Why Concepts Can’t Be Theories

ASU Author/Contributor (non-ASU co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
Jack Kwong Ph.D., Associate Professor of Philosophy (Creator)
Appalachian State University (ASU )
Web Site: https://library.appstate.edu/

Abstract: Presents an alternative argument for Jerry Fodor’s recent conclusion that there are currently no tenable theories of concepts in the cognitive sciences and in the philosophy of mind. Briefly, the approach focuses on the ‘theory-theory’ of concepts. It argue that the two ways in which cognitive psychologists have formulated this theory lead to serious difficulties, and that there cannot be, in principle, a third way in which it can be reformulated. Insofar as the ‘theorytheory’ is supposed to replace, and to rectify the problems of, the earlier ‘classical’ and ‘probabilistic’ theories, its failure confirms Fodor’s original observation. Since the critique does not rest on controversial philosophical assumptions and is readily available from within the cognitive sciences, it is a stronger argument than Fodor’s.

Additional Information

Kwong Jack (2006) "Why Concepts Can't Be Theories", Philosophical Explorations, vol. 9, no. 3, September 2006, pp. 309-325. [ISSN: 1386-9795] The version of record is published by Taylor & Francis available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/13869790600815830
Language: English
Date: 2006

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