Costly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security

ASU Author/Contributor (non-ASU co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
Todd Cherry Ph.D., Professor (Creator)
Appalachian State University (ASU )
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Abstract: This paper examines how transaction costs affect Coasean bargaining with secure and insecure property rights in the lab. Consistent with the theory that secure property rights lowers the cost of non-cooperation, we find that bargaining eficiency is inversely related to property right security. Less secure property rights increased economic efficiency twofold. Property owners with secure rights are more likely to opt for their riskless outside option rather than pay the costs of bargaining.

Additional Information

Todd L. Cherry & Jason F. Shogren (2005) "Costly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security"Environmental & Resource Economics Volume 31 Issue 3 pp. 349-367 Version of Record Available From (
Language: English
Date: 2005
bargaining, Coase theorem, property rights

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