Humanitarian Intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

by

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ABSTRACT

Ashley Gerow: Responsibility to protect: human rights or our interests
Under the direction of Aleksander Lust

This thesis was written to redefine successful humanitarian intervention under my own criteria. By analyzing the course of action of two notable humanitarian intervention campaigns, Kosovo and Libya, I argue that both were humanitarian failures and did not prevent a further humanitarian crisis. My conclusion of failure in regards to intervention in Kosovo contradicts popular literature on the intervention, and I highlight the intervention in Libya as being the cause of the current humanitarian crisis in the region. My critiques and criteria present an alternative way of examining military campaigns in the name of humanitarian intervention and I propose relying on civilian organizations to conduct humanitarian aid.
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

Chapter 1: Introduction 5
   Humanitarian Intervention: History and evolution 6
   Literature Review: Analyzing criteria, theories, and implications 10

Chapter 2: Kosovo 19
   Foreshadowing Intervention 19
   NATO Intervention 23
   Critiques 25
   Application of thesis 26
   Conclusion 32

Chapter 3: Libya 31
   Foreshadowing Intervention 32
   NATO Intervention 33
   Critiques 34
   Application of Thesis 39
   Conclusion 41

Chapter 4: Conclusion 42

References 46
Chapter One: Introduction

Humanitarian intervention is the use of an external military force to combat human rights violations. The charter of the United Nations (UN) explicitly identifies inalienable human rights and requires its member states to uphold these rights, whether at home or abroad. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes thirty articles explaining the rights internationally agreed to belong to every human; it states that these fundamental human rights are to be universally protected because they are “the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world (The United Nations 1948).” By emphasizing human rights, humanitarian intervention in the form of military intervention allows states an opportunity to involve themselves in other state’s internal affairs.

Throughout this thesis, I will argue that humanitarian intervention of the modern era is repeatedly unsuccessful and an alternative way of states conducting military campaigns against a perceived security risk. My criteria for determining success is it must be legal, prevent further loss of life, and facilitate political stability. In order for an intervention to be legal, it must receive Security Council approval, and in some cases intervention has been conducted without approval making the campaign unable to be truly successful from the beginning. I have identified preventing loss of life as a guideline for success because intervention in the name of protecting civilians from oppression and loss of life should not result in further deaths. For intervention to be successful, the loss of life must be minimized in the sense that there should be an immediate end of intentional civilian causalities by the adversary. Finally, in order for intervention to be successful it must end with the state’s government, whether permanent or interim, possessing the capability to be secure, functional, and stable. If intervention causes a
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

failed state, it does not provide a long lasting stability or protection for the civilians of the region and is laying the foundation for a subsequent humanitarian crisis.

**Humanitarian Intervention: History and evolution**

The United Nations (UN) was established following the Holocaust, which is often viewed as one of the worse human rights violations in the world, as a method of international cooperation. The UN replaced the ineffective League of Nations and, in order to be more effective, had an extensive charter and a functioning Security Council. The Security Council explicit powers and functions all revolve around the emphasis on international peace and security. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed in to authority on December 10th, 1948, however, the contemporary notion of humanitarian intervention did not come to the forefront until the 1990s. Following the implementation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the understanding and need for protecting human rights was expanded through several milestones: the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the two 1966 Covenants relating to civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights; and the adoption in 1998 of the statute for the establishment of an International Criminal Court (Hubert and Weiss 2001). Unfortunately, these additions often coincided with other humanitarian crises, and citizens of the international community are not equally protected from human rights violations.

Acts of aggression between societies has existed since the beginning of civilization. Typically described as war between empires, kingdoms, or religions, conflict is seen throughout history. Within the same history lies the origins of humanitarian intervention. As is the nature
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

of international law, the history of the doctrine outlines the loose definition, loose interpretation, and loose constraints that have constructed the modern understanding. As said by P H Winfield (1922);

The subject of intervention is one of the vaguest branches of international law. We are told that intervention is a right; that it is a crime; that it is the rule; that it is the exception; that it is never permissible at all. A reader, after pursuing Phillimore’s chapter upon intervention, might close the book with the impression that intervention may be anything from a speech of Lord Palmerston’s in the House of Commons to the partition of Poland.

Often, the righteousness of intervention has been determined by those intervening. With that, there must be a distinction made between humanitarian intervention, and other forms of justification. When a sovereign intervenes in order to protect nationals, it is justified through the right of self-preservation, self-defense, or necessity (Brownlie 1963). Acting in self-defense is not bound by the same standard as intervening based on humanitarian intentions. The evolution towards humanitarian intervention is most notable during the Middle Ages through interpretations of the writings of prominent scholars and theologians. The father of international law and order, Hollander Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), pulled from the laws of nature to construct an international society bound by the laws of nations (Chesterman 2001).

Grotius was writing during some of the bloodiest years of European history. Kingdoms were continuously fighting over religious differences, and often citing a precursor to humanitarian intervention based on their orders from God. Grotius was one of the first people
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

to argue that war was not just solely on the basis of religious differences, an idea that would be incorporated into the drafting of the Treaty of Westphalia. He wrote on a variety of topics regarding just and unjust war from what is permissible, inexcusable, and unavoidable. Although Grotius viewed even monstrous acts as acceptable during a just war, he distinguished between acts that occurred during a war with just cause versus one of indiscriminate damage with unjust reasons. He places accountability on those who were leaders of war rather than the followers, protections on the innocents, and limitations on the damage (Grotius 1625). Several hundred years before the Geneva Convention, his writings were far from that of a humanitarian advocate, but his ideas would lay the foundation for humanitarian restraints during war.

An early example of intervention based on the implied international responsibility to help those being oppressed was the European intervention during the Greek War of Independence between 1821-32. During the bloody war for independence, both sides committed atrocities, including large massacres, but the Treaty of London allows for western powers to intervene to “peacefully secure the autonomy of the Hellenes (Frary 2013).” The European powers saw their own national security threatened by an extensive Ottoman Empire, and Great Britain, France, and Russia sent in military assistance to those rebelling. The European intervention allowed the Greeks to gain an advantage, and ultimately the European powers presided over an agreement between the Turks and Greeks establish Greek independence.

During the 19th century, one of the most prominent advocates of universal human rights, and the protection of civilians, was the International Committee of the Red Cross. The founder of the movement, Jean-Henri Dunant, was disheartened by the slaughter at Solferino in
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

1859 during a battle between Austria and France (Dunant 1862). Approximately 6,000 people died in one day, with many losing their lives due to injury or illness, rather than the conflict. Several years later, in 1864, the Geneva Convention was signed by 16 countries, granting Dunant and his organization access to battlefields and warzones under a protection of neutrality with the intent to provide medical assistance. By the outbreak of World War I, the ICRC was the largest humanitarian organization, and by 1965 it would codify its work according to seven principles of humanitarian action: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality (Chandler 2002). Universality, impartiality, neutrality, and humanity are held to be the underlying principles of humanitarian intervention (Chandler 2002). Impartiality and neutrality separated the ICRC from the politics and ‘sides’ of conflicts. They would provide aid to all, regardless of race, ethnicity, age, gender, or affiliation. They did not see winners or losers, only victims. Universality and humanity allowed for the ICRC to have international clout. Their volunteers were prepared to provide medical assistance to whoever, wherever, on the basis that human rights are inalienable and are extended to those participating in conflict. While the notion of protecting noncombatants through intervention, in this case to provide medical assistance, was becoming increasingly important, it was not embraced internationally for several more years.

Humanitarian crises continued after WWI with Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. Approximately 6 million Jews died during Hitler’s reign of terror over Europe. The death toll of the Holocaust climbs when considering the other victims, including the Roma, disabled, gays, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Poles, Soviet POWs, and political prisoners. It was following this dark time in history that the international community embraced the responsibility to act when large scale
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

human rights violations are being undertaken. However, after the implementation of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the promise to protect, humanitarian intervention
evolved into military campaigns that produce varying outcomes without eliminating the threat
to civilians.

This thesis examines the cases in which military action has been utilized under the
umbrella of humanitarian intervention. By examining each case through the lenses of the three
principles I have constructed, I will determine success as conducting intervention in accordance
with my constraints. Based on my criteria I will argue that although intervention is Kosovo and
Libya were conducted differently, have varying levels of immediate destruction, and drastically
different post intervention states, they have both been failures. Ultimately I will determine
whether humanitarian intervention is truly an act based on the protections of human rights and
international security, or if states are motivated by their own interests and their own security in
relation to the country they are intervening in.

Literature Review: Analyzing criteria, theories, and implications

Humanitarian intervention as a means of military intervention is not a concrete notion
abiding by specific criteria and definition. Rather it has evolved from a notion that
indiscriminate damage and loss of human rights is not permissible by a sovereign or during
wartime; however interventionists, who are acting under its pretense, have caused immense
damage during their campaigns. Throughout this thesis, I will argue that whether or not
interventionists led successful campaigns based on my established criteria. Prior to outlining my
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

criteria for success, I researched other scholar’s opinions and have included a synopsis of their literature as further evidence for my own criteria.

When researching preexisting criteria for successful humanitarian intervention I have found a variety of responses – each with their own implications. The writings of Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahan (2002) provided a thorough set of guidelines for determining success that covers justifications, morality, proportionality, and reasonableness. Their six principles are just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means, reasonable prospects, and right authority (2002). While their criteria highlights many variables present during intervention, I believe their principles are too lengthy to be applicable as well as subject to opinion. Last resort and right intention are fluid notions and different states and organizations could discredit the others reasoning.

Due to the complex nature of humanitarian intervention, determining criteria and assessing the success or failure of these campaigns is open to interpretation. According to Taylor Seybolt, success is solely determined by the lives it saves. “To be more specific, if in humanitarian crisis some people would have died without assistance, but did not because of the actions of military personnel, the intervention succeeded (2015).” Although Seybolt elaborates further, he’s concise determinate in deciding success or failure does not take into account the loss of life that follows intervention due to instability or reverse oppression. Focusing on “lives saved” is viewed as the “lowest common denominator” (2015) across interventionist campaigns because it occurs in response to humanitarian crisis usually characterized by oppression, massacre, or genocide.
Another notable determinate for evaluating success was put forward by Alex Martins (2013) and emphasizes the aftermath of intervention. He identifies political stability and the resolution of the conflicts that lead to intervention as the criteria for success (2013). While I agree that conflict resolution and political stability are incredibly important when evaluating a campaign, I believe neglecting the loss of life caused by intervention reduces the need for restraint. If interventionist know success will not be judged based on their ability to prevent loss of life, they will not need to conduct their mission in a way to minimize loss of life.

Since the reintroduction of humanitarian intervention, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has undertaken several operations with varying degrees of success. Later in my thesis I will discuss the intervention of Kosovo and Libya, but I will argue that they were both unsuccessful based on the established criteria I have set forth.

To provide the background information for my hypothesis, I will explore the three main theories of international relations as well as leading interpretations of them and their implications. Understanding the theories of international relations provides necessary background information for understanding how the international system works. The driving force behind state’s interactions with one another is its own national interests, and these actions fit the criteria of one of the three schools of thought, realism, liberalism, and constructivism.

With much of the literature surrounding humanitarian intervention being based on a theory of international relations, I feel that it is important to explore the principles of various theories, their implications on humanitarian intervention, and emerging variations of traditional
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

ideologies. Although I am judging these cases with my criteria previously outlined, these
themselves have origins in theory and a broader understanding of these theories will explain,
justify, and validate the arguments presented by those who are pro intervention and those who
are against.

Of the three main theories, realism takes the most aggressive stance to international
affairs. Understanding the actions of realists has been summed up by five assumptions
(Mearsheimer 2014):

1. Great powers are the main actors in world politics and they find themselves
   in an anarchic system.
2. All states possess offensive military capability.
3. There is a constant state of uncertainty between states.
4. The main goal of states is survival.
5. States are rational actors.

Realism is determined by its permanent state of anarchy, or lack of central authority. Without
an overarching “police force,” states are independent to act as they please without true
repercussions. Although there are institutions that attempt to regulate the international
system, the true sovereignty of a state is undeniable, and to maintain its position a state must
act with power; military, diplomatic, or economic. That power is often exorted through
military force and many cases of military campaigns can be understood through the lens of
realism.
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

A leading scholar, and writer of *Just and Unjust Wars* (2006), Michael Walzer is a strong advocate of state sovereignty and the lack of international authority to intervene in internal affairs. He argues that citizens should be free under the confines of their government without foreign interruption, regardless of regime type, perceived oppression, or international skepticism (2006). Walzer only allows for international arbitration on the grounds of widespread massacre or enslavement of the citizens, which is only two of the human rights listed on the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. With the roots of humanitarian intervention being in explicit human rights violations, under Walzer’s understanding, the interventions in Kosovo and Libya were illegitimate and illegal.

While realism is typically viewed as a theory not directed by ethics, Martha Finnemore presents a counter argument suggesting that when viewed through a more “sophisticated understanding” (2003) realism is a theory of ethics. Finnemore suggests that through this understanding it is possible to be a realist and pro intervention. She believes that a fundamental understanding of realism can be summed up with a single notion: prudence (2003). Prudence, in her words, is “self-preservation” and goes along with the assumption that realists act with national interests. By being interested in the self-preservation of a nation, politicians and diplomats act prudentially to ensure continued safety and security. To act with such prudence is to act ethically, making intervention ethical, and essentially acceptable.

Liberalism takes a drastically different approach than realism. It does not identify states as all powerful but rather as one actor of many in world politics. Instead of arguing that states are all motivated by the same factors, liberalism emphasizes the importance of international institutions. Through this school of thought the UN was created and the states that have
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

ratified its charter and subsequent documents have agreed to act in accordance with its guidelines. Liberalism focuses on civil and political liberties, government through the consent of the governed and protection from brutal authority.

As a theory, liberalism views international law as sustainable through positive acts of state consent. It is the corner stone of the United Nations, and can explain the humanitarian interests of states when public opinion shows sympathy to international crises. In liberalism, Andrew Moravcisk suggests that individuals and private groups are the driving force behind world politics, that governments serve the will of the people, and their preferences determine relations between states.

Liberalism is extremely important in the formation of institutions. Not all institutions propelled by liberalism are international organizations, but the international organizations that subscribe to it are crucial to the expansion and protection of human rights. Robert Keohane attributes three advancements to the expansion of liberalism:

Since the early 1990s we can observe three developments of note: an increase in legalization; increasing legalism and moralism expressed by people leading civil society efforts to creates and modify international institutions; and a decline in the coherence of some international regimes with a failure to increase the coherence of others.

These three notions were the driving force behind the idea of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) that has become front and center in regards to interventions within sovereign states. R2P was centered on moralism and an embodiment of liberalism’s school of thought. While R2P emphasizes morality, it also sidelines legality.
Constructivism is the third, and newest, approach to understanding international relations. This theory emphasizes that actors and their perceptions are more influential than the anarchical state of global politics. This approach is less concrete and embraces the idea that states can change their positions, attitudes, and actions over time, directly affect the making of conditions rather than accepting preexisting ones. Similarly to liberalism, constructivism in international relations explain states actions to be based on identity, interests, culture, and relationships between states. Instead of viewing all states under the same five assumptions as realist do, constructivists view some states as friends and others as enemies, and treat each according to its label. With this understanding in mind, the previous discussion of Martha Finnemore could be examined as a constructivist interpretation.

Constructivist believe that the state of anarchy is a condition set by states themselves and will continue to exist until they decide otherwise. Constructivism allows for more opportunity to interpret actions separately and through these interpretations that a deeper understanding of relations and interactions between states can be formed. Constructivist allows highlight the importance that leaders play in international politics. Instead of viewing states as all powerful entities that have their own wills, constructivism emphasizes the power that a leader, or policy maker, has on the relationships between states.

All three theories subscribe to the notion that the international system is anarchic. Within this anarchical system, they take different approaches and attitudes. If there was no anarchy, it would be safe to assume that some hierarchical power would be responsible for ensuring the rights and protections of all peoples. Unfortunately, this is not the case and people are often at the discretion of those who govern them. Humanitarian intervention is seemingly a
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

characteristic of the liberalist school of thought because intervention post WWII has been through the UN or NATO, both international, intergovernmental institutions. However, the actions taken under the pretext of humanitarian intervention have resembled full scale invasions, destabilizing operations, and reigns of terror on civilian populations.

Stepping away from an emphasis on theory, David Gibbs argues against humanitarian intervention, or what he’d prefer to call “purported humanitarian intervention,” based on its motives. Gibbs suggests that hegemons only conduct military operations where they have economic or strategic interests, and that humanitarian intervention is an attempt at justification. In his book, First Do No Harm (2009), he explores his understanding by critiquing U.S. intervention in the Balkans. He’s main argument is that humanitarian intervention is an excuse for military aggression and should be viewed the same way as “Britain’s ‘white man’s burden,’ France’s ‘mission civilisatrice’, and the Soviet Union’s ‘defense’ of the Afghan people (2009).” Gibbs has also contributed critiques directly relating to Kosovo and Libya which I will explore in their respective chapters.

Elizabeth Ferris studies the protection of citizens who find themselves amidst violence and the actions of various humanitarian actors’ in the protection process. While she does not focus on the morality, legality, and justifications as critically as other scholars, her ability to explain UN Peacekeeping missions provided essential background knowledge to my own understanding of intervention and its implications. Published in 2011, her writings do not reflect the intervention in Libya, but she outlines the trend that UN peacekeeping missions have continuously expanded their amount, size, and impact (2011). While peacekeeping missions are not the type of intervention that I am exploring in my thesis, her explanation of the evolution
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

towards humanitarian intervention was vital to the historical background I provided. For the purposes of this thesis, Ferris represents the opinion of someone who is pro intervention, and while I will continuously argue against it, I believe in the necessity of highlighting both sides.
Chapter Two: Kosovo

The breakup of the former Yugoslavia led to the formation of eight new countries in Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, the transition to independence was marked with violence, oppression, and destruction throughout the region. Under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian government decided to end the autonomy of Kosovo in 1989 and the conflict that followed would lead to the intervention of NATO in 1999. In this chapter I will identify the pre-existing regional conflict, outline the events that lead to NATO intervention, and the consequences of NATO’s campaign. While describing how the events unfolded, I will also determine whether or not it fits my criteria for successful intervention.

Foreshadowing intervention

The former Yugoslavia was a region of many ethnicities and religions living together relatively peacefully until a series of conflicts in the 1990s. The Dayton Accords of 1995 brought peace to the region temporarily while simultaneously creating new divides along the religious and ethnic lines already present in the region. Each new nation had its own path to independence, but some had a harder, bloodier fight than others.

The implementation of new government policies saw the dissent and opposition of Kosovar Albanians from the beginning. Beginning in 1987, President Milosevic rallies Serb nationalists in Kosovo and promises to defend their interests in the providence (Cousens and Carter 2001). Constitutional changes reduce the autonomy of Kosovo and places restrictions on “the activities of their cultural organizations(2017).” The breakup of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY/Yugoslavia) began in 1991 when Slovenia and Croatia declared
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

independence. The citizens of Bosnia and Albanians in Kosovo attempted to break away as well, but war erupts over Bosnia and the Kosovars are reportedly oppressed further. Ultimately Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia were granted international recognition but Kosovo would remain under the control of the former Yugoslavia (FRY).

By December 1992, the U.S. recognizes the potential need for action in Kosovo and President Bush issues the “Christmas Warning” to President Milosevic. Through the “Christmas Warning,” U.S. policy was to “remain prepared to respond against the Serbians in the event of a conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action (1999).” The policy would not change through the election of President Clinton, who stated, “I am determined to do all I can to stop a repeat of human carnage in Bosnia and the ‘ethnic cleansing.’ And I have authorized, and I am supporting, an accelerated planning process for NATO (1999).” Milosevic continued his tyrannical rule of the Kosovars and a nationalist resistance force, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), begins fighting back in 1996 (Pierpaoli 2016). The KLA operated a series of sporadic attacks against Serb authorities in the region and Milosevic responded through further repression of student and ethnic movements.

In 1998, the Serbian military and police forces engaged in open conflict with the Kosovar Albanian forces, signaling the escalating conflict within Yugoslavia. The destruction of their autonomy was followed by the murders of their citizenry which was portrayed to the rest of the world as signs of ethnic cleansing in the region. The conflict between the Serbian and Kosovar Albanian forces resulted in approximately 1,500 deaths and the displacement of 400,000 more (UNHCR 1999).
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

By April 1999, “the United Nations High Commission for Refugees estimated that the campaign of ethnic cleansing had resulted in 226,000 refugees in Albania, 125,000 in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and 33,000 in Montenegro (UNHCR 1999).” President Milosevic disregarded attempts to settle the conflict through diplomacy, and as time passed the Kosovar Albanian resistance became increasingly militant. After the intervention, investigators, reporters, and forensic teams came into FRY and the surrounding areas to conduct research and many of the previous reports of genocidal actions were debunked.

NATO Intervention

As NATO began formulating its course of action in FRY, there were clear objections from other international leaders. Russia and China expressed concerns regarding the operation and would not give their approval; therefore the NATO intervention in Kosovo did not have Security Council authorization and was not legal. Regardless, the international community prepared to implement policies to end Serbian oppression, and the objectives of intervention were laid out in the April 1999 North Atlantic Council meeting. NATO’s objectives were reaffirmed by the Heads of States and Government and were defined as:

1. A verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression.
2. The withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police, and paramilitary forces.
3. The stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence.
4. The unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations.
5. The establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords, in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

These five objectives were reiterated repeatedly throughout the bombing campaign, *Operation Allied Force*, and it was clear that the campaign would not end until President Slobodan Milosevic agreed to the terms.

The bombing campaign conducted by NATO was the first major use of destructive armed force with the intentions of implementing UN Security Council resolutions. Although the Security Council did not give its approval, *Operation Allied Force* was still carried out. China and Russia argued that NATO’s military campaign was illegal, however the alliance prepared for intervention anyways and reaffirmed the precedent of humanitarian intervention on behalf of the oppressed peoples. Arguably, NATO was acting as an assisting force to revolutionaries seeking freedom from tyranny and authoritarian repression.

Reportedly, the Serbian government was responsible for the death, displacement, and harming of thousands of Kosovar Albanians during the years of oppression. Reports of 1 million people were displaced, more than 10 thousand were killed, many others were raped and tortured, and many saw their property destroyed or confiscated (UNCHR 1999). The ethnic cleansing campaign began after the beginning of NATO intervention and is often cited as the spark for the beginning of the cleansing campaign. The Kosovo Report places responsibility on the Belgrade, but does attribute the bombing campaign as an external factor that speed up the killing in Kosovo.
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

Correctly labeled as a bombing campaign, the NATO operation that launched in March 1999 was extremely air based. When the air campaign was suspended in June 1999, the allied forces had 912 aircraft and 35 ships (Roberts 1999). Throughout the 78 days of airstrikes, the allies conducted roughly 38,000 sorties, an attack from a defensive position, with more than 10,000 of them being strike sorties (1999). The strikes were intentionally carried out to target the Yugoslavia air defenses, and then gradually shifted to more widespread targets. NATO extensively reviewed it’s target selection to “ensure that it complied with international law, was militarily justified, and minimized the risk to civilian lives and property (1999).” However, as I will explore further in my next segment, the damage inflicted by NATO was more extensive than limiting to military targets and the Serbian oppression was less deadly.

Critiques

Intervention in Kosovo had been contested since before NATO deployed its forces and since disputed due to moral and legal objections, and accusations of inaccurate information being publicized. World leaders tossed around words including genocide, refugees, and human rights violations to invoke feelings of distress and need by the Kosovar civilian populations. Investigations after the campaign brought to light the amount of misinformation that had been shared and several argued that they were falsely given information to ensure their support.

News of the genocide occurring in Kosovo against the ethnic Albanians was broadcasted throughout the Western world. While many people did lose their lives as a result of the conflict between the Serbs and KLA, the Serbian government was not systematically killing Kosovars during this time. Instead, the majority of deaths were a result of the shoot outs and other
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

skirmishes between the Serbian army and police and the insurgent KLA. While it is true that the violence the KLA resulted in further Serbian oppression, the death toll was not in the tens of thousands as falsely reported by the *New York Times* in 1999. In an interview, former Canadian ambassador to FRY stated that the U.S. and NATO intentionally exaggerated the details of the crisis in the Balkans in order to ensure global support for their efforts. Truly, the actions of the KLA were as bad as the Serbian forces that were being labeled war crimes, but because NATO chose to side with the Kosovar resistance during the campaign, there actions are often left out of the literature of the events.

Morally, humanitarian intervention through extensive bombing campaigns can be viewed as counterproductive. NATO stated that their campaign would solely target military capabilities, but as the intervention continued, they expanded their targets to include support infrastructure and industrial components. Throughout the campaign the Human Rights Watch was on the ground collecting information pertaining to civilian causalities and they concluded that there was anywhere from 489 to 528 civilians killed due to the NATO bombing. In official press releases, the civilian causalities were often referred to as collateral damage, a label that critiques often resonated negatively with those who thought military intervention for the sake of protecting human rights was counterintuitive.

Critiques of NATO actions in Kosovo did not emerge solely after the end of the campaign. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, criticized the operation in her report:
In the NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia large numbers of civilians have incontestably been killed, civilian installations targeted on the basis that they are or could be of military application, and NATO remains the sole judge of what is or is not acceptable to bomb. In this situation, the principle of proportionality must be adhered to by those carrying out the bombing campaign.

Throughout the NATO intervention, she made further statements regarding the destruction in Kosovo and rejected her peers’ notion of “collateral damage.”

The idea of human rights violations pulls on the heart strings of Western diplomats and they feel called to action, but none of the NATO member states are interested in jeopardizing the lives of their citizens to undertake these operations. In the case of Kosovo, “it was an astonishing achievement to engage in acts of war against a well-armed sovereign state for 11 weeks and not incur a single combat casualty (Roberts 1999).” Bombing campaigns have taken the place of boots on the ground and diplomatic efforts and have large scopes of damage with little to no repercussions. These campaigns are meant to target military objectives, but those objectives are loosely defined as “object which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action (HRW 2000).” Arguably, NATO took an interest in Kosovo as a means of greatly weakening the military of Serbs rather than defend the citizens. Immediately following NATO’s first sortie, the Serbian forces began attacking and displacing more civilians than before. The refugee crisis cited by Western leaders did not exist until after the beginning of NATO bombardment.
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

Legally, the intervention is Kosovo should not have occurred because it directly violated international law and precedent. By acting without UN Security Council approval, NATO set the precedent that simply perceiving a human rights crisis, whether true or not, would be enough for full scale military operations. This precedent of acting outside international law laid the foundation for the writing of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which broadened the criteria for intervention based on human rights.

The NATO intervention into Kosovo allowed for Western powers to solidify their ability to violate state sovereignty under the pretense of humanitarian intervention, which would later expand to include the “war on terror” or “preventive war.”

Application of thesis

The intervention in Kosovo was undertaken under the pretense of “preventing instability spreading” throughout the region, and many proponents of humanitarian intervention have deemed the campaign a success. I, however, will argue that the intervention on Kosovo was unsuccessful because it failed to meet two of my three criteria for success.

NATO began Operation Allied Force, the alliance’s first use of military force against a sovereign state that did not pose a threat to any of the alliance members, without UN Security Council approval. By acting without approval, the alliance violated established international law and acted illegally. I believe in order for an intervention to be successful it must be legally undertaken because the UN was established to mediate conflicts and prevent unnecessary wars from ripping the world apart. By forsaking the legality of their operation, NATO delegitimized their campaign.
During their illegal campaign in Kosovo, NATO forces rained bombs down on Serbian forces that often produced “collateral damage” that included civilian infrastructure, including schools, libraries, and hospitals, as well as civilian casualties. The Human Rights Watch was not the only source that examined the civilian death toll that resulted directly from NATO bombing, the UN International Criminal Tribunal for FRY includes details regarding several incidents that were arguable war crimes. I will focus on the attack of a civilian passenger train, the bombing of the Chinese embassy, and the attack on the Korisa Village.

To be a successful campaign, my second criteria was the emphasis that interventionists could not be responsible for the death of non-combatants. I believe that the resources and time should be expended to ensure the careful vetting of targets prior to attacks. By gathering further knowledge on secondary military targets (those that do not fit the description of military objectives in Article 52 of Additional Protocol I), I believe that civilian deaths and vital infrastructure can be spared. On April 12, 1999, NATO aircraft struck a civilian passenger train traveling across the Leskovac railway bridge (ICTY 2000). The target of the strike was the bridge that was allegedly being used as part of the re-supply route for Serbian forces in Kosovo. While mistakes can be made due to the fallibility of humans, the description of the events published by the International Criminal Tribunal reiterate the neglect for civilian life:

After launching the first bomb, the person controlling the weapon, at the last instant before impact, sighted movement on the bridge. The controller was unable to dump the bomb at that stage and it hit the train, the impact of the bomb cutting the second of the passenger coaches in half. Realising the bridge was still intact, the controller picked a second aim point on the bridge at the opposite end from where the train had come and
launched the second bomb. In the meantime the train had slid forward as a result of the original impact and parts of the train were also hit by the second bomb (2000). The strike should have been called off immediately following the discovery of the passenger trains movements, but the follow up strike on the bridge reaffirms the neglect on the behalf of NATO operators.

In May 1999, NATO aircraft struck the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, resulting in the death of three Chinese citizens, many more injuries, and extensive damage to the embassy and surrounding area. The embassy had been falsely identified as the headquarters of the Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement (ICTY 2000). The negligence of NATO intelligence again resulted in civilian casualties, and in this case, the death of Chinese diplomats. At the time of the strike, the Chinese had stood firm against the NATO intervention in Kosovo and contributed to it being an illegal intervention by their unwavering stance. Ultimately, the U.S. issued a formal apology to the Chinese government and the families of those affected, but the damage was already done.

Another notable incident that resulted in civilian deaths was the bombing of the Korisa Village in May 1999. Approximately 80 civilians were killed when NATO dropped ten bombs on a Serbian refugee camp (2000). Unlike the previous incidents I examined, the U.S. stood by their attack due to the close proximity of a true Serbian military camp and Command Post. With the confirmed presence of military facilities before and after the attack, NATO validated the strike. As the bombing campaign concluded, many reports agree that an estimated 495 civilians died due to NATO strikes, with almost a thousand wounded (2000). However, with civilian deaths
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

being viewed as collateral damage, and “unclear laws” regarding the course of action during intervention, the International Criminal Tribunal did not press charges on the basis of war crimes and NATO’s campaign was documented as a success.

I disagree with this conclusion because of the loss of civilian life due to negligence. To be a successful campaign of humanitarian intervention, I argue that the humanitarian crisis cannot be worsened as a result of the intervention. The NATO missiles and warplanes were untouchable by the Serbian forces, they did not have the capability to defend against the more advanced weaponry. U.S. officials acknowledged the likelihood that the bombings would lead to further Albanian victimization because they were more vulnerable on the ground than those dropping bombs from the sky. The NATO campaign would end without a single combatant casualty. However, the campaign directly caused the refugee crisis in the region and when the bombing ended, the violence did not. As Serbian forces withdrew from Kosovo, the Kosovars began reverse discrimination against the Serbs still present in the providence.

Following the campaign, Kosovo became a protectorate of NATO and peace keeping troops were set up in the region. Although NATO had intervened on behalf of the ethnic cleansing and oppression, they apparently turned a blind eye when the KLA began attacking Serbs remaining in Kosovo. According to an agreement from June 1999, NATO would “establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo” but during this occupation “between 60 and 90 percent of Serbs and Roma left Kosovo” due to “KLA harassment, home burnings, and killings (Herman 2000).” During this time as a protectorate, Kosovo remained legally part of FRY, but authority rested with the Albanians and KLA. Whilst this violence
ensued, NATO made no attempt to re-intervene on the humanitarian rights of the Serbs who were left.

I have established and argued that to have a successful humanitarian intervention it must be legal, prevent civilian causalities, and establish a stable government. UN Charter identifies state sovereignty, and the necessity of approval for military campaigns as two crucial components of international law. By acting without UN Security Council approval, NATO’s campaign was illegally undertaken and directly violated the sovereignty of FRY. The negligence of NATO officials led directly to the deaths of hundreds of civilians, mostly Serb civilians, without repercussions. While the establishment of peacekeeping troops in the region was a successful attempt to establish order following the intervention, they failed to continue protecting the Serb civilian minority population. In regards to my third criteria, stable governance, I do conclude that NATO’s actions established a secure government in the sense that the governing bodies were stable. The intervention in Kosovo began and ended in 1999, but they would not receive full, and still contested, independence until 2008.

Conclusion

After applying my criteria for success to the NATO intervention in the former Yugoslavia, I have concluded that the campaign failed to be humanitarianly successful. I draw this conclusion from the high civilian causalities as a result of the bombing. In my opinion, NATO forces failed to protect the lives of civilians, caused a refugee crisis for the surrounding countries, and acted without Security Council approval making their campaign illegal.
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

Chapter Three: Libya

Libya’s history is constructed through foreign rulers. The Arabs conquered Libya in the 600s, and during the 16th century it became part of the Turkish empire. Libya remained part of the Turkish empire until the Italians invaded in 1911, and the Turks surrendered the northern African territory in 1912 (Lambert 2016). Driven by a fascist regime, Italy moved from controlling the coast of Libya to all of Libya by 1932. Following the end of WWII, Libya was controlled by the British and French, with a UN decree that it must be independent by January 1st, 1952 (UN 1950). Libya became an independent state under the rule of King Muhammad Idris al Sanusi on December 24th, 1951. Initially, Libya was impoverished, but its economic fortunes turned around when oil was discovered in 1959. The oil brought wealth to the country and Libya became a major oil producer by the mid-1960s (BBC 2017).

A new era of politics began in Libya following the 1969 coup. A group of military officers, led by Muammar Gaddafi, abolished the monarchy and seized control of the state. Colonel Gaddafi immediately introduced socialisms by nationalizing most of the economic activity of the state, including the prosperous oil industry (2017). Gaddafi outlined his political theology in his book, Green Book, combining socialist and Islamic theories while rejecting parliamentary democracy and political parties (Pargeter 2012). As the head of state, Gaddafi exercised virtually total control over major government decisions and declared a “cultural revolution” in 1973 (2012). This “revolution” lead to the formation of “people’s committees” in schools, hospitals, universities, workplaces and administrative districts (Pargeter 2012). Gaddafi is also responsible for changing the official name from Libyan Arab Republic to the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

**Foreshadowing Intervention:**

Commonly referred to as the Arab Spring, a wave of pro-democracy protests and uprising ran through the Arab world between 2010 and 2011. The movement challenged the extremely authoritarian regimes in the region as demonstrators expressed their political and economic grievances. The Arab Spring took hold in some form in almost all Arab countries, however it truly shook the governments of Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia, Syria, and Libya. Characterized by a series of revolutions, regime changes, and civil wars, the Arab Spring affected each country differently. The protests began as peaceful and civilian based, but took a dark turn when states fired back with oppression and violence. Gaddafi and his regime had one of the most violent and bloody responses to the protests.

Protests began in Benghazi in February 2011 following the arrest of a human rights activist, and are violently met by the Libyan security forces and Gaddafi loyalists. Gaddafi calls on the military to carry out strikes against protestors, but after two Libyan fighter pilots defected, several high-level Libyan officials and diplomats also defected (Ham 2012). The protestors are able to take control of Benghazi as well as most of eastern Libya, while Gaddafi relied on extreme violence in an attempt to regain control. By March, the UN Security Council approves sanctions against the regime and the International Criminal Court begins an investigation into crimes against humanity. Amidst the chaos, the Transitional National Council (TNC) declares itself the sole voice of Libya (2015).
NATO Intervention

NATO intervention in Libya began after Western leaders called on Gaddifi to accept his “responsibility to protect” and his subsequent failure to do so (Economist 2011). Instead of protecting his citizens against human rights violations, Gaddifi was reportedly instructing the attacks on the civilians involved in the protests. In March 2011, NATO implemented the UN’s policy to prevent the supply of “arms and related materials” to Libya by launching a navy force to operate throughout the Mediterranean. NATO took sole control of the operations in Libya and began taking military action to protect the civilian population. *Operation Unified Protector* was undertaken based on three principles: “a sound legal basis, a strong regional support, and a demonstrable need (2011).” The allied forces were working with the UN, the League of Arab states, and other international organizations to ensure the best possible plan of action. The three main objectives of *Operation Unified Protector* are:

1. Enforcing an arms embargo in the Mediterranean Sea to prevent the transfer or arms, related materials and mercenaries to Libya.
2. Enforcing a no-fly zone to prevent aircrafts from bombing civilian targets.
3. Conducting air and naval strikes against military forces involved in attacks or threatening to attack Libyan civilian and civilian populated areas.

On April 14th, 2011 NATO allies and their six operational partners agreed that OUP would not end until the attacks on civilians ended, the Gaddifi regime withdrew its military to bases, and the regime allowed safe access to humanitarian air for the Libyan population.
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

As in Kosovo, the alliance operated through airstrikes, more than 26,000 sorties with 42% being strikes (NATO 2015). OUP was operating with 21 ships and 250 aircraft at its height and allowed for the safe passage of humanitarian assistance provided by the UN and other NGOs. The operation was carried out in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1973, that outlined the basis for intervention in Libya (2015). Unlike in Kosovo, the UN approved the intervention into Libya. The seven months’ operation ended in October 2011 following the death of Muammar Gaddafi.

Critiques

Operations in post-Gaddafi Libya have been a source of endless critiques. Currently, Libya is a failed state with little international support or guidance, many militias vying for power, and no clear path for the future. There are many factors that contributed to the lasting destabilization of the country including un-humanitarian motives of intervention, the lack of effort to stabilize before withdrawing, and the consequences of enforcing the western philosophy of “responsibility to protect.”

Operation Unified Protector, was less of an intervention effort and more of regime toppler. The actions of NATO, including the embargo and no fly zone, were directed at destabilizing the regime and forcing Gaddafi from power. While the U.S. has a policy of supporting democracy and pro-democracy movements, the consequences of destabilizing Libya should have been foreseen and taken into account prior to involvement. The immediate end of OUP following the death of Gaddafi highlighted the gapping hole in NATO’s plan for
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

intervention; they wanted Gaddafi out of power, but were not concerned for the future of Libya. Best said in Alan Kuperman’s essay, Lessons from Libya: How not to intervene:

Libya’s 2011 uprising was never peaceful, but instead was armed and violent from the start. Muammar al-Qaddafi did not target civilians or resort to indiscriminate force. Although inspired by humanitarian impulse, NATO’s intervention did not aim mainly to protect civilians, but rather to overthrow Qaddafi’s regime, even at the expense of increasing harm to Libyans (Kuperman 2015).

The overthrow of Gaddafi lead to more civilian causalities, whereas the protests and violence before the toppling of the regime was between rebels and Gaddafi’s enforcers. As the country fell into chaos, civilians lost all order and protection, and new, unforeseen problems arose.

The lack of effort to stabilize Libya before withdrawing, and the consequences of destabilization have affected more than just Libyans. Due to the lack of a strong, central government, or any functioning government, Libya has “the largest flow of modern African migration” as people try to make their way illegally into Europe. Libya is a known haven for traffickers and smugglers who extort desperate refugees and offer unsafe passage to the southern coasts of Europe.
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

The figure above outlines key travel paths of refugees and other migrants who are pouring into the destabilized Libya to access the Mediterranean. The NATO intervention, and quick withdrawal, turned this North African country into a hodgepodge of vying militias, war ragged civilians, and those trying to seek a better life in Europe.

NATO and other partners called on Gaddafi to honor the doctrine of R2P, emphasizing with the notion that if a state does not protect its citizens from mass human rights violations, the international community is responsible to step in. In the case of Libya, Gaddafi and his regime were hard lining protestors, who evolved into rebels of the regime, and anyone suspected of sympathizing with the movement. Extreme violence and oppression in response to the Arab Spring was seen in Tunisia and Egypt, but unlike Libya, these countries were able to
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

ousts their regimes without international intervention. Now, many countries that experienced
the Arab Spring are under new, authoritarian regimes that are also repressive, or in total
disarray. In Syria, the Arab Spring turned into a civil war with the hopes of NATO intervention to
oust Bashar al-Assad. However, following the disaster in Libya, NATO did not intervene in Syria
and Syria has been torn apart by civil war ever since.

Although NATO intervened with strict agenda of protecting civilians, following the death
of Gaddafi and the end of OUP, the civilians of Libya live in fear due to the continuous factional
fighting. There are two distinct political groups vying for power, and four armed militias
wreaking havoc. Power in Libya is now split between the east, Tobruk, and the west, Tripoli. In
the east, the government is ran by the House of Representatives, who elected Prime Minister
Abdullah al-Thinni, and is backed by Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (EFCR 2015). Tripoli, a
city in western Libya, is the home of the General National Congress, a house of representatives
that formed in reaction to the relocation of the Libyan HOR, and its own prime minister, Omar
al-Hassi (2015). Each views the other as illegitimate and therefore lacking true authority, but
the true power in Libya belongs to Libya Dawn and Haftar’s Dignity (2015). The power of
western prime minister Khalifa Ghwell, successor of Hassi, is second to the paramilitary alliance
of armed groups that exist in the region (2015). The government of al-Thinni is endorsed by the
Dignity operation. The Dignity operation has a centralized command under Abdul Razzaq al-
Nadhuri, but tensions arise between al-Nadhuri and other eastern officials over strategy,
supplies, and future plans for Libya. While these groups fight over political control, armed
groups reign terror on all of Libya. There are a dozen rebel groups in Libya, each with its own
agenda and weapons base. Most notable are Libya Dawn, Libya Shield, Islamic State, and Ansar
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

al-Sharia, and these groups have been known to harm civilians in the crossfires (EFCR 2015).

The figure on the previous page outlines the different areas of Libya, who they are controlled by, and their influence. The government set up in eastern Libya is viewed internationally as the government of Libya, but is still viewed as a falling government as the country has yet to re-unify and bring peace and stability.

An important distinction that is often left out of the analysis of the events that led to intervention in Libya is the difference between civil war and human rights violations. Many critiques, including David Gibbs, emphasize the violence that was inflicted by the rebels, not the
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

regime. Arguably, the rebels fighting the regime were the ones who instigated a violent response from Gaddafi, rather than him firing on protestors first. Also, there is a difference between the peaceful protests and armed rebels besieging government buildings. NATO intervention into Libya served as a means to topple their former ally and give the rebels the upper hand in the conflict. Gibbs describes the previous relationship between the West and Gaddafi, and their readiness to intervene to overthrow him after an extensive relationship that included exchanging military equipment and intelligence collaboration (Gibbs 2011).

Throughout his essay, Gibbs argues that the West intervened in Libya on the basis of self-interest in the oil industry and an opportunity to show Western military might.

NATO intervention in response to their perceived responsibility to protect the civilian population of Libya has led to the chaos that causes more harm for the civilian populations. While Libya is currently a failed state, dipping low on the human rights index, and a source of refugee crisis, Western leaders are not preparing for a re-stabilization operation.

Application of thesis

Unlike Kosovo, many scholars and politicians agree that NATO’s intervention into Libya was a failure. However, they draw that conclusion because unlike in Kosovo, the U.S. did experience casualties as a result of this intervention. Often referred to by the location of the attack, Benghazi, this attack resulted in the death of four American diplomats. This attack, and the deaths that occurred during, caused U.S. public support for intervention in Libya to plummet and attributed to why peacekeepers were not left in the region. In Kosovo, peacekeeping troops helped stabilize governance, but in Libya operations ceased. The attacks
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

on the U.S. government facilities were conducted by a branch of the rebel forces that NATO had intervened on behalf of.

The chaos, and failed governance of Libya post-Gaddafi has led to a failed state in Libya and regional disarray. NATO failed to facilitate a stable governance and because of that they do not meet one of my three criteria for successful intervention. I argue that eliminating the initial source of conflict and human rights violations is not enough to ensure the prolong safety of the civilian population. By withdrawing from Libya before stabilizing, the civilian population has endured the terror of the different rebel factions fighting throughout the country. The death toll has climbed continuously since the official end of NATO’s campaign, but the humanitarian crisis that exists now has not enticed the UN or NATO to intervene again.

Intervention in Libya also failed to protect the civilian populations. NATO strikes attributed to civilian deaths, and although the numbers vary depending on the source, the Human Rights Watch report examines eight strikes that resulted in the death of 72 civilians. However, civilian deaths due to NATO intervention are higher than those caused by Gaddafi’s oppression of the protestors. While it was difficult finding documentation regarding the amount of deaths that resulted due to the backlash of Gaddafi’s region following the Arab Spring protests, there was plenty of evidence and stipulation that Gaddafi did not attack the protestors first nor instigated more violence. The violence that has now been caused by the rebels has been more harmful than the attempts for Gaddafi to regain control of the country.

In order to remove the negative stigma associated with humanitarian intervention, I argue that interventionists need to be wary of the consequences of negligence and avoid
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

causing civilian casualties. According the Human Rights Watch report, the strikes that resulted in civilian deaths were surrounded with ambiguity and incomplete information. Instead of brushing off the civilian causalities as collateral damage, NATO should be held responsible for the damage that was not military objectives.

With Libya being a failed state, continuous civil war, and a refugee crisis that has added to the chaos, the humanitarian intervention was a failure and an example of what not to do.

Conclusion

There is little scholarly debate about whether or not intervention into Libya failed miserably. While I draw the same conclusion, I do so through my criteria and understanding of what it means to carry out a successful humanitarian intervention campaign. While the NATO forces caused less civilian casualties upfront, their actions destabilized the country and caused a continuing humanitarian crisis. Currently, there are several rebel factions vying for power, smugglers, traffickers, and terrorist have made their permanent home in Libya, and civilians lives are torn apart by the never ending violence. For these reasons, the NATO campaign failed to meet two of my three criteria for a successful intervention.
Chapter four: Conclusion

Throughout this thesis I have argued that to carry out a successful humanitarian intervention it must be legal, prevent civilian causalities, and facilitate the creation of a stable government. By adhering to my criteria, I believe future interventions would have less negative consequences because it would limit destruction, be internationally supported, and lead to the emergence of a new, stable, and successful government.

To ensure legality, any force, whether it be an alliance such as NATO, or a single state intervening in another, must receive UN Security Council approval. Intervening in a sovereign state without Security Council approval is illegal under international law, and acting outside the law sets the precedent that states can invade simply on the pretense of human rights violations. By abiding by the international laws established under the UN Charter, I believe it would lead to further international cooperation because all military interventions would be viewed unilaterally as legitimate.

Adhering to the legal precedent already established prevents the slippery slope effect in regards to humanitarian intervention. If other countries adopted the Responsibility to Protect, they would be able to invade their foes with less restraints. While the U.S. has its notion of human rights violations and points fingers at other state’s extreme practices, many states believe the U.S. violates human rights by allowing the death penalty. If NATO continues to violate sovereignty under the pretense of human rights, they could be opening the door for other states to do the same. In order to prevent this slippery slope, NATO needs to be restricted by the international laws they claim to be defending.
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

Limiting civilian causalities is included as one of my criteria for success because causing death to noncombatants while waging war to prevent further humanitarian crisis is counterproductive and delegitimizes the campaign. By acting with restraint and caution, I believe the intervening force will not cause more harm than necessary because they will be thinking of the long-term ramifications of their actions. I also believe that if civilian lives are prioritized, diplomatic means of peaceful solutions will become more important and utilized.

Finally, I think the true determinate of success is the long-term stabilization, success, and prosperity of the nation that was intervened in. By aiding the new government in creating and administering law and order, the humanitarian mission will end with an effort to prevent a new crisis. If efforts had been made to stabilize Libya, thousands of refugees would not be pouring into the coasts of Europe. By facilitating the growth and integrity of new governments, NATO is expanding its network of allies while honoring the goal of their missions: protecting human rights. Without a government monitoring and protecting the human rights of its populations, chaos and terror ensues.

Not to be confused with state building, my vision for the future of humanitarian intervention is peace keeping forces, whether supplied by the UN, NATO or an individual country, being present during the uneasy transition from revolution to rebuilding. History shows repeatedly that after a revolution, chaos erupts as competing factions vie for power. Instead of operating a military campaign to topple the oppressor and then immediately withdrawing, I believe that those who intervened on behalf of human rights violations should remain for a minimum of 6 months to act as a mediator, protector, and neutral presence in case of further violence. I do not envision, or support, the notion of these peace keeping forces
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

swaying the restructuring of a state. Instead, I support the idea of preventing the chaos and disarray present in Libya from occurring following future revolutions.

The topic of humanitarian intervention, and limiting the damages it inflicts, is increasingly important as the world becomes more globalized. Through advanced communication networks and the interdependence of states, a humanitarian crisis is become less a regional issue but a global one. Currently, the world is seeing the effects of a regional humanitarian crisis on the international community. The refugee crisis that began in the Middle East and Africa is now affecting the policies of countries around the world. As civil wars and violent regime changes continue to shape developing countries, I believe redefining, limiting, and reimagining humanitarian intervention is important.

The Syrian Civil War is presently ripping apart Syria and negatively affecting its neighboring countries. As debate swirls regarding the future course of action, instead of relying on traditional, flawed, methods of humanitarian intervention, I believe a new alternative should be considered. Through my analysis of Kosovo and Libya, I concluded that brute military strength against a lesser developed country in the name of human rights is counterproductive. The large-scale bombs that are routinely dropped cause substantial damage to the infrastructure of the countries, ruin urban centers, cause causalities, and force people out of their homes.

Moving forward, and looking back, I think humanitarian intervention should be less militarized and more humanitarian. Before states used their militaries to protect human rights, the ICRC was working to aid and protect all victims of war. I suggest that civilian entities are
humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

Better for providing humanitarian aid and assistance and should be used rather than military campaigns. I understand the need for protection, and I would not except an aid operation to be conducted without any protection unit, but those units should only be utilized as a protectionary caution, instead of as an invading force. By coming into an already conflicted area peacefully, instead of inflicting more damage, the humanitarian workers would be there to prevent it.

I believe that the future of humanitarian intervention does not coincide with use of military force, but rather actual humanitarian relief. There will always be conflict in the world, but in order to limit the scope and damage of these conflicts there must be a new course of action.
Humanitarian intervention: preventing or prolonging human rights violations

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47
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