Competitive Location and Entry Deterrence in Hotelling's Duopoly Model

UNCG Author/Contributor (non-UNCG co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
Joyendu Bhadury, Professor, Information Systems and Supply Chain Management (Creator)
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG )
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Abstract: This paper analyzes the problem of two firms competing in a common linear market with demand distributed continuously over the market. The firms wish to maximize their respectíve profits by appropriate choice of number of facilities and their locations. Equilibrium location strategies are derived for uniform and symmetric triangular demand distributions. It is shown that pioneering advantage may help a firm overcome its cost disadvantage with respect to a competitor.

Additional Information

Location Science, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp 259-275. (1994).
Language: English
Date: 1994
Competitive location theory, duopoly model, Stackelberg games, entry deterrence, pioneering advantage

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