Stability Of Nash Equilibria In Locational Games

UNCG Author/Contributor (non-UNCG co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
Joyendu Bhadury, Professor, Information Systems and Supply Chain Management (Creator)
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG )
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Abstract: Consider a locational game on a network in which two competing facilities charge fixed, but not necessarily equal, prices and the decision variables are their respective locations. Rather than deciding in a given situation whether Or not an equilibrium exists, we devise a stability index that measures the stability or instability of a given situation. In other words, given that an equilibrium exists, our index indicates how much external effort (or subsidy) is required to destroy that equilibrium; if equilibria do not exist, the index shows how much external effort (or tax) is needed to "generate" an equilibrium. Computational evidence for randomly generated problems is presented.

Additional Information

Operations Research (vol. 29, n° 1, 1995, p. 19 a 33)
Language: English
Date: 1995
Competitive location, Nash equilibria, Stability

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