ALLISON, KIARA FATTAH. Ph.D. A Critical Philosophical Examination of the Educational Mission in Student Conduct Practice in Higher Education. (2022) Directed by Dr. Leila Villaverde. 156 pp.

As a Student Conduct professional, I felt a tension between the espoused educational mission of our field and the daily functions of my role, which did not seem to have anything to do with education. Therefore, this dissertation investigates the purported educational mission of Student Conduct practice in higher education by building from the careers worth of scholarship offered by Gert Biesta. To do this, I first conduct a historiography to understand the normative view of education within the broader field of Student Affairs. I found that although the dominant narratives that emerged from the historical discourse promote the idea that our work is educational, Student Affairs has always struggled to couple its functions with its supposed educational mission. Then, I explore 'accountability' and its relationship to education since it is assumed that holding students accountable is related to their learning. Here, using a hermeneutic approach, I demonstrate that we do not *hold* students accountable as much as we *make* students accountable through surveillance, tracking, sophisticated student databases, and misconduct reporting structures. Furthermore, I suggest that student accountability is more closely related to risk and brand management than it is to our supposed educational mission. Both aforementioned inquiries serve as attempts to deconstruct commonly held assumptions within our professions. Next, I offer suggestions on how we might affirmatively reconstruct our educational mission by shifting from pedagogies of essence, which focuses on who the student should be and become, towards pedagogies of existence, which involves what the student chooses to do in the world. Finally, to conclude this project, I introduce preliminary plans to continue this research, namely by focusing on the intersubjectivity of students and Student Conduct professionals. Here, I posit that this research may present a productive opportunity for our field to reimagine our interpretation of theory-to-practice by shifting from an externally focused endeavor, in which the

goal is to control our students and predict their educational outcomes, to an internally

focused pursuit of our own professional subjectivities. The result of this dissertation is an

alternative articulation of the educational mission of our work as Student Conduct and

Student Affairs professionals.

A CRITICAL PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF THE

EDUCATIONAL MISSION IN STUDENT CONDUCT

PRACTICE IN HIGHER EDUCATION

by

Kiara Fattah Allison

A Dissertation

Submitted to

the Faculty of the Graduate School at

The University of North Carolina at Greensboro

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philsophy

Greensboro

2022

Approved by

_____
Dr. Leila
Villaverde
Committee Chair

DEDICATION

My dissertation is dedicated to my ancestors, both deceased and alive, who live(d) about 100 miles south of The University of North Carolina at Greensboro in Gastonia, North Carolina. They were not able to receive an education from the very university from which I earned my PhD due to segregation. So, this degree is not just for me. It is a representation of my lineage and an acknowledgment of my roots that ground me.

To my great grandparents:

Minnie & Frank Allison and

Ezeperee & Charles McCaskill

And my grandparents:

Charlene & Johnny Allison, Sr.

APPROVAL PAGE

This dissertation written by Kiara Fattah Allison has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of The Graduate School at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

Committee Chair

                                                    _____
                                                    Dr. Leila Villaverde

Committee Members

                                                    _____
                                                    Dr. Kathy Hytten

                                                    _____
                                                    Dr. Christina Wright Fields

March 14, 2022

Date of Acceptance by Committee

March 3, 2022

Date of Final Oral Examination

ACKNOWLEGMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I: INSIGHT INTO INQUIRY

Introduction

"How'd that meeting go?" I was asked by a senior colleague. She was referring to an informal conduct meeting that I had just completed with a student who was charged with failure to comply for not completing their assigned sanctions from an earlier conduct case. "Oh. It went well. I dismissed their failure to comply charge and adjusted their old due dates from the earlier case," I responded. "Why did you do that?" my colleague asked. "Well, the student has not been on campus for the past 7 weeks because their mother was in hospice care and recently passed away, so obviously completing their sanctions was the least of their worries. Adding more sanctions to complete for the student is not in their best interest. Instead, I sent the student to the undergraduate academic office so that they can get assistance with a total course withdrawal for this semester. This way, their financial aid won't be impacted in the future due to failing all their courses." I was feeling confident in my logic. However, my colleague was not sold. "But how are you holding the student accountable for not completing their sanctions? Students need to learn that they still have obligations to meet, even when their life is in shambles." I was taken aback. I quipped "Huh? Well ...when do we give students grace?"

The above anecdote is how I arrived at this research. Although I only asked one question in this scenario, there were numerous questions that were sparked for me. Namely, How did my colleague know what this student needed to learn? How did my colleague know that holding the student "accountable" (in this case, by providing more sanctions) would help the student learn this lesson (e.g., students need to learn that they still have obligations to meet, even when their life is in shambles)? More importantly, Why is it so that a student would need to learn that, although their mother is dying, they need to ignore their mental and emotional needs to meet external demands? By this time, I was already in my 4th year of practicing Student Conduct, so I was aware of its supposed educational mission. Through my years of practice, however, and because of situations like those described above, I started to wonder, What exactly do we mean when we say that Student Conduct is educational? Are these the type of lessons that we are tasked with teaching?

The questions that I have about Student Conduct are not ones that can be answered by statistical analysis or through coding qualitative interviews. Moreover, the questions that I have do not have conclusive answers per se. This is not to say that one cannot arrive at an answer. One may, however, arrive at an answer through a mix of intuition, experience, expertise, and the sense that their work as a Student Conduct professional is important and contributes to the larger mission of higher education. For instance, my colleague may have either had personal experience or experiences with students that led her to believe that students needed to learn how to tend to their obligations during difficult periods. She probably believed that this lesson builds resilience.

At face value, I find it hard to state any objections with guiding students toward building resilience. My colleague, however, was not in the room with me and the student during our conduct meeting. She did not psychically feel the brokenness of the student. She did not feel the defeat that was present in the room. Perhaps this is why I thought the student needed a break— that she needed grace in this moment instead of another lesson. Wasn't life teaching this student enough lessons at the moment? The point is that these are not topics that can receive definitive answers. These situations need to be wrestled with, which is why this study is important.

Like me, Anna Patton (2017) took up a question that needed to be wrestled with in Student Affairs. Her dissertation asked about a standard and ubiquitous practice in higher education: New Student Orientation. Specifically, she wanted to know "What does it signify to have a student 'orientation'? By, toward, around, and from what are students oriented?" (Patton, 2017). Patton found that New Student Orientation was not a curricular intervention designed to help students navigate campus life, as it was promoted to be. Instead, New Student Orientation is really about the degree to which a new student can adopt the existing orientation of the institution. It is about asking students to make a commitment to align to the institution's

orientation, or they run the risk of "remaining disoriented, aslant, or sideways" (Patton, 2017, p. 81). Some students seamlessly fit into the existing orientation of the institution. Patton used those students who may serve as orientation leaders for example.

These students "take up their membership within the institutional community as demonstrated by behaviors such as collecting University merchandise, attending campus events, or enthusiastically participating in school chants and cheers" (Patton, 2017, p. 65). Asking for this commitment, however, is no small ask, or even a neutral ask for some. Patton brilliantly captured this when she shared this anecdote:

> At convocation, University administration teaches all students in attendance our institutional fight songs, chants, cheers, and the alma mater, which begins with the lyric, 'where the winds of Dixie softly blow.' Mere days after a white supremacist attack in Charlottesville, Virginia- land included in the 'Dixie'- the standard model of student orientation presupposed asking all incoming new students of color to sing with pride about 'Dixie', while ignoring the racialized, historical ramifications of that word. (p. 132)

This illustration shows the costs of taking up the orientation of the institution. In this case, it would be asking students of color, especially black students who are descendants of slaves, to ignore that facet of their heritage in order to fit into the university community.

I am sharing Patton's (2017) work because I believe our projects have a similar mission. While we did not study the same area in Student Affairs, her work did something that I hope to do in my project. Patton effectively provided a new interpretation to a common practice in Student Affairs. She made the familiar unfamiliar. She inspected the aspects that are taken for granted. In fact, Patton invited more of this type of work when she asked "What additional practices might be reinterpreted? How might other thought experiments highlight other avenues

to make sense of the history, purpose, and aims of Student Affairs?" (p. 12). I see my work entering the conversation here, through the opening that Patton forged.

The purpose and scope of this project was to call into question readily accepted beliefs and narratives that surround our work in Student Affairs and Student Conduct practice. Graduate training programs and historical accounts found in textbooks provide a fairly standard account of the field's history, mission, and vision. Moreover, in Student Conduct practice, words are casually used that evoke a sense of education and justice, such as "accountability," to shape, rationalize, and evaluate our practices. What happens, however, if we take another look at these practices? Is it possible that we can view the history and these practices through another lens—a lens that provides an alternative narrative outside of the globally accepted version? This was precisely what I sought to achieve through this project.

As alluded to earlier in the anecdote that opened this chapter, I am highly skeptical about the supposed educational nature (and the content of the education) of Student Affairs work, and in particular Student Conduct practice. Like many Student Affairs professionals, however, I identify as an educator. This creates a schism in my professional identity. On one hand, I feel a deep desire and hope that the work that I do harnesses the almost mythical potential of education to transform not only individuals, but society as a whole. Yet, on the other hand, I feel that many of my daily practices have nothing to do with education. Instead, a deep sense of mistrust is invoked because I feel that, in many ways, the language of education has been co-opted to disguise other agendas. In this respect, this project was personal as it was my attempt to make sense of and find coherence within my professional life. My hope was that it may resonate with others who feel the same.

Although I do have a deep skepticism about the educational nature of this type of work, I do believe that Student Conduct practice does have educational potential. In this project, however, I suggest that if we are to be concerned with education in Student Affairs work, and subsequently Student Conduct Practice, then we necessarily must be concerned with how our students become capable of independent thought and action—or, in other words, become subjects. Later in this chapter, I share why we should be concerned with student subjectivity, but for now, understand that the guiding question of this project is how might we do this? What would our practice look like if we prioritized student subjectivity?

This is a very large question, and there are several routes that one could take in search of an answer. For me, it was important to address deeply held and unexamined philosophies and narratives that frame our field and to provide alternative interpretations of those things. My motivation for inspecting and reinterpreting our practices is not to be controversial. Instead, I like to imagine this work as a shedding of old, tight skin. With multiple narratives and rationales for our practices, professionals are no longer confined by their old skin, which constrains how they can think and be. Now, with new skin, they have more flexibility and things that were out of reach are suddenly made possible. In this way, I would like to provoke thought and/or conversation. Now, with an alternative interpretation, what spaces are available for professionals to inhabit? Further, in continuing in the tradition of Patton (2017), I ask and challenge my colleagues to consider what other spaces are open to reinterpretation.

Conceptual Framework

As earlier stated, the larger goal of my research was to prioritize the concern of student subjectivity in the fields of Student Affairs and Student Conduct. In many ways, my work was greatly influenced by educational philosopher Gert Biesta's book, The Beautiful Risk of Education (2013). I see my work as advancing Biesta's work, but in the realm of Student Affairs in higher education, which is why his larger body of work conceptually shapes how I think about the issues facing Student Conduct.

Biesta was chosen for this project because his scholarship over time has produced a coherent and articulable language to describe: the multiple functions of education, the emancipatory capacity of education, and how we create systems that squelch the possibility of education being anything more than a socializing mechanism that provides skills and knowledge to the next generation of laborers. Biesta stops short of describing what education should look like, but he does, in great detail, describe what education should primarily be concerned with, which is its potential to bring something new into the world through students who establish their own subjectivities. Moreover, Biesta shares my concern in steering educational conversations back towards matters of education. He points out that the educational discourse fell victim to bait and switch for concepts like "learning" and "accountability" which mask as education but are not primarily concerned with the subjectivities of students.

So, to be clear, Biesta and I also share the same belief that education is about its emancipatory, generative capacity to bring something new into the world and is not simply about replicating the generations of people in the past. Instead, it is about the possibility that young people will create a new future beyond our wildest imaginations. Therefore, henceforth, when I refer to 'education' or 'educational mission,' I am speaking about this latent capacity within the

multiple functions of education. The other functions of education, as outlined by Biesta, are described as such. Overall, Biesta's scholarship has framed how I think about the larger, guiding concepts of this dissertation. His works served as a touchstone throughout this project as I implemented the various questions and methods in other chapters.

To properly situate my work among the conversation that Biesta has begun, it is helpful to look at the core challenges that his scholarship addresses. Biesta (2012) believes that philosophy of education can productively contribute to conversations around a few educational challenges. The issues examined in this project are 'Education, not learning,' 'Weakness, not Strength,' and 'Existence, not essence.' In many ways, Biesta's various works all respond to each of these issues and capture the core of Biesta's educational claims.

Education, Not Learning

Biesta's work can be summarized as an attempt to bring attention back to the actual questions of education. Discourse that is pervasive in modern education around "learning," "accountability," and "competency," to name a few, have clouded questions about what constitutes a good education. For challenge number one, "Education, not learning," Biesta (2012) reminded us that education is about education, not about learning (p. 583). Biesta argues that education is a teleological practice, that is framed and constituted by purposes...The educational demand is not that students learn, but that they learn something...with reference to a particular outcome. This means the discourse of learning only becomes an educational discourse when we ask questions… -The learning 'of what' and 'for what'...and 'from whom' (p. 583).

Biesta outlined three domains of education: Socialization, Qualification, and Subjectification More simply stated, an educational discourse about learning should ultimately ask critical questions about the ends of learning. Biesta does not suggest, however, that learning

is without ends. Instead, he highlights that the ends "lack reflection and judgement...and thus tend to be directed by so-called common sense or even populist ends. The language of learning makes it difficult, if not impossible, to take responsibility for the direction of education" (Biesta, 2012, p. 584). It (i.e., language of learning) obscures the crucial elements of education, such as questions about the content and purpose of learning, as well as the relational aspects of education. Discourse about learning often fails to ask, What constitutes an educational relationship?

To distinguish more clearly the contours between education and learning, it is helpful to understand what Biesta (2013) suggested are the three broad categories that educational ends tend to fall into. Biesta referred to the following categories as domains: qualification, socialization, and subjectification. The domain of 'qualification' is about obtaining knowledge, skills, values, and dispositions. 'Socialization' is how we become part of existing traditions and practices, and 'subjectification' is about how education helps to form the person as an individual. Subjectification is where "educational aims such autonomy and criticality, but also more postmodern understandings of subjectivity, such as in terms of responsibility or uniqueness" are found (Biesta, 2012, p. 584). The domains of qualification and socialization are necessary, as they provide people with the ability to navigate existing sociopolitical settings, but the domain of subjectification is about "ways of doing and being that simply do not accept the given order but have an orientation toward the change of an existing order so that different ways of doing and being become possible" (Biesta, 2013, p. 64). It is here in the domain of subjectification where the delineation between education and learning exists.

For the purposes of this conceptual framework, it is important to know that I find Biesta's conceptualization of the domains of education helpful in thinking about my questions of Student

Conduct Practice. It is even more important to know that I share Biesta's insight that the domain of 'subjectification' is, or at least should be, the primary focus of education. In using Biesta's insight, I explored the distinction between learning and education as posited by Biesta and used this distinction to shed light onto the normative view of education in Student Conduct Practice. I was not so much interested in Biesta's conceptualizations about how subjectification occurs, as much as I was interested in his argument that it should be the primary domain of concern in education.

Weakness, Not Strength

Weakness is not a word that conjures up positive emotions. Its connotation is usually marked by a deficit of some sort. In education, however, weakness is its hallmark feature because education is a relational term as it refers to how human beings aim to influence each other intentionally" (Biesta, 2012, p. 584). Education is about interaction and it proceeds in a hermeneutic way. Education happens through dialogical methods that include "interpretation, interruption, and response" (Biesta, 2013, p. 4).

Those dialogical elements that are core to education makes it a "fundamentally open art which lodges an element of unpredictability at the very heart of education" (Biesta, 2012, p. 585). Moreover, weakness derives from the fact that "there will never be a perfect match between educational inputs and outputs" (Biesta, 2013, p. 3). This means that education is not simply a technology that can be used to create intended outcomes. This is why education always involves. Technology, in this sentence, refers to a tool or mechanism by which to bring about desired outcomes. risk. A teacher can never predict what the actual outcome(s) will be. This is not an argument for laissez faire education, but rather it is an acknowledgement that humans are unique in nature; therefore, every interaction or event is unpredictable.

9

To go a step beyond the inherent weakness found in education due to its dialogic nature, Biesta (2013) also posited that education itself is a weak form of creation. Biesta (2013) stated,

I am interested in education as itself a creative 'act' or, to be more precise, in education as an act of creation, that is, as an act of bringing something new into the world, something that did not exist before. I am particularly interested in seeing education as a process that in some way contributes to the creation of human subjectivity (p. 11).

Thus, in this way, a weak understanding of creation is about the process or the event. In contrast, a strong interpretation of creation is creatio ex nihilo, or literally the creation of something out of nothing. Biesta linked this understanding of creation to origin stories that exist in most cultures and religions. In the Bible, for example, God created the world out of nothingness. Secularly, the Big Bang theory follows the same logic, in that it tries to identify "the first original event from which everything else has emanated" (Biesta, 2013, p. 12). Biesta suggested that this understanding that is of creation in strong terms is pervasive and influences how we think of creation and creativity in all areas. He then asks, "whether it is possible to think of creation differently… in weak existential terms- in terms of encounters and events" (Biesta, 2013, p. 12).

Above, I briefly described how the domain of subjectification is about bringing something new into the world; it is about changing the existing order of things. If we limit our ability to imagine what something new may look like by only understanding creation in strong terms, however, then we also limit our understanding about the possibilities for education to alter our existing world. To speak less abstractly, many educators share the experience of having a student reach out to them sometime later—days, weeks, months, or even years— to tell them about how one interaction, which could have been a supportive pat on the back, encouraging words, or a firm

reprimand, changed them forever in a positive way. These anecdotes are what keep many educators fulfilled. That change noted by the student is something new. The ripples of that positive change and the impact that it has on other people, or the world, cannot ever be calculated or measured.

The aforementioned example is an illustration of education as an act of creation (in weak terms) where the encounter or the event is what matters. In this way, we can see why weakness (more specifically, a weak understanding of creation) is requisite for the educational domain of subjectification. First, it is not controversial to say that education relies on dialogic and hermeneutic elements, so many would agree with that conception of weakness in education. Many may also agree that education should help people to develop their own subjectivity. When we closely inspect the discourse around education—talk of job preparation, market value, and standardized testing— it is clear to see that we over-value creation in strong terms, or in other words, in terms of production. Moreover, this discourse is about preparing students for the world as it currently exists; it is not about the possibility of something new arising. This is precisely why it is appropriate to be reminded about the importance of weakness in education.

Given the inherent weakness present in education, the issue at stake for Biesta (2012) is that "the weakness of education should be seen as a problem, as something that should be overcome and ultimately 'solved'" (p. 585). Viewing education solely in terms of its functions in the domain of qualification, which is about obtaining knowledge, skills, values, and dispositions, would transform education into mere training. Likewise, if the sole purpose of education is socialization, which is how we become part of existing traditions and practices, we would probably understand this to be indoctrination. Of course, we want our pharmacists to have the knowledge and skills to be able to calculate precisely a safe amount of medication for an

11

individual. Moreover, we also want individuals to be able to thrive in the existing social society that precedes them. If this is all that education is (training and indoctrination), then weakness is a problem that needs to be addressed because there would be a need for tight control over the outcomes. Intuitively, however, we know that education harnesses potential far beyond training or indoctrination, with the latter being a generally undesirable outcome. If we are truly concerned about the domain of subjectification, which transcends all domains, then it is accepted that weakness in education is necessary because it creates the space for something new to enter the world.

Existence, not Essence

Thus far, I have outlined Biesta's claim that education first and foremost must be concerned with the domain of subjectification. In other words, education has an interest in the human being as a subject. The idea that education is not simply about securely placing individuals into the existing order is not a new idea. In fact, it can be traced back to Immanuel Kant's (1982) essay "An Answer to the Question 'What is Enlightenment?'" In this essay, Kant describes enlightenment as the process by which one becomes independent and autonomous. For Kant, it was in the inherent nature of man to pursue "vocation and free thinking" (Kant, 1982, p. 701, as cited by Biesta, 2013, p.80). Moreover, Kant viewed education as the vehicle by which this capacity toward free thinking emerged. Therefore, hindering this propensity towards free thinking was a crime against human nature. While Biesta found Kant's supposition that education is not only about incorporating individuals into a pre-existing society helpful, but the consequence of this rationale is also that concepts of what it means to be human become prescriptive and predetermined. According to Biesta, "In this view, the human being can only

become human- that is, a rational autonomous being- through education" (p. 80). This idea ultimately shaped conceptions of modern western education, even contemporarily. Biesta's project challenges this conception in a number of ways. First, borrowing from Levinas (1981), Biesta (2003) troubles,

> the modern approach to education where the subject is conceived as a cogito: as a being whose first relationship with the world (including other human beings) is a knowledge relationship, and where only on the basis of this knowledge that the subject comes to act- and hopefully… to act reasonably and morally. (p. 62)

For the brief purposes of this framework, Biesta (2003) argued (inspired by Levinas) that "the subject as a cogito is conceived to be first concerned with itself, and then if it decides to, with the other" (p. 62). This understanding of the subject is characterized by individual freedom and rationality. Levinas argued instead, however, that the subject is constituted by a relationship of responsibility for the other. In subsequent chapters, I discuss in greater detail what this responsibility for the other entails. What is important to know at this point is that this theoretical move, from conceiving of the subject in terms of their individuality to in terms of their relationship with the other, ushers in a conversation regarding what it means to be unique and what it means to be a social being in the world, which is pertinent for Student Conduct and so-called taking responsibility for one's actions impacting others.

From this theoretical move, Biesta broached the topic of subjectification as an educational endeavor through the notion of 'uniqueness.' Biesta (2012), adopting from Levinas' body of work, believed that there are two possible ways to understand uniqueness: uniqueness as difference and uniqueness as irreplaceability. The former implies uniqueness in terms of the way

in which I am different from everyone else: "It locates uniqueness in my own singular unique essence" (p. 587). In this understanding,

> Uniqueness is about what can be known about me...it goes no further than to acknowledge that all human beings are in some respects different from each other, but it is not able to value the existence of each unique 'unit.' (p. 588)

The latter, uniqueness as irreplaceability, is not, however, about what makes me unique. Instead, the question is, "When does it matter that I am unique, that I am I and not somebody else?" In this interpretation of uniqueness, the questions transform from 'what' to 'when,' thus also transforming the discussion from one about essence (what) to one about existence (when). Moreover, this allows for discussions regarding pedagogies that "can operate in the domain of the existential rather than the domain of essence" (p. 589).

In moving the conversation from the domain of 'essence,' Biesta (2015) viewed his work as making possible the "existential challenge, that is, the challenge to exist and exist humanely" (p. 420). This was a bold move on Biesta's part, as he called into question the entire framework for western education. To reiterate, dominant conceptions of the role of education describe a process of bringing out the inherent potential of students to become fully autonomous subjects. Biesta (2003) wrote, "education has been conceived...as a process in which a child is brought to reason- or to be more precise...as a process in which a child is brought to a common, pre-established and pre-existent reason" (p. 62).

Moreover "the purpose of the educational process is to get the student to know what the teacher already knows" (p. 66). This understanding is underpinned by the ontological basis of the subjects as a cogito. It is about providing knowledge to the student and stimulating their inherent nature towards reason so that they may have the tools to make rational decisions. This

14

understanding is limiting, however, because it is only about the individual, not about the individual's uniqueness. Under this rationale, any student can be substituted for another student. Furthermore, this rationale is about incorporating students into the world as it currently exists, as the goal is to get students to know what the teacher knows.

> It specifies what the child, student, or newcomer must become before giving them an opportunity to show who they are and who they will be...it is unable to be open to the possibility that newcomers might radically alter our understanding of what it means to be human. (Biesta, 2012, p. 587)

When beginning to speak about those instances where it matters that you are you— those events where you could not be substituted for— this is where the possibility is open for a new understanding of the world to emerge. Biesta (2015) summed this up beautifully by writing, I only try to highlight what we may encounter in our lives and what we may encounter in educational situations. It is up to each of us to 'take up' what we encounter...and remain responsible for whatever road we took. (p. 420)

Biesta viewed the existential challenge of being human, the challenge of being responsible, as the space for the very possibility that something new may enter the world. As demonstrated, Biesta provided a coherent framework for thinking about and articulating educational problems. I utilized this framework to elucidate my thinking about issues facing Student Affairs and Student Conduct practice, namely how we may hinder opportunities for student subjectification from occurring. There are a few tenets that must be shared among my readers to accept the use of this conceptual framework as posited by Biesta. First, and most importantly, any Student Affairs or Student Conduct Professional reading this would have to identify as an educator. Although, in my experience, most Student Affairs professionals do

identify as educators and that has been the language that the field has historically adopted, I am aware that there are some professionals who may identify more closely with other frameworks like counseling, for example. If you do not identify as an educator, then the findings of this project may seem unconvincing or useless to you as this project asserts the importance of bringing the discourse back to matters of education. The next tenet that must be shared is that one must believe that the most important function of education lies in its generative capacity and its ability to bring forth newness into our world. While the other functions of education (i.e., socialization and qualification) are very important to the maintenance of our society, our students' abilities to become subjects should be the premier concern. This means that we must be astute in designing curricula and enacting pedagogies that do not hinder student subjectivities from emerging. If one does not believe that student subjectivity is the most important domain of education and instead believes that education should primarily be concerned with job preparation, then my arguments may not seem appealing, either. While I do expect that not all my claims will be accepted because there are various ways to view our profession and multiple opinions about what the purpose of higher education is, I do hope at the very least to provoke an appreciation for philosophical thought in Student Affairs practice. I hope that by providing an alternative understanding of our work and guiding principles that I also open new pathways for inhabiting our profession that may not have seemed accessible before great engagement of the reader.

In this next section, I will discuss why subjectification should be a concern for Student Affairs and Student Conduct professionals. Subjectivity is not simply an academic discussion without any real-world implications. Thus, it is imperative to have a grounded discussion and to

articulate what is at stake if subjectification becomes an afterthought in our educational discourses.

The Case for Subjectification

From this project's conceptual framework as posited by Biesta (2013), it is known that education operates within three domains: qualification, which is about the acquisition of knowledge skills and dispositions; socialization, which is how individuals become a part of the existing orders, including political, professional, and social orders; and subjectification, which can be seen as the opposite of socialization, as it is about how individuals can become independent and autonomous agents of social action and responsibility (p. 64). As mentioned earlier, since Kant's essay, An answer to the question 'What is Enlightenment?, there has been a long-standing notion that education can serve as a means of becoming, or coming into oneself as an autonomous individual. In this project, this becoming is referred to as subjectification.

This idea of subjectification is about individuals having the freedom to choose what kind of person they want to be (Davies, 2006). According to Levinas (1981), subjectification is about our uniqueness— about when it matters that I am I and not someone else. There are many theories about how exactly individuals become subjects, and sometimes these theories compete and contradict one another. For example, critical social theories "are those conceptual accounts of the social world that attempt to understand and explain the causes of structural domination and inequality in order to facilitate human emancipation and equity" (Levinson et al., 2011, p. 2).

The underlying idea of critical theories is that power works upon our consciousness in ways that conceal our domination. Therefore, someone must teach us about power or demystify how it works so that we can be liberated from and act against its domination. Therefore, in this logic, emancipation requires an intervention from someone else whose consciousness is not

17

subject to the workings of power. In contrast, for Foucault (1984), as cited by Biesta (2013), there is no requirement that an individual escape from power or that they gain knowledge about the workings of power. Instead, emancipation occurs through transgression, which is simply proving that things can be different and that things do not have to be the way that they currently are.

Lastly, there are political theories of subjectification, such as those found in the work of Hannah Arendt. Arendt introduced the concept of natality, which is "fundamentally a potentiality for beginning" (Bowen-Moore, 1989, p.21). Natality manifests in two ways. First, "human birth is the fact through which the capacity for beginning is introduced to the world" (Bowen-Moore, 1989, p. 21). The second manifestation is the capacity for the individual to make beginnings. This is when an individual leaves childhood and "enters the stage of the public world where his words and deeds will be heard and seen and judged by others" (Bowen-Moore, 1989, p. 41). In this public world, individuals have the capacity for a "second birth," where they can introduce something new into the world through their thoughts, actions, or a new way of being.

There are many ways to conceptualize the human ability to alter themselves and the existing world. I find myself most aligning with Arendt's conception of subjectivity, although I find other conceptions useful. I view it as the opportunity, or rather many opportunities, that arise for one to make decisions, take a stance, and to have those decisions and stances seen, evaluated, disagreed with, and judged among others who have the same capacity. In taking advantage of the opportunities, a new version of the self is sometimes born. Moreover, sometimes these opportunities result in changes that affect more than just the individual, but whole communities and societies; further, sometimes these changes are radical and beyond what we imagined

possible. Regardless of the method, subjectification implies a disruption in the order of things, and in this disruption, not only does something new emerge into the world, but so does a new version of oneself. This might lead one to ask, what is at stake if this human capacity is lost? Why should I be interested in subjectification as an educator in these current times?

I argue that it is more important than ever to be interested in student subjectivity. We are currently living in an age where we are being constantly tracked and monitored. Now, many people always carry a powerful computer in their pockets in the form of smartphones. These smartphones are connected to our homes, our cars, our computers, and our social lives through health tracker apps, social media apps, and journals. These tiny computers are engineered to track our data points, and through sophisticated algorithms, they can alter our human behavior (Lanier, 2018). According to Lanier (2018), in the past, people saw TV or print advertisements that were made for general populations. Now, however, we are receiving individualized content through social media that is constantly being adjusted and modified to incite certain behaviors. Unfortunately, these core processes that social media empires developed to make money from advertising are not only successful in behavior modification in terms of consumerism.

In 2016, we witnessed Russia hijack our presidential election by manipulating public opinion through social media (Calabresi, 2017). Using data collected through social media engagement, Russian intelligence officials were not only able to capitalize off the divisiveness in American politics, but also created even more division within our nation. Using algorithms, they can segment huge populations into thousands of subgroups according to defining characteristics like religion and political beliefs or tastes in TV shows or music. Other algorithms can determine those groups' hot button issues and identify 'followers' among them, pinpointing the most susceptible to suggestion (Calabresi, 2017).

This is the precise reason that we have seen an increased interest in how large social media companies— like Facebook— are protecting user data, how they are moderating speech, and how they are protecting against the spread of 'fake news.' With the ubiquitous forces that exist, that have explicit goals in modifying and controlling human behavior; it is not an exaggeration to say that our democracy is at stake if we as educators are not concerned with subjectification.

In Hannah Arendt's (1968) The Origins of Totalitarianism, she skillfully documents the rise of Totalitarian government regimes like Nazi Germany. She asks, what happened? Why did it happen? And how did it happen? In this exploration, Arendt detailed how anti-Semitism and imperialism created the perfect conditions to take away human agency. Her work was very controversial at the time because she wondered how it was so that people would walk themselves into gas chambers to be exterminated. Arendt was believed to be victim-blaming Jewish people for their own deaths. Arendt's intent, however, was not only to illuminate the exact conditions in which people would behave in such a way that would lead to their own demise, but also how governments configured themselves to have people willingly work towards the extermination of another group of people. Arendt found that terror could be used to stamp out all spontaneity in the human spirit. Without this spontaneity, people were resigned to accepting the reality of the situation and lost their will to fight for a different future.

Some may believe that totalitarianism is far behind us and that those conditions could never rise again in today's society. Timothy Snyder (2017), the author of "On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century," issued this warning when he wrote,

> You submit to tyranny when you renounce the difference between what you want to hear and what is actually the case. This renunciation of reality can feel natural and pleasant,

but the result is your demise as an individual, and thus the collapse of any political

system that depends on individualism. (p. 66)

If you watch the Documentary Film The Social Dilemma (2020), however, a compelling

narrative is presented of how the algorithms of social media are doing exactly this. Social media

is engineered to show its users more people who think like them and align themselves with the

same issues. The result is that humans develop this idea that the general population agrees with

them and that those who do not are in the minority. Therefore, those who disagree must be

misinformed and delusional. This type of insulation creates an 'us vs. them' mentality that, as we

have seen in the 2016 and 2020 elections, can lead to extremism and violence.

Unfortunately, social media is only one reality, albeit ubiquitous, that is a threat to human

subjectivity. It is not an overstatement to say that our whole world is configured around

controlling human behavior to meet some end goal. In the age of neoliberalism, which is an

ideology that emphasizes winning and rugged individualism and necessitates that all things be

subject to market-driven rationality, there is almost no area of social life that is left outside of its

reach (Giroux, 2013). This includes education.

Thus, while we live in a society that emphasizes individual freedom, now more than ever

it is important to ask, exactly how free we are? Do we really make our own decisions? Or are we

victims of group thinking and algorithms? On January 6, 2021, we watched as self-proclaimed

patriots stormed our nation's capital in a literal attempt to stage a coup on supposedly the world's

most stable democracy. In the spirit of Hannah Arendt (1968) and her investigation into how the

atrocities of Nazi Germany happened, we must take a critical look ourselves to ask, how could

this happen here, in the United States of America? This is why our interest in subjectification

matters. As educators, we necessarily must be concerned about preserving the human spirit, the desire to resist, the belief that reality can be otherwise, and the hope for a better future. Otherwise, we run the risk of losing our society to unbridled authoritarianism and nationalism.

The goal of the previous section was to illustrate why our interest in the domain of subjectification should matter. In this next section, I address the systematic way in which I take up the questions outlined in this project.

Methodological Considerations

Epistemology, Ontology, Positionality, and Anticipated Outcomes

In this project, when I speak of having a method, I am not referring to a scientific method with prescribed steps and parameters. Instead, I am speaking broadly about the various modes in which I think and write to make my work systematic and purposeful (Ruitenberg, 2009). I operate under the assumption that knowledge is both multidimensional and complex, so it is imperative that I engage in a methodology that is flexible to alternative forms of knowing outside of scientific knowledge (Kincheloe, 2008). This research is not intended to be empirical in nature. I am not trying to prove or validate a hypothesis. I am not searching for Truth or "reliable" data. I am, however, searching for insight, which is beyond gathering and reporting facts. Insight is another type of knowledge that helps us to view the whole picture and to see the connection between seemingly disparate things, ideas, notions, or concepts (Jardine, 2012). I think of it this way: when you visit an elder for advice, perhaps your grandparent or an older neighbor, often times you are not looking for them to provide you with facts about the issue in question. Usually, we find that they provide something much more than that. The word that I am using to describe that 'something more' is insight.

Practically speaking, each chapter is constructed as a stand-alone paper with its own question(s) and method. All chapters are, however, threaded by the educational concerns outlined in the conceptual framework: Chapter Two addresses education, not learning; Chapter Three addresses weakness, not strength; and Chapter 4 addresses existence, not essence. In this way, I am acting as a bricoleur, which is a French word for a handyperson. A bricoleur in research makes use of a diverse set of tools by "carefully exploring the relationships connecting the object of inquiry to the contexts in which it exists" (Kincheloe, 2001, p. 686). Bricoleurs "use any method necessary to gain new perspectives" and avoid the trappings of disciplinary boundaries that control what can be knowable (Kincheloe, 2001, p. 687).

I am most comfortable with calling the methodology of the whole project 'Critical Philosophical Analysis.' I believe that I operate in an interpretive space, pulling from hermeneutic inquiry, phenomenology, and critical theory. While I have no aspirations of pursuing a philosophical inquiry that strictly adheres to the traditions of that discipline, I am attracted to the method of questioning that Philosophy allows for. Philosophical questioning is about being attuned to that which often goes without question. It is about getting to the heart of meaning. Its questions do not beg answers. On the contrary, these questions invoke wonder and evoke emotions. Perhaps the project that I am pursing can be likened to Sara Ahmed's (2014) concept of 'not philosophy.' Ahmed wrote, "not philosophy is practiced by those who are not philosophers and aims to create room within philosophy for others who are not philosophers" (p. 15). To be clear, my intent for this study was to bring philosophical thinking into the very applied field of Student Affairs. I drew all my analyses and reflections from my almost decade of experience of working in the field of Student Affairs, formal education, and training. My hope is

that this offering of 'not philosophy' creates a space for other 'not philosophers' to engage in philosophical thinking and questioning in Student Affairs.

In practicing Critical Philosophic Analysis, there are many assumptions about research under which I operate. Critical Philosophy can be traced back to the early critical theorists at the Frankfurt School in Germany who wanted to integrate philosophy with social analysis and were "interested in the possibilities of transforming the social order through human praxis" (Jay, 1996). It was developed in response to traditional theory, which was oriented towards explaining society, therefore being inherently complicit in unjust systems, whereas critical theory (philosophy) was oriented towards changing society (Levinson et al., 2011, p. 9). As such, core tenets of critical theory are as follows: the belief that the world can be altered through awareness; reflection and action; and the idea that the enterprise of research is related to creating a more just society. In this way, research is not neutral or impartial; rather, it is oriented towards social justice (Levinson et al., 2011).

Because I have disabused myself of the idea that research is ever neutral or impartial (even when provided with the illusion of impartiality), it is helpful to also understand my epistemological grounding in relation to both research broadly and to this project specifically. In terms of knowledge claims, I did not attempt to provide a universal conceptual framework for an educative Student Affairs or Student Conduct practice. Instead, the research is firmly situated in a particular knowledge and culture at a particular time in history, all of which confound to create my world view. As such, I reject positivism as an epistemological position, which suggests that an objective Truth can be arrived at through observation and reason. Although positivism has long been critiqued and discredited, its relics still exert influence on knowledge production and what type of knowledge is valued. The only knowledge that is worthwhile, it seems, is that

24

which is produced by following strict scientific methods. This makes knowledge production a site of contestation and conflict (Kincheloe, 2008). Positivism, however, is not just an academic or theoretical premise; we live in a culture of positivism which "is also a material force, a set of material practices that are embedded in the routines and experiences of our daily lives" (Giroux, 2018). Keeping this in mind, I ask my readers to carefully examine any hesitance to engage with this work because of the lack of scientific approach. I also ask my readers to be open to other types of knowledge that may be gleamed from employing various modes of inquiry.

My epistemological stance of this project was informed by my positionality in this world and in my profession. As a Black woman from inner-city Philadelphia (code for the 'hood'), I have a deep knowing through my lived experience that enforcement of the law is not always just and equal. I have uncles and cousins who fell victim to the crack epidemic and ended up in prison due to the war on drugs. I have seen police officers body slam teenage boys in the hallways of my school. I did not need any theory to tell me that ideals of justice, fairness, and impartiality were mythical. So, as a Student Conduct administrator who enforces the "laws" or policies of the university, facilitates hearings, makes decisions about responsibility for violations, and imposes sanctions in a quasi-criminal justice like system, of course I am skeptical. As Student Conduct professionals, not only do we espouse operating in a neutral manner as fact-gatherers and decision makers, but we also believe that we are educators, too. I already know that neutrality is a figment of our social imagination (and product of our positivistic culture) because of my earlier described lived experience. The scope of this project, however, involved the latter idea. I investigated this readily accepted idea that we are educators. Where does this come from and what does this mean in the context of our field? In completing this project, I relied on not only my personal belief, but also on the historical professional assertion that we are,

in fact, educators. So, from there, the next logical question is how can we fashion practices that leave the possibility for new subjectivities to emerge into the world, all with unlimited potential to create change?

Project Organization and Anticipated Outcomes

The first task of this project was to investigate the meaning of education within the field of Student Affairs. Biesta (2012) demonstrated that discourses about education have been replaced with discourses about learning. In Chapter Two, I begin by describing the current climate in Student Conduct practice and the interesting claim by practitioners that it is losing its educational mission. The existence of this claim must mean that there was an educational mission to begin with. Therefore, to understand this, I found it appropriate to explore the normative view of education within the broader field of Student Affairs by tracing how its discourse has evolved since the inception of the field. In this chapter, we see that three main discourses emerged within Student Affairs, which were (a) student services, (b) student development, and (c) student learning. In each case, these discourses substituted for conversations about education, its purposes, content, and the nature of an educational relationship. Moreover, it was found that Student Affairs' relationship to education has always been fraught. The field has struggled since the very beginning to couple its functions with the educational mission of higher education. The findings of this chapter trouble the idea that Student Affair professionals are inherently educators, despite that being the dominant narrative promulgated in graduate training programs.

Similar to Chapter 2, Chapter 3 continues the deconstruction of commonly held beliefs within our field, but in this case, I inspect Student Conduct Practice more closely.

Specifically, I explore the concept of "accountability" and its relation to education, as it is assumed that holding students accountable is somehow related to them learning, and therefore making our work educational. Through unpacking the conceptual baggage of the word "accountability," it was found that we do not hold students accountable insomuch as we make them accountable through surveillance, tracking, and reporting mechanisms. I further posit that the goal of making students accountable, or as I show, attempting to control their behaviors and collect data to make their behaviors more predictable, is to protect the brands of universities against scandals that affect the bottom line. Like Biesta (2012) questions in 'weakness, not strength,' I ask, is weakness in education seen as a problem to be overcome? In this case, I show that Student Conduct practice goes to great lengths to remove the inherent weakness that exists within the behavior management of college students. I conclude the chapter by acknowledging this fact and asking practitioners to consider how we might create space for student subjectivity to emerge given this reality.

Chapters 2 and 3 represent my attempts to disturb commonly held views and narratives that frame our work as Student Affairs and Student Conduct Professionals. In the true spirit of a bricoleur, my hope was to dismantle assumptions, brick by brick, so that I may hypothesize about new possibilities and reimagine what it means to be an educator in our field. In this way, I see myself as rebuilding a new foundation. Chapter Four presents the beginning of that new foundation. Although two chapters were devoted to critically examining our educational mission, I do believe that our work can be a space for education to occur. Based on this belief, I ask, similarly to Biesta (2012) in "existence, not essence," what would our practice look like if it operated in the domain of existence, and not in the domain of essence? In these aims, I speculated that, first, we should enact policies that reconnect our students with their freedom by

emphasizing how they engaged in a particular behavior instead of simply prohibiting the content, or the what, of the behavior.

Next, I suggest that abandoning our role as educators may actually be an educative gesture by creating the space for our students' uniqueness and singularity to emerge. In this way, our function is twofold. On one hand, we help our students navigate the existential challenge that comes with having freedom and having to negotiate that freedom among others. On the other hand, we navigate the existential challenge of being educators and having to decide when shifting to a pedagogy of existence is preferable. The result of this discussion is a new way to articulate the educational mission of our work beyond the language of accountability. Building off Chapter Four, Chapter Five circles back to the entry-point of this inquiry, which is the role of grace in Student Conduct. Here, I introduce my preliminary plans on continuing this line of research through exploring how offering grace in Student Conduct practice can be an opening for not only student subjectivity, but also professional subjectivity. I conclude by suggesting that this vein of research may present a paradigm shift for Student Affairs, in which we see the concept of theory-to-practice as being an internal focused endeavor and commitment to our own professional subjectivities, as opposed to being externally focused on controlling the behaviors and educational outcomes of our students. The end-product of this project is intended to offer critiques of dominant education, produce novel insights about Student Affairs and Student Conduct Practice, and illuminate paths of resistance toward a more expansive, educative vision of our work.

CHAPTER II: 'EDUCATION, NOT LEARNING': THE NORMATIVE VIEW OF

EDUCATION IN STUDENT AFFAIRS

Introduction

The purpose of the chapter is to investigate the normative view of education within Student Affairs. To do this, I examine how the field of Student Affairs adopted the professional identity of educators. To identify as educators means that we believe that we provide education. So, how do we describe our provision of services? Similarly, what do we mean when we say that Student Conduct is educational? I take up these questions by first zeroing in on Student Conduct. In this chapter, I discuss the perceived loss of the educational mission felt by Student Conduct professionals. I do this by reviewing the literature and providing a brief history of the field and a description of the current landscape of Student Conduct practice that fosters these sentiments.

This discussion illustrates the evolution of Student Conduct practice and the challenges that it faces in living up to the educational mission of Student Affairs. Next, to gain a greater understanding of the contours of this supposed educational mission, I pan out by examining the broader level of the field of Student Affairs. The reasoning behind this decision was twofold.

First, the field of Student Conduct shares a professional heritage and theoretical foundation with Student Affairs. Second, Student Conduct still operates within the domains of Student Affairs practice and, practically speaking, is most commonly organized within divisions of Student Affairs. Because research has demonstrated that there is a perceived loss of an educational mission (Miller, 2018, Glassman, 2021), this obviously suggests that there was, at least at some point, an educational mission to begin with. Therefore, it imperative to begin with a viewpoint from the whole field perspective. I examine the normative view of education and educators by presenting a historiography of Student Affairs, paying specific attention to the

discourses around and about education or concepts that can be conceived of as education. I found

that there were three distinct discourses that emerged within the evolving field (Carpenter et al.,

2016; Evans & Reason, 2001; Doyle, 2004). They are Student Services; Student Development,

and Student Learning. I show that each shift in discourse within the field of Student Affairs has

represented both an attempt to articulate our relationship to the broader academic mission of the

institution as well as to establish itself as a rightful profession by resisting the idea that our

functions were only ancillary to academic affairs (Brown et al., 1972). Moreover, I also look to

Biesta's (2013, 2015b, 2017) commentary on the language of learning to critique the final shift

in discourse, which is Student Learning, to show how critical conversations about the content

and purpose of our educational functions have been obscured.

Lastly, I demonstrate that although Student Development has endured its share of

criticism for allegedly usurping the academic mission of institutions, it was found that it is still

normatively viewed as the educational mission of our work, despite a shift in discourse to

Student Learning which was intended to align with the academic mission of institutions. This

presents our field with a professional quandary: how do we reconcile student development being

simultaneously viewed as the educational nature of our work while also being seen as competing

with the academic mission of higher education? I conclude by suggesting that this quandary may

be a productive opening to conceive of our educational mission a bit differently.

Brief History and Current Landscape of Student Conduct

The history and evolution of the field of Student Conduct follows a similar trajectory to

the larger Student Affairs profession. In Student Conduct, specifically, history has shown that

there has been a continuous battle to balance the needs of the institution with the needs of the

individual. Lowery (2016) captured this best when he wrote, "It is complex because it has many

different and seemingly competing dimensions, including philosophical, legal, legislative, educational, and organizational issues" (p. 203). I demonstrate how striking a balance between all these factors is still a contemporary issue faced by the field.

In the early colleges, discipline was a mechanism to mold the moral, ethical, and religious character of students during colonial times. There were strict codes of behavior and penalties for disobedience, which could range from corporal punishment to public humiliation (Smith, 1994). At this time, faculty and presidents were responsible for student discipline. Colleges began to turn away from this paternalistic model in the early 1900's when Deans of men and women, instead of faculty, began to handle student disciplinary matters. It should be noted here that the emergence of Deans is often seen as one of the first Student Affairs roles and is therefore viewed as the origin of the profession. These roles were created to handle the non-academic matters involving students so that faculty could focus solely on intellectual endeavors. Nevertheless, for the Deans, the ultimate goal for discipline during this time was to develop self-control and self-discipline among their students. There was also an expressed concern that student discipline should be seen as more than just rigid enforcement of the rules (Hawkes & Hawkes, 1945).

As the field of Student Affairs (and, subsequently, Student Conduct practice) developed, there was tension between Deans and early Student Affairs specialists regarding how student discipline should be handled. The Deans were viewed as punitive disciplinarians, which did not serve the goals of student development, according to the specialists. Lowery (2016) suggested that, over time, disciplinary affairs became less about control and punishment and more democratic, educational, and rehabilitative. It must be noted that this idea is challenged and viewed from another perspective later in this chapter when discussing the Student Development

Era. Nevertheless, Lowery's (2016) standpoint is readily accepted within the field of Student Conduct. To support this, Lowery (2016) noted that, in the 1960s and 1970s, students began to have input into codes of conduct and disciplinary procedures.

In 1961, landmark court case Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education had direct implications for both Student Affairs and Student Conduct. The impetus for this case was the expulsion of St. John Dixon from Alabama State College for unclear reasons3. First, this case formally ended the doctrine of in loco parentis, which helped to usher in the broader focus on student development in Student Affairs (Carpenter et al., 2016). Second, the court decided that education was property; therefore, students have due process rights that include a right to notice and a hearing by way of the Fourteenth Amendment that ensures that the state cannot deny any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law" (Dannells, 1997). This court intervention began the trend of colleges and universities implementing judicial-like processes for the adjudication of student misconduct.

This trend raised concerns in the field because of its adversarial nature, which was seen as a detractor from the educational nature of Student Conduct (Dannells, 1978). In a 10-year longitudinal study, Dannells (1990) found that the majority of institutions provided a written notice of hearing, allowed the accused to cross-examine witnesses, and allowed the accused to appeal the decision. Forty percent of the institutions that were surveyed allowed attorneys in their process. In a later study conducted by Waryold and Peck (1997), it was found that over 66% of institutions allowed for attorneys to participate in campus processes. Donald Gehring (2001) likened these findings to "criminal law adversarial procedures," which obviously can only operate under the presumption that there are adversaries (p. 467). Gehring (2001) continued by saying that purposefully creating situations in which students are

antagonists to each other or the institution makes it difficult to create the community that colleges wish to foster. While concepts of "community" in higher education are varied by contexts, the theoretical ideas of belonging (Maslow, 1954) and mattering (Schlossberg, 1989) are the threads that connect most research on the subject (White & Nonnamaker, 2008). According to Maslow (1954), belonging is the motivation to overcome feelings of alienation or aloneness. A sense of belonging occurs when an individual develops an emotional and/or social relationship with others. For Schlossberg (1989), "mattering is a motive: the feeling that others depend on us...are concerned with our fate…or experienced as an ego extension, exercises a powerful influence on our actions" (p. 8). With this is mind, it is clear to see why established procedures within student codes of conduct that isolate individuals and pit them against one another seem to run counter to the broader mission of Student Affairs and higher education to foster community. Moreover, any prescribed repercussions for students that are found to be in violation that restricts or removes a student from the community could directly impact their sense of belonging.

Debates about the purpose, scope, function, and philosophy of student discipline have existed since the inception of colleges. There was no formal professional organization, however, for Student Conduct professionals to take up these matters in any systematic way until 1988. In that year, the Association for Student Judicial Affairs (ASJA) was founded by Donald Gehring, but the name eventually was changed to the Association for Student Conduct Administration (ASCA) in 2008. This shift in the name of the organization marked a transition from the legal jargon and concepts that were embedded into campus codes and processes towards more restorative practices and conflict resolution (Schrage & Giacomini, 2009). Since then, many institutions have transitioned from Offices of Judicial Affairs to Offices of Community Standards

or Offices of Student Conduct, and from Guilty/Not Guilty to Responsible/Not responsible findings, among many other language and practice shifts. These efforts are further demonstrative of the ongoing battle to strike a balance between legalism and student development.

Contemporarily, the field of Student Conduct is still engaged in the decades-long fight against judicialization. Legal and legislative environments are adding increasing constraints on Student Conduct administration; namely the release of the Dear Colleague Letter in 2011 by the U.S Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR). The purpose of the Dear Colleague letter was to provide clearer guidance to institutions of Higher Education on how to respond to campus sexual violence and sexual harassment. According to Miller (2018), however, the purpose and intent of the letter sorely missed the mark for providing clearer guidance, as many institutions found the guidance difficult to understand or difficult to put into practice. This led to a spike in institutions under investigation by OCR for violating Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which protects people from discrimination on the basis of sex. For reference, in 2015, OCR investigated approximately 150 institutions for violations of Title IX related to sexual misconduct (Lowery, 2016). In response to this guidance and out of fear of potential OCR investigation or litigation, Higher Education Institutions began to make changes to staffing, structure, policies, and procedures to meet the unclear expectations outlined in the Dear Colleague Letter of 2011.

Nathan Miller (2018) sought to understand the impacts of addressing campus sexual violence and sexual harassment on Student Conduct administrators and Title IX coordinators. In his study, he found that several of the participants articulated that their work feels "more clinical and restrictive" (Miller, 2018, p. 60). Furthermore,

Many participants highlighted that with the increased focus on compliance and regulation and an underlying fear of not wanting to make a mistake that would result in litigation or investigation, the entire process of addressing campus sexual violence and sexual harassment has become much more rigid and legalistic. (p. 60)

The increasing legalism that many participants in Miller's study bemoaned is captured in the following. As mentioned earlier, Waryold and Peck (1997) found that over 66% of institutions allowed for attorneys to participate in campus processes. When Gehring (2001), wrote about these findings, he made the argument that perhaps colleges were over-interpreting what was required of them by the law in terms of due process. He pointed out that the right to counsel was not an essential element of due process noted in the Dixon V. Alabama State Board of Education (1961) case. This is not true in some states now, however. Notably, North Carolina became the first state to guarantee that students had the option of legal representation for campus conduct proceedings (Student and Administration Equality Act, 2013). Arkansas (House Bill 1892, 2015) and North Dakota (Senate Bill No. 2150, 2015) soon followed with similar laws. In line with this trend, the ASCA advised that the role of attorneys in conduct proceedings should clearly be defined in the institution's student code of conduct (King & White, n.d.).

Making further note of how colleges have over-interpreted their due process requirements, Gehring (2001) wrote, "even where the consequence of the hearing may be expulsion, the courts beginning with Dixon V. Alabama State Board of Education (1961) have said there is no right to cross-examine witnesses" (p. 474). On May 6, 2020, the U.S. Department of Education under the leadership of U.S. Secretary of Education, Betsy Devos, released new Title IX rules with the effect of law that allows advisors, who may be and are often attorneys, to cross-examine victims and witnesses 4. In addition to cross-examination, the new Title IX rules

created significant changes to evidence procedures and added additional due process protections, effectively making university processes almost identical to legal courtroom proceedings.

In my professional experience as a Student Conduct Administrator for 5 years, and now as an administrator who primarily handles reports and complaints of sexual misconduct in the Title IX and Equal Opportunity realm, I agree with the sentiments of the participants in Miller's study. Further, I would note the effects of the changes made to be in compliance with the recommendations from The Dear Colleague Letter of 2011 also trickled over into general Student Conduct practice and not just into those cases involving sexual misconduct. Koss et al. (2014), wrote, "compliance fosters a quasi-criminal justice approach not suited to all sexual misconduct and inconsistent with developing practice in Student Conduct management" (p. 242), which can now be seen as a forecast the current landscape. Participants in Miller's (2018) study described this landscape as being "one hundred thousand times more legalistic" (p. 61), and they noted the seeming loss of the educational mission of student development in conduct processes. In fact, The American College Personnel Association (ACPA) and the Association for Student Conduct Administration (ASCA) recently sent out an announcement inviting its members to participate in research that seeks "to understand the impact of 'judicialization,' or the phenomenon of legalistic mechanisms superseding those processes specifically developed to facilitate the adjudication of university policy violations..." (Glassman, 2021).

The rising interest into studying "judicialization" is an indicator of the trend and direction that the field of Student Conduct practice seems to be heading. This can be attributed to the heightened scrutiny and public eye on college conduct processes by the way of sexual misconduct cases. Many institutions reacted by revising their policies and ensuring that all of

their conduct procedures were legally defensible (Lowery, 2016). In this aim, many schools fashioned their procedures much like criminal processes.

I have discussed in detail above the external constraints and the political backdrop that impacts our work. There are also, however, internal realities that may sustain the perception that we are losing our educational mission. From my experience practicing Student Conduct at three universities and from my conversations with colleagues, it is fair to say that most Student Conduct professionals have demanding caseloads which consist of meeting with multiple students per day, reading incoming reports, charging students and scheduling their meetings, and making sure students are being compliant with their sanctions, along with other prevention and education functions of their offices.

For further illustration, take this fact into consideration: the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, where I previously practiced Student Conduct, had over 20,000 students, but only employed two professional staff members in the Office of Student Rights and Responsibilities (OSRR). OSRR was not only responsible for adjudicating general student misconduct, but also for facilitating academic integrity hearings and Title IX hearings. In my experience, when working in this office, it is very easy to view students as "cases." The work becomes very routine and, for efficiency's sake, you rely on the same few sanctions instead of being creative and responsive to individual student needs. Also, you have to be very skilled in getting students to speak openly with you, but students cannot get too comfortable and begin to share too much. They may go beyond their scheduled appointment and, if this happens, it is likely that you have another student who will be anxiously waiting for you outside of your office. Besides holding actual informal conduct meetings, you may also be scheduled to facilitate a formal hearing that day. These are usually scheduled in 3 to 4-hour blocks. In the midst of these appointments, you

are doing case management, fielding questions from walk-ins or phone calls, managing graduate

assistants, and running reports on data requested by the student government association, the

Dean of Students, or the President's Cabinet.

I suspect that the perceived loss of the educational mission stems from the legal

requirements, fears of litigation (Miller, 2018), and the daily reality of what it is like to work in

an Office of Student Conduct. While research supports the sentiments that 'something' is being

lost, there is no satisfactory explanation (to me) of what that 'something' is. Glassman (2021)

describes this 'something' as processes that emphasize student development and holistic

education. This is the same jargon that imbues our field and does very little to describe the

educational mission in any clear way. It is peculiar in the fact that this description has so much

meaning to conduct professionals and simultaneously means nothing at all. Because of this, I

next look more closely at the normative view of education within the broader field of Student

Affairs in hopes of gaining more insight about the educational mission that many conduct

professionals are reporting to be losing. As such, through the lens of historiography, I question

how our professional identity came to be that of educators.

A Historiography of Student Affairs: Its Emergence and Discourses

In order to create space for the expansive possibilities of education, it is first necessary to

understand the ways in which we have traditionally thought about education. Therefore, in this

next section, I review the historical philosophies that have guided the field of Student Affairs.

Instead, however, of presenting the relatively consistent historical account of Student Affairs that

is broadly accepted, I pay specific attention to the discourses around education and the

motivations for the adoption of those particular discourses. In this way, this recount of history is

not viewed as a static retelling of the facts, but rather is an interpretive endeavor to illustrate the

relationship between people, events, the concerns of the time, and the larger social context, all of which are brought to bear to in the understandings gleaned from the findings.

Higher Education - 19th century

Besides the colonial era, when the nation's most prestigious and historic colleges were founded, the 19th century was a foundational period in American higher education. During this time, the number of institutions proliferated. In 1800, there were 25 degree granting institutions. By 1820, there were 52 and by 1860 there were 241 institutions (Thelin, 2004). Along with this expansion in sheer numbers, there was also an expansion in institutional diversity. In the colonial era, higher education existed to prepare clergy; however, during the 19th century, schools began to be founded as universities, academies, seminaries, scientific schools, normal schools, and institutes (Thelin, 2004).

This was an innovative period in the history of American higher education. Still, there were old guards looking to preserve earlier notions of the purpose of higher education. Yale and Princeton, in particular, exerted a great amount of influence on the American higher education landscape because of their privilege and ability to attract students and faculty from outside of their region. Both institutions remained committed to their religious origins and to a conservative curriculum (Thelin, 2004). In fact, the Yale report of 1828, which was written by Yale Faculty, is often viewed as a conservative response to the introduction of professional education. This report emphasized a general education through the study of classical languages, science, and mathematics. Using faculty psychology, this report argued that students needed general education to exercise all mental faculties to bring them to "the fair proportions which nature designed" (Spring, 2011, p. 71). The result of this would be balanced character and distinctive habits of thoughts (Thelin, 2004). This same report also placed an emphasis on creating a family

structure within an institutional setting. "To achieve this form of parental control, the report argued strongly for the necessity of a residential college," thus calling for the establishment of residence halls on college campuses "where students were to develop an intellectual culture" (Spring, 2011, p. 70).

Even as institutions began to adopt the residential college model, many schools lacked the features typical to a modern college campus. Most campuses "often included three or four buildings: a multipurpose 'old main' building flanked by a residential 'college' and perhaps a chapel or one other structure" (Thelin, 2004 p. 66). This modest arrangement meant that some students had to find their own lodging off-campus in private homes or boardinghouses. It also was common for students to form "eating clubs," in which they would pool together resources to hire a cook to prepare meals for them. On campus, colleges typically lacked formal student organizations. Despite this, students lead lively social lives. Thelin (2004) wrote,

> What emerges is a remarkable pattern of student life in which undergraduates-especially at the established colleges, and then to some degree at colleges elsewhere that emulated the established model- created an elaborate world of their own within and alongside the official world of the college. (p. 65)

For many undergraduates, compliance with the formal curriculum was merely the price of admission into college life.

I have taken this time to present a brief snapshot of the context and developments leading up to the emergence of Student Affairs as a field. What is important to note here is that institutions were interested in providing interventions, such as a general education and residential colleges, to promote 'good character.' During this time, however, students were left to their own

devices outside of the classroom. This resulted in the students creating informal networks and social activities that were ultimately left unmonitored by college faculty.

Pre-Professional Era

The first Student Affairs roles that emerged were Deans of Men and Women in the 1890's, who were assigned to handle disciplinary matters. Changing student demographics, including women matriculating into colleges "created a perceived need for increased adult supervision to satisfy parents that the welfare of their child was being addressed" (Evans & Reason, 2001, p. 360). In addition, schools began to adopt the German research university model, which caused faculty to devote less time to the out-of-classroom activities of the students (Doyle, 2004; Nuss, 1996). Moreover, as mentioned above, students began to create lively social lives outside of the classroom on college campuses. So, as American higher education began to evolve into research enterprises, there was still a need and desire to monitor the behavior of matriculated students.

By this time, it was long well ingrained into the social logic that children became delinquent or wayward due to a lack of parental government. Thus, it was the role of schools to replace the family in providing this supervision to children with hopes of eliminating crime and poverty by keeping children off the streets and out of contact with criminals (Spring, 2011). This concept is commonly referred to as 'in loco parentis,' which translates to in place of the parent. According to Hoekema (1994), there are four legal elements to the in loco parentis. First, "the institution has the authority to direct the behavior of students... and, therefore...it can enact rules concerning personal behavior and responsibility to the community." Second, "the institution has the authority to punish rule violations." Third, in loco parentis "carried a special responsibility of care for students..., meaning that... schools were held to a higher standard for care for their

41

students than corporations for their customers and employees." Lastly, colleges "enjoyed, to a certain degree, an exemption from limits on searches carried out in conjunction with the enforcement of school rules" (p. 27). While most of the elements provide the institution with certain rights over the student, the third element requires that institutions provide a certain level of care for the students. This aspect of the doctrine is what ushered in the need for early Student Affairs Professionals.

Happening concurrently was also the emergence of a new developmental concept, which was adolescence. G. Stanley Hall, an influential developmental psychologist, published his seminal work Adolescence in 1904, in which he wrote "The whole future of life depends on how the new powers [of adolescence] now given suddenly and in profusion are husbanded" (Spring, 2011, p. 240). Hall's theory suggested that, during puberty, the child enters a phase of savagery, driven by a new flood of passions. Moreover, Hall's ideas promoted this notion that "adolescents' interests and abilities must be harnessed and directed in some socially useful function" (Spring, 2011, p. 240). This logic sparked a rise in the creation of social institutions, such as summer schools and social centers, to keep children and adolescents from having idle time and out of trouble (Spring, 2011). This conception of adolescence as "savagery" served to inform the mission of institutions in shaping good character. While today we think of traditional college aged students as nearing the end of their adolescent phase (18-22 years old) and moving into young adulthood, in the early 1900's, students entered college at younger ages because high school was not a mass institution until the 1920's and 1930's (Spring, 2011). Therefore, colleges viewed themselves as being in the business of corralling the unbridled tendencies of young people. The future of society depended on this function, insomuch as it could prevent poverty and criminality.

Further, the idea of social mobility was implicit in the rhetoric of a general education providing good character under the assumption that one would be able to fit into any intellectual conversation or gathering (Spring, 2011). Therefore, higher education was also viewed as a place where individuals could be provided with the knowledge and skills required to rise above their current social class.

Thus, we see that early Student Affairs Professionals emerged to meet the needs of rapidly evolving institutions under the legal doctrine of in loco parentis. These new roles were assigned to handle all non-academic matters and student discipline. These roles also provided the standard of care required under in loco parentis, which was seen as a necessary social function that simultaneously reduced crime and poverty and promoted social mobility.

Power Struggles: Discourse of Student Affairs

It is generally accepted that three major discourses emerge when examining the historical philosophical statements of the field of Student Affairs: Student Services, Student Development, and Student Learning (Carpenter et al., 2016; Evans & Reason, 2001; Doyle, 2004). What is less often discussed in the literature, however, is that these discourse shifts all represent attempts by the field of Student Affairs to gain institutional legitimacy and power. Therefore, in this next section, I explore how Student Affairs has defined the scope of their work and its relationship to serving the academic mission of the institution. In doing so, I hope to illustrate how education has historically been conceptualized within the field.

Student Services

'Student Services' is the earliest discourse that framed the work of Student Affairs Professionals. The Student Personnel Point of View (SPPV [1937]), is seen as the first guiding philosophical statement of the field and was primarily authored by Ester Lloyd-Jones, who was

43

the president of the American College Personnel Association (ACPA) between 1935-1937 (Ester Lloyd Jones 1935-1937, 1992). This document is the resulting report from the committee on problems and plans of the American Council on Education (ACE). The 1937 SPPV was written for all non-faculty at institutions, or in other words, student personnel 5, and it emphasized the importance of providing quality services to address the holistic needs of students (Carpenter et al., 2016, p. 19). This idea of holistic needs included not only extra-curricular development, but also providing a standard of care which satisfied the needs of the doctrine of in loco parentis. Within a Student Services framework, the primary purpose of student personnel "was to support the academic mission of the institution by providing adjunct services necessary to ensure a student's readiness for the classroom" (Doyle, 2004, p. 68).

In 1949, current ACPA president E.G Williamson initiated and chaired a committee to revise and update the 1937 SPPV. Building on the work of the 1937 edition, the revised version focused primarily on the structure and administration of services. There was acute attention paid to what services should be offered and how these services should be organized in the division. In addition, there was a new emphasis on specialization in personnel work. This new focus was in response to new and diverse student populations arriving on college campuses after World War II. These changing demographics created a demand for 'Personnel specialists' who were trained in psychology so that they could assist with student adjustment and conduct psychological measurement and interpretation (Young, 1993).

While both the 1937 and 1949 versions of the SPPV represent the guiding principles of the student services era, these two documents also illustrate professional tensions that arose within the young Student Affairs profession. We can look to Ester Lloyd-Jones and E. G Williamson for the differing philosophies regarding the direction and future of the field of

Student Affairs. These disagreements, as I argue, are fundamentally about how to secure more institutional recognition and legitimacy. Therefore, it is important to take a deeper look into the public figures representing these tensions.

Ester Lloyd-Jones received her M.A. and Ph.D. degrees at the first Student Personnel program in the country at the Teachers' College, Columbia University (Ester Lloyd Jones 1935- 1937, 1992). It is important to note that Lloyd-Jones was a student at Teachers College when John Dewey, one of the most influential pragmatic philosophers in education, was a faculty member (Evans & Reason, 2001). Moreover, the Teachers' College program reflected his instrumentalist philosophy: "that education served the whole person solving real problems within the broad context of culture" (Young, 1993 as cited in Schetlin, 1968). Regarding the 1937 SPPV, which is primarily attributed to Lloyd-Jones, some readers of this document have interpreted its contributions to the field of Student Affairs very generously. Caple (1998) as cited by Evans & Reason (2001), asserts that the 1937 SPPV embodied the "'experimentalists' (pragmatists') assertion that human beings were not discreet and separate from society but developed as unique personalities as a result of participation in the social structure (p. 361). This interpretation is most certainly reading beyond the text. In contrast, my reading of the 1937 SPPV is more in line with Doyle (2004), in that the primary function of this document was to identify the 23 services that all institutions should offer to serve the needs of students. While Evans & Reason (2001) stated that the 1937 SPPV is "foremost a statement of philosophy," I suggest that it is a very practical document of best practices, which was visionary at the time among a new and evolving field.

While I cannot be certain if this is true, I have a suspicion that these generous readings of the 1937 SPPV have very much to do with Lloyd-Jones and Smith's (1954) book titled Student Personnel Work as Deeper Teaching, which she co-edited with Margaret Ruth Smith in response

to the 1949 SPPV. This book included the insights of 24 expert contributors who shared their perspectives on the personnel services of the future (Brown, 1955). In the first chapter, Lloyd-Jones is seemingly responding directly to the developments of the 1949 SPPV when she asserts that personnel work cannot remain specialized, but instead needs to become an integral function of the "everyday educative process, which makes for more effective and deeper teaching and makes possible the full, rounded, and continuing development of the student" (Brown, 1955, p. 59). Lloyd-Jones and Smith (1954) go on to describe services where all faculty and staff would share the responsibility of basic counseling: "Under this type of program...basic counseling would shift out of the dean's office into natural groups and units, such as the residence hall, the classroom, the adviser's office" (Brown, 1955, p. 59).

This perspective from Lloyd-Jones and Smith was offered in response to the unsettling trends that she noticed due to increasing specialization in the field. Instead of encouraging collaboration and mutual respect between faculty and personnel workers, increasing specialization was seen as furthering the division between the two groups. Moreover, Lloyd- Jones and Smith believed this new language of 'specialists' removed the "orientation from the goal of education as the development of individuals to the fullest extent possible" (Williamson, 1954, p. 396). Instead, now the focus was on the techniques and not the individuals involved in the counseling process (Young, 1993).

Lloyd-Jones believed that specialization in personnel work diminished its educational orientation because it neglected to consider the environment in which this work was occurring; this attention to context was especially important for Lloyd-Jones. Lloyd-Jones also did not withhold her philosophical alignment with instrumentalism. According to Lloyd-Jones and Smith

(1954), "the instrumentalist philosophy, more than any other, has represented the principles in which student personnel workers have protested that they believe" (p. 12).

Core to understanding Lloyd-Jones' motivations and philosophical alignments is first understanding Dewey's conceptions of education. First, Dewey was a proponent of evolutionary biology. According to Dewey, as cited in Wible (1984), "every distinct organ, structure, or formation, every grouping of cells or elements, has to be treated as an instrument or adjustment or adaptation to a particular environing situation" (p. 1052). In the physical and biological sense, these adaptations work to achieve the renewal of life. Likewise, these adaptations serve to preserve the continuity of social life, including any experience— beliefs, hopes, practices, and misery, for example. Therefore, for Dewey, "education in its broadest sense, is the means of this social continuity of life" (p. 2)

Social life, for Dewey, is predicated on communication. "To be a recipient of communication is to have an enlarged and changed experience" (p. 5). Therefore, all social life, which is identical with communication, is educative. It loses its educative power, however, when the communication becomes routine. Dewey's next logical conclusion from this thinking is that "the very process of living together educates" (p. 6).

While the very process of communicating and living together is educative, Dewey believed that formal institutionalized schooling was necessary as civilization advanced to address the increasing gap between the young and the concerns of the adults. As society continued to progress, it became increasingly more difficult to relay certain occupations through shadowing and imitation. Therefore, Dewey advocated for delegating the task of teaching all the resources and achievements of a complex society to a "special group of persons" (p. 8). This advocacy for formal schooling does, however, come with a stern warning. Dewey wrote, "There is the

standing danger that the material of formal instruction will be merely the subject matter of the schools, isolated from the subject matter of life-experience. The permanent social interests are likely to be lost from view" (p. 8). He continued, "As formal teaching and training grow in extent, there is the danger of creating an undesirable split between the experience gained in more direct associations and what is acquired in schools" (p. 9).

Now, we can clearly see Dewey's influence on Lloyd-Jones. First, Jones, as an instrumentalist, believed that all social life was educative, meaning that education could not only be confined to the classroom and formal education was also only one mean of sustaining social life. Moreover, she was concerned that student personnel workers were becoming too specialized, which isolated their intellectual knowledge from the realm of life experience.

As alluded to earlier, Lloyd-Jones' views and philosophies were not unanimously shared by other influential student personnel visionaries. E. G. Williamson, who again was largely responsible for the 1949 SPPV, was a professor of psychology, and his views of student personnel services were derived from establishing counseling services at The University of Minnesota where he eventually became a Dean of Students (Roberts, 2012). Both Lloyd-Jones and Williamson agreed on the idea of tending to the whole student and on student personnel's inheritance of Dewey's philosophies. Williamson (1961), as cited by Roberts (2012), critiqued the relationally oriented use of Dewey's philosophy in personnel work. He wrote,

> The therapist and progressive educators have distorted his philosophy by substituting 'togetherness' and 'affect' for his concept of 'rational inquiry' as the goal to be achieved through education. Many of his concepts are freshly relevant as foundations for our program of services-if we abandon that form of anti-intellectualism which enthrones feeling as the foundation of the happy and adjusted way of living. (p. 6)

48

The aforementioned opinions are extended to his views on specialization in personnel work, which Lloyd- Jones staunchly advocated against. Williamson (1954) wrote in his review of Lloyd-Jones and Smith's (1954) edited volume,

> The reviewer find himself in disagreement with the editors' conclusion that the intensive specialization, with the deepening of technology underlying personnel work, is the principal reason why it has lost its educational flavor and objectives. Personnel work resembles other human endeavors in that advancing experience, more particularly the use of research experimentation, naturally brings intensive specialized practice...Specialization is less to blame for the divorcement of personnel work from education, it seems to this reviewer, than the fact that we have simply neglected, if not entirely forgotten, to emphasize the point that many personnel workers operate in education institutions. (p. 396)

In essence, Williamson believed that specialization was a natural consequence of the advancement of student personnel work. Moreover, he believed that it was necessary for rational inquiry which was, according to him, Dewey's goal of education. In contrast, Lloyd-Jones advocated for student personnel generalists who shared responsibility with faculty in creating an environment that facilitated a rich social life, which according to Lloyd-Jones, was the goal of education. Plainly put, the target of Williamson's strategy was the individual while Lloyd-Jones target was the community (Roberts, 2012).

From these two perspectives, we see that both Lloyd-Jones and Williamson agreed on the basic tenet of student personnel work, which was that their function was to provide services to support the holistic development of students and to support the academic mission of the institution. I am positing here, however, that there was a more subtle disagreement: a

disagreement beyond just a generalist versus specialist orientation. Next, I illustrate how their disagreement had gendered implications, which perhaps impacted their chosen strategies for obtaining intuitional power.

Access to American higher education was not granted to women until 1837, when Oberlin college opened its admissions. By 1880, women represented 33% of the overall college population. This number increased to 47% percent by 1920. As the presence of women increased on campus, however, many male college presidents and faculty expressed discomfort due to in loco parentis and a perceived need to protect students from sexual impropriety. This created the need for Deans of Women, with the first being at the University of Chicago in 1892. In 1903, the first Deans of Women meeting occurred, and later in 1916, Columbia University established the first graduate program specifically for Deans of Women (Duffy, 2010). This is the same program that Lloyd-Jones received her master's and doctorate degrees (Ester Lloyd Jones 1935-1937, 1992). It both interesting and important to note here that men were not admitted into this program until 1928, some 12 years later, and that is when the program's name was changed to student personnel administration (Young, 1993).

This information allows for us to deduce important insight into the perception of early student personnel work. As explicated earlier, the first Student Affairs roles were developed to provide discipline. As colleges continued to evolve by creating residential colleges, expanding out-of-classroom social activities, and admitting women, there became an increased need to tend to student well-being and to provide the standard of care as required by in loco parentis. This included protecting the sexual virtue and reputation of college women and providing motherly support (Duffy, 2010). Academia was a considered to be man's profession where male faculty tended to the intellectual needs of students, while women served in student personnel roles and

50

handled everything else to ensure that students were prepared to engage in intellectual activities. (Voyles, 2015).

Looking through this lens— that early Student Affairs work was seen as women's work and was therefore less important— provides us new insights about why Lloyd-Jones advocated for a generalist approach. Her philosophy of student personnel work, influenced by Dewey, allowed her to align student personnel work with academic mission of the institution. In this way, personnel work was not simply replacing the role of the parent. In making this move, now everyone in all capacities was responsible for education, meaning that one function was not more important than the other in serving the academic mission. She called for an even distribution of institutional power by suggesting a cooperative environment where faculty and staff alike where responsible for student well-being and overall development.

On the other hand, we see Williamson, who was first a psychology faculty member, advocating for specialization in student personnel work. Unlike women, Williamson's status as a male and as a faculty member automatically meant that he had recognized institutional power. With one foot in both realms, as faculty member and a student personnel leader, perhaps there was no consideration on Williamson's part of what "specialization" meant to an historically women's field at a time where women were not perceived as intellectual or academics.

Another reading of this effort to increase specialization was that Williamson did in fact consider what specialization meant to this women's field of Student Affairs. From Williamson's own perspective, women had misunderstood and misapplied the instrumentalist philosophy of Dewey. This created the space for men like Williamson to bring expertise and scientific knowledge into this underdeveloped field that inappropriately focused on "togetherness and "affect," which was anti-intellectual. To be clear, these are Williamson's own words. In essence,

51

specialization, specifically through the field of psychology, was a backdoor for men to establish dominance and control the discourse in a traditionally women's field6. Implicit in this shift from a feminine discourse of community and togetherness to a more masculine discourse of scientific advancement and rational inquiry was this perceived notion that it was more academic and intellectual, and therefore more worthy of institutional respect.

To be more precise, what I am attempting to point out is that although Lloyd-Jones and Williamson agreed on the purpose of student personnel work, they disagreed on the method in which to carry out this work. Their disagreement carried a subtle gendered undertone, but the impact of these varying perspectives was not so subtle. The movement toward specialization effectively allowed men to control the discourse about student personnel work and establish themselves as the experts in an historically women's field. Additionally, with the masculinization of the field, came perceived institutional power.

Student Development

Despite the best efforts of Lloyd-Jones, Margaret Ruth Smith, and the 24 other colleagues who collaborated to produce Student Personnel as Deeper Teaching (1954), the field of Student Affairs eventually became beholden to a specialist focus. The new Student Affairs specialization now came packaged in student development theory. According to Paul Bloland (1991) this emphasis can be traced back to 1964 when protests and demonstrations erupted at UC- Berkeley because a Dean restricted the placement of political tables. This student movement started a 7-year wave of student challenges to university rules and authority across the United States (p. 4). Because Student Affairs Professionals were responsible for student behavior and discipline, they became the front line for addressing these student demonstrations. This also left them open to wide criticism for their inability to control student activism (Evans & Reason, 2001)

52

In addition, student activism sparked the erosion of the doctrine of in loco parentis. As earlier mentioned, the landmark case of Dixon v. Alabama, St. John Dixon, a student at Alabama State College was allegedly expelled for participating in civil rights demonstrations with no hearing, which was allowed under in loco parentis. The court later ruled that a public college could not expel a student without at least minimal due process. With the demise of in loco parentis, along with heavy public criticism, came the need for Student Affair professionals to fundamentally shift their identity (Brown et al., 1972).

In this search for a new identity, ACPA launched THE (Tomorrow's Higher Education) Project in 1968 and tasked Bob Brown with re-envisioning the changing role of the profession (Evans & Reason, 2001). What is interesting, but unsurprising to note, is that Bob Brown, like Williamson, was both a psychology faculty member and in leadership positions within counseling centers on multiple college campuses. Brown produced the culminating product of THE Project, which was a five-chapter monograph titled Student Development in Tomorrow's Higher Education: A Return to the Academy. This monograph discussed the current state of American higher education, speculated about where it might be heading, and hypothesized how Student Affairs work may look in the future. In imagining the future of Student Affairs, Brown et al. (1972) suggested that Student Affairs Professionals might take up roles as college professors, behavioral scientists, and researchers, with the explicit intention of gaining legitimacy, in addition to roles as consultants and programmers. Brown concluded this specific chapter with a bleak take on what the future might include, which was unemployment. He wrote,

It is doubtful that that the term student personnel or many of the functions served by such persons will disappear soon...the question of whether or not these functions ever achieve professional status remains in doubt, however, not every commentator viewing the

53

student personnel movement see the professionalism as inevitable, the usual argument

being that research and practice in the area lacks the theoretical base upon which most

professions are founded. (p. 41)

He continues by suggesting that adopting student development theory may move Student Affairs

closer towards professionalization of the field.

The THE Project was successful in that the outcome was the adoption of student

development theory. Marking this transition, ACPA changed its journal's title from the Journal

of College Student Personnel to the Journal of College Student Development. This shift provided

Student Affairs with a new area of expertise and a linkage to the academy. Rogers (1991) wrote,

Student development theory offers a conceptual means whereby heretofore service-

providers (perceived as somewhat ancillary to the institution) are able to link their

contribution(s) to the academic mission of higher education and claim an educational role

in addition to that of a service provider, i.e., developmentalist, development specialists.

(p. 6)

This effectively allowed Student Affairs Professionals to position themselves as experts on

Student Development and to, yet again, demand that they been seen as equal to faculty.

In addition to giving Student Affairs Professionals new purpose, the adoption of student

development theory also fundamentally shifted how Student Affairs Professionals viewed the

growth and development of students. In the student services era, the notion that institutions of

higher education should contribute to the holistic development of students was an undisputed

core value. In the student development era, however, what was new was this idea that Student

Affairs Professionals should manipulate the environment and provide interventions to promote

development. Moreover, through the use of student development theory, these interventions can be specified to produce intended outcomes (Bloland, 1991).

While student development ushered in a new area of expertise for Student Affairs that lasted well into the early 1990's, it began to garner criticism for its apparent loss of focus on student learning. According to Bloland et al. (1994), not only did student development theory carry a prescriptive value, but it also placed the development of students before the academic mission of higher education. Moreover, it further exasperated the "us vs. them" mentality between faculty and Student Affairs Professionals, as it was perceived that both groups were working towards competing goals (Voyles, 2015). Lastly, it was unsuccessful at garnering the respect of faculty as it was earlier touted. All the aforementioned set the stage for a new era of discourse to be ushered in, which was Student Learning.

Student Learning

Although there were several documents written by Student Affairs organizations and thought leaders calling for a new paradigm, the conceptual shift from student development to student learning is most often seen to have occurred with the 1994 publication of The Student Learning Imperative (SLI). According to Bloland (1996),

> The Student Learning Imperative document grew out of the presidential address by ACPA President Charles Schroeder during the 1993 ACPA Convention...In his address, Dr. Schroeder sounded a clarion call for student affairs to rejoin the rest of the higher education community and focus again on student learning, to join with our faculty colleagues in affecting the definition and nature of higher education. (p. 6)

Bloland continued by sharing that Dr. Schroeder was motivated by several reports on the status of higher education, including reports from the Association of American Colleges and

Universities (AAC&U, 1985), that indicated that student learning would be the imperative for this decade.

The intent of the SLI was to "stimulate discussion and debate on how Student Affairs Professionals can intentionally create the conditions that enhance student learning and personal development" (p. 118). The document goes on to define learning in the broadest sense, often using "inseparable and intertwined" concepts of 'learning,' 'personal development,' and 'student development' interchangeably. The SLI describes 'Learning-oriented Student Affairs divisions' as a division that has a mission that complements the mission of the institution, with the enhancement of student learning and personal development being the primary goal; a division that allocates resources to support student learning and personal development; a division in which Student Affairs Professionals collaborate with other institutional partners to promote student learning and personal development; a division in which the staff are experts on their students, the environment, and teaching and learning processes; and lastly, a division with policies and programs that are based on promising practices and research on student learning.

Broadly speaking, this document served as a unifying philosophical framework that viewed learning as both cognitive and affective and occurring both inside and outside of the classroom. It echoed and reiterated historical assertions that Student Affairs Professionals share responsibility with faculty in meeting the broad mission of higher education. It can be correctly viewed within the history of the field as seeking to validate itself as a profession that contributes more than routine administrative services (Bloland, 1996). Although the SLI is often viewed as a divorcement from student development, I suggest it is more appropriately viewed a re-statement of the profession's commitment to student learning as the primary mission of Student Affairs, but student learning was used interchangeably with student development. Furthermore, the SLI

56

described similar themes of student development in that it assumed that "educationally purposeful experiences may be a precursor to desired outcomes" and that Student Affairs Professionals should create the conditions for student learning to occur (p. 119). Obviously, those assumptions are relics from the almost 20-year student development era.

In 2004, NASPA and ACPA collaborated and commissioned Richard P. Keeling, along with six other contributing authors, to write Learning Reconsidered to advance the tenets set forth by the SLI in 1994. Richard P. Keeling, a medical doctor (MD) by training and medical faculty, found his way into Student Affairs through directing student health centers on multiple college campuses (Rutgers University, n.d.). He eventually started a student learning consulting firm, Keeling & Associates, which was responsible for creating the product of Learning Reconsidered. According to Keeling et al. (2004),

Learning Reconsidered is an argument for the integrated use of all of higher education 's resources in the education and preparation of the whole student. It is an introduction to new ways of understanding and supporting learning and development as intertwined, inseparable elements of the student experience. It advocates for transformative education-a holistic process that places the student at the center of the learning experience. (p. 3)

He continued by stating that "the purpose of this document is to reexamine some widely accepted ideas about conventional teaching and learning" (p. 3).

While adhering to the earlier promoted understanding of student learning, Learning Reconsidered (2004) expanded on ideas presented the SLI in very significant ways. First, is the shift towards student centered learning. In numerous places within the document, Keeling et al. (2004) suggested that the conventional curriculum (i.e., general education and major requirements) is unappealing and does not consider the interests of students. He also suggested

that students should become "managers of their own learning processes and goals (p. 11) and that student should be able to direct their own learning. Second, in what seems like an interesting regression back to the student development era, Keeling et al. (2004) stated that "the focus of education must shift from information transfer to identity development (transformation)" (p. 10). Lastly, again, in another seeming regression, Keeling et al. positioned Student Affairs Professionals as specialists on student learning when he wrote, "Student Affairs Educators can be accessible and flexible consultants, advisors, and resources for faculty members who are reconsidering academic learning" (p. 14). Reiterating Student Affairs Professionals' position as learning experts, Keeling et al. stated, "Student Affairs Professionals have a particular responsibility for ensuring that institutions of higher education become true learning communities committed to providing transformational educational experiences for all students" (p. 25).

Within the historical context of the dominant Student Affairs discourses, we see yet again another institutional power grab. The discourse of Student Development was unsuccessful in its attempt in garnering the status of equal partners with faculty. While, perhaps, it may have been successful in creating experts in student development, it eventually failed because it heralded student development as the preeminent mission of higher education. To remedy this, the field attempted to rebrand itself by recommitting to the broader mission of higher education, which was now student learning. In this recommitment to student learning, however, they also redefined student learning as interchangeable with student development and continued to adhere to the core philosophy and logic of the student development paradigm. Lastly, after redefining learning, it also described traditional curriculum and methods of learning as outdated and inappropriate for the current context of higher education. This can be read as a direct critique of

58

academic affairs and the traditional teaching practices of faculty. Lastly, in addition to the criticisms, Student Affairs suggested that they were the new vanguards of student learning and that the campus community, even faculty, should look towards them for expertise.

I would now like to take this time to clearly lay out what this chapter has uncovered thus far in terms of identifying the normative view of education within Student Affairs. The impetus for this exploration was the perceived loss of the 'educational mission' within Student Conduct, which was unclearly defined as processes that promote student development and holistic education. Unsurprisingly, this language of student development and holistic education was adopted from the broader field of Student Affairs. It is important to note, however, that both terms are outdated regarding how Student Affairs describes its mission now, with holistic education (or holistic development) being a hold-over from the Student Services era, and student development obviously being from the Student Development era. Nevertheless, due to social beliefs about adolescence, sexual impurity, and the idea that children became criminals or poor due to a lack of parental supervision, the Student Services era emphasized holistic development. The idea of holistic development included not only tending to the academic needs of students, but also providing the standard of care as required under in loco parentis.

In addition to discipline, loan administration, and record keeping, this also included providing motherly support and meeting other socio-emotional needs so that students would be prepared to engage in intellectual activity. For this reason, early Student Personnel work was seen as non-academic women's work that supported the academic mission of the institution. Next was the Student Development era, which introduced a theoretical foundation to the budding profession. The explicit assumption of Student Development theory was that college environments can be manipulated to produce intended student outcomes. This era faced critiques

for attempting to replace the academic mission of higher education with student development. Considering these critiques, Student Affairs adopted the discourse of Student Learning to realign itself with the academic mission of institutions. Student Learning was, however, simply Student Development dressed in new language. Student Learning was redefined to include student development and the core logic of manipulating environments to produce student outcomes remained intact. Nevertheless, there was a new paradigm introduced during the Student Learning era, which was the assertion that Student Affairs professionals should be the student learning experts on campus. This is also when the term 'Student Affairs Educator' started being used.

Keeping all of this in mind, I found that Student Affairs and Student Conduct professionals view student development as the educational nature of our work. The answer was right there all along and, of course, I picked this sense up during my tenure as a professional. I found this conclusion unsatisfactory and unclear, however, because the Student Development era was criticized for competing with academic mission of the institution. This illuminates a professional conundrum. If Student Development is the educational nature of our work, then how does it compete with the academic mission of the institution?

The purpose of this chapter was not to prove whether we are educators or not or to define the parameters of education. Instead, the goal was to attempt to understand what we mean when we use the word education in our professional context. What was presented thus far was an attempt to systematically explore the conundrum referenced above to see if there was any resolution to be found from an historical lens. While no coherent solution was found, this does present a helpful opening for Student Affairs and Student Conduct Professionals to inhabit, as student development has a contested relationship with education, what other possible ways exist to articulate and conceive of the educational mission of our work. A logical answer might be to

become more steadfast in adopting the language of Student Learning within our practice. After all, that has been the guiding professional mission for almost 3 decades now. Biesta's work on the language of learning, however, provides a compelling argument for why we might continue to search for alternative conceptions of the educational nature of our work.

Student Learning Era and Biesta

Since the 1990's, the word 'learning' has become a popular concept in educational research and has dominated discourse. In Student Affairs, the Student Learning Imperative (SLI) was published in 1994, right on par with this larger trend in education. This trend shifted 'education' into 'teaching and learning.' Schools became 'learning environments." Students became 'learners.' Teachers became 'facilitators of 'learning' and adult education became 'lifelong learning' (Biesta, 2013, 2015b, 2017). The emergence of the new language of learning can be attributed to several developments in education including new constructivist theories of learning that center students and their activities, postmodern critiques of authoritarian forms of teaching, and neo-liberal educational policies (Biesta, 2013). While Biesta acknowledged that the language of learning has provided positive insight into some educational issues, such as authoritarian teaching, he largely believed that it functions to obscure important educational questions.

For Biesta, questions of content, purpose, and relationships are all questions that need to be addressed when discussing education. Of these three questions, purpose is the most fundamental question,

> because it is only once we've been able to indicate what it is we seek to achieve through
> our educational activities and endeavors, that we can make decisions about appropriate

content students should engage with, and that we can decide how educational

relationships can be used most productively and meaningfully. (Biesta, 2017, p. 28)

These important educational questions, however, are no longer asked with the rise of language of

learning. It is not that students "just learn, but always that they learn something, that they learn it

for particular reasons, and that they learn it from someone" (Biesta, 2017, p. 28).

With the aforementioned in mind, we can take another look at Learning Reconsidered

(2004), which was a joint publication between NASPA and ACPA that was commissioned to

update and advance the Student Learning Imperative (1994). While Keeling et al. (2004) made a

compelling argument for why higher education institutions need to coalesce all their resources

around student learning, he did not discuss what he viewed as the purpose of student learning.

The 'content' of learning is thoroughly discussed and is presented as ideal learning outcomes

with accompanying examples of student experiences that may foster said outcomes. Nowhere in

the document, however, is there a discussion about why these outcomes are desirable or to whom

they are desirable.

Keeling et al. (2004), however, did indirectly present how he envisioned an educational

relationship. In many places in Learning Reconsidered, students are described in the likes of

being "managers of their own learning processes and goals" (p. 10). This discourse around

learning effectively shifts the responsibility from educators to provide an education to the

students themselves. Now, it is up to the student to make sure that they gain the necessary skills

and knowledge to meet the learning objectives. Oddly enough, this responsibility is also a

supposed outcome of a transformative education. Students are supposed to learn how to learn

and learn how to manage their own learning (p. 17).

While there is no mention of the purpose for learning in *Learning Reconsidered*, you can read between the lines to come to your own conclusion. When speaking about transformative education, Keeling et al. (2004) presented an edict which states, "the focus of education must shift from information transfer to identity development (transformation)" (p. 10). The identity that should be produced through transformative education is that of an "intentional learner" who can continue to learn throughout their lives, design their own learning plans, and conceive of their contribution to society (p. 11). This statement may not cause any concern on its face. We must consider that this is not, however, a value-free statement; instead, the discourse of learning has obscured its political nature. According to Biesta (2013), the language of lifelong learning is for the development of human capital and characterized by an economic rationale. In this way, learning is now a duty that individuals need to live up to. Education is no longer seen as a right available to all. Instead, learning is something that is demanded from all. The extension of this logic under this economic rationale is that individuals are responsible for adapting to market pressures and keeping up their employability in a global economy. This effectively transforms social issues, like unemployment, which should be addressed by the state, into private problems. If people are unemployed, it would now be because they failed to learn the skills necessary to survive in the market economy.

This interpretation of Keeling's "intentional learning" is not far-fetched. In the preface, it states that "our society expects colleges and universities to graduate students who can get things done in the world and are prepared for effective and engaged citizenship" (p. 5). In the light of Biesta's work, we can now view "getting things done" in a new perspective. An intentional learner is someone who finds their value in how much they can produce in the marketplace (i.e.,

63

get things done). Moreover, an engaged citizen is someone who keeps up with the demand to learn so that our society has a competitive pool of human capital.

I know that there are many Student Affairs professionals who have accepted the utilitarian view that the purpose of higher education is to provide the human capital needed to keep the economy afloat. Those who take this perspective would certainly not be in the minority given current discourse around the purpose of higher education. Tomlinson (2018) revealed pertinent insights into this matter in his critical analysis of the dominant meaning of 'value' in relation to the purpose of higher education in liberal political economies, including the United States and the United Kingdom. In unpacking the meaning, Tomlinson showed that "there is an explicitly utilitarian policy framing of the economic value of higher education, collectively and individually" (p. 724). He also found that students were positioned as consumers who viewed higher education as a private good that enhances their own value in the market. I am not inclined to disagree with the many who may adopt this viewpoint about the purpose of higher education, as education functions in three domains. Both qualification and socialization meet the aims of providing human capital. If, however, the question at hand is about what space exists to view the educational mission of our work as fundamentally different, I argue that we should first not settle for the language of Student Learning, and second, we should take seriously the domain of subjectification because the other two domains are being satisfied. In the spirit of Biesta, we must now ask, "how can students become subjects of their own rights and not just remain objects of the desires and directions of others?" (Biesta, 2017, p. 28). In this case, the "direction of others" includes being at the behest of the market economy and policy makers who prioritize economic interests. So, while the language of Student Learning may have moved the needle for Student Affairs in aligning with the academic mission of higher education, there is still work to

be done in terms of publicly negotiating the purpose of education outside of meeting market demands.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to investigate the normative view of education and educators in Student Affairs through an historical lens. The perceived loss of an educational orientation in Student Conduct practice is what sparked curiosity into this question. This chapter began by illustrating the challenge felt by many conduct administrators to maintain the educational mission of Student Conduct practice. Not taking anything for granted, I explored what is meant when we say 'educational mission' or other similar terms in Student Affairs. First, we see that Student Affairs has always struggled to couple its functions with education. The historical shifts in discourse can be properly understood as attempts to clarify our relationship to the academic mission of the institution. Moreover, they were attempts to articulate why our work was more than ancillary to academic affairs. It was also found that, generally, we see student development as the educational nature of our practice. This finding, along with critiques about the language of learning, not only troubles the idea that we are inherently educators, but it also provides an opening for Student Affairs and Student Conduct Professionals to imagine other ways to connect our work to the educational missions of our institutions. In illuminating this space, it is not my hope to reimagine a radically different Student Affairs. Instead, my goal is more modest. I ask, what alternatives exist that do not require us to abandon our theoretical heritage of student development and are also not dependent on dismantling a global neo-liberal system? This question is revisited in Chapter Four. As for the next Chapter, I further interrogate our educational mission by taking a closer look at the relationship between education and accountability in Student Conduct Practice.

CHAPTER III: 'WEAKNESS, NOT STRENGTH: ACCOUNTABILITY IN STUDENT CONDUCT

Introduction

Before beginning this chapter, it is appropriate to review what has been explored thus far and what claims I am making. In Chapter 1, I began by sharing an anecdote as an illustration of one of the many encounters that I have had as a Student Conduct professional that have made me think twice about our educational mission. Furthermore, I shared that I experience a schism within my professional identity: on one hand I identify as an educator, as that is how I was trained in my graduate program; on the other hand, my daily functions seem to have very little, if anything, to do with education. Nevertheless, I remain hopeful that Student Conduct Practice can still be educational or, in other words, function in all three domains of education.

This brings me to the task(s) of this project. The first task was to make the familiar unfamiliar. Like Patton (2017), this project provides alternative understandings about commonly held beliefs and narratives surrounding Student Affairs practice. In Chapter 2, I found that we see using Student Development Theory as the educational mission of our work. The emphasis on Student Development, however, was criticized as competing with or taking priority over the academic mission of higher education; therefore, this raises questions as to if Student Development alone can be considered education after all. Furthermore, I provided a novel interpretation to our Student Affairs history and found that our relationship to education and our status as educators has always been a contested matter. Considering these two findings in tandem troubles the idea that our work is inherently educational, which is a taken for granted assumption within our field.

In this chapter, I continue with the task of making the familiar unfamiliar by demonstrating that the educational mission in Student Conduct may not be as high as a priority

as some of us might hope or imagine. This chapter, along with Chapter 2, serves to deconstruct common practices and beliefs in aims to provide fertile ground for us to imagine and reimagine educational possibilities within our profession. If we begin to realize that education in our roles is not something that is natural and 'just is,' then perhaps we may begin to take seriously our responsibility to cultivate spaces where students become subjects in their own right.

Keeping the aforementioned in mind, this chapter focuses on Student Conduct practice regarding its claims of possessing an educational mission. Specifically, I am interested in investigating the concept of accountability. If you recall in the anecdote that I shared in Chapter 1, my colleague asked how I was going to hold a student accountable for their incomplete sanctions. In this case, the student had not completed their sanctions because their mother was actively dying. The underlying sentiment of this question was that there was a lesson to be learned in this situation. Apparently, from my colleague's suggestion, the student needed to learn how to navigate life's challenges while still meeting external demands- and the vehicle for learning this lesson was accountability. This suggests that there is some link between the educational mission of Student Conduct and accountability. This chapter investigates what this relationship entails.

In this chapter, I show that we do not hold students accountable; rather we make them accountable through technological and community surveillance. Moreover, the primary aim of making students accountable is risk management. If education is at all a concern in making students accountable, then it is secondary. This finding demonstrates that many of the functions of Student Conduct have explicit goals in creating secure and predictable outcomes, or in Biesta's (2013) words, a 'strong' form of education— and for good reason. Nevertheless, we

must remain diligent in maintaining space where certain risks are tolerable, as this space is where subjectification may occur.

Accountability

Accountability is a word that is used casually and often within the field of Student Conduct. Even in the professional statement from The Associate for Student Conduct Administrators (ASCA), we can see that Student Conduct professionals are tasked with guiding students towards "ethical decision making and accountability." Furthermore, we often articulate our work to campus constituencies through the lens of accountability. For example, on UNCG's Office of Student Rights and Responsibilities (OSRR) website, it states that "We value a student's right to a fair, respectful process, and the responsibility each student has to be an accountable member of the University Community" (UNC Greensboro, n.d.). Similar statements can be found on university Student Conduct pages nationwide. Moreover, much of how we legitimate the work that we do through assessment is viewed through the lens of accountability. Campus constituents, like the Student Governments or President's cabinets for example, want to know, what violations are happening on campus? In what frequencies? And what were the penalties for such actions? Taking all this into consideration, and from my professional experience, it would seem to me that accountability, as a concept, is a priority in the work that we do as Student Conduct professionals. Therefore, I would like to closely observe this concept of accountability, to follow it around. In this quest, I ask, what are the characteristics and traits of accountability? What does it do? And what type of relationships does it establish?

Accountability as a rhetorical term has several different meanings and connotations. Its conceptual ambiguity allows for multiple interpretations and enables its application into various discursive and ideological contexts (Ambrosio, 2013). Therefore, to properly explore the

questions asserted in this chapter, clarity around the word accountability must be established to illustrate the conceptual baggage that it carries. Afterall, Ahmed (2012) reminds us that "words become tools or means of doing something. To work with words is to work through their associations: words can be more or less affective depending on their associations" (p. 60). In these aims, I first address the common understandings of the word accountability. Then, I discuss when accountability arrived in educational conversations. From there, I explore what accountability does; that is, what are its characteristics and how does it function? These questions are important so that its impact on Student Conduct practice may be ascertained.

Conceptual Baggage of Accountability

As earlier mentioned, the word accountability connotes several different meanings. According to Charlton (1999), one distinct meaning of accountability is in the technical-managerial sense. The term historically associated with fiscal responsibility in organizations, referred to auditable financial documentation that presented accounts of all the organization's activities. The auditing of these documents served to "detect and deter incompetence and dishonesty in the handling of money," thus encouraging responsible behavior (Biesta, 2004, p. 235). These same principles are also present in the managerial context. Trustworthy and transparent organizations are those that are auditable, and auditable organizations are manageable. Therefore, organizations must be made auditable (Biesta, 2004). In this way, accountability is not only a way to maintain integrity in an organization, but it is also how an organization becomes manageable.

Another distinct way that accountability is understood is related to one's responsibility and carries connotations of "being answerable to" (Biesta, 2004, p. 234). Biesta (2004) argued that the understanding of accountability as being a system of mutual responsibility was the

dominant understanding before the rise of the technical-managerial approach. In particular, the idea of professional accountability was dominant until the 1970s. In the post-war society, there was an emphasis on social democracy designed to address class disadvantage and differences. This led to the rise in public goods and services that required complex practices that needed to be carried out by professionals. Thus, public trust was afforded to the specialists, who formed professional relationships and created administrative hierarchies where their professional judgements were tested (Ranson, 2007). Louise Poulson, as cited by Biesta (2004), also agreed that there was a strong emphasis on professional accountability in the 1970's. At that time, accountability was about the professional responsibility that, for example, teachers had to themselves, to their colleagues, and students.

Accountability in Education

In the 1970s, the professional accountability discourse in education slowly became subsumed by managerial accountability, which was characterized by standardized tests and the management of schools by for-profit businesses (Ambrosio, 2013). Formally memorializing this fact, President Richard Nixon sent a message to congress in March of 1970 about education reform that declared that "school administrators and schoolteachers alike are responsible for their performance, and it is in their interest as well as in the interests of their pupils to be held accountable" (Ambrosio, 2013, p. 318). This emphasis on accountability likely emerged because new managerial procedures in industry demanded a basic level of competence and because families were spending more on taxes (Lessinger & Tyler, 1971). Therefore, there was an increasing public desire to ensure that tax dollars were being spent well.

The political focus on accountability was accompanied by a professional investment as well. Ambrosio (2013) explained,

The national concern with accountability produced a growing volume of research and

publications that led to the appearance of accountability as a subject heading in the

Education Index, the main general database for education, for the first time in 1970. Two

years later, the Library of Congress acknowledged the accountability movement's

importance by introducing educational accountability as a subject heading. (p. 318)

The growing support and sentiments among educators and politicians alike for accountability in

schools presaged the 1983 publication Nation at Risk, which was commissioned by President

Ronald Regan. This report suggested that the United States had mediocre educational

performance and called for rigorous performance metrics and the adoption of nationwide

standardized testing. After decades of dominating political and educational discourse,

developments in educational accountability eventually led to the passage of the No Child Left

Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001. Under the NCLB, states were now required to test K-12 students to

determine if they were making adequate progress toward benchmarks in core subjects (Deming

& Figlio, 2016).

The rise of accountability rhetoric in educational discourse can be properly understood as

happening against the backdrop of the rise of neoliberalism. According to Stitzlein (2017),

Neoliberalism is a worldview closely aligned with free market fundamentalism and

neoclassical economics...Generally, neoliberals view the state as inefficient and having

too much bureaucratic control. Instead, they argue, the free market and privatization of

public resources should be used to achieve social and individual goals in more efficient

ways that respond to the demands of consumer. (p. 3)

As the United States began the ideological shift towards neoliberalism, the discourse of

accountability became very attractive to educators, policymakers, and the general public because

they were seeking more efficient and transparent schools that could produce graduates with the skills necessary to succeed in modern society but could operate with less government funding and less bureaucratic red tape (Stitzlein, 2017).

Within the rhetoric of neoliberalism and accountability were lofty claims of providing the public with transparency and quality assurance in education, all while keeping cost low through managerial and technocratic methods. There have been many critiques, however, about the impact of adopting neoliberal thinking and accountability culture. Martin et al., as cited by Ambrosio (2013), suggested that the true intention of the accountability movement was not to meet workforce requirements or to provide an equitable education to all students, but rather it was to "prevent analysis of the influence of social and economic factors on school success by forcing educators to concentrate on measuring and testing learning in a social vacuum" (p. 319). In this way, the conversation was redirected from the social issues that created disparities in educational outcomes, thus leaving them irrelevant and unaddressed, towards improving the outcomes themselves at the lowest cost and in the most efficient way. To do this, all functions in education now had to be conceived of as either inputs or products whose value could be quantitatively measured through standardized assessments. This shift effectively promoted market-based rationality in education, in which "students are consumers who pursue education to prepare for a life of economic competition and exchange" (Stitzlein, 2017, p. 5). De Lissovoy (2013) succinctly captures the effects of this logic when he wrote,

> Students and teachers are trained to view themselves as fundamentally isolated and
> forever in competition- salespeople for their own human capital in a world in which there
> will always be winners and losers and in which the losers have no one but themselves to
> blame for their 'inefficiencies'. The test-based accountability system in education

powerfully mobilizes this competition, pitting students, teachers, and schools against

each other in a struggle for higher scores and superior rankings. (p. 423)

In essence, school communities (and the people within them) were forced to rearrange their

identities to fit within the structure of the capitalist market (De Lissovoy, 2013).

In addition to transforming the relationships between teachers and students, making it one

of competition, the accountability movement also changed the relationship between the state and

its citizens (Ambrosio, 2013; Biesta, 2004; Stitzlein, 2017). In the logic of neoliberalism,

education is a personal investment, instead of a public good. Similarly, schools are in the

business of producing services that consumers desire (Stitzlein, 2017). Supposedly, this makes

schools more responsive to the needs of students. Biesta (2004), however, made a compelling

argument as to why this is not actually true. Within neoliberal logic, education is viewed as a

public service provided by the government and paid for by citizens through tax dollars. This

configuration actually creates an indirect relationship between parents and students (the

consumers of education) and schools (the providers of education). The public is seen as a mere

aggregation of individuals and the public good is seen as an aggregation of private goods

(Stitzlein, 2017). While this may seem like a non-issue, the result is that parents and students are

left out of the accountability loop. This system encourages schools to be accountable to

regulators who enforce the technical and managerial requirements placed on schools, leaving the

stakeholders (parents and students) with little power to determine outcomes. In this way, the

relationship produced through this system between parents and students and the state is purely

economic. While they may have some input on the 'quality' of the services produced, they do not

have any substantial voice in democratic deliberation about the aims and objectives of education.

At this point, we have discussed the various meanings and interpretations of the word accountability. We have also discussed the accountability movement in education, its relationship to neoliberalism, and its impacts on relationship between the public and the state. Next, we discuss accountability from another perspective. In this instance, we are looking for what accountability does. What are its characteristics? What is its intellectual baggage and if that has any significance on our understanding of accountability in Student Conduct?

Characteristics: Accountability in Action

An important aspect about the concept of accountability that cannot be overlooked is that fact that it represents a social practice (Ranson, 2007). Ranson reminded us that accountability functions through communities who enact procedures that shape the dispositions of its members. Accountability also entails an evaluative capacity. Judgements are made regarding what counts as quality, what is lacking and needs to be improved, how procedures or processes can be improved upon or made to be more efficient, and what is deemed to be effective. To make these judgements, accountability necessarily requires the collection of vast amounts of information about the subject being assessed (Deming & Figlio, 2016). The collection of this data is used to assess whether the subject performed up to prescribed standards. As such, accountability sets rewards and sanctions for performance (Deming & Figlio, 2016). This, in turn, influences the subject behavior. The subject will alter and reconfigure itself in ways that support 'good performance.' The subject will prioritize being accountable. This means that items that can be assessed will take priority over non-quantitative and substantial aims. In this way, accountability causes restructuring of the subject to be made accountable and thus manageable (Biesta, 2004). Accountability also requires efficiency of processes or, in the managerial perspective, processes that are inefficient cost, whether that is in dollars or time. The goal is ultimately to reduce

transactional costs related to the task. Related to the last point is the orientation towards future improvement (Ranson, 2007). When the subject is evaluated for their present performance and made to give an account for it, there is an implied presumption that it will also be improved upon in the future. Lastly, and quite importantly, accountability defines the reasonableness of communication (De Lissovoy, 2013; Ranson, 2007; Robinson, 2016). It sets the parameters around what is intelligible in each context, therefore any arguments against accountability seem nonsensical (Biesta, 2004). The effect of this is that there seems to be no alternative to accountability as an organizing rationality in education.

Now that the intellectual baggage that accountability carries has been illuminated, I ask, what does it mean when we say that we hold students accountable? What does that imply? What does it mean that accountability is an outcome of our conduct processes? Is there any linkage between accountability and education?

Accountability in Student Conduct

Earlier in the chapter, I discussed that one interpretation of accountability is related to that of personal responsibility. In my professional experience, accountability and responsibility are used interchangeably in Student Conduct Practice. In this section, however, I challenge this generally accepted interpretation of accountability. On the Association for Student Conduct Administrator's (ASCA) website, it states, "ASCA supports the mission of higher education by cultivating student responsibility and accountability on college campuses nationwide." This means that responsibility and accountability must be two distinct outcomes associated with Student Conduct practice. Therefore, I will briefly address conceptions of responsibility to disentangle these two words.

Responsibility

Legal and Moral theorists generally view the concept of responsibility in two ways. Kamerman (1998) explained the first way, which is called 'role responsibility.' This involves assigning duties and obligations to an individual based on their position in a network of social relations or institutions. For example, parents have a responsibility to provide for the needs of their child and doctors have a responsibility to provide medical care to patients. The second conception of responsibility is referred to as 'act responsibility.' Act responsibility is initiated when "we identify a person who we believe deserves punishment or blame for wrongful behavior. Unlike role responsibility, which deals with actions a person is expected to perform, act responsibility "concerns actions that have already been performed" (p. 17).

In the context of Student Conduct, one may argue that we address both role and act responsibilities. As students, which would be their role, they are obligated to adhere to the code of conduct because of their membership within the university community. While this is not incorrect, students do not end up in conduct offices because of roles they are expected to perform. Instead, it is the opposite: they end up in conduct offices because codes of conduct outline the behaviors that they cannot engage in. In other words, codes do not describe the duties of students. They do not, for example, say as a student you must study for a minimum of 10 hours per week. Instead, they describe the range of behaviors that are prohibited. To be even more clear, consider the example of a student using a racial slur at a public, state institution of higher education. The majority of my Student Conduct work occurred at this type of institution and, in my experience, only in very specific situations 7would using a racial slur be considered a violation of the code of conduct because the use of racial slurs is considered free speech under the First Amendment. So, while using the racial slur may violate their 'role responsibility' of

being a student within the university community— as we generally frown upon racist incidents— the offending student in this case would not be charged for violating the student code of conduct. For the aforementioned reasons, I argue that, generally, Student Conduct practice addresses 'act responsibilities' because students are referred to our offices *after* they have been identified as potentially committing wrongful behavior as outlined by student codes of conduct. This brings me to the question of, when we say that we cultivate student responsibility as stated on the ASCA website, what does that actually mean? In light of this discussion, 'role responsibility' does not need to be cultivated. Students simply have it because of their position within the community. On the other hand, it would seem absurd to cultivate 'act responsibility' by seeking to identify persons in need of punishment. Interestingly, I suggest that this is exactly how accountability and responsibility work in tandem in Student Conduct.

When a student has violated policy and is referred to the Student Conduct office, typically they are sent some type of formal written notice that provides them with information about the alleged violation. This notice also requires them to meet with a Student Conduct administrator to resolve the allegations. At this meeting, the student is made to give an explanation of the events surrounding the violation. In other words, the student is required to present an account of how they ended up in the Student Conduct Office. According to Robinson (2016) "an account is a linguistic device employed whenever an action is subjected to valuative inquiry. That is, an account is a device for bridging the gap between action and expectation" (p. 15). Those that are requested to give accounts are those who behaved outside of the established guidelines of the community. In this way, accounts represent an act of conversational repair. It "is an attempt by one interlocuter to modify (e.g., change, explain, justify, clarify, interpret,

rationalize, recharacterize, etc.) either prospectively or retrospectively, other interlocutors'

understandings or assessments" (Robinson, 2016, pp. 15–16).

Not taking anything for granted, this brings into question how students are referred to

Student Conduct offices for violations. On college campuses, the number of Student Conduct

administrators in relation to the number of students is minuscule. At UNCG, for example, with a

student population of about 20,000, there were only two full-time Student Conduct

administrators within the Office of Student Rights and Responsibilities (OSRR) when I was

employed there. Without saying, it was unreasonable for the administrators in our office to know

about all student behavior happening both on and off campus. The solution to this is that

universities have created intricate networks and reporting structures that keep tabs on student

behavior. University faculty and staff down to the lowest levels, such as Resident Assistants, are

trained to document and report code violations. University police departments regularly refer

low-level criminal violations to conduct offices. With modern technology, closed-circuit

television (CCTV) surveillance cameras are ubiquitous on college campuses, located at

entryways into buildings and strategically placed to monitor intersections, sidewalks, and

parking lots. Similarly, many campuses have adopted keyless entry, where your ID grants you

access into buildings. This allows for students' locations to be traced with date and time stamps.

In regard to reporting, there is a huge market for Student Conduct management systems. The

most sophisticated systems allow conduct offices to create reporting links that quickly take you

to online forms that allow you to report alleged violations of the code. You can even transform

those reporting links to QR codes and place them on flyers around campus, like on the back of

bathroom stalls for example. These conduct management systems also provide conduct

administrators with detailed information about students, including demographic information such

as race, gender, age, hometown, GPA (both cumulative and semester), if the student is an athlete, if the student is a member of a fraternity or sorority, the student's major, the student's picture, and the student's prior conduct history (if it exists). This provides the administrator with various data points by which they come to know the student before they even have the first meeting.

By the time students have received their notice to meet with a Student Conduct administrator— before they even have the chance to provide their account— they have already been made accountable. Moreover, once they present their account and a resolution is reached via the conduct process, they now have a Student Conduct record that catalogs the interaction with the office and is kept in accordance with university's record retention policies 9. Beyond the conduct record, the student now becomes a data point that is reported out to student governments and vice presidents who are eager to know what students are doing and how their behavior is being managed. Through complex analytics, conduct officers can disaggregate the data to know information such as what was the average GPA of students who were found responsible for violations, their race, if they are affiliated with student organizations, or where most violations occur. What I am suggesting is that Student Conduct does not hold students accountable, as if that is some sort of natural state of being and conduct administrators simply enforce it; instead, Student Conduct makes students accountable through sophisticated monitoring, reporting mechanisms and structures, and with the use of technology that stores their personal data and tracks their every move.

Coming back to an earlier point, because Student Conduct makes students accountable, then the logical conclusion is that it, in fact, does cultivate student responsibility in the sense that it proactively seeks to identify rule violators. It is expected of community members to report code violations and Student Conduct offices do their due diligence in making the processes and

mechanisms for reporting more effective. One of the important functions of Student Conduct offices is to create awareness around the policies that it administers. In my professional experience, when there is time and attention devoted to training and education around reporting in the university community, reporting increases. The implicit goal of this type of training and education is to get more reports or, in other words, identify more students who need to be punished (read educated) for their misbehavior.

The next logical question from this conclusion is why an institution might be actively invested in identifying those who violate the rules. I believe that a plausible explanation can be found in the unique ways that accountability culture has affected higher education. Although 47% of Americans have a degree or credential and the higher education attainment of young adults (age 25-34) has increased by 11 percentage points since 1997, there are still widespread concerns about the value of education (Kelchen, 2018). According to Kelchen, a Pew Research Center study showed that 57% of respondents believed that a college education was not a good value for students. This sentiment, along with rising costs of attendance, have sparked demands for colleges to improve their performance and for them to be held accountable for their outcomes.

Brand and Risk Management

In K-12 education, the institutional structure facilitates less competition because, as a default, school choice happens indirectly through residential location (Deming & Figlio, 2016) unless a parent chooses to send their child to a charter, private, or magnet school. In higher education, however, institutions are in the market to attract students in an economy that questions the value of a college degree. With hefty price tags, colleges need to put their best foot forward to attract enough students to keep their doors open. There are several different ways that colleges

do this, from sophisticated and targeted recruitment to offering top of the line amenities. To narrow this conversation down more closely to conduct, I discuss the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act of 1990, most commonly called the Clery Act.

The Clery act is named after Jeanne Clery, a college student who was raped and murdered in her dorm room at Lehigh University. This act requires colleges to publish an annual security report with the crime and fire statistics for their respective campuses and to make this report publicly available for anyone to access. What is interesting about the Clery act is that it is a consumer protection law, which is intended to protect the buyers of goods and services. It is a consumer protection law because Jeanne Clery's parents successfully argued that if they had known Lehigh University's crime record, they would not have sent their daughter there. Legally, the Clery act signifies that the relationship between universities and students is economic, in that the university offers goods and services in exchange for students' tuition dollars. If this is the relationship, and if universities are competing for students, then the logical conclusion is that universities should be responsive to consumers. As Jeanne Clery's parents stated, high crime at an institution could mean that prospective students would elect not to attend. Moreover, Schuck (2017) found that "more violence on and around campus is associated with lower 4-year graduations rates, whereas higher rates of disciplinary actions regarding alcohol, drugs, and weapons are associated with higher graduation rates" (p. 77). In other words, this study suggests that the Student Conduct systems should be used for minor criminal offenses to promote student success. What I am trying to illuminate is that colleges have an investment in eliminating bad behavior on college campuses. This fact will not be news to Student Conduct Professionals, as we see ourselves as 'educating students' to be better 'citizens.' While that rationale may be true,

I am introducing another rationale that is not acknowledged, which is an economic one. Student Conduct systems help colleges appear attractive on the market by (a) ensuring the schools ability to attract new students and (b) by maintaining the value of the brand of the university by promoting, as Schuck (2017) found, "student success."

To be clear, what am I suggesting is that Student Conduct practice has more to do with brand management then we as practitioners, who see ourselves as educators, would like to acknowledge. While Student Conduct certainly does not attract students, meaning that prospective students and parents do not choose a particular college because of their exceptional Student Conduct office, Student Conduct functions absolutely preserve the brand of universities. According to Kelchen (2018), adverse publicity and scandals are quite costly to colleges. Luca et al. (2016), as cited by Kelchen (2018), estimated through an empirical study that a scandal with significant media coverage was associated with a 10% drop in applications the following year. Furthermore, because high application rates mean that colleges get to deny more students, making them more selective which then contributes to higher college rankings, a scandal could cause a significant drop in ranking in the U.S. News & World report. This is why Student Conduct professionals are also often leading threat assessment committees, behavioral intervention teams, crisis management teams, and other acute teams designed to respond to scandals in the making.

In my professional experience, Student Conduct as brand or risk management trumps any educational mission that our offices espouse. I would like for you to consider the following scenario that I encountered as a professional, which I think illustrates the points that I am attempting to convey. We had a student respondent who was shooting a video for a course project which included fake, but realistic looking handguns. The respondent had a friend that

worked in a smoothie shop chain, which was located in a university complex that housed

residence halls and business spaces. The respondent spoke to a friend who worked at the

smoothie shop and received permission to film a video for class in which the store would be

robbed at gunpoint. The respondent coordinated an elaborate scene involving many different

student actors, including a black student who was the perpetrator with the gun, and began to film

the scene. Although the respondent had permission from the friend who was an employee, the

respondent took no other steps in getting this filming approved. So, when another employee of

the smoothie shop looked at live-stream video of the store, it appeared that the store was being

robbed during the video shoot and they called the police. Because the shop was on campus

property, the university police arrived to find what appeared to be a robbery in progress and a

suspect brandishing a weapon. This meant that multiple responding officers entered the shop

with their guns drawn at the black student actor. Luckily, no students were hurt in this situation,

but we can imagine what could have happened if the University police shot a black student. This

situation most certainly would have made the news and, considering our current social and

political environment where police are routinely not held accountable for killing black people,

there certainly would have been local and perhaps national upheaval.

As such, this case was referred to our office, but with an unusual amount of oversight

from upper administration. Before the student was even issued a notice of charges, before any

additional fact gathering, upper administration was demanding that the student be suspended.

Misguidedly, the respondent believed that they had followed the proper procedures for filming in

the smoothie shop by obtaining permission from an employee. The respondent was naïve in that

they did not think through the possibility that police would be called to intervene in a robbery in

progress. If, however, the primary purpose of Student Conduct was to educate, then we could

83

have talked through the incident and provided the respondent with an opportunity to reflect and to learn through educational sanctions. The decision to suspend was, however, ultimately made even before the student met with any Student Conduct professional because of pressure from upper administration. It must be noted that the Student Conduct professionals at this institution certainly agreed that suspension was well within an appropriate sanction range given the severity of the incident. They did not, however, agree that this decision could or should be made without even speaking to those involved yet. Nevertheless, upper administration saw the situation through the lens of what could have been a major scandal, and therefore wanted a harsh punishment for the student. In this case, it was clear that education was only a secondary function to brand management in Student Conduct.

Given all that I have suggested, the final question remains: does accountability have anything to do with espoused educational mission of Student Affairs and Student Conduct? My answer to that is maybe. As one might assume, I am not convinced that there is any direct relationship to be claimed. As a Student Conduct professional, however, I know that we often have transformational experiences with students. At times, we meet with students who take the opportunity to make meaning of the situations that landed them in our offices. These students reflect and acknowledge the impact of their actions on their community, on their families, and on their future. These types of interactions are what make our work meaningful. I take pause, however, at suggesting that students reach this disposition because we hold them accountable. The underlying logic in that thought is that students will learn if we hold them accountable, but in practice, we know that is not the case. For example, it is quite common that we assign reflection papers or educational workshops only for students to turn in assignments that meet the bare minimum requirements but show no reflection regarding the violation. In these cases, what

84

is intended to be an educational sanction is just a hurdle for a student to jump through. Thus, we see that accountability is not necessarily the vehicle by which education happens.

Looking at the question of whether or not accountability has anything to do with our educational mission from another perspective and returning back to the conceptual framework of this project (i.e., weakness, not strength), we can ask ourselves a similar question that Biesta (2012) posed: is weakness in Student Affairs practice seen as a problem that should ultimately be overcome and solved? Considering what we learned in Chapter 2, a central component of student development theory is the idea that the environment can be manipulated to produce intended outcomes, the discourse of student learning is covertly intended to produce a specific type of person— one who is responsible for keeping themselves competitive within a market economy— and lastly, considering what was found in this chapter, we do not hold students accountable as much as we make students accountable in aims of protecting the brand of the university, I would argue that Student Affairs practices do assume that weakness is a problem to be addressed. Student Affairs practice has not abandoned its historical roots of being invested in monitoring and disciplining students with explicit intentions of controlling students. Certainly, controlling students and outcomes is about eliminating risks. It is about creating security and predictability.

In many respects, eliminating risks is absolutely necessary. No one wants to pay thousands of dollars in tuition to an institution that has a poor reputation, whether for high criminal activity, high academic misconduct, dangerous drinking cultures, or places where hazing and other student organizational misconduct runs amok. This is why Biesta's conception of the three domains of education is useful. Student codes of conduct and enforcement of those policies are a mechanism of socialization, as they contribute to the norming of acceptable (and unacceptable) behaviors within the campus community. Related to this, student codes also help

85

to support the domain of qualification, because degrees would have very little integrity or value from institutions who did not manage student behavior well. I am not attempting to prove that we are doing something wrong; I am not even saying that we have mismanaged our priorities in terms of risk management trumping education in some instances. I am, however, trying to clearly articulate that education is not the main priority and that education is not something that inherently just exists within our processes. This means the question is not whether we should value safety and predictability, but it is about to what extent does this quest for safety and predictability become un-educational? How do we ensure that our students are not only viewed as "objects to be molded and disciplined, but as subjects of action and responsibility" (Biesta, 2013, p. 1). In recognizing that education is not a simple byproduct of our work, we can begin to be intentional about how we see our processes contributing to student subjectivity.

Conclusion

I began this chapter with questions about the relationship between accountability and education. I found that we do not hold students accountable as much as we make them accountable and students are made accountable. Regarding the characteristics of accountability, we can see that many of its features are present in Student Conduct practice. What I have suggested here is that students are made accountable through Student Conduct practices in order to be manageable. In line with the nature of accountability, Student Conduct practices collect vast amounts of information on students, including demographic data, academic performance, and even information about their locations. Both literally and figuratively, this information serves as a type of tracking device, which is intended to be used to know the students, predict their behaviors, provide interventions to curb misbehavior, but most importantly identify and

address prohibited conduct. To do this, Student Conduct professionals must implement efficient processes to deal with the demands placed on their office.

Moreover, Student Conduct professionals' erect systems and structures of reporting violations to ensure that they are receiving reports. Therefore, accountability in Student Conduct also requires efficiency of processes. Most importantly to me is that accountability in Student Conduct also defines how we do our work. When accountability is questioned, or in other words, if there are any arguments against why holding students accountable may not be the best thing educationally speaking, it seems as if one is not making any sense. This all results in a strong form of education, as Biesta would call it, where we try to control variables to predict outcomes. When we squelch all weakness in education, however, we also squelch the potential for something new to emerge. We prevent the possibilities that students may come into their subject-ness through our processes. Therefore, the task of the next chapter is to consider, how might Student Conduct professionals create space for subjectivity to occur, especially when our work is heavily focused on the domain of socialization, and when our culture and society overvalue a strong, managerial, technocratic approach to education? I ponder and address these questions in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER IV: 'EXISTENCE, NOT ESSENCE': SUBJECTIFICATION IN STUDENT

CONDUCT

Introduction

Thus far in this project, I have devoted significant time to unsettling the idea that our

work is, simply by default, educational. I have chosen the word 'unsettling' because my point

was not to prove that we are not educators, as a matter of fact or truth, but to show that education

is not simply a condition that is omnipresent in traditional or institutional schooling. That is to

say that education is not a given. Instead, education is a condition that must be tended to, and

perhaps in our current sociopolitical climate, painstakingly fought for. These thoughts should not

be seen as a critique reserved only for Student Affairs practitioners. On the contrary, professors

too should be concerned with pedagogies and curricula that translate to more than mere

information transfer and skills acquisition. This matter has, however, been taken up extensively

by critical pedagogues regarding traditional classroom teaching, including Paulo Freire and

Henry Giroux. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce a similar conversation within the fields

of Student Affairs and Student Conduct.

The problem that I attempt to illustrate and address is as follows: Student Conduct

professionals are experiencing a perceived loss of the educational mission of their work. The

educational mission in Student Affairs and Student Conduct is commonly conflated with student

development, although this focus has been criticized for replacing the academic mission of

higher education. This calls into question the relationship between student development and

education. Moreover, Student Conduct practice balances many priorities, with education (read

student development) being only one of them. In many instances, other priorities such as risk and

brand management trump the educational mission. So, my argument is, if student development

may or may not be educational and student development is not the main priority in Student Conduct, then we need to reconsider what an educational Student Conduct practice looks like because perhaps our current practices are not as educational as we propose.

In previous chapters, I have used historiography and hermeneutics to interpret our history and common practices. In this chapter, I put educational philosophy in conversation with Student Affairs and Student Conduct to identify alternative ways to enhance and communicate about the educative capacities of our work. In these aims, I first revisit the domains of education as posited by Biesta (2013) and demonstrate why subjectification is the most important domain of the three. Then I move towards explaining subjectification, but first I establish a clear understanding of humanist philosophy and concepts such as the subject as cogito and their critiques so that the reader can comprehend the subsequent theoretical moves that this chapter suggests. In this aim, I also situate student development theory within the same conversation and delineate how critiques of student development echo those of the modern subject and humanist philosophy. From there, I discuss what subjectification is not so that the reader is clear not to confuse what is offered in this chapter as another developmental theory. Then, I discuss subjectification and introduce a new way of conceptualizing the subject where primacy is not given to what the subject is, but rather what the subject does. In other words, I shift the conversation from the essence of the subject to the existence of the subject. With this shift, I then speculate about how this conception of the subject can support Student Affairs and Student Conduct Professionals in harnessing the educative capacities of our work.

Educational Domains

In Chapter 1, I introduced the three domains of education as posited by Biesta (2013). These three domains are helpful as an analytical tool because they provide us with language to discuss the multiple, and at times, competing purposes of education. Moreover, it helps us to conceptualize what makes a practice educational. In our society, education has been given the tall tasks of preparing our citizenry for participation in our democracy, for alleviating social injustices and disparities, promoting social mobility, for equipping our students to be contributing members of workforce, and many other purposes. We can conceptually capture these many priorities by breaking them down into the domains of education. As a refresher, the first domain is 'qualification,' which is about obtaining knowledge, skills, values, and dispositions. We become qualified by obtaining apprenticeships, diplomas, degrees, and certifications. If education is focused only on qualification, then we typically would refer to this as training. The next domain, 'socialization,' is how we become part of existing traditions and practices. This is the domain in which we become enculturated. It is about how we become individuals of a particular epoch. This domain can be thought of as the continuity of the past, as it is about how individuals adopt existing beliefs, patterns, and ways of living. Education that is only focused on this area would likely be identified as indoctrination, as zealous socialization requires the uncritical adoption of these cultural norms. The last domain is 'subjectification,' where dispositions of autonomy and criticality are located. This domain is about how one becomes a self, among many in society. This final domain is the most important: it represents the difference between education solely for production and education for liberation (Biesta, 2013). Without this aspect present in educational endeavors, education can only amount to preparing students for the world as it exists today, including today's mores, values, desires, and jobs.

Intuitively, we see that without subjectification, education simply does not work because we can point to how society has evolved in terms of social issues— we see the new career paths emerging, and we've witnessed major technological advances. This means that there must be a dimension in education that is attuned to that which has yet to come. This happens in the domain of subjectification.

What is important to understand about each domain of education is that these are always happening simultaneously and inextricably linked to one another. For an example, since the 1980s, co-curricular records or co-curricular transcripts have been taken up by Student Affairs divisions with the intent to document students' educational experiences that happen outside of the classroom that would otherwise not be captured on an academic transcript (Stirling & Kerr, 2015). I have worked at two distinct institutions that have adopted some version of a co-curricular transcript. At one institution in particular, students had the ability to choose a co-curricular focus, like declaring an academic major. Once a focus was chosen, the students were required to participate in a designated number of focus-specific co-curricular activities to accumulate the required number "credits" to fulfill their focus area. These co-curricular transcripts can be seen as functioning in the domain of qualification, as the intent is to certify that a student has completed the requisite experiences in a particular area of interest. Co-curricular transcripts, however, also provide students with tangible and extrinsic motivation to participate in a Student Affairs curriculum. Students may engage in employment opportunities such as resident assistants or orientation leaders, they may take on leadership roles in student organizations, may participate in civic engagement events, may attend programs hosted by Student Affairs departments, and may take advantage of professional development opportunities. These opportunities all operate in the domain of socialization as they will require students to

interact with others who possess a similar commitment to a certain cause or area of interest. In these interactions, students learn the norms, values, and dispositions required of them to be successful in their chosen field. The domain that would transform these activities from just being about qualification or socialization and into educational experiences, however, is subjectification.

As detailed later in this chapter, subjectification is about one's uniqueness and their encounter with their own freedom and ability to act. For example, a second-year finance student becomes the vice-president for an environmental justice student organization and elects to participate in activities to fulfill a global competence focus. Through participating in these activities, the student realizes that they have been investing their extra money, that they do not have much of, into companies that exploit and deplete the environment in a multitude of ways. The student feels like a fraud in their organization because they hold such a prominent position, yet they still believe in market competition and innovation. They also see investing as a way to elevate the socioeconomic status of their family to create generational wealth. In this situation, the student will likely have challenging conversations with their peers or mentors to tease out their seemingly competing beliefs and commitments. Other students in the organization may pressure them to completely divest from capitalism while their family looks to them for their financial savvy and advice. Ideally, over time, the student may resolve this particular tension for themselves, but it may involve changing their mind many times and taking various "stances," so to speak. The important part to note is that each time they do take a stance, it will be among others like their peers and family who will have their own opinions, thoughts, and beliefs about the taken stance. The act of being 'public' with their stance is what Biesta refers to as

subjectification, and it is about what it means to exist and the never resolved existential challenge to exist humanely among other humans.

The example above illustrates how a co-curricular transcript supported by a Student Affairs curriculum address each of the three educational domains. Later in the chapter, I expound more on subjectification, but at this point, it is important to recognize that all three domains are interconnected. Although the domains are always interconnected, however, this does not mean that they are always balanced in focus. In our current age, where the logic of neoliberalism is embedded in everything that we do, we increasingly see the pressure placed on our students to become brands so that they can market themselves, be employable, and remain competitive. We see the public and government suggest that students should only choose majors that lead to jobs. We see critiques that general education classes are irrelevant and keep students from earning their degree faster. This, along with many other examples, suggest that perhaps we may be over focused on the domain of qualification. Thus, the challenge that sits before us as Student Affairs and Student Conduct professionals is to consider how we make sure that we are also intentionally directing our efforts towards the domain of subjectification.

I would like to take this opportunity to make a point about intentionality. As a general matter, our field would benefit from being clear about what our efforts seek to accomplish in each of the three domains. More specifically, in this project, I suggest that we should devote special attention to the domain of subjectification because we are lagging conceptually in this area. Of course, subjectification has occurred and will continue to occur as a byproduct of engaging in our areas as was shown in the example above. This is happenstance, however, and primarily because we deal with students who have the capacity to think and act. Moreover, we exist in a world with other humans who also have the same capacity. Yet, although this capacity

93

exists as a marker of our humanity, there are conditions that are more favorable for it to emerge. For example, cults, gangs, and extremist religious or political organizations overly emphasize socialization and the adoption of specific values and beliefs. This indoctrination almost entirely squelches the human ability to think for oneself. This is why Biesta (2013) reminds us that while we cannot plan for or produce subjectification, we can certainly make it difficult for it to occur. Therefore, when I say that we should intentionally direct our efforts towards the domain of subjectification, I am referring to deliberately creating space for the possibility of our students' subjectivity. As Student Affairs professionals, we should ask ourselves whether we are devoting balanced attention to each of the domains or if one domain is dominating our efforts. We should be seeking to assess the ways that our practices can hinder our students' ability to think, act, and begin anew.

In order to discuss how we may intentionally direct our efforts toward the domain of subjectification, there are key concepts that must first be understood. In the next section, I discuss the modern subject often conceptualized as the cogito, humanism, and their critiques. This section also parallels this conversation with student development theory and illustrates how it shares similar critiques.

The Subject: Cogito and Humanism

In western philosophy, the subject can be thought of as "the self" or a being with a consciousness. This idea can be traced back to French philosopher Rene Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), where he introduced the well-known Latin phrase cogito ergo sum, which is commonly translated into "I think, therefore I am." While the phrase "I think, therefore I am" is sometimes used as a type of idiom, it is foundational to western philosophical thinking. Descartes (1641), in a systematic inquiry to find certainty, noted that all that he thought was true

was based on information gathered from his senses. There were instances, however, where his senses were not reliable; therefore, his senses could not be entirely trusted. This meant that all his knowledge and everything that he believed to be true was subject to doubt. The one thing that he could not doubt, however, was the fact that he existed. Descartes suggested that in the very act of doubting, a truth emerges: the one who doubts must exist, hence I doubt (think) therefore I am. From this finding emerged the Cartesian argument:

> This experience, the necessary existence of the doubter, must be taken as proving, first, that the existence of the thinker is certain; secondly, that it is only in pensar (thinking) that such necessary existence can be found; and thirdly, that the whole of consciousness is the primary datum of knowledge. (Beck, 1953, p. 220)

The last point, which suggests that consciousness is the starting point for all knowledge, is also the epistemological foundation of educational thought (Biesta, 1999). This means that the implicit assumption is that knowledge begins from the first-person perspective. This also means that knowledge is not only about what we experience, but our ability to be conscious of our experience (thinking) and direct our intentions towards objects. Plainly put, discussions about the subject are also about subjective experiences when one is able to consciously make decisions and take action.

Education has long been seen as integral in the journey towards subjecthood. Since Kant's essay An answer to the question 'What is Enlightenment? (1784), education has been viewed as the mechanism by which individuals become autonomous and independent in western philosophy. As children, we are young and naive. This makes us incapable of making rational choices for ourselves due to lack of experience, which is foundational to knowledge. Because of this, children are often the object of the adults in their life choices. Nevertheless, as we grow

95

older and gain more experience, the assumption is that, eventually, we will be able to direct our own lives and no longer be at the behest of others desires and wills. In this conception, education was not only seen as making this transition towards self-government possible, but it was seen as necessary and inevitable (Biesta, 2020). Usher and Edwards (1994) suggested that modern education is supported by the "humanist idea of a certain kind of subject who has the inherent potential to become self-motivated and self-directed" (p. 24). Because this potential is inherent, meaning that it is a capability that all humans possess from birth, then the implicit task of education can be understood as coaxing out this capability.

While this view of education is helpful in supporting the domains of qualification and socialization— that is, it is helpful in incorporating individuals into a preexisting society— it does have its limitations. Namely, it is deterministic in defining what it means to be human. Postmodern critiques of the subject usually detail the limits of its reliance on humanism, which places individual consciousness as the starting point of inquiry. Humanism presupposes that "it is possible to know and articulate the essence of the human being" (Biesta, 2013, p. 16). Thus, humanism creates a norm about what it means to be human. It delimits our perceptions of humanity by prescribing what the child ought to become and it leaves no space for the possibility that the child may alter our conception of what it means to be human (Biesta, 2013). We can look at how we speak about gender for a contemporary example of why the space for possibility is necessary. The idea of being non-binary is a relatively new concept in the social imagination of western societies. While non-binary people have always existed, the political act of naming and identifying with this label created a new possibility for existing in the world for people who are gender fluid or reject the gender binary all together. This example is one of many that highlight the practical limitations of a humanist philosophy.

96

Another critique of humanism is that it is not sufficiently human (Levinas, 1981). More precisely, it promotes only a positive idea about what it means to be human but is not able to account for the atrocities that humans commit. This is because humanism places the self at the center of all inquiry, as consciousness is the foundation of knowledge (Descartes, 1641). Levinas (1981) critiqued this idea because, according to him, this logic in western philosophy insists that all others are 'knowable' and a reflection of the self. Others become something to be understood, and in this quest, the other becomes a source of negative feelings. The result of these negative feelings is that the other becomes an extension of individual will and it leads to great violence and suffering. A real-world example of this is humanism not being able to reconcile the inhumanities of Nazi Germany, which was motivated by specific definitions (i.e., Aryan master race) of what it means to be human. These definitions relegated Jewish people to a subhuman category and rationalized their genocide. Therefore, Levinas rejects Descartes' (1641) assertion that epistemology is the first philosophy, as it does not properly account for the relationship between the self and other. This rejection is revisited in greater detail later in this chapter.

As mentioned earlier, educational thinking is inconspicuously undergirded by the subject as cogito and humanist philosophy. Educational thinking in higher education and Student Affairs is not exempt. Next, I explore Student Development theory to juxtapose the critiques. Because student development is seen as the educational mission of our work, it is imperative to situate student development theory within this conversation and understand its philosophical underpinnings.

Student Development Theory

Although the locution 'Student Development Theory' seems to point towards a set of ideas that form a cohesive theory, that is not actually the case. Instead, it refers to an eclectic

grouping of various perspectives borrowed from other disciplines including psychosocial, cognitive, and identity-based theories. The thread that strings this hodgepodge of theories together is the underlying idea that they describe the "natural, biological unfolding of ability and personality" of college students (Bloland et al., 1994, p. 8). While Student Affairs, since its inception, has always ascribed to the idea that higher education should influence the growth and development of the whole student, student development theory added an additional layer to this aim. Under this new edict, university staff were now expected to be proactive and introduce interventions that produced specific outcomes by using relevant theories of human development (Bloland et al., 1994).

This new demand to produce specified student outcomes relied on a few assumptions, which Bloland et al. (1994) explicated in their monogram Reform in Student Affairs: A Critique of Student Development. First, the authors pointed out that the idea that proactive interventions could produce intended outcomes suggested that human development is "patterned, orderly, and predictable, and therefore controllable" (pp. 25–26). In another paper, monograph author Rogers (1991) referred to the aforementioned as "romantic humanism" and that the premise of intentionally directing outcomes overstated what is possible (p. 10). Rogers (1991) continued by pointing out that student development theory does not address the "dark side of the human psyche" and is therefore vulnerable to being adopted by educational faddism (p. 11). This renders anything outside of the norm as pathological, instead of acknowledging the human capacity for both great good and great evil. Critiques of student development theory also pointed out a professional irony: while Student Affairs espoused educative functions, student development theory created a psychological model of professional preparation, while neglecting core competencies to educational practice such as pedagogy and learning theory (Bloland et al.,

1994, p. 33). More to this point, the authors also suggested that student development theory promoted a clinical-psychological relationship between Student Affairs professionals and students, instead of one of an educational nature.

Like humanist philosophy, which is supported by the subject as cogito, student development theory was also criticized for what Bloland et al. (1994) called "the supremacy of the individual" (p. 33). They wrote, "Student development emphasizes the student to the exclusion of other institutional purposes and sees higher education as only a means by which to develop students who have unlimited potential, who are self-directed, and who become self-fulfilled" (p. 33). From this statement, it can be inferred that the authors are signaling towards the fact that student development theory also relies on a specific understanding of the subject ascogito. The authors continue by writing… "To subordinate institutions and society out of deference to the self-fulfillment of the individual student is to miss the essential relationship between the two" (p.33). In essence, the authors are problematizing the epistemological assumption that individual is at first concerned with the self instead of primacy being given to what happens between the self and others (i.e., society).

Student Development Theory Now

It is important to note that Bloland et al. were vocal critics about the unquestioned adoption of Student Development Theory as the knowledge base of the field. While they did not advocate that the field abandon Student Development Theory, they did suggest that it be approached with more skepticism. These authors were also instrumental in leading the transition of the field from the Student Development era to the Student Learning era. If you recall from Chapter 2, this transition supposedly signaled the realignment of the goals of Student Affairs with the overarching academic mission of higher education. Despite this formal shift, the

99

commitment to student development theory continues today. This is demonstrated in the ACPA/NASPA Professional Competency Areas for Student Affairs Educators and the CAS Professional Standards for Higher Education, both of which describe professional standards for the field. Moreover, Student Development theory is still taught in graduate preparation programs, as it is seen as an essential knowledge base for professional practice (Torres et al., 2019).

Because Student Development Theory is not simply a relic of an era past, the field has experienced a proliferation of theories that have emerged under its umbrella. In fact, Student Affairs scholars (Jones & Stewart, 2016) have borrowed the metaphor of 'waves' from the feminist movement to describe how student development theory has evolved over time. Jones and Stewart (2016) described the first wave of theories as being foundational and primarily psychological and developmental, while the second wave focused more on diverse populations, social identities, and holistic theories. The third and final wave is characterized by the application of critical and post-structural perspectives to an understanding of student development. Keeping this fact in mind, the critiques presented by Bloland et al. (1994) almost 30 years ago cannot reasonably account for all student development theories. Moreover, the various waves of student development represent attempts at being more critical about the knowledge base of our field, as Bloland et al. (1994) suggested. The critiques from these authors, however, problematize an issue core to the work of this project, which is how we view the subject in Student Affairs work. For this reason, the work of these authors remains relevant, as it properly situates Student Affairs within a long history of educational thought.

In this next section, I provide a comprehensive exploration of the domain of subjectification. Within this conversation, I detail two interrelated concepts central to Biesta's (2012, 2013) conception of subjectification which are uniqueness and coming-into-the world. As

Biesta was heavily influenced by the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, significant time is spent detailing Levinas' concerns and the problems that his works were attempting to address. I conclude this section by interrogating how Biesta and Levinas contributions implicate our work as Student Conduct Professionals.

Subjectification

If it is not already abundantly clear by what has been presented, I would like to take this opportunity to state that subjectification is not the ultimate concern of education— that is, it is not the only function and purpose of education. This is precisely why Biesta (2013) suggested that education operates within three domains. It is, however, the most important domain because if subjectification is not present in educational endeavors, then they will cease to be educational (Biesta, 2020). While students may learn and gain the qualifications and socialization needed to seamlessly fit in to the existing society, education is not complete without the dimension present that allows newness to be introduced into the world. Biesta (2020) admitted himself that he initially underestimated the complexity of the domain of subjectification and how interrelated it is to the other domains of qualification and socialization. Therefore, it is appropriate to start by addressing what subjectification is not, especially because our field of Student Affairs has trained us to think about our students in particular ways, such as, for example, life-long learners who remain competitive in the market economy as detailed in Chapter 2, or as students who are manageable and predictable as shown in Chapter 3. Both instances build upon a long-standing tradition of viewing the subject as cogito within education. Please note that some concepts that are introduced in this section will be explained when discussing what subjectification is in greater detail.

Subjectification is Not

Because we are Student Affairs and Student Conduct professionals, it is appropriate to start with what is the easiest conceptual leap for us: this is the fact that subjectification is not developmental (Biesta, 2020). This means that subjectification is not about the 'process' of becoming a subject. It does not assume that individuals are not subjects and then go through certain stages to eventually unfold into subjects. It is also not about the personality or psychological, which attempt to explain human behavior. If this were so, then subjectification would be relying on a specific conception of what it means to be human or, in other words, subjectification would be another theory about the subject that attempts to describe the essence of a human being. Rather, subjectification should be seen as an event that "always interrupts our becoming" (Biesta, 2020, p. 100). Because this is so, subjectification is therefore not another thing that students must "achieve" and should not be thought of as a learning outcome.

Subjectification is also not about the subjective. It is not about our personal opinions, beliefs, or our identity. It is about what happens when those opinions and beliefs encounter the world. Furthermore, while notions of identity are certainly complex and shape our actions and interactions within the world, Biesta (2020) wrote that subjectification

> is not the question of who I am, but the question of how I am, that is to say, the question of how I exist, how I try to lead my life, how I try to respond to and engage with what I encounter in my life. It therefore includes the question of what I will 'do' with my identity- and with everything I have learned, my capacities and competencies, but also my blind spots, my inabilities and incompetence in any given situation. (p. 99)

Biesta (2020) did acknowledge that subjective experiences like those based on our identities are relevant to the educational project. He would, however, contend that those aspects are located in

the domain of socialization, as that is the domain that "seeks to provide students with access to traditions and practices, with the invitation to locate oneself in some way in such traditional practices" (p. 99)

On a final point about what subjectification is not, it is important to note that it should not be confused with self-objectification. In other words, subjectification is not about embodying a neoliberal personhood in which one becomes their own personal brand, markets themselves, manages their own learning, and completes other tasks designed to remain competitive in the marketplace. In the case of self-objectification, Biesta (2020) suggested that this promotes a split between the self that manages and the self that is being managed. In addition, the tasks associated with self-objectification, say building a personal brand, are based on one's identity, their beliefs, and their specialized skills and knowledge, all of which are located in the other domains of socialization and qualification.

Subjectification Is

In order to best understand Biesta's ideas about the domain of subjectification, it is necessary to first understand Levinas' philosophy and the issues that he was attempting to resolve. According to Walsh (1989), Levinas first wanted to address the practical concern of peace and justice by illustrating that human atrocities like the holocaust were made possible by the totalizing definitions of what it means to be human in western philosophy. Second, Levinas also investigated the question of theodicy, which is about how evil can exist in the face of divine goodness. In this aim, Levinas attempted to establish an essential relationship between humans and the divine. Levinas' contributions to our understanding of the subject and conceptualization of ethical relationships have been criticized for being both utopian and impractical. Some, however, have viewed his contributions to be particularly productive. Todd (2002) suggested that

we should take another approach to working with Levinas. We should ask not what we can learn about Levinas' ethical philosophy to come up with educational answers, but instead, we should ask what we can learn from it. In relation to this project, what Biesta was able to learn from Levinas was a way to discuss the subject in existential terms, instead of as a matter of identity or essence. He also was able to use Levinas' philosophy as a way to develop two important and interrelated concepts core to his educational thinking, which are 'uniqueness' and 'coming into the world.' In the next section, I provide clarification about what these concepts entail.

Uniqueness

As described earlier, modern education tends to operate on the assumption of the subject as cogito that will eventually assume their inclination towards autonomy and rationality. This means that the educational project is then seen as 'bringing about' these natural proclivities of self-government. In this rationale, the domain of subjectification is then about how successful the child or student is in embodying that which has already been characterized in advance. In other words, if we view education as the cultivation of the child or student, then the domain of subjectification transforms into a form of socialization (Biesta, 2013). This is why Biesta suggested that education should not focus on cultivation; rather, it should "focus on the ways in which individuals come uniquely into this world" (Biesta, 2014, p. 19).

In order to focus on how individuals come uniquely into this world, Biesta (2003, 2012, 2013) built his concept of uniqueness by borrowing Levinas' (1981) notion of responsibility. As a reminder, Levinas (1989) challenged Descartes' (1641) proposition that humans are human through consciousness. Instead of epistemology being the first philosophy, meaning that I become an I because of the knowledge about the world that I intentionally grasp for through consciousness, Levinas (1989) suggested that there is a non-intentional and passive

104

consciousness prior to any knowledge. This passive consciousness is sensed rather than known and is the condition for all objectifying thought. Moreover, this precognitive consciousness is exposed through our encounter with the other who, being entirely separate from us, reminds us that we are not the center of the universe (Cromwell, 2015). In this encounter with the other, we are compelled to respond to the infinite (or God) revealed in their otherness, therefore establishing a relationship of responsibility. To be clear, this responsibility is instilled in us by the infinite. Therefore, to be a subject in the ethical sense means to be subjected to the ongoing approach of the other and to be disrupted by this infinite responsibility. According to Levinas, this is what it means to be human (Walsh, 1989).

Building off of Levinas, Biesta (2012) offered "uniqueness" to capture how the encounter with the other and the perpetual disruption of responsibility is how oneself is revealed. According to Biesta (2012), in this disorientation is when I recognize that I am an I. Biesta (2013) made clear that when he is discussing uniqueness, he does not mean uniqueness as in difference, which is about the way that I am different from everyone else. Uniqueness as difference is about one's own singular essence and about what can be known about an individual. Instead, Biesta (2013) offered uniqueness as irreplaceability, which is not about what makes one different; rather, it is about when does it matter that I am unique. It changes the question from what I am to when it matters, "That I am I and not someone else" (Biesta, 2012 p. 588). The answer is that it matters in situations in where I am called to respond—when I am called to take up my responsibility for the other. Therefore, the concept of uniqueness continues the Levinasian tradition of challenging the cogito by giving primacy to the ethical relationship between self and other. It also captures the existential and perpetual nature of the question of subjectivity by suggesting how one might come into the world.

105

Coming-Into-the-World

Inextricably related to Biesta's (2013) concept of uniqueness is coming- into-the- world. Again, the event of being called to respond—the event in which it matters that I am unique— is how one comes into the world. Biesta (2013) utilized the term coming into the world because it denotes the existential nature of subjectification and also signifies the presence of others, as one cannot come into the world in isolation. The most important contribution of coming into the world is that it highlights what Biesta (2013) called the deconstructive nature of the event of subjectivity.

To hone more in on the deconstructive nature of coming into the world, Biesta found Hannah Arendt's (1958) reflections on action and freedom helpful. Additionally, Arendt provided Biesta with the language to capture the political nature of the event of subjectivity. This political nature is primarily due to the fact that we do not exist alone, but instead we exist among others. Biesta (2020), in reference to this fact, wrote, "this is not a simple backdrop, a context in which we act, but rather a complex network through which we act" (pp. 95–96). Moreover, the deconstructive nature of the event of subjectivity is because

> This world is real and puts limits on our actions, albeit that one important aspect of trying
>
> to exist as a subject is to figure out what these limits are, which limits should be taken
>
> into consideration, which limits are real, and which limits are the effect of arbitrary
>
> (ab)use of power. (p. 96)

In other words, the possibility of coming into the world also presents its impossibility. Our freedom to act is not unlimited and we confront this fact when our actions encounter resistance. Arendt (1958) provided insight into this with her definition of 'action,' which is our beginnings as well as how they are taken up by others. In order for our initiatives to become 'real' and to

arrive in the world, they must be taken up by others, and it is only when this happens that Arendt speaks about action (Biesta, 2020, p. 96). For Biesta (2020), this makes us "subjects in the twofold sense of the word: we are subjects of our own initiatives and are subjected to how others take up and continue our beginnings" (p. 96). In essence, this makes our relationship with freedom fraught, as it is always negotiated among others.

In summary, what is at stake in the domain of subjectification is our freedom; but not simply the freedom to do whatever we want. Biesta wrote, "Subjectification rather is about qualified freedom, that is, freedom integrally connected to our existence as a subject. This is never just an existence just with and for ourselves, but always an existence in and with the world" (p. 95). In the lineage of Levinas, Biesta does not offer an alternative theory about the essence of a subject, but rather he provided insight into the event of subjectivity, which he called subjectification. Furthermore, this event describes a never resolved existential challenge. It is about what it means to be human living among other humans (Biesta, 2015). As such, shifting from thinking of humanity in essential terms toward existential terms alters the educational project. In doing so, educators are no longer tasked with coaxing out abilities that already exist within; rather, it is about the interruptions that come from the outside.

What Does This Mean For Our Work

Earlier in the chapter, Student Development theory was situated within the long history of educational thought, and it was demonstrated that it was subject to similar critiques to that of humanism— namely, its prescriptive nature about who humans are and should become, its assumption that it can produce intended outcomes through manipulating environments, and its inability to account for the negative aspects of the human psyche. In the next section, I narrow the conversation by showing how Student Conduct practice has operated under the assumption

that the task of education is to bring about inherent dispositions towards rationality. After that

fact is made clear, I then ask, what would Student Conduct practice looks like if we directed our

efforts toward the domain of subjectivity? Phrased another way, how would our pedagogy have

to shift in order to operate in the domain of existence?

Student Conduct

Managing the behavior of students is the mandate that Student Conduct offices are tasked

with on college campuses. As this is the case, learning is most often thought of in terms of

behavior modification. In other words, the success of the conduct process is measured by

students acknowledging that their behavior was wrong and agreeing not to do that behavior

anymore. The research in Student Conduct confirms this insight, as the measured learning

outcomes in many studies refer to students learning to view their behavior negatively, learning

about the consequences of their behavior, and learning more about the conduct process itself

(King, 2012; Stimpson & Janosik, 2011, 2015). The goal in this type of learning is to prevent

recidivism. In one study about learning outcomes conducted by Howell (2005), it was found that

"As a general rule students indicated that they would either not repeat the specific behavior that

violated the code of conduct or would be more careful" (p. 383). While not repeating the specific

behavior is the desired learning outcome, this study also illuminated another unintended

consequence of participating in conduct process, which is that students learn to be more careful,

as to not get caught again. Furthermore, Howell (2005) also found that "When it came to the use

of alcohol, however, students were far more reluctant to change their behaviors. This is an

important finding because 7 of the 10 participants entered the campus judicial process because of

alcohol" (p. 383). This finding should not be understated because it essentially points out that the

conduct process in this study was ineffective in its intended goal of behavior modification in

70% of its cases. Additionally, Howell (2005) found that students who participated in the judicial process would advise other students to "be honest, act remorseful, and tell the judicial officer what he or she wants to hear" (p. 385). Considering the aforementioned, there appears to be limitations in terms of what Student Conduct professionals are actually capable of as managers of student behavior.

We can also look at the problem stated above from a philosophical lens. Similarly, to the western notion that the educational project is to cultivate the inherent rational and autonomous capabilities of the child or student, the implicit task of Student Conduct practice is to bring our students to reason. That is, it is assumed that once students realize that there are consequences for certain actions, they will behave rationally and in their self-interest and not repeat the offensive behavior. It also assumes a universal norm about appropriate and inappropriate behavior, or at the very least it assumes that students are willing to adopt the university's perspective about what constitutes appropriate and inappropriate behavior. We see, however, that this thinking falls under its own weight in practice as illustrated in Howell's (2005) study. Although students are aware of the consequences of their actions, or even when they have participated in the conduct process and have already been sanctioned for their actions, we see that mere knowledge about the consequences is not a sufficient deterrent for misbehavior. Instead of curbing unwanted behavior, we see that students may learn how not to get caught or how to manipulate the conduct process by telling the conduct officer what they want to hear.

I am going to go a step further and argue that the humanist assumption that our students are inherently rational, and therefore can be brought to reason, is fundamentally mismatched with the functions of Student Conduct. The reason for this assertion is simple: if our students were behaving rationally, they would not be engaging in the conduct process. For example, it is

reasonable to assume that if you smoke marijuana in a residence hall room, that you will be caught because of the easily identifiable odor. In my experience, however, this is exactly how many end up with conduct violations. While the previous example is a common illustration of students behaving irrationally because it is not in their own interest to be caught with drugs, it is certainly not the most outrageous. Consider the following: in one instance, a student was referred to our office for presenting false documentation for her academic dismissal appeal hearing. The student, in trying to make the case that her poor academic performance was due to dealing with the death of her grandfather, used liquid white-out and blue ink to alter the dates in her own handwriting on a completely typed obituary in multiple places. It was clear to everyone who had seen this obituary that it was modified, yet the student still decided to submit the document to the appeal board. Her actions were clearly nonsensical, and while this example was extreme, it captures the point that I am trying to make: our work proves that the humanistic vision of our students is insufficient because if it were, then we would be out of work, as our students would make better choices through using reason.

One could argue that because our students are generally young adults, they have not yet reached the age of reason. To this argument I would then ask, at what age does one begin to behave rationally? At age 23 or 31? Perhaps it is at age 40? This pointed question illuminates the arbitrary nature of this idea of bringing the child or student to reason. Many people can think of mature children and immature adults, so the ability to reason is not directly correlated to age. This, again, significantly puts into question the humanistic assumption that humans ultimately become self-motivated, rational, and autonomous beings. Taking all of this into consideration provides further support to Biesta's argument that we should consider in what situations would it be preferable to shift our focus to pedagogies that operate within the domain of existence, as

110

opposed to pedagogies that assume an essential nature of human beings. This shift would help us to think differently about how we educate. In this way, education would become less about assisting our students in reaching a particular status as it is about helping our students to navigate their encounters with their own freedoms and responsibilities.

Existential Pedagogy in Practice

As mentioned before my starting assumption, Student Conduct and Student Affairs Professionals can fulfill our educational mission. To do this, I suggest that we become more intentional about directing our energies towards the domain of subjectification. Thus far, I have discussed why we should begin to think about pedagogies that operate in the domain of existence, instead of pedagogies based on the essential nature of human beings. The section that follows explores what this shift in pedagogy may look like in practice. For greater clarity, I break down this discussion into two levels specific to Student Conduct practice: Institutional concerns, in which I describe how our practice may help students come-into-the world; and interpersonal concerns, which I use to explore how we may create space for our students' uniqueness to emerge. Although I am discussing coming-into-the-world and uniqueness separately, I do want to be clear that they are inextricable in supporting the domain of subjectification. I am simply hoping to highlight how we may begin to think about our work in light of Biesta's theory of education.

Institutional Considerations

In addition to responding to individual infractions of student codes of conduct, Student Conduct Professionals are responsible for the creation and maintenance of university policies and procedures. According to the ASCA (2021), Knowledge and Skills Publication, an advanced Student Conduct Professional, has "detailed knowledge on language, requirements, and big-

picture impact of policy on the organization" (p. 12). Conduct professionals are also tasked with keeping policies relevant to respond to new developments within the society. For example, In the age of COVID-19, many schools have written masking, testing obligations, quarantine requirements, and other compliance measures into their policies in response to the global pandemic per the guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2022). Codes of conduct are artifacts of their time, and the maintenance of the campus community depends on its responsiveness to new trends. Therefore, Student Conduct professionals, through their administration of codes, have an impact on shaping the campus community that affects every student, and not only those who are charged with violating the code of conduct.

In thinking about the institutional impact that Student Conduct Professionals possess and thinking about how we can use this ability to influence institutional culture in such a way that promotes the subjectification of students, we are encountered with an educational paradox. As cited by Biesta (2020), Kant (1784) questioned, "How do I cultivate freedom through coercion?" (p. 94). If subjectification is about how one exists as a subject of their own life, and not as an object of others' desires (p. 93), then a task of education is to get students to step into their subject-ness. That is, education should bring a student's subjectivity into 'play,' so to speak (p. 95). To illustrate this, Biesta (2020) shared his insights gathered from a 20th century educator, Homer Lane, who operated a school for young boys and girls with criminal backgrounds. In speaking about how he ran his school, Biesta (2020) wrote,

> He did not do this through discipline, behavioral management, or a strict regime of 're-education', but through freedom. Instead of taking his students' freedom away, he actually returned their freedom to them, so to speak, in the hope that they would reconnect. (p. 89)

So, in Student Conduct, how might we craft policies, which are inherently coercive in nature, in such a way that it helps students to reconnect with their freedom? I think a productive place for us to start is by looking at obedience.

In imagining the possibilities of policies that provide opportunities for students to encounter their freedom, I would like to provide an interesting perspective that was shared with me while I was interviewing for a position early on in my career. The opening was for a residence life coordinator position (RLC) at an elite private institution located in the southeast United States. One of the core functions of an RLC is to enforce the student code of conduct. The interview consisted of meeting with current employees both within the Residence Life Department and those in other departments who would work closely with the successful candidate. In meeting these individuals who spanned from entry-level to senior Student Affairs officers, a recurring question kept arising: what were my thoughts and feelings on how this university enforced their alcohol policy? It was explained to me that at this University, they emphasized responsible alcohol consumption and the policy was only enforced when students were no longer drinking responsibly. An example of what this looked like practically was provided to me during the interview and is as follows. This University often has alcohol at campus sponsored events or events hosted by recognized organizations. If at one of these events the RLC happens to see a student whom they know is underage drinking alcohol, the RLC will not document this student unless they are also engaging in prohibited behaviors such as participating in a drinking game, exhibiting public drunkenness, or operating a vehicle. If they are otherwise drinking responsibly, then the fact that are underage would not be pursued as a violation. This matter kept coming up during the interview because it was unique to this specific university, and they were attempting to ascertain whether or not I would be a cultural fit.

Fortunately, I was able to inquire about why the University chose to enforce their alcohol policy in this way. What I gathered from a few different responses were two insights. First, the university has a high international student population because of its status as an elite institution. This means that some of their students come from countries or cultures where it is both legal and acceptable to consume alcohol before the age of 21. Moreover, the arbitrary age of 21 does very little to describe an individual's relationship to alcohol and whether or not they can consume it in a healthy manner. Secondly, the university placed emphasis on responsible alcohol consumption, and not prohibition. This approach was illustrated in their policy which explicitly outlined what was considered unsafe and irresponsible behavior, whereas many codes of conduct fashioned like the model code are less comprehensive and only describe prohibited conduct in relation to alcohol.

I chose to highlight this University's philosophy of emphasizing responsibility over prohibition because this slight shift provides a different perspective about what is required of students to be obedient. I am not suggesting that the written policy is what makes the significant difference. Underage drinking is against policy at the elite university, too. What is significant, however, is that on this campus, the question is not simply about whether you comply with what is codified as lawful or unlawful. If underage students were not in compliance with this aspect of the policy, but were otherwise drinking responsibly, they would not be documented. Instead, it is more about how you engage in consuming alcohol and understanding the boundaries between safe and unsafe behavior. The question of how takes precedence over the question of what in this culture, and in this shift, students are given an opportunity to engage with the authority of the university, instead of being held in complete submission. Borrowing Biesta's (2020) words, they are being reconnected with their freedom.

I would like to share another anecdote that illustrates what I have called an opportunity to engage with authority. On social media, I came across a mother who shared her perspective on her children using profanity. This mother stated that, in her home, there was no such thing as 'bad words' that were off limits for her children. Instead, she taught her children about the contexts in when those words would be inappropriate. For example, you should not use profanity in professional settings or in church. If you stub your toe, however, using profanity out of frustration and pain could be appropriate. This mother shared that she thought it was more important for her children to recognize that words can hurt others than it was for them to recognize what words were off limits for them to say. In her home, calling a sibling stupid would be reprimanded before a child who used an expletive after losing a round in their video game. Similar to the counter-cultural enforcement of the alcohol policy at the elite university, this mother did not ask sheer obedience of her children. Instead, she required that her children use their words responsibly, which is about how and when and not just what.

Taking the following into consideration provides insight into Kant's (1784) question about how freedom can be cultivated through coercion. What can be learned from the provided example is that there are possibilities for enacting policies that do not only require sheer obedience. Certainly, this is not support for an anarchist campus. I am not suggesting that students be allowed to do whatever they want. Certainly, I agree that well-conceived codes of conduct are necessary for maintaining a safe and orderly campus community where students can focus on their academic endeavors. What I am suggesting is that we look to our codes and their enforcement and ask where there might be space for us to place more emphasis on how a student behaved instead of the mere content of their behavior.

As mentioned earlier, there are always inherent risks when it comes to education. Immediate objections to what I have outlined above would involve questions about institutional responsibility to prepare students for the world outside of campus. Regarding the example presented at the elite university, some might ask, by flouting the university's underaged drinking policy, are we sending the message to students that it is fine to drink underaged as long as they are drinking responsibly? As this is not true off-campus, is it not our responsibility as educators to prepare our students for the 'real world'? This concern is legitimate because we should be concerned about the implications of our practices. In response to this concern, however, I would ask, do we believe that how we enact our policies serves as a sufficient deterrent for misconduct? In other words, do we believe students would stop underaged drinking if we enforced our policies against underaged drinking and then punished them for such misconduct? Or that they would not underage drink off-campus? Howell's (2005) empirical study showed us that this was not the case, as 70% of students who entered the conduct process for alcohol reported that they would not change their behaviors. So, what we can learn from this is that the behavior of our students is beyond our control, regardless of our policies and how they are enforced. This is not, however, an excuse to just do anything. Instead, I would ask us to consider what other messages students may receive from how we enforce our policies. For example, do we want to send the message that it is fine to be subject to constant surveillance by the state, similar to how students are monitored on college campuses? The point that I am making here is that preparing students for the real world should be more about creating positive conditions for them to emerge as subjects, and less about legislating all misbehavior away. The latter being not only impossible, but also educationally undesirable, because then our students would never come up against the limits that the real world puts on their actions.

116

If we shift our thinking in this way, then we would recognize that questions about (dis)obedience present an existential challenge. Yes, obedience is desirable in many circumstances, but what is also true is that there is a point where obedience becomes undesirable. Indoctrination, totalitarianism, and civil injustices are made possible by sheer obedience. This is not to say that strict alcohol policies could possibly give rise to a humanitarian crisis, but perhaps helping our students navigate questions of obedience is how we can bring their subjectivity into play, as Biesta (2020) recommended. This presents a new educative position that we can take as Student Conduct professionals. In addition to seeing ourselves as supporting our students as they face the consequences of their actions, we can also see our role as helping students figure out when following the rules is necessary and when the rules should be bucked. Even when thinking about the example of alcohol, nothing is ever all good or all bad. This is, however, precisely the point. Navigating the good and bad, the pros and cons, personal interests versus community interest, all capture the existential challenge of being human. In helping our students, we are ushering them into-the-world, where for every action is a reaction. This is what it means to be a social being. This ontological shift toward existentialism would then influence the types of conversations that we have with students and also the sanctions that we choose to assign. Instead of focusing on moral categories of right and wrong conduct, we would now focus on how the student took up their responsibility to be citizens of this world.

Before we move off the topic of institutional concerns, it is important to highlight how the concept of 'drinking responsibly,' which I rely on to illustrate my thinking, can have disparate impacts on our students of color and other minoritized students who may be more routinely surveilled and have their behaviors scrutinized in ways that other students may not be subject to. This one example allows for us to imagine how Student Conduct professionals may

broach providing space for student subjectivity while also dealing with the very real concerns that arise when considering identity. If I am thinking like Biesta, he would reiterate that subjectification is not about our identities, but rather is about what we do with our identities. Keeping this in mind, if the student or the conduct professional intuits that the student's identity played a role in them being referred to the conduct office for a violation, then the conduct professional should either dismiss the charges if there is no merit to the referral or incorporate the student's identity into the sanctions. For example, maybe the conduct professional has the student write a letter to the Vice President of Student Affairs at their institution with well researched ideas on anti-racist practices in Student Affairs and the implications of their research on the enforcement of the alcohol policy. This sanction provides the student with the opportunity to do something with their identity. Of course, the student could not take the assignment seriously and piecemeal together a paper the day before the due date. On the other hand, the student could use the assignment as a launchpad to request a dialogue with the leaders of their Student Affairs division to effect change. In both cases, the student was provided with the opportunity to consider what they should do with their identity and how they should exist in a world that is not always fair.

Institutional concerns were highlighted in the previous section, which began the conversation on how we might intentionally guide our students towards encounters with their own freedom by looking towards our policies. This conversation captured Biesta's (2012) notion of coming-into- the world, as it highlighted that, while we cannot prevent misconduct, we can assist students in navigating the fraught tensions between their personal freedom and the reality that our freedom has bounds because we live among others. In this next section, I explore the corollary of coming-into-the-world, which is uniqueness. The question of when it matters that I

am I is best captured at the interpersonal level, as it is a derivative of Levinas' concept of ethical responsibility.

Interpersonal Considerations

In Student Conduct, we use the word 'respond' in reference to due process protections. Our codes of conduct outline the nature and content of our charge letters or notices of hearing, which give students time to review the allegations against them and prepare for their meeting. We may colloquially refer to this period as providing the student with the opportunity to respond. In this context, respond means to render a defense, or present their case against the allegations. In the Levinasian sense, the word respond refers to our ethical relationship of responsibility to the irreducible other. According to Levinas (1981), we are not only engaged in relationship with the other, but instead, we are constituted by this relationship that exists outside of the ego and consciousness. For Biesta (2013), our uniqueness emerges within this ethical relationship, and it is how our singularity is revealed. Moreover, this relationship highlights that we do not just exist with ourselves, but instead we exist among others. Considering both the Student Conduct and Levinasian meaning of "respond," the question that sits before us is, what are the conditions necessary for a student to respond to allegations in a way that promotes their subjectivity? I would like to share an anecdote in light of this question.

Our office received a report of a white male student who had purposefully backed his car into a black woman student's vehicle and called her the n-word. This student was charged for damaging property and disorderly conduct, and I was assigned to hold the informal conference meeting. An informal conference meeting is an opportunity for the responding party to learn more about their rights and responsibilities in the Student Conduct process, to gather more information about the allegations against them, and to either waive their right to a formal conduct

hearing by accepting the charges and sanctions or to elect to take their case before a formal hearing panel. The student had been sent a charge letter which informed them of the date and time of their conduct conference, which was at least 5 days from the date of notification as outlined in our code of conduct. Before meeting the student, I looked into our Student Conduct database and found out that he was 63 years old and from a rural county in the state. To me, this information made sense. He was older and from a less progressive area in the state. That was why he was racist.

He arrived early for our scheduled meeting and had dressed himself in business casual attire. I walked out to greet him with a smile and introduction as I always do for every student. As we settled in for our meeting, I made small talk, maybe about the weather or about how classes were going this semester, and he participated in the pleasantries. I then transitioned into asking if he was able to review the rights and responsibilities document that was attached to his charge letter and if he had any questions about the content. He stated that he understood and had no questions. From there I said something along the lines of "So, you seem like a really kind person, how did we get here today?" Sometimes, I would note something about the demeanor of the student that was seemingly in contrast with behaviors that made them end up in my office. The student responded immediately by expressing his shame. He said that "I am a Christian and my anger got the best of me that day." He shared that he felt like the black female student intentionally blocked him from backing out of his parking spot and he was enraged because that was very rude and inconsiderate of her. He acknowledged, however, that he was supposed to turn the other cheek, like the bible says. He had already spoken to his pastor about it and he had prayed for forgiveness. He continued by saying that, prior to the meeting, he looked me up and saw my biography on the office website. He stated that he was really embarrassed by his "choice

of words," and he wanted me to know that I was not the kind of person to whom he would ever direct that type of language.

The subtext of saying that he looked me up on our website meant that he had seen that I was also a black woman, like the student that he called an n-word. He also learned about my education and professional history. Moreover, when he used the euphemism "choice of words," he was referring to using the n-word. I understood this without it being said, and I was very triggered. Although I was triggered, I remained composed because I knew the meeting could take this turn, as I was meeting with a racist student.

I pressed on, "So who do you reserve that type of language for?" Flustered because perhaps he thought that I should just accept his remorse of the situation and the "compliment" that he would not use that language with me, he stated "Well I only use that word to talk about those blacks from the hood who go around with their pants hanging down, shooting and killing each other, but not you. You're the type of black deserving of my respect." In my mind, I was shocked, but still, I retained the demeanor of a professional. After all, this is my job. I continued the meeting by telling him that I am from 'the hood' and that those black people he described are my family. I asked him whether that changed anything for him. Do I still deserve his respect? I wanted to take the educational approach and challenge his assumptions about who was deserving and who was not. I had no goals of undoing decades of conditioning in one meeting, but I did think that I could perhaps create some productive dissonance for him.

I do not remember much else about how the conversation went, as what was described above is etched in my memory because it was particularly triggering for me as a black woman. I do remember, however, that we left on a positive note. He suggested that society needed more dialogue like the one we had during our meeting because he felt that our country was so divided.

He accepted the charges, thanked me, and wished me well. I felt positively about the meeting as well. Yes, he was still racist, but I hoped that this experience may begin to challenge some of his long-held beliefs.

In the example provided above, I was able to hide my frustrations with the student for a few reasons. First, I was prepared for my identity as a black woman to be salient in the meeting. I already believed that this student was racist because of his behaviors. Second, I believed myself to be an educator. Implicit in this belief was that I possessed knowledge that my student did not yet have. This belief motivated me to remain composed because my mission was to transmit this knowledge and losing my temper would surely make that impossible. To be clear, I had no intentions of mere information transfer; rather, I wanted to disrupt his worldview with difficult knowledge that challenged his existing beliefs. In essence, I thought my role was to not be reactive to any triggering beliefs that this student may have held so that I may impart knowledge. What ensued in the meeting was my attempt at carrying out that role.

From Biesta (2013), however, we know that, in order for an individual's uniqueness to emerge, there must be a precognitive, ethical relationship with the other that is not based on knowledge. This presents a barrier for Student Conduct practice as it currently exists. In Chapter 3, I demonstrated how students are made to be accountable through surveillance, reporting obligations, and sophisticated student databases. In the story shared above, I used our student database, the incident report, and relied on stereotypes about older white men from the rural south to make assumptions about who this student was before I even met him. Moreover, my years of experience in doing Student Conduct and my professional training as a Student Affairs professional influenced my understanding of our relationship to one another. While I cannot speak for the student, I can reasonably assume that ideas about university administrators, black

people, and educated people may have informed his preconceived idea about who I was going to be in our meeting. The result of entertaining these preconceived ideas about each other was that we entered a performative, instead of an ethical, relationship. I was intent on remaining composed and inhabiting the space of the educator. I wanted to challenge the ideas that were manifesting in his racist behaviors. On the other hand, the student was determined to seem remorseful and make sure that my opinion of him was positive. Philosophically speaking, the conditions were not present for either of us to express our singularity as subjects because our relationship was based on information that we could gather about the other. Levinas' (1989) critiques remind us that knowledge relationships block us from existing in complete alterity. In this example, there was an implicit assumption that we already knew the other, which left us only to interact with ideas that we held. So, this begs the question, in the scenario provided, what would have had to change for me to see this student as a true other, in his complete alterity, so that I retained the possibility that his uniqueness might emerge during our interaction?

I hope the obvious fact is that the burden was on me to create the conditions for subjectification to occur, as I view myself as an educator. If I am thinking about what I could have done differently to enter our interaction without any (or at least fewer) preconceived notions, the first logical step would be to not gather additional information about the student. For instance, I could have refrained from looking at the conduct database to gather relevant information, yet I am not confident that this would have sufficed because I would have had to still overcome deep ingrained beliefs about the nature of college students that I acquired over years of working in Student Affairs and Student Conduct. Furthermore, I think the suggestion to ignore this type of information would actually disadvantage the educational relationship because I often used it to build rapport with my students and guide the conversation about their

123

behaviors. While the aforementioned are true, the most convincing argument against simply not gathering more information is the fact that Levinas did not suggest that we should not know the other; rather, he said knowing the other is not the origin of our subjectivity. Instead, our subjectivity emerges during the interruptive experience with the other in complete alterity. So, what is helpful about Levinas' philosophy in this context is that it can remind us that our students are not the sum of their behaviors and the bio-demographic information that we gather about them. This means that instead of doing the easy thing and going into conduct meetings blind, so to speak, that our task is messier. Perhaps we need to explore what dispositions are necessary to maintain an openness towards our students. In thinking about the anecdote shared above, in addition to information gathered, my idea about my role as an educator hindered my openness towards the student. As an educator, I had an objective to meet. What if, however, I did what would seem contrary to the objectives of education and abandoned my role as an educator? In doing so, would that have changed my interaction with the student?

If I was no longer an educator, I would not have tried to remain objective. I have been in situations where peers or colleagues have said racially triggering things around me, and I have expressed my displeasure and emotions related to those comments. What would have happened if I shared with the student that I was upset by his comments that suggested that I was somehow different or better than other black people? Maybe my honesty could have had an interruptive quality. Perhaps in me sharing my feelings about his comment, he would have been able to experience the impact of his thinking and I would have been made real to him, instead of just being the face representing university interests. What if I didn't see my role as presenting difficult knowledge by asking calculated questions? Perhaps I would have approached his statements with more curiosity and less judgement. I could have asked how he felt after using

124

such derogatory language with the black female student. I could have inquired more about the costs and toll on himself after using racialized language. I could have asked more about the role of Christianity in his life and how his actions lined up with who he wanted to be. The result of that would have been that I was less focused on meeting my objectives of knowledge transmission and more focused on the individual in front of me. Maybe I would have been compelled to respond differently to the face in front of me. In this way, the student would have not just been a caricature of a racist old white man, and I would have been more than a black female administrator. We would have been both humanized and made unique, and perhaps if we were lucky, we may have been able to respond to the infinite reflected in the other as Levinas (1989) suggested.

Of course, this is all conjecture, as I do not know if abandoning my role as an educator would lead to any educational outcome. I do not even know if the meeting would have gone well. Biesta (2020) prominently did not suggest that his philosophy will always lead to happy and positive outcomes. Showing up as an educator, however, does not guarantee those outcomes either. What we do know, as Biesta (2013) demonstrated, is that education ceases to be education without the domain of subjectification. It was illustrated above how easy it is to squelch any possibility for a student's uniqueness to emerge during our interactions. This means that, at best, our work only functions in the domains of socialization if we are not being intentional. If this whole project was about how we might become intentional in directing our efforts towards the domain of subjectification, then the success of our conduct processes cannot be evaluated by behavior modification alone. Rather, we need to begin to find language to articulate our success in terms of equipping our students for the existential challenge of being human.

Conclusion

What I have laid out in this chapter is an argument for a shift from pedagogies that rely on essential definitions of who and what the human is to become towards more expansive pedagogies that are open to our students altering our ideas about what is possible. This argument is not a zero-sum game, and I am not asking for Student Conduct Professionals to abandon the traditions and practices of our field. What I am suggesting is that we pay special attention towards those situations in when the shift towards an existential pedagogy would be preferable. I am also suggesting that knowing the difference is what separates a novice from a true professional. I do believe that, in reading the anecdotes shared and my speculations about the slight shifts that we could make, many experienced professionals may feel that they already are doing these things. This is the point and one aim of this project. These things are happening, but our field desperately needs an articulation outside of the realm of accountability and recidivism rates to discuss why what we do is educational and why it matters. I also would like to be clear that this is not an indictment to denounce rationalism and the promotion of our students being independent and self-directed. Those things are not bad or unwelcomed in and of themselves. In this chapter, however, I do provide an alternative rationale for how we can help our students to balance their individual needs, wants, and desires with the needs of society at large.

CHAPTER V: EMERGING RESEARCH, ALTERNATIVES, AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

I began this inquiry into the educational mission of Student Conduct because I wanted to make sense of the fact that, although I was told that I was an educator in my master's program, by my professional organizations, and in the mission statements of my offices, much of my daily work did not feel like it had anything to do with education. I still believed, though, that Student Affairs and Student Conduct Professionals had the potential to fulfill our espoused educational functions. As such, I looked towards perspectives borrowed from the field of philosophy of education to provide another lens for us to examine the normative foundations and beliefs of our field and offer us alternative narratives and justifications for our work. In this aim, Chapter 2 demonstrated that our relationship to education has always been contested and negotiated throughout our profession's history. This was necessary to disrupt the normative idea that we are educators, simply because we work in institutions of higher education. Chapter 3 illustrated that the concept of accountability in Student Conduct is more closely correlated with brand and risk management than it is with education. This finding provided a compelling alternative justification for our work and highlighted how providing education may not be the primary function of Student Conduct offices. These two chapters were meant to trouble our understanding and articulation about our educational mission. Chapter 4, however, was meant to provide a new way to imagine our work. In Chapter 4, I explored how we can harness our educative capacity by considering existential pedagogies, where the important question is not who or what we are, but rather how we exist. I proposed that we enact and enforce our policies in ways that do not require sheer obedience. Instead, we should reconnect our students with their freedom by focusing on how they engage in a particular behavior and not on simple categories of

right and wrong behavior as legislated in our codes. I also proposed that laying down our role as educators may actually be an educative gesture, which could help us to see our students' uniqueness and foster their subjectivities. For this final chapter, I would like to briefly introduce my preliminary thinking on how I intend to continue my research by returning to the entryway of this whole project, which was the role of grace in Student Conduct. I also discuss what I view as the implications for practice and areas of further research.

Professional Subjectivity

In Chapter 4, I alluded to our need to explore what dispositions are required of Student Conduct Professionals to maintain an openness towards our students. That is, how might we establish an ethical relationship with our students so that we can encounter and welcome their uniqueness? In ruminating on this question, it became apparent that we cannot fully engage in a discussion about student subjectivity without also considering the subjectivity of the professional. If we take seriously my proposal that, in some instances, it may be more appropriate to abandon our role as educators to create space for student subjectivity to emerge, then we would be acting counter-culturally to our professional mandate and desire to control student behavior and manage educational outcomes. To abandon our roles would mean to acknowledge that weakness in education is not only inevitable, but also desirable (Biesta, 2013). In this way, embodying an open presence with our students would also be an act of resistance against dominant notions about our role in the larger educational mission of our institutions. In other words, the act of creating space for our students is also where our professional subjectivities can emerge. Ball and Olmedo (2013) wrote,

> When the teacher begins to question the necessity of and think about the revocability of
>
> his or her own situation. That is, when the teacher begins to look for answers to questions

about the how(s) of power inside and around him or her, the how(s) of his or her beliefs

and practices"… It is then that he or she can begin to take an active role in their own self-

definition as a teaching subject, to think in terms of what they do not want to be and do

not want to become. (p. 86)

While Ball and Olmedo (2013) were writing about teachers in the classroom, the same still

applies to conduct professionals. To make the shift towards pedagogies that operate in the

domain of existence, we would need to possess a critical eye towards the discourses and

narratives that are being promoted through our professional organizations, the values being

promoted through our policies, and the actions that we take in the name of education. With this

special attention, we are then able to see the small opportunities for us to respond, and perhaps

respond differently. One way that we might respond differently and maintain an openness

towards our students is through grace.

Grace In Student Conduct

Revisiting the anecdote shared to introduce this project in Chapter 1, where my colleague

suggested that I should hold a student accountable for not completing their sanctions while their

mother was dying, I rhetorically asked, when do we give students grace? I was speaking

colloquially at that moment, but I was vaguely referring to the idea of withholding punishment

from someone although it was deserved. My understanding of Grace was learned in church as a

non-denominational Protestant Christian. Although overly simplified and perhaps distorted, the

origins of this understanding of Grace can be traced back to Martin Luther. While the offerings

of this project are not religious or spiritual, it is helpful to understand the origins or words and

their meanings so that we are clear about the intellectual baggage that it carries.

Martin Luther was a German professor of theology and is often credited with starting the Protestant Reformation movement by challenging core doctrines and dogmas of the Catholic Church. One major break between the early Catholic and Protestant Church, in particular, involved the interpretation of God's divine grace. According to Dillenberger (1961), Martin Luther was interested in how one could stand in holiness before a righteous God. Prior to Luther's reinterpretation, Grace was understood as the objective reality that made perfect one's serious intentions, good works, and sacraments. Luther's understanding changed with an epiphany, however:

> The words righteous and righteousness of God struck my conscience like lightning. When I heard them I was exceedingly terrified. If God is righteous [I thought], he must punish. But when by God's Grace I pondered, in the tower,...over the words… 'the righteousness of God' [Romans 1:17], I soon came to the conclusion that if we, as righteous men, ought to live from faith and if the righteousness of God contribute to the salvation of all who believe, then salvation won't be by our merit but God's mercy. My spirit was thereby cheered. For it's by the righteousness of God that we're justified and saved through Christ. These words [which had before terrified me] now become more pleasing to me. The Holy Spirit unveiled the Scriptures for me in this tower. (Luther, 1955, pp. 193-194)

Now as Luther understood it, Grace was not dependent on any human activity, such as intentions, good works, and sacraments; rather, it was Grace alone that makes one righteous. God's Grace was thus, understood as being the mercy and righteousness of God, which transforms, and is often characterized by the sentence "Justification by Grace through faith"

(Dillenberger, 1961, p.xxv), with faith being understood as a mode of existence in the power of God's graciousness that unites the soul with Christ (Luther, 1955).

Thus, what does it mean to offer our students grace? In unpacking Luther's (1955) concept of grace, first it is important to note that what was radical about his understanding was the proposition that it is given freely by God, not as a reward for good behavior or devotion. Man did not have to ask or beg for grace; rather, it is at his avail simply because of God's merciful character and nature. As a reminder about the anecdote shared in Chapter 1, I decided to drop the additional failure to comply charge that the student was facing because I learned that they were coping with the death of their mother. Instead of 'holding the student accountable' for not complying with their earlier sanctions from a separate case, I chose to give the student a break.

My decision was motivated by that fact that I am human, and I can empathize with great loss and the heaviness of grief. I can imagine how disorienting it must be to lose your mother during a major life transition like going to college. There was also a sense of sadness that enveloped the room that was palpable. I knew that I could not pull this student out of the difficulty that they were facing at the moment, but I could do something. I chose to not burden the student with anything additional to worry about, like Student Conduct sanctions, and I chose to help the student navigate the best possible academic outcome, which at that time was seeking a retroactive withdrawal. The student did not ask for me to make this decision and they did not make excuses. Honestly, the student seemed despondent and as if they did not care about the outcome of this meeting. I am not suggesting that the student was ambivalent, but the student gave me the sense that they viewed our meeting as yet another obstacle in front of them. In this situation, I chose to see that dealing with loss is an integral part of the human condition. I chose

131

to respond from an understanding of our shared humanity. Phrased another way, I chose to give grace.

In addition to being offered freely, we see that grace has the ability to transform in Luther's (1955) interpretation. This ability to transform is made possible by faith, which is a mode of existence and its power source. From this, we learn that, while I may have offered the student grace, what they chose to do with my offering, which is an existential question about how they take up my beginnings, determines if they are transformed (or not). The old adage, "you can lead a horse to water, but you can't make them drink" comes to mind because while I can initiate and set the stage for the student to take action, there is no guarantee that they will. Therefore, to offer grace is also to relinquish control of any outcomes. Biesta (2013) captured this sentiment with what he called a "pedagogy with empty hands" (p. 22). He utilized this metaphor to capture the fact that we cannot plan for subjectivity. It is beyond our control whether or not our students realize their subject-ness, or whether they are transformed. It is out of our hands, so to speak. Samuel Rocha (2016) presented an eloquent analogy that describes this reality. He wrote, "...people all know about love: that it cannot be given; it can only be offered. To be in love is not to say to the beloved, 'I have shown you my love, now you must take it because it has been given'" (p. 129). Similarly, as educators, we cannot give grace. We can only make an honest offering and hope that it is received.

Considerations for Practice

Taking all this into consideration means acknowledging the fact that I do not know if offering this student grace in this instance lead to their subjectivity. I will likely never know. One may ask, *So what are we to do with grace? What are its limits? How would Student Conduct professionals know when grace would be enabling misconduct versus providing an opening for*

student subjectivity to emerge? My response to these questions is quite unfulfilling if you are looking for a neat instruction manual on how to promote subjectivity. The answer is that we do not know if grace will encourage more poor decision making or if it will be a turning point in a student's life trajectory. This is the hallmark feature of weak education. But, this does not give us permission to make just any decision or to be careless. Instead, I am encouraging us to become professionals in every sense of the word. We should take our jobs seriously and continue to invest in our professional selves as to increase our educational judgement and intuition. This means that we do not do anything with grace, in the utilitarian sense. Rather in any given situation set before us as conduct professionals, we recognize the human capacity to begin anew. Then given the specific set of facts and circumstances, we make a decision that we feel is best to help our students harness their capacity towards subjecthood. I know this answer may make some uncomfortable because there are hundreds of what if scenarios that may come to mind. This is because we have been trained and conditioned to think that we have control over educational outcomes, which simply is not true. Those same what if scenarios would still be relevant even if we only followed best practices in the field. So, really the true task of grace is to get professionals to release their desire for control and predictability. Once we realize that education is always just beyond our reach and that grace is only an offering, we can begin to think about our role as educators differently.

Our ability to view our work differently is a core function of this project. The anecdote that sparked my curiosity into this research happened in the Fall of 2016. I have spent 6 years contemplating and researching so that I may make sense of the professional schism that I often felt while working in Student Conduct. While I cannot tell you if the student was transformed by my offering of grace, I can tell you that I was. As Ball and Olmedo (2013), suggested, I began to

take an active role in who I wanted and did not want to be as an educator. This allowed me to think in more nuanced ways, be more critical about our work, and to contemplate the educational relationship with students that I encounter. My engagement with philosophical thought as a doctoral student while I was practicing Student Conduct excited me. I began to ponder teleological questions about education: What is the purpose of education in our society? What are we educating for? Whom does this benefit? And how has this evolved over time? I was attracted to more theoretical work because I enjoyed the sense of expansiveness that it provided. As a practitioner, any ideas that we may have for transformational educative experiences are quickly met with reality and limited by budgets, institutional politics, staff shortages and a range of other concerns to be navigated within our institutions. However, philosophical thought provided me an avenue to be much less concrete and far more imaginative about the possibilities for our work. Furthermore, I thought that the field of Student Affairs could benefit from this type of theoretical project, as its value is not found in its ability to translate seamlessly into practice-rather its value is found in its ability to evoke thought and conversation. Whatever this project inspires is not within my control. Similarly, to grace, it is simply an offering of newness into the world.

Because this is an offering, I do not know how this will be received or taken up by other professionals. Some may feel as though I am putting words to their unexpressed professional concerns, and others may feel that my work is too abstract. Someone may really resonate with one of my chapters and use it to create something more concrete or someone may be encouraged that philosophical thought does indeed have a place in Student Affairs. This is how theory works and precisely what it means to live in the world. This captures the never-ending existential

challenge of being human. It is about doing something among others who have the same ability to do something as well. This is what Biesta referred to as subjectivity.

This brings me to the discussion of not only professional subjectivity, but also the intersubjectivity that exists between students and Student Conduct professionals. I see this as both an area for further research and as a productive place to discuss implications for practice. This next section highlights how I see these two areas being interconnected.

Areas for Further Research

In Student Affairs, we talk ad nauseam about theory-to-practice. In most contexts, it is about how to apply relevant student development theory to our daily work with students. Keep in mind that the explicit aim of student development theory is to explain and predict the behaviors of college students through manipulating environments (Bloland, 1991). As such, theory-to-practice discussions are predicated on the fact that Student Affairs professionals are able to collect data and create formal or informal theories to produce desirable student outcomes. In thinking about professional subjectivity and how it is tied to the subjectivities of our students, is it possible that a develop an alternative paradigm for what theory-to-practice means?

What if theory-to-practice could also be viewed as paying prudent attention towards our own behaviors? This paradigm shift effectively transforms theory-to-practice from being a control-based external endeavor focused on the behaviors of our students, to an internal commitment to our own professional subjectivities and a commitment to hold space for our students to unfold. It would be creating the intentional space for what Biesta (2013) refers to as weak education. This would mean that we would have to be constantly looking for spaces where we can resist dominant desires to think of all educational outcomes in terms of quantifiable indicators or its value in the market economy.

If it is not already abundantly clear by now, this project was not focused on student outcomes. Rather, it was about illuminating dominant discourses, narratives, and rationales for our work and presenting alternatives. However, we can also view this project as being about the professional dispositions of Student Conduct professionals. To be concrete, If I was a director of a Student Conduct office, I would want to hire professionals who thought of education in conduct more broadly than prescribing educational sanctions. I would want them to understand that the relationships that they establish in their meetings and the conversations that they have can literally be life altering. I would look for those moments where they stepped outside of the norm and assigned creative and custom sanctions. A superior candidate would also find ways to communicate to our community broadly that recidivism rates are not the only indicator of a successful Student Conduct program. Instead, they would assess our programs by presenting more qualitative data that highlights the transformational opportunity that students are encountered with when they meet with professionals in our office. They would be critical thinkers, reflective, aware of their own biases, and how Student Conduct policies and processes can disproportionately affect certain student groups. Lastly, they would contemplate education and its purpose in society broadly and not just within the domains of Student Affairs. Organizationally, I would like to see our leading national organization, The Association for Student Conduct Administrators (ASCA), place value on the intangible and take control of the narrative about Student Conduct practice. Collaboratively, the organization could find ways to highlight those things that are hard to quantify, but nevertheless make up the essence of our work.

Giving the proper attention to intangible aspects of our work is important because we have explicit roots in monitoring and controlling students as discussed in Chapter 2 and because

we operate under heavy surveillance and model our work after legal institutions as detailed in Chapter 3. Therefore, we must then take deliberate steps to ensure that our true covert mission is not the domination of our students. This emphasis would help us to right-size and provide balance to our other necessary obligations to maintain a safe and orderly institution. I am happy to say that many professionals embody the ideal dispositions presented above based on my experience. However, the issue is that those dispositions do not seem to be valued by external stakeholders and are becoming less important due to rising legalism, as discussed in Chapter 1.

Moreover, those dispositions are not required for success as a Student Conduct professional. This is why I suggest that a timely area of further research is in developing this model of resistance and further teasing out the paradigm shift in discussing theory-to-practice. In this way, we would put a telescope on Student Conduct professionals and avoid being overly preoccupied with students whom we have limited control. It would also make the case that the intersubjectivity of the student and the professional is a hallmark feature of an educational process. A potential research question could include exploring how Student Conduct and Student Affairs professionals resist dominant norms and how that contributes to their own subjectivities. Another area of interest involves exploring the nature of intersubjectivity in Student Conduct work and how that impacts the educational relationship between the student and the conduct professional. This research agenda would help Student Conduct professionals to legitimate our work beyond behavioral management. Lastly, I also invite other researchers to describe how an internally focused conception of theory-to-practice would impact their specific areas within the field of Student Affairs, as there are possibly other areas that trying to balance their educational missions with broader goals of the institution. Taking up these types of philosophical questions would add depth to our field by exposing taken-for-granted and implicit beliefs that guide our

work. It would also contribute to educational theorizing in our field to further bolster our espoused educational missions.

Conclusion

As a person who loves working in higher education and is devoted to the educational missions of Student Affairs and Student Conduct, I offer this dissertation as a labor of love. I hope that this project presented alternative rationales for our work and provided a new language to speak about our educative functions. I also hope this project serves as an invitation to other 'not-philosophers' to do more 'not-philosophy' in Student Affairs to advance the literature in the area of educational theory (Ahmed, 2014). As a person who practiced Student Conduct for a number of years and now works as a close partner with Student Conduct professionals as a Title IX Coordinator, this project has provided me a sense of solace. As a newer professional, I struggled with my desire to not only self-declare that I was an educator, but I also wanted to feel like an educator as well. I thought that education was just something that should be happening in our processes since we have an educational mission. However, I now know and feel more comfortable with the fact that education is something for which to be fought. Moreover, the struggle that I experienced in trying to make sound educational decisions was not only appropriate, but necessary to education as it helped me to shape my professional subjectivity. I now have a greater appreciation for the fleeting and tenuous status of education. Instead of this fact being discouraging, it makes the moments where I intuit that something is shifting in a student much more sweet and rewarding. I end this project by paying homage to Patton (2017), whose lineage I follow, with the question that they proffered in their dissertation to other researchers interested in philosophical inquiries: "What additional practices might be reinterpreted? How might thought experiments highlight other avenues to make sense of the

history, purpose, and aims of Student Affairs?" (p. 12). I believe that the opportunities for critical

and novel insights to be developed are limitless if we continue in this vein as a field.

REFERENCES

Ahmed, S. (2012). *On being included: Racism and diversity in institutional life*. Duke University Press.

Ahmed, S. (2014). *Willful subjects*. Duke University Press.

Ambrosio, J. (2013). Changing the subject: Neoliberalism and accountability in public education. *Educational Studies*, *49*(4), 316–333.

American Council on Education. Committee on Student Personnel, W., & Williamson, E. G. (1949). *The student personnel point of view* (Revised edition).

American College Personnel Association. (1994). *The student learning imperative: Implications for student affairs*.

An act to provide a right of counsel for students during disciplinary appeal proceeding at state supported institutions of higher education; And for other purposes. Arkansas State legislature. §6-60-105. (2015). https://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/Bills/FTPDocument?path=%2FBills%2F2015%2FPublic%2FHB1892.pdf

A bill for an act to create and enact a new section to chapter 15-10 of the North Dakota Century Code, relating to student and student organization disciplinary proceedings at institutions under the control of the state board of higher education. Sixty-Forth Legislative Assembly of North Dakota. §15.0596.0200. (2015). https://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/64-2015/documents/15-0596-02000.pdf

Arendt, H. (1958). *The human condition*. University of Chicago press.

Arendt, H. (1968). *Totalitarianism: Part three of the origins of totalitarianism*. Harcourt, Inc. ASCA. (2021). The ASCA knowledge and skills publication. https://www.theasca.org/files/Simone/Knowledge%20Areas%20&%20Skills-%20CS-v2.pdf

ASCA. (n.d.). Student conduct administration & transcript notation: Issues and practices context. https://www.theasca.org/files/Best%20Practices/Transcript%20Notation%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf

Ball, S. J., & Olmedo, A. (2013). Care of the self, resistance and subjectivity under neoliberal governmentalities. *Critical Studies in Education*, *54*(1), 85–96.

Beck, R. N. (1953). Descartes's cogito reexamined. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 14(2), 212–220.

Biesta, G. J. (1999). Radical intersubjectivity: Reflections on the "different" foundation of education. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 18(4), 203–220.

Biesta, G. (2003). Learning from levinas: A response. *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, *22*(1), 61–68. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1021137611436

Biesta, G. J. J. (2004). Education, accountability, and the ethical demand: Can the democratic potential of accountability be regained? *Educational Theory*, *54*(3), 233–250.

Biesta, G. (2012). Philosophy of education for the public good: Five challenges and an agenda. *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, *44*(6), 581–593. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-5812.2011.00783.x

Biesta, G. (2013). *The beautiful risk of education*. Paradigm Publishers.

Biesta, G. (2014). Cultivating humanity or educating the human? Two options for education in the knowledge age. *Asia Pacific Education Review*, *15*(1), 13–19.

Biesta, G. (2015a). An appetite for transcendence: A response to Doris Santoro's and Samuel Rocha's review of the beautiful risk of education. *Studies in Philosophy and Education: An International Journal*, *34*(4), 419–422. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-015-9475-2

Biesta, G. J. (2015b). *Beyond learning: Democratic education for a human future*. Routledge.

Biesta, G. J. (2017). *The rediscovery of teaching*. Routledge.

Biesta, G. (2020). Risking ourselves in education: Qualification, socialization, an subjectification revisited. *Educational Theory*, *70*(1), 89–104.

Bloland, P. A. (1991, March 19). *A brief history of student development* [Paper presentation]. Annual Convention of the American College Personnel Association, Atlanta, GA. https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED350520.pdf

Bloland, P. A. (1996, March 9). *Understanding Acpa's student learning imperative* [Paper presentation]. Annual Meeting of the American College Personnel Association, Baltimore, MD. https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED404598.pdf

Bloland, P. A., Stamatakos, L. C., Rogers, R. R., Harmon, W. W., & McGovern, E. (1994). Reform in Student Affairs: A critique of student development. *Journal of College Student Development*, *36*(6), 611.

Bowen-Moore, P. (1989). *Hannah Arendt's philosophy of natality*. http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-1-349-20125-9

Brown, M. R. (1955). Book review: Student personnel work as deeper teaching. *The School Review*, *63*(1), 59–60.

Brown, R. D., American, P., & Guidance, A. (1972). *Student development in tomorrow's higher education, a return to the academy*. American Personnel and Guidance Association.

Calebresi, M. (2017). *Inside Russia's social media war on America*. Time. https://time.com/4783932/inside-russia-social-media-war-america/

Calhoun, J. C. (1996). The student learning imperative: Implications for Student Affairs. *Journal of College Student Development*, *37*(2), 118–122.

Caple, R. B. (1998). *To mark the beginning: A social history of college student affairs*. American College Personnel Association.

Carpenter, S. L., Dean, S., Haber-Curran, P. (2016). The philosophical heritage of student affairs. In Zhang, N. (Ed.), *Rentz's Student Affairs practice in higher education* (pp. 3–27). Charles C. Thomas Publishers, LTD.

Charlton, B. G. (1999). The ideology of 'accountability'. *Journal of the Royal College of Physicians of London*, *33*(1), 33–35.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). (2022). *Guidance for institutions of higher education (IHEs)*. https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/colleges-universities/considerations.html

Crowell, S. (2015). Why is ethics first philosophy? Levinas in phenomenological context why is ethics first philosophy? *European Journal of Philosophy*, *23*(3), 564– 588. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2012.00550.x

Dannells, M. (1978). *Disciplinary practices and procedures in baccalaureate-granting institutions of higher education in the united states* [Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa].

Dannells, M. (1990). Changes in disciplinary policies and practices over 10 years. *Journal of College Student Development*, *31*(5), 408–414.

Dannells, M. (1997). From discipline to development: Rethinking Student Conduct in higher education. *Ashe Eric Higher Education Report*, *25*(2).

Davies, B. (2006). Subjectification: The relevance of Butler's analysis for education. *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, *27*(4), 425–438.

De Lissovoy, N. (2013). Pedagogy of the impossible: Neoliberalism and the ideology of accountability. *Policy Futures in Education*, *11*(4), 423–435.

Deming, D. J., & Figlio, D. (2016). Accountability in US education: Applying lessons from K-12 experience to higher education. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, *30*(3), 33–56.

Descartes, R. (1641). *Meditations on first philosophy*. Broadview Press.

Dewey, J., & Hinchey, P. H. (2018). Democracy and education: An introduction to the philosophy of education.

https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1804163

Dixon V. Alabama State Board of Education (5th cir. 1961); cert. den. 386 U.S. 930 (1961). Dixon V. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F. 2d 150.

Doyle, J. A. (2004). Where have we come from and where are we going? A review of past Student Affairs philosophies and an analysis of the current student learning philosophy. *College Student Affairs Journal*, *24*(1), 66–83.

Duffy, J. (2010). How women impacted the historical development of Student Affairs. College Student Affairs Journal, 28(2), 235–250.

Ester Lloyd Jones 1935-1937. (1992). https://myacpa.org/past-presidents/lloydjones/

Evans, N. J., & Reason, R. D. (2001). Guiding principles: A review and analysis of student affairs philosophical statements. *Journal of College Student Development*, *42*(4), 359–377.

Foucault, M. (1984). *What is enlightenment*. Pantheon.

Gehring, D. (2001). The objectives of student discipline and the process that's due: Are they compatible? *Naspa Journal*, *38*(4), 466–481.

Giroux, H. A. (2013). *On critical pedagogy*. Continuum International Publishing Group.

Giroux, H. A. (2018). *Pedagogy and the politics of hope: Theory, culture, and schooling: A critical reader*. Routledge.

Glassman, V. B. (2021). *The judicialization of Student Conduct administration and its impacts on practitioners*. East Carolina University.

Hall, G. S. (1904). *Adolescence; its psychology and its relations to physiology, anthropology, sociology, sex, crime, religion and education*. D. Appleton and Co.

Hawkes, H., & Hawkes, A. (1945). *Through a dean's open door: A guide for students, parents, and counselors* (1st ed.). McGraw-Hill.

Hoekema, D. A. (1994). *Campus rules and moral community: In place of In loco parentis*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Howell, M. T. (2005). Students' perceived learning and anticipated future behaviors as a result of participation in the student judicial process. *Journal of College Student Development*, *46*(4), 374–392.

Jardine, D. W. (2012). *A hitherto concealed experience that transcends thinking from the position of subjectivity* (S. R. Steinberg & G. S. Canella Eds.). Peter Lang Publishing

Jones, S. R., & Stewart, D. L. (2016). Evolution of student development theory. *New Directions for Student Services*, *154*(2016), 17–28.

Kamerman, J. B. (Ed.). (1998). Negotiating responsibility in the criminal justice system. SIU Press.

Kant, I. (1982). Über Pädagogik [On education]. In I. Kant, *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*. Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag.

Kant, I. (1992). An answer to the question "what is enlightenment?" In P. Waugh (Ed.), *Post-modernism: A reader* (pp. 89– 95). Edward Arnold.

Keeling, R. P., Dungy, G. J., American College Personnel, A., & National Association of Student Personnel, A. (2004). *Learning reconsidered: A campus-wide focus on the student experience*. ACPA.

Kelchen, R. (2018). *Higher education accountability*. JHU Press.

Kincheloe, J. L. (2001). Describing the bricolage: Conceptualizing a new rigor in qualitative research. *Qualitative Inquiry*, *7*(6), 679–692. https://doi.org/10.1177/107780040100700601

Kincheloe, J. L. (2008). *Knowledge and critical pedagogy: An introduction*. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8224-5

King, R. (2012). Student Conduct administration: How students perceive the educational value and procedural fairness of their disciplinary experiences. *Journal of College Student Development*, *53*(4), 563–580. https://doi.org/10.1353/csd.2012.0058

King, T., & White, B. (n.d.). *An attorney's role in the conduct process* [PDF File]. https://www.theasca.org/files/Best%20Practices/Attorney%20role%20in%20conduct%20process%20%202.pdf

Koss, M., Wilgus, J., & Williamsen, K. (2014). Campus sexual misconduct: Restorative justice approaches to enhance compliance with title ix guidance. *Trauma, Violence & Abuse*, *15*(3), 242–242. https://doi.org/10.1177/1524838014521500

Lanier, J. (2018). *Ten arguments for deleting your social media accounts right now* (1st ed.). Henry Holt and Company.

Lessinger, L. M., & Tyler, R. W. (Eds.). (1971). *Accountability in education*. Charles A. Jones Publishing Company.

Levinas, E. (1981). *Otherwise than being or beyond essence*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Levinas, E. (1989). Ethics as first philsophy. In S. Hand (Ed.), *The Levinas Reader*. Blackwell.

Levinson, B., Gross, J., Hanks, C., Heimer Dadds, J., Kumasi, K., Link, J., & Metro-Roland, D. (2011). *Beyond critique: Exploring critical social theories and education*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Lloyd-Jones, E., & Smith, M. R. (1954). *Student personnel work as deeper teaching* (1st ed.). Harper.

Lowery, J. W. (2016). Student Conduct. In Zhang, N. (Ed.), *Rentz's Student Affairs practice in higher education* (pp. 203–242). Charles C. Thomas Publishers, LTD.

Luther, M., & Dillenberger, J. (Ed.) (1961). *Martin Luther, selections from his writings* (1st ed.). Doubleday.

Luther, M. (1955). *Luther's works* (American Ed.). Pelikan, J, Oswald, H. Lehmann, H. Brown, C. Mayes, B, Langebartels, J. (Eds.). Concordia Publishing House.

Luther, M. (2016). *The freedom of a Christian, 1520: The annotated Luther study edition*. Fortress Press.

Manning, K. (2013). *Organizational theory in higher education*. http://www.123library.org/book_details/?id=92873

Maslow, A. H. (1954). *Motivation and personality*. Harper & Row.

Miller, N. (2018). *Dear colleagues: Examining the impact of title ix regulation, investigation, and public scrutiny on higher education administrators* [Doctoral dissertation, University of Pennsylvania). ScholarlyCommons.

Nuss, E. M. (1996). The development of Student Affairs. In S. R. Komives & D. B. Woodard (Eds.), *Student affairs: A handbook for the profession* (3rd ed., pp. 22-42). Jossey-Bass.

Orlowski, J. (Director). (2020). *The social dilemma* [Documentary Film]. Exposure Labs, Argent Pictures, The Space Program .

Patton, A. (2017). *Welcome to new student orientation!: A thought experiment on alternative models of student orientation(s)* [Doctoral dissertation, University of North Carolina at Greensboro].

Ranson, S. (2007). Public accountability in the age of neo-liberal governance. In *The Routledge Falmer reader in education policy and politics* (pp. 208–229). Routledge.

Roberts, D. C. (2012). "The student personnel point of view" as a catalyst for dialogue: 75 years and beyond. *Journal of College Student Development*, *53*(1), 2–18.

Robinson, J. D. (2016). *Accountability in social interaction*. Oxford University Press.

Rocha, S. D. (2016). Folk phenomenology and the offering of teaching. *Journal of Curriculum and Pedagogy*, *13*(2), 121–135.

Rogers, R. R. (1991, March 19). *Student development as professional practice* [Paper presentation]. Annual Convention of the American College Personnel Association, Atlanta, GA. https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED348598.pdf

Ruitenberg, C. (2009). Introduction: The question of method in philosophy of education. *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, *43*(3), 315–323. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.2009.00712.x

Rutgers University. (n.d.). *Richard P. Keeling*. https://ctaar.rutgers.edu/keeling/Richard%20P%20Keeling%20bio.pdf#:~:text=Dr.%20Keeling%20has%20received%20the%20highest%20awards%20of,and%20their%20effects%20on%20individuals%2C%20society%2C%20and%20culture.

Schetlin, E. (1968). Guidance and student personnel work as reflected by Ester Lloyd-Jones from 1929 to 1966. *Journal of the National Association of Women Deans and Counselors*, *31*(3), 97–102.

Schlossberg, N. K. (1989). Marginality and mattering: Key issues in building community. In D. C. Roberts (Ed.), *Designing campus activities to foster a sense of community* (pp. 5– 15). Jossey-Bass.

Schrage, J., & Giacomini, N. (2009). *Reframing campus conflict: Student Conduct practice through a social justice lens* (1st ed.). Stylus.

Schuck, A. M. (2017). Evaluating the impact of crime and discipline on student success in postsecondary education. *Research in Higher Education*, *58*(1), 77–97.

Smith, D. (1994). Student discipline in American colleges & universities: A historical overview. *Educational Horizons*, *72*(2), 78–85.

Snyder, T. (2017). *On tyranny: Twenty lessons from the twentieth century* (1st ed.). Tim Duggan Books.

Spring, J. H. (2011). *The American school: A global context from the puritans to the Obama era* (8th ed.). McGraw-Hill.

Stimpson, M. T., & Janosik, S. M. (2011). Variability in reported student learning as a result of participating in a Student Conduct system. *College Student Affairs Journal*, *30*(1), 19–30.

Stimpson, M. T., & Janosik, S. M. (2015). The conduct system and its influence on student learning. *Journal of College Student Development*, *56*(1), 61–66.

Stirling, A. E., & Kerr, G. A. (2015). Creating meaningful co-curricular experiences in higher education. *Journal of Education & Social Policy*, *2*(6), 1–7.

Stitzlein, S. M. (2017). *American public education and the responsibility of its citizens: Supporting democracy in the age of accountability*. Oxford University Press.

Students & Administration Equality Act (2013). *Students and Administration Equality Act*. The General Assembly of North Carolina, §116-40.11. https://www.ncleg.gov/Sessions/2013/Bills/House/PDF/H843v2.pdf

Thelin, J. R. (2004). *A history of American higher education*. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Todd, S. (2002). On not knowing the Other, or learning from Levinas. *Philosophy of Education Yearbook*, 67–74.

Tomlinson, M. (2018). Conceptions of the value of higher education in a measured market. *Higher Education*, *75*, 711–727. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-017-0165-6

Torres, V., Jones, S. R., & Renn, K. (2019). Student Affairs as a low-consensus field and the evolution of student development theory as foundational knowledge. *Journal of College Student Development*, *60*(6), 645–658. https://doi.org/10.1353/csd.2019.0060

UNC Greensboro. (n.d.). *Office of Student Rights and Responsibilities*. https://osrr.uncg.edu/

Usher, R., Edwards, R., & Edwards, R. (1994). *Postmodernism and education*. Routledge.

Voyles, A. W. (2015). *Learning reconsidered: A Foucauldian power analysis of the discursive relations between Student Affairs and Academic Affairs* [Doctoral dissertation, University]. http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/listing.aspx?styp=ti&id=18340

Walsh, R. D. (1989). *The priority of responsibility in the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas* [Doctoral dissertation, Marquette University].

Waryold, D., & Peck, K. (1997). *Association for student judicial affairs membership survey*. Unpublished raw data.

White, J., & Nonnamaker, J. (2008). Belonging and mattering: How doctoral students experience community. *Naspa Journal*, *45*(3), 350–372.

Wible, J. R. (1984). The instrumentalisms of Dewey and Friedman. *Journal of Economic Issues*, *18*(4), 1049–1070.

Williamson, E. G. (1954). A compilation [Review of the book Student personnel work as deeper teaching]. *The Journal of Higher Education*, *25*(7), 395–397. https://doi.org/10.1080/00221546.1954.11776191

Williamson, E.G. (1961). *Student personnel services in colleges and universities*. McGraw-Hill.

Young, R. B. (1993). Examining the history of Student Affairs through the lens of professional education. *NASPA Journal*, *30*(4), 243–251.