magda describes her violent action against the couple. Magda describes her father’s penis as “the tired blind fish, cause of all my woe, lolling in his groin (would that it had been dragged out long ago with all its roots and bulbs!). The axe sweeps up over my shoulder” (Coetzee 11). Magda’s sense of her woes coming from her father’s sex organs is perhaps because she was literally created by his sexual acts with her biological mother, but I also read this as the reproduction of more white, male sons as the cause of woe. It is here that Magda first murders her father and step-mother. In Magda’s violence, the two bodies are still inseparable: “Leaning forward and gripping what must be one of their four knees, I deliver much the better chop deep into the crown of her head” (Coetzee 11). This reflects Magda’s understanding of their respective places as coupled colonizers; to Magda, her step-mother is not dominated by the patriarchal order but instead unified with it and a beneficiary of it. She attempts to separate the two: “I must pick them off one by one, recover (with some effort) my axe, and hack with distaste at these hands, these arms until I have a free moment to draw a
sheet over all this shuddering and pound it into quiet” (Coetzee 11). These murderous acts are the pinnacle of the disruption Coetzee attempts to enact with Magda’s self-negating narrative and repeated descriptions of space and place.

Leading up to this initial murder attempt, Magda positions herself in the kitchen instead of remaining cloistered in her bedroom. She pushes her ability to occupy space in the home before performing her ultimate act of defiance. It is in the master bedroom where Magda finds the strength and weapon necessary to take up space. Immediately after the murder, she claims her ability to make decisions about what space bodies can occupy. After her initial act of agency, the axing of these two bodies, Magda states, “I ask myself: what am I going to do with the bodies?” (Coetzee 13). Tradition has determined the place of these bodies until now, but because of Magda’s physical action, she has the opportunity to determine what to do with them, to decide where they belong. However, Magda’s relief does not last. She writes that these events did not take place, and her father is still alive and unwounded.

The next example of a physical act creates unity while also disrupting boundaries and alienating Magda from her father; it is the sexual relationship between Magda’s father and Klein-Anna. Magda imagines their interactions from her bedroom: “My father is exchanging forbidden words with Klein-Anna. I do not need to leave my room to know. We, he is saying to her, we two; and the word reverberates in the air between them” (Coetzee 35). This description is quite different from that of the father and stepmother’s sexual acts; Magda’s father, who she feels has convinced her of his own power,
now uses language to convince Klein-Anna of their unification. Magda imagines the 
domination as both coercion and physical force:

My father tethers his horse outside his servant’s house. He locks the door behind 
him. The girl tries to push his hands off, but she is awed by what is about to 
happen. He undresses her and lays her out on his servant’s coir mattress. She is 
limp in his arms. He lies with her and rocks with her in an act which I know 

enough about to know that it too breaks codes. (Coetzee 36)

This supposed act of union renders Klein-Anna powerless, unlike Magda’s step-mother. 
The space occupied here is also important; Magda’s father goes into the servant’s 
quarters to force himself on Klein-Anna, and Magda recognizes this as an act against the 
respective people’s designated space:

I am a conserver rather than a destroyer, perhaps my rage at my father is simply 
rage at the violations of the old language, the correct language, that take place 
when he exchanges kisses and the pronouns of intimacy with a girl who yesterday 
scrubbed the floors and today ought to be cleaning the windows. (Coetzee 43)

Magda entertains the idea that she desires to maintain colonial order, though when the 
question is of her own place within it, she wishes to destroy it. She immediately negates 
this consideration: “But this, like so much else about me, is only theory. Let me at all 
costs not immure myself in a version of myself as avenger, eyes flashing and sword on 
high, of the old ways” (Coetzee 43). Here, again, Magda’s conflicting views are evident. 
Coetzee reveals that while Magda wants to change the systems of power in which she 
exists, she clings to them for a sense of control and self-preservation.
This connection between Magda’s father and Klein-Anna results in Magda’s perception of her own displacement. Before Magda’s father partakes in a meal with Klein-Anna, he comes to Magda’s door and locks her in:

I should be seated at that table, at the foot properly, since I am mistress of the household; and she, not I, should have to fetch and carry. Then we might break bread in peace, and be loving to one another in our different ways, even I. But lines have been drawn, I am excluded from communion, and so this has become a house of two stories, a story of happiness or a lunge toward happiness, and a story of woe. (Coetzee 54)

Magda advocates that other people remain in their own place, despite the pain she experiences as an outsider to her own. She also longs for her space at the foot of the table rather than exclusion from it. Through Magda’s plea, Coetzee reveals the anxiety at the heart of colonization: others must be controlled and kept in a subordinate place in order for the colonizer to remain in an elevated place. The success of the Afrikaner does not exist without the domination of the African. This is further illustrated as Magda blames the character who should occupy a lower place than she. As a result of her sense of rejection, Magda questions Klein-Anna’s intentions rather than demonizing her father for abusing this power dynamic: “What does this new man mean to her? Does she merely part her thighs, stolid, dull-nerved, because he is the master, or are there refinements of pleasure in subjection which wedded love can never give?” (Coetzee 52). When Magda imagines her father giving gifts to Klein-Anna, she wonders, “Why have those relics never come to me? Why is everything secret from me? Why should I not sit too at the kitchen table smiling and being smiled on in the warm haze of coffee fumes? What is there for me after my purgatory of solitude?” (Coetzee 53). Again, Magda turns to self-
pity rather than imagine the powerlessness of Klein-Anna’s situation. She posits Klein-Anna’s receipt of gifts in direct contrast to her own solitude. She explicitly questions what this shift will mean for herself:

If she ceases to be the servant who will be the servant but I, unless I run away into the night and never come back, but die in the desert and am picked clean by the birds, followed by the ants, as a reproach? Will he even notice? Hendrik will light on me in his wanderings and bring me back in a sack. They will tip me into a hole and cover me up and say a prayer. Then she will light the fire and put on an apron and wash the dishes, the great mound of dishes, coffee-cup upon coffee-cup, that I left behind, and sigh and begrudge me my death. (Coetzee 53)

While Magda does not successfully occupy her own place, she imagines this shifting of social order will result in a lowering of her status. Again, keeping the Other in place is the only way to protect the self. The suggestion that Anna will “light the fire” supports this point when compared to Magda’s previous reference to the vestal virgins.

Magda then describes the second instance of killing her father, but she does not kill Klein-Anna. This is in contrast to the initial murder scene in which Magda killed her step-mother first:

Wherein does my own corruption lie? For, having paused for my second thoughts, I will certainly proceed as before. Perhaps what I lack is the resolution to confront not the tedium of pots and pans and the same old pillow every night but a history so tedious in the telling that it might as well be a history of silence. What I lack is the courage to stop talking, to die back into the silence I came from. The history that I make, loading this heavy gun, is only a frantic spurious babble. (Coetzee 59)

Again, Magda thinks and rethinks her own intentions, her own silence and expression. The silence she came from is her prescribed place as white woman, silent supporter of
husband and producer of children, a place she desires to escape and protect. This fractured desire is reflected by her physical act of shooting; though she leaves the farmhouse with a sense of self-possession unrivaled in the novel, finally taking up space outside of the home, she describes her act as though she does not intend to kill: “I elevate the gun until it points very definitely toward the far ceiling of the room and, closing my eyes, pull the trigger” (Coetzee 61). But she does shoot her father, and afterwards, Magda reverts to doting daughter and attempts to help him. This pairs well with her earlier assertion that if she had place and purpose, she would be satisfied and more pleasant to those around her: “If my father had been a weaker man he would have had a better daughter. But he has never needed anything. Enthralled by my need to be needed, I circle him like a moon” (Coetzee 5). By shooting her father, Magda creates a place for herself as temporary caretaker. She wonders: “Is the following the key: through the agency of conflict with my father I hope to lift myself out of the endless middle of meditation on unattached existence into a true agon with crisis and resolution?” (Coetzee 62). At the heart of the structures of power in the country, people view one another as an obstacle to their own success. Others are not people, but hurdles.

There are many more descriptions of bodies and physical acts to consider in this text. What I aim to illuminate here is the way in which these descriptions reveal Magda’s perception of people and their relationship to structures of power in the systemic, institutional sphere. It is clear from my reading of corporeal descriptions in the text that Magda is a person who resists her own place in the patriarchal order but also feels excluded from this place and desires to uphold it. Without a clear place, Magda
experiences limits in the space she can occupy beyond those of the successful image of volksmoeder; as Elsabe Brink states, “women who, even partially, begin to question society and their role within it, lose the privileges of this position, because, having questioned social norms and structures, they are no longer as controllable; society loses its power over them” (Brink). Additionally, Coetzee’s choice to reveal Magda’s inability to escape the dominant ideology of her sociopolitical situation brings to light the failing of global feminism to adequately address the oppression of people by means other than gender. Coetzee further illuminates the deeply-ingrained yet constructed nature of colonial domination by writing a female narrator who takes agency by destroying the man who took part in creating her. During these acts, Coetzee writes the father as son, daughter as sovereign, and servants as neglected and silenced. This text not only illuminates the ever-complicated nature of structures of power—it confronts the fearful emotional state that creates the need to dominate Others.
WORKS CITED


MAKING AMERICA GREAT AGAIN: TRUMP’S RHETORIC OF NATION-BUILDING AND AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM

Donald Trump’s campaign slogan, “Make America Great Again,” inspired many people. Many who felt disillusioned by the condition of the United States flocked to support Trump, a candidate who ran on the premise that he was outside of the establishment. The slogan and subsequent support suggest not only that the United States is not what it once was, but that the nation is in need of rebuilding. Conversely, some citizens wondered, at what point was America great, and what made it so? What policy leads the nation back to this greatness, and what does that suggested return mean for citizens who have been historically disenfranchised by the state? Many citizens and public figures have suggested that this campaign was unprecedented. In some ways, this may be true. However, when examining Donald Trump’s rhetoric throughout the campaign season, beginning in early 2015 and ending at his election on November 8, 2016, it is clear that there is a historical precedent for using divisive language under the guise of creating unity—for using fear to control the masses. Jeremy Engels’s piece, “Friend or Foe?: Naming the Enemy,” offers a rhetorical analysis of United States nation-building. Engels examines the rhetoric of Thomas Jefferson and David Walker in their attempts to name the enemy—an endeavor inextricable from their attempts to persuade others of their respective positions. For Thomas Jefferson, this enemy was rebellious slaves, ones who could rise up and kill their masters. This rhetoric mobilized white citizens, because it instilled a fear in them that if they did not name and disenfranchise
the Other, their own safety would be lost. Engels illuminates the ways in which those who formed an alliance with the enemy became the enemy as well. Similarly, Donald Trump’s campaign named many enemies who threatened the essence of great and safe Americanness. He eventually named his political/public opposition as the dangerous enemy, too. I explore this creation of enemies through Donald Trump’s naming of women, Hispanic people (particularly Mexicans), black Americans, and Muslims.

Throughout the course of his campaign and beyond it, Trump mobilized his largely white supporters by instilling fear, denying animacy to his enemies, and insisting on the validity of United States exceptionalism. I rely on Mel Y. Chen’s theory of animacy and Jasbir K. Puar’s work on U.S. exceptionalism and homonalism to make the historical precedent for Trump’s strategy legible.

In order to lay the groundwork for a discussion of rhetorical nation-building, I turn to Engels’s discussion of Thomas Jefferson’s naming of the enemy. Engels notes that Jefferson relied heavily on the physical appearance of this enemy in order to name it: the rebellious slave who could rise up and kill her/his master. And this enemy was one with dark skin. Jefferson forever changed the rhetorical discussion of black and white in America by deeming this difference a natural and inescapable condition that necessitated a systemic hierarchy. For Engels, this divisive naming is a historically necessary component of creating identity and participating in sociality:

Without division, there is no need for identification or persuasion. Because humans are goaded by a spirit of hierarchy, our social reality is one of division—which means that the ability to create identification and the ability to persuade are two fundamental skills for social life. (Engels 38)
To name and divide through naming are fundamental elements of social life in human relations as we know them. How then, do these elements function when examined at the political, systemic level? Engels turns to the work of Carl Schmitt to tease out meaning here, particularly Schmitt’s work on “the political”: “We must first understand the political drive toward identification as division, the will to name the enemy, the victim, the scapegoat, the other” (Engels 39). This drive is historically legible in United States nation-building. For Schmitt, the larger issue at hand is one of social stability (Schmidt qtd. in Engels 39). Engels addresses the question of how this social navigation translates to the political: the political, “as a transcendental condition for the possibility of political sociality, acts as an invitation to rhetoric. The logic of the political calls for rhetors to create tension between friend and enemy, between us and them” (Engels 40). This is important context because Trump, like Jefferson, addressed the public with the stated intention of creating a unified nation. In order to create a national sense of identity, a sense of Americanness, and a sense of stability, Schmitt argues that it is necessary to create an enemy (Schmitt qtd. in Engels 40). Donald Trump’s efforts to name the enemy can be seen in many circumstances. What is particularly striking is the way his naming of enemy perpetuated (and continues to perpetuate) the marginalization of groups who have been historically disenfranchised by the state. Jefferson worked to keep slaves in bondage, a move that benefitted him and his fellow white Americans socially, politically, and financially. He pursued this by presenting black people as villains, as agents who posed a direct threat to whiteness and Americanness. Similarly, Donald Trump uses his rhetoric to portray his enemies as dangerous to Americanness. With his slogan, Make
America Great Again, Trump successfully suggests that the United States is in dire need of revamping, that the nation is under threat and has been for some time, and that he has the ideology and tools to recreate what once made the United States great.

Jefferson used his descriptions of blackness “as an opposite, negative, and in opposition to whiteness . . . to fabricate a white identity from the diverse ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic strata of Virginian society. Edward Said argues that when studying colonial contexts like this one, identities are relational” (Engels 43). Jefferson created a sense of whiteness by naming the black Other and separating that Other from the white experience. As I stated above, Jefferson and his supporters also conflated the black enemy with those who acted as allies to the black community. In 1741, black and white people joined together in an uprising against the government of New York. The men who were given credit for leading the uprising, a black slave named John Gwin and a white tavern owner named John Hughson, were hanged for their crime. White citizens described Hughson as “blacker than a slave” (Engels 45). It became clear through these events that while Jefferson’s rhetoric framed the conflict dividing the United States was one between black and white, the true division was between the state and anyone who opposed its power: “Demonstrating that the state, and not its people, had the legitimate right to violence, Hughson was hung alongside Gwin, both examples of the ruin that would befall participants in multiracial cooperation against the state” (Engels 45). Though Jefferson presented black people as the enemy of whiteness and Americanness, this example illustrates the willingness of the state to name white people as the enemy if they did not comply as oppressors of their black counterparts.
Trump’s campaign largely relied on naming. This is most evident when we examine his rhetoric through the concept of animacy. Mel Y. Chen offers a current and legible explanation of animacy and how it relates to linguistics and insults: “For linguistics, animacy is the quality of liveness, sentience, or humanness of a noun or noun phrase that has grammatical, often syntactic, consequences” (Chen 24). It must be understood that naming does not require deanimation, but rhetoric that deanimates the opposition of the rhetor functions to create the Other in a convincing way. Once this is achieved, the audience can more easily be manipulated. Language, for Chen, “whether benevolent or vicious . . . animates humans, animals and things in between. [Chen] suggest[s] that this can be done in collusion with existing registers of citizenship, race, sex, ability, and sexuality, depending on the recurrent materializations of iterative power” (Chen 23). Chen also states that “de-animation (by way of objectification)” is enacted through the spoken and written word (Chen 23). This de-animation produces and hinges on social, economic, and political dominance. John Cherry, Chen’s predecessor in this theory, created a hierarchy of animacy:

Cherry’s study, representing several language families and including Swahili, English, Navajo, Shona, Chinook, Algonquian, Hopi, Russian, Polish, and Breton, yielded a summary that roughly characterizes each station (with its own hierarchical orders) in an animacy hierarchy, and offered perhaps the most detailed summary of its kind. (Chen 26)

This hierarchy posits adults above children, male/masculinity above female/femininity, proximate (first and second-person pronouns) above remote (third-person pronouns), and more (Cherry qtd. in Chen 26). This structure is relevant when we examine the language
of Donald Trump’s rhetoric, particularly in the context of nation-building, because his ability to create unity within his supporters and his ability to name the enemy hinged on deanimation through hierarchy. By denying animacy to marginalized groups, Trump was able to mobilize a following built on fear. Chen claims that “above all . . . animacy is political, shaped by what or who counts as human, and what or who does not” (Chen 30). It was through naming and insults that Trump was able to convince his audience that those unlike them are less than human and therefore do not deserve the protection or respect of United States leadership. Chen looks “in particular [at] how insults utilize complex social and political devices that hinge on animacy” (Chen 31). With Chen’s theory in mind, the function of Trump’s public insults becomes legible.

Chen grounds their discussion of animacy and insults by using the example of the rhetoric U.S. Senator George Allen, a Republican candidate from Virginia, used when departing from a speech to address an audience member on August 11, 2006. Allen addressed Shekar Ramanuja Sidarth, a volunteer for the Democratic opposition, who was filming Allen’s speech. Allen pointed at Sidarth, calling him the man in yellow, and referred to him as “macaca” or “whatever [his] name is.” Because Sidarth was the only person of color in the audience and a man of Asian descent, Chen rightfully sees the adjective “yellow” as a racialized attack and the use of the name “macaca” as one meant to deanimate Sidarth. Allen also stated that Sidarth had been “following” him around; in the political context, this can be read merely as the statement that Sidarth followed from one campaign event to the next. However, with the context of Cherry’s hierarchy in
mind, this can also be read as an attempt to infantilize and deanimate Sidarth as a child or pet who follows its master.

The last concept I examine before reading Donald Trump’s rhetoric is central to Jasbir Puar’s text, *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times*. This is the theory of United States exceptionalism. While Puar largely focuses on U.S. sexual exceptionalism, her analysis readily applies to exceptionalism in other realms. United States exceptionalism, in its most basic sense, is the belief that the United States acts as a global force above the scrutiny of its fellow nations—one that acts on the international scale as a force for good rather than selfish gain, even when the material reality suggests otherwise. One example that Puar uses is the United States’ refusal to claim itself as a nation that enacts empire. As a nation that was once a British colony, U.S. leaders have historically denied participation in colonization and instead argue that the nation acts as an intervening force against violations of human rights. Particularly in the context of the War on Terror, the United States claims to use torture for “maximization and optimization of life” (Puar 3). In her task to define U.S. sexual exceptionalism, Puar defines homonationalism. Puar does this by outlining the historical precedent for positing Islam as the enemy of queerness: “While the conflict is increasingly articulated as one between queers and Muslims, what is actually at stake is the policing of rigid boundaries of gender difference and the kinship forms most amenable to their maintenance” (Puar 20). The United States government, among other governments, uses the claim of accepting queerness as a method to posit itself as more morally correct than Islamic nations. Homonationalism is the exclusion of some aided by some homosexual bodies,
which in turn functions to perpetuate sexual exceptionalism (Puar 4). Inderpal Grewal “argues against the naturalization of human rights framed by feminists, noting that the US routinely positions itself ‘as the site for authoritative condemnation’ of human rights abuses elsewhere, ignoring such abuses within its borders” (Grewal qtd. in Puar 5). A clear example of this is the way United States feminism has named Muslim men as a threat and enemy to Muslim women (Puar 5). The United States then takes on the position of protector, seen today in the ongoing debate about whether or not burqas should be legal in the U.S. or in Europe. Naturally, the concepts of U.S. exceptionalism and homonationalism are most relevant to my examination of Trump’s naming of Muslims, particularly Muslim immigrants. I elaborate on these concepts further in my close reading of Trump’s speech, “Understanding the Threat: Radical Islam and the Age of Terror.”

Donald Trump has consistently denied women animacy throughout his career in the public eye. I limit my scope to his statements from the 2016 campaign, the statements that came to public attention as a result of his campaign, and his public responses to statements unearthed during this time frame. The most obvious and consistent way he has done this is by reducing women to their bodies. This has been a powerful tactic, not only in establishing himself as a caricature of the American man, but in discrediting his female opposition while simultaneously asserting himself as the antithesis of political correctness, further solidifying his image as the candidate outside of the establishment. One highly publicized example came in August of 2015 during the first major Republican debate of the campaign. Megyn Kelly, who was a journalist for Fox News, moderated the
event. Kelly pressed Trump to confront a number of misogynistic comments he had made in the past. She cited Trump’s documented insults of women, calling some women “fat pigs, dogs, slobs, and disgusting animals” (Kelly qtd. in Yan). The following evening, Trump stated that Kelly was coming after him personally from a position of anger: “‘You could see there was blood coming out of her eyes,’ [he] told CNN’s Don Lemon on Friday night. ‘Blood coming out of her wherever’” (Trump qtd. in Yan). The subsequent outrage from many, including Trump’s fellow conservatives, was rooted in the implied meaning that Kelly’s questions were the result of hormones. There is no need to prove that there is a history of treating women as if they are irrational and thereby invalid because of menstruation. What was less obvious, or at least, what went unstated by commentators is that Kelly confronted Trump with instances in which he had denied women animacy: explicitly, he referred to women as animals. Instead of taking the opportunity to apologize or even suggest the comments were out of context, Trump insulted Kelly as a journalist by calling her questions “ridiculous” and “off-base,” then later denied her animacy as well with his misogynistic comments (Trump qtd. in Yan). He insulted her intelligence and denied her ability to experience rational thought by reducing her to a gendered bodily function. In terms of naming the enemy, this was one of the first recorded and indisputable instances on the international stage when Trump expanded the definition of an enemy. Trump’s enemy is not simply the women he publicly named as unattractive and sub-human, it is anyone who comes to the defense of the women to whom he denies animacy. This applied to Kelly and quickly came to include her defenders.
One vocal opponent of the comments was Erick Erickson, the editor of RedState.com, who uninvited Trump from the Redstate Gathering (a gathering that features GOP candidates) as a result of his comments. Erickson said that the comments crossed the line and that to this point, he had “given Donald Trump a lot of latitude because he’s not a professional politician. He’s been a very blunt talker” (Erickson qtd. in Yan). This illustrates the effectiveness of Trump’s repeated assertion that he was the candidate outside of the establishment. Although Erickson could not condone all of Trump’s rhetoric, he, like many, excused his behavior because of a sense that Trump was not a politician at all. Erickson stated that “it was inappropriate . . . It’s a family-friendly program, and if he’s not going to clarify that this isn’t what he meant, I don’t think I want him at my event” (Erickson qtd. in Yan). But Trump did clarify that he was not making a claim about Kelly’s gender. In fact, he tweeted the following day that the “wherever” in question was actually Kelly’s nose (#realDonaldTrump). While I do not feel the need to combat this flimsy defense, this was one of many instances in which Trump refused to apologize but instead claimed his opposition was not thinking rationally. Trump’s other tweets at the time were more congruent with his overarching strategy. Trump lamented that those in opposition to his statement were politically correct fools (#realDonaldTrump). Trump’s campaign stated, more directly, that those who were looking forward to Trump’s speech at the Redstate Gathering should “blame Erick Erickson, [their] weak and pathetic leader” (Trump qtd. in Yan). Again, Donald Trump and his campaign illustrated that those who defend their enemy become enemies
themselves. Again turning to Cherry’s hierarchy, it is visible that Trump aimed to lower Erickson’s status, emasculate him, and posit him as an unfit leader.

This willingness Trump displayed to reduce a woman in the public eye to her physical self is legible throughout his campaign. Similarly, Trump insulted Carly Fiorina, the only major female GOP (Grand Old Party) nominee, by saying in an interview with Rolling Stone, “Look at that face! Would anyone vote for that? Can you imagine that, the face of our next president?” (Trump qtd. in Timm). Trump’s statements are striking for a number of reasons. First, as I have stated, he reduced Fiorina to her physical appearance rather than criticizing her skills or attributes. His repeated use of the pronoun “that” denied Fiorina animacy while simultaneously suggesting to the Republican National Party and the global audience that she was a candidate unworthy of backing. Further still, Trump asks if his interviewer and implied audience can imagine her face as that of the next president of the United States. The suggestion here calls to mind Mike Pence’s repeated statement that the United States needs a president with broad shoulders: “Look, Donald Trump’s got broad shoulders . . . He’s able to make his case and make a point” (Pence qtd. in Griffiths). Pence denied that this image was meant to suggest a man is more fit to be president, just as Donald Trump claimed his statements about Fiorina’s face were not a suggestion that a woman’s face cannot represent the United States.

The next instance of Trump’s deanimation of women I choose to examine is his highly public exchange with Alicia Machado. Her example reminds us that individual identities do not fit solely into one group, and therefore, insults can attack an individual on multiple planes of identification. Machado was the winner of the 1996 Miss Universe
pageant, and Trump was an executive producer of the pageant at the time. After Machado won, she gained some weight—by her account, twelve pounds. Trump “insisted on accompanying Ms. Machado, then a teenager, to a gym, where dozens of reporters and cameramen watched as she exercised” (Barbaro). He described her to the audience as “somebody who likes to eat” (Trump qtd. in Barbaro). This incident occurred after Trump reportedly insulted Machado in private. She later came forward to tell Trump’s political opponent, Senator Hillary Clinton, that Trump had called her “Miss Piggy” and “Miss Housekeeping” (Clinton qtd. in Barbaro). Miss Piggy, a reference to a children’s cartoon, explicitly denies Machado animacy. He compared her to a literal puppet, a prop for children’s entertainment, and a swine. Miss Housekeeping is an insult that is blatantly based on racialized, gendered stereotypes of Latinas. Donald Trump defended these remarks in 2016 by telling Fox News that “she gained a massive amount of weight, and it was a real problem” (Trump qtd. in Barbaro). Pleading ignorance to the insidious nature of his own words and actions, Trump continued to localize the discussion on Machado’s body.

This instance, again, was not in isolation. Trump has insulted Hispanic people, particularly Mexicans, on multiple occasions. He most famously ran on the campaign that he would build a wall at the border of Mexico and the United States. In an interview that aired on CNN, Trump stated, “you force them because we give them a fortune. Mexico makes a fortune because of us. A wall is a tiny little peanut compared to that. I would do something very severe unless they contributed or gave us the money to build the wall” (Trump qtd. in Brand). Not only does Trump posit the entire country of Mexico as an
enemy to the United States, one that benefits from the U.S. in a quasi-paternal relationship, utilizing Cherry’s hierarchy of animacy, he uses rhetoric of domination and separation to name them/they: “They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.” Beyond his clear language of Othering, repeatedly homogenizing an entire nation of people, Trump here is using a strategy very similar to that of Thomas Jefferson. In an effort to mobilize his supporters by creating a common enemy, Trump explicitly posits Mexican immigrants as sub-humans who are a direct threat to the safety of U.S. citizens. Statements that at first were anti-Mexican were soon followed by those that were anti-immigrant in general: “You have people coming in, and I’m not just saying Mexicans, I’m talking about people that are from all over that are killers and rapists and they’re coming into this country” (Trump qtd. in Brand). I will return to Trump’s statements about immigrants later in this piece. For now, however, it is clear that his distrust of Mexicans did not hinge on citizenship or even the act of immigration.

Trump University, an unaccredited real estate college that Donald Trump started, resulted in three lawsuits against him (who settled for $25 million). Trump explicitly doubted the ability of the chosen judge, Judge Gonzalo Curiel, to preside over the case. Curiel is a United States citizen—born, raised, and educated in Indiana (Totenberg). Trump stated, after calling Curiel Mexican several times, that his Mexican heritage was “an inherent conflict of interest” because of Trump’s immigration policy (Trudo). Again, Donald Trump illustrates a clear slippage between his named enemy and those he associates with them. The difference between this case and those I explore above is that
Curiel in no way defended Mexican immigrants or criticized Donald Trump’s person or position on immigration, though Trump’s comments were unquestionably racist and xenophobic. In fact, Curiel served as federal prosecutor in South California for seventeen years and rose to “chief of narcotics enforcement in San Diego” (Totenberg). When Curiel “was leading a joint task force to take down a notorious Tijuana drug cartel, law enforcement authorities got credible information that the cartel was planning to assassinate him” (Totenberg). A U.S. citizen who spent his career combating the very drug crimes on which Trump built his racist attacks on Mexican immigrants was deemed an enemy solely because of his heritage and legitimate opposition to Donald Trump’s fraudulent university.

Another of Trump’s rhetoric of Othering can be seen through his descriptions of black Americans. As evidenced by the trending hashtag #TheAfricanAmericans, many took notice of how Donald Trump repeatedly referred to black citizens as “the African Americans.” As noted by some linguists and in congruence with Cherry’s hierarchy of animacy, this Othering move creates the sense that the homogenized group in question is separate from Trump’s audience. Jenee Desmond-Harris observes that this rhetorical move was frequently accompanied by Trump’s association of black people with inner cities and poor areas:

It’s understandable that many have seized upon Trump’s unusual speech patterns here, because voters don’t have much other material to work with when it comes to his views about race in America. He has stated repeatedly that African Americans live in “the inner city,” which he describes as a hellscape of violence, where education is across-the-board terrible or nonexistent. He’s expressed his enthusiasm for the revival of stop and frisk, a policing program that illegally
discriminated against black and Latino people. But he has not made any detailed policy proposals.

Trump’s rhetoric posited black Americans not only as a monolith but one that solely existed in a space separate from his audience. It is important to note that his naming and placing of black Americans is factually inaccurate:

Trump’s rhetoric is also painting a false picture of black America, falling back on outdated stereotypes about where African-Americans live, and how much money they make. In aggregate, he’s both overstating the economic problems facing African-Americans and ignoring past lessons about how to reduce black poverty. (Vinik)

By placing black Americans in a separate space and repeatedly using rhetoric that suggested black Americans created and perpetuated this hellscape for themselves, Donald Trump earned the support of conservatives who did not want to be seen as unaware of the racialized struggles of the United States and simultaneously separated himself from the responsibility of improving the very real socioeconomic struggles of black Americans.

“I’m going to help the African-Americans. I’m going to help the Latinos, Hispanics. I am going to help the inner cities. [Clinton has] done a terrible job for the African-Americans,” he said (Trump qtd. in Murphy). Again, Trump claimed he would help this Other while offering no practical policy to combat the problems he identified.

In an instance that is comparable to Allen’s naming of Sidarth, Donald Trump pointed to a black man in his audience during one of his notoriously heated rallies. Unlike Allen’s naming, Trump celebrated the black member of his audience: “‘Oh, look at my African-American over here. Look at him,’ Trump said. ‘Are you the greatest?’” (Trump
The possessive pronoun “my” is a clear naming of Gregory Cheadle, the audience member in question. Gregory Cheadle, a Republican California congressional candidate, confirmed to CNN he was the supporter to whom Trump pointed. While Cheadle said he was not offended by Trump’s comment, the use of the possessive pronoun is problematic in several ways (Cheadle qtd. in Dlamond). First of all, Trump’s very act of pointing and naming brought attention to Cheadle at a rally largely dominated by white audience members. Because there was a precedent for people of color being thrown out of Trump rallies, this move could easily have put Cheadle in physical or psychological danger. Rhetorically speaking, Trump claimed ownership of a black man and simultaneously used his body to fill the slot of token. He deanimated the audience member by making a spectacle and prop out of him. Trump was widely criticized for drawing a predominantly white audience, a criticism that was validated by the attendees of his rallies as well as the overwhelmingly white population of his voters in November. Cheadle, a Trump supporter, made clear statements that he did not take offense from the occurrence: “Cheadle added he was glad Trump is giving attention to black issues, pointing to Trump’s pledge to bring down unemployment among African-Americans” (Cheadle qtd. in Dlamond). As stated above, Trump did make such statements, but he did not and still has not proposed any practical methods for achieving his purported goals. But Trump’s naming of black Americans can be better understood with more context:

In November [2015], Trump retweeted a graphic of false crime statistics comparing percentages of ‘blacks killed by blacks’ and ‘blacks killed by police’ that included an image of a dark-skinned man wearing a bandana, military-style
pants and holding a handgun sideways. The graphic vastly overstated the number of homicides committed by blacks. (Diamond)

Again, Trump made multiple false statements, particularly using social media, that presented black Americans as the victims and victimizers in the undeniably disproportionate percentage of annual homicides of black people. Though Trump lamented the state of inner cities, he also made claims that support the narrative that black Americans, as a whole, are to blame for their oppression.

Finally, I turn to Donald Trump’s rhetoric and naming of Muslims, particularly Muslim immigrants. In this section, we again see that his descriptions of a clear enemy become blurred and spill into all persons he associates with the specified threat. This section is where U.S. exceptionalism and homonationalism become most relevant to my reading. While Trump made many explicit statements about Muslims and Islam as a religion throughout his campaign, I focus my reading on his speech, “Understanding the Threat: Radical Islam and the Age of Terror.” This speech, delivered on 15 August 2016, offers a great deal of insight into how Trump rhetorically presented Muslims, all non-Western nations, and the United States. Playing with his own campaign slogan, Trump opens the speech by saying that, today, “we begin a conversation about how to Make America Safe Again” (1). This statement is reminiscent of Jefferson’s assertions that rebellious slaves were a direct threat to Americanness and the lives of white United States citizens. Trump then turns to ideologically-based military successes of the United States (against Fascism, Nazism, and Communism) before explicitly stating his enemy: “Radical Islamic Terrorism” (1). For the following two pages, Trump enumerates each
attack ISIS has taken credit for that gained international attention. Some of these
descriptions hinge more obviously on the rhetoric of fear than others; one of the more
detailed descriptions reads as follows: “Only days ago, an ISIS killer invaded a Christian
church in Normandy France, forced an 85-year-old priest to his knees, and slit his throat
before his congregation” (3). Trump temporally positions this event in the near-present
and encourages his audience to associate with the priest by highlighting his Christianity,
further positioning Muslims and Christians in opposition to one another.

After centering his speech on the acts of ISIS, Trump performs an act of naming
that was visible on the international stage during the second presidential debate between
him and Senator Clinton: he switches between the organization ISIS and what he refers to
as “Radical Islam” (3). This shift quickly allows Trump to claim a moral superiority that
is localized in the United States. Not only must Radical Islam be stopped, but the United
States is responsible for stopping it:

We cannot let this evil continue. Nor can we let the hateful ideology of Radical
Islam—its oppression of women, gays, children, and nonbelievers—be allowed to
reside or spread within our own countries. We will defeat Radical Islamic
Terrorism, just as we have defeated every threat we have faced in every age
before. (3)

After Trump conjures fear of Islam in his audience, he successfully associates Islam with
past enemies of Americanness. Then, he assures his audience that he has the tools to
defeat this enemy. Further still, Trump demands that the enemy be named and that
anyone who does not name Radical Islam as such is unfit to lead the United States:

“Anyone who cannot name our enemy, is not fit to lead this country. Anyone who cannot
condemn the hatred, oppression and violence of Radical Islam lacks the moral clarity to serve as our President” (4). Trump explicitly states that this is an issue of a morality. Because of U.S. exceptionalism, it is the responsibility of the United States, and especially U.S. leaders, to correct what they deem as the moral wrongdoings of citizens beyond U.S. borders.

The next section of the speech is titled, “The rise of ISIS is the direct result of policy decisions made by President Obama and Secretary Clinton” (4). This section describes the Middle East, country by country, as being stable before “the Obama-Clinton Administration took over” (4). “Fast-forward to today,” Trump says,

Libya is in ruins . . . Syria is in the midst of a disastrous civil war . . . In Egypt, terrorists have gained a foothold in the Sinai desert, near the Suez Canal, one of the most essential waterways in the world . . . Iraq is in chaos, and ISIS in on the loose. ISIS has spread across the Middle East, and into the West. (5)

Here is a jarring conflation of naming the enemy in Trump’s rhetoric. Again, Trump positions his opposition in alignment with threats to Americanness, democracy, and the lives of United States citizens. Rather than discussing the safety of civilians in these countries, Trump names them as nations in chaos and disaster. He also takes the opportunity to credit Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton for this danger.

In another clear turn of rhetoric that highlights the exceptionalism and the United States, Trump states that “at the same time, ISIS is trying to infiltrate refugee flows into Europe and the United States” (6). While other countries are in crisis, European nations and the United States are threatened by outside intruders. Trump no longer solely claims Radical Islamic Terrorism as the enemy, and Radical Islamic Terrorism is not an enemy
that acts evenly among the United States and other nations; Trump shifts his demarcation of the enemy to include all refugees. Additionally, it is Obama’s fault that the United States is infiltrated because of his “Apology Tour”:

President Obama described America as “arrogant,” “dismissive” “derisive” and a “colonial power.” He informed other countries that he would be speaking up about America’s “past errors.” He pledged that we would no longer be a “senior partner,” that “sought to dictate our terms.” He lectured CIA officers of the need to acknowledge their mistakes, and described Guantanamo Bay as a “rallying cry for our enemies.” (6)

Trump characterizes President Obama’s choice to build relationships with those outside of the United States; arguably, this strategy is a much more effective option when combating a group of militarized people who see the United States as a threat to their own lives and religion than the antagonistic language Trump uses when describing Muslim countries and immigrants.

From there, Donald Trump moves into the section dedicated to proposing a new approach to dealing with ISIS, or so the title “It is time for a new approach” would imply (8). Trump first makes clear that he did not support the Iraq war, though video evidence shows otherwise; he then blames Hillary Clinton and President Obama for the state of things as a result of “the reckless way in which they pulled out” (9). When he does shift his focus to how he intends to move forward, Trump focuses his intentions on stopping the Other from building their nation: “the era of nation-building will be ended. Our new approach, which must be shared by both parties in America, by our allies overseas, and by our friends in the Middle East, must be to halt the spread of Radical Islam” (11). With Engels’s and Said’s respective theories of naming the enemy and Othering in mind, it is
clear that Trump intends to do exactly what he says he will stop others from doing: building the nation. Indeed, his claims of nation-building are focused on naming and opposing the enemy, the Other. Reminiscent of the many examples I analyze above, Trump states that “we cannot always choose our friends, but we can never fail to recognize our enemies” (11). Trump again calls for identification through opposition and for a legitimizing of his near-constant attempt to name the enemy.

In the next section, “But we must use ideological warfare as well,” Trump states that while Senator Clinton “accepted millions of dollars in Foundation donations from countries where being gay is an offense punishable by prison or death, [his] Administration will speak out against the oppression of women, gays and people of different faith” (12). Rather than analyze the legitimacy of his attacks on Clinton, I include this quotation because of the apparent homonationalism at play. While this is not the first time homonationalism is present in this speech, it is the most explicit. The acceptance of queerness serves as evidence of U.S. exceptionalism, even though the rhetor of this speech selected a vice president who advocates for conversion therapy (Stack). This attack on the morality of Islamic ideology is an effective segue into Trump’s immigration policy. He again opens this section with fear-based rhetoric, citing multiple examples of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. He then opens these examples to other Western countries. He renames the enemy, ISIS, first as Radical Islamic Terrorism, then refugees to the United States and countries where Islam is the predominant religion: “Pew polling shows in many of the countries from which we draw large numbers of immigrants, extreme views about religion—such as the death penalty for those who leave
the faith—are commonplace” (15). By creating such slippery boundaries, Trump invites his audience to read refugees and Islamic extremists as one. In one emotionally-charged sentence, Donald Trump portrays the entirety of immigrants as one group, all capable of mass murder in the United States of America. “In addition to screening out all members or sympathizers of terrorist groups, we must also screen out any who have hostile attitudes towards our country or its principles—or who believe that Sharia law should supplant American law” (15). In keeping with his language of nation-building, this rhetoric deanimates his opposition and posits the enemy as not only an enemy to U.S. citizens but to the very essence of Americanness. If immigrants are unwilling to embrace an idea of Americanness that was created in opposition to their home nations, they are unwelcome in the United States. The language to this point has been problematic, but it is here that Donald Trump gives his most clear policy so far: “To put these new procedures in place, we will have to temporarily suspend immigration from some of the most dangerous and volatile regions of the world that have a history of exporting terrorism” (15). Without addressing the refugees of the nations in question and the very real danger they face as a result of ISIS, Trump announces that these people will not be welcome in the United States for an undisclosed amount of time.

As for Muslims who are already within U.S. borders, Donald Trump calls them to join his side of this War on Terror. He claims this is his attempt to erase divisions: “That is why one of my first acts as President will be to establish a Commission on Radical Islam—which will include reformist voices in the Muslim community who will hopefully work with us. We want to build bridges and erase divisions” (18). While some
interpret this call to action as one that aims to build peace, it is clear when examining Trump’s rhetoric more closely that he is still naming Muslims as the enemy; he merely offers them the opportunity to become more American in exchange for their safety. The use of the phrase “reformist voices in the Muslim community” again suggests that Islam as a whole is anti-Americanness and dangerous. Trump also states that these voices will “hopefully work with us” (italics added). This one word again solidifies the division between us and them while stating that it is the choice and responsibility of the Muslim community to “erase divisions.” Engels identifies a similar call to action amongst white slave owners:

Moreover, slave owners created an economy of surveillance that dispersed power by encouraging slaves to become snitches. Hence, Walker observed that slave owners perpetuated the system of slavery by stamping out the slaves’ desire for freedom and turning them against one another, making it the job of educated blacks like himself to enlighten their brethren by nurturing the desire for freedom in their souls. (Engels 48)

Similarly, in Donald Trump’s quotation above, he asks Muslims to forego their religious freedom in favor of earning the trust of the state. But how does Trump ask non-Muslim Americans to participate in this bridge-building? He does so by calling his audience to exude U.S. exceptionalism: “This also means we have to promote the exceptional virtues of our own way of life—and expecting that newcomers to our society do the same” (19). Trump calls his audience to be exceptional and to hold “newcomers” accountable for adopting Americanness. Trump demands surveillance by naming a dangerous enemy like Jefferson and other nation-builders before him: “It was fortune alone that prevented slaves from destroying their masters, he concluded. If things changed, and if, by
implication, whites were not vigilant, the world could very easily turn upside down” (Jefferson qtd. in Engels 44). Just as the United States has historically denied its participation in colonization, Trump continues to frame this call to mimic as a generous invitation to immigrants: “Assimilation is not an act of hostility, but an expression of compassion. Our system of government, and our American culture, is the best in the world and will produce the best outcomes for all who adopt it” (20). He explicitly states that immigrants will be better off for adopting Americanness, completely eliding the value of any other culture. Jefferson and his contemporaries were heavily influenced by the ideas of nation-building produced during the Scottish Enlightenment: “The philosophers of the Enlightenment taught that without shared worldviews, cultural assumptions, and language games, conversation was impossible” (Engels 42). Trump’s rhetoric is reminiscent of these same ideas. He suggests that adopting the dominant American culture will necessarily bring unity: “Renewing this spirit of Americanism will help heal the divisions in our country. It will do so by emphasizing what we have in common—not what pulls us apart” (20). Though Trump consistently named the enemy throughout his campaign, and this speech explicitly functions to name the enemy while calling his audience to do the same, Trump’s concluding statements rhetorically posit the responsibility of healing division on those who do not fit his definition of Americanness. This is a very stark contrast from Obama’s “Apology Tour” that he earlier criticized. Though Trump says we must emphasize what we have in common, in the context of this speech, he is telling those unlike him and his audience to conform to their “normal.” Finally, Trump offers his audience the safety he assures them they deserve:
This is my pledge to the American people: as your President I will be your greatest champion. I will fight to ensure that every American is treated equally, protected equally, and honored equally. We will reject bigotry and oppression in all its forms, and seek a new future built on our common culture and values as one American people. Only this way, will we make America Great Again and Safe Again—for Everyone. (20)

Trump assures his audience that if they follow his instruction, he will keep them safe from the enemy he has just spent twenty pages worth of speech describing. Though he promises safety for everyone, his rhetoric throughout the speech suggests that he is actually offering safety to those who obey his leadership.

The media covered Donald Trump more than any other presidential candidate in the 2016 election season. In many instances when he insulted individuals and entire populations, the media focused on his intent. By doing a rhetorical reading of his statements grounded in theories of animacy and U.S. exceptionalism, it is easier to ground the discussion in the effect of his words rather than the unknowable intent behind them. Trump’s rhetoric was and continues to be emotionally-charged. It frequently produces fear and names the enemy responsible for the hyperbolic danger he describes. By examining his insults and naming among the four groups I explore here, it becomes clear that his enemy, though frequently named, is not a static one. His enemy can and has become anyone who opposes him or hampers his accumulation of power. It is crucial that United States citizens understand this. Perhaps by understanding that the enemy is not naturally so, that the enemy exists through naming, that identifications of Americanness exist in opposition to this enemy, the American people can begin to better understand the Other as a fiction that represents many individuals with animacy equal to their own.
While many are attracted to Trump’s shirking of the confines of “political correctness,” through this approach, it is evident that his rhetoric corresponds to the policies he suggests in very real ways. Words are never just words. As Chen suggests, words constantly work to grant or deny animacy. The division here is not between citizens and immigrants; it is between individuals and the state.


Griffiths, Brent. “Pence denis ‘broad shoulders’ remark is about Trump’s masculinity.”  


#realDonaldTrump. “So many ‘politically correct’ fools in our country. We have to all get back to work and stop wasting time and energy on nonsense!” *Twitter*, 8 Aug. 2015, 5:29 a.m.,
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/629992743788523520?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw.

---. “Re Megyn Kelly quote: ‘you could see there was blood coming out of her eyes, blood coming out of her wherever’ (NOSE). Just got on w/thought” *Twitter*, 8 Aug. 2015, 8:46 a.m.,


Yan, Holly. “Donald Trump’s ‘blood’ comment about Megyn Kelly draws outrage.”