Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich

by

David H. Nikkel

[Dr. Nikkel’s book, which began as his dissertation, was later published, with some modifications, by Peter Lang Publishing in 1995, ISBN 0-8204-1678-9.]
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I greatly appreciate the many hours of work by the secretarial staff of the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Youngstown State University, especially Anna Ficocelli.

Quotations from the following works are reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago: Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vols. I & III, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951 & 1963. All rights reserved.
PREFACE

This work began as my 1981 Ph.D. dissertation at Duke University. I have made modifications to reflect changes in my thinking over the years, to improve felicity of wording, and to be gender neutral in language for God.

The general climate in theology and religious studies is more skeptical regarding claims about ultimate reality than when I first wrote this thesis. Nevertheless, my developing a concept of panentheism is based on the convictions that belief in an ultimate reality that is the source of the universe is reasonable and that, given that basic belief, understandings of the nature of ultimate reality can be more or less plausible, more or less coherent. My hope is that I have offered a plausible and coherent vision of the nature of God.

David H. Nikkel
Youngstown, Ohio
June, 1992
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS........................................i

PREFACE..................................................ii

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION........................................1
   Panentheism Defined
   The Nature of Theological Language According
   to Hartshorne and Tillich

II. TILICH AS PANENTHEIST..............................41
   "God Is Not a Being"
   Other Panentheistic Formulations

III. HARTSHORNE AS PANENTHEIST......................115

IV. CRITICISM OF HARTSHORNE ON THE ACTIVE
    ASPECT..............................................157
   Undermining God as All Power
   Undermining the Divine Governance
   Other Undermining of the Divine Majesty

V. CRITICISM OF TILICH ON THE PASSIVE
   ASPECT...............................................201
   Divine Temporality?: Open or Closed?
   Divine Impassibility and Creaturely
   Freedom and Suffering

VI. CONCLUSION...........................................277
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

As my title suggests, I believe both Charles Hartshorne and Paul Tillich can, on the whole, rightly be labelled panentheists. As far as Hartshorne is concerned, the above statement is not surprising or controversial. He has used the term "panentheism" (as well as "surrelativism," "superrelativism," and "neo-classical theism") to describe his doctrine of God. And to my knowledge, no one has disputed the appropriateness of the term in that connection. Tillich on the other hand has rarely used the term and only once directly in connection with his own thinking. Though he then favorably applied the term to his understanding of God, hardly anyone has explicitly acknowledged the strong panentheistic flavor of Tillich's theology, except James F. Anderson and Jacob Faubes, and to some extent Hartshorne himself in noting aspects of Tillich's thought akin to his own. And even less so has anyone argued for or developed the idea of Tillich as panentheist--by taking central concepts, phrases, and formulations such as "being-itself," "the ground of being," transcending "the subject-object cleavage," God as knowing God's self through the finite individuals, God as being nearer to the creatures than they are to themselves, and that God is not a being and by showing that Tillich has meant these panentheistically and that they are interrelated. Therefore, this aspect of my project is, I believe, original and significant for fully under-
Panentheism Defined

At this point it would be good to describe the concept of panentheism. I will be guided by the use of this term by previous thinkers, as well as by my own sense of the basic thrust of the concept. "Panentheism" literally means "all in God." (The word was coined by the early nineteenth-century German philosopher, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause.) It holds that the non-divine individuals are included in God, are fully within the divine life. God knows all that exists without externality, mediation, or loss (though God's knowledge and valuation are more than the creaturely experiences that are wholly included in the divine experience). God empowers all that exists without externality, mediation, or loss (though there is genuine indeterminacy and freedom of choice and action which God empowers in the creaturely realm). This is in contrast to traditional theism, which has tended to regard God as utterly distinct from the creation and the creatures. Deism is an extreme of this tendency. On the other hand, panentheism also distinguishes itself from pantheism (literally "all [is] God"). It holds that God is not reducible to the nondivine individuals, to the universe as a whole, or to the structure of the universe; but rather God
transcends them, having a reality—an awareness and a power—that includes but is not exhausted by the reality of the creation and the experiences and actions of the creatures.

A distinction between a "passive" and an "active" aspect of God as panentheistically understood figures crucially in the structure and purposes of this work. As presaged in the preceding paragraph, the passive aspect refers to divine knowledge, while the active aspect refers to divine power. By using the term "passive," I am implying that by knowing what occurs, God is in some sense qualified or affected by it. The extent to which God is active and controls what happens in the universe is not prejudiced by this formal definition per se. Even for the traditional theist who believes that God totally controls our actions, that divine knowing and acting are utterly one, we could say that God's decisions affect or qualify the divine self and that the "passive" and the "active" aspects merge. However, in that case, practically speaking, the distinction would not be useful. Thus, only when, as in panentheism, it is accepted that the creatures have some indeterminacy with respect to action and that God is aware of their actions is the distinction likely to be significant.\textsuperscript{iv}

Hartshorne has written extensively about the cognitive aspect of the divine inclusion of creation, my "passive" aspect. Indeed, he often equates divine inclusion with God's direct and complete knowing or
perceiving. In contrast to the creatures, who exclude much of the fullness of the experiences of others, for whom these are, relatively speaking, indirect and external, God experiences or feels precisely what we experience and feel as we experience or feel (though as above God will also have knowledge, feelings, and valuations in relation to a situation in addition to those of the individuals perfectly included). So unqualifiedly to say that God and the creatures are distinct beings is misleading, since our experiences are at the same time (without mediation though with addition) experiences of God.

As panentheistically active, God coinheringly empowers all that exists--without externality, mediation or loss. The active aspect then refers to God's being the very power of being in all that is, the very power of acting in every action--but in the radical sense that whatever power we have is God's power and whatever action we take is in a (qualified) sense God's act, in that in panentheism there is no power that can be unequivocally distinguished from or contrasted to God's power, no power (just as no knowing or feeling) that is external to God as the ultimate power (and knower). There is no separation or mediation with regard to God's power as well as with regard to God's knowledge. Here again it should be remembered that God transcends as well as includes, so that divine power is more than God's power in the form of or in the manifestations that are the creaturely lives per se.
The preceding formal definition of the active aspect is not meant to preclude God's granting to those whom God immediately empowers the power to freely determine the divine experience to some extent. Indeed, that is the sense in which every action's being an action of God must be qualified. For, as has been said before, panentheism upholds the mutual transcendence of God and the creatures with respect to freedom. God does not make our decisions for us, so far as those are indeterminate. That panentheistic empowerment is compatible with some indeterminate creaturely freedom will be argued in chapter 6.

One could say that, insofar as there is indeterminacy in creaturely actions, the creatures are in that sense "external" to God. One could also speak of a further "separation" to the extent they willfully act contrary to the divine will. This latter separation is akin to more or less involuntary unawareness of God, in that these both are estrangements from the side of the creatures and do not involve separation by God as ultimate power and knower beyond the independence involved in creaturely freedom per se. But such freedom need not I believe controvert that the creatures are not "external" to or "separated" from God in the sense that I have intended and will intend when I speak thusly: namely, that God encompasses them, knowing perfectly and fully empowering whatever actions the creatures may take in their freedom.

In passing I will note that when I say "being,"
as in "God is the very power of being in all that has being," I am not using it in contrast to "becoming." I have no objection to "God is the very power of becoming in all that becomes." For I endorse temporality with regard to both the world and God. I have used "being" because it is more natural in our language (and less likely to make the reader feel some esoteric meaning is intended), and in common usage—in divergence from the philosophical and theological tradition—is not I think prejudiced in favor of staticity or timelessness.

I will now develop my initial contrast of panentheism with both traditional theism and pantheism. I have indicated that the passive aspect refers to God's perfect knowledge. But does not traditional theism affirm, indeed insist upon, divine omniscience? Tillich and Hartshorne both indicate that what I would consider panentheistic formulations are explicit expressions of what has been intuited by theists all along and which has not been without some voice in traditional theology. For example, Tillich suggests that when God is said to be omniscient or to be nearer to us than we are to ourselves, the notion that God is a being or person who is clearly distinct or separate (as subject) from other beings (as objects), who "excludes" others from its "center" rather than includes "everything that is," is countered. But there is this other tendency in theology to view God as someone who relates, participates, or knows from "outside" or "alongside" or as "external." God it seems is pictured as someone who, though knowing
something about everything, knows in a glorified human way,\textsuperscript{xii} being external to or separated from everything but looking (down) at it from some "heavenly" perspective.

Besides this general concern to maintain the distinctness and externality of the creation with respect to God, traditional theology also balks at the full inclusion of creaturely reality in the divine life on two other counts. It has often been felt that God can be sufficiently ultimate or glorified only if divine experience is exclusively positive, only if God is unaffected by or "impassible" to any suffering or negativities. Yet how can God experience our feelings of sorrow and frustration with no mediation or loss without being affected by them, without sympathy, without, in short, truly feeling them? Hartshorne concedes that one could formally adhere to panentheism simply by saying suffering is included in God, apart from whether God feels it.\textsuperscript{xiii} However he, as I, does "not see how a conscious being can contain suffering and not in some sense suffer."\textsuperscript{xiv}

The other incompatibility of much traditional theology (or "classical theism" to use Hartshorne's term) with respect to panentheism has to do with temporality. There has also been the feeling that change, as well as suffering, is not reconcilable with God's majesty, and so "immutability" was paired with "impassibility" as a traditional attribute of deity. If it is granted that temporality, change, and some degree of indeterminacy regarding the actions of the
creatures are not mere illusion, then if God knows and feels our lives immediately and accurately, it would seem to follow that God is in some sense temporal and that the divine experience in some sense changes. (As we shall see in chapter 5, Tillich cannot bring himself to break with traditional theism so as to allow unequivocally that God suffers and changes, despite his strong acceptance of the basic idea that God fully includes finite reality.)

I sense that some who do not necessarily share the above-indicated traditional tendencies of theology, but who are still uncomfortable with the notion that the creatures are included in or parts of God, misinterpret panentheism in the following way: That things are contained in God in a materialistic or spatial, or quasi-materialistic or quasi-spatial, manner, such that God is material or spatial and thus limited in more or less the same way that the included realities are. In connection with Tillich, this certainly is not part of his meaning. While he affirms that God is not "spaceless" and "participates in" or includes spatiality, he denies that God is subject to spatiality and declares that God transcends as well as grounds spatiality. He specifically rejects the quasi-materialistic notion of God as a "substance" which is either localized or extended through space.

Hartshorne is more likely to be taken in a quasi-materialistic fashion. This is because Hartshorne employs a body analogy, an analogy of individual cells to a human person, to illuminate the
relationship of the nondivine individuals to God. If Hartshorne's body analogy is taken apart from his qualifications of it, it could suggest certain properties not appropriate to God. The general properties of our bodies not referable to God are two. One is that our knowledge of and control over the cells of our bodies are hardly perfect; and indeed we are subject to death because of our lack of any ultimate control over them. This will not do for God. The other is that there are things and persons in some sense beyond or external to our cells and our bodies. Now there are no clear demarcation lines among what is my body, what is "in" it, and what is "outside" it. But we can speak of relative internality and externality. The point is that our knowledge and control of our environment is very limited; we are far from being in full possession. The same is not untrue with respect to our bodies. And to the extent our cells are beyond our knowing and control, we could say they are "external" to us. So in one way the two problems of the body analogy for God merge. But generally our awareness and control of our bodies and cells, as in moving parts of our bodies, feeling emotions and sensations, and thinking, are more immediate and greater than that of other things and persons. The claim that God has the world as a body could suggest something quite independent of God beyond the world with which God must contend by means of a body. This would entail some ultimate dualism even more strongly than a lack of control over that which is
relatively "internal" to one.

In Hartshorne's defense, when he utilizes the body analogy, he clearly notes that God has no external environment and/or that God has perfect knowledge and control of the included lesser individuals. Indeed, the very purpose of the analogy is to give us a human analogue by which to grasp the immediacy and the fullness of God's knowledge and control in relation to the world, as Hartshorne makes quite explicit at least once. Therefore, Hartshorne cannot be legitimately accused of rendering a spatial or quasi-materialistic sense of God's containment of finite reality. Indeed, if one thinks about the immediate possession of what is felt by something, one can see that a spatial relation is not truly feasible. For a spatial relation implies some distance between the perceiver and the perceived. Ask yourself what the distance between the feeling, say, in your big toe, and "you" is. The question is not appropriate. Even less so is any question of spatial relationship between God and the creatures.

We have already covered the essential ways in which panentheism differs from classical theism. It is now time to enlarge upon the distinction between panentheism and pantheism. In relating that God's inclusion of non-divine individuals is not materialistic or spatial, a difference with certain types of pantheism has been implied. But there is much more to be said, following a brief excursus. I have indicated that to my knowledge just two writers apart from Hartshorne have expressly acknowledged Tillich's
panentheism. However, at least two other critics have more or less accused Tillich of pantheism—though in no case do they offer anything like a thorough study of the key concepts and phrases that might with a measure of plausibility be interpreted pantheistically. Some plausibility to so interpreting them is provided by Tillich's own insistence that any valid doctrine of God must have "a pantheistic element." And Hartshorne in an early article refers to his and similar understandings of God (including Tillich's) as "the new pantheism," which serves as the title of the article. Since then, of course, Hartshorne has found a term, "panentheism," more likely to ensure that people will not confuse the "new pantheism" with the "old."

Just what then are the basic differences between the two? In a brief definition earlier, I indicated that God is not reducible to nor exhausted by the world which God includes, but rather has a reality which is more than, which transcends, the universe. This suggests that in panentheism there are qualities which apply to the including whole that most definitely do not apply to the included parts. These are the properties of divinity, such as aseity, omniscience, and omnipotence. Thus, in panentheism there is no question of confusing the creation with the Creator, even though it is included in God.

Pantheism by contrast tends to attribute divinity and its attributes to the world as a whole or to parts of it or to its structure, in and of
themselves. (It should be noted, though, that in most well-known forms of pantheism, there is some original divine substance that more or less transcends the world, even to the point of having impassibility and timelessness ascribed, as in classical theism.) This seems to rest upon a quasi-materialistic understanding of the divine substance (which we have seen is not applicable to panentheistic inclusion). There may be attenuations of this substance, so that things possess differing degrees of divinity (with nonliving matter usually lowest on the scale). In acosmic pantheism, that is, where the material world is regarded as illusion or "maya," as in traditional Eastern pantheism, the quasi-materialistic or substantialistic pattern is not broken. Though the substance is here a "spiritual" one, it is still subject to manipulation appropriate to materials, being divided up or broken off from the original into individual selves who try to return to unity.

That God is more than the finite experiences and decisions suggests that God makes decisions not made for God by the creatures, that God is transcendent in the sense of having some freedom of action (in addition to being transcendent in the sense of the perfection of attributes, as above). In itself, though, this does not tell us whether the creatures conversely have any transcendence with respect to God in the sense of some degree of genuine indeterminacy in their actions. In much traditional pantheism, as with the Stoics and Spinoza, the tendency is towards determinism, for God
to wholly determine all actions in the world. It should be stated that in much traditional theism, as in Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin, all creaturely actions are also completely decided by God.

This question might then be raised: How much do classical theism and pantheism really differ? Traditional theism is not substantialistic and does not tend to attribute divine status to the world. Also, classical theism is less likely than pantheism to make God's decisions necessary (particularly in its holding that God might not have created the world).

This much can be said: classical theism, which unlike pantheism stresses the distinctness of God vis-a-vis the creation and divine transcendence of it, even to the point of making God impassible and completely nontemporal, has ironically and incomparably, by denying genuine creaturely freedom, made finite individuals mere expressions of God (as pantheism, except that these manifestations of God are not regarded as divine themselves). Panentheism maintains that the creatures are expressions of the divine life, but not mere expressions: they have limited but real freedom; there is some real indeterminacy before they act, even from the divine perspective. I submit that this is both truer to our experience and better preserves the divine transcendence and guards against pantheism than does the determinism of classical theism in combination with impassibility and immutability, the latter two of which compromise God's immanence. As we shall see, though both Hartshorne and Tillich affirm
the creaturely freedom of panentheism, Tillich sometimes talks of the relationship between Creator and created in terms not fully consonant with that affirmation. Hopefully the preceding contrast with traditional theism and with pantheism has furthered the reader's grasp of panentheism's raison d'être.

The distinction between passive and active aspects will figure into the structure of my book in the following way: Relatively speaking, Hartshorne emphasizes the passive aspect, and Tillich the active one, which should be discernible in chapters 3 and 2, respectively. But they go beyond merely emphasizing one pole more than the other. In chapters 4 and 5, respectively, I will argue that Hartshorne undermines his panentheism (especially) in relation to the active aspect, and that Tillich undermines his (especially) in relation to the passive. The basic areas in which Tillich does this have already been mentioned in passing: despite his desire to affirm the full inclusion of temporality, of "non-being," and of creaturely spontaneity in the divine life, the pull of the theological tradition is evidenced in statements not wholly consistent with such intentions.

I will judge that when it comes to the active aspect of divine power Hartshorne in fact is not panentheistic. There is no clear formulation in Hartshorne of God as (encompassing and working through) all power, as actively and immediately empowering everything. Moreover, certain Hartshornean notions gainsay an utterly immediate empowerment. A second
major problematic area is Hartshorne's model of divine governance, which con Hartshorne's contention does not involve any truly direct or unmediated control, and which is not compatible with the perfect divine control of the world's destiny which he envisions and panentheism demands. These problems have undoubtedly played a part in the feeling of some that process theology does not do justice to the divine ultimacy and majesty.

In the final chapter I will employ what has preceded as the basis for further development of, defense of, and argumentation for a viable panentheism that is adequate with regard to both the active and passive aspects. In this connection I will attempt to show that the two are not finally incompatible. A possible contradiction for traditional theism as well as for panentheism is suggested by the concept of aseity, that God depends for existence and experience on no ontologically ultimately independent power, and thus by implication is the source of anything else. (Throughout this work, I will use aseity as meaning both the primary etymological sense of "self-existence" and its implication of being the sole ultimate source of anything else.) On the one hand, there is then no power other than God to give being to the world. On the other hand, if God possesses all power unrestricted by any external forces, should not God always possess all possible value and be subject to no negativities, and all this unchangeably? But these latter qualities all seem irreconcilable with genuinely relating to, with truly creating and knowing, the world, let alone
Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich

relating with total immediacy. Nevertheless, traditional theism, and to some extent Tillich, answer "yes" to that question. I will avoid this incongruity in classical theism and attempt to overcome the general dilemma by arguing that God as genuinely (and perhaps intrinsically) temporal—though with a perfect temporality not entailing our deficiencies—and as perfectly inclusive of, and thus partially affected by, experience of value by nondivine beings is quite compatible with aseity and ultimacy. Indeed, I will argue that on the whole the divine ultimacy implies just such a concept of God.

Thus, I will give evidence that the idea of God is not inherently incoherent. And I will, I hope, have shown that a theology of process can be construed so as to do full justice to the divine majesty and holiness. And I will, I trust, have rendered a Tillichian theology that does fuller justice to Tillich's desire to offer a "living God" in contrast to the Thomistic actus purus.

The Nature of Theological Language According to Hartshorne and Tillich

Before closing this introductory chapter, an overview of Hartshorne's and Tillich's respective understandings of how language applies to God is in order. This will give some reassurance that they are meaning the same thing to a degree sufficient to be compared as panentheists, as well as point out some
differences between the two. The similarities and differences concerning symbolism and analogy with respect to God parallel congruencies and dissimilarities in their doctrines of God and foreshadow some of the findings of future chapters. Especially in connection with Tillich, this may mean we will be getting ahead of ourselves a little and that some of these remarks may be clearer in retrospect.

Hartshorne (in keeping with his being more the rationalist in style than Tillich) is straightforward in his analysis of religious language. He distinguishes three types of language with regard to God. Symbolic language involves particular, concrete parts of finite reality, such as calling God "shepherd." Literal language is comprised primarily of categories that are purely abstract, such as necessity and contingency, potentiality and actuality, and absoluteness and relativity, and mutually exclusive (with respect to the same thing in the same sense), and that thus must apply to everything. For example, Hartshorne contends that "that which is not literally 'in some degree and quality made what it is by contingent relations,' i.e., relative, ...must be quite literally and entirely absolute." Hartshorne also considers the concept of inclusion by God or of being a "constituent of the divine life" as abstract enough to be literal. The third type of language, more or less between his "symbolic" and "literal," Hartshorne labels "analogical," a venerable theological term. Words like "know" and "love" are analogical. They vary
in their meaning depending upon whether, say, a dog, a human, or God is doing the knowing. Hartshorne recognizes a great difference, a difference in principle, between the divine instances and any other. In general this means that only for God will such attributes be all-inclusive quantitatively and qualitatively, in scope and adequacy. For example, only God will know all entities and know them completely. Hartshorne does not believe that we can go beyond that type of abstraction and know concretely what it would be like to apprehend all or anything utterly.

According to Hartshorne there is a sense in which analogical attributes can tend to become literal. Hartshorne holds that everyone has some direct awareness of God, an opinion by the way shared by Tillich, who sometimes refers to this awareness as the "mystical a priori." The more fully one is aware of God, the more one has an immediate sense of the perfection of attributes in relation to God (and the less need to analogize from nondivine cases). With this lessening of our dependence on our experience of the ("literal") nondivine cases, our sense of what is "literal" changes; it could perhaps as well be said that God "literally" knows, since knowing for us is as much a matter of ignorance as of knowing, than that we know literally and God knows analogically. Again, Hartshorne is not suggesting that this immediate or mystical awareness, no matter how strong, ever entails direct participation in what God concretely knows about
the world.

Overall it could be said that Tillich offers a two-pronged division concerning language about God: that which is symbolic and that which is either literal or on the boundary between literal and symbolic. Before the second volume of the Systematic, Tillich cited "being-itself" as the only term that could be literally applied to God. In volume 2, he indicates that, when "we say that God is the infinite, or the unconditional, or being-itself, we speak rationally and ecstatically at the same time" and that these "terms precisely designate the boundary line at which both the symbolic and the non-symbolic coincide."

Except for "in passing" remarks, Tillich does not say much about how symbolic language applies to God. (His articles and chapters on symbolism tend to devote only a portion to symbolism specifically in relation to God and here not to go beyond the generality that symbols participate in being itself, as well as being transcended by it.) Making use of such remarks I will try to give a plausible interpretation of Tillich on God-talk in comparison to Hartshorne.

Tillich does not have a separate category for what might be called "poetic" language, such as calling God "shepherd." But this is a trivial matter. And though Hartshorne considers basic metaphysical categories as literal when applied to God, I find any pellucid contrast between these and "analogical" terms like "to know" questionable. Though I quite agree with Hartshorne that God is in a genuine sense relative and
contingent, God does not "relate" nor is God "contingent" in the same way that we relate and are contingent, any more than God "knows" just as we know. And Hartshorne does not mean to imply otherwise: for example, he denies that God is contingent in the senses that God could ever not exist or could be totally surprised by any future event.

The main question then becomes how the bulk of theological language—"analogical" language for Hartshorne or "symbolic" language for Tillich—applies to God, why it does not apply literally. The mere difference in terminology is not important for our purposes (though Tillich and Hartshorne both have reasons for their preferences, Hartshorne's being his threefold distinction previously described).

One aspect of Tillich's belief that (at least most) language cannot be literal in application to God is a general sense of mystery, a general uncertainty and intellectual humility, in the face of that which "infinitely transcends" us—a common Tillichian phrase. For example, Tillich pens, "A deep feeling for the riddle of existence and for the mystery of being makes it impossible for these people [among whom Tillich numbers himself] to accept a too 'well-informed' speaking of God." Also, Tillich does expressly associate the symbolic character of the finite realm in application to God with divine infinite transcendence.

More specifically and more formally, "mystery" is said to characterize "a dimension which 'precedes' the subject-object relationship." Since "ordinary
language" has grown out of, and is bound to, the subject-object scheme, it cannot be applied literally to God. Or to put it in a way that uses the not strictly symbolic "being-itself" as regulative with respect to symbolism: "The unsymbolic statement which implies the necessity of religious symbolism is that God is being itself, and as such beyond the subject-object structure of everything that is." But what does that entail about symbolism?

One type of Tillichian expression suggests one possible interpretation: being-itself "precedes" reason or structure. For Tillich, this seems to mean both that God is not subject to any particular rational structure and that being-itself is "the Unvordenkliche, as Schelling has called it ("that before which thinking cannot penetrate"), is impenetrable to reason, because "as something existing, it itself is based thereon." On this latter prong, he also writes that defining being-itself "is impossible, since it is the presupposition of any definition." If transcending the subject-object structure means being strictly beyond any rational structure, one could conclude that symbolism is necessary because language or anything else pointing to God involves some structure, rationality, and definiteness, whereas God is essentially beyond any and all such structure (or at least any structure at all analogous to creaturely structure). But does not such a conclusion make any symbolism arbitrary and rule out any definite, reasonable thought about God? On the
second prong, contrary to Tillich's assumption, it does not necessarily follow that the basis or presupposition of knowing is absolutely unknowable. Obviously, if the impenetrability to thinking or impossibility of defining is taken strictly, then any language and thought about God, even symbolic, are blind and arbitrary. At first glance Tillich may appear humble in relation to divine mystery in the above claim of divine transcendence of all reason or structure. The most humble claim, though, would be an agnostic one: we do not know whether there is rationality or structure in God's being in itself, that is, apart from the world. (This addresses Tillich's concern that God not be subject to any particular rational structure of creation.)

There are other comments which suggest that God's transcendence is such that nothing or next to nothing can be known about God and that language about God must be regarded as "symbolic" because it does not, in the final analysis, apply to God (or at least we have no idea whether it does). Sometimes Tillich asserts that we can know God in relation to us, but not ("at all," he says at one point \textsuperscript{xlv}) in God's essence or self.\textsuperscript{xlvii} But unless this relation is to some extent constitutive of God in and to God's self, of which we know something, how can knowing God in relation to us be more than subjectivistic?\textsuperscript{xlviii} Tillich also writes that symbolic statements on God are not true or false, but rather constructive or destructive.\textsuperscript{xlix} For Tillich symbols are destructive if they are demonic or idola-
trous, that is, claiming ultimacy for themselves rather than for God. This seems especially appropriate to concrete symbols like persons, events, and physical objects, which can obviously become idolatrous, but could not such symbols also convey the nature of God more or less accurately? While theological language can also become idolatrous in the senses of one's becoming overly bound or devoted to particular ways of saying things and of making a claim of ultimacy for a deity who is less than ultimate, would not this latter problem also entail relative misunderstanding and falsity? Tillich seems here to have torn asunder knowing from valuing and doing.

Related to this is an aspect of Tillich's understanding of ultimate concern or faith. Though all particular formulations and all concrete repositors of our ultimate concern involve risk and may come to be doubted, there is an immediate sense of ultimacy, of the "God above God," as it is called in one work, which cannot be denied. While this "God above God" supposedly transcends "words and concepts," it would probably not be false to Tillich's meaning to say that in experiencing it one senses that which depends upon nothing else to be and which is the ultimate source of everything (aseity). For it is the "God above God," who gives the "courage to be" (even amidst doubt). The awareness of God as ultimate power, as almighty, allowing us to courageously conquer "non-being," anxiety and doubt, is an important Tillichian theme. And, indeed, Tillich specifically identifies "the God
above the God of theism" with "the ground of the whole." Aseity enters into another aspect of or perspective on "mystery." Tillich writes, that there is something rather than nothing is the mystery.

With aseity we are starting to get some positive content to being-itself. However, that the world is rooted in God as necessary ultimate source may not entail any further knowledge about God, at least in the opinion of some. For instance, Plotinus sees God as ultimate source, but his undifferentiated One could not legitimately be said to know the world or to have any other attributes. And some have regarded the Neoplatonic one as the key to Tillich's "being-itself."

The following statement by Tillich does evince agnosticism as to God's nature beyond being the ultimate source, though it does not speak for or against undifferentiation: "I really do not know what past and future are in the ground of being, I only know they are rooted in it."

We have viewed one side of Tillich. One suspects that there must be another or else he would not have spent so much time trying to describe God. I will not pretend that each side is fully reconcilable with the other. Perhaps one way of tying them together would be to say that the aseity or ultimacy that is immediately sensed is all that Tillich is absolutely sure of and that other statements can be made only with relative confidence.

Some general declarations that indicate we can talk rationally and significantly about God will be
listed first. Tillich maintains that human reason cannot and should not be suppressed in relation to any area, including theology. He argues against what he perceives as someone else's uncritical approach, advocating a "full, conceptually strict investigation" into "the range and the limits of meaning" of "the traditional Christian terms," even though this may sometimes point to the limits of understanding. He sees a need to explore the meaning of various biblical symbols. He insists that on the basis of God's "ineffability much can and must be said about him." Moreover, he violates his stricture that the God above (the) God (of theism) is "undefinable," by offering a panentheistic description, both in contrast to the God of "theological theism" and more directly. Finally, he does affirm an "analogy of being" in general, and specifically one "between the basic structure of experienced life and the ground of being in which life is rooted." He holds that everything must express something knowable about God, that all dimensions of reality can provide valid (and even "true") symbolic material because they are grounded in God.

Now as a general rule that which is rooted in something is not necessarily similar to it. Be that as it may, what is important for us is that being grounded in the divine life does for Tillich entail some similarity or proportion. (Though we cannot forget our previous section, the tenor of which diverged from this, and, in particular, the agnostic comment on past
and future as rooted in God.\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{\textasteriskcentered}} And Tillich does not trivialize this by saying that any symbol is as valid as any other, which would imply that, not some degree of intrinsic similarity, but the mere fact of being rooted in or caused by God is the basis of symbolism. Instead he discerns differences in "the finite-infinite proportion," such that, for example, "God is manifest according to his innermost nature in man but not in a stone."\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{\textasteriskcentered}} The phrase "innermost nature" would seem to suggest that something can be said about God in God's essence or self.

So what may be said more specifically about why or how symbolic language does not apply literally, beyond the general mystery and transcendence of God covered earlier? A central aspect of the preceding of the subject-object relationship that characterizes "mystery" is the absence of separation or externality or ignorance, which was touched upon before and will be further developed in chapter 2. Tillich often speaks of (God's transcending) the subject-object "cleavage," or like terms, suggesting the relative externality of nondivine things to each other. Related to this is Tillich's ubiquitous insistence that God is not a being, even the highest, or a person, but being-itself or the power of being. Beings or persons are "alongside" each other, relatively external, all of whom derive their existence and basic conditions of existence from the ultimate ground, who is not "alongside."\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{\textasteriskcentered}} Therefore, to use for God terms that normally or "literally" are used in reference to
persons must be symbolic. Significantly, Tillich avows that since there are no "external" relations between God and the creatures, but only "internal" ones or "inner relations of the divine life," all relations (and most, if not all attributions, involve relations) are symbolic when involving God. Tillich regards the word "cause" as symbolic with respect to God, because a "cause" is more or less external to its effects and because a "cause" is one in a series of causes and effects, rather than the "cause" of the entire series.

Thus, we have here the panentheistic idea of a God who is not external or exclusive in relation to the creatures in either the passive or active aspect, in either knowledge or power. This is comparable to Hartshorne's understanding of the analogous character of attributes as applied to God: in God they are perfect in scope and adequacy, for God fully includes all. What we have here, in effect, is Tillich's version of the via eminentiae. Terms like "know," "cause," and "love" that ordinarily apply to "persons" are negated in a positive and definite manner (in contrast to the above general caveat about God infinitely transcending us and our limitations). When applied to being-itself they must be understood as involving none of the externality that they involve in normal usage. Thus, as Hartshorne suggests, in a way they apply even more to God because they are free from deficiency.

It is our sense of a term that is not strictly
symbolic, like "being-itself," that guides us in understanding how other language applies. (Though, of course, without elaboration upon the term, perhaps including a statement of why other language is not literal, we will get nowhere.) If one does not grasp what Tillich means by being-itself, one will not see why or how other language is symbolic. The panentheistic aspect of being-itself provides a parallel to God's "inclusion" of things as "literal" for Hartshorne in offering a key for interpreting "analogical" or "symbolic" language. And like Hartshorne, Tillich believes that an immediate awareness of God is needed to grasp the key to symbolism and analogy. If an "ecstatic" experience of God is not associated with "being-itself" or the "infinite" we will not know what is meant by such terms. For example, some might interpret being-itself as the abstract common denominator of whatever exists, a possibility Tillich recognizes and denies as his meaning. This is probably why Tillich changed his mind about calling "God is being-itself" a strictly nonsymbolic statement and held instead that when we say this "we speak rationally and ecstatically at the same time."

There is one other basic way in which ordinary language is symbolic in relation to God for Tillich. It lies somewhat between the general mystery of God and panentheistic eminence. It gives a fairly specific sense in which ordinary language must be negated but, depending upon how it is interpreted, may not give us
anything positive. It is that everything in the divine life transcends (the distinction between) potentiality and actuality,\textsuperscript{xix} and therefore cannot be spoken of literally.\textsuperscript{xvi} For example, he states that "one speaks symbolically of God as love," because "the divine life has the character of love but beyond the distinction between potentiality and actuality," and therefore "is mystery for finite understanding."\textsuperscript{xvii} Indeed, "in the proper or nonsymbolic sense of the word 'life,'" "we cannot speak of God as living," of the "divine life," precisely because life "is the process in which potential being becomes actual being."\textsuperscript{xviii} If all this is understood as a genuine temporality, but one without deficiencies, this could be seen as an aspect of panentheistic eminence and would be compatible with Hartshorne's thought. If on the other hand it is taken to mean that God is in no real sense temporal, we have problems. We can easily see how it can be reasonably said that God knows, even though--or indeed because--there is an immediacy, an absence of externality, that we do not possess, and even though we do not know concretely what and how God knows. But even on the abstract level, it is not clear what could be meant by saying that God knows the world even though there is no temporal movement or change in any sense in the divine experience. Indeed, to say that the world is temporal, while God is wholly nontemporal, but that God is related to, causes, knows, and loves it, appears on the face of it contradictory, especially if any creaturely indeterminacy is granted. Thus, if nontemporality is a
key for comprehending how ordinary language applies to God, it will not open any locks for me. Rather it seems that with temporality translated or abstracted out for God, ordinary terms lose all positive content, at least insofar as God includes the world. What Tillich does intend by "no difference between potentiality and actuality" is not at all obvious. In chapter 5, we shall investigate where or whether Tillich comes down on temporality.

The tension in Tillich between the positive and the negative in symbolism, between eminence on the one hand and general mystery and perhaps the contention that God transcends potentiality and actuality on the other, can be looked at in terms of panentheism's two principles of God as embracing but transcending the world. The question, which goes beyond just symbolism to the substance of Tillich's doctrine of God, is whether he holds the two together, of whether God is deemed transcendent in such a way as to compromise full inclusion of creation.

I will close with a word on mystery and rationalism. While I would not contest that Hartshorne is more the rationalist, while Tillich emphasizes more the divine mystery, the difference may not be as great as some might think. We have seen Tillich strongly affirm the need for rational analysis. Hartshorne mentions often the "mystery" and once even the "impenetrability" of God with respect to God's concrete actuality. The abstract divine essence, though, is another matter for Hartshorne, being much
more accessible to our grasp. Yet there may be in Tillich a parallel distinction between two types of knowledge about God and concomitant degrees of certainty. Remember that for Tillich there is a direct sense of ultimacy or aseity that is certain, whereas concrete symbols and more definite formulations of the divine nature are always subject to risk and doubt. God's aseity is certainly part of the divine essence. Hartshorne does differ in believing aspects of the divine essence other than aseity to be equally open to our ken (and if aseity is understood to mean that God is not affected by our choices, Hartshorne rejects it as applying to God).

But ironically there is a sense in which Hartshorne pays more homage to mystery than Tillich. Hartshorne confesses a number of times that he and anyone else could be mistaken about their basic metaphysical intuitions and opinions concerning reality or God. Though he shares with Tillich a belief in an immediate awareness of God by all persons, he is not bold enough to assert that this is so transparent as to give us any absolute or utter certainty. Rather it is more or less "dim," "faint," though he believes "never wholly submerged."

Finally, some may accuse Hartshorne of not giving mystery its due in allowing that God is subject to change (in the concrete contents of experience and in happiness) and suffering. However, he well notes that traditional "negative theology" is far from humble. For it definitely declares that God is not
contingent, relative, or possible. The "humblest" position would be that we do not know whether or not God changes or suffers. Now Tillich does not conclusively take the side of either Hartshorne or traditional theism here. But as we shall see, this is not so much a matter of explicitly saying, "I don't know," as of being ambiguous or incoherent.

I trust I have shown enough similarities and parallels between Hartshorne and Tillich on theological epistemology to reassure that they are "in the same ballpark," as well as to suggest some real differences between the two.
ENDNOTES


iv. The only exception I can think of would entail that God wholly determine the world, but not fully intend the sufferings of creatures in the sense of enjoying or being indifferent to them; suffering here might be considered something logically entailed in the very nature of creaturely finitude, and not removable even by the power of God, who would in that sense be passive to it.


xv. Systematic Theology, 1: 277.

Introduction 35


xvii. Systematic Theology, 1:277.


Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich


xxxii. E.g., Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1: 9.


xl. Paul Tillich, *The Protestant Era*, trans. and with a concluding essay by James Luther Adams (Chicago:

xlii. Systematic Theology, 1: 249.


Tillich, Protestant Era, p. 76. See also Philosophical Interrogations, pp. 403-4.


Here Tillich has uncharacteristically engaged in a Cartesian and Kantian dualism, in which experience of some thing and the thing "in itself" are divorced. Cf. ch. 2, endnote 72.

Philosophical Interrogations, p. 387.


lxvii. Systematic Theology, 1: 156.


lxxi. Two other comments on grounding in God might be interpreted as agnostic: 1) "The polarities of being are rooted in" God but God "is not subject to them." (Philosophical Interrogations, p. 359.) 2) Divine love "does not mean that a higher being has in a fuller sense what we call love," but that "our love is rooted in the divine life." (Love, Power and Justice, p. 110.) However, the former could be read to mean that God is not subject to the polarity, say, of dynamics.
and form, in the way that we are (that is, in danger of losing our identity as we change), but that it is not without appropriate application to deity. The buzzphrase, "a higher being," and the preceding comment, "love is transformed but not lost," point to a less agnostic interpretation than the most obvious one. In fact, for Tillich "a being, even the highest," can never possess fully any attribute, as we shall see eventually.


lxxiii. See, e.g., Philosophical Interrogations, pp. 380-81. This theme will be developed in chapter 2 with extensive footnoting, so I will not list more references now.


lxxv. Systematic Theology, 1: 271.

lxxvi. Courage to Be, p. 184; Systematic Theology, 1: 156.

79. Systematic Theology, 1: 238.

lxxviii. Systematic Theology, 2: 10-11; My Search
42 Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich

for Absolutes, p. 82. Cf. Ultimate Concern, p. 46.

lxxix. E.g., Systematic Theology, 1: 252.


lxxxi. Systematic Theology, 1: 280.


lxxxv. Ibid.

lxxxvi. Natural Theology, p. 38.

lxxxvii. Logic of Perfection, p. 94; Creative Synthesis, p. 32; Man’s Vision of God, p. 133; Philosophical Interrogations, p. 337; “Kinds of Theism,” p. 130.


In this chapter I will look at a number of (mostly) recurring expressions in the works of Tillich that are panentheistic, at least in a very important part of their meaning. Some may emphasize the active aspect more and some the passive, though each aspect is implied in and usually at some point associated with all of them.

Probably no phrase is more distinctively Tillichian than this one: God is not a being, but being itself; or alternatively, God is not a being beside others, but being-itself. Actually, as far as I know, neither phrase appears exactly as above. But those are the best composites based upon frequency of words in this type of statement and upon freedom from particular contexts. There are countless variations on this basic theme. (Though I have "counted" all of them that I have encountered, as the endnotes will attest!)

In addition to the most common preposition, "beside,"\textsuperscript{i} we have "besides,"\textsuperscript{ii} "alongside,"\textsuperscript{iii} "among,"\textsuperscript{iv} and "side by side with."\textsuperscript{v} As the ultimate is not a being\textsuperscript{vi} (beside others),\textsuperscript{vii} neither is God a "thing,"\textsuperscript{viii} an "object,"\textsuperscript{ix} a "natural object"\textsuperscript{x} (Tillich in this context is using these words in a general sense, not in contrast to "subject"\textsuperscript{xi}), a "person,"\textsuperscript{xii} a "reality,"\textsuperscript{xiii} a "meaning,"\textsuperscript{xiv} "one level,"\textsuperscript{xv} a "power,"\textsuperscript{xvi} or a "cause,"\textsuperscript{xvii} (beside others), nor "a part,"\textsuperscript{xviii} nor
"something or someone," nor "somebody or something." When the alternative to "a being beside others" and similar phrases is explicitly stated, which it is roughly half the time, "the power of being" or "the ground of being" (or "the ground of" some other appropriate term or phrase) are sometimes offered instead of the preferred being-itself. Also, in many cases, "ground of being" or "power of being" or both are mentioned in addition to "being-itself" as alternates for it. (The terms are also used synonymously in contexts other than denying that God is a being.)

In addition, Tillich speaks of our awareness of ultimate reality in terms paralleling his distinctive phrase about the nature of ultimate reality. Such awareness is not a "state of mind" or an "encounter" "beside other" ones. Instead it is "in, with, and under" other states of mind and "within" other encounters. Moreover, Tillich believes that if God is not a being beside others and if awareness of being-itself is not a state beside others, then in some sense the "subjective" ultimate concern we have and the "objective" ultimate must be "one and the same." More will be said about this later in the chapter.

But what does Tillich mean by denying that God is a being (beside others)? In approaching this, I will restrict myself to ramifying comments Tillich makes when using that type of phrase or key parts of it, which often are not too explicit, when present at all. However, we will not be left without some very
significant evidence. And other panentheistic Tillichian formulations to be covered in the remainder of this chapter cast an aura providing additional support for my interpretation.

At first glance Tillich's distinctive phrase(s) may seem to be merely a catchy way of emphasizing God's radical superiority in relation to other individuals. For "beside(s)," "alongside," and "among" suggest being more or less on the same level, while "just a" or "a" (as it is rendered a majority of times, though far from always, when not coupled with a phrase like "besides others") suggest understatement. This interpretation would seem to find support in the fact that almost every ramifying comment maintains that God would be a being if "subject to" the "structure of finitude" in general or to one or more of the ontological elements or categories of finitude, or to some other aspect of finitude.

Along these lines, it is often indicated that God as a being may or may not exist and sometimes that God would be subject to the split between essence and existence, that is, would fall short of what God should be. Tillich appears to be saying the same thing when he indicates that God as a being becomes "a part of" or "a creature within the world" or is "within the totality of beings," "within the universe of events" or "of existing things," or "within the structural whole." In all this seems to run a desire to preserve God's necessary existence and the perfection of the divine attributes, a refusal to
attribute to God the deficiencies of the finite creature. Is then the refusal to call God a being only a semantic device to highlight God's radical unsurpassibility?

One amplification of this basic Tillichian theme hints that something more is going on here. Sometimes Tillich adds that God is not "above" others to the declaration that God is not a being "alongside" or "beside" others. Or similarly, he writes that God is not a being, even the highest being. Or more simply, he just negatives God as a highest being. Nor is God the "most powerful being," the "most important part" of reality, or the "greatest" or "most eminent" object. Neither is God "an absolute being," which he considers a contradiction in terms.

Tillich explains why "above" is not good enough: logically the "above" is one direction of the "alongside," except it means that which is the ground and abyss of all beings. Then, however, it is hard to call it a being.

Or more fully:

What stands "beside," is by reason of this very position a single finite meaning, for which one would then have to seek a basis of meaning, a God over God, a religion over religion. No superlative can protect such a God, no matter how high above the word [sic] He stands, from becoming a creature within the world; for in every "above" lies a "beside" and in every
"beside" a "conditioned."¹

These seem to say that it is inappropriate to call God a being, because God is the ultimate source of all (other) beings.² This receives backing from the suggestion that it is "unconditioned power which makes God God (and not a highest being only)."³ But none of this is obviously helpful in showing why God cannot be a being above others. For, on the face of it, could not one maintain that God is the highest being, who self-exists and who created the world, who is the ultimate power of being?

But Tillich does offer some more revealing explanations. They suggest an answer to a key question—Why is "above" "one direction of the alongside," Why does in "every 'above'" lie a "beside"? Tillich rather explicitly gives the answer on this occasion: As the creative ground of everything that has being,...or, in the most radical abstraction,...being-itself.... God is neither alongside things nor even "above" them; he is nearer to them than they are to themselves.⁴ That is to say, to be "alongside" or "above" others entails a relative separation or externality with respect to others that is not appropriate for the ultimate.

At this point we will take a slight excursus from phrases specifically denying that God is a being, a thing, etc., to explore further the logic of "alongside" for Tillich. Significantly, he declares
that certain statements "can have the unfortunate implication that there is something alongside God in which he participates from the outside."lv (More will be written about the context of this remark later.) He rejects the notion of "a being alongside the world" as "half-theistic, half-deistic."lv Deism, of course, regards the world as largely independent of and external to God, though divinely created. "Supranaturalism," which is anathema to Tillich, localizes God in a supranatural world alongside the natural one,lv giving God a "special place."lvii In a revealing comment, he proffers this as the alternative to God as "beside the world" in supranaturalism: "an interpretation of reality in which the infinite is within the finite and the finite is contained within the infinite."lviii

Tillich's interpretation of "alongside" as meaning relative separation or externality gives an answer as to why God cannot be a being "alongside" or even "above" others. But does the absence of separation, the inclusion of "the finite within the infinite," also provide the clue to why "it is hard to call" the ground of being "a being"lix in any sense, even the highest being? Another criticism qua description of supranaturalism implies that it does: Supranaturalism "separates God as a being, the highest being, from all other beings, alongside and above which he has his existence."lx I submit that understanding Tillich as panentheist answers why God cannot be a being in a way that goes beyond regarding this
distinctive phrase as merely a turn of a phrase to highlight God's radical superiority and beyond the seeming semantic arbitrariness of insisting that God cannot be called the highest being. For if God is not separated at all from the creatures, if they are fully within God, then to posit God as a being who can be unambiguously contrasted to distinct other beings, as the creatures are with respect to each other, is untenable.

Now I am not arguing that every time Tillich says that God is not a being alongside or beside others that the panentheistic absence of externality and simple distinctness is in the forefront. Indeed, there seem to be times when "beside others" does simply mean relative equality, operating as a rhetorical device to reinforce the divine unsurpassibility rather than indicating that God is not an unqualifiedly distinct or separate being from others. Remember that almost every ramifying remark on God's not being a being (beside others) has to do with God's not being subject to "finitude" in some sense. That God does not exist contingently, for example, is not related, at least not obviously, to lack of separation with regard to the creatures. What I do want to argue is that the absence of externality and exclusivity is why Tillich "goes to the mat" on God's not being a being in any sense, even the highest, that this nonseparation and inclusivity is explicit on a number of occasions when the subjection to (the structure and categories of) finitude by God as a being is mentioned, and that it may be implicit on
many other occasions.

The initial plausibility of my premise that panentheistic nonseparation is crucial to understanding Tillich's insistence that God is not a being is, I believe, strong. It makes sense of that insistence, saving it from total semantic arbitrariness. For to say simply (that is, without qualification) that God is a being naturally suggests contrast to clearly distinct other beings, while it does not obviously suggest contingent existence, lack of ultimate power, or falling short of the divine essence.

It can be said that relative externality or separation with respect to others implies subjection to "finitude," including contingent existence and the "disruptions characteristic of the transition from essence to existence." For if there is externality of the world with respect to God, if God is "highest being" unambiguously contrasted to distinct other beings, then some more ultimate power, a "God over God" as above, must establish the conditions that enable these more or less independent entities to interact. In that case it would be the "God over God" which self-exists and is the very power of being in everything, including our alleged "God." And this "God" would become a being within this larger universe of interaction, existing dependently and more or less subject to the weaknesses the other beings have. This I submit is a plausible expansion of Tillich's avowal that "in every 'above' lies a 'beside' and in every 'beside' a 'conditioned'" and an indisputable expan-
sion of future remarks to the effect that if the rest of reality is not included by God or the infinite, if it is "alongside" or "besides," God is in fact finite.

We can approach the question of the relationship between relative externality and the deficiencies of "finitude" from a somewhat different angle that recalls our discussion about God's not having any ignorance or imperfect control of God's "body" (the universe God includes) and no "external" environment. In brief, human deficiencies can all be perceived in terms of externality. For externality entails relative ignorance and lack of possession and control. And there is some externality not only in relation to others, but also with respect to ourselves—to our bodies, our past, our motivations. This makes us liable to cognitive and moral imperfection (for if we knew others with utter immediacy and intimacy, we would love them as our-selves—they would be a part of us—and we would be God!); to "losing our identity, through time and change" (but if we knew ourselves and others perfectly and thus the future so far as determinate, we would always act in terms of our essential nature, of what we should be); and, finally, to death (for neither our cells nor our "external" environment are in our full possession and under our ultimate control).

Tillich in fact does explicitly recognize relative externality or separation as a, and even as the, key aspect of finitude. He regards the self-world correlation as "the basic ontological structure" of reality. It entails "being separated in some way
from everything else" as well as belonging "to that at which" one looks.\textsuperscript{lxviii} There is "a tragic truth" here: "the strangeness of all beings to each other. We can approach other beings only in terms of analogy and, therefore, only indirectly and uncertainly."\textsuperscript{lxix} Formally, "the subject-object structure" is the self-world correlation with respect to reason.\textsuperscript{lxx} However, Tillich actually--and frequently--uses "subject-object" in a general way to refer to "the basic ontological structure," rarely uses the phrase "self-world correlation."

The subject-object structure is referred to as the "deepest and most universal" aspect of (the way we perceive) reality.\textsuperscript{lxxi} As we have seen in chapter 1, it is often rendered as the "subject-object" cleavage, thus connoting the relative externality of things to each other.\textsuperscript{lxxii} In volume 3 of the \textit{Systematic}, Tillich devotes a large subsection to the subject-object cleavage or "separation"\textsuperscript{lxxiii} in relation to cognition in general and to various facets of our lives, such as language, the arts, and education (and to how this alienation may be overcome--fragmentarily--by the Spiritual Presence).\textsuperscript{lxxiv}

Hopefully I have shown how externality is implicit in the contingency and imperfections of existence that are sometimes associated with God as a being (beside others). Again I am not arguing that Tillich was intending the connection in such statements. He just does not offer elaboration upon them so as to enable me to say that. He may or may not be using "beside" and "a" here simply to emphasize
God's radical superiority rather than to also indicate
the impropriety of the all-encompassing God being
spoken of as a being unambiguously distinct from all
other beings.

Now we shall examine the extent to which separa-
tion is explicitly involved in the subjection to
finitude when God becomes a being (beside others). A
good place to start is with how a being is subject to
the four categories of finitude: time, space, causal-
ity, and substance. (Tillich follows Kant here.) In
the following, Tillich expressly cites three of the
categories:

The God of theological theism...is supposed to
be beyond the ontological elements and
categories which constitute reality. But every
statement subjects him to them. He is seen as a
self which has a world, as an ego which is
related to a thou, as a cause separated from its
effect, as having a definite space and an
endless time.\[\text{\textsuperscript{1xxv}}\]
The comments on self-world and ego-thou should be seen
as covering the category of substance. In that case it
should be clear that the first three categories covered
all have to do with externality in relation to the
creatures (remembering the relative separation involved
in the self-world correlation). The other category,
that of time, will be commented upon shortly.

The category of cause received additional atten-
tion in relation to God as a being in supranaturalism:

But the petty idea that God is \textbf{a being} who some-
times works in terms of finite causality, producing finite effects within the structural whole, is contrary to everything I believe of God.... If he merely exists, of course he can participate in normal causalities.\textsuperscript{lxxvi}

Also, we have:

The concept of a "Personal God," interfering with natural events, or being "an independent cause of natural events," makes God a natural object besides others, an object among objects, a being among beings, maybe the highest, but nevertheless a being.\textsuperscript{lxxvii}

Or more briefly, supranaturalism renders God finite "by making God a cause alongside other causes."\textsuperscript{lxxviii} All of these remarks on causality seem to have the following in common: God as a being is "localized" with respect to causality, is made a particular or "independent" cause producing or interfering with certain events, rather than as the ultimate cause that is not separated from but acts through all other causality. Thus God is not a cause that can be unqualifiedly contrasted to distinct other causes, any more than a being in simple distinction to other beings. Interestingly, in one of the quotes, contingency of existence is associated with exclusivity and externality in regard to causality. Conversely, by implication, aseity goes hand in hand with being the ultimate and all encompassing ground that expresses itself through, not in addition to, creaturely causality.
Tillich as Panentheist

Time was the one category in the above description of "theological theism" that is not directly related to separation with respect to others. In another relevant passage, time is the only category explicitly considered:

In popular parlance the concept "omnipotence" implies a highest being who is able to do whatever he wants. This notion must be rejected....

It makes God into a being alongside others, a being who asks himself which of innumerable possibilities he shall actualize. It subjects God to the split between potentiality and actuality—a split which is actually the heritage of finitude.\textsuperscript{1xxix}

In this last quote, Tillich has used "alongside" in a way different than we saw earlier. Rather than pertaining to spatial or quasi-spatial relationship—and thus spatial distinctness and separation, here it seems to be used in the sense of relative qualitative equality. What Tillich might mean by subjecting God to "an endless time" and to "the split between potentiality and actuality" must await chapter 5. It was stated that externality with respect to ourselves and others makes us liable to "lose ourselves" through temporal change, with the implication that in God there must be an eminent temporality that guarantees against loss of essential perfection. To the extent that Tillich views God's relationship to time in those
terms, externality could be said to be indirectly involved in the subjection to "finite" temporality of God as a being.

That three of the categories are explicitly associated with separation from and simple distinctness with regard to others, while time is not, parallels the findings of chapter 1 regarding why, beyond the general mystery and transcendence of the deity, language about God is symbolic. There panentheistic eminence and transcendence of the distinction between potentiality and actuality were the two bases for symbolism.

Significantly Tillich does once give priority to two of the categories as rendering God finite: "If God is a being, he is subject to the categories of finitude, especially to space and substance." These can be seen as the two primary categories relative to making God one being in simple contrast to other ones; the first by localizing God in spatial separation from others, the second by attributing individual substance to God in unambiguous contrast to other individual substances. Causality could then be understood as derivative of space and substance, as looking at a distinct, localized being from the perspective of acting and being acted upon. However, Tillich does not there explicate the remark, so we are left to speculate, as I just have, based upon earlier statements on spatiality, substance, and causality and upon more general panentheistic observations.

In addition to explicit connection between externality and some "categories" of finitude, there
are, in connection with God as a being, more general pronouncements on finitude that clearly have to do with separation with regard to the nondivine individuals.

The following declaration concerns the subject-object structure, which we have seen is "the basic ontological structure" of finite reality: "If God is brought into the subject-object structure of being, he ceases to be the ground of being and becomes one being among others (first of all, a being beside the subject who looks at him as an object)." There is also this indicative statement: "Speaking to God and receiving an answer...transcends all ordinary structures of subjective and objective reason.... If it is brought down to a level of a conversation between two beings, it is blasphemous and ridiculous." (Emphasis mine.) God's relationship with respect to the subject-object structure of reality is spoken of in many other places, but these do not refer to God as a being (among others). Therefore, that issue will be explored more fully in a separate section later. Tillich does offer elaborating comments on the first quote, but these are rather stylized formulations that appear a number of times in his works and will also receive treatment in their own section. Nevertheless, without further explication the above assertions should clearly convey the separation of a quite distinct being (looked at or spoken to by another outside of it), especially in light of our earlier analysis of the nature of the subject-object structure—or cleavage—for Tillich.
Unlike "alongside," "beside," "above," or even "among," "besides" can never directly refer to a spatial relationship, with the externality which that entails. It means "in addition to" and is well suited to connoting either being on the same level qualitatively or distinctness of being in addition to others. Significantly, Tillich does once explicitly consider the meaning of "besides":

The infinite is always a radical breaking away from the finite, so radical that the relationship can never be imagined as besides each other. It must always be understood as within. Only then is the radical separation possible. That seems to be very difficult. I discussed it last night at Columbia in connection with Nicholaus Cusanus.... The infinite must embrace itself and the finite, otherwise it is not infinite. If you (call) one-half of this blackboard...the finite and the other the infinite, then this infinite is not the infinite because it has something beside it, the finite...the infinite and the finite are not in different places, but they are different dimensions.lxxxiv

As this reflection indicates, in panentheism the "infinite" and the "finite," God and the creatures, can be contrasted with and distinguished from each other—and radically so, for God is much more than the world God includes taken in itself. However, this radical contrast by its very nature precludes the type of
contrast or "separation" one has between creatures, who
are in "different places" and distinct from or
"besides" or in addition to each other, for God is the
all-encompassing, embracing the finite within God's
self. lxxxv And if this were not so, God would be
finite, the other half of the blackboard. Of course,
this does not mean that every time Tillich uses
"besides" or the other prepositions in relation to
God's subjection to finitude and elsewhere, that this
meaning of separate beings in addition to each other is
intended. It does, though, definitely raise the
possibility that it may be there in the background for
Tillich. And it is strong evidence that Tillich's
adamant demand that God not be a being in any sense is
based on this panentheistic understanding of God.

By the way, if it has not been obvious
heretofore, it should be now, that "besides" or "a" as
meaning a simply distinct being who thus is not being
itself is not mutually exclusive with "besides" or "a"
as meaning a being more or less qualitatively on the
same level. Rather, the former includes the latter,
and goes beyond it, giving it further content, and
making it other than simply a catchy way of indicating
God's radical superiority, which nobody denies anyway
(intentionally at least, though many do deny it by
thinking of God as a separate and separated being,
rather than as the all-inclusive).

We come now to the four observations, one with a
supplement, which are singly the most decisive in
support of my thesis that Tillich will not give an inch
on the issue of God as a being (even to those who add "above others" or "the highest"), because to be a being for Tillich implies simple and unambiguous contrast to all other beings. To begin, I will repeat Tillich's criticism of supranaturalism that I used to establish the initial plausibility of this contention: It "separates God as a being, the highest being, from all other beings, alongside and above which he has his existence."lxxxvi

This key passage comes from Philosophical Interrogations:

...all the predicates which we attribute to God are incompatible with the assertion that he is a person. The emphasis is on the "a," because this brings him side by side with other persons and makes him ontologically finite in relation to them. It belongs to the characteristics of a hu-man person to be centered in himself and to exclude every other person from the center itself. My ego is always my ego, and nobody else's. But God according to religious assertions--biblical, and mystical, and Reformation ones--is nearer to my ego than I myself am to it. Similar consequences follow from symbols like omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence. If they are taken seriously, they do not prevent one from calling God personal, but they make it impossible to call him a person. lxxxvii

Here we have quite clear entailments among being "a,"
subjection to finitude, and externality or simple distinctness with regard to others. Along with the recent quote on the relationship of the infinite and the finite, it gives support to my above interpretation of "beside" and "alongside" in connection with "conditionedness," as entailing an externality or a separation (that implies a "God over God" setting the conditions of interaction). This is a fine panentheistic statement. Rather than excluding others from the divine "center," God includes them. My ego can be regarded as always my ego, and nobody else's--except in relation to God. For it is also God's--or better, a part of the divine "ego," lest there be any hint of exhaustive identification. For God is more than the included nondivine individuals, and "infinitely transcends" them (which is why they are rightly called "nondivine individuals," even though they are expressions of and fully included in the divine life).

Peter Bertocci cites Tillich's above remarks, which were in answer to a question by Helmut Tielicke, and asks a further question:

Unless God's being and my being are to some extent and in some way ontologically distinct--at least so that the center of my being and the center of God's being exclude each other ontologically (without denying interaction)--can there be real individuality for me and individual freedom in any degree?

Tillich responds:
Man is finite freedom.... But this does not make him ontologically independent. God's sustaining creativity, as Martin Luther asserts, gives the arm of the murderer the power to stab his victim. One cannot speak of a relation of the divine to the human center as if they were in the same ontological dimension. If we speak of a divine center at all--symbolically--we must say that the periphery of which one's center is the center is infinite and includes everything that is (cf. the symbols "omnipresence" and "omniscience").

Bertocci had earlier parenthetically equated the divine "center" with the divine "essence," which he held must transcend us in some sense. Tillich could agree with that opinion. And panentheism should affirm Bertocci's desire that a person be "a limited but creative source of change." However, Bertocci's question posits a simple distinctness and exclusivity of two centered beings who "interact." He also assumes that whether "persons are 'alongside' or 'within' God" is not the "ontological issue." Tillich demurs on the basis of the divine inclusivity. This adds further support, if anyone needs it, to a panentheistic understanding of Tillich's above denial that God is a person.

Thirdly, Tillich contrasts the concepts of being-itself and of "ground of being," which symbolically point "to the mother-quality of giving birth, carrying, embracing, and, at the same time, of
calling back, resisting independence of the created, and swallowing it," with the morally "demanding father-image of the God who is conceived as a person among others."xcvi In this context "among others" is manifestly not directly concerned with relative equality, but with unqualified distinctness of being.

Finally, we have this important conclusion pertaining to the self-world correlation discussed earlier:

The basic ontological structure of self and world is transcended in the divine life without providing symbolic material. God cannot be called a self, because the concept "self" implies separation from and contrast to everything which is not self.xcvii The same logic that applies here would likewise apply with respect to calling God a being, a person, a cause, etc.xcviii

With that we have ended our direct consideration of phrases of the form, God is not a being (beside others), (but being-itself). While it could not be concluded that every instance of this type of phrase was intended to be panentheistic, panentheism was decisive in the use of it overall. Subsequent terms, concepts, and phrases to be dealt with will for the most part be exclusively panentheistic, and will lend additional weight to my conclusion that a panentheistic understanding of God is determinative in the great significance which Tillich attaches to that distinctive formulation of his.
Other Panentheistic Formulations

We have seen Tillich deny that God is a person. And he repeats this gainsaying elsewhere. The idea that God is a person and belief in a "personal God" are very important in the theology as well as in the "popular piety" of this century. This is why Tillich's denial that God is a person is perhaps the least well received aspect of his doctrine of God. And this denial, as well as other statements, have brought accusations from a number of theologians that Tillich's God is impersonal. Because of the importance of the concept of a personal God, Tillich has more to say on the subject than a simple veto of God as a person. First of all, he does give his reasons, a good taste of which we have already received in the quotations on the concepts "person" and "self." Some other explications seem to allow that God is a person in a certain sense: "God is called a person, but he is a person not in finite separation but in an absolute and unconditional participation in everything." Similarly he pens, "Is it meaningful to call him the 'absolute individual'?...only in the sense that he can be called the 'absolute participant.'" These pronouncements must be taken as somewhat rhetorical, as explanatory of why God should not be called a person or individual, for Tillich never simply refers to God as a person, self, or individual, and does specifically deny the first two. He also in effect disallows the third by chiding
supranaturalism for attributing "individual substance" to God.\textsuperscript{cii} Obviously Tillich feels that all those terms are so strongly associated with separation and simple distinctness of being that it just is not safe to use them in reference to the deity.

Though denying that God is a person, his position on whether God is "personal" is not as straightforward. Once he intones that as "the God who is a being is transcended by the God who is Being itself," so is "the God who is a person transcended by the Personal-Itself."\textsuperscript{ciii} Or similarly, he opines that "God is completely personal in our encounter with him," in which "we first experience what person should mean."\textsuperscript{civ} Elsewhere, however, the "personal" vis-a-vis God is not spoken of in such unqualifiedly positive fashion. Often he speaks in terms of a polarity in our understanding of or relationship with God, the elements being the "personal" and the "mystical"\textsuperscript{cv} or "transpersonal"\textsuperscript{cvii} or "suprapersonal"\textsuperscript{cvii} (or once the "ego-thou" and the "unconditional"\textsuperscript{cviii}). The "personal" aspect, along with the other, is necessary. Indeed, without the personal element, no relation to God would be possible.\textsuperscript{cix} Or similarly, "the symbol 'personal God' is absolutely fundamental because an existential relation is a person-to-person relation."\textsuperscript{cx} Moreover, "in the I-Thou relationship of man and his God, God becomes a being, a person, a 'thou' for us."\textsuperscript{cxi} But since this aspect "is on the ground of his character as being-itself,"\textsuperscript{cxii} the implication is that what might be proper in religious practice, that is,
referring to God as a person, is improper in theology. But though a personal "element" may be clearly affirmed, that God is "personal" is not unambiguously upheld, despite the two comments at the beginning of the preceding paragraph. The "absolutely fundamental" "personal God" is said to be "a confusing symbol" (because of the implication of separation). A couple pages after twice explicitly distinguishing between calling God personal and calling God a person and permitting the former (one instance of which we have seen), he perhaps undermines the value of so doing with these words: "If, however, Spirit is thought of as 'all-penetrating' and 'co-inhering,' it cannot be distinguished from the creative ground of everything, and the adjective 'personal' as a particular quality loses its meaning." Alternatively, it is said that God is "not less than personal" or "supra-personal" or "more than personality." Tillich would not at all want such talk to be taken to imply that God is "impersonal": The supra-personal is not an "It," or more exactly, it is a "He" as much as an "It," and it is above both of them. But if the "He" element is left out, the "It" element transforms the alleged supra-personal into a sub-personal, as usually happens in monism and pantheism.

However, at least five critics find Tillich's doctrine of God impersonal. Four of these even believe that Tillich's God is not "conscious," is without "self-consciousness and self-determina-
Tillich as Panentheist

One of these critics bases his conclusion on a misreading of Tillich's claim that God transcends the subject-object cleavage, which we have seen means that God is not subject to the separation from others that the creatures are. Instead he interprets it to mean that God has a "neutral position between and prior to" the conscious "subject" and the unconscious "object" or thing. If this were true, I would regard it as a fatal compromising of panentheism, that "all is in God." For we would be bereft of a reasonable sense in which God includes the creaturely experiences and, more fundamentally, without "God," as this term is normally understood.

Perhaps he and others have been influenced by the following facet of Tillich's thought. Tillich writes that, as Spirit, God "is as near to the creative darkness of the unconscious as he is to the critical light of conscious reason." That just preceding this, Spirit is said to be the inclusive symbol for the divine life suggests that the "creative darkness of the unconscious" can be symbolically applied to God. And Jacob Boehme, who influenced Tillich, is favorably cited for "his description in mythological terms of the
unconscious elements in the ground of the divine life and therefore all of life."\textsuperscript{cxxix} That there are unconscious elements in God, whatever Tillich might mean by that, does not support the notion that God is a tertiam quid between "conscious" and "unconscious" in the most general sense of these words, any more than the fact that there are unconscious aspects of humans supports the same notion in regard to us. Moreover, given the contrast with critical reason in the first instance and the lining up of Boehme against the Cartesian "pure consciousness" in the second, I suspect that "conscious" in this context implies explicit and discursive reasoning and "unconscious," tacitness and intuition. In those senses, God is as much or more "unconscious" than "conscious," for God surely knows and acts without verbalization, formalization, and reflection. But such "unconsciousness" does not in the least contradict God as conscious or sentient in the most general sense of those words and, indeed, entails them. Elsewhere, Tillich writes that God "is in it [an atom], not substantially only but also spiritually, therefore knowingly."\textsuperscript{cxxx} This certainly contrasts God as conscious, with the ultimate as a nonconscious force.

In my experience, the question of whether God is "personal," apart from a more particular context, is in the first instance whether God is in some sense conscious, aware, or sentient, rather than merely a force or principle. That Tillich never directly dealt with that issue when he specifically considered the word
"personal" in reference to God is perhaps due to the fact that he was not a native speaker and thus may have missed this primary, general connotation. (For him "personal" always has the more particular sense of a distinct being with whom one can enter into a reciprocal relationship.) And this has contributed to misunderstanding. However, I still find it hard to comprehend the charge that Tillich's God is not conscious. For the most fundamental point of theism as usually understood and of Christianity, in contrast to nontheistic options, is precisely that the ultimate reality is aware rather than a nonconscious principle or force. And given that Tillich saw himself as a Christian and philosophical theologian, one should assume that his God is in some sense conscious, in the absence of compelling proof to the contrary.

To come back to the main track of this chapter, we can conclude that Tillich is not comfortable with God as "personal," because "personal" for him tends to connote distinctness and externality in relation to others (though not as straightforwardly as "being a person," which denotes it for Tillich).

We have already had a fair exposure to the formula that God transcends the subject-object "structure" or "cleavage." Substitutes for the former are "scheme," "correlation," "relation," and "relationship," and for the latter, "split," "separation," "division," and "opposition" ("Gegensatzes") (usually rendered the split, etc., "between subject and
object”).

This might be taken to mean that since God is "beyond" the basic structure of creaturely reality, any knowledge of God or any relationship of God to the world is dubious or impossible. Tillich's statements that God "precedes" reason and structure could bolster such a position, if they are strictly taken to mean that God absolutely precedes reason and structure in any sense at all. That such talk recalls the earlier Schelling's Unvordenkliche, to which we have seen Tillich refer in this context, might be perceived to support such a radical interpretation. For the Unvordenkliche was for Schelling God as undifferentiated unity, the Indifferenz, in the tradition of Plotinus' One (and as stated in chapter 1, Tillich has been regarded as Plotinian). Such an interpretation would rule out any definite knowledge of God and any relationship to the world by God, save an undifferentiated or oceanic mystical participation in God in which one also wholly transcends any structure and environment. (I rather think that some have derived their concept of God by projecting that type of mystical experience upon God. Not that a mystical element in God and in our experience of God is invalid. Only that mysticism as meaning utter undifferentiation and unawareness of anything particular should not be determinative.) Tillich does not elaborate upon these statements, nor does he use them when referring to God's transcendence of the subject-object structure. Therefore, we had best look at his employment of that
formulation.

Tillich does write, "Absolute...means detached or freed from any limiting relation, from any particular relation, and even from the basis of all particular relations, the relation of subject and object." This may sound as if God is unaware of anything particular, is indeed the undifferentiated or the formless. However, the evidence is that God's transcendence of the subject-object structure is not intended to separate God from the world (save qualitatively), but rather to give God an absolute nearness to everything. God is "freed from" the "limiting" and "particular" relations that we have for absolute participation in everything. That relative externality of things to each other is such a central aspect of the subject-object structure for Tillich, and that this is repeatedly reinforced by use of terms like "cleavage," is itself very strong evidence that God's preceding of this structure and cleavage entails that the creatures are not external to, but included by, God. But there is more explicit support.

The following quotation was offered previously: "If God is brought into the subject-object structure of being, he ceases to be the ground of being and becomes one being among others (first of all a being beside the subject who looks at him as an object.)" While earlier it was used to corroborate the separation and exclusivity vis-a-vis others of a being for Tillich, insofar as there is other evidence for that, it can work conversely here. Plus, the
parenthetical remark fairly clearly indicates relative separation. Moreover, the criticism of "theological theism," which cited the externality of God as a being in relation to substance, space, and causality, makes a reference to the subject-object structure. To pick up and continue the passage: "He is a being, not being-itself. As such he is bound to the subject-object structure of reality, he is an object for us as subjects. At the same time we are objects for him as subject." Tillich emphasizes the externality involved here by claiming that such a "tyrant" God "makes me into an object which is nothing but an object," since he is "all-powerful and all-knowing." (But only to the extent that a being among others can be so.) The apparent alternative to this external God is suggested a little later: "If the self participates in the power of being-itself it receives itself back. For the power of being acts through the power of the individual selves" (rather than in separation from or clear contrast to the individual selves). Also Tillich asserts that God should not be treated as "a partner with whom one collaborates," as "it is impossible to draw him into the context of the ego-world and the subject-object correlation." This is very indicative, for being a partner suggests an unambiguously distinct being with simply distinct powers and duties.

What has preceded is in a somewhat indirect or negative form: God is not subject to the subject-object structure and as such is opposite to the
Tillich as Panentheist

separation involved in that. Tillich is sometimes more
direct and positive. These positive comments view
God's transcending the subject-object structure in
terms of perfect knowledge and truth with respect to
the world. Avers Tillich, the power of being "is the
basis of truth, because it is the transcendance [sic]
of subject and object," or is the principle of
knowledge, because "he is the identity of subject and
object." As Tillich also puts it, God "is the
prius of the separation and interaction of subject and
object." Or more fully, the power of being "precedes
every separation and makes every interaction possible,
because it is the point of identity without which
neither separation nor interaction can be thought.
This refers basically to the separation and interaction
of subject and object, in knowing as well as in
acting." God is the "glue" which holds together the
"subjects" and "objects," which are more or less
external to each other, because God is not. Finally,
this passage on divine knowledge makes the connection
between transcending the subject-object structure and
panentheistic eminence very clear:

Therefore we have always had to have a theology
that combats the idea of a god who simply knows
more than men. Instead, theology insists on a
God who knows everything. And that is something
entirely different, qualitatively different,
because this is not a knowledge in terms of
subject-object. It is the knowledge of being
the "creative ground" of everything. And
therefore everything participates in him, and he in it.\textsuperscript{111}

Tilich writes in terms of a transcendence of the subject-object structure in our awareness of God, and indeed of some kind of identity of this awareness with the ultimate of which we are aware. It has been noted that Tillich believes in an immediate awareness of God by all persons, a "mystical a priori." To the extent we have an immediate awareness of the divine consciousness, this would mean that we transcend a subject-object relationship in the sense of God's being a person external to us in the way other finite beings are. And if this awareness is in some sense a totally immediate one, this itself implies some kind of identity of this awareness with the ultimate of which we are aware. Looking at it from the angle of the divine experience, since God's transcending the subject-object structure entails the knowing and empowering of creaturely experiences with total immediacy, our immediate awareness of God must also be God's experience of knowing and empowering--or more precisely part of the divine experience. God's awareness of us and our immediate awareness of God coinhere or "merge." (This word and perhaps "coinhere" could have the unfortunate implication that two independent entities have come together--thus the quotation marks.) But they merge only in certain aspects. Human immediate awareness of God does not intuit the concrete contents of God's experience by any means. (The most we might thereby know concretely
about the divine experience is that our total concrete experience is immediately embraced by it.)

The key passages in this connection follow: 1) "In terms like ultimate, unconditional, infinite, absolute, the difference between subjectivity and objectivity is overcome. The ultimate of the act of faith and the ultimate that is meant in the act of faith are one and the same." 2) In faith, "the source of this act is present beyond the cleavage of subject and object." 3) "Prayer is a possibility only insofar as the subject-object structure is overcome; hence, it is an ecstatic possibility."

There is a conceivable interpretation of the above union of God and humankind that would undermine a viable panentheism. It is the extreme mysticism in which the subject-object structure, and all structure, is completely dissolved for God--and for us insofar as we ecstatically are one with God. In this case God's transcendence of the externality of the subject-object structure would only be with respect to an aspect of ourselves. God would be quite separated from us as embodied, as having an environment, and as enjoying particular values--in short, from the whole world as concrete. God would be more subject to the subject-object cleavage as far as the world in its particularity is concerned than we are! This would be God as wholly undifferentiated. This is hardly the type of nonseparation, inclusion, or perfect knowledge that has been evident heretofore concerning God's relation to the world.
And one cannot find much more support for it coming from the angle of our awareness of God. Tillich does speak of "the disappearance of the ordinary subject-object scheme in the experience of the ultimate." But this does not mean that the concrete is lost. Tillich seems to hold that there must be a concrete element in every experience of God. Remember that awareness of God is not a "state of mind" or "encounter" besides others, but that it is in, with, and through every state of mind or encounter. (For there is always immediate awareness of God for Tillich. But this does not entail that every experience is equally revelatory.) Thus, the concrete, that is, ourselves and other things, are experienced as immediate parts of the divine life to the extent we are aware of God, rather than as simply independent entities, as they tend to be in "the ordinary subject-object scheme." This "transcendent unity" one has with others is not a unity in which everything is more or less absorbed into everything else, and individuality and particularity are lost:

He who prays earnestly is aware of his own situation and his "neighbor's," but he sees it under the Spiritual Presence's influence and in light of the divine direction of life's processes. In these experiences, nothing of the objective world is dissolved into mere subjectivity. Rather, it is all preserved and even increased. But it is not preserved under the dimension of self-awareness and in the
subject-object scheme. A union of subject and object has taken place in which the independent existence of each is overcome; new unity is created. Of course, Tillich is not suggesting that we immediately intuit the contents of God's perfect knowledge of someone else. We get no new information directly, but rather our attitude is affected. The subject-object scheme in the sense that we remain relatively separated from or ignorant of others is "preserved," though transformed. More could be said about the strong mystical element in Tillich's doctrine of God and its relation to the concrete and particular. But I believe enough has been offered here to uphold adequately the panentheistic eminence involved for Tillich in the divine transcendence of the subject-object structure against any counter argument based on that mystical element.

Before we leave this section on immediate awareness of the divine "beyond the subject-object structure," I should mention that such awareness is optional as regards the essential requirements of panentheism. That we are included in the divine experience without mediation or loss, that we are expressions of God as the ultimate cause which is not separated from but acts through us, does not necessarily imply that we are aware of being included in or being expressions of the divine life. That there is no resistance as it were to our being known by God, that God is not a clearly distinct being or cause from us, that there is an utter
coinherence in one sense, could just as easily imply especial difficulty in grasping God as imply an immediate awareness of God. It would be interesting to know if Tillich believed animals to have an immediate awareness of God, for they are certainly included within the divine awareness with perfect intimacy. Hartshorne is consistent on this score, holding that all concrete individuals (which include subatomic particles for this panpsychist) have some immediate, albeit dim or vague, prehension of God.

In connection with God's transcendence of the subject-object cleavage, we have seen Tillich declare that God cannot be an object for us as subjects.\textsuperscript{clxii} Sometimes Tillich uses a related formula (that appears to recognize that "in the logical sense of the word" one cannot speak of God without making God an object\textsuperscript{clxiii} and that in relating to God there is inescapably that "personal" element in which in some sense God is something other than oneself\textsuperscript{clxiiij}). He writes that God remains a subject even if God becomes an object.\textsuperscript{clxiv} This points to the fact that, panentheistically understood, our very relating to God, our "looking at" God, is completely within God, that God knows this with perfect immediacy and that even this is ultimately God working through us (to view it from both the passive and active angles). (That Tillich is willing to speak of God as "subject," which has meant for him a conscious or sentient being knowing something, is further evidence that he is not wanting to deny that God is conscious, in the general sense of
Tillich also expresses the idea that our relating to God is within God with this type of formulation: Our "knowledge of God is the knowledge God has of himself." Likewise "man's love of God is the love with which God loves himself." Prayer receives similar treatment: "We can only pray to the God who prays to himself through us." Even our searching for God must be within the divine life: "In every serious question about God, God asks the question of himself through man;..." Finally, this reflection, also on prayer, describes more fully the paradoxical character of a relationship with God:

In every true prayer God is both he to whom we pray and he who prays through us. For it is the divine Spirit who creates the right prayer. At this point the ontological structure which makes God an object of us as subjects is infinitely transcended. God stands in the divine-human reciprocity, but only as he who transcends it and comprises both sides of the reciprocity. He reacts, but he reacts to that which is his own act working through our finite freedom.

Other times our deliberate relating to God is not singled out. Rather all of human or creaturely life seems to be the target. It is said that God "knows," "loves," "recognizes," "wills," or "expresses" God's self through "man," "the creature," "the finite," "the finite beings," or the "finite mind."
A cursory reading of this type of expression might be that God is narcissistic. However, the real message of such formulations is that the creatures are so utterly and immediately present to God as ultimate ground that divine knowing and loving of them are knowing and loving of (parts of) God's self, that in the divine case there is no conflict between loving oneself and loving others, as the latter is within or "simultaneous" with the former.\textsuperscript{clxxx} That God does love the creatures is spelled out in one instance: "Agape is first of all the love God has toward the creature and through the creature toward himself."\textsuperscript{clxxxi}

In expressions such as God knows God's self through the creatures, God is grammatically or explicitly the only actor. In addition, in some of the observations on our relating to God, the emphasis was on God as actor. If these are interpreted to allow that God is active in absolutely every sense in the divine-human interrelationship or coinherence, Tillich's panentheism would be pushed towards pantheism. In the longer quotation on prayer and on the divine-human interaction in general, Tillich does say that it is our "finite freedom" through which God works. Just how well Tillich safeguards real human freedom will be pursued in chapter 5.

In a very important section, Tillich talks of divine-human relations in a more formal way than in most of the preceding remarks:

But they are not the relations of God with something else. They are the inner relations of the
divine life....the question is whether there are external relations between God and the creature. The doctrine of creation affirms that God is the creative ground of everything in every moment. In this sense there is no creaturely independence from which an external relation between God and the creature could be derived. If God is said to be in relation, this statement is as symbolic as the statement God is a living God.\textsuperscript{clxxxii}

(In this last sentence we have encapsulated the two specific factors that make attributions to God symbolic for Tillich: panentheistic eminence and transcendence of the split between potentiality and actuality.) I take this to be a clearly and clear panentheistic statement that does not need further interpretation.

Tillich goes on to formally define holiness in terms of this internality of all things to God:

The unapproachable character of God, or the impossibility of having a relation with him in the proper sense of the word, is expressed in the word "holiness." God is essentially holy, and every relation with him involves the consciousness that it is paradoxical to be related to that which is holy.\textsuperscript{clxxxiii}

Because of his holiness, God cannot be a "partner in action,"\textsuperscript{clxxxiv} a "partner with whom one collaborates,"\textsuperscript{clxxxv} cannot be drawn "into the context of the ego-world and the subject-object correlation."\textsuperscript{clxxxvi}

For God "embraces" and is absolutely near to any
Thus, as indicated earlier, God is not a partner for Tillich because this implies a clearly separate or distinct being with unambiguously distinct powers and duties, rather than God as embracing and acting through the creatures. Since holiness is correlative with divinity for Tillich, being the general quality that "qualifies all other qualities as divine," it is significant that it has been defined and described panentheistically by Tillich.

"Participation" by God is used panentheistically by Tillich. It is a term basically relating to knowledge and emphasizes the passive aspect. We have already encountered it in the earlier remark on God's perfect knowledge (as not being in terms of subject-object) and in the claim that God is not a person or individual because of absolute participation. It is also used in respect to Jesus' comment on God's knowing the number of hairs on our heads and when a bird falls. If perfect knowledge involves complete participation in or nonseparation from everything, conversely, "doubt is based on man's separation from the whole of reality, on his lack of universal participation, on the isolation of his individual self."

Tillich also has this to say about divine participation: "God participates in everything that is; he has community with it; he shares in its destiny. Certainly such statements are highly symbolic." Lest anyone think that by the mention of "symbolic" here Tillich is backing away from absolute
participation in the name of transcendence, these are the words that immediately follow: "They can have the unfortunate logical implication that there is something alongside God in which he participates from the outside." Thus, "participation" is not "positive" or strong enough, unless it carries the connotation of panentheistic eminence when it is applied to God! Tillich then notes the active aspect, God as ultimate source, implicit in the passive aspect of participation: "But the divine participation creates that in which it participates."

Another formulation that suggests the passive aspect of presence and knowledge is one we have already met: God is nearer to "the I," "my ego," or "the ego," than the ego is to itself, or nearer to "the creatures" or "things" than they are to themselves." It is used panentheistically to counter the notion of a (simply distinct) person or being "alongside" or separated from others. Two such instances have already been related in which the wording is similar to that of the preceding sentence. Elsewhere the same theme is played as the phrase counteracts "personalism" and the idea that an "ego-thou" relationship is strictly or nonparadoxically applicable to God.

We come now to the last category of words and phrases, those that are the most explicitly panentheistic, recalling the literal rendering of panentheism ("all in God"): "in" or "within" God, and God "embraces" or "includes," or the like. In a general vein,
it is stated that being-itself "embraces everything" or "everything particular," that God "includes the finite, and with it, nonbeing," that the divine "center is infinite and includes everything that is," and that God is "that in which everything has its being." In one of the two instances in which he uses the term "panentheism," Tillich agrees that if you call an idea of Calvin's "panentheism, that could be all right, because this means that everything is in God" (though to call it "pantheism" would be misguided). This idea is that all things "are instruments through which God works in every moment." As we have seen Tillich subscribes to this type of idea.

Sometimes a more specific aspect of God or the world is featured, as in: "The divine self-love includes all creatures." Or, "spatiality" or "extension" is in God as creative ground. Regarding the divine-human relationship, he writes, "If we speak, as we must, of the ego-thou relation between God and man, the thou embraces the ego and consequently the entire relationship." In the only other passage in which Tillich actually uses the term panentheism (specifically, "eschatological pan-en-theism"), everything is "in" God as potential, as actual and thus as dependent on the divine creative power, and as ultimately fulfilled. In an expression related to God's inclusion, Tillich speaks in terms of a realization of being "a part of that which...is the ground of the whole."
We have twice seen Tillich characterize the relationship between the infinite and the finite as one of "within." Tillich talks in that manner in at least six places (specifically using "within" in four of them). The infinite has the finite ("contained") "within" itself, is "embracing the finite," "embraces itself and the finite," or "comprises his infinity and finitude." If this were not so, if the finite were "besides," "alongside," "outside," or "in addition to" the infinite, the infinite becomes finite.

As has been noted, some perceive Tillich's God as the undifferentiated. That Tillich speaks of "the impossibility of identifying God with anything particular" may seem to support this. But when Tillich expounds upon this type of declaration in connection with inclusion by being-itself, formlessness is not the kind of nonparticularity that emerges: "This 'being' transcends everything particular without becoming empty, for it embraces everything particular." Or more elaborately: "The nonbeing of negative theology means 'not being anything special,' being beyond every concrete predicate. This nonbeing embraces everything; it means being everything; it is being-itself." The "tension" between the "beyondness" and the "embracing" is highlighted in this passage:

Where we use symbolic terms like "ground of being" we mean that we experience something which is an object of our ultimate concern, which underlies everything that is, is its
creative ground or formative unity, and cannot be defined beyond these negative terms.... And on the other hand these negative statements imply, always in relation to a positive statement, that this same ground of being is not this or that, yet is at the same time all this finite world in so far as it is its "ground." ccxxxi

The general picture is this: God transcends each concrete thing and all specific predicates (at least as applied to finite realities). But this does not mean that things in their particularity are external to God. Certainly, there is evidenced here a very great concern by Tillich that God not be too limited, "finitized," domesticated, by our conceptions, that God not be concrete in such a way that ultimacy is compromised. Elsewhere, this is evidenced in his "Protestant principle" and in his belief that "an element of 'atheism'" is required for a proper theism, ccxxii even to the point of preferring atheism over a too limited understanding of the ultimate, ccxxiii as in supranaturalism. ccxxiv But this does not translate into God as the simply undifferentiated. Divine inclusion of everything cannot be comprehended in terms of formlessness, for then God could embrace things only to whatever extent they lacked plurality, complexity, and particularity. (Being-itself would be rather "empty.") For to say that God "embraces everything particular," is "everything," "is...all this finite world" (emphases mine), forcefully shows Til-
Tillich's desire to affirm full inclusion by God, inclusion of the world in its concreteness. That desire is also apparent in this phrase: "the concrete is present in the depth of the ultimate."
cxxv

Thus, as transcendence of the subject-object structure permits God to be infinitely close to things, not being any one particular thing (a particular thing among others) frees God to embrace all particularity. (In a related vein, Tillich avows that "the character of a time which is not related to any of the dimensions of life but to all of them, thus transcending all of them, belongs to the mystery of being-itself."cxxxvi) God's radical transcendence entails perfect immanence or coinherence, God's infinity entails embracing of the finite: "...the infinite transcendence of the infinite over the finite...does not contradict but rather confirms the coincidence of opposites."cxxxvii And I might add, if the finite insofar as it is concrete were external to God, it would be "alongside" or "besides" God, and God would be "finite."

While total nondifferentiation or formlessness is ruled out by, and a desire to affirm God's all-inclusiveness is patent in, the material on God's nonparticularity above, the "negative theology" tendency of saying nothing "special" about God beyond God's including or being the ground of everything—which is a manifestation of the Tillichian strain of emphasizing or over-emphasizing the divine mystery and infinite transcendence delineated in the first chapter—could conflict with that very inclusion of everything.
For this inclusion may entail certain "concrete" predicates like omniscience, perfect temporality, and divine suffering. Practically speaking, though, Tillich does not take the road of agnosticism regarding such predicates (and traditional "negative theology" generally did not either). He avers omniscience, as we have seen. And, as will be developed in chapter 5, while there is an element of agnosticism concerning temporality and suffering as divine attributes, what most characterizes Tillich's handling of these is an attempt to hold on to both the affirmations of timeless eternity (or at least to its language) and impassibility by classical theology and the affirmations of divine temporality and suffering by panentheism, with resulting ambiguity (on temporality) and incoherence (on suffering).

Finally, I will consider Tillich's three favorite terms for God, "being-itself," "power of being," and "ground of being." Our initial concern will be whether they are in themselves panentheistic (at least for Tillich). Of course, insofar as Tillich has developed his doctrine of God panentheistically and used these as stand-ins for "God," they acquire panentheistic associations. But my question concerns the extent to which these terms have more inherent panentheistic connotations. Of course, how a word or phrase strikes one depends upon one's culture and personal experience. I will speak for myself and for Tillich insofar as I judge him to have revealed himself.
If being-itself is not taken as the abstract common denominator of everything that has being (as it could well be in our present culture), then the following meanings fairly immediately and naturally suggest themselves: Being-itself cannot but be. Being-itself is or includes all being. Now Tillich never out-and-out announces that he is telling us the intrinsic connotations of "being-itself." Thus, one cannot usually be sure whether he is intending to invest it with definition and meaning or just making explicit what the term in itself suggests. Whatever his intentions, he does indicate, as suggested before, that God is not a being who may or may not exist, but being-itself. "Power of being" is once mentioned along with being-itself in this connection. And as recently mentioned, God's nonparticularity "means being everything; it is being-itself." That Tillich does use phrases like "God is not a being, but being-itself" in panentheistic ways, but often without being terribly explicit, suggests the possibility that he expects the term in itself to clarify or reinforce his meaning by pointing to the all-inclusive whole of reality (that as such cannot be unambiguously contrasted to distinct other beings). (The same thing can be said for "ground of being" and "power of being." And that he pens this sentence without further explanation suggests the same possibility: "But the ego-thou relation, although it is the central and most dynamic relation, is not the only one, for God is being-itself." In the follow-
ing, Tillich may be pointing out ultimate causality as a more or less intrinsic or immediate meaning of "being-itself," though it is not totally clear how much it is a matter of immediate meaning rather than of further implication or deduction:

Ever since the time of Plato it has been known...that the concept of being as being, or being itself, points to the power inherent in everything, the power of resisting nonbeing. Therefore, instead of saying that God is first of all being-itself, it is possible to say that he is the power of being in everything and above everything, the infinite power of being. 

"Power of being" as a connotation of being-itself, or on its own, certainly suggests God's necessary existence and most immediately God's giving the power of being to everything else. But panentheistic inclusion is not obvious here in my opinion. Tillich, though, as suggested in a parenthetical remark above, may be intending "power of being" in itself to clarify or reinforce the panentheistic meaning of certain passages by pointing to the cohering ultimate power in everything. This ends my consideration of the intrinsic meanings of "being-itself" and "power of being," save for an upcoming passage primarily on "ground of being," that also involves them.

Unlike with "being-itself" and "power of being," Tillich is very explicit on the connotations of "ground of being," which are panentheistic for him:

"Ground" is such a symbolic term. It oscillates
between cause and substance and transcends both of them. It indicates that the ground of revelation is neither a cause which keeps itself at a distance from the revelatory effect nor a substance which effuses itself into the effect.\textsuperscript{ccxlv} [Here are contrasts with both traditional theism and pantheism.]

He also offers this on "ground of being," part of which was rendered previously:

In so far as it is symbolical, it points to the mother-quality of giving birth, carrying, embracing, and, at the same time, of calling back, resisting independence of the created, and swallowing it. The uneasy feeling of many Protestants about the first (not the last!) statement about God, that he is being-itself or the ground of being, is partly rooted in the fact that their religious consciousness and, even more, their moral conscience are shaped by the demanding father-image of the God who is conceived as a person among others. The attempt to show that nothing can be said about God theologically before the statement is made that he is the power of being in all being is, at the same time, a way of reducing the predominance of the male element in the symbolization of the divine.\textsuperscript{ccxlv}

That according to Tillich "many Protestants" react against the declaration that God is being-itself or the ground of being (and apparently also that God is the
power of being), because they sense its denial of God as a clearly separate "person among others," is certainly very strong evidence that Tillich believes "being-itself" and "power of being," as well as "ground of being" on which he is totally explicit, to be intrinsically panentheistic in their connotations. Personally, apart from further definition or context, I take "ground of being" and "power of being" to be general expressions meaning only the ultimate source of everything, which can and has been understood in many different and, indeed, incompatible ways. But that Tillich has taken them in themselves to entail the nonseparation of the God who immediately works through and embraces all is another indication of his panentheism.

Of course, there is a further question of what are the reasonable implications and entailments of being the ultimate source of everything. My above disagreement with Tillich may simply be a matter of just how immediate and obvious these implications are. In any case, Tillich definitely feels that as the ultimate source of being, God cannot but be utterly near to things, coinhering with (though transcending), acting through, and fully including them. The subsequent comments, which we have seen before, though not with this particular focus, illustrate this:

1) Certain statements have the unfortunate logical implication that there is something alongside God in which he participates from the outside. But the divine participation creates
Tillich as Panentheist

that in which it participates. ccxlvii

2) The doctrine of creation affirms that God is the creative ground of everything in every moment. In this sense there is no creaturely independence from which an external relation between God and the creature could be derived. ccxlviii

3) ...theology insists on a God who knows everything. And that is something entirely different, qualitatively different, because this is not a knowledge in terms of subject-object. It is the knowledge of being the "creative ground" of everything. And therefore everything participates in him and he in it. ccxlvi

The following stipulation, of which we have heretofore only seen a small part, is also relevant:

I could agree with Gustave Weigel's statement that God, for my thought, is the "matrix of reality," if matrix means that in which everything has its being. The term "Ground of Being" points to the same truth (which is also implied in the symbol creation continua). ccxlix

While God's being the ultimate source of all being, dependent on nothing else for existence, guarantees that nothing will be external to God, conversely if anything is external to or "alongside" God, God is rendered finite, and "the real power of being must lie beyond" the supposed "God" and what is alongside it. Obviously the active aspect of the deity, God as ultimate causality and power, is very important to Tillich's doctrine of God. ccxlix Two of his three favor-
ite terms for God, "ground of being" and "power of being," in themselves emphasize this facet. The active aspect of ultimate power is quite necessary for a reasonable panentheism (and for any competing doctrine of "God" worthy of the name), being the ultimate basis of the passive aspect of perfect presence to and knowledge of the creatures and their actions. Hopefully the active aspect will include the passive one without swallowing it. Whether Tillich has given the divine passivity its due will be discussed in chapter 5. Whether the active and the passive can be held together without final contradiction, which has implications for the coherence of any theism, will be considered in chapter 6.

In this chapter, in expounding numerous Tillichian expressions, showing how Tillich has used and explained them, and drawing out their interconnections, I believe I have made a compelling case that God for Tillich is panentheistic and that this is crucial for comprehending Tillich's understanding of God.
Tillich as Panentheist

ENDNOTES

i. Systematic Theology, 2:23; Theology of Culture, pp. 4-5, 11, 130; Courage to Be, p. 184; Protestant Era, p. 119; Interpretation of History, p. 222; "Theologie der Kultur," pp. 43-44.


iv. Systematic Theology, 1:172, 3:294; Theology of Culture, p. 130; Protestant Era, p. 163.

v. Philosophical Interrogations, p. 381.


x. Theology of Culture, p. 130.

xi. See "Tillich Replies," p. 23, for explicitation.
Actually, instances of "being-itself" all alone do not outnumber instances of either of the others, but when more than one of the three is listed, "being-itself" almost always comes first. Ultimate Concern, p. 46, stipulates "being-itself" as his preferred term for God but indicates that it probably has lost its effectiveness in our culture--this is why he has often used
"ground of being," says Tillich.

xxiv. Biblical Religion, pp. 82-83; Systematic Theology, 1: 205.


xxvii. E.g., My Search for Absolutes, p. 82; Theology of Culture, p. 61; Courage To Be, p. 179; Biblical Religion, p. 13; Systematic Theology, 2: 10.

xxviii. Courage To Be, p. 188.


xxxi. Dynamics of Faith, p. 11.

xxxii. Theology of Culture, p. 25.


xxxiv. Systematic Theology, 1: 205, 2: 23. Cf. 1: 212. "Tillich Replies," p. 23, affirms "no difference between essence and existence" in God. Traditionally this means both that it is God's "essence to exist," that is, necessary existence, and that divine existence lives up to the qualitative divine
"essence." It is not clear whether Tillich intends one or the other or both here. In *Systematic Theology*, 1: 205, he refers to both facets of the divine essence-existence relationship, without explicitly noting the two distinct aspects. A Hartshornean version is that God's abstract perfect nature necessarily finds instantiation in some concrete divine state or other.


xxxvi. *Interpretation of History*, p. 223.


xxxix. *Theology of Culture*, pp. 4-5.

xl. *Ultimate Concern*, p. 166. See also *Courage To Be*, p. 184.


Systematic Theology, 1: 273.

xliv. Courage To Be, p. 184.

xlvi. Protestant Era, p. 163.


xlviii. My Search for Absolutes, p. 127.


1. Interpretation of History, pp. 222-23.


lii. Protestant Era, p. 79. See also Systematic Theology, 1: 235.


liv. Systematic Theology, 1: 245.


98 Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich


lxi. Of course, one could attempt a unique sense of "a being" appropriate to God, in which this being is not unambiguously contrasted to distinct other beings. Hartshorne does make such an attempt, as we shall see in chapter 3.

lxii. Systematic Theology, 1: 205.

lxiii. Interpretation of History, p. 222. Compare this use of "God above God" to that in Courage To Be. Primarily, this latter has to do with a certainty despite a state of radical doubt about concrete formulations concerning God, as he notes in Philosophical Interrogations, p. 379, and Systematic Theology, 2: 12. Or somewhat similarly, with God's transcendence of "finite symbols" expressing God, as in Christianity and World Religions, p. 90. But as stated earlier, the God above God is identified with the ultimate ground of being and is pictured panentheistically (cf. "Tillich Replies," p. 23). Thus, a tension exists between "God above God" as positive, as summing up his doctrine of God, which the "God over God" of Interpretation of History can be seen as doing, and as negative, as questioning any and all formulations about God insofar as God is the God above God (though formulations may have their place insofar as one is not radically doubting all particular formulations and insofar as God does not utterly transcend all language about God). The two aspects can find a point of unity, though, insofar as normal concrete formulations tend to make God a being, separate and separated from others, and thus less than ultimate.

lxiv. Interpretation of History, p. 223. Or at least it is a part of Tillich's meaning in this phrase.
translated from the German. As to why the unconditioned meaning that is not beside the finite meanings cannot be identified with them, Tillich mentions the "inexhaustibility" of unconditioned meaning, without which it would "become a single finite meaning," needing "a new basis of meaning." This might suggest that God cannot be a meaning (beside others) because of inexhaustibility. In his English works, Tillich is not given to speaking of God in terms of meaning, nor does inexhaustibility figure into comments that God is not a being, thing, etc. (beside others). Actually inexhaustibility would not be a good basis for holding that, in contradistinction to finite things, God is not a meaning (or being), for finite things have some inexhaustibility also, as the German Tillich often indicates.

Externality may also be a connotation of the "alongside" in this remark from Systematic Theology, 1: 242: The Old Testament prophets "never make God a being alongside others, into something conditioned by something else which is also conditioned."

lxv. This is a central "anxiety of finitude" for Tillich. It was "this anxiety which drove the Greeks to ask insistently and ceaselessly the question of the unchangeable" (Systematic Theology, 1: 197). Formally, this anxiety concerns the "category" of "substance" (Systematic Theology, 1: 197-98) and the ontological polarities of dynamics-form and freedom-destiny (Systematic Theology, 1: 199-201).

lxvi. This does not necessarily mean we would--or rather that God does--have only one choice. It does mean that the only options that would be possible would be ones compatible with essential perfection. That there could be only one such choice is at least not obvious.
However, within this basic structure, he does regard temporality as the "central category of finitude." (Systematic Theology, 1: 193. Emphasis mine.)

Tillich cannot fairly be accused of Cartesian subject-object dualism. There is always union as well as separation in our encounters for Tillich. The self-world correlation is basic (Systematic Theology, 1: 164), or to put it another way, he views someone perceiving something as the basic unit of reality. He specifically inveighs against Cartesian dualism (Systematic Theology, 1: 168, 171, 174; Theology of Culture, p. 107; Shaking of the Foundations, pp. 85-86) and Cartesian "pure consciousness" (Systematic Theology, 1: 171, 173-74; Theology of Culture, pp. 107, 115; Protestant Era, p. 134).

There Tillich details how supranaturalism renders God finite in terms of each of the four categories. However, it is not directly concerned with the issue of God as not a being. Regarding "theological theism" in comparison with
"supranaturalism," one could say the latter is cruder in explicitly placing God in a heavenly world and in limiting divine creativity to a definite temporal period.

lxxvi. Ultimate Concern, p. 166.
lxxvii. Theology of Culture, p. 130.
lxxx. Systematic Theology, 1: 235.
lxxxi. Systematic Theology, 1: 172.
lxxxii. Systematic Theology, 1: 127.
lxxxiii. They are: "If there is a knowledge about God, it is God who knows himself through man. God remains the subject, even if he becomes a logical object (cf. I Cor. 13:12)." (Systematic Theology, 1: 172.)
lxxxiv. "Systematic Theology 383," pp. 89-90. The parentheses (around "call") mean the transcriber was not sure of Tillich's exact word(s). The second ellipsis is also the transcriber's.
lxxxv. As Tillich says in Systematic Theology, 1: 251, the finite "is distinguished from the infinite, but it is not separated from it."
Nature and Existence of God: A Study of Tillich and Hartshorne" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1966), pp. 169-70, notices from this passage that Tillich considers the concept of a "person" as too transcendent for God. However, he does not draw any panentheistic implications from it. Moreover, he does not see the (rather obviously intended) connection between God as finite and as exclusive here. He sees them as in tension, rather than as complementary, claiming that "person" is too "determinate" to be applied to God for Tillich and that inclusive immanence tends to make God determinate. As I will argue in chapter 5, Tillich does compromise God's inclusion of all, God's total immanence--but not with his denial that God is a person, which is not made on the grounds of purely general mystery or of "indeterminateness," but of nonseparation and inclusivity.

lxxxviii. See pp. 44 and 48 above, including endnote 63 with respect to the latter.

lxxxix. Peter Bertocci, Questions to Paul Tillich, in Philosophical Interrogations, p. 384.

xc. This assertion by Luther is also mentioned in Biblical Religion, p. 84. It is another example of Tillich's seeing panentheism as represented in traditional theology. See also "Systematic Theology 383," pp. 89-90, on this.

xci. Cf.: "...the infinite and the finite are not in different places, but they are different dimensions." ("Systematic Theology 383," p. 90.)


xciv. Ibid.

xcv. Ibid.


xcvii. *Systematic Theology*, 1:244. Lest anyone think that Tillich has in effect ruled out the possibility of any symbolism by the first sentence, he does add later in the paragraph that "the elements which constitute the basic ontological structure can become symbols because they do not speak of kinds of being (self and world) but of qualities of being...which are valid in their symbolic sense when applied to being-itself." In other words, God cannot directly or simply be called "a self" or "the world," but attributes normally applied to them can be utilized.

xcviii. Again, however, this does not necessarily preclude modifying the normal meanings of the concepts "self," "being," etc., so as to render them suitable to the extraordinary divine case.


c. *Systematic Theology*, 1:243-44. That God is a person simply cannot stand by itself for Tillich: "He is a person and the negation of himself as a person." (*Biblical Religion*, p. 85.)

ci. *Systematic Theology*, 1:244. In this and the preceding remark, Tillich is explicitly stating how the polar elements of individualization and participation are transcended or perfectly united in God. In "Reply to Interpretation," p. 334, he writes that the polar
categories are negated as "qualitatively distinct," which apparently serves to explain a later assertion that God is not a person. While it is not explicit, it could be that the polarity of individualization and participation is decisive here, in keeping with Tillich's general position that it is externality and exclusivity that makes being a person inappropriate for God.


ciii. Biblical Religion, pp. 82-83.

civ. Biblical Religion, p. 27. This is strikingly analogous to Hartshorne's idea that our knowledge of various attributes is based (in part) on an immediate awareness of these as perfectly instantiated in God. Tillich, however, criticizes Hartshorne on this score as having a via eminentiae that needs to be balanced by a via negationis, specifically by the negation of the distinctness of the polar elements ("Reply to Interpretation," p. 334). As will be developed in the next chapter (see pp. 137-39 below), Hartshorne actually has his own version of the negation of the distinctness of (or, better, the tension between) the polarities of individualization and participation (such negation is itself a panentheistic formulation and is a necessary implication of any panentheism), though he does not share Tillich's view that such distinctness negates God's being "a person." What Tillich might mean by such negating in relation to dynamics-form and freedom-destiny and by implication whether Hartshorne is criticized fairly will be handled in chapter 5.

cv. Courage To Be, pp. 156-57, 169.

cvi. Courage To Be, p. 187; Christianity and World
Tillich as Panentheist 105


cviii. Theology of Culture, p. 62.


cx. Systematic Theology, 1:244.

cxi. "Reply to Interpretation," p. 341. See also Theology of Culture, p. 61.


cxiii. Systematic Theology, 1:245. Cf. Theology of Culture, p. 131; Biblical Religion, p. 84.

cxiv. Philosophical Interrogations, pp. 380, 381.


cxvi. Systematic Theology, 1:244, 245.


cxviii. Systematic Theology, 1:156.

cxix. Systematic Theology, 1:223, 2:12.

cxx. Theology of Culture, p. 131-32.

cxxi. Streiker, p. 275; Ferre, Searchlights on Theology, p. 127; Killen, pp. 113, 124; McLean, p. 54; Martin Luther King, Jr., "A Comparison of the

cxxii. Killen, p. 124; Ferre, Searchlights on Theology, p. 127; McLean, p. 54; King, p. 155.


cxxiv. Ferre, Searchlights on Theology, p. 127

cxxv. McLean, p. 54.

cxxvi. King, p. 155. On this page, King technically only asks the question of "whether...God is an unconscious reservoir of power or whether he is a conscious person." But it would be fair to conclude that his answer in the remainder of the section is that Tillich's God is the former. (See esp. p. 158.)


cxxviii. Systematic Theology, 1:250.


cxxxi. Systematic Theology, 1:172, 272, 278, 3:254; Courage To Be, p. 185; Ultimate Concern, p. 173; "Reply to Interpretation," p. 334.

cxxxii. Systematic Theology, 1:9, 3:252-65 passim; Dynamics of Faith, p. 12.
Tillich as Panentheist


Cxxxix. *Dynamics of Faith*, p. 61; *Theology of Culture*, p. 25.

Cxl. "Uberwindung des Religionsbegriffs," p. 367. The preceding ten endnotes inclusive do not claim to be a complete list of the appearances of these terms in this context.


Cxliii. *Courage To Be*, p. 185.


Cxlv. See *Ultimate Concern*, p. 173, which also speaks of a "heavenly tyrant," and see endnote 152 below.


Tillich associates omniscience and a lack of exclusivity or externality in relation to the creatures.

Compare Tillich’s declaration that "omniscience is not the faculty of a highest being who is supposed to know all objects" (Systematic Theology, 1:278) and the earlier reference to an external God as an "all-knowing" tyrant (Courage To Be, p. 185) to the insistence here on "a God who knows everything." Though knowing all may appear to be common to all three passages, in the first two, it should be understood as more or less external knowledge. (The buzz-word "highest being," the word "objects," and a subsequent reference to subsuming God under the subject-object scheme support this for the first). In that case, God might know something about everything, but not everything about everything. God would be "a god who simply knows more than" us. In our passage, Tillich goes on to speak of "a heavenly tyrant who has a better knowledge of physics than we have" (in contrast to God as "in every atom"). This suggests that the tyrant God just knows more than humans, but is not truly "all-knowing."

In our passage and in Systematic Theology, 1:278, Tillich talks of God within the subject-object structure as knowing what might or would have happened if what did happen had not happened. This could mean that God as perfectly intimate with the world has
deterministic knowledge—that is, that only one thing in each case could have happened, apparently determined by God. Or it could mean merely that God has knowledge of things insofar as they are not indeterminate—or were not indeterminate (as this remark pertains to the past). That is, God knows the range of the possible, and unlike we who are relatively (indeed, mostly) separated from things, does not speculate about the issuance of hypothetical possibilities that never were real possibilities. Or, I grant, it could mean something else.

cliii. Dynamics of Faith, p. 11.

cliv. Ibid.

clv. Systematic Theology, 3:120. See also 1:127. Cf. 1:111-12.

clvii. Systematic Theology, 1:107, 211, 216. See also Systematic Theology, 3:255; Christianity and World Religions, p. 93. On the other hand, he does recognize that many mystics attempt to reach a union with God apart from any medium of revelation. (E.g., Systematic Theology, 1:140; Dynamics of Faith, p. 60.) We are left to speculate whether he believes mystics actually can (temporarily) lose awareness of anything concrete.

clviii. Systematic Theology, 3:256.

clix. Systematic Theology, 3:119. See also Systematic Theology, 1:282, 2:8, 3:320. And also see Tillich’s section on how the subject-object cleavage affects many facets of life and how the Spiritual Presence fragmentarily overcomes this: Systematic Theology, 3:252-65. There is certainly no absorption of individuality and
particularity indicated here. Though in any case we can participate in it only "fragmentarily," even in "Eternal Life"--the transtemporal fulfillment of each moment of time in which all negativities and ambiguities are entirely overcome (including "the ambiguities of objectivation" [Systematic Theology, 3:414]), "the universal centeredness does not dissolve the individual centers" (Systematic Theology, 3:401; cf. 3:402).

clx. Systematic Theology, 1:109, 110.

clxi. Theology of Culture, p. 25. See also Systematic Theology, 1:271; Biblical Religion, p. 81.

clxii. Systematic Theology, 1:271.


clxiv. Systematic Theology, 1:172, 271, 282, 3:120; Dynamics of Faith, p. 11.

clxv. Dynamics of Faith, p. 11. See also Systematic Theology, 1:271.

clxvi. Systematic Theology, 1:282.


clxx. Courage To Be, p. 180. In this passage Tillich is paraphrasing Spinoza to express his own thought.

clxxi. Systematic Theology, 1:271, 3:138; Courage
Tillich as Panentheist

To Be, p. 180.

clxxii. Systematic Theology, 1:271; Biblical Religion, p. 36.


clxxv. Systematic Theology, 1:271.


clxxvii. Systematic Theology, 1:218.


clxxix. Biblical Religion, p. 36. Tillich is here speaking in the voice of "ontology" (in comparison with biblical religion), but would not disagree with the basic intent of the sentence, though "Absolute Mind" and "finite Mind" might not be his own choice of words.

clxxx. Hartshorne, as we shall see, notes this coincidence of self- and other-love in God. Tillich writes in Systematic Theology, 1:282, that there must be "separation from one's self" for self-love to be possible. In this connection he cites "creaturely freedom" and estrangement or sin. This kind of "separation" is not denied by panentheism;
indeed, it must be affirmed by a panentheism that is true to experience and keeps a healthy distance from pantheism. But this in no way compromises the idea that God includes, knows, or loves the creatures with perfect immediacy and intimacy. Though "separation within himself" a la the trinitarian personae is contrasted with "separation from himself" with regard to the creatures, this must be understood in light of the above: being "separated from" does not preclude being "within" in another sense. In fact, in this passage he indicates "the distinction within God includes the infinity of finite forms." Cf. Systematic Theology, 1:255-56. Also see p. 5 above.

clxxxii. Systematic Theology, 3:138. In this case it is God's love for the creature, rather than the creature's love for God (as in the section on our relating to God as being within God) that is focused upon. In the following phrase from Courage To Be, p. 180, it is not entirely clear which of the focuses Tillich intends: "the love and knowledge with which God loves and knows himself through the love and knowledge of finite beings." Is this "love and knowledge" that which the finite beings have for God or which God has for the finite beings? Probably the latter, for the love and knowledge of God by certain "finite beings," such as animals, is either absent or extremely attenuated.

clxxxiii. Ibid.

clxxxiv. Ibid.

clxxxv. Systematic Theology, 1:272.

clxxxvi. Ibid. Also in Systematic Theology, 1:216,
and Dynamics of Faith, p. 14, holiness is directly associated with transcending the subject-object structure or cleavage.

clxxvii. Systematic Theology, 1:271.
clxxix. Systematic Theology, 1:272.
cxc. Biblical Religion, p. 84.
cxci. Courage To Be, p. 49.
cxcii. Systematic Theology, 1:245.
cxciii. Ibid.
cxciv. Ibid.
cxcv. Courage To Be, p. 187.
cxcvi. Philosophical Interrogations, p. 381.
cxcvii. Systematic Theology, 1:271.
cxcviii. Biblical Religion, p. 84.
cc. Ibid.; Philosophical Interrogations, p. 381.
cci. Biblical Religion, p. 84; Courage To Be, p. 187.
ccii. Systematic Theology, 1:271; Courage To Be, p. 187.
cciii. Systematic Theology, 1:18.
cciv. *My Search for Absolutes*, p. 82.


ccvi. *Philosophical Interrogations*, p. 384. "Center" is said to be symbolic with regard to God, perhaps because it normally entails distinctness and (spatial) separation from others.


ccix. Ibid.


ccxiv. *Systematic Theology*, 3:421. This movement from "essence" through "existence" to "essentialization" does not primarily refer to pre-birth, life, and afterlife. Rather it applies to each moment. Moreover, its application to every moment is not essentially one of temporal progression. The three concepts are better seen as factors within each moment. (*Systematic Theology*, 3:419-22.)


Tillich as Panentheist

Systematic Theology, 1:252; Philosophical Interrogations, pp. 370, 376.


ccxxii. Philosophical Interrogations, p. 376.


ccxxiv. Philosophical Interrogations, p. 376.


ccxxvi. "Systematic Theology 383," p. 87. The phrase "in addition" is in parentheses here, indicating that the transcriber was not sure of Tillich's exact words.

ccxxvii. In addition to the references of the preceding three footnotes, see Systematic Theology, 1:252.

ccxxviii. Christianity and World Religions, p. 67.

ccxxix. My Search for Absolutes, p. 28.

cccxxi. Systematic Theology, 1:188.

cccxxi. Ultimate Concern, pp. 43-44. The "is" here rather than "includes" is in a context that should
not invite accusations that God is exhaustively identical with the world for Tillich. He did receive some criticism for writing that "God is the structure of being," in Systematic Theology, 1:238, 239. Compare the following, from Theology of Culture, p. 10, as a remark that very explicitly notes both identity and transcendence: In overcoming estrangement a person "discovers something that is identical with himself, although it transcends him infinitely,...from which he never has been and never can be separated."

ccxxxii. Theology of Culture, pp. 25, 131.

ccxxxiii. Theology of Culture, pp. 4-5, 25.

ccxxxiv. Systematic Theology, 1:245; Protestant Era, p. 82.

ccxxxv. Systematic Theology, 1:235. Here Tillich is speaking of what "dialectical realism" "tries to show." Dialectical realism is the philosophical analog of "trinitarian monotheism" (Systematic Theology, 1:234) and recalls terms Tillich has employed to describe his conception of the relationship between God and the world, "ecstatic" and "transcendent realism" (See, e.g., Systematic Theology, 2:5-10). That "the concrete is present in the depth of the ultimate" is certainly Tillich's own phrase and owned by him.

ccxxxvi. Systematic Theology, 3:314. Not all of Tillich's statements on God's relation to time are as affirmative of a divine temporality.

ccxxxvii. Systematic Theology, 1:263. The opposites, of course, being the finite and the infinite. The phrase "coincidence of opposites," coined by Nicholas Cusanus, is used more than once by Tillich (also, e.g., Systematic Theology, 1:81, 277;
Philosophical Interrogations, p. 370) and without too much explanation. Ironically, his fullest explanation of the relationship between the infinite and the finite, in "Systematic Theology 383," pp. 89-90, which we have already encountered, mentions Cusanus but not his term.


cx. Systematic Theology, 1:188.

ccli. This response, in "Reply to Interpretation," p. 341, cited earlier in part, is a prime example: "To Mr. Thomas's request to think of God as a being, not alongside but above the other beings, I answer that logically the 'above' is one direction of the 'alongside,' except it means that which is the ground and abyss of all beings. Then, however it is hard to call it a being." Unless "ground of being" has that panentheistic implication for the reader, one is not helped by Tillich's answer to comprehend his resistance to calling God a being (above others).

ccclii. Systematic Theology, 1:289.

cccliii. Systematic Theology, 1:236.

cccliv. Systematic Theology, 1:156.

ccclv. Systematic Theology, 3:293-94.

ccclvi. Systematic Theology, 1:245.
ccxlvii. Systematic Theology, 1:271.


cccl. Systematic Theology, 1:237. Externality is not mentioned in the (somewhat obscure) passage in which this phrase is found, but the phrase is certainly suitable to the context in which I have used it.

ccl. A good case could be made that power is more important in Tillich's doctrine of God than any other more or less particular quality: "The 'almighty God' is the first subject of the Christian credo. It separates exclusive monotheism from all religion in which God is less than being-itself or the power of being.... Faith in the almighty God is the answer to the quest for a courage which is sufficient to conquer the anxiety of finitude" (Systematic Theology, 1:273).

At one point, other attributes are spoken of in terms of omnipotence: eternity, omnipresence, and omniscience are omnipotence with respect to time, space, and the subject-object structure of being respectively (Systematic Theology, 1:274). (Ultimate power ensures that there will be no externality in regard to others due to localization and ignorance.) On the other hand, eternity is once accorded the honor of being the "decisive characteristic of those qualities which make him God" (Systematic Theology, 3:420). Here, as with symbolism, there is a contrast between God's transcending potentiality and actuality, and some other candidate, as most characteristic of deity.
HARTSHORNE AS PANENTHEIST

Since no one doubts that Charles Hartshorne is a panentheist, there is no need to document each time he writes in terms of God's inclusion of the nondivine individuals. Instead I will present his elaborations upon that basic theme and his more or less distinctive panentheistic formulations. In many cases, the meaning of particular Hartshornean ideas and expressions will be seen to be similar to particular Tillichian ones, and, in some cases, the wording of Hartshorne will be similar to Tillich's. Such congruities are not to be explained by dependence of one on the other. Hartshorne developed most of his major panentheistic ideas and formulas before Tillich had written the overwhelming majority of the material presented in the previous chapter. And though Hartshorne did read some of Tillich's works and has demonstrated some knowledge of some of Tillich's major ideas, he could not be said to have a detailed knowledge of Tillich's writings. Tillich, on the other hand, never read any of Hartshorne's works (other than Hartshorne's critique, in The Theology of Paul Tillich, of his doctrine of God as rendered in volume 1 of the Systematic'), as far as I know. They did have some conversations with each other, but these were after their basic ideas and most panentheistic formulas had been established. Thus, my explanation is that two people sharing a basic idea or intuition have expressed and developed this conception in ways that are sometimes very similar. The fact that
Tillichian expressions are paralleled by ones of Hartshorne, an undisputed panentheist, lends some further support to a panentheistic interpretation of these expressions, such as I offered in chapter 2. Finally, some of Hartshorne's panentheistic formulations involve a response (partly negative, partly positive) to some of Tillich's declarations, which is one reason why this chapter on Hartshorne appears after the one on Tillich.

Hartshorne labels one of his themes "modal coincidence." This means that God "coincides" with reality in both the "mode" of actuality and of potentiality. That is, there is a "coincidence or coextensiveness of the [divine] individual's actuality with all actuality, and of its possibility with all possibility." Or similarly: "All actual things must be actual in God, they must be constituents of his actuality, and all possible things must be potentially his constituents." This type of formulation of God's all-inclusiveness indicates God's temporality, that there is in some sense a distinction between potentiality and actuality for God, which Hartshorne believes is requisite if God is truly to embrace the temporal world. Related "modalities" or "polarities" are necessity-contingency and abstract-concrete, in that God's necessary and abstract essence is bound to be actualized in some contingent and concrete state, the precise issue of which depends upon divine and creaturely choices. Such polarities give rise to one of Hartshorne's terms for his perception of God,
"dipolar theism." The theme of God as inclusive with regard to both potentiality and actuality appears in many variations, sometimes without modal "coincidence" or "coextensiveness" being specifically mentioned. The following evokes the value of the creatures for God:

"Being" is God as enjoying creatures: the creatures he does enjoy are the actual beings, along with the enjoyment itself as the inclusive being; the creatures he might enjoy, along with the possible ways he might enjoy them, are the possible forms of being.\(^vi\)

That full inclusion is only proper to God and proper only to God is often suggested by Hartshorne. One way this is done is by directly or indirectly comparing God with the creatures in that respect: "That we 'have things outside us' is because we have without having," that is, "abstractly," "only with inefficient, faint awareness."\(^vii\) (If God 'has' them, he has them, and that is the clear meaning of containing."\(^viii\)) Or similarly, contra the idea that since "we as knowers do not literally include the known; therefore, God does not," Hartshorne writes: "In the highest sense of knowledge, namely, direct, infallible, concrete, clearly conscious apprehension, we human subjects can scarcely be said to have any knowledge."\(^ix\) As stated in chapter 1, Hartshorne often associates inclusion and knowledge,\(^x\) as in the previous quotation and as in the following: "The vaunted transcendence [of knowing getting "'outside' itself to know an independent and larger world"]\(^xi\), taken as
externality of known to knower, is thus really a defect of our human knowledge.\textsuperscript{xii} The above remarks, and others,\textsuperscript{xiii} parallel ones by Tillich on the externality or separation of finite things with respect to each other, usually spoken of in terms of "the subject-object cleavage."

God, on the other hand, includes perfectly, both in scope and adequacy, and does so infallibly or necessarily. "Scope" points to God's inclusion of everything, while "adequacy" indicates that each thing is embraced utterly. Sometimes Hartshorne speaks of "adequacy" without modifying it with "perfect," as in, "the infallible adequacy of his awareness to its objects,"\textsuperscript{xiv} and as in, "only God reflects adequately, infallibly, all that conditions him."\textsuperscript{xv} "Adequate" in such contexts must not be understood in the colloquial sense of "average," but in the more literal one of functioning in correspondence to the reality of something, which only God does fully. Perfect scope and adequacy go hand in hand: "Only where nothing is external can anything be absolutely internal."\textsuperscript{xvi} (Conversely, that humans do not fully possess their "members" is one with their having an external environment.\textsuperscript{xvii})

As quoted above, God "infallibly" includes or knows with perfect adequacy. In a similar vein, Hartshorne suggests that "God must be viewed as necessarily all-inclusive, incapable of a genuinely 'external' environment."\textsuperscript{xviii} This is part of divine "unsurpassability,"\textsuperscript{xix} of God's radical superiority, a
superiority in principle.\textsuperscript{xx} Divine unsurpassability in general and necessary all-inclusiveness both involve necessary existence.\textsuperscript{xxi} (Conversely, to have an "external environment" makes one vulnerable to "factors not under immediate control," which "may happen to conflict fatally with one's internal needs."\textsuperscript{xxii}) God's ultimacy or radical superiority vis-a-vis humankind is the basis for and necessitates divine inclusiveness: "In spite of, indeed because of, his infinite difference from man, God repeats in himself all positive qualities and qualitative contrasts that are present in man..."\textsuperscript{xxiii} This recalls Tillich's remarks that "the infinite transcendence of the infinite over the finite...does not contradict but rather confirms the coincidence of opposites"\textsuperscript{xxiv} and that "the infinite is always a radical breaking away from the finite, so radical that the relationship...must always be understood as within. Only then is the radical separation possible."\textsuperscript{xxv}

And if God is not all encompassing, if the creation is external to or simply distinct from God, unacceptable consequences ensue: "For if God is distinct from nature, then the total universe includes God as one part and nature as another, and this seems to make God less than the universe and in so far finite rather than infinite."\textsuperscript{xxvi} This recalls Tillich's contention that if God has other realities "alongside," if the infinite does not embrace the finite, then God becomes finite. As Hartshorne uses "finite" here, it seems to be "quantitative" only, at least explicitly--it seems to mean that God includes less than exists.
Hartshorne is aware, though, as suggested in connection with his employment of the body analogy, xxvii that if things are external to God, if God has any external environment, then God does not have immediate and perfectly adequate knowledge and control of everything. Also, that any externality implies lack of omniscience is, of course, true more or less by definition for Hartshorne, with his equation of inclusion and knowledge. And asserts Hartshorne, "omnipotence could only be direct control of every part of the universe, since indirect control is subject to the imperfections inhering in all instruments." xxviii "Surely God controls the world not by hands, but by direct power of his will, feeling, and knowledge." xxix Finally, externality, as indicated in the parenthetical comment of the preceding paragraph, makes one liable to death. Thus, Hartshorne definitely sees the externality of the world to God as making God "qualitatively" finite, deficient in essentially the ways the creatures are.

Furthermore, the externality of the world to God, which makes God a "mere constituent" of the whole, xxx implies the need for a "God over "God," which is implied for Tillich if God is "beside" or "above" the world:

...if we deny the inclusiveness of the divine unity, we will either have to admit that relations between God and the lesser minds belong to no real individual, no real substance, or have to admit a superdivine individual to which they belong.xxxi
If the relation of the absolute to the world really fell wholly outside the absolute, then this relation would necessarily fall within some further and genuinely single entity which embraced both the absolute and the world and the relations between them—in other words, within an entity greater than the absolute.xxxii

Obviously Hartshorne senses that unless all relations are fully internal to God, including our relating to God, then there are loose threads, then something is left unexplained. Though the following comment is general, it is very appropriate to the status of our relating to God, for it is there that a distinction between God and what is other than God is most strongly implied and felt: "...the distinction between God and anything else must fall within God."xxxii (Note, of course, that Hartshorne is not disbarring, and is, indeed, affirming, that distinctions between the lesser individuals and God can be made—there is no simple or exhaustive equivalence. Instead he is insisting that any such distinction, that all things, must ultimately be embraced within the divine life.) By the preceding quotations, I am reminded of Tillichian statements on our relations with God as being within God, especially two of his remarks on relations between God and the creatures of a general nature, as are the Hartshornean comments: 1) "God stands in the divine-human reciprocity, but only as he who transcends it and comprises both sides of the
reciprocity."xxxiv 2) God does not have "external relations," but only "internal" ones, "inner relations of the divine life."xxxv

Tillich also spoke of a specific aspect of our relating to God, our love of God, as being within God by stating that this love is the love with which God loves God's self.xxxvi Hartshorne mentions this type of formula in relation to Spinoza, saying it has a truth "he did not intend" (apparently because the creatures "lose their value" or disappear "as distinct individuals" and only God is left loving for Spinoza according to Hartshorne).xxxvii Since we are "by direct sympathetic union...parts of his internal life," since "God through loving all individuals...makes them one with himself,...when we for our part love God this love is a factor in God's enjoyment of himself, that is, in his self-love.xxxviii

Hartshorne uses "participation" panentheistically to connote a lack of separation or externality, to point to coinherence in some sense. As with inclusion or knowledge, a contrast between attenuated and full participation in the creaturely and the divine cases, respectively, is drawn. In relation to participating in the feelings of others, particularly the negative ones, Hartshorne pens, "...the human attention span will not permit more than minute doses of participation in the joys and sorrows of others, and even this much involves the risk that we shall at times be merely and ignobly wretched." God on the other hand has an "attention span positively
inclusive of all feelings, while preserving its own integrity."xxxix This observation implies more directly than most comments on God's perfect passivity an active aspect entailed in this. Divine passivity to the feelings of the creatures is itself an activity (as "participation" suggests) and is enabled by God's ultimate power or aseity, by a perfect "attention span" that preserves the divine "integrity." Also focusing on suffering is this expoundment: God is not "thirsty literally," but the feelings of suffering involved are somehow within the divine experience, as analogously the sympathetic spectator of a thirsty man imaginatively shares in his sufferings. In the divine case, however, there is not mere imagination, but sheer, intuitive participation.xl

As for Tillich, he talks of human "lack of universal participation"xli and of God's "universal"xlii and "absolute and unconditional participation."xliii Hartshorne tries to show the "sheerness" or "absoluteness" of the divine participation, which involves a kind of coinherence (but one in which God is not reducible to the lives in which God utterly participates): "...all being is God in that only God participates adequately in all lives..."xliv Again we find "adequate" meaning not "so-so," but to correspond to and, indeed, coincide or coinhere with.

A theme appearing in a number of Hartshorne's works is that in God self-love or self-interest and altruism or other-interest have "certain and absolute
He defends the possibility of altruism in the human case and in general by debunking the maintenance of an absolute distinction between "love as desire, with an element of possible gain or loss to the self, and love as purely altruistic benevolence," devoid of any such gain, a distinction which leads some to believe that any genuine concern for others is impossible:

Altruism is identifiable in experience as a process of participation in the good of others, so that some sort of value accrues to the self through the very fact that value accrues to another self. This does not mean that all motivation is merely selfish.

Against the notion "that all motivation is merely selfish," he points to the concern that some people have for the distant future, even though they will not be present to reap the fruits of their efforts. More generally, he notes the fundamental misconception of those who, in "Catch 22" fashion, maintain that all supposed desire for the good of others is tainted simply because we desire it and derive satisfaction if this desire is met: "...we desire to enjoy the fulfillment of our interests in others because we have those interests; we do not have them because we desire enjoyment." The model Hartshorne is arguing against seems to split knowing and valuing, reason and emotion: one is supposed to recognize and act toward the good of others, but not have any positive feelings if successful. A key point is that for Hartshorne we
naturally and more or less immediately participate in the interests and feelings of others in relating to or perceiving them\textsuperscript{125}--we have their interests and feel their feelings. But only to a certain extent, for much of their reality is external to us.\textsuperscript{131}

God, however, fully includes or knows each person's experiences, feelings, and desires without mediation or loss. Hartshorne indicates that it is precisely omniscience that entails a complete coincidence of love and self-interest in God.\textsuperscript{131} For, "in respect to value, perfect knowledge is perfect possession. Any emotions of beauty and joy which God enables us to have, become elements in God's own all-embracing experience, contributory to the richness of that experience."\textsuperscript{144} For the creatures, who cannot possess fully the experiences and enjoyments of others, there is conflict between self-interest and altruism--concern for the good of others can involve some sacrifice of our own good.\textsuperscript{15} This is looking at the situation more or less in terms of present experience. From the perspective of a longer stretch of time, Hartshorne suggests that God will always be around to enjoy the results of whatever actions God takes to promote the welfare of others, while a creature may not.\textsuperscript{16} This highlights the general rule that self interest and altruism coincide fully only in God and that the creatures have opportunities for sacrifice and "selflessness" that God does not.\textsuperscript{17} (This is morally "a glory," but metaphysically "a defect."\textsuperscript{18}) This does not deny that God suffers-- which is the only
sense in which it might be said that God makes sacrifices, merely that in feeling our sufferings, which Hartshorne believes cannot be separated from feeling our joys or from the perfect knowledge or inclusiveness that is an essential aspect of deity, God is not passing up some greater good.\textsuperscript{ix}

Hopefully it is clear that all this does not mean that God is "selfish." As Hartshorne indicates, "...God through loving all individuals for their own sakes makes them one with himself, with phases of his own life."\textsuperscript{ix} (Compare this Tillichian description of agape: "the love God has toward the creature and through the creature himself."\textsuperscript{ixi}) Indeed, "a will perfect in knowledge as well as goodness could have no means of distinguishing between success for others and success for itself."\textsuperscript{ixii} The essential point of the concept of the coincidence of self- and other-interest in God is that God so intimately and utterly knows and loves the creatures that their joys are God's joys, their best interests, God's interests, that God "loves them 'as he loves himself,' since by direct sympathetic union they are parts of his internal life."\textsuperscript{ixiii} This was what I took to be the central intent of Tillich's formula that God loves God's self through the creatures.

Certainly more than implicit in the above is that omniscience is not something that operates emotionlessly. Hartshorne expressly states that "concrete knowledge, knowledge inclusive of the actual concrete feeling of creatures," must be a "kind of
sympathetic participation or love," for "purely nonemotional knowledge of particular emotions in their concrete uniqueness" is "gibberish." More briefly, he maintains that being included by God entails a perfect sympathy or entails that God "feels our feelings." Also, recall the quote from chapter 1, that Hartshorne does "not see how a conscious being can contain suffering and not in some sense suffer." Negatively, a lack of sympathy and externality are associated: God is not "a mere spectator God who surveys creaturely sufferings and fears with 'mere happiness' (Whitehead), i.e., without participation," nor does God act upon the creation "coldly or from without." (In this latter, an active aspect of God's nonseparation and sympathy seems explicit, though whether Hartshorne's God is truly panentheistically active will be considered in the next chapter.) Thus, to full inclusion and perfect knowledge as correlative concepts for Hartshorne, we can add perfect sympathy or love. Says Hartshorne, "The 'simplicity' of God has here its true meaning, that there can be no duality of understanding and motivation" when each is perfect.

In *Reality As Social Process*, Hartshorne is especially eloquent on the divine inclusivity as sympathetic and the divine sympathy as inclusive, as he contrasts this with the externality of our caring, which tends to be "mere benevolence" and "external well-wishing": 1) "...when any creature suffers—or rejoices—God is united with that suffering through a
sympathy so intimate and absolute, that what we call benevolence or love is insignificant, pale, or external by comparison."

2) "That other fellow...is not just a product of divine power, or just an object of divine well-wishing, but a very fragment of the life of God which is made all-inclusive through sympathy."

In the following, which is reminiscent of Tillich's claim that God is neither "spatial" nor "spaceless," but that space is in God, Hartshorne suggests that people wrongly assume that the relative externality of others to them applies to God:

Men seem outside each other, and they imagine they are all outside God; but space is in God, not God merely in space or merely 'outside' space (in some superspace? [as in "supranaturalism"]). All is within the divine sympathy. We are members one of another because we are members of the living whole, bound together by solidarity of feeling, a solidarity imperfect in us but perfect and absolute in God.

If we even inconvenience our fellows, we inconvenience God; if we torture our fellows, we torture God..."

That the creaturely lives are expressions of the divine life, a kind of formulation traditionally used in pantheistic or (implicitly) panentheistic ways, is affirmed by Hartshorne. This type of formulation tends to connote the active aspect of God (though again just how panentheistic an active aspect Hartshorne actually intends will be discussed in the ensuing chapter). He
asserts that "all wills somehow express and tend to fulfill one Will, all lives one Life."\textsuperscript{1xxvi} That all wills "tend to fulfill one Will" cannot mean for Hartshorne, who is adamant that all creatures have some measure of interminate freedom, that all creatures fully obey the divine will, as the parenthetical remark here suggests: "He [Jesus] is an expression of the divine life, as are all things whatever (even though not all are in accord with the divine ideal for them)."\textsuperscript{1xxvii} The following also attempts to protect the freedom and, in general, the reality of each creature in its own right in some sense: the content of the divine knowledge "is not a mere state or adjective of the divine subject or substance.... True, the being of these individuals is their presence to him, and therefore, their being; not just his presence to himself or just his being."\textsuperscript{1xxviii} Tillich twice said that God expresses (and also knows, wills, etc.) God's self through the finite. That Tillich uses the reflexive form of "to express" with God as the grammatical subject, while Hartshorne uses "all wills" as subject, and the noun form, may be indicative of Tillich's relative emphasis on the active aspect and Hartshorne's on the passive, rather than merely due to chance. Tillich also desires to uphold creaturely freedom (whether or not he succeeds), stating that the "individual is not a mere 'mode' of the eternal substance."\textsuperscript{1xxix}

In \textit{Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism}, Hartshorne proffers two types of analogy for apprehend-
Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich

ing God and God's relationship with us, which strikingly parallel in structure and intent Tillich's positing of two aspects in our understanding of God (the personal and the "transpersonal") and in our relating to God (the "person-to-person" or "ego-thou" relationship and a transpersonal or more "mystical" relationship with being-itself). One type of analogy is the "social analogy," which has to do with the relationship between "human beings and other human beings or creatures not radically superior or inferior to them."\textsuperscript{lxxx} The other has to do with the relationship between radical unequals, as in the relationship of a person to its cells, which is called here the "mind-body analogy"\textsuperscript{lxxxi} (or less frequently the "organic"\textsuperscript{lxxxi})). Hartshorne recognizes, as does Tillich, that the social or person-to-person analogy "seems to be the religiously preferred basis of analogy. God is to the creatures as a human father to human children, or a ruler to the ruled, or a beloved to a lover, or a friend to the befriended."\textsuperscript{lxxxi} But the social analogy is doubly insufficient in itself; it throws no light on the radical superiority of creator to creatures; and it throws no light on the immanence or omnipresence ascribed to God. It suggests that he is merely outside things, operating on them through intermediaries, such as sound waves, light waves, etc., whereas all such intermediaries are also his creatures.\textsuperscript{lxxxiv} The first aspect of the social analogy mentioned is
that of being "one among others" in the sense of relative equality, the second, that of relative separation from things. These two aspects do not seem unrelated for Hartshorne here, for omnipresence is certainly part of God's radical superiority. We have seen Tillich deny the appropriateness of calling God a person and qualify the appropriateness of applying the adjective "personal" and a person-to-person or ego-thou relationship to God, because of the separation and unambiguous distinction from things supposedly entailed in all this. He specifically mentioned omnipresence (along with omniscience and omnipotence) as incompatible with God as "a person" who is relatively separated from or excludes others from its center. And he further spoke to the denial of radical superiority here by claiming that God is finite as "a person" and that divine holiness is at odds with a strict ego-thou relation.

The essential purpose of the mind-body analogy, as suggested in the first chapter, is to evoke the immediacy and directness of God's presence, of divine knowledge and control, in contrast to the externality of the social one. Omniscience cannot rightly "be conceived except as clear intuition of the entire cosmos... Omnipotence could only be direct control of every part of the universe, since indirect control is subject to the imperfections inhering in all instruments."

The mind-body analogy, though, has its problems in interpreting the relationship between God and the
creatures, when taken in itself, apart from the social analogy. This is one:

The human body does not, for direct perception, contain distinct individual things, as the world to which God is to be related certainly does. It is a quasi-continuous solid, differentiated, but without clear-cut separateness or independence of parts. Hence it is feared that to interpret the world as though it were God's body would be to deny the reality of individuals as such other than God.

However, Hartshorne notes that, in fact, the human body is composed of individual cells, even though we do not perceive them distinctly, and suggests that in applying the analogy to God, God's immediate perception must be, unlike ours, wholly distinct and vivid. Hartshorne also realizes that God's control or influence, as well as knowledge, with regard to the divine body must be perfect or unsurpassable, including the infallible ability to ensure God's existence. Still, Hartshorne indicates that the human mind-body relation is harder to get a grip on than the interhuman one, is even, at this point, "mysterious or unintelligible." A further complication is that the relationship of "a man's mind to his cells appears to be the relation of 'mind' to 'matter,’” while God's relation to us is obviously one to sentient individuals. However, Hartshorne believes that closer attention to our experience reveals that our cells are sentient entities whose feelings we immediately and
sympathetically share. For Hartshorne, this both clears up the just-mentioned difficulty and provides the general key for grasping the mind-body relation. To add to the individuality of the members of the body, sentience, allows us to combine the two analogies. That is the mind-body relationship is immediately social." Though from another chapter of Man's Vision of God, the following is important for grasping how the two analogies--the relative distinctness of beings involved in the social and the immediacy and inclusivity of the mind-body--are wedded for Hartshorne:

God is neither the whole in which all parts lose their value as distinct individuals--so that there is only the one loving the one--nor is God so exalted that he is not a whole at all, and so that our feelings and conflicts are not his feeling and conflicts, but rather God is the socially differentiated whole of things... This gets to the heart of panentheism. It contrasts panentheism with both a kind of pantheism and a more or less deistic theism. It attempts to show that neither are the creatures mere modes or appearances of God or ultimately undifferentiatedly the same as God, nor are they in utter contrast to God as a simply distinct being.

I would add that I do not think one has to panpsychically posit our own cells as sentient or aware in their own right in order for the relationship of oneself to parts of one's body to be helpful. (I would
not refer to it as the "mind-body" relation, though, for this may suggest a dualistic distinction between the two--which Hartshorne on the whole does not intend.) The feeling, say, in my hand, can still suggest the immediacy with which God experiences my experiences and feels my feelings, can still suggest the absence of any spatial or quasi-spatial distance between God and me. After all, Hartshorne uses the analogy for God despite the indistinctness of our perceptions of what is part of or "within" our bodies and the imperfection of our control of our cells; so why not use it despite the non-sentience, or despite agnosticism concerning the sentience, of parts of our bodies.

In the remaining portion of this chapter I will consider Hartshornean material that is directly relevant to, and, in some cases, in response to, Tillich's ideas that God is being-itself, is not a being, and is not a being beside others. In some relatively earlier works, Hartshorne speaks of God as in some sense being itself or being as such, though not frequently as does Tillich. He uses it in the sense of necessary existence and being the ultimate source of all being, which are two of the intrinsic connotations of "being-itself" for me and probably for Tillich mentioned in the previous chapter:

As supremely efficacious, God is the everlasting and ungenerated controlling power of the universe--the only way a maximum of efficacy can be conceived.
Thus it is a short step to the assertion that God is that without which other beings would not exist at all, would be nothing. And it seems only another way of saying this to state that God is in some sense Being itself, while all other things participate in being through God.

Or more briefly:

In some sense, then, God must coincide with Being as such; for he cannot be without existence, and therefore equally existence cannot be without him, so that the very meaning of "exist" must be theistic.

Whether Hartshorne was at all influenced to use the term in this manner by any familiarity with Tillich's use of it, I cannot say. Certainly "esse ipsum" and "Being itself" are enough a part of the theological and philosophical tradition that we need not assume any connection here.

In more recent writings, Hartshorne uses being-itself in connection with Tillich. Evident now is the other intrinsic connotation of being-itself for me and Tillich, that God in some sense is or includes all being, which was at most tacit in Hartshorne's earlier reference to the term. And as he sees this panentheistic meaning in it, he basically approves of the term. He pens: "Thus divine actuality and potentiality are definitive of actuality and possibility as such [modal coincidence]. This has some analogy with Tillich's 'God is being itself.'"

With respect to knowledge, which is more or less equivalent to inclusion for
Hartshorne, he writes: "...God's capacity to know is as wide as being itself, coincident in this sense with being in general." More straightforwardly, he perceives Tillich's "being-itself" to mean that God must all-encompassingly "coincide with being or reality itself." Sometimes this is in relation to approving half of the Tillichian formula that "God is not a being, but being-itself," while still maintaining that God is a being. He does note that he prefers "reality itself," because it avoids any suggestion of a contrast between static "being" and dynamic "becoming" (to the detriment of God as temporal, and thus as actually inclusive, if identified with static "being"). However, he does not explicitly indicate in the above instance that by the term "being-itself" in itself Tillich means to imply a timeless God, and, in any case, seems to acknowledge the meaning of all-inclusiveness in Tillich's "being-itself."

In one case, though, Hartshorne asks if Tillich by "being-itself" meant that God in "contingent concreteness...is all-inclusive." It is not entirely clear there whether he is questioning Tillich's desire to associate "being-itself" with inclusivity or merely his success in carrying this through. In the following, concern over whether concreteness is lost is evident, though here he is dealing with "being-itself" in conjunction with the denial that God is a being: "...when Tillich says, God is 'not a being, but being itself,' do we not confront a new example of the Greek or Indian exaltation of the
undifferentiated or universal at the expense of the individual and particular? I have some sympathy with this objection."cviii Also in response to that Tillich-ian formula, he says, "But alas, we now seem to have made deity a mere universal, wholly lacking in concrete or particular actuality."cix In fact, in these two instances, as would seem to be the case prima facie, it is the denial that God is a being that prompts Hartshorne's feeling that individuality, concreteness, and particularity are threatened, for in the latter and elsewhere, he proceeds to argue that God is both a being or an individual and, "with Tillich,"cx being or reality itself. Specifically in relation to "being-itself," he writes of "the coincidence of God with reality which Tillich rightly sees as definitive of the divine."cxi Apart from a particular context, he asserts that Tillich "rightly holds that God must be all-inclusive."cxii Thus, overall he does not gainsay the meaning of all-inclusiveness of "being-itself" in itself or for Tillich, but rather questions whether Tillich compromises this divine inclusivity. cxiii

As just indicated above, Hartshorne denies the exclusivity of Tillich's "disjunction, 'a being or being itself,',' in relation to God. cxiv Specifically in response to Tillich, Hartshorne does affirm that God cannot be a being or thing in such a way as to compromise God's radical superiority: God "does not merely happen to exist, as one thing among others."cxy And God "is not 'one more individual being,' since it is other individuals who are added to the primordial being
Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich

rather than vice versa, nor is God "simply one more, though the greatest, finite thing." We apparently have in these two instances Hartshornean paraphrasing of "a being beside others" and "a being, even though the highest being," respectively, which he seems here to have taken only in the sense of relative equality. In the following, though, the understanding of clear distinctness of being vis-a-vis others, rather than just relative equality, is evident in regard to a paraphrase of Tillich: God is "not simply 'one more being additional to the others.' Not at all; we have the universally presupposed individual, intrinsic to and in his actuality containing all reality. In this case, a being is also the being..."

But, as this last quotation suggests, despite not being "one more being," God is still "a being" as well as "being itself," "an individual reality" as well as "reality as such." God has both the universality and inclusivity of being-itself, as well as the individuality, integration, unity, and self-consciousness of a being. "He is individual, but the individual with strictly universal functions, the all-encompassing and yet not merely universal principle of existence." "He is the all as an individual being." Or in a brief formula that appears many times, God is the "universal individual." Hartshorne agrees with Tillich that normally universality and individuality are more or less in opposition, but finds an irony in Tillich's formula, which attempts to show God's exceptionality:
I accuse Tillich of a subtle form of the very error he is trying to avoid, that of putting God under an inappropriate rule. It is a rule universally valid except with reference to deity that what is individual is not, to an equal degree, universal, and what is universal is not to an equal degree individual.... What Tillich overlooks, however, is that this seemingly inevitable contrast between universality and individuality is one of the very rules to which God as worshipful or unsurpassable must be an exception. His uniqueness must consist precisely in being both reality as such and an individual reality....

Hartshorne generally recognizes that being "a being" (in contrast to just plain "a"), apart from immediate contrasting yet complementary pairing with "being-itself," tends to undermine God's universality and inclusiveness (and unsurpassability). Except for one time that the phrase, "God is a being," stands alone, Hartshorne states that, in addition, or better, God is "the" being. I should add that the combination of universality and individuality in God is a theme that occurs apart from explicit response to Tillich's dictum and likely originated in independence from Tillich, in that it appears in a fairly early work.

As Hartshorne allows that God is a being or an individual, one would expect that God is also a self or a person for him—and rightly so. To Tillich he
responds, "That 'self implies contrast to everything which is not self' may be accepted, but not that it implies 'separation from everything.'" Of course, due to God's all-inclusiveness, certain contrasts to other selves are barred for Hartshorne. But that God can be contrasted in some senses to the included selves is obvious enough for Hartshorne for God to be a "self." While he does not specifically counter Tillich's denial that God is a person, this passage which voices an objection of some to the idea of God's inclusion of the creatures, is relevant: "...if God is a person he must have other persons 'over against' or 'outside of' him." Tillich concurs with this objection, but, of course, rather than accepting the externality of other persons to God, he opts for denying that God is a person. Hartshorne, on the other hand, demurs from the disjunction, maintaining that God is a--or the--person who fully contains all other persons.

Just what are we to make of the discrepancy between Hartshorne and Tillich over whether God is a being, self, etc.? Panentheism is operative in both opinions. Tillich will not permit calling God an individual because this (normally) entails separation from and unambiguous contrast to other individuals rather than God's embracing and working immediately through everything that is. Both agree that the usual tension between individuality and universality for Hartshorne or individualization and participation for Tillich "is in God simply transcended."
Why do they then draw divergent conclusions? Hartshorne once states that "the issue is at least partly verbal."[cxxxv] I would go further and say that it is wholly "verbal." This does not mean that the issue is insignificant, however. The real issue is how best to express and safeguard from misinterpretation the panentheistic idea of deity. On Tillich's side, there is the usual tendency to think of a person as relatively separated from and simply distinct in relation to others and, more crucially, the usual inclination to picture God as someone who can be simply contrasted to me and the world, which is evidenced in both religious practice and theology. To go so far as to deny that God is a being or individual can serve to bring us up short, to brake us and keep us from conceiving God as less than the all-encompassing ultimate. In Hartshorne's corner, there is the fact (or at least my opinion) that to be an individual is not so utterly associated with externality and unequivocal contrast to others that it grates to hear it said that God is the individual who fully encompasses all other individuals. And to speak of God as an individual or person safeguards against misunderstanding, indicating that God in panentheism is integrated and self-conscious and "not a mere or universal form, pattern system, matter, or force."[cxxxvi] If I had to choose between referring to God as a being or refraining from the same, I would do the former, but with frequent and conspicuous qualifications. I would affirm that God is a being in a sense, while denying that God is a being in the sense
of excluding or separating others from utter immediacy to the divine perception and power. And in attempting to explain panentheism I would point to both Tillich's denial and Hartshorne's affirmation that God is a being or self, as ultimately expressing the same basic idea—as, indeed, I have.

The last panentheistic material of Hartshorne's to be considered concerns worship. He regards worship as the unifying or integration of all "desires and aims," all "thoughts" and "perceptions," "in the light of" a "supreme aspiration." He cites the Great Commandment as expressing that. And he concludes that only if God is the integrated and "all-inclusive whole," can the integrity, all-inclusiveness, and wholeness of response definitive of worship find an appropriate correlate. For if any creature is not included by God, "then in thinking this very thought I have gone beyond loving God to loving (or being mildly interested in) certain individuals outside him. But then my total interest is not in God, but only a part of my interest."

Tillich also cites the Great Commandment as definitive of his expression, "ultimate concern," and defines God as that which ultimately concerns us. Indeed, it seems to be "Tillich's proposal to define 'God' through the idea of worship" that stimulated Hartshorne to do the same, as above. Unlike Hartshorne with worship, Tillich does not specifically refer to God as all-inclusive as an aspect of the proper correlate of ultimate concern. But, in general, he
Hartshorne as Panentheist

does not discuss properties of God in connection with ultimate concern, "for the first criterion of theology must remain formal and general."cxlv Therefore, this is no reason not to think that it is implicit.

Hartshorne does take Tillich's other basic definition of God, that God is being-itself, to be correlative with the definition that God is that which concerns us ultimately: "If God is what is loved or can be loved with all one's capacities, then he must in some sense coincide with being or reality itself."cxlvii

"Thus Tillich's two proposals for defining God are not only mutually consistent, but they are equivalent."cxlviii Hartshorne does not believe, though, that this "twofold definition of deity" is "followed out without deviation or contrary assumptions"cxlix by Tillich. Focusing on ultimate concern, he questions whether Tillich, by holding that God transcends the distinction between potentiality and actuality and by speaking of "unconditionedness"cl in relation to our ultimate concern, is consistent with himself. On the first point, he writes:

But we love both self and neighbor as involving potentialities which may or may not be realized, and not all of which can possibly be realized.... If there is a real and literal separation or difference between potentiality and actualization in ourselves as objects of concern and yet this concern is to be wholly concern for God, then the difference must be no less real and literal in God, for He is, for our
Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich

close, the measure of reality.\textsuperscript{c11}

And Hartshorne prefers a term like "unreserved" to "unconditioned" to avoid any implication that the referent of our concern is totally unconditioned (which would preclude that each creature is embraced by and thus "somehow qualifies God"\textsuperscript{c11i}).\textsuperscript{c11i} These concerns of Hartshorne hopefully will whet the reader's appetite for chapter 5, when I will delve into whether Tillich sabotages his panentheism in certain ways.
ENDNOTES


iii. Logic of Perfection, p. 85.

iv. Natural Theology, p. 20.

v. Logic of Perfection, pp. 65, 91, indicate this relatedness.

vi. Natural Theology, p. 136. The distinction between enjoying the "actual beings" and "the enjoyment itself" and between "the creatures he might enjoy" and "the possible ways he might enjoy them" stems from Hartshorne's view that God has some freedom as to just how to synthesize the multitude of creaturely experiences in God's own all inclusive experience(s).


viii. Divine Relativity, p. 91.


x. See also, e.g., Divine Relativity, p. 144; Man's Vision of God, p. 289; Logic of Perfection, p. 38; Natural Theology, pp. 11-12; Anselm's Discovery (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1965), p. 107; Creative Synthesis, p. 137; "God as Absolute, Yet Related," p. 37.

xi. Divine Relativity, p. 110.

xiii. Divine Relativity, p. 144; Natural Theology, pp. 11-12; Philosophical Interrogations, p. 343.

xiv. Encyclopedia, s.v. "transcendence."


xvii. Ibid.

xviii. Natural Theology, p. 20.

xix. Ibid. The concept of "unsurpassability," used to classify types of theism and in relation to Anselm's (second) proof, is common in Hartshorne. See, e.g., Natural Theology, pp. 17-20, 39-45; Man's Vision of God, pp. 11-12, 16.

xx. See ch. 1, endnote 28, for references.

xxi. Natural Theology, p. 20.

xxii. Man's Vision of God, p. 181. See also p. 163.


xxiv. Systematic Theology, 1:263. See p. 83 above.

xxv. AP, p. 89. See pp. 55-56 above.


xxvii. See p. 9 above, including ch. 1, endnote 20, for references.


xxxv. Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:271.

xxxvi. Systematic Theology, 1:282.


xli. Courage To Be, p. 49.

xlii. Systematic Theology, 1:245.

xliii. Systematic Theology, 1:244.


Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich


1. "...only a mere machine that blindly passed out benefits could conform to the notion of a benevolence that had nothing to gain from the success of its services to others," thinks Hartshorne. (*Whitehead's Philosophy*, p. 104.)


lii. This does not mean that morality vis-a-vis others is simply a matter of the extent to which we grasp their needs and feelings. Hartshorne certainly upholds moral freedom. Rather, relative externality entails options as to how sensitive to others one will be, whereas God as all-inclusiveness will always be perfectly sensitive. See esp. *Divine Relativity*, p. 126.


lix. Man’s Vision of God, pp. 161, 162.


lxii. Whitehead’s Philosophy, p. 104.


lxviii. Creative Synthesis, p. 263.

lxix. Whitehead’s Philosophy, pp. 93-94.
150 Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich

lxxiv. See p. 8 above.
lxxxi. Man's Vision of God, pp. 175-76.
lxxxv. Tillich, Philosophical Interrogations, pp. 381, 384.


xcviii. There is a type of formulation by Hartshorne that structurally parallels Tillichian ones to the effect that God is not a being or a meaning, but the ground or ultimate source of every being or meaning. The relevant instances follow:

1) The ground of alternatives which makes it impossible that none shall be realized is not itself a member of an alternative... (*Encyclopedia*, s.v. "cause.")

2) ...divinity is not religiously conceived as a mere illustration of first principles but as somehow the first principle, the correlate of every interest and every meaning... (*Natural Theology*, p. 32.)

3) ...there is an abstract essence of God which is no fact at all, since it is rather a
principle expressed in possibilities as truly as in actual facts. (Philosophers Speak of God, p. 482.)

4) ...they have looked for the very principle of factuality as though it were itself just another fact. (Natural Theology, p. 124.)

Alternatives, illustrations, and facts suggest contingency, which is why it is inappropriate to call the necessary basis of factuality and alternatives a fact or an alternative. (For Hartshorne, though, it can be said that a particular contingent state of God is a fact, an illustration, or an alternative: "Now, in our panentheistic view God in his concrete, superrelative actuality is indeed a great fact, inclusive of the facts of science and infinitely more" [Philosophers Speak of God, p. 481]. For Hartshorne makes a distinction between the "abstract essence of God which is no fact" and God's concrete actuality, which is an illustration or instantiation of God's perfect and necessary essence. Yet despite a particular state of God being an alternative, illustration or fact, one would not want to say that God is an alternative, etc., because of the contingency entailed in such terms.) The same logic does not seem to apply for "being" and probably "meaning." For to say that God is a being does not in itself entail contingency as to God's very existence. "Meaning" ("Sinn"), relatively common to Tillich's German writings in this connection, but not at all to his English, is harder to figure, because we do not in English normally refer to even a nondivine person as "a meaning"; but it does not seem to particularly entail contingency, even in German. Thus, these sentences by Hartshorne make sense rather obviously and without any panentheistic or other explanation, while Tillich's do not.

Compare the following declaration with those above:
..."God" is not simply another word in our language but, if anything rational, a name for the principle back of every word in any possible language. He is not merely another topic to think about, but the all-pervasive medium of knowledge and things known, to recognize whom is a way of thinking about no matter what. (Natural Theology, p. 79.)


civ. "Tillich and Tradition," p. 245; Creative Synthesis, pp. 148, 150; Natural Theology, p. 34.


cxix. Natural Theology, p. 34.


cxii. Logic of Perfection, p. 144.

cxiii. See endnote 149 for an overview of Hartshorne's assessment of Tillich's doctrine of God.

cxiv. "Tillich and Tradition," p. 247; Creative Synthesis, p. 151. This section of Creative Synthesis on Tillich's doctrine of God is taken, with some excising, rearrangement, and rewriting, from the article.

cxv. "Tillich and Tradition," p. 258; Creative Synthesis, p. 150. The context of this statement is to argue that, contra Tillich, it is all right to attribute "existence" to God. In Logic of Perfection, p. 31, he speaks, in the context of necessary existence, of "nearly all" theologians and metaphysicians as regarding God as "not simply one being among others, but the Being, identical in some sense with 'Being itself,'" without any reference to Tillich.


cxvii. Natural Theology, p. 36.


cxx. Natural Theology, p. 35.

cxxii. Natural Theology, p. 36.


cxxv. Natural Theology, pp. 34-35.


cxxviii. Ibid., p. 257.


cxxx. Creative Synthesis, p. 236, which was quoted on p. 137 above; Natural Theology, p. 136.


cxxxiii. Divine Relativity, p. 91.

156  Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich

cxxxvi.  Natural Theology, p. 36.
cxxxviii.  Natural Theology, pp. 4-5.
cxli.  Natural Theology, p. 7.
cxlili.  Natural Theology, p. 16.  See also "Tillich and Tradition," p. 246; Creative Synthesis, p. 149; Logic of Perfection, p. 100.
cxliv.  E.g., Systematic Theology, 1:11-12.
cxlv.  Logic of Perfection, p. 113.
cxlix. "Tillich and Tradition," p. 259; Creative
Synthesis, p. 157. See also "Tillich and Tradition,"
pp. 243, 245. In general, Hartshorne finds an
ambivalence in Tillich, "a hesitation to choose" (Logic
of Perfection, p. 9), a failure to envisage "clearly
the issue between classical and neoclassical views"
(Logic of Perfection, p. 144). He declares that
Tillich "rightly holds that God must be all-inclusive"
(Logic of Perfection, p. 144; see also Creative
676), yet, he believes, Tillich incongruously makes
statements that appear to entail that God is not at all
temporal or contingent ("Process as Inclusive," pp. 98,
100; "Non-theological Meaning," p. 677; Philosophical
Interrogations, pp. 374-75; "Tillich's Doctrine of
God," pp. 173-74, 177-78, 186-90; Logic of Perfection,
p. 144) and not at all conditioned or affected by the
creatures ("Process as Inclusive," p. 98; Natural
Theology, p. 17; "Tillich's Doctrine of God," pp. 183-
84, 191; "Tillich and Tradition," pp. 247, 257;
Creative Synthesis, p. 150). An epilogue: "It seems
Tillich must be with us in all this but his language
keeps making concessions to those who are not with us."
("Tillich's Doctrine of God," p. 177.)

cxi. Actually Tillich uses "unconditional" with respect
to ultimate concern, and infrequently, if ever, "uncon-
ditioned." Hartshorne apparently regards them as
synonymous.

Philosophical Interrogations, pp. 374-75. In "Tillich
and Tradition," p. 147, Hartshorne uses a parallel line
of argument with regard to "conditioned reality" (in
which we have an interest) to conclude "that the divine
must be both conditioned and unconditioned."

clii. "Tillich and Tradition," p. 246; Creative
Synthesis, p. 149.

CHAPTER 4

CRITICISM OF HARTSHORNE ON THE ACTIVE ASPECT

One may wonder about the asymmetry of the four middle chapters--Tillich as panentheist, then Hartshorne, followed by criticism of Hartshorne and then of Tillich. The two positive chapters were placed contiguously for purposes of comparing the panentheistic formulations of the two thinkers, and as indicated at the end of the previous chapter, Hartshorne aptly followed Tillich, as he specifically responded to Tillich in various relevant ways. As for the order of the critical chapters, I think it best to avail myself of the opportunity to maintain continuity with respect to Hartshorne, for this opportunity was, under the circumstances, not available regarding Tillich. Plus I do not think that the additional wait for criticism of his thought will be crucial. Indeed, given the length of the chapters on Tillich and the greater diversity and complexity of Tillich than Hartshorne in the areas of our concern, a longer respite between chapters on Tillich is probably felicitous.

As background, it is important to outline Hartshorne’s understanding of the general nature of reality, perception, and influence or causation. The basic unit of reality is a "unit event" or "unit occasion" that "synthesizes the many into one." Any and every concrete entity is a momentary and discrete "state" of sentient experience, within which there are no distinctions between earlier and later stages, which "creatively synthesizes" "data" from the immediate past
into a whole. "Creative" indicates that the data, which influence the unit event, which it must take into account, do not wholly determine the synthesis, but that every state has some indeterminate freedom. The data from the immediate past that it synthesizes are themselves unit events that synthesized previous unit events, etc. In this way, though what is immediately perceived is from the immediate past, the further past is included or accumulated in the immediate past, which now is included in the present. However, creaturely states perceive or include other states, including past states of the same individual ("personal memory"), in attenuated fashion. Only God fully perceives or possesses all prior divine and creaturely states in God's present creative synthesis. That what is perceived is always and only in the past applies to God, as well as to the creatures. That is, God apprehends creaturely syntheses only after they are made, not while they are being made. This opinion of the later Hartshorne represents a reversal of his earlier view. Now when a present unit event itself becomes past, it in turn becomes a datum to and thus exercises influence on subsequent unit events. For Hartshorne only that which, whether relatively consciously or unconsciously, is experienced, perceived, or "prehended" (Whitehead's term sometimes used by Hartshorne) can exercise influence. Since whatever is perceived is in the immediate past, nothing yields influence until it is past. This applies to God as well as to the creatures in Hartshorne. The divine synthesis that is taken into
Criticism of Hartshorne on the Active Aspect

account by present creaturely states is the divine state of the immediate past.

Now to the substance of this chapter. Its general contention is that Hartshorne in various ways undermines his panentheism with regard to the active aspect. As indicated in the first chapter, the active aspect refers to God's being the very power of being in all that is, the very power of acting in every action, in a full-fledged sense. That is, whatever power we possess is also God's power and whatever action we take is in a (qualified because of some indeterminate creaturely freedom) sense also God's act, in that there is no power that can be simply contrasted to God's power, no power (just as no perception) that is external to or separated from God as the ultimate power (and perceiver). All power is a part of or included within God's power; God immediately works through everything. God's power coinheres with creaturely power, though there is much more to this power than its manifestation in the creatures per se. Therefore, whenever I speak of God's (utterly) immediate or coinhering empowering, upholding, or sustaining of things, God's power or empowerment is not to be understood as something additional to or as a particular aspect of a thing. Rather, the entity itself, in its total existence or reality, is a part of or an immediate manifestation of God's power.

There are two basic facets of the active aspect of God in panentheism and Hartshorne's undermining thereof that will be explored. The first has to do
with God's all-pervasiveness or total inclusivity with respect to power, described above. This is actually not a particular facet of the active aspect, but the active aspect in its most basic and general sense. I claim that Hartshorne's understanding of divine power is not panentheistic in this basic sense: Hartshorne never gives an explicit formulation and affirmation of the active aspect in that all-encompassing sense. Moreover, Hartshorne not only undercuts his panentheism by this sin of omission but by sins of commission, through passages that can or must be interpreted to deny the utterly immediate and coinhering nature of the divine power. First, he specifically speaks against all power as being God's power. The second problematic area is this: If God is the ultimate all-pervasive power, then God's immediate and coinhering empowerment of anything in all its aspects is what in the first instance keeps anything from instant and sheer nothingness. However, Hartshorne stipulates aspects of God other than this immediate all-inclusive empowerment as that which gives things being or keeps them from nothingness, divine aspects that by comparison involve externality and which apply only to certain aspects of the creatures. The implication of such material is that there is something creaturely that has some ultimate ontological externality and independence with respect to God. Third, that each creaturely state is in the past when it is first perceived by God blatantly posits an externality of the creatures to God, which goes against the very heart of panentheism.
The other basic area to be considered is God's governing of the universe, the nature of the divine decisions and actions that determine the shape and direction of the universe. If the universe is not at all external to God's knowledge, sympathy, and power, then it follows that God must know what divine decisions and actions will optimally govern the universe and be willing and able to carry these out, with the result that the universe and creaturely experience on the whole will be very good. While Hartshorne envisages God as effecting this type of perfect control, I will maintain that his model of divine influence is not adequate to the supremely effective control he desires. I might note that what ultimately distinguishes this facet of the active aspect of panentheism, namely God's determination of the nature or direction of the world, from the active aspect in general, namely God's immediate and pervasive empowerment of everything, is indeterminate creaturely freedom. Past and present creaturely decisions help determine the particular shape and direction of the world. These decisions, insofar as indeterminate, are distinguished from divine decisions, though God empowers with utter immediacy creatures in their freedom. The general active aspect of God in panentheism includes creaturely power, including its freedom. This is why it is broader than God's determinations concerning the shape of things. Without such indeterminate creaturely freedom, God's immediate and coinhering empowerment of everything and God's deter-
mination of the particular nature and direction of the universe would wholly merge (a la pantheism).

**Undermining God as All Power**

We have seen that Hartshorne panentheistically maintains that God is or coincides with all reality, that God is reality itself. However, Hartshorne has developed this notion only with respect to the passive aspect of knowledge or perception. But if God is all reality, must God not likewise in some sense be all power? Hartshorne, however, never does directly speak of God as in some sense all power, as the one power which wholly encompasses, utterly coinheres with, or immediately works through all other power. There are a few passages that approach such formulations, but clearly fall short. In the previous chapter, we saw Hartshorne speak of God's power or control over the creatures as direct and unmediated. While Hartshorne probably intends to affirm a panentheistic understanding of divine power by so speaking, we shall see in the section on divine governance that what Hartshorne means by "direct and unmediated" is not a presently active and immediate empowering of all other powers.

Two statements that may seem to hint at immediate and coinhering empowerment are that "God is always actively sustaining all men" and that "God 'creates' man in the radical sense that all of man's being involves the divine creativity as its sustaining
Criticism of Hartshorne on the Active Aspect

However, these are not at all explicit on the nature of this divine sustaining, as to whether this is a more or less external sustaining. Though the divine creativity may be relevant to "all of man's being," this in itself does not tell us how it is relevant. As shall soon be shown Hartshorne does write of God's necessity for our existence in terms other than immediate and all-pervasive empowerment. Therefore, we can hardly presume that these two remarks by Hartshorne should be interpreted panentheistically.

Perhaps Hartshorne's most promising declarations are that any thing is "an expression of the divine life" and that "all lives ["somehow express"] one Life," cited in chapter 3. However, that, grammatically speaking, in neither case is God the subject expressing God's self through the creatures and, especially, that in the one case the creaturely lives are the subject doing the expressing calls somewhat into question just how active God is in this. This verbal matter could also be a matter of substance. That God passively includes all experience in the divine life could conceivably be the primary sense in which creaturely lives express one life. Still, despite their nonactive grammatical form, these phrases more naturally connote the active aspect of God than the passive and are probably, though not certainly, meant by Hartshorne to be interpreted accordingly. However, that God somehow expresses God's self in the creatures does not tell us how direct or coinhering an active expression this is. Though the
creaturely lives as "expressions" of God has tradition-
ally tended to be used in an active pantheistic or
(implicitly) panentheistic sense, in the absence of
corroborating evidence, one cannot say it is being used
that way by Hartshorne.

Hartshorne then never does indicate in any
definite manner that all power is God's power, that it
coinheres with all other power. Moreover, in his
concern to protect creaturely indeterminate freedom, he
instead declares that there must be a "division of
power" and that "even the greatest possible power is
still one power among others" (as he defies a Til-
lichian formula, apparently unwittingly; by the "among"
here Hartshorne does not mean to deny the categorical
supremacy of God's power--though insofar as he does not
affirm God's all-encompassing power, that would be the
ultimate effect). Such phrases simply contrast God's
power with creaturely power, implying that the latter
cannot also be (part of) the former.

But this is precisely what we cannot do on a
panentheistic understanding. God's power cannot be
unambiguously contrasted with any other, for it
embraces any other; any other is a very manifestation
of it. Now as long as that is made quite clear, divine
and creaturely power can pantheistically be contrasted
in various senses, because they are not exhaustively
equivalent. Then we contrast that which is a part of a
whole with that whole (that infinitely transcends its
creaturely parts), and not two simply distinct/entities. One such contrast is that God does not make
our decisions for us insofar as these are indeterminate, on which I agree completely with Hartshorne. But we cannot act or choose without God's immediate and continual empowerment. As with everything else, our freedom is a part of God's power. Hartshorne does once state that God "gives us the power to do the act, but also the power not to do it," vi though he does not indicate whether this empowerment is utterly immediate and pervasive or relatively external. Hartshorne once speaks of a "division of responsibility" vii in connection with indeterminate freedom, which is much better than "division of power," for it upholds our freedom and responsibility without undermining God's ultimate and all-encompassing power.

The second type of sin of commission against the concept of the all-pervasive divine power is that aspects of God other than immediate all-inclusive empowerment are cited by Hartshorne as that which gives things their being or saves them from nothingness. But if all power is (part of) God's power, then it is God's immediate and coinhering empowerment that in the first instance keeps anything from immediate and utter nothingness. By mentioning only relatively external and indirect ways of divine empowerment in the context of stipulating how God is necessary for our existence, Hartshorne does not merely commit a sin of omission, but implies that utterly immediate and pervasive empowerment is not how God gives us being. For if this panentheistic empowerment is subscribed to—while other
senses in which God is necessary for our existence are
not precluded—it is so much the primary and overriding
sense of God's necessity for existence that it would
certainly be mentioned here.

What then are the ways that God is necessary for
our existence according to Hartshorne? In Man's Vision
of God he twice indicates that it is God's measurement
or assessment of things as giving objective or public
criteria of truth or value that keeps them from
nothingness
1) "He is that without which all
lesser indivi-viduals would be nothing, since devoid of
definitive measure, ground of relationship with others,
etc." 2) Without God's
participation "being" would have no definite or
public character, and "I am" (or "there is a man
of a certain type") would have meaning only for
the speaker, that is no meaning.

Without God we should be nothing at all, for
to be would be nothing.

Now whether God's knowledge and valuation of things as
giving public criteria of truth and value in itself is
strictly necessary for anything to exist is not our
concern (though I doubt it). What is crucial for our
purposes panentheistically speaking is 1) that God must
be immediately empowering or working through us for
there to be anything that is measured or assessed by
God and 2) that our knowledge of God's assessment or
valuation of things is only a part of our total being,
so that God must be immediately upholding us in other
aspects of our being for us to exist. Moreover, even
our knowing of God's assessment cannot be given being by that assessment per se; God must be empowering us as knowing this assessment with coinhering immediacy. Furthermore, God's assessment or measurement is in the past when it is perceived by us for Hartshorne. God in the present must be upholding or empowering our knowing of God as in the immediate past. For all these reasons, God's measurement as providing public criteria is a secondary and rather external sense of an empowerment that allegedly saves us from nothingness.

Concerning God's ability to provide God's self with creatures, Hartshorne pens that God "has power always to elicit or entice some such into being." In Hartshorne here is indicating that it is our perception of God as an attractive or eliciting object or datum that gives us our being. Whether such a perception is a necessary part of our being without which we could not even exist is not our concern (though I doubt it).

What is important are the following points. Though the perception of the divine datum is our total perception for Hartshorne, since the divine datum is the all-inclusive object, it is not our total being. For Hartshorne, at least our response to or synthesis of that datum is another aspect of each unit event. Thus, even if we accept Hartshorne's metaphysical schema of perception, God must be empowering us with total immediacy as synthesizing the attractive divine object in order for us to be. Moreover, our perception of the enticing datum cannot be given being by that datum per se. God must be immediately sustaining us as
receiving this datum. Furthermore, the divine object is in the past when it is perceived by us according to Hartshorne. God in the present must be empowering our perceiving of the divine state of the immediate past. Therefore, God as enticing datum is a secondary and rather external sense of God's giving us being.

The ensuing lines "elicit" the same basic problems as the preceding instance:

In one sense, however, perhaps God creates ex nihilo. At each phase of process God sums up the entire actuality of previous phases; and thus any datum which we now, say, can use in our self-creation is "nothing" unless it be an item in the divine reality as just prior to now.\textsuperscript{xii} Hartshorne's comment touches on what the symbol of creation ex nihilo tries to express, namely, that it is God's creative power, and ultimately only divine creative power, that keeps things from utter nothingness. Here Hartshorne is not directly speaking of the giving of being to the creatures or keeping them from nothingness, but of keeping the divine datum from nonbeing. However, God creates as much ex nihilo with respect to anything and everything, as God does with respect to the datum per se; without God's immediately upholding power, anything is nothing. As with the previous case, God in the present must directly be giving the very power of being to us as receiving and "self-creatively" synthesizing the divine datum from "just prior to now."

In all three cases then, it is God as object--as
Criticism of Hartshorne on the Active Aspect 169
criterion for truth and value, as "enticing" datum, as datum summing up the past—which is designated as that which gives being or preserves from nonentity. But God as object to us is very external and exclusive vis-à-vis God's unmediated and all-encompassing empowerment of everything. For one thing, there are other aspects of our reality than our knowing and perceiving the divine object (in Hartshorne's schema, there is our synthesis of this datum). Thus, this model of empowerment involves externality in that it excludes part of our being. More importantly, our receiving of this object itself requires coinhering empowerment, which the divine object per se, or in any sense since it is past, cannot provide. More fundamentally, then, this model involves externality because God as past object offers no sense in which God as present subject immediately upholds us in the present in any, let alone all, aspects of our being.

Hartshorne develops no stronger sense in which God is necessary for our existence, of how God upholds us against nothingness. In his only other specific statement on this issue, he speaks of God's ordering as keeping the universe from disintegrating into nothingness. This concerns how God keeps the various ongoing individual streams of momentary creaturely states from conflicting with each other such that they do not all eventually destroy each other. The three instances concern what is necessary for any single creaturely state, or unit event, to come into existence in the first place. Therefore, God's ordering seems to offer
a comparatively indirect and secondary sense for Hartshorne of how God is necessary for existence. In any case, it is God as past datum (which includes preferences for possible creaturely action in the present) that orders the world.

Critics have long contended that process theology entails some kind of ultimate dualism. While process theologians have not so intended, my preceding analysis 1) suggests that dualism is indeed an implication of the Whiteheadian-Hartshornian systems and 2) pinpoints the crucial area—namely the creature as receiving and as creatively synthesizing data. Unless God is presently empowering and giving existence to each creature as it receives and synthesizes data, then each creature's existence is ultimately due to something in addition to God—be it each creature possessing its own necessity and power to receive and synthesize data, be it the metaphysical principle of creative synthesis, or be it ultimate chance or ultimate mystery.

Such a dualism goes against Hartshorne's intention. He insists as firmly as any theologian that God exists necessarily and is necessary for the existence of anything else, as in the following:

God is thus the great "I am," the one whose existence is the expression of his own power and none other, who self-exists—rather than is caused, or happens to exist—and by whose power of existence all other things exist.

He specifically denies that there can be more than one
Criticism of Hartshorne on the Active Aspect  171

self-existent being\textsuperscript{XV} and avers that "there is no presupposed 'stuff' alien to God's creative work."\textsuperscript{XVI} Yet some kind of ultimate dualism is precisely the implication if God as datum is the sole or primary sense in which God empowers things.

In itself the pastness of God before being perceived by any creature need not entail any externality of the creature to God, as long as the present creaturely state is embraced with regard to power (as God immediately empowers it as receiving the divine synthesis of the immediate past) and knowledge by the present divine state (though as we have seen above Hartshorne happens not to endorse such empowerment). Practically speaking, though, one might perhaps wonder why God as object should possibly be past, if God is immediately sustaining the creature in the present: why would God not present God's present state or synthesis rather than that of the immediate past to the creature? There are some reasons, though, why someone might accept that aspect of Hartshorne's thought (and still could subscribe to God's utterly immediate empowerment). Since God in some sense must have completed a synthesis before this is a datum, it might be called "past," even though it be the specific contents of God's present. Moreover, for Hartshorne the durations of the various types of momentary creaturely states (human versus insect versus cellular) can vary, so that God may be completing additional syntheses of processive creaturely states even as another creaturely state is working on the strictly
"past" divine datum from before the additional syntheses. Therefore, I cannot take issue with calling God "past" when God is perceived under this model (though I do not accept the basic model--however a basic acceptance or rejection is not relevant to the concerns of this project), nor does this pastness necessarily entail any separation of the creation from God.

But while the pastness of God as perceived need not have deleterious consequences for God's all-inclusiveness and, therefore, ultimacy, the notion that God does not perceive or prehend creaturely syntheses until they are past mostly definitely does. It represents the most blatant and serious undermining of God's all-inclusiveness and ultimacy in Hartshorne's thought--and more directly with respect to the passive aspect than the active, though it torpedoes both with equal effectiveness. I say that it is the most serious because, if Hartshorne would come to acknowledge that all power is (part of) God's power, his desire that God's power not be deterministic could be upheld if he modifies his concept to one of a division of responsibility rather than of power, and the divine datum as somehow necessary for the existence of any creaturely state could still be maintained (though it would become a secondary sense of this necessity). However, the only way Hartshorne can escape the problems of his opinion presently under consideration is to (re-) reverse it.

For most of his career, Hartshorne demurred from Whitehead and held that "prehension of contemporaries"
was possible. But later in his career he came to conclude that no one, including God, prehends the synthesis of a unit event until it is over. Harts-horne gives hardly any sign of recognizing the problems with this notion if applied to God: each creaturely state in its present, in its actualization, is external to God's knowledge and power. This externality to God's knowledge is obvious, for that God does not know it until it is past is precisely the point. And this in itself subverts God's all-inclusiveness and ultimacy with respect to the divine omniscience. But externality to God's power—and thus some kind of ultimate dualism—is mutually implicative with externality to God's knowing. For if God does not know each creaturely state in its present, how can God be presently relating to it in any sense, including as empoweror, let alone empowering it with utter immediacy, that is, coinherently? Either some other power must be presently upholding it, or it possesses an ultimate power or aseity of its own. Conversely, if God is the immediate sustainer of each creature, how could God fail to know each creaturely state in its present, each creaturely decision or synthesis as it is made rather than only afterwards? As Tillich notes, if God is "the creative ground of everything in every moment," there is no basis for an external relation.

As David R. Griffin suggests, there is one statement by Hartshorne that may disclose his sensing that the nonprehension of contemporaries by God under-mines the inclusion of all reality by God and may be an
attempt to avoid facing this implication:

"The present is nascent, it is coming into being...and there is no definite entity to prehend." But that the present is "nascent" seems particularly inappropriate to Hartshorne's model of process with its spurning of time as continuous in favor of a radical discreteness. For Hartshorne, as I understand it, within a unit occasion, which lasts a finite length of time, there is no distinction between earlier and later stages. This would seem to entail that a creaturely decision is made immediately at the beginning of the state's existence and is thus without any preceding time during which it is nascent. But in any case, as Griffin notes, even that which is "nascent" must have some reality. It must be more than nothing and should be embraced by God in a panentheistic outlook. However process is conceived, whether continuous or discontinuous, the central distinction is that, in panentheism, God must perceive what happens as it happens, creaturely choices as they are made, rather than divine awareness being "just subsequent to its data." Everything in the present must be in God, included in God's knowledge and power, instead of being a "latest class of subjects" waiting to be admitted.

Undermining the Divine Governance

We now move from the most basic and general sense of the active aspect of panentheism—that all power is God's power, that God coinheres with or immediately works through all other power—to God's
governing or ordering or shaping of the world, to
divine control of its destiny. As mentioned in the
preview at the beginning of this chapter, if the
universe is not at all external to God's knowledge,
sympathy, and power, God must know what divine
decisions and actions will optimally govern the
universe and be willing and able to carry these out, so
that creaturely experience overall will be very good.
I will examine Hartshorne's understanding of divine
control of the world and then consider whether it
allows for such perfect governance worthy of the active
aspect of God in panentheism.

Hartshorne maintains that God's controlling
power is able to ensure both the universe's continuing
existence and its goodness on the whole. He suggests a
number of times that God has the power to order the
universe in such a way that it will not disintegrate,
as in the following: God is

the only social being able to guarantee the
survival, the minimal integrity, of its soci-
ety.... This is a new definition of
omnipotence. It means power adequate to
preserve the society no matter what other
members may do.\textsuperscript{xxiii}

Now it would seem that merely keeping the universe from
destruction or chaos can be distinguished from keeping
it well-ordered and on the whole very good. Does God
only do the former in Hartshorne? There are one or two
remarks that seem to imply so. Writes Hartshorne, God
tolerates variety up to the point beyond which
it would mean chaos and not a world; but his intolerance of what would lie beyond that excludes nothing real from his fullest participation, but rather prevents reality from losing all definite character. xxiv

Also, remarks in the context of arguing for God's necessary existence, which are not worth delving into for our purposes, seem to imply that a world with any less order than what God in fact supplies would be too disorderly even to exist. xxv Perhaps because of the importance Hartshorne places on variety in aesthetics, he actually does believe that the best ordering by God and the best world are those which stop just short of chaos, though I doubt that he does.

In any case, despite the above writings, he clearly believes that God not only prevents the universe from destroying itself, but maintains its "social beauty" and "enjoyableness for most of the creatures," xxvi ensuring a preponderance of good over evil in the universe for any given time xxvii (whether or not merely preventing destruction also guarantees overall goodness). In order to do so, Hartshorne envisages for God a very effective and very substantial control over the creatures. God's control in some sense is irresistible: God's deciding "irresistibly and universally imposes limits upon the arbitrariness of the others." xxviii God's selection of "a particular world order" is "an irresistible datum." xxix Natural laws are "something like divine--that is, unsurpassably influential--decrees, free creations which the universe
is inevitably inspired to adopt."xxx Since for Hartshorne there is always some indeterminacy involved in any creaturely decision, God's irresistible influence does not determine the decision to the last iota. Rather, God sets "optimal limits" to creaturely freedom\xxxii or fixes "the range of possibilities open to us."\xxxii But God does put creaturely choice within narrow bounds, having determined to a large extent the outcome, according to Hartshorne: God "is the essential object for us. Hence God can set narrow limits to our freedom; for the more important the object to the subject, the more important is its effects upon the range of possible responses."\xxxiiii Animals "impulsively" take the roles which God assigns to them, only "the small details being left to them."\xxxiv In general, what is left for the creatures to decide is "by comparison trivial" in relation to God's choice of the "world order."\xxxv And in interpretation of and in the terminology of Whitehead, Hartshorne says that God furnishes "all but the last element of determinateness to the subjective aim of the actual entities"\xxxxvi (though what is furnished would depend upon past creaturely and divine choices as well as upon the present divine choice or synthesis for Hartshorne). I do not believe, though, that he has interpreted Whitehead properly, agreeing with Lewis Ford that for Whitehead God only assigns values to the various options open to one, and that it is past creaturely choices alone that set the range of possibilities.\xxxvii
Expanding upon his above statement on God's setting "narrow limits," Hartshorne indicates that God does this by presenting "himself as essential object, so characterized as to weight the possibilities of response in the desired respect."\textsuperscript{xxxviii} That is to say, we perceive or feel God's preferences, the divine "weighting," concerning all possibilities for action. Now this is actually a different notion than that of "imposing limits" or "fixing a range of possibilities" in the sense of excluding all others as real possibilities for us, which is the sense these phrases naturally suggest. Instead, in Whiteheadian fashion, apparently all possibilities are open and one could theoretically resist the ones favored by God. But to the extent that Hartshorne opts for this model as the way God "sets limits," he apparently believes that statistically all or at least enough would choose within a desired range so as to ensure that a particular world order would continue as long as God desired. Even this kind of inevitability goes further than Whitehead.

There is at least one passage of Hartshorne's which seems to diverge from his usual position that God to a large extent decides for the creatures what is in their best interests, leaving to them comparatively small or trivial decisions, by either actually limiting the range of possibilities or by weighting certain possibilities heavily. In this passage creaturely judgments that their best interests are not in choosing the negativities of disorder is important for even the
basic structure of the world: "They submit to partial control because they want to be, and they cannot be except within an ordered and adequately inclusive experience."\textsuperscript{xxxix}

As to how God influences and sets limits on us, I will sum up the relevant material that has been presented in the background section at the start of the chapter, in recent paragraphs, and elsewhere in the chapter: We perceive God as object or datum of the immediate past, which consists of God's synthesis of past creaturely and divine states and a "partly new ideal or order of preference" for possibilities of action for us, so that we feel "what God as of this moment desiderates."\textsuperscript{xl} In addition there is for Hartshorne a sense in which God influences or attracts us that can be distinguished from summing up the past in a particular creative synthesis that includes preferences concerning possibilities, though it complements and could be regarded as a part of that. It is by our sensing that God appreciates or enjoys or loves us.\textsuperscript{xli} God's appreciation of what we choose is something that occurs in the present, or will occur in the immediate future for the later Hartshorne, and not something that the divine datum of the immediate past will do. It could be, though, that part of perceiving that datum is the realization that, as God has included all past creaturely values in the divine experience, God will do the same for our present. And knowing that God appreciates and will "everlastingly cherish"\textsuperscript{xlii} the creaturely lives is incentive to choose possibilities...
that are preferred by God, though in itself that tells us nothing of what the preferences of a particular creative divine synthesis are. Here follows a long passage covering the importance for us of being known and enjoyed by God:

...we know we are (or will be) known; our being entirely known is itself known by us. We enjoy God's enjoyment of ourselves. This enjoyment-of-being-enjoyed is the essential factor in all our enjoyment.... Who is so happy as the successful singer or actor in the hours of imparting supreme joy to multitudes! How much more is the value of living due to the secret, yet ever-present sense of being given, with all our joy and sorrow, to God! For, other men being also similarly given to God, whatever joy we impart to them we also impart to deity. And only God can adequately enjoy our joy at all times, and forever thereafter through the divine memory, which alone never loses what it has once possessed. xliv

Hartshorne indicates that we do "not have the divine as a clear and distinct datum" but instead as "a vague environment," analogous to what he imagines the relationship of a human cell (which is sentient for Hartshorne) is to our thoughts and desires. xlv We have just seen Hartshorne refer to the "secret" sense of being enjoyed by God. He carries this type of thinking further by speaking of our prehension of divine syntheses in general and of our sense of God's sympathetic
love and our returning this love as "subconscious" or "unconscious." On the first score, he writes, "...persons in the world in the depths of their largely unconscious feelings take account of the divine reaction to them." And he pens, "The 'monarch' sees to it there is enough involuntary or unconscious cooperation to make voluntary forms of cooperation possible without intolerable risks." (The influence of the non-divine individuals upon each other also involves "more or less unconscious prehensions." On our sense of God's sympathetic awareness, Hartshorne avows,

...to be is to know (feel) oneself as known. Our dependence on God is simply the radical or supreme aspect (for that very reason largely unconscious since if--per impossible--we were fully conscious of it we should be God) of this familiar phenomenon, that our being for ourselves essentially or constitutively includes our being-for-others.

Our responding love, too, is "subconscious": "...we know ourselves and everything else in relation to our dim but direct sense of God's love, with which we are one by our subconscious but inalienable returning love for him." Or "unconscious": "Because only God can appreciate us fully, we unconsciously respond to this appreciation as we do to no other." Also, Hartshorne avers that "God has power over us because we cannot but love him, at least unconsciously."

Hartshorne has envisaged a very effective divine governance of the universe, involving a substantial
amount of control over or setting of limits upon the creatures, that ensures its continuing existence and overall beatitude. My criticism will be directed to whether his model of divine governance is conducive to such perfect control. I will first be concerned with its internal clarity and consistency, for we need to know clearly how God governs under this model in order to evaluate whether this rule is optimal. I will then trace out one of its possible internal implications, one which is not favorable to a perfect control that guarantees the ongoing existence, let alone the goodness, of the universe. I will next examine whether a basic facet of Hartshorne's model squares with our actual experience. For, even if Hartshorne's model internally or theoretically allows for a coherent way in which God might perfectly govern a possible world, if this is not compatible with experience in the real world, he has not offered a viable conception of how God perfectly administers the world. Finally, I will consider an aspect of Hartshorne's thought that entails unclarity in wording and nonconformity with experience and more importantly—panentheistically speaking—that entails a denial of any truly direct and immediate shaping of the world by God. Some direct and immediate shaping of the world being a natural concomitant of a panentheistically active God, I will conclude by attempting to clarify Hartshorne's one-time and seemingly out of character affirmation of God's "unmediated" and "direct control of every part of the universe."
Hartshorne is not at all explicit or concrete as to how or, in what sense, God synthesizes the many creaturely decisions into a whole. Particularly, how does God's synthesis of decisions after they have been made bring more unity and wholeness than had to be there in the first place for these decisions to be made within a socially interconnected world? Of course, that these decisions were within a unified world could be referred back to a previous synthesis. But the question remains as to what unifying synthesizing God does in this round beyond what unity was already there in the previous round and back to the time when the basic spatial continuity and basic order of the universe were established. Of course, we are not God and cannot with anything approaching full concreteness know or imagine how God synthesizes, if that is what God essentially does in perceiving the creatures. But Hartshorne might have made a little more of an effort here.

One might mention God's weighting of possibilities, God's "order of preferences," in answer to how God synthesizes. However, this weighting presumes a whole with attendant possibilities; it would seem to follow the synthesis of the many creaturely decisions into one whole. The preceding points to the fact that if the evaluation of possibilities is the only divine deciding, then God "synthesizes" in at best an attenuated sense. Certainly God would not be synthesizing the many creaturely decisions into one whole, as Hartshorne posits. The only "synthesis" by
God would be of creaturely decisions, which already were a whole and carried their own possibilities, and the divine preferences regarding these possibilities.

From the standpoint of consistency, it is a definite weakness that Hartshorne never picks—or even recognizes the discrepancy—between divine choices as making real certain possibilities and precluding others versus as only weighting possibilities (though thinkers can sometimes be more fecund for others by such inconsistency—or at least they provide topics for books). This conflict is manifested in widely divergent statements. On the one hand, Hartshorne indicates that God decides what is to even be a definite possibility. And he pronounces that God "imposes limits" and does "impose and maintain laws of nature" and speaks of "constraint" and "involuntary cooperation" in connection with God's power over the creatures. On the other hand, Hartshorne speaks even of the laws of nature in terms of inspiration, one instance of which has preceded, in line with the declarations that "all that God can directly give us is the beauty of his ideal for us" and that all divine—or any—power is "the direct and indirect workings of persuasion." (In relation to creaturely power, that is certainly a gross overstatement. Even philosophically speaking, does it make sense to say my head or its constituents are "persuaded" to move when hit by a baseball bat? In relation to the divine power, perhaps by "indirect workings" Hartshorne meant that which is not persuasion at all, but which determines the basic order that makes
Criticism of Hartshorne on the Active Aspect 185

divine persuasion possible. But if so, he should have been much clearer.)

There may be a basis on which God as only assigning preferences to, rather than as determining, possibilities might be able to effect the same result as if doing the latter, might be just as "irresistible" and able to put creaturely choices within narrow bounds—though the distinction between the two and Hartshorne's failure to note it would still stand. And so would the inappropriateness of "imposition," "constraint," and "involuntariness" or of God's deciding what is to be a definite possibility, if God exercises influence only by offering preferences concerning possibilities. It might be posited that, though God does not preclude any possibilities by God's synthesis, but allows all possibilities not cut off by creaturely choices to be prehended, the creatures will find God's preferred choices so supremely attractive that there is absolutely no chance that a creature will choose possibilities low on God's order of preferences, even though these are definite and real. I will not say that that notion is incoherent, though it certainly is controversial and should have been specifically described and argued-for by Hartshorne, if that is at bottom his position. If this above notion of irresistible attractiveness cannot be sustained, then the arguments and conclusions of the following paragraph must hold sway.

I have examined Hartshorne's model of divine governance in regard to internal consistency. I will
now draw out the implications of one of Hartshorne's conflicting sides: If God only governs by letting the creatures know or feel divine preferences regarding possibilities, rather than determining possibilities, then, strictly speaking, God would not set (optimal) limits on the creatures' freedom, as Hartshorne often states. For whatever the strength of God's desire, whatever the probability, that a creature would choose a certain possibility, it would be possible for the creature to opt for the possibility least desired by God. And, however unlikely, cosmically it would be possible for the creatures as a whole to make a decision that did not fall within the range of "limits" God desires. (The universe would not be "inevitably inspired to adopt" natural laws selected by God.) This is the Whiteheadian position. And Lewis S. Ford, who defends it against the strain in Hartshorne wherein God imposes the laws of nature, is willing—or almost willing—to accept the consequences: "The world could possibly generate into near chaos..." I do not see how stopping at "near chaos" can be justified. Hartshorne's remark, in one of his most Whiteheadian moments on this subject, that the creatures accept some control because they want to exist, suggests a possible justification. But how can the desire to exist be guaranteed to countervail creaturely ignorance about just how close destruction might be and about how a particular decision might impinge upon this, as well as creaturely willingness to take a chance on destruction in order to satisfy an immediate desire for a selfish good? Chaos
and destruction of the universe would seem to be a possibility in this model. Another comment by Ford appears to accept even that consequence: "The forces of evil could conceivably overwhelm God. Against that there is no metaphysical guarantee." But if God is sovereign, God's perfect love must be united with power to ensure the ultimate fruition of this love. Hartshorne is right in maintaining that God must have power to ensure both the continued existence and overall goodness of the universe, even if his understanding of how God exercises power is insufficient to that intention.

Having considered Hartshorne's model of divine governance internally, I now turn to its relationship—or lack thereof—to experience. In a fundamental way—in its great reliance on our knowledge, feeling, or prehension of God—Hartshorne's model does not square with our experience. To the extent that God's influence depends upon prehension of divine desires and divine appreciation of our lives, the problem is fairly obvious. Human beings are the only known earthly creatures who can consciously or explicitly base their decisions on awareness of God's will and memory, and on the whole they do so infrequently. By claiming that such awareness is for the most part "subconscious" or "unconscious," Hartshorne makes his position harder to attack, especially for someone like me who strongly senses the deep tacit and implicit element in perception and knowing. But Hartshorne's position that even animals have an intuitive knowledge of God strikes
me as counterintuitive. To make credible his position, Hartshorne would have to offer some "psychoanalysis" of our experience that causes an "aha," that brings to consciousness the sense of God's preferences and enjoyment of us that was on a nonconscious level in a past experience, and in such a way that we see all our experiences in those terms and have some sense of how the least of subhuman creatures likewise sense God's wishes and appreciation. This Hartshorne does not attempt, as far as I can see. And even if one were convinced of the universality of awareness of the divine thoughts and memory, there are still the questions of whether such awareness is strong or full enough to potentially have much effect on behavior and, if so, whether in actuality it does have much effect.

There are problems with placing God's influence on perception solely on the side of that which is apprehended, solely on God as molding God's self as object of our perception. Hartshorne's model of perception and causation seems to entail a wholly amorphous or unlimited subject in the present which is shaped or defined by its perception of a datum or object from the past. Even all bodily cells and prior states of a said individual are part of the overall datum for Hartshorne. But does not the perceiver in some sense bring its own structure to whatever it perceives? And must not God have a role in determining that structure, if only through selection of basic laws, including those relating to sentience in the universe? (Insofar as creaturely free choices have
played a part in the evolution of a species, God would not have the sole responsibility in determining the perceptual structure of that species). This would entail that God in some sense is acting immediately and directly in the present in determining the nature of things, at least if God's empowerment is understood panentheistically, and not only by being a past datum (if God's syntheses of past creaturely decisions are needed at all for that purpose). I should add that the structure of the perceiver cannot be unambiguously separated from the structure of the world that is perceived; these are correlative.

I will close this section by investigating whether God's governance of creation can be said to be direct or immediate for Hartshorne. His basic position, that God's decisions and actions shape the world only by being (past) object to the creatives, seems irreconcilable with direct or unmediated control in an active panentheistic sense. Yet we have seen Hartshorne declare that "omnipotence could only be direct control of every part of the universe, since indirect control is subject to the imperfections inhering in all instruments." In the same section of *Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism*, he writes of God's controlling the world by "direct power of his will, feeling, and knowledge" (eminently analogous to the way we control our nerve cells, believes Hartshorne). I believe that Hartshorne's use of such language in this early work reflects his sensing on one level that a panentheistic understanding of God
requires divine power and activity and control to be
direct and immediate with respect to the creatures.
While Hartshorne is not explicit about what "directness
and immediacy" mean, they can be interpreted in a way
consistent with his Whiteheadian views on causation and
ultimate causation. Hartshorne refers to indirect
power or control as "through intermediaries, or
'instruments.'"\textsuperscript{\textlongcite{133}} The directness and nonmediation
may mean that we perceive the (past) divine datum with
its inclusive "knowledge" and its "will" or preferences
apart from "intermediaries" or "instruments." This
then would be in keeping with Hartshorne's position
elsewhere, that God's control is only as passive (past)
object not present active subject, that all of God's
control is in fact mediated through our prehension of
God. Just above we have seen the need for a genuinely
immediate and direct divine governing of creation, in
addition to whatever comparatively indirect influence
God exercises through creaturely perceiving of God. Of
course, in panentheism, our awareness of God as object,
as with our exercise of indeterminate freedom, is a
part of or manifestation of God's power, though these
are distinguished from God's direct and immediate
shaping of things beyond our ken.

\textbf{Other Undermining of the Divine Majesty}

I will close this chapter by discussing ways in
which Hartshorne does not do justice to the divine
majesty and ultimacy that do not directly relate to
either divine immediate and coinhering empowerment of everything or governing of the universe. And these do not specifically involve doing injustice to the active aspect as contrasted to the passive. However, insofar as a sense of God's awe-inspiring majesty and holiness arises from God's ultimate power, the power of self-existence and empowerment of all, and insofar as the all-inclusiveness and majestic nature of the passive aspect rests upon this ultimate power, the following problems are symptomatic of his not giving the active aspect of divine power its full due.

Tillich indicated that liberal Protestantism had taken away the numinous and awe-inspiring character of God by reducing divine holiness to just moral goodness or righteousness.\textsuperscript{lxiv} Hartshorne falls into this liberal Protestant tradition by using God's "holiness" only in the sense of righteousness.\textsuperscript{lxv} Just how much can be read into this is not easy to say. To some extent he may have been using the word in the usual way of his culture. Yet he was not unaware of other, and less circumscribed, senses of holiness. It is fairly safe to say that Hartshorne's use of "holiness" shows liberal Protestant influence upon him and is a manifestation of a tendency to slight God's majesty and power.

The following is perhaps Hartshorne's least fortuitous phrase: "This strict logical incomparability of deity is his unapproachable majesty."\textsuperscript{lxvi} (Emphasis his.) Hartshorne is correct that God's unsurpassability can be expressed logically or abstractly as a difference in principle. But to
imply that that is all there is to it undercuts the majesty and power of God in its concreteness and our emotion-laden and intuitive sense of this. That remark is not representative. We have seen more sensitive and holistic statements on God's unsurpassability, including God's power, that evoke a sense of the divine majesty and holiness. Yet this above declaration is an extreme manifestation of a tendency to shortchange the divine grandeur.

Finally, Hartshorne undercuts God's ultimacy, transcendence, and majesty by restricting God's reality and enjoyment of value to God's relationship with the universe. He reacts against any notion that God's absoluteness consists of anything in addition to "the eternal adequacy of type in the divine relational acts," that God as absolute "is more than the supreme as relative to the world." The only way in which he implicitly backs away from this understanding of God's absoluteness is by holding that God eternally knows all logical and mathematical truths and apparently derives some aesthetic value from that.

The limiting of God to relationship to the world is manifested in the identification of God with the "universe" or "nature" in his earlier works. In doing so, Hartshorne is clear that the universe or nature as a whole is an integrated consciousness or a person. In our culture, though, nature or the universe is not thought of as aware or personal; this factor may be responsible for the absence of the equation of either of these with God in later works. Also, concern
lest anyone assume that God does not have some indeterminate freedom with respect to the nature of the universe or that God's experience is only the sum of what happens in the universe (instead of an aesthetic synthesis greater than the sum of the parts) may have contributed to this change. But this apparently only represents a change in manner of speaking, to avoid misinterpretation, not a change in substance.

Since I have criticized Hartshorne on the above point, it is incumbent upon me to suggest what experiences or values, independent of relation to the universe, God is thus prevented from having. With Hartshorne, I demur from the notions of actus purus, that is, of God eternally realizing all particular values, and of a certain type of mysticism, in which God's enjoyment is essentially "beyond" any and all particular values. However, contra Hartshorne, I do not think God should in principle be limited to having just this one universe. Besides obviously limiting God's creative power and possibilities a priori, such tying of God by necessity to just this universe and its spatiality strikes me as perhaps entailing that God is spatial or quasi-spatial, thus undermining Hartshorne's panentheistic intention that God not be at a distance or separated from anything (not to mention undermining God's aseity.) And apart from the values God derives from any and all worlds, both from the creaturely experiences per se and divine syntheses of them, I find it plausible that God realizes other concrete aesthetic values (not just the value of abstract logical and
mathematical truths, an idea I find somewhat problematic in any case). That is, very metaphorically speaking, God composes music that only God hears and paints pictures that only God sees. This issue will be further explored in chapter 6.
ENDNOTES

i. See for example Whitehead's Philosophy, pp. 125-27.


vii. Whitehead's Philosophy, p. 106.

viii. I suspect that a Roycean-type epistemic argument for God's existence (a version of which is offered by Hartshorne as one of six theistic proofs in Creative Synthesis, pp. 286-89) is part of what lies behind this manner of speaking. By such a proof one is asked in effect to imagine whether there could be any knowledge in the absence of a final or absolute standard of truth, which could only be an omniscient deity. If the proof works for one, then all knowledge and thus all existence disintegrate into nothingness when God is taken away. Similarly, Hartshorne's claim that without God there would be chaos, which is then sometimes equated with nothing definite or simply with
nothing, could stem from trying to imagine, in an argument from order, what the universe would be like without a supreme orderer, and seeing it disintegrate into chaos and then nothingness. As God as ultimate and immediate empoweror or upholder, for me, underlies or is the basis for God as knower or orderer, so in one sense the argument from contingency is a necessary presupposition of those from knowledge or order. For if one is willing to allow that the universe in itself may carry its own necessity of existence, why not also allow that as part of this "aseity," it carries its own order and knowability?


xii. Philosophical Interrogations, p. 345.

xiii. That God "requires" (Natural Theology, p. 64; Philosophers Speak of God, p. 275) or "could not exist without" (Natural Theology, p. 84; see also Man's Vision of God, p. 108) some world or other or that some creatures or other are necessary (Creative Synthesis, pp. 263-64; Encyclopedia, s.v. "cause") could be misinterpreted, at least if the wider context is ignored, to mean that creation has aseity as much as God and is as necessary for God's very existence as vice versa. Hartshorne always does note, though, at least this difference concerning how God and the world are necessary and require each other: God is the only individual who is necessary, while it is necessary only that there be some nondivine individuals or other, but whether any particular entity embodies this class is contingent. One might submit that this contrast could still permit some sort of "prime matter" independent of
God that is necessarily instantiated. (Whitehead never decisively dispels suspicion that he intends some such notion.) And if this necessity is independent of God, God's very existence would seem to be as dependent on "world" as much as the other way around. In fact, though, the necessity of a world declared by Hartshorne is the not unfamiliar notion that it is God's nature to be creative—which is endorsed by Tillich (Systematic Theology, 1:252, 263-64), that such necessity is rooted in God and not intrinsic to the world: "...if God could not exist without some world or other, this would only imply that with his unsurpassable creativity he infallibly provides himself with a world..." Natural Theology, pp. 84-85. See also Man's Vision of God, p. 108; Philosophers Speak of God, p. 275.) Or similarly, he states that "the first cause...in its essence...depends upon (in the sense of necessitating or omnipotently requiring) the class of contingent beings as such" (Encyclopedia, s.v. "cause"). And, he once adds, if God, contra Hartshorne's own opinion, "is capable of sheer idleness, then he can and would exist even were there not anything worldly" (Natural Theology, p. 84).


xv. Ibid.


xviii. David R. Griffin, "Hartshorne's Differences from Whitehead," in Two Process Philosophers: Hartshorne's Encounter with Whitehead, ed. Lewis S. Ford, AAR Studies in Religion, no. 5 (Tallahassee, FL:
Hartshorne is concerned that any prehension of contemporaries would 1) entail a logically absurd infinite regress (A is aware of B's being aware of A's being aware of, etc.) and 2) deprive a unit occasion of its freedom to make a decision without outside interference. On the first score, I do not see why it is contradictory to say that A perceives that B perceives him/her and B perceives that A perceives him/her, and leave it at that. As to the second concern in relation to God, the creatures do not necessarily have to be aware of God's immediate awareness of them. But even if they are, I do not see how this would preclude their making a (free) decision. I doubt that the interference that Hartshorne has in mind would be our awareness that God would know our decision as soon as it was made. For Hartshorne, any such awareness would be more or less indistinct anyway, and we do know (indistinctly or subconsciously) that God will experience our decisions shortly after we make them and forevermore, yet this does not keep us from acting, and acting contrary to the divine will. Probably the interference--and the logical absurdity entailed in it--that Hartshorne wants to avoid is contained in the following proposition: If God prehends contemporaries, then God's awareness of A's choosing possibility B must--per--impossible, at least if there is indeterminacy--be used by A in choosing B. But as long as God knows that A chooses B only as A chooses it, and not before, there is no entailment that it be a datum in the decision making.


xxvi.  Whitehead's Philosophy, p. 93.

xxvii.  That according to Hartshorne each new divine state, which perceives a new state of the universe, increases the total value of the divine experience is indicative of this surplusage of good in each moment.


xxx.  Natural Theology, pp. 88-89.


xxxiii.  Divine Relativity, pp. 141-42.


xxxv.  Whitehead's Philosophy, p. 133.

xxxvi.  Whitehead's Philosophy, p. 75.

xxxvii.  Lewis S. Ford, "Whitehead's Differences from
Hartshorne," in Two Process Philosophers, p. 78.


xli. In addition to future citations on this score, Creative Synthesis, p. 12; Whitehead's Philosophy, p. 197.


xliii. Divine Relativity, p. 139. Hartshorne even goes beyond claiming that God's appreciation of us is the essential factor in our enjoyment. He exclaims that, since being appreciated by our fellows is important, "how much more literally and completely can reflection in God's ideally sympathetic, that is, completely clear, appreciation constitute our reality" ("Ideal Knowledge," p. 580. Cf. Man's Vision of God, pp. 282-83; Correction of "Ideal Knowledge Defines Reality," Journal of Philosophy 43 [December 1946]:724), and he claims that "we may well derive our whole being from this enjoyed-being-object" (Divine Relativity, p. 124). This may just be a manner of speaking, for it seems to me that we must make some kind of distinction between the content of our being and its being appreciated, both because we are not fully aware of God's enjoyment of us and because we must do or experience something that has some intrinsic value to us and/or other creatures in order for God to appreciate it--its only value cannot be that God appreciates it or there would be nothing to appreciate.

Criticism of Hartshorne on the Active Aspect  201


xlix.  Man's Vision of God, p. 127.  Compare the following comment: "...we love God with an immediate love or sympathetic prehension which is our very being, and can therefore at most be distorted rather than destroyed, while we persist at least." (Whitehead's Philosophy, p. 92.) This has definite affinities to Tillich's notion of "essential being," which is "theonomous" being in which we are in awareness of and unity with God, and which is disrupted partly, but never completely, by "existential" distortion.


liii.  Natural Theology, p. 53.


lvi.  Creative Synthesis, p. 239.


lx. Ford, Lure of Theism, p. 120.


CHAPTER 5

CRITICISM OF TILLICH ON THE PASSIVE ASPECT

The time has finally come to examine how Tillich undermines his panentheism—that finite reality is embraced by and not external to God, that God is utterly near to and absolutely participates in each creature—especially in relation to the divine passivity. If God fully includes the creatures, who are temporal, who have some freedom, and who suffer, God must in some degree genuinely be temporal, be affected by the creatures, and suffer. (Though, of course, temporality, conditionedness, and suffering must apply to God in categorically eminent ways, not in the ways these qualities are manifested in the creatures.) My theological mentor in seminary, the late Ronald L. Williams, was fond of saying that "theologians take away with the left hand what they have just given you with the right." Tillich could be used as a prime example of that saying as far as the issues of this chapter are concerned. The relevant Tillichian material is rife with unclarity, ambiguity, and inconsistency.

The general plan of the chapter is as follows: I will first consider the divine vis-a-vis temporality. Included will be Tillich's uses of phrases such as, "God transcends the distinction between potentiality and actuality," and, "in God the poles of dynamics and form or self-transcendence and self-preservation are not in tension," and his descriptions of eternity and its relation to time. I will offer possible
interpretations of God's transcending or balancing without tension the relevant polarities and categories and possible interpretations of God's eternity, and by examining key passages, make certain determinations. My overall conclusion will be that the balance tips toward a divine temporality, and some genuine openness of the future, but hardly unequivocally. Indeed, various passages, if interpreted in themselves in the most natural manner, are decidedly antitemporal. It is only in the larger context of Tillich's works that other interpretations suggest themselves. And some of that larger context will await the final portions of this chapter.

I will next consider whether Tillich upholds genuine creaturely freedom, that is, freedom with an element of indeterminacy to it. My finding will be that he does, though not without a few discordant notes, particularly in connection with the divine-human inter-relationship. This will add some support to openness with regard to the future in the divine life. This affirmation of indeterminacy is in either tension or contradiction with the next aspect of Tillich's thought to be covered, namely, his holding that the creatures do not at all "condition" God. The subsequent topic, that God includes and participates in the negativities and sufferings of creation, has an aspect which points to Tillich's way of trying to reconcile God's inclusion of creatures who have some indeterminacy and who suffer with God's non-conditionedness by them: that negativities are
overcome or conquered in the divine life. It is pointed to even more clearly when we move to the nature of fulfillment in the divine life: what occurs in creation is unambiguously and totally fulfilled by God, resulting in total divine blessedness, however well or poorly the creatures realize their potentialities, as God thoroughly purges the negative element and then unites whatever positive element is left with the essential potentialities which were not achieved in time (but are in eternity).

The composite Tillichian position on the issues of the chapter then is this: Creaturely actions are not entirely predetermined or foreseen by God and thus do processively affect or condition divine knowledge, but they do not affect or condition God's experience of value or happiness with respect to creation, which is maximal however the creatures choose and however much they suffer. I will argue that this represents a serious undermining of Tillich's panentheism.

Divine Temporality?: Open or Closed?

The affirmation of a divine temporality is crucial for a coherent panentheism: For if God is related to the universe, which is temporal, with utter immediacy and directness (of knowledge and power), God must be correspondingly temporal, at least in part; divine experience must in some sense be processive. And unless everything is wholly predetermined or foreseen, this temporality must have some openness to
Tillich expresses a clear desire to do more justice to temporality in God than does the doctrine of *actus purus*:

Potentiality and actuality appear in classical theology in the famous formula that God is *actus purus*, the pure form in which everything potential is actual, and which is the eternal self-intuition of the divine fullness (*pleroma*).

In this formula the dynamic side in the dynamics-form polarity is swallowed by the form side. Pure actuality, that is, actuality free from any element of potentiality, is a fixed result; it is not alive. Life includes the separation of potentiality and actuality. The nature of life is actualization, not actuality.

The God who is *actus purus* is not the living God.¹

Tillich also rejects *actus purus* more briefly on other occasions² and often affirms the "living God"³ (not to mention countless references to "the divine life"), again combining the two in this declaration: "...the idea of a living God seems to me to contradict the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of God as pure actuality."⁴ Tillich thus affirms an element of potentiality, a "dynamic element,"⁵ and an element of becoming...and consequently an element of temporality⁶ in God, which supposedly precludes God's being "not alive."

It must be remembered that "life" and attendant
terms when applied to God are symbolic (as is anything from finitude for Tillich). In the first instance, this reflects a desire that God not become less than God in the process of the divine life. For Tillich the finite being actualizes its potentialities less than perfectly: its existence falls short of its essence; it is "fall-en." But God "is not subjected to a conflict between essence and existing.... His existence, his standing out of his essence, is an expression of his essence. Essentially, he actualizes himself."\textsuperscript{viii} It was this concern that God's existence not be less than essence, that is manifested, though improperly or too extremely, in the Scholastic idea of \textit{actus purus}, indicates Tillich.\textsuperscript{ix}

A key aspect or movement of life, related to that of the movement from potentiality to actuality, or actualization, is that of dynamics in polarity with form. This is also expressed by related polarities of self-alteration and self-identity, self-transcendence and self-preservation, and going out of or separating from and returning to or reuniting with oneself. Tillich applies all of these to God.\textsuperscript{x} Before proceeding further, it may be helpful to let Tillich briefly describe this polar relationship of dynamics and form in general:

The dynamic character of being implies the tendency of everything to transcend itself and to create new forms. At the same time everything tends to conserve its own form as the basis of its self-transcendence. It tends to
unite identity and difference, rest and movement, conservation and change. Therefore, it is impossible to speak of being without also speaking of becoming.\textsuperscript{x}i

However, in finite life the uniting or balancing of these polarities, as with all polarities, is relative or imperfect; the poles are always in "tension." And this tension tends to "disruption" of the poles, to rigidity and stagnation or recklessness and chaos, depending upon which pole is emphasized.\textsuperscript{xii} And, with respect to an individual, if the polar imbalance is severe enough, the result is fatal: "Inhibition of growth ultimately destroys the being which does not grow. Misguided growth destroys itself and that which transcends itself without self-conservation."\textsuperscript{xiii} The creature can "lose itself"\textsuperscript{xiv} relatively--which it always does to some extent in Tillich's opinion--or absolutely. But these problems of creaturely actualization cannot be applied to divine actualization. God "does not lose his identity in his self alteration."\textsuperscript{xv} God "is dynamic not in tension with form but in an absolute and unconditional unity with form, so that his self-transcendence never is in tension with his self-preservation, so that he always remains God."\textsuperscript{xvi} Similarly, "neither side" of the dynamics-form polarity threatens the other, nor is there a threat of disruption. In terms of self-preservation one could say that God cannot cease to be God. His going-out from himself does not diminish or
Criticism of Tillich on the Passive Aspect 207

destroy his divinity. It is united with the eternal "resting in himself."\textsuperscript{xvii}

What we have seen so far on dynamics and form--and earlier on potentiality and actuality--does not deny and in fact seems to demand some temporality and change in the divine life. (And Tillich does accept Peter Bertocci's "statement that 'God [is] that kind of creativity that endures through change.'"\textsuperscript{xvii}) Tillich seems to be saying that actualization and self-transcendence on the basis of self-conservation do not have the pitfalls they do in the case of the creatures but they do apply to God in a perfect way. His principal concern appears to be to avoid attributing the "tension" involved in normal dynamics-form, with its threat of "disruption," to the divine life and instead attribute a perfect balance.

His criticism of process thought concerning the relation of dynamics and form, in volume 1 of the \textit{Systematic}, reflects this concern that there be not tension but perfect balance. As such, though it is somewhat misinformed and unfair, it is not antiprocess. Tillich speaks of some who "try to distinguish" a dynamic and a form element and "assert that in so far as God is a living God, these two elements must remain in tension."\textsuperscript{xix} He then mentions Hartshorne and "the contingent" as "an expression of what we have called 'dynamics.'"\textsuperscript{xx} Actually Hartshorne does not posit the necessary and contingent in God as "in tension" but rather as in perfect harmony. Each contingent divine state necessarily embodies the perfect abstract divine
essence. To borrow Tillich's phrase, God's standing out of the divine essence is an expression of that essence.

Tillich also criticizes ...

...a nonsymbolic, ontological doctrine of God as becoming. If we say that being is actual as life, the element of self-transcendence is obviously and emphatically included. But it is not in balance with becoming. Being comprises becoming and rest, becoming as an implication of dynamics and rest as an implication of form. If we say that God is being-itself, this includes both rest and becoming, both the static and dynamic elements. However, to speak of a "becoming" God disrupts the balance between dynamics and form and subjects God to a process which has the character of a fate or which is completely open to the future and has the character of an absolute accident.xxii

The preceding quotation need not signal any substantial disagreement between Tillich and Hartshorne. For Hartshorne, becoming includes both an element of fixity or abstract "being" and an element of motion. Which is to say that the discrepancy may be essentially verbal. Tillich himself suspects "that the discussion about 'being' and 'becoming' as basic concepts is merely verbal."xxiii In this dialogue both make concessions suggestive of that. Apparently because "becoming" in this particular connection suggests an imbalance of motion over fixity (which is how Tillich had used it),
Hartshorne concedes,

It is doubtless best, as Tillich says, not to speak of a "becoming God" (translated from Scheler's German?), because this suggests that perhaps God can be born, ...or...could degenerate or die,...or, as our author puts it, that God is subject to a process which...is completely open to the future and has the character of an absolute accident.xxiii

For his part, while maintaining that being as the negation of nonbeing precedes in "logical" or "ontological" dignity any characterization of being, such as the polarity of dynamics and form, that being said, Tillich is "not disinclined to accept the process-character of being-itself."xxiv Indeed, he affirms that, "if being means static self-identity [which is how Hartshorne uses it], becoming must be the ultimate principle."xxv This seems to uphold Hartshorne's insistence that a whole which includes both fixity and motion must overall change or become, rather than compositely be a static or changeless identity. So even the above criticism of process thought contains nothing to gainsay temporality and change in God and, indeed, seems to demand it.

But all of the section to this point hides an ambiguity. One would normally assume that actualization and dynamics involve various real potentialities, only some of which will be actualized, and various paths "dynamics" might take within the limits set by "form." But it might be posited
otherwise. Suppose there is just one real possibility for the divine actualization, its standing out of its essence. That is, the divine life, including all that happens in the universe which is embraced by that life (indeed it is only via creation, the positing of "nonbeing" or "otherness," that God for Tillich "lives in the first place"xxvi), consists of the temporal or processive execution of an eternally totally predetermined--or at least foreseen--plan. If we use the description of Tillich's God as a "dynamic form" by Edgar A. Townexxvii or an "inexhaustible form" by James Luther Adamsxxviii and picture it as extending through all time (which is probably infinite for Tillich--at the very least he rules out any positing of or speculation about a beginning or end to creation at a particular moment of time), this would be an eternally preplanned and set dynamic form. Form, as it were, would determine to the last iota the direction of dynamics. This is a "closed temporality."

Note how this differs, perhaps subtly, from what I will call "classical eternity," a corollary of actus purus. In actus purus, if it is stipulated that part of God's eternally actualized and unchanging experience consists of knowing the world, then the whole of creation through all time is already and always actual from the divine perspective, but, from our (deficient or illusory?) perspective, to be acted out in time. The actual relation of God to the world for God would not be at all temporal or processive. This presents the, I believe, insurmountable incoherency of trying to
relate the utterly unchanging to the changing, the literally timeless to the temporal. But in a closed temporality, God's eternal vision is to be acted out or actualized in time—from the divine perspective, not just the creaturely—instead of an actuality already in every sense real or accomplished. God, as the driver, comes along for the ride through time, so to speak. God is processively related to the universe, knowing when a stage of the unfolding actually occurs, knowing whether or not a particular stage has been or has yet to be actualized in time. For classical theology, on the other hand, to ask if God knows when something now happens or knows whether it has yet happened for us temporal creatures is to speak improperly, for God is eternal in a timeless sense; all "times" of creation are eternally and equally actual for God.

But what reason is there to think that Tillich may be going against the normal assumption regarding actualization? What reason to think that the requirements that the poles of dynamics and form be without tension or in perfect balance or unity, and that God not cease to be God in going out of God's self, can only be met by a closed dynamic form? Actually, as the reader may suspect, for the purposes of organizing our discussion, I have been preventing Tillich's left hand from obfuscating what he has been giving us with the right. One could not read too much by Tillich in this area without seeing ambiguity and perhaps inconsistency.

Much of Tillich's language on God's relationship
to the ontological polarities generically (which include dynamics and form along with freedom--destiny and individualization--participation) suggests either a closed temporality or classical eternity. His claim that the poles have no independence or practical distinctness in God, if applied to dynamics-form would rule out an open temporality, which requires some distinctness of the two poles such that form does not wholly predetermine the path of dynamics. His statements that God "transcends" or "is not subject to" the polarities or that they "disappear" in God, if taken at their face value, would mean that the polarity of dynamics and form does not apply to the divine life, as in classical eternity. On the latter score, though, I suspect, from his respective descriptions of the three polarities vis-a-vis God and the phrases to be immediately quoted, that it is the polarities only insofar as "in tension" with a "threat of dissolution" that are transcended, and not the polarities absolutely. (In that case, "disappear" would only suggest that operationally the poles have no disharmonious separation. Transcendence and nonsubjection would then be compatible with either a closed or open temporality, depending upon what the criterion for nontension was.) Moreover, precisely because the above remarks are not made specifically about dynamics and form, they can only provide fairly indirect and tenuous evidence in favor of even a closed temporality (versus an open one). But at the least, Tillich's language here is careless and ambiguous.
More serious problems attend a basic and common type of Tillichian phrase specifically on the relationship of potentiality and actuality in the divine life. Tillich declares that God transcends or is beyond the "distinction"\textsuperscript{xxxv} or "difference"\textsuperscript{xxxvi} between potentiality and actuality, or, in shorthand, that God transcends potentiality and actuality,\textsuperscript{xxxvii} or that there is "no distinction"\textsuperscript{xxxviii} or "no difference"\textsuperscript{xxxix} between them in the divine life. Since Tillich indicated that it is the separation of potentiality and actuality characterizing life that separates the living God from \textit{actus purus}, one may be ready to throw up one's arms in exasperation.\textsuperscript{xii} And the most obvious, which in this case is the strictest, interpretation of such phrases taken just in themselves yields \textit{actus purus}. If there is no distinction in any sense, if God wholly transcends any such distinction, then the unavoidable implication is that all real potentialities are already or eternally (in this case meaning without involving any passage of time) actual or actualized in every sense.

Let us now examine how the concept of a closed temporality stands in relation to such phrases. There is here a sense in which potentiality and actuality are distinct for God. Knowledge that a particular stage of process has been actualized becomes actual only when it is actualized and before then is potential. But in the sense of content or scope, there is no distinction or difference between potentiality and actuality. That is, every real potentiality will become actual in its
time. So this model allows for a strict, though not absolutely strict, interpretation that does justice to the claim that God transcends the distinction between potentiality and actuality.

Now consider the following model vis-a-vis that formula: There is some indeterminate creaturely freedom, thus entailing that there are real potentialities for the divine life, regarding its knowledge, that do not become actualized. (For example, God as knowing that a person picks A rather than B at a particular time cannot become actual if the person opts for B.) However, no matter how the creatures utilize their freedom, God derives maximal fulfillment and happiness from each juncture of the unfolding of creation. That, I believe, is Tillich's view. And if God is assured of realizing a maximum of value from each stage of this unfolding, can God eternally possess a maximum of happiness with regard to the creation as extending through all time? This is perhaps Tillich's view. (This would be an actus purus with respect to value rather than just a closed temporality in that respect.) God's maximal happiness or possession of value is either assured or complete in the mosaic of the divine life, but free creaturely decisions and God's knowledge of them are filled in only when the decisions are made. Since God always maximally actualizes potentialities with regard to value, there is "no distinction" or "difference" between potentiality and actuality in a fairly strict sense that at least would do no great injustice to that formula.
Criticism of Tillich on the Passive Aspect 215

So the apparent options to ascribe to Tillich are classical eternity, closed temporality, and open temporality (though closed with regard to the divine beatitude). But why not dismiss out of hand the strictest reading of the transcendence of the difference between potentiality and actuality--classical eternity--after Tillich has rejected *actus purus* and has applied dynamics-form in perfect harmony and balance to God? Well, there is the strain in Tillich wherein we can only know God in relation to us but not in God's self. This strain is manifested in a couple of agnostic comments on God and time: 1) "I really do not know what past and future are in the ground of being. I only know they are rooted in it."xli 2) "...the question of a 'before' or 'after' in God cannot be answered,..."xlii This can create some suspicion that the following is Tillich's view: "For us" God is naturally thought of and "sym-bolically" spoken of as being processively or dynamically related, because we are temporal, but God's own experience of this relation is not processive, but strictly unchanging--or at least we do not know whether God's experience is processive. Moreover, Raphael Demos proposes a sense in which he believes Tillich is using "dynamics" that is compatible with a nonprocessive eternity. He suspects that the only dynamism is the dialectical positing and overcoming of "nonbeing" in the divine life: "But I think by dynamism the author means dialectical movement, and that, of course, is lacking in the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception."xliii
"...but dialectical movement ('the inner movement of the divine life') is timeless.\textsuperscript{xlv} It is true that God's dynamic element and God's not remaining in "immovable" or "dead identity" are sometimes associated with this relation to nonbeing.\textsuperscript{xlvi} If Demos is correct, Tillich's agreement with Hartshorne that becoming must be the ultimate principle, if being means static self-identity, could be reconciled with an atemporal divine life. On the other hand, the association of dynamic self-transcendence with nonbeing in itself says nothing against this self-transcendence as involving a real temporal aspect. Demos' remark does point to a not insignificant point: However inadequate Tillich's treatment of time, freedom, and the divine participation in negativity, Tillich does improve on classical theology simply by holding that there is nonbeing in the divine life.

But despite the "agnostic" strain in Tillich, there are some reasons why classical eternity should be discarded. His specific and rather frequent application of dynamics-form to the divine life, his rejection of \textit{actus purus}--that "everything potential is actual," and his endorsement of becoming as the ultimate principle, over being as static, certainly count for something. A later section on the relation of time and eternity will favor temporality--albeit ambiguously. Other important evidence is his basic panentheistic temperament, as with his characterization of God as absolute participant (in temporal creatures).

This leaves two main contenders. One is a
closed temporality in which in every sense every real potentiality will be actualized in its time, as God temporally enacts an eternal plan that predetermines or foresees each creaturely actualization. This at least would allow for a processive and nonexternal relationship of God to creation—but only if novelty and indeterminate freedom are denied. Since Tillich on the whole upholds such freedom, this would entail quite a contradiction. In any case, this closed temporality would be an improvement over classical eternity—yet not a very satisfying improvement. If we think again in terms of a "dynamic" or "inexhaustible form," this eternally given "inexhaustible form" would, in a very real sense, be eternally exhausted and not very "dynamic." Though God would be temporally involved in its execution, in its substance it would be a "fixed result," to hark back to Tillich's critique of actus purus. Though more politely than in actus purus, form would swallow dynamics, rest would swallow motion, actuality would swallow potentiality, and eternity would swallow time.

The other option is that there are real potentialities that the creatures may not actualize and thus real potentialities for the divine knowledge of the creatures that may not be actualized, though God is maximally happy, maximally fulfills divine potentialities, despite how the creatures actualize theirs. (Ruled out by foresight is God as optimally fulfilling potentialities by doing all that can and should be done by God, but not necessarily maximally fulfilling poten-
tialities in every sense, due to creaturely decisions having a role in the degree of divine beatitude.) This would allow for a processive and nonexternal relationship to the temporal world as productive of novelty.

Which is it? Is there any openness, or is the universe and the divine life a totally closed system for Tillich? Some general statements on the polarities favor closedness. But these are general rather than specifically on dynamics and form. The stricter and more obvious interpretation of the transcendence of the distinction between potentiality and actuality favors closedness. However, a closedness with respect to the divine actualization of value but not to knowledge of the creatures, though not an option that obviously presents itself, would provide a fairly strict reading. We need to look at Tillichian passages that clearly point one way or the other—to openness or closedness. We will look first at passages that refer to potentiality and actuality or dynamics and form in connection with God. Then Tillich's characterization of eternity and its relationship to time will be probed (including also the question of whether any of this favors classical eternity). "I put before you life or death," said God. The question put before us is whether Tillich's God has any claim to be the living God or is in fact "dead."

Our first bit of evidence, from two different sources, is somewhat indirect. Tillich starts by mentioning "self-transcendence" or "self-creativity" in the creaturely case as involving some openness. Self-
transcendence or growth, the movement from form to form, is not completely determined by self-preservation "forms of growth," but involves a gap and "risk"; something can either "fulfill or destroy itself." Similarly, growth is not "a continuous series of forms alone"; it "is made possible only by breaking through the limits of an old form," by "a moment of 'chaos' between the old and the new form." He then applies this element of "risk" or "chaos" to God. God symbolically takes a risk with the creation. At least part of why this is "symbolic," I would propose, is that there will be a maximal fulfillment, no matter what the creatures do. This receives some support from the other source: "...in the divine life the element of chaos does not endanger its eternal fulfillment..." But that "risk" or "chaos"--that is, that form does not entirely determine dynamics--applies at all to the divine life seems to allow for some openness, at least in relation to creaturely decisions and God's knowledge thereof. Of course, the open or "chaotic" element within the creatures themselves, who are known by God, provides support for that interpretation. Offering some collaboration on all of this is a remark from another context:

It belongs certainly to the possibility of finite freedom to fail; and therefore one can say that God may fail in what he intends to do through men and mankind. But there is the transcending certainty that in spite of every individual and group failure, an ultimate
fulfillment can be expected.¹

In passing, one might ask whether the element of "chaos" applies at all to divine decision making and not just to God's inclusion of creatures with freedom. This is secondary to our basic panentheistic concern of whether God can include the creaturely world with its temporality and relative openness. But it is not totally beside the point. If there is no temporality or indeterminism in God's actual choosing (if God's choice is a necessary eternal one to be acted out in time that allows creaturely freedom within certain limits), then this tends to cast the relative indeterminacy of our acting as deficient and to deny the value of novelty, insofar as we take God as our model, and to lend credence to the idea that God should not and does not permit any such openness. Tillich's admittedly few and brief comments on the relevant polarity of freedom and destiny are not very assuring. He speaks of "an absolute and unconditional identity" of those poles,¹¹ of their oneness,¹¹i of their disappearing,¹¹ii and of losing "the sense of their distinction."¹¹iv And he mocks the notion of God as "a being who asks himself which of innumerable possibilities he shall actualize," thus subjecting God to the "split between potentiality and actuality."¹¹v Tillich is concerned lest there be "arbitrariness,"¹¹vi lest God be "a highest being who is able to do whatever he wants."¹¹vii While the notion of more than one optimal or perfect divine choice for a given juncture rules out "arbitrariness" in a negative sense, it does
involve a certain arbitrariness: God is called upon to choose between equally good—and perhaps "innumerable"—possibilities. The question is whether a lack of arbitrariness for Tillich is only met when there is just one real option for divine deciding. The evidence above seems to say "yes."

We now come back to the main track. It is time for Tillich's left hand to offer an opinion on potentiality-actuality in God:

But an existence of God which is not united with its essence is a contradiction in terms. It makes God a being whose existence does not fulfill his essential potentialities; being and not-yet-being are "mixed" in him, as they are in everything finite.\textsuperscript{lviii}

The most obvious interpretation of this passage, because of the denial of "not-yet-being," is that there is absolutely just one particular existence compatible with God's essence, that the divine experience is closed, the divine knowledge of all time complete. The idea that God always possesses a maximum of value and happiness, of "being," though not a complete or completed knowledge of just what the creatures will do, is granted, not an interpretation suggested by the quote itself, yet one that would not do it violent injustice by any means. (Note that an eternal possession of all the value of creation through all time is more appropriate to this passage than a maximal garnering of value from each stage of creation only as it is actualized, for this latter would clearly entail
The following pronouncement provides a balance on the "not-yet" issue: The divine creativity, balancing dynamics and form, "includes a 'not yet' which is, however, always balanced by an already within the divine life. It is not an absolute 'not yet,' which would make it a divine-demonic power, nor is the 'already' an absolute already." This is not the most precise of theological language. In the wider context, the "absolute 'not yet'" he wants to avoid is a "complete openness to the future having the character of an absolute accident" that he sees in certain doctrines. This leaves room for some openness. And the denial of an "absolute already," however poetically, upholds some openness.

There are three passages from the Systematic which expressly speak to the relationship of creaturely potentiality and actuality to divine potentiality and actuality. One of these unmistakably affirms some temporal openness:

For the divine ground of being we must say both that the created is not new, for it is potentially rooted in the ground, and that it is new, for its actuality is based on freedom in unity with destiny, and freedom is the precondition of all newness in existence. The necessarily consequent is not new; it is merely a transformation of the old. (But even the term "transformation" points to an element of newness; total determination would make even
Here, being potentially rooted in the ground does not entail a total predetermination or foreseeing. Creaturely actuality involves some indeterminate freedom and some newness. At the most, the lack of newness for God means that God knows all relevant possibilities for actualization in all their concreteness or definiteness, but that God does not know just which ones the creature will in fact actualize.

Two related passages are not quite so forthright. However, this one does definitely support some openness:

The new is beyond potentiality and actuality in the divine life and becomes actual as new in time and history. Without the element of openness, history would be without creativity.

It would cease to be history. The first sentence, taken by itself, would be quite compatible with complete predetermination and foresight. However, the latter part indicates that, though history must of course be within certain limits, it does have some creativity and openness. In this case, the new as beyond potentiality and actuality must mean that God knows beforehand each possibility and each possible state of the whole world in all their definiteness (unlike in Hartshorne), but that God does not foreknow just which will be actualized.

Finally, we have this declaration: "The concept of 'the purpose of creation' should be replaced by 'the telos of creativity'--the inner aim of fulfilling in
actuality what is beyond potentiality and actuality in the divine life."lxiv This is certainly compatible with a totally predetermined eternal plan being acted out. However, it at least does not explicitly indicate that the "fulfilling in actuality" requires one set of creaturely decisions. Moreover, it does not state that creatures always make decisions maximally conducive to fulfilling the divine aim in actuality. This statement is in the context of depreciating the notion that "God lacks something which he must secure from the creature."lxv That lends some contextual plausibility to the interpretation that fulfillment or happiness regarding creation is what is beyond potentiality and actuality in God, not being threatened by creaturely indeterminate freedom, which has a part, though, in "fulfilling in actuality."

Thus, we have some indirect evidence in favor of openness, three passages that clearly affirm some openness, one passage that is most readily interpreted to favor closedness (but which would not be incompatible with this closedness as applying only to the divine experience of value), and one ambiguous passage. When we also consider Tillich's dictum of no distinction between potentiality and actuality, which most obviously would be read to mean closedness (though, as above, might apply only to value), and his remarks on the polarities (which include dynamics-form), which generally favor closedness (albeit indirectly), my conclusion is that, so far, an open temporality is supported, though hardly unequivocally.
This concludes our consideration of the relationship of potentiality and actuality and dynamics and form in the divine life.

We are now ready to consider the relationship of time and eternity in the divine life. Tillich often affirms that eternity includes time or temporality, as well as transcending it, and that eternity is not timelessness. This may seem to be enough to establish that Tillich's position here is not that of classical eternity, that at least there is a real temporal relationship of God to creation (even if temporality be wholly closed). However, while it points in that direction, such material is not conclusive. For in one sense, classical eternity could be said to include time and not be timeless, in that God does survey the temporal creation. True, God's eternal vision was in itself or subjectively unchanging or timeless. But no "classical eternist" denied that God was aware of the sequential character of time, of its process character, for the creatures, though for God the whole sequence is eternally and unchangingly actual, no part of it being relatively past or future for God. (This is not to say that this is a coherent combination. I do not think it is.) Therefore, this adumbration of timelessness by Tillich is also not decisive: "It is not adequate to identify simultaneity with eternity. Simultaneity would erase the different modes of time; but time without modes is timelessness. It is not different than the timeless validity of a mathematical proposition." In classical eternity,
God's vision realizes that for the creatures there is not simultaneity, there are modes; but this vision itself sees everything "simultaneously" and as simultaneously actual and has no modal relation to creaturely time. (An incoherent combination again.)

The key difference between classical eternity and a divine temporality, even if closed, is that the latter involves some concrete relation to the actual movement or procession of creaturely time, while the former merely abstractly views time as a whole. Now when Tillich says that, "since time is created in the ground of the divine life, God is essentially related to it" (emphasis mine) or that God "includes temporality and with this a relation to the modes of time," this suggests a concrete relationship in a way that saying that eternity, which is a quality, includes time does not. (We have just seen the sense in which classical eternity could be said to "include" time.) Certainly classical eternity would shy away from any suggestion that God includes creaturely temporality, because God does not include creation. Classical theology is not on the whole panentheistic. The creatures and creaturely time concretely are external to God. Now if God includes creaturely time, logically, God must have a real, concrete, and processive--a temporal--relation to time, rather than the abstract, wholly nonprocessive one of classical eternity; there must be a divine temporal-ity. However, in the history of theology, thought has not always been so logical. Classical pantheism has held
that God includes creation, which is temporal, but that God or the all is timeless—temporality becomes illusory. So to say God includes creaturely time supports a concrete relationship to it, a real divine temporality, but is not wholly conclusive.

Tillich does, though, sometimes speak not just of God's inclusion of creaturely time, but in terms of a divine time or temporality. On two such occasions, Tillich's concern that this be an eminent temporality is very evident. It is "not subject to the law of transitoriness" nor to the split between essence and existence. Those qualifications present no problems. However, Tillich goes beyond that and states that the divine time is not subject to "the 'not yet' of our time" and that "the moments of time" or "past and future" are "united" in it, thereby clouding and partly undermining the positing of a divine temporality. Though the future must be more "present" or presently known to God than to us, there must be some "not yet" for God, if only in knowledge of the part of an eternal plan yet to be acted out, in order for there to be a "divine time." It is grammatically ambiguous whether it is only the "not yet" of our time that is here denied, or any "not yet." Though, knowing the larger picture, I would say that it is probably the former that is being denied, in the passage itself there is much ambiguity. And the unity of the different moments of time might commonly be taken as classical eternity. More on this later.

In addition, there is this attempt to define a
temporality that can relate to all creaturely temporality:  
The character of a time which is not related to any of the dimensions of life but to all of them, thus transcending all of them, belongs to the mystery of being-itself. Temporality, not related to any identifiable temporal process, is an element in the transtemporal, time-creating ground of time.\textsuperscript{1xxiv}  
This does seem to indicate that there is no intrinsic divine temporality, apart from the creation of and relating to creaturely time. That is to say, if \textsc{per impossible} for Tillich, God did not create a world, there would be no divine temporality. (This is collaborated by Tillich's endorsement of the view that God creates time with creation\textsuperscript{1xxv} and statements that, without the positing of "otherness" and "nonbeing," which is to say, finitude, in the divine life, God would remain in dead identity with God's self.\textsuperscript{1xxvi}  
This opinion may produce a tendency to undermine a concrete temporality in relation to the creatures and may be a cause of some of Tillich's ambiguity, though it need not be. In any case, the denial of relation to "any" dimension or "identifiable temporal process" seems in this context to be an attempt to avoid identifying God exclusively with one finite temporality in order that God be able to relate temporally or processively to all finite temporality, though one cannot be absolutely sure (\textsc{per usual}) just what Tillich means here. Finally, we have what represents Tillich's
most direct and simplest affirmation of divine temporality: "...God is beyond our temporality, though not beyond every temporal-ity."\textsuperscript{lxxvii} There is also this sentence which appears to speak of eternity as processive: "The eternal present is moving from past to future but without ceasing to be present."\textsuperscript{lxxviii}

Are there passages which tilt toward classical eternity rather than at least a closed temporality? Tillich does occasionally speak of God as transcending time, failing to couple this with an inclusion of temporality.\textsuperscript{lxxix} These are rare enough that we probably should not interpret these to mean that God absolutely transcends and is in no real sense temporal; but this is a carelessness that might cause readers to see classical eternity and might betoken some tornness in Tillich. In a German work, Tillich clashes even more strongly with his usual position, referring to the eternal as "the negation of all time."\textsuperscript{lxxx} This is in connection with the attempt to realize ultimate fulfillment at some utopian point in time. But Tillich's basic stance is that our eternal fulfillment essentially includes temporal fulfillment and completes it, not that it negates it completely—it negates it only as complete in itself. I doubt that Tillich meant to abandon this position with the above phrase. Rather, it is a case of hyperbole and carelessness. (So Tillich can be careless in German as well as in English.)

Tillich usually couples his denial that eternity is timelessness with the denial that it is the
"endlessness of time," of "temporality,"\textsuperscript{lixvi} or of "mere process"\textsuperscript{lixvii} or is "permanent change."\textsuperscript{lixviii} As with the former, this is not in itself unambiguous or conclusive. It could be taken to imply classical eternity. For if time extends infinitely forward, as it probably does for Tillich, then \textit{if God is processively related to it}, there must be an "endlessness of time" and ever-ongoing change for the divine experience, if only in processively and knowingly carrying out a closed eternal plan. Strictly speaking, Tillich's formula does not state that eternity does not or cannot involve an endessness of time—only that that is not what eternity is. Instead he may be saying that it is a quality, a quality of relating to time, rather than how far something extends through time, rather than the mere fact of endless duration per se. The "mere" qualifying "process" above suggests this. Also, Tillich does associate "dissected" temporality with the "endlessness of time."\textsuperscript{lixix} What he means by dissected temporality is perhaps best elicited by the following sentences:

In spite of the continuity of the time-flux, every discernible moment of time in a physical process excludes the preceding and the following moments. A drop of water running down the riverbed is here in this moment and there in the next, and nothing unites the two moments.... it is bad theology that uses the endless continuation of this kind of time as the symbolic material for eternity.\textsuperscript{lx}
Subjecting God "to the structure of dissected temporality would deprive him of his eternity and make him an everliving entity of subdivine character." Thus, it may be the dissected nature of ordinary temporality, rather than an endlessness of divine temporality per se, to which Tillich objects. And it is the quality of in some sense uniting the dissected moments of time that defines eternity. Whether eternity has an ongoing or processive character, which would be endless if time were, is another matter. However, since Tillich never does specifically sanction an endless divine temporality by stating that it does not necessarily entail dissected temporality, or otherwise, and since explicitly it is only spoken of in negative terms, an interpretation of classical eternity can hardly be ruled out. Moreover, Tillich criticizes theological theism for envisioning God as having "an endless time." Here one cannot point to the grammatical structure and say, he may just be denying that endless time is what essentially defines eternity, though eternity may include it. Though, as a possible reading between the lines, he could be censuring theological theism for only stipulating an endless time and not eternity. All things considered, the negativity in relation to an endless temporality does provide evidence in favor of classical eternity, though not conclusive evidence.

On the whole then, Tillich's treatment of the category of time in the divine life and its relationship to eternity favors a divine temporality of
some kind as opposed to classical eternity, but hardly unambiguously. But whether this divine temporality is open or closed is another matter. This is a question of how the dissected or transitory moments of creaturely time are "united" by God. Certainly any worthwhile concept of divine temporality--or eternity as including temporality--would hold that God does not lose the concreteness of the past in the way we do, that divine memory is perfect; that God foresees or anticipates the future in a perfect way to whatever extent it is foreseeable; and that this is all a part of God's present state, is "united" with God's awareness of the present. But if there is openness, then such a unity is not a once-for-all completed thing. As indeterminate creaturely creativity occurs, this must become part of the unity in a way it was not before. The future within this unity cannot be determinate in the same sense in which the past is determinate. The eternal unity must be an ongoing and changing unity if there is openness--and not just in the sense of realizing which stages of a totally predetermined or foreseen project have thus far been executed.

Tillich generally does not elaborate upon his statements on eternity as the unity of the (dissected or separated) moments of time or of the modes of time--past, present, and future. Since the unity is not described as changing, and since no distinction is made between how future and past moments are incorporated in the eternal unity, the most natural way
of reading such averments is that the future is included in the same way as the past, that God already knows the future precisely as it will be. The tendency to read it this way is encouraged by the normal connotations of "eternity" or "eternal unity," based upon traditional theological use. In the words of a popular song, eternity traditionally means, "Just one look, that's all it took."

At least, in reference to those formulations, Tillich does not expressly indicate that this is a closed unity. A related passage, though, may seem more specifically to entail exact divine foreknowledge of the future:

The creative process of the divine life precedes the differentiation between essences and existents. In the creative vision of God the individual is present as a whole in his essential being and inner telos and, at the same time, in the infinity of the special moments of his life-process.\textsuperscript{lxxxix}

Actually, I believe that the point here is that God's vision of one's possibilities involves not just one's essence in a relatively general or universal sense but what one could be as a particular individual at particular times. (The preceding paragraph deals with the relation of essences to universals and individuals, how both should be taken into account and united.) And if this is just a knowledge of possibilities, of what one could be, or of what one will be within certain limits, rather than of precisely what one will be, then
openness is not controverted. But once again Tillich is unclear and has given us something that can easily be read in terms of closedness. In passing, this passage would appear to confirm that for Tillich possibilities are totally definite and concrete.

What do we have on the side of eternity as involving an open temporality? Not much in quantity. Tillich does speak of the eternal "unity of the temporal modes and moments which are separated in empirical time" as "dynamic."\textsuperscript{xc} This offers a little support, but is unelaborated. Happily, the one other passage supporting openness is definite and unambiguous. And it is the only definite and unambiguous one on whether eternity is open or closed.

Leading up to the decisive sentence, we have: "The future is genuine only if it is open, if the new can happen and if it can be anticipated." Of course, if anticipation is absolute, newness and openness would be denied. Tillich then chides Bergson for insisting on an absolute openness of the future. When Tillich says that a God unable "to anticipate every possible future is dependent on an absolute accident," one is not totally sure, given Tillich's equivocacy, whether this means that God must foresee exactly what will transpire to ensure no absolute accident (an unreasonable position, to be sure) or that God must foresee the possibilities that may be actualized and set these within limits. The answer: "Therefore, a relative although not an absolute openness to the future is the characteristic of eternity."\textsuperscript{xci} This joins three other
comments of the English Tillich which have definitely and directly spoken for some openness of the future for the divine life. In fact, the comment on potentiality and actuality and history immediately follows the one just above on eternity. In the next paragraph Tillich adds that the past has an openness in virtue of the future; it can be reinterpreted or seen in a new light. This is not unlike Hartshorne's idea of an element of the past, which in itself is unchanging and finished (which Tillich does not deny), being synthesized in a somewhat new way in each new divine experience.

It is time--overtime--to conclude this section on time. I must apologize for the length. However, I wanted to be true to and fair to Tillich. If he had been clearer and more distinct and less split within himself, I could have done so in much less space. My overall conclusion is that there is some openness of the future, some novelty, for God, at least in respect to creaturely decisions (though probably not with regard to divine ones), but that divine fulfillment or happiness is not open to the future. Probably there is nothing that Tillich wrote that has to be interpreted as contradictory to that. Therefore, Tillich may have been clearer within himself than he is in print. However, the most natural interpretation of many a Tillichian passage, as with transcending the distinction between potentiality and actuality or uniting all time, does contradict it. One has to be able to read between the lines, based on a knowledge of the whole corpus, to give an interpretation consistent
with openness in many cases, as by using the distinction between the openness of divine knowledge and closedness of the divine beatitude. And one cannot always be totally sure even with this in-depth knowledge. Many passages are as susceptible to being interpreted in terms of classical eternity as of a closed temporality. Even more susceptible to an interpretation of classical eternity is Tillich's negativity surrounding an endless divine temporality and some remarks on the polarities. Because of the strain in Tillich wherein we do not know what God is "in God's self," one cannot completely banish suspicion that perhaps the "symbolic" applications of potentiality, dynamics, and temporality concern the way it appears "for us" temporal creatures, though God's actual experience may or may not be at all processive.

It is the definite affirmation of an open temporality in a few passages that provides the very best evidence against classical eternity, rather than Tillich's symbolic language that on the face of it affirms at least a closed temporality (though this is certainly some evidence). I have said that Tillich may have been more consistent within himself than in print. But it cannot be ruled out that in some passages he was thinking in terms of a closed temporality or even of classical eternity--or that he just was not sure. In any case, the pull of classical tradition and its antitemporality is manifested, at the least, in ambiguous language and, perhaps, in ambivalence. But for us what Tillich wrote is what is most important. On
that score Tillich's affirmation of a temporality and of an open temporality for God is not full-fledged and unambiguous enough to escape conviction for undermining the panentheism presented in chapter 2.

**Divine Impassibility and Creaturely Freedom and Suffering**

In a proper panentheism, God is not active in absolutely every sense. For a proper panentheism recognizes the importance of genuine creaturely freedom, of some degree of real indeterminacy, contingency, or spontaneity. God must be active, the very power of acting in every action, must be working through us with utter immediacy, in order that we can act freely. But God cannot determine our decisions or actions for us to whatever extent they are indeterminate. Which is to say that God is passive to them in some sense. Genuine creaturely freedom is one of the things that distinguishes panentheism from pantheism. Mutual creaturely and divine freedom is one of the ways that God transcends the creation that God includes with total intimacy.

And Paul Tillich in the following suggests both panentheistic non-separation and freedom: "This mutual freedom [of God and the world] from each other and for each other is the only meaningful sense in which the 'supra' in 'supranaturalism' can be used. Only in this sense can we speak of 'transcendent' with respect to the relation of God and the world." It is this
freedom which prevents pantheism or emanationism. Indeed, it is finite freedom, Tillich suggests, that separates his doctrine of God from Spinozistic monism, from the creatures being "mere 'modes' of the eternal substance." (Both this and the previous quote further support Tillich's basic panentheistic intent argued for in chapter 2.) It is this freedom that allows for turning away from God. And it is this freedom to say "no" to God that permits "true love" for God.

So far, so good. However, many have talked a good game of freedom without meaning it. By freedom they have only meant self-determination in a weak or tautological sense, as freedom from external compulsion. That is, what one wills or wishes is what one wills or wishes. But for them there is no real possibility of a different choice than that which is made. This may not be mechanistic or biological determinism, but such self-determination is determinism nonetheless. (This is what Augustine meant by freedom in the later anti-Pelagian writings.) A couple of passages speaking negatively of "indeterminacy" or "indeterminism" could create suspicion that that is all Tillich means by freedom: "Man is essentially 'finite freedom'; freedom not in the sense of indeterminacy but in the sense of being able to determine himself through decisions in the center of his being." And Tillich inveighs against a doctrine called "indeterminism," which allegedly "asserts something absolutely contingent, a decision without motivation, an
unintelligible accident." Since this would appear to be arguing against a strawperson, or at least to be very unfair to some who have advocated "indeterminism," one might well wonder if this is a reductio ad absurdum attacking any degree of indeterminacy.

As it turns out, it is only an absolute indeterminacy in which decisions are not rooted in a "destiny" in polarity with freedom, in a situation, in a past, that would seem to be attacked by Tillich, not "indeterminism" or "indeterminacy" as I understand or use them, which is always in a relative sense. In that sense, there are many Tillichian passages that unequivocally uphold indeterminate freedom. We have already witnessed some such material in the previous section: on the dynamic movement from form to form as not wholly predetermined, as involving "chaos," "risk"; the new as not necessarily consequent and even transformation as precluding total determination. To add to that are the following assertions: 1) The "empty tautology" "that the stronger motive always prevails" [perennially used against indeterminacy] fails to take into account that the person who weighs motives is "above the motives" and "not identical with any" of them. 2) "A decision cuts off possibilities, and these were real possibilities, otherwise no cutting would have been necessary." 3) "...nothing is determined a priori... decisions cannot be deduced a priori." 4) "Spontaneity" involves a "reaction not calculable." 5) "Freedom" involves "creating the underivably new." 6) A "reaction is only
partly calculable and ultimately undetermined. 

Every moment of a living relationship is characterized by an element of indeterminacy." (Here he obviously is willing to use the term "indeterminacy," if qualified as relative.) Tillich even sees in subhuman beings "spontaneity," analogous to "freedom"—a term he reserves for humans, which "makes an absolute determination impossible" in their cases. And Tillich twice denies that there is a divine plan in which everything is predeterined.

But though Tillich advocates some indeterminacy in general, he becomes less bold when he approaches the realm of the sacred—which seems to include not only God, but traditional theology. I find some of what I would regard as excusings of traditional theology in this area somewhat interesting and indicative. He mentions Augustine as fighting "for a way between Manichaeism and Pelagianism." While he quite rightly accuses Pelagius of missing "the tragic element of man's predicament, manifest from earliest infancy" (our intrinsic "self-centeredness" in a negative sense?), and allows that Pelagius saw that bad examples influence one's decisions, he does not note that Pelagius also saw the influence of habits and in general realized that our control over ourselves is not absolute, nor that the final Augustine was unflinchingly deterministic. According to my study of these two thinkers, there is a need for "a way between" Pelagius and Augustine! Tillich also speaks of a "divine determinism" that is present in biblical
thought and given sharpest expression in Augustine, Thomas, Luther, and Calvin without any criticism of it and with a nebulous sentence on how "this can be understood" as compatible with "divine-human reciprocity." But in themselves these declarations just manifest the pull of theological tradition against the position of indeterminate freedom, advanced elsewhere, in "sins of omission," rather than in definite "sins of commission."

Tillich does commit some, however. In the same work in which "an element of indeterminacy" in every moment is affirmed, there is this observation on "ethical" decisions:

...after the decision we realize that it was not our own power but a power which decided through us. If we make a decision for what we essentially are, and therefore ought to be, it is a decision out of grace. If it is a decision contrary to what we essentially are, it is a decision in a state of being possessed or in-habited by demonic spirits.

If this is meant only in a relative experiential sense--either that certain ethical decisions seem wholly beyond our control or that the element of indeterminacy is overshadowed but not eliminated in many or most ethical decisions--I have no quarrel with it. But it sounds very absolute, and there are no surrounding qualifications preservative of some indeterminacy. And it covers a wide swathe: all decisions with moral ramifications.
Other Tillichian remarks undermining indeterminacy more or less specifically deal with the quality of our relationship with God, rather than morality in general. Very possibly, though, especially since he holds that all persons have an immediate awareness of God, Tillich may feel that all ethical decisions bear on the quality of this relationship. That points to the difficulty of trying to exclude indeterminate freedom from the religious realm, while trying to preserve it in others. Here is Tillich's most deterministic sounding avowal regarding our relationship with God: "But with respect to the unconditional, we can never in any way gain power over ourselves, because we cannot gain power over the unconditional."\textsuperscript{cxiii} I can agree with Tillich that a person does not have "in every moment" "the undetermined freedom to decide in whatever way he chooses--for good or bad, for God or against him."\textsuperscript{cxiv} Our control, freedom, and responsibility are never absolute. And they are greater at some moments than others. And our decisions are not absolutely good or bad, but relatively ambiguous. But if indeterminate freedom is upheld in general, it makes no sense to say that we have no religious self-determination. We must have some control over the degree of rightness or wrongness in our relationship with God, and God must in some sense be passive to this.

Tillich seemingly senses the difficulty here and takes some apparent stabs at reconciling some degree of general indeterminate freedom with the traditional
Criticism of Tillich on the Passive Aspect 243

notion of no freedom or control with respect to the unconditional, none of them convincing. And they undermine the premise that we have no such control. In a sermon he preaches:

Isaiah did not produce either the vision or the purification.... Isaiah's decision to go must be free. With respect to our fate and vocation we are free; with respect to our relation to God we are powerless.\textsuperscript{cxv}

But surely Isaiah's decision itself "to go" and prophesy for Jahweh, rather than not go, directly bears upon the relative rightness of his relationship with God. Also, he states that humanity has essential freedom in the realm of finite relations, but that human decisions are unable to break through estrangement or achieve reunion with God; "they remain in the realm of 'civil justice.'"\textsuperscript{cxvi} It is not clear here whether he is denying that we have any control over our relationship with God. But if so, such an attempt to preserve some freedom while denying any control over our relationship with God will not work. For while we may not be able to completely overcome estrangement, our "essential freedom" with respect to the realm of "civil justice" should have relevance to the degree of estrangement or unity (at least assuming some freedom to act out of compassion for others and not merely out of selfishness or self-righteousness).

While the above attempts seem to imply some indeterminate freedom in our relationship with God, even as he tries to hold on to contrary traditional
ideas, Tillich does use certain traditional formulas that normally would be taken to imply no such freedom, no "religious self-determination." Says Tillich, "If we follow Luther in this respect [and pace Melanchton, he does], then the act of accepting the act of faith in the justifying grace of God, is an act of God Himself in us." God works "the beginning and the fulfilling in us." Tillich also uses the phrase that in relation to God, everything is God. As a panentheist who believes that God immediately empowers and works through us, there is a real sense in which I can very much accept such talk. But it is a sense that preserves indeterminate freedom. I will say more on how a proper panentheism can offer a solution to the perennial problem of "grace and free will" in the final chapter. Unfortunately, Tillich does not say more. And if he did not want these formulas understood deterministically, he should have said more. For the natural tendency is to interpret them thusly, reinforced by the fact that they have usually been used theologically in ways denying or undermining freedom. Moreover, by unqualifiedly hailing Luther and denigrating Melanchton in this area, he himself reinforces a deterministic reading. On the profreedom side, Tillich avers that humans can resist salvation.

Overall then, Tillich does support some indeterminate freedom in the creatures, though undercutting this to some extent, especially when it comes to the quality of our relationship with God, at least in part
Criticism of Tillich on the Passive Aspect

because of the weight of theological tradition. This provides some corroborating evidence as to a temporal openness in Tillich's God. Of course, Tillich need not follow out the logical implications of creaturely indeterminacy, so any such evidence is not simply "transferable," especially since many of his statements on the divine relation to time, as most readily interpreted, do not follow out such logical implications to an open divine temporality.

And Tillich's insistence that God is not at all conditioned by or dependent upon the creatures which God includes totally and perceives utterly, does not seem to recognize the implications of indeterminate freedom: 1) God's "freedom means that that which is man's ultimate concern is in no way dependent on man or on any finite being or on any finite concern."cxx 2) "The internal relations [as God's relations with all things are for Tillich] are, of course, not conditioned by the actualization of finite freedom."cxxi (Of course?) 3) In response to Hartshorne's critique of his doctrine of God, he pens,

But Mr. Hartshorne's resistance against the term "unconditional" follows from his doctrine that creaturely contingency conditions God in some respect and makes him literally finite in relation to it. My resistance against this doctrine (not against the positing of the finite in God) is rooted in the overwhelming impression of the divine majesty as witnessed by classical religion. This makes any structural dependence of
God on something contingent impossible for me to accept.\textsuperscript{xxxii}

In the absence of further qualification, I would normally use "depends upon" or "is conditioned by" to mean "is affected by." Surely, given creaturely indeterminate freedom, the \textit{specific} or \textit{concrete} contents of God's experience, of divine omniscience, especially true omniscience to which nothing is at all external, must be affected by its actualization. That is, to the extent of indeterminacy, God's knowledge of what we choose must by definition (of omniscience) be affected by what we chose. Unfortunately Tillich gives no explicitation of what "condition" or "depend" denote or connote for him. (By now the reader is probably as accustomed as I am to Tillich's failure to be explicit in the face of ambiguity in the areas of our concern.)

One or both of the following connotations may be entailed by one or both words for Tillich: 1) dependent upon for fulfillment or happiness and 2) being affected by something against one's will.

We have already seen some evidence that Tillich will not brook God's beatitude being in any degree dependent upon what the creatures do, and we shall eventually see much more such evidence. There is also some evidence that is appropriately presented in this section of the thesis. In rejecting the idea that there is a "purpose of creation" for God in any usual sense, Tillich cites Calvinist and Lutheran theologies, apparently approvingly, to support his point:

No Calvinist theologian will admit that God
lacks something which he must secure from the creature he has created. In creating the world, God is the sole cause of the glory he wishes to secure through his creation...according to Lutheran theology, there is nothing which the created world can offer God. He is the only one who gives.

In a similar vein, Tillich pronounces that the "libido element" in divine love in devotional and mystical language is "poetic-religious symbolism, for God is not in need of anything."

Relevant to the second possible connotation, Tillich writes that aseity "means that there is nothing given in God which is not at the same time affirmed by his freedom." Concerning creaturely freedom, one might then say that God willingly grants it. I would certainly agree that creaturely freedom is not something at all imposed upon God (and so would Hartshorne). But for me there is a secondary sense in which God can be affected against God's will: God has preferences on the use of the freedom willingly given, so that the creatures must be able to do things contrary to willingness in that sense—and therefore divine happiness would apparently be somewhat affected.

I doubt that Tillich would want to part company with me on God's having preferences concerning creaturely actualization. But he does not follow out its obvious implication that "the actualization of finite freedom," "of course," conditions God.

There is a passage that may seem to back off
from Tillich's view that God does not depend upon the creatures in any respect. These words on reciprocity in the divine-human relationship come from Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality: "God reacts differently to different human actions. Logically, this means that he is partly dependent upon them." However, this is in the voice of "biblical religion," which he is contrasting with "ontology" in rhetorical fashion (in that he does not feel them to be as irreconcilable as he is making them to sound at that point). Conversely, ontology asks, "how can a being act upon being itself," "how can a being influence the ground of being?" Nowhere in the rest of the book does Tillich give an endorsement of biblical religion's "logical" implication that God "is partly dependent upon" "human actions." Instead, his attempts to find a common ground between biblical religion and ontology in this area are on the side of nondependency: these are the references to the feeling that a gracious or demonic power decides through us and to the aspect of "divine determinism" in biblical thought, mentioned earlier.

To conclude, once again the force of theological tradition is evident, along with its version of the divine majesty that "overwhelmingly has impressed" Tillich, as he denies that the creatures and creaturely freedom condition or make God dependent "in some respect," despite the fact that for him the creatures and their freedom are wholly internal to God. Though Tillich probably would not have denied that the
specific contents of divine knowledge "depend upon" or "are conditioned by" creaturely freedom, that he never did use these terms thusly perhaps stems from this general reluctance to use such words in relation to God.

If God fully includes the creatures, God must fully include the sufferings of the creatures and thus with total intimacy participate in them—and therefore in some real sense suffer. Tillich does make a considerable break with classical theology in this area. God or being-itself includes "non-being." Tillich is willing to draw the consequence that this embracing entails participation. God participates "in the negativities of creaturely existence" or "life," "in the suffering of existential estrangement," "in the suffering of the world" and "of the universe." He states that blessedness, even in the divine case, must involve an element of negativ-ity, and joy an element of sorrow. He even seems to follow out the obvious implication that participation in suffering means that the participant must in some sense suffer (even more obvious when the participation is absolute).

However, the infrequency of his speaking of God as "suffering"—only twice in his writings that I am aware of, and the circumstances thereof, probably represent a reluctance to directly use the term in relation to God, an indication of the left hand taking back some of what the right has given us. One instance is the mention of the divine life's "suffering over and
with the creatures" as one historical symbolic manifestation of the "chaotic element" in God. Though he does not take exception to the phrase, neither does he specifically "own" it. On the other occasion, he opines, "We do not know what divine suffering may mean, as we do not know what eternal blessedness means." While he does "own" divine "suffering" here, the expression of agnosticism may be indicative of a reluctance to use it—at least he does not pen it elsewhere (though we shall see an apparent instance of it in conversation).

While used more frequently than suffering per se, God's participation in suffering does not escape qualification. Beginning the just mentioned passage on suffering, which was in response to a question by Albert C. Outler, Tillich characterizes Outler's "phrase that God 'participates in the agony and tragedy of human life'" as "highly symbolic." "Symbolic" is one thing, as is every description of the divine life for Tillich; but "highly symbolic" indicates special reservations.

And in reference to the earlier phrase that God "participates in the negativities of creaturely existence," Tillich does add that the idea must be stated with reservations. Genuine patripassianism (the doctrine that God the Father has suffered in Christ) rightly was rejected by the early church. God as being-itself transcends nonbeing absolutely. On the other hand, God as creative life includes the
Criticism of Tillich on the Passive Aspect  251

finite and, with it, nonbeing, although, nonbeing is eternally conquered and the finite is eternally reunited within the infinity of the divine life.\textsuperscript{cxxxviii}

In what may be a shorthand version of the above, Hartshorne quotes Tillich, apparently from conversations with him, as saying, "God is suffering not in his infinity, but as ground of the finite."\textsuperscript{cxxxix}

If distinctions between God as transcending nonbeing absolutely versus God as creative, as infinite versus as ground, are interpreted concretely in this context, this would compartmentalize the totality of the divine experience with regard to (participation in) suffering, making God a "split-brain," part of whom suffers and part of whom does not. The more sensible and probably correct interpretation is that there is a unity of experience in which the nonsuffering in God's infinity and absolute transcendence of nonbeing mean that the negativity that is grounded or included in God is "eternally conquered" for the whole of the divine experience.

Tillich repeats on a couple of occasions that nonbeing or negativity is eternally "conquered" or "overcome" in the divine life that includes it.\textsuperscript{cxl} Now if this "conquest" is a relative one, such as God's deriving value from negativities as part of an aesthetic whole, value that is not in these negativities taken in themselves, such talk need not be problematic. But from what we have seen just above (as well as from previous intimations), this would appear
to be an absolute overcoming, in the sense that creaturely suffering is not or is "no longer" operative or effective as a negative factor, as an element of disvalue, in the divine experience. That patripassianism can be rejected, that God as infinite could be said not to suffer, certainly appears to demand that suffering be absolutely overcome. That in another place patripassianism is rejected on the grounds that it "too obviously contradicts the fundamental theological doctrine of God's impassibility" demands it even more strongly. The "no longer" is put in quotation marks to suggest that there is no time lapse before which creaturely suffering is not completely overcome for Tillich, no time when suffering is present as an element of disvalue followed by its absence as disvaluable. This is suggested by the use of "eternal" in relation to "conquering." And it is demanded if impassibility is to be maintained, for there must be no time stretch, however limited, during which God is negatively affected. But this would contradict all he has given us with the right hand.

In general, that a negative element can be present in an experience without having a negative effect, without being an effective factor of disvalue, is absurd; it destroys the very meaning of negativity. But more concretely, and panentheistically more to the point, how can God participate with utter intimacy in creaturely suffering, how can creaturely suffering be a direct and immediate part of the divine experience, a
very part of God, without its being felt as an
effective element of disvalue—an effective element of
suffering? If anyone should say that it is felt by God
as an effective element of disvalue and suffering just
as I have said, but one that is nevertheless entirely
overcome, I would say—besides that I have no idea what
you mean—how is it effective? If an instance of
creaturely suffering were more or less intense, it
would make no difference to God. Any degree of
suffering would be wholly "overcome" and God would be
equally blissful. Where here is any "effectiveness"?
How here is any suffering "felt"? The pull of the
classical tradition, of the "fundamental doctrine of
God's impassibility," has caused Tillich effectively to
sabotage his desire to affirm God's participation in
the suffering of the world. The immediately following
treatment of the divine blessedness and eternal ful-
fillment in Tillich will confirm that negativity is
overcome absolutely and without any lapse of time, as
well as consider related issues.

Central to Tillich's notion of unambiguous
divine fulfillment is the purging or "exclusion" of the
negative in creaturely life and history, the
liberating of "the positive from its ambiguous mixture
with the negative." In his last major work, volume
3 of the Systematic, Tillich pens, "...the ever present
end of history elevates the positive content of history
into eternity at the same time it excludes the
negative.... The positive becomes manifest as
unambiguously positive and the negative...as
unambiguously negative...."cxlv This basic idea was not
new for Tillich, receiving expression in a much earlier
piece, written in German:

The ultimate meaning of history is the supra-
historical unification and purification of all
elements of preliminary meaning which have
become embodied in historical activities and
institutions....

...purification means that the ambiguous em-
bodiment of meaning in historical realities,
personal and social, is related to an ultimate
meaning in which the ambiguity, the mixture of
meaning and distortion of meaning, is overcome
by an unambiguous, pure embodiment.

cxlv

Following is an expoundment on the nature of this
purification or exclusion:

...here and now, in the permanent transition
of the temporal to the eternal, the negative is
defeated in its claim to be positive, a claim it
supports by using the positive and mixing
ambiguously with it. In this way it produces
the appearance of being positive itself (for
example, illness, death, a lie, destructiveness,
murder, and evil in general). The appearance of
evil as positive vanishes in the face of the
eternal. In this sense God in his eternal life
is called a "burning fire,... [But] Nothing
positive is being burned.... And since there is
nothing merely negative (the negative lives from
the positive it distorts), nothing that has
being can be ultimately annihilated... but it can be excluded in so far as it is mixed with nonbeing....

This whole notion of wholly extracting the negative from the positive with respect to concrete experiences and values is extremely questionable. Is not a negative element often an integral part of an experience and even more so of the experiences of a group of individuals as they collectively interact? A man who generally is not a rationalist has offered us a rationalistic and abstractive model that ignores the Gestalt or holistic and social character of reality. But that whole issue is of a fairly abstract nature. More concrete and, panentheistically, more fundamental than whether any such exclusionary attempt could conceivably be successful is whether the exclusion of any part of reality is appropriate to deity. Such attempted abstracting by God seems more appropriate to a God to whom things are relatively external and abstract in the first place, "a half-deistic, half-theistic" God, than to the all-embracing infinite. Note how the notion of segregating and excluding the negative goes beyond the earlier cited one of the inclusion of nonbeing that is eternally totally overcome, for the latter seems to want to affirm that negativity is a part, and an integrated part, of the divine experience, though it contradicts itself. Even more directly does the separating and excluding of negativity entail that suffering is not included or participated in by God. It is probably no coincidence
that Tillich's way of speaking just above is not very applicable to suffering. "Claiming" or "pretending" or "appearing" to be positive seem much more appropriate to relatively active moral evil than to passive suffering, as do references to the "exposure" of negativity as negative\textsuperscript{cxlviii} (yet Tillich uses them in relation to "evil in general" and "universally," including nonindividual and "non-human" negativity.\textsuperscript{cxlix}) Does one usually experience one's own great pain as positive and need God to defeat its claim to be so? Does one even want one's pain to be "here and now" "burned" by the eternal, either in the sense of being banished from or "negated"\textsuperscript{cl} in the divine experience? Or would it be more comforting to feel that God utterly shares that pain, suffering with the sufferer?

The "here and now" in relation to the "transition" into the eternal strongly suggests that the eternal conquering of nonbeing or the negating or excluding of the negative is immediate, entailing no time lapse. This is confirmed in another elaboration, this time in terms of "eternal memory":

...the negative is not an object of eternal memory in the sense of living retention. Neither is it forgotten, for forgetting presupposes at least a moment of remembering. The negative is not remembered at all. It is acknowledged for what it is, nonbeing. Nevertheless it is not without effect on that which is eternally remembered. It is present in eternal memory as that which is conquered and
thrown out into its naked nothingness (for example, a lie).\textsuperscript{11}

There is then no time lag, no "moment of remembering," before the negative is "conquered and thrown out." The negative is "not without effect," but it never is affecting God negatively. Note also that "naked nothingness" is more appropriate to the exposure of moral evil, as with the example of a lie, than to suffering. Finally, this passage illustrates a tension or discrepancy in Tillich's language about and conception of the status of negativity vis-a-vis divine experience, which was touched on above: between the negative as present or as absent. The words "conquered" or "overcome" allow, at least on the surface, that the negative is present, though not as effective, but as overcome. The terms "excluded," "annihilated," or "thrown out" do not, with "negated" somewhere in the middle. The former are panentheistically less objectionable, for they imply at least some sense in which the negative is "included" by God, even if a tenuous, rather external, and incoherent inclusion.

There is more to Tillich's understanding of divine fulfillment with regard to creation than the negating or purging of the negative per se. Not only is the negative removed, but the positive is maximally realized: "Eternal Life, then, includes the positive content of history, liberated from its negative distortions and fulfilled in its potentialities."\textsuperscript{12} There is one comment that might sound as if the negating of
the negative in itself brings an absolute fulfillment of essential potentialities (remember that for Tillich, "essence" and "essential" refer to what a thing ideally should be): Tillich speaks of the "positive" that is left or "saved" "as the created essence of a thing." If the whole created essence is thereby produced, then negating the negative per se brings maximal fulfillment. However, while negating the negative yields a total positive in the rules fabricated for arithmetic, this seems more than dubious for the case of concrete entities and values. If this notion of the exclusion of the negative is used at all, it would seem more sensible that a certain amount of positive value be left, commensurate to how much negativity had to be removed. Then, if maximal fulfillment must be maintained, this positive is supplemented by that part of its "essence," what it ideally should be, that it has fallen short of; God makes up the difference, as it were. This is in all probability Tillich's view, for he defines "essentialization" as meaning "that the new which has been actualized in time and space adds something to essential being, uniting it with the positive which is created within existence." Similarly, he writes, "The conflicts and sufferings of nature...serve the enrichment of essential being after the negation of the negative in everything that has being." In any case, Tillich is quite clear that there is always a maximal fulfillment of history in Eternal Life: 1) "...there is no ought-to-be-in it which at the same time is
not."^{clvi} 2) "...there is no truth which is not also 'done,' in the sense of the Fourth Gospel, and there is no aesthetic expression which is not also a reality."^{clvii} 3) "The only unconditional prospect is the promise and expectation of the supra-historical fulfillment of history, of the Kingdom of God, in which that which has not been decided in history will be decided and that which has not been fulfilled will be fulfilled."^{clviii} (Of course, Tillich is not meaning a temporal eschaton after history, but the immediate eternal fulfillment of each moment of history.)

What shall we then say vis-a-vis panentheism about Tillich's idea of a maximal fulfillment in which creaturely disvalue is purged and creaturely value is supplemented to the precise degree it fell short of perfection, in which all is decided that was left undecided in history? We have already delved into the inappropriateness of Tillich's position on the overcoming or exclusion of negativity, so that aspect will not be focused upon. If God includes the whole of creaturely experience without mediation or loss, then God perceives it as it is, knows its precise value in and for itself; and God garners that value, since there is no mediation or loss. To put it more briefly, the creaturely experiences and the values these have for the creatures are a very part of the divine experience. If there were a greater or lesser degree of value, depending upon which creaturely possibilities had been actualized, God would include, know, and value appropriately. Any additional value for God, based upon
any kind of synthesis involving the creaturely values (even making use of "essential potentialities") or totally unconnected with the creatures, cannot invalidate that a greater or lesser amount of creaturely values will be an immediate part of the total divine experience of value and that therefore this total experience can have a greater or lesser amount of value, of happiness--however small the differential be that the creatures can affect in comparison with the total divine happiness.

Tillich's conception of an absolutely maximal fulfillment in relation to creation is then not consistent with the idea that God is the all-inclusive and utterly immediate knower--and likewise appreciator--of existence. Some of the ramifications of Tillich's position follow:

The divine knowing of the creaturely existence that has various possible degrees of joy and sorrow open to it is split from the value that this has for God. Creaturely life and the divine knowledge are variable, but the divine experience of value, its happiness, does not vary.

The notion of supplementing the actualized value of realities with the value of their essential potentialities, such that their essential potentialities are fully realized for God, confuses possibility and actuality. It entails that a part of abstract potentiality, that part by which the creatures have fallen short, is as valuable as mere potentiality as its concrete actualization by the creatures would have
been. One might insist that for God it is not "mere potentiality" but actuality. But what does this mean? Surely it does not mean that in God's knowledge the actual creature itself did concretely actualize all its potentialities. Therefore, that God realizes all the creatures' potentialities, that everything that ought-to-be is, seems very much to entail an abstract divine wish-world paralleling the real world. Tillich, who rightly censures supranaturalism for positing a supra-world beyond this one, can be criticized on the same score, though not as severely.

Worst of all in this model of divine fulfillment is its practical meaning for the creature. Contributing to the divine life, to its level of value, its happiness, cannot legitimately be a motive for doing the good. Whatever we do, God purges the negative and makes up the difference. Nor can it consistently be said that God has preferences or a "will" regarding creaturely decisions and actions. For if God did, it would make a difference to God what was actualized. If one might say that God cares or has preferences for the sake of the creatures' happiness but not for the sake of the divine happiness, which is maximal, I must say that, whether or not God has any direct concern for God's own happiness, if God truly cares for the creatures, God will be relatively happier or sadder on their account depending on whether things go relatively well or poorly for them, depending on the extent to which divine preferences are enacted. And with this model we cannot feel that God shares both our
joys and our sorrows. For whether we are joyously
delirious or woefully despondent, it makes no
difference to God, who is equally blissful. I am not
saying that Tillich was fully aware of or fully inten-
ding the divine indifference implied in his model. For
he affirms God's love and "infinite concern" for
the creatures. But that is its consequence.

Tillich's conception of the purgation or con-
quering of the negative and supplementation of the
positive such that all essential creaturely poten-
tialities are fulfilled allows us to understand how he
can claim that God transcends the distinction between
potentiality and actuality, despite an overall en-
dorsement of an open temporality, and claim that God is
not conditioned by or does not depend upon the
creatures for anything, despite a basic upholding of
indeterminate freedom. For all essential
potentialities will be actualized for God;
actualization will never be less than ideal
possibility, whatever particular purifying and
supplementing are called for by the novel actualized in
time. For whatever the creatures in their freedom
decide, God will make up the difference between that
and essential potentiality. The creatures contribute
no value by a relatively good use of freedom that God
would not have if they made the worst possible use of
it. Furthermore, if God is able to realize the
actualized value of essential potentialities whatever
possibilities the creatures actualize, then perhaps God
does not need to wait to see what possibilities the
creatures do actualize but can always possess the actualized value of all essential potentialities through all time. Since Tillich does not make a distinction between an assured perfect actualization of value when the time comes and an eternally complete possession of all value from all time, one cannot say for sure which was his view, or whether he even thought about the issue. But certain considerations point toward the latter. It would make for a stronger or stricter sense of God's transcendence of the distinction between potentiality and actuality and for a stricter interpretation of the passages in which "not yet" is said to be inapplicable to God. And it could help explain Tillich's talk of eternity as the transcendent unity of all time, as if it were completed. For God would already possess the full value of the future, despite its openness regarding creaturely decisions.

I would be remiss if I did not mention some statements in volume 3 of the Systematic that may be taken—or mis-taken—to imply that the creatures can contribute to the divine life in the sense of making it richer or poorer, depending upon how they choose to act. Tillich does declare that "every finite happening is significant for God" and that "the world process means something for God" and uses the phrase, "man in his significance for the Divine Life and its eternal glory and blessedness." However, the model that we have seen does stipulate that the positive content of creation is elevated to eternity, that creation does
therefore have significance for God in some sense, but not in the sense that our decisions can influence how much significance God derives from creation. To recall the comments about God as the sole source of divine glory (and blessedness) and as the only one who gives, the question is whether God gives to God's self all the significance and meaning of creation apart from how our indeterminate freedom is used, or whether we can really give something to God that God would not have otherwise. Since God empowers and works through each creature even in its freedom, if God then makes up whatever distance one falls short of one's essential possibilities, then God would be the sole cause of divine happiness in every sense. If, however, the use of our freedom makes a valuational difference to God, then, even though God is the very power of acting in our acting, we would have a causative role in divine happiness; God would have some nontautological passivity to God's own activity of working through us. God's creativity with respect to us is significant for God, but whether our creativity is significant for God, that is the question. Of course, what we have seen thus far gives a "no" to this question.

There is an occasion on which Tillich uses "contribute" in a manner that might be taken—or mistaken—to mean that we affect the divine life for better or worse. In a sermon he states that, in looking back at certain past pleasurable experiences, we may feel now that these are empty, that they "have not contributed to the eternal." Since this is a
Criticism of Tillich on the Passive Aspect 265

sermon, his language may be looser than usual. But beyond this, since in Tillich's model the positive that is created within existence, which can vary depending upon whether we relatively "waste" or "fulfill" our potentialities, is elevated to eternity, he perhaps would be willing to say that our actions do contribute to the divine life. But this would not be a "contribution" that makes a positive difference to that life. For if we had "contributed" less, God would negate the greater negativity involved in this and fully compensate for the greater distance between this lesser contribution and our essential potentiality.

The following is the remark by Tillich that most sounds as if we can affect the level of divine fulfillment: "...the eternal act of creation is driven by a love which finds fulfillment only through the other one who has freedom to reject and accept love." That sounds pretty good. However, it is not conclusive. For it is Tillich's position that our estrangement from God or rejection of God in each moment, as with all negativity, is negated or overcome as this is "here and now" elevated to eternity; everything in each moment (not in some future time or afterlife) returns to and in some sense is reunited or reconciled with God in eternity. Therefore, though the most natural way of interpreting that declaration is that God remains somewhat unfulfilled to the extent we reject God's love, that probably is not Tillich's meaning.

Talk about the significance of the finite for
God suggests that Tillich may have been trying to break away from the divine impassibility. But we cannot say that the shackles were loosened enough for him that he would have wanted such passages to be taken to mean that we can affect the divine life for the better or for the worse.

How then on the whole does the Tillich of this chapter stand in relation to panentheism, particularly the passive aspect? He seems to allow for a processive relationship of God to the world, though ambiguously. To the extent that he does, God's panentheistic relationship, God's utterly immediate and coinhering relationship, with the temporal world--both with respect to knowledge and ultimate empowerment--can be preserved. In general, he affirms indeterminate creaturely freedom fairly strongly, which is a key factor in preventing his panentheism from becoming a pantheism. However, given indeterminate freedom, he severely undermines his panentheism by denying that this freedom, which can affect creaturely experiences for better or for worse, can valuationally affect the divine experience of which these creaturely experiences are in panentheism an utterly immediate part. This entails that Tillich's God cannot very convincingly be called the living God. For as far as divine happiness and experience of value are concerned, God is closed, fixed, static, rather than in living relationship with creation. And more or less apart from the issue of indeterminate freedom, for there would be evil even if every creature optimally used its freedom, Tillich
Criticism of Tillich on the Passive Aspect  267

severely undercuts his panentheism by denying that the creaturely suffering that is a very part of God in panentheism is effective as an element of suffering and disvalue for God at God's core. And these problems with respect to the passive aspect of panentheism ultimately undermine the active as well, for these are mutually implicative. To whatever extent the totally inclusive and immediate relationship of God to the world is denied or only ambiguously upheld in connection with temporality, dependence upon creaturely free choices for degree of happiness, or suffering, and externality or separation therefore implied, God cannot then be the all-encompassing power, the immediate empoweror working through all existence. God cannot be "the creative ground of everything in every moment"; instead there is "an external relation between God and the creature."clxvii Only the God who suffers with the creatures can be the ultimate and a se power that is the very power of being in the creatures.
ENDNOTES

i.  Systematic Theology, 1:246.

ii.  Systematic Theology, 1:179-80, 2:22-23; Philosophical Interrogations, p. 376.


v.  Ibid.; Systematic Theology, 2:22.

vi.  Philosophical Interrogations, p. 376.  See also Systematic Theology, 1:247.

vii.  Systematic Theology, 1:246.

viii.  Systematic Theology, 2:23.


x.  E.g., Systematic Theology, 1:56, 245-47, 3:284, 405, 420; Love, Power and Justice, p. 107; Interpretation of History, p. 84.

xi.  Systematic Theology, 1:181.

xii.  Tillich's basic description of the polarity of the ontological elements in finitude can be found in Systematic Theology, 1:198-201, with dynamics and form specifically considered on pp. 199-200.

Criticism of Tillich on the Passive Aspect 269

xiv. Systematic Theology, 1:199; Love, Power and Justice, p. 54.

xv. Systematic Theology, 3:405.

xvi. Systematic Theology, 1:244.


xix. Systematic Theology, 1:246.

xx. Ibid.


xxx. Systematic Theology, 1:243; Philosophical Interrogations, p. 359; Biblical Religion, p. 82.

xxxi. Systematic Theology, 1:244.


xxxiii. Systematic Theology, 1:243-49.


xxxvi. Philosophical Interrogations, p. 376.

xxxvii. Systematic Theology, 1:252.

xxxviii. Systematic Theology, 1:252.

xxxix. Systematic Theology, 1:254.

xl. Tillich does write, "If I assert that potentiality as well as actuality is in God, I add that these are not separated in God as in finite beings." ("Reply to Interpretation," p. 339.) It is grammatically unclear here whether separation between potentiality and actuality per se is being denied, or only separation as this is present in the creatures.


xliv. Ibid., p. 209.


l. *Systematic Theology*, 1:244.


lv. *Systematic Theology*, 1:244.

lvi. *Systematic Theology*, 1:244.


lxiii. There are other Tillichian remarks that sound as if possibility is fully definite or concrete. He suggests that God is able "to anticipate every possible future" (Systematic Theology, 1:275-76) and states that "it [anything] participates in potential being before it can come into actual being" (Systematic Theology, 2:20). Of course, the first comment's meaning depends upon how strict the criterion for "anticipation" is, and the second may be a manner of speaking, so these cannot be taken as decisive in themselves.

lxiv. Systematic Theology, 1:264.

lxv. Ibid.

lxvi. Systematic Theology, 1:257, 274; Eternal Now, p. 130; Biblical Religion, p. 78.


lxviii. Systematic Theology, 1:274.

lxix. Ibid.


lxxi. Systematic Theology, 1:257.


lxxiii. Systematic Theology, 1:257.


Criticism of Tillich on the Passive Aspect 273


lxxvii. Theology of Culture, p. 62.

lxxviii. Systematic Theology, 1:275.


lxxxiii. Systematic Theology, 3:418.

lxxxiv. Systematic Theology, 1:275.

lxxxv. Systematic Theology, 3:316.

lxxxvi. Systematic Theology, 1:275.

lxxxvii. Courage To Be, p. 184. Compare that to his upbraiding of supranaturalism for finitizing God in
regard to the category of time by "determining a beginning and end to God's creativity." (Systematic Theology, 2:7.)


lxxxix. Systematic Theology, 1:255.


xci. Systematic Theology, 1:276.

xcii. Eternal Now, p. 129.


xcv. Systematic Theology, 1:158.


xcix. Courage To Be, p. 52.

c. Systematic Theology, 1:183.

ci. Systematic Theology, 1:184.
Criticism of Tillich on the Passive Aspect 275

cii. Ibid.
ciii. Love, Power and Justice, p. 41. See also p. 43.
civ. Love, Power and Justice, p. 47.
cv. Systematic Theology, 3:326.
cvii. Systematic Theology, 1:186. See also 2:43. Cf. 2:31, 79. Tillich perhaps held a different view in an earlier piece: "But nature itself has no history because it has no freedom. In all nature the existence of things is a necessary result of their essence." ("Kingdom of God and History," p. 108.) Of course, the absence of "freedom" may not necessarily gainsay indeterminate spontaneity, if "essence" allows for more than one expression of itself at a given juncture.
cx. Systematic Theology, 2:41.
cxiv. Systematic Theology, 2:57.
cxvi. Systematic Theology, 2:79.


cxviii. Ibid.


cxx. Systematic Theology, 1:248.

cxxi. Systematic Theology, 1:271.


cxxiii. Systematic Theology, 1:264.

cxxiv. Systematic Theology, 1:281.

cxxv. Systematic Theology, 1:248.


cxxx. Systematic Theology, 2:176.


cxxxii. Systematic Theology, 1:284.
Criticism of Tillich on the Passive Aspect

Cxxxiii. Systematic Theology, 3:405.


Cxxxv. Systematic Theology, 3:51.


Cxxxvii. Ibid.

Cxxxviii. Systematic Theology, 1:270.

Cxxxix. Hartshorne, "Tillich's Doctrine of God," p. 191. Since no page references to the Systematic are given, "upon which, apart from conversations with Prof. Tillich, my exposition is essentially based" (p. 164, n. 1), one assumes this remark comes from conservation.


Cxlii. Systematic Theology, 4:404.

Cxliii. Even if it be held that the suffering is entirely overcome only at a later time, there are still problems. For though the creature may not be suffering at a later time, and whatever instrumental value the suffering might have for the future, that the creature was suffering at the original time and that this was a negative experience then cannot be changed. And God's perfect memory cannot forget this suffering that was—and is—a very part of God's own experience.

Cxliii. Systematic Theology, 3:399, 401.

278 Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich

cxlv. Systematic Theology, 3:397. See also 3:385.
cxlvi. "Kingdom of God and History," p. 113. See also p. 127.
cli. Systematic Theology, 3:398, 399, 400.
cli. Systematic Theology, 3:400.
clii. Systematic Theology, 3:397.
cliii. Systematic Theology, 3:400.
cliv. Ibid.
clv. Systematic Theology, 3:405-6.
clvii. Systematic Theology, 3:403.
clviii. "Kingdom of God and History," p. 141. See also p. 142.
clix. Systematic Theology, 3:422.
clxi. Systematic Theology, 3:422.
clxii. Systematic Theology, 3:423.
clxiii. Shaking of the Foundations, p. 129.


clxv. Systematic Theology, 3:422.


clxvii. Systematic Theology, 1:271.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

What has preceded concerning Tillich and Hartshorne has been previewed and summarized enough and has been, I believe, clear enough that any large-scale summary here would be repetitious (though a brief summation will be a part of the final words of this chapter and this project). My "synthesis" of Hartshorne and Tillich, namely, a panentheism that fully embraces both an all-encompassing active aspect and an all-encompassing passive aspect, was outlined in chapter 1 and developed through my exposition on, agreements with, and disagreements with Tillich and Hartshorne in the subsequent chapters; so to give a basic description of my brand of panentheism, as so far developed, would again be repetitious. Instead, what I propose to do in this final chapter, as promised in the first chapter, is to use what has come before, especially material in chapters 4 and 5, as a basis or springboard for further considerations. This, in fact, will provide some summary of the panentheistic outlook presented thus far, but without needless repetition.

A major thrust of this chapter will be an apologetic one of showing how the active and passive aspects of God in panentheism can be held together without final contradiction. The first area concerns whether a panentheistic active aspect is compatible with the indeterminate creaturely freedom that has been maintained throughout, or whether the only sense God can be "passive" is to God's own self-decided activity. The
second and probably more important area of concern, which is relevant to the coherence of any theism in the usual sense of the word, involves the following dilemma: How can the ultimate and in se power, with nothing with any ultimate ontological independence from it that could negatively affect it, be anything other than unchangeably in possession of all possible value, with no negativities? But if this is the case, any actual relation of God to the world, as passive and even as ultimate empoweror, is dubious and, in fact, I will argue, impossible. I will maintain that the existence of other individuals included in God follows from God's ultimacy and provides value God would not otherwise have, despite the negativities entailed in finitude by its very nature.

Growing out of the discussion of that dilemma will be the possibility and perhaps desirability of the notion of God as truly inexhaustible and therefore intrinsically temporal. I will contend that such an eminent temporality and openness is at least as protective of the divine majesty as any notion of a fixed maximal possession of value by God.

With these further discussions upon the concepts broached in earlier chapters, I will try to consummate my attempt to offer a process theology that does full justice to the divine majesty and a Tillichian theology that does full justice to the concept of a living God.

Though I have consistently insisted that there is some genuine indeterminacy and spontaneity in creaturely activity, some will feel that if God is
immediately and coinheringly empowering each creature in each decision and action, this, in fact, entails that God completely determines each decision. If such determinism be upheld, then the passive aspect of panentheism, except in a tautological sense (of God being passive only to God's wholly self-decided activity), is obliterated, and our doctrine of panentheism moves towards pantheism (though if a strict qualitative difference between God and the nondivine individuals God includes and totally determines be strictly maintained, there would still be a difference). The active aspect would swallow the passive, rather than just being its ultimate basis.

However, I will now argue that there is no contradiction between panentheistic empowerment and indeterminate creaturely freedom. I claim the following: creatures find themselves with the freedom, capability, power to decide, but they do not create their freedom to be creative, they are not ultimately responsible for this freedom of decision. A creature's power to decide, as well as its total existence, is contingent. Such contingent freedom is either ultimately unexplained or it is given, empowered by an ultimate and necessary reality and power. If one admits the conceptual possibility of an ultimate empowerment behind creaturely contingent freedom, then I submit the following is conceptually possible: God empowers each exercise of creaturely freedom in decision and action, but "holds back" or limits divine power in not making the decision, instead allowing and
empowering creatures to choose among possible options, empowering them in whatever decision they make and carry out. Thus, the absence of mediation with respect to divine power—that there is "nothing between" our decision and God's empowerment—does not mean God decides for us, but rather that the God who relates to us with total intimacy gives existence to our free choice and to whatever action we choose. And if it were not for such empowerment and upholding of creatures in their freedom, they would not be able to act, they would not be at all (if I am correct in my belief that contingent creaturely freedom is in need of an ultimate cause).

Conversely, to maintain that our power to freely decide is simply external to God has entailments incompatible with divinity. As Tillich stated, there is no basis for an external relation from the side of ultimate power. What could such externality mean? That we are spatially outside God, thus rendering God spatial? That God is not paying attention to us, is not fully aware? Externality, whether spatial or epistemological, implies that there is some God behind or beyond God setting the conditions for interaction between us and this alleged "God", who is actually non-divine regarding presence and knowing.

We have also seen Hartshorne argue against external relations with respect to God: ...if we deny the inclusiveness of the divine unity, we will either have to admit that relations between God and the lesser minds belong to
no real individual, no real substance, or have to admit a superdivine individual to which they belong.\textsuperscript{i} However, Hartshorne did not follow out the logic of his endorsement of a "genuinely single entity which embraced both the absolute and the world and the relations between them."\textsuperscript{ii} Instead the creature's reception and synthesis of the divine datum is external to God, rather than within God's knowledge and power.

If the absence of external relations with respect to God be upheld, then our whole being, including the aspect of indeterminate freedom, which concretely cannot be separated from other aspects of our being, is itself (a part of) God's power. Parenthetically, this discussion points to the incompatibility of paying lip service to God's sustaining empowerment of everything by much of traditional theism, while explicitly or implicitly denying God's coinhering empowerment, denying that everything is part of God's power, of God (since there is nothing divine that is not in some sense divine power). This makes God's empowerment just one aspect or factor of or in things, in addition to many others, thus denying its total and utter immediacy and directness in relation to anything in its totality, in all its aspects--and implying some ultimate ontological independence of the creature from God. Now if by "external," one is simply meaning that God does not make the decisions God coinheringly gives us the power to make, that, of course, I grant--in substance, though not approving such use of "external."
My uncompromising upholding of a panentheistic divine active aspect entails that God indeed is passive to God's own activity through the creatures—but not in a tautological sense, not to wholly self-decided activity. For a part of that activity is our activity involving indeterminate freedom. We are active not as "secondary agents" completely determined by the primary agent, but as creators. This model allows for an outlook on the question of "grace and free will" that preserves some real human freedom and responsibility, while fully crediting the proper religious intuitions and motivations (and there have also been some improper ones) of those who have emphasized the divine primacy, "preceding," and grace. Since our whole being, since our freedom, since any good action we take (and also since anything good we receive from creation) is by virtue of or, better, is God's coinhering empowerment, without which there would be absolutely nothing, everything is of grace. We do nothing deserving of any reward, and indeed even of existence, that itself is not this immediate working through us by God. To merely say that God "enables" us to do the good is too weak to do justice to the panentheistic empowerment I have presented. In my scheme there is not a division of what we do and what God does. The trouble with many traditional attempts to preserve human freedom has been precisely a tendency to make a simple distinction or division between what God does and what we do in the economy of our moral and religious determinations. But God is the one who cannot be simply distinguished from
or contrasted to other beings, for God immediately embraces them. Instead of a division then, we are looking at the same thing on different levels—a penultimate and ultimate level. And the ultimate level encompasses the penultimate.

But have I not endorsed Hartshorne's talk of a division of responsibility (while vetoing a division of power)? Indeed, I have. Human responsibility has nothing taken away from it by God. Since God does not make our decisions for us to whatever extent they are indeterminate, to the extent we deliberately make worse use of our freedom than we could have, we are to blame; God is not responsible. (But there still is no division of power, for God is immediately empowering us in our sinfulness, some measure of which in each of us is the inevitable, or virtually inevitable, result of our freedom and the relative exclusivity of our awareness.) Conversely to the extent we deliberately make better use of our freedom than we might have, some credit is appropriate. But this does not mean that "God is not responsible"! While human responsibility has nothing taken away from it by God, in one sense it has everything it is given to it by God. Since God is the coinhering power in any good action (and is desirous of our choosing the best possible action), it would be the height of arrogance—or at least ignorance—to deny that God is responsible for the goodness of an act. But this does not contradict or detract from our responsibility. There is a penultimate and an ultimate level of responsibility that do not
conflict (to the extent we opt for the good), for the one, as it were, is within the other. We might say this: we can rightly receive some credit for a good deed, but God should receive all the glory.

We come now to the second area in which I will try to show that the active and passive aspects of panentheism can finally be held together without contradiction—an area which is relevant to whether any theism can hold together. The active aspect points to God as ultimate power. It is this ultimate power that enables God to be fully passive to everything, that is, perfectly passive in adequacy and scope, perfectly knowledgeable of and sympathetic to everything. And such knowing and loving is itself a participatory activity. Moreover, for there to be anything for God to be passive to, to know and sympathize with, God must be immediately and coinheringly empowering it. On all these counts, the active aspect of power underlies the passive one. But if God has this all-encompassing power, why would God want to include a world, as in the basic postulate of panentheism; why would God want to be passive to a world in any sense? Why would God not unchangeably possess all possible value apart from, and thus not bother with, a world, and especially not bother with one that brings any negativity into the divine life? For there is no power external to God's self that could negatively affect God, that could hinder God from unchangeably possessing all possible value without any tinge of negativity. Our dilemma is this: On the one hand, only God has the ultimate power
to immediately give being to the world. On the other hand, giving being to our world may not seem appropriate to the ultimate power.

While I have phrased this dilemma in panentheistic terms, the same basic quandary applies to any theism in which God's ultimacy or aseity is affirmed—any theism in which God is God. God's aseity means that God has an—or the—ultimate power of self-existence, that God is the ultimate power whose existence and experience are not dependent upon any powers that have any ultimate ontological independence from God. By implication then, God must be the ultimate source of anything else that exists. This must be the starting point, the most basic assumption, of any viable theism. But aseity, in general, like aseity panentheistically construed, means that there is no power beyond God's ultimate control that could prevent God from unchangeably having all possible value without trace of negativity. But if God possesses a completed maximum of value, creating a world either seems pointless and incomprehensible, or, if there is a point to it—which is to say that it has some value for God—the premise of immutably possessing all possible value is seemingly denied. And relating to the world, with its many negativities, would seem to imply some participation in negativity. Therefore, relating to our world, deriving either value or disvalue from it, may not seem fitting to the ultimate power.

The approach of classical theism, though, has been precisely to deny the seeming changeability,
purposeful increase in possession of value, and subjection to negativity involved in God's relating to the world. Classical theists strictly adhered to the belief that God's aseity entails unchangeable possession of all possible value sans mixture with disvalue and attempted to construe God's relationship to the world in terms consistent with that belief, at least formally (though informally, classical theists did not wholly refrain from speaking of God as in dynamic and changing relationship with the world, of the world as having meaning for God, and of God as sympathizing with the sufferings of the world—and how could any Christian avoid speaking of God's love for the world, even if this ran counter to one's theology!). By looking at the classical view, I will argue that our apparent incongruity of relating God, as unchangingly having an unadulterated maximum of value, to the world is a real incompatibility and impossibility and that this classical view of God and God's (supposed) relating tends to finitize God, to make God less than ultimate.

Classical theism will not permit that God be at all changeable, lest God decrease in value or need to increase in value to reach a maximum. The concept of "classical eternity" has been described in the preceding chapter. Since God's experience is not at all processive, there is absolutely no way God can have a relationship with the processive world that is at all immediate or direct. Supposedly God has an indirect relationship of sorts by having an unchanging vision of
all of time, all of which is equally actual, none of it more in the past or future for divine experience. Divine certainty of things that have not yet happened from our perspective apparently is based on God's creative power which (pre-)determines things. However, without a processive relationship of empowering things in the present, there is no basis for even this indirect relationship of knowing based on creative power. Unless God's upholding power is temporally related, it will not find its target; it will be blind. In this model, God makes creative decisions for all time and sits back in a timeless boudoir while these are automatically carried out (by whom?) without God's immediate attention. But unless God is directly and temporally involved in executing these plans, nothing will be carried out, for nothing can exist without God's immediate sustaining. Classical eternity, then, makes the real world in its concreteness and temporality blatantly external to God, even if the indirect timeless relationship to the world it posits be sustained; and since it cannot, it makes the universe totally external to, completely unknown and not at all empowered by, God. If there be some timeless God somewhere, there must be a God behind that God, a God who is temporal, at least in part, and who can thus coinheringly empower both the temporal world and this timeless God.

Classical theism also posits that God has all possible value apart from whether or not God creates a world. Creation yields no value God does not otherwise
have. But however much "nonsocial" value God might have apart from creation—even if there be an absolute maximum of this type of value—God cannot have the "social" value that comes from caring for creatures (and from having that love returned by some of them), except by having creatures. Some confusion on this issue is caused by those who argue that God’s love for the creatures is an agape that is in need of nothing and only gives value without receiving any. While I would agree that God’s love for the creatures is not at all corrupted by selfishness, by its very nature love or caring finds value and happiness in the happiness of others. Therefore, though God not be directly or primarily concerned with God’s own happiness in relations with the creatures, divine love and care, insofar as successful in promoting the well-being of the creatures, entail that God garners value and happiness from relating to the world. (Though God not be directly or primarily concerned with such happiness, this does not and cannot mean the omniscient one is ignorant of the prospect of garnering happiness or value through the happiness of the creatures for which God is working. Thus, in one sense, God’s love is not entirely selfless, though it is not at all selfish.) That God realizes value from creaturely experiences of value finds its strongest expression in panentheism, in which these experiences are an utterly immediate part of the divine experience. But it is entailed in any theism in which God is said to love or care for the creatures, in any theism in which creation is other
than a totally arbitrary and indifferent—or hostile—enterprise. (Of course, some classical theists have drawn the logical implications of their position and denied divine love, and many have regarded creation as a wholly nonchalant act.)

Note how the classical view differs from Tillich's in relation to value. While we cannot affect the level of value for God by our decisions, God's activity in relation to the universe has value and significance for God. It was not clear whether for Tillich God eternally possesses all the value creation might have for God. If God does already possess all the value of creation, one might be able to salvage the idea that divine aseity entails that God unchangeably has a maximum of value (though not on the basis that this possession of value is entirely apart from the world). However, if indeterminate creaturely freedom be granted, the degree of God's happiness with respect to the world will be dependent upon the extent creaturely actions promote creaturely well-being. No kind of supplementation or synthesis of creaturely experience can change the fact that a caring God is happier the greater the happiness of the creatures. This is epitomized in panentheism, in which creaturely happiness is a very part of God, but it is true for any theism in which God is love. Even if any freedom be denied, and thus God anticipates all creaturely experience of value, it is plausible that the actual realization of value by the concrete creature would have a greater value for God than the mere
anticipation. Like unchangeability, the possession of all possible value by God conflicts with relating to the world.

Finally, classical theism denies that God is negatively affected by, or in any sense suffers with, the world. Only a God who is totally insensitive, only a God for whom everything creaturely is a matter of indifference, could fail to be somewhat negatively affected and suffer with creaturely woe. I find this failure incompatible with the idea that this God knows the world. For even the more insensitive of persons cannot but feel some sympathy for those whose woe they know and understand fairly well. How then can God, who will be regarded as in some sense omniscient by any theism which maintains aseity, be totally insensitive and unsympathetic to the plight of creatures? This notion is certainly incompatible with the idea that God loves the world. For a God who cares about the well-being of creatures will not be absolutely blissful in the face of their distress. This is especially true for panentheism, in which our sufferings are an immediate part of the divine life. But it is true for any theism that upholds the divine love (or, I believe, the divine omniscience). Therefore, a God who experiences no negativity cannot be related to the world.

Thus, I believe I have established that a God who unchangeably possesses all possible value untinged by any negativity cannot be related to the world on all three counts: unchangeability, absolute maximality of
value experience, and nonsubjection to negativity—except perhaps if it be held that God is related to creation, though divine upholding and knowing of it are totally arbitrary, pointless, whimsical, and indifferent, a notion touched upon in our discussion, but not given full explicit consideration. Then it might be alleged that, though the concrete contents of divine experience change, God's possession of all possible value and nonsubjection to negativity are unchangeable. But there are two problems here (not to mention the moral repugnance of such a deity). If the world were a matter of total indifference to God, God would never have created it. Moreover, even if God had a world in relation to which God purposed to be wholly indifferent, thus neither gaining value nor being subject to disvalue, God could not pull it off! For, as argued above, God's knowing the world's miseries would have some negative effect. Similarly, knowing of the world's ecstasies could not but bring some happiness, in spite of God's self. This model then is not really compatible with God's relating to the world.

Even if a wholly indifferent relating to the world be allowed, through total indifference this God misses some possible value, namely, social value, the value of loving and having an interest in others, contrary to the premise of unchangeable possession of all value. (Note how the concept of agape, discussed in relation to social value earlier, if construed as meaning that God derives absolutely no happiness or value from the well-being of creatures, is equivalent
As implied when first presented, it is this concept of social value that points to the misconception involved in positing possession of all possible value by God. That is where the basic problem or misunderstanding within our initial dilemma lies. Though God might immutably have all possible nonsocial value, God cannot immutably have all possible social value, by its very nature. God obtains social value only by creating and relating to certain possible creatures rather than to others. Even barring indeterminate freedom, it is questionable whether the full social value of a certain creature can be possessed in anticipation of that creature's actual existing and experiencing. And if freedom be granted, what value is realized is dependent on creaturely choice.

While it might be granted that an absolute possession of all possible value is an unreasonable entailment of ultimate power which overlooks social value, it might still be insisted that ultimate power would ensure that there be no negativity in the universe and in the value that God derives from it. This is the issue of theodicy. It is beyond the purview of this project to delve deeply into that question. Suffice it to say that the following entail that natural and moral evil (which are not wholly separable) are part of the very nature of creaturely existence: relative ignorance, the need for natural laws (which provide the order and constancy needed for creaturely life and interaction, but as such cannot be
modified or suspended for the particular needs and desires of each and every creature), and indeterminate freedom (a necessary aspect of at least the higher organisms, I think). There is then no power ultimately independent of God (no "prime matter" or malevolent deity) that resists God and causes negativity, nor is there a weakness within God that causes it. Instead, the very idea of a creation without any negativity is an incoherent or absurd one. Therefore, there is no denial of God's ultimate power in the "inability" to effect a supposed notion, which in fact makes no sense at all.

Thus, some evil or negativity is the price attendant to social value, though it is always outweighed by the good in the universe. This and what has preceded in this section point to why God's ultimacy and aseity demand that God have a world of which only God can be the ultimate source. Ultimacy means God will know and be able to ensure that creaturely existence on the whole will be good, so for the creature's sake God will have a world. Secondarily, God will have a world for God's own sake, for God knows that God will share in all the happiness of the creatures, which will outweigh the sadness, and will derive pleasure from love for the creatures being returned by some of them.

But it is only the panentheistic God that has such ultimacy. To the extent the creatures' experiences are not an utterly immediate part of the divine experience, God will not fully possess the value
of these experiences. And any attempt to keep God from totally immediate participation in the negativities of creaturely experience will likewise entail a relatively indirect and external relationship to the positive in same (for God cannot know just which aspects of an experience are positive and which negative without knowing the whole experience with perfect intimacy), thus resulting in lesser value for the divine experience, since the good outweighs the bad in creaturely experience on the whole. And a God who does not garner all the value available is surely less than ultimate compared to one that does. This applies all the more to classical theism, where any positive value of the creation for God is directly denied. Moreover, to whatever extent the creation is imagined as more or less external to God, in order to lessen God's dependence on or passivity to the world for experience of value or happiness, or for any other reason, God's ultimacy is contradicted in the following manner: Any externality means that God is not the totally immediate and coinhering empowerer of the world, thereby entailing a God above or behind God, who is the utterly coinhering empowerer of our supposed "God" and of the world, and who determines the conditions for the interaction of these relatively external or separated entities.

I have gainsaid the notion of an unchangeable possession of all possible social value, while thereby perhaps seeming to imply the unchangeable possession of all possible nonsocial value by God. Actually, I have
not spoken for or against this latter idea to this point. But first I will consider what comprises nonsocial value. By that I mean the particular values, the aesthetic values, that God realizes apart from the world or any worlds. As we realize values which are not (at least directly or primarily) social (that is, involving our encountering and appreciation of the experiences of others), such as enjoying a sunset or appreciating the beauty of a symphony, so analogously does God. Of course, in the divine case, what God aesthetically enjoys is not relatively external nor dependent upon the creativity of others. Very metaphorically, God paints pictures and composes music that only God can enjoy.

What about value that is beyond any and all particular values, a la a mystical or undifferentiated God or aspect of God? The only senses of more or less undifferentiated value that recommend themselves to me are the following: 1) God has a feeling and appreciation of divine existence per se and ultimate power, of *aseity*. 2) God surveys possibility in general. (This latter could not in any way be said to involve total formlessness, though, for possibility must have at least some form or definiteness.) These, especially the former, do have real value for God. Yet by themselves they are rather empty. They have the value of experienced potentiality, of being poised for creativity, and are incomplete unless they issue forth in particular social and nonsocial values (and therefore should not be simply classified under social
or nonsocial value). (As an analogy for God's sense of
divine existence per se and power, I think of the
feeling I have when I am done with a particular project
or phase of my life, having a clean slate and clean
closets and desk drawers, and looking forward generally
and indefinitely to doing something.) If someone else
has some additional sense of God's appreciation of
value beyond particular value, I would not have much
quarrel with it, as long as particular values in
addition to the undifferentiated value are regarded as
real and valuable for God. However, advocates of
undifferentiation have often regarded particular values
as disvaluable (and therefore sometimes wished them
into maya or illusion), as sulllying the simplicity and
unity of God's experience with complexity and
manifoldness--thus attempting to make God the cosmic
equivalent of a lobotomy patient.

We now return to the consideration of particular
nonsocial value. My position is that God may not
unchangeably possess all nonsocial value, but that
particular nonsocial values (like social ones) might be
realized temporarily or processively. This is tenable
only if possibility is regarded as more or less in-
definite (with Hartshorne and contra Tillich, insofar
as he has revealed himself), rather than as a fixed
group of wholly definite entities (waiting to be
instantiated in the case of social possibilities).
For, while in the case of social value, there is a
valuational difference between God's seeing the
possibility of Dave Nikkel realizing a particular value
and God's experiencing Dave Nikkel as actually realizing the said value, in the case of nonsocial aesthetic values, if they are "seen" in their total definiteness, they are realized, they are actual. Social values, by their very nature, even if determinate \textit{qua} possibility, still depend upon creaturely actualization for realization, while divine nonsocial values obviously do not.

But certain problems arise in regard to possibility as indefinite. How can God be the ultimate source and controller of possibility unless God knows all possibility in all definiteness? And if God is not, there is something more ultimate than God (perhaps possibility itself, which is to say, chance) or some kind of dualism. However, I believe that God can be in possession and control of possibility, even though it not be composed of completely definite entities. God can do so by knowing the limits within which possibilities lie. On this model, possibilities can be thought of as being within a continuum. Analogous to the way I know the real number line, without establishing (that is, without creating or bringing to full definiteness) each number of the infinite possible, or the spectrum of colors without seeing each of the infinite possible shades, God can know all possibility.

But apart from the need for possibility to be possessed by or be "within" God for God to be ultimate, this question arises: If God is the ultimate power, unhindered by an ultimately independent power, why should not God unchangeably possess all possible
nonsocial value? If nothing is thwarting God, why should God stop at only realizing a certain portion of all possible nonsocial value up to a particular divine time? Does not this idea entail that there is a particular structure imposed upon God that limits divine power and creativity? This type of concern, which certainly has some legitimacy, is reflected in Tillich's statements that God "precedes" reason or structure and in his admonitions against trying to find a "definite" structure in God. Of course, in one sense, even God's general sense of divine existence and power must have some structure. That is to say, it cannot be absolute chaos, which is nothingness. But I quite agree that God does not have a particular or definite structure in the way we do, a structure that sets the limits, conditions, and possibilities for our perceiving and creating. There are no a priori limits on God's power and creativity. But since I grant this, again the question raises itself, why then might not God unchangeably possess all nonsocial value?

My answer is that it is the nature of possibility and of God's power to be inexhaustible (though the unlimitedness of possibility is one of "depth," of unlimitness within general limits, within an inexhaustible "continuum"). While God could realize any given amount of nonsocial value "right now"--instantly or eternally, that does not mean the realization of all possible nonsocial value right now is a coherent idea. Because, for any supposedly completed set of all value, even an infinite one, more
values can be stipulated, can be created. To use a mathematical analogy, though the set of all integers is infinite, the set of all real numbers is an infinity of a higher order; there are "orders" of infinity. Just as one can be added to any supposed completed set of finite integers, "one can be added" to any supposed completed infinity. Looking at it directly in terms of the divine power and experience, by stipulating the possession of the completed set of (supposedly) all possible nonsocial values, we may limit and exhaust God's power by disallowing God any further creative potency, and we may confine God to eternal boredom, save for God's social relations. (This is even more the case in classical theism, where divine creativity with regard to the universe is eternally complete and completed.) We seemingly deny God's inexhaustibility.

Traditional theology has been concerned that God and God's power not be exhausted in the creation of the universe. I have a similar concern regarding the creation of nonsocial value.

The reader may have detected a basic quandary here in relation to God's ultimate power. On the one hand we seem to limit or "hold back" God's power by holding that God cannot possess all possible nonsocial value instantly or eternally. On the other hand we seem to limit or "hold back" God's power by holding that there is nothing further God can create beyond a given set of values. This issue, which has very significant ramifications for God's ultimacy and majesty, is one that to my knowledge has not been
recognized anywhere, at least not explicitly. Which side to choose does not seem obvious. Perhaps it is mainly a matter of taste whether one opts for ongoing creativity and inexhaustibility as most expressive of God's ultimate power and majesty. But at the least it seems in itself as supportive and as nondestructive of the divine ultimacy as the other.

Beyond the respective immediate attractiveness of each of the options, we have the following respective advantages with regard to God's ultimacy: On the side of a completed outpouring of divine power in respect to nonsocial value is that it allows for a more exact surveying of possibility. On the side of inexhaustibility is the seeming divine ennui involved in the other option. Also on the side of ongoing potency is the following consideration. If God's experience, apart from creating and relating to a temporal world, is wholly atemporal and nonprocessive, it perhaps becomes difficult to see how God could, in fact, relate to a temporal entity at all. If God creates a world at a particular time, "prior to" which God did not have a temporal world, the problem is fairly obvious. It is questionable whether an experience that is wholly nontemporal and durationless could become temporal and durational, even in an aspect. It may appear easier to relate a God intrinsically timeless to a temporal world, if there has always been a temporal world for God. Then God has supposedly always been temporal in an aspect, and we do not have to imagine the strictly atemporal becoming
processive. However, if God is intrinsically, or apart from the world, atemporal (rather than there being unchanging aspects to an experience with intrinsic temporality), while temporally relating to the world, we still have the difficulty of integrating the concretely durationless and nonprocessive with the concretely durational and processive within the divine experience. A way to get around this difficulty would be in positing that God's experience is intrinsically temporal or durational, and that part of it is the continual possession of all possible nonsocial value, which has an infinite duration which is beginningless and endless (in contrast to God's possession of any particular social value, which always has a beginning). That is, God's experience of nonsocial value is durational, though its concrete contents do not change. This seems to be a coherent way to avoid this particular problem, though I have never heard anyone advance such a model in any context. With that model, I would call it more or less a standoff between a completed outpouring of divine power (and its more precise view of possibility) and ongoing creativity (and its avoidance of divine boredom), with one's own sense of which less compromises the ultimacy of divine power being the determinative factor. In comparison with a model of God as intrinsically atemporal, though, I think the balance is tipped in favor of the model of inexhaustible creativity, for it is more clearly compatible with God's relating to a temporal world, which I have argued is demanded by God's ultimacy. I
might note that in this model there is a unity or symmetry between God in relation to social value and nonsocial value (new values being ongoingly created in both areas), unlike with an atemporal possession of all possible nonsocial value, or even with a temporal or durational possession of all possible nonsocial value. I doubt, however, that this, in itself, constitutes any evidence in favor of the model.

It is time to bring to a conclusion this whole project. In the following ways, I believe I have offered a process theology that, unlike Hartshorne's, does full justice to God's aseity and majesty: God's all-encompassing and coinhering power is fully affirmed. (In this I do fuller justice to the divine power and majesty than does any nonpanentheistic theology.) God's direct and immediate governing, shaping, and controlling of the world's nature and destiny is truly affirmed—though God also lets us do some of the shaping via our freedom. (A God who can exercise ultimate power and governance only by determining everything to the last iota, who is not strong and secure enough to permit some indeterminate creaturely freedom, is not very majestic.) God's power is not exhausted in divine creativity with respect to this universe (as in Hartshorne). I uphold the possibility that God has many universes other than this one and affirm that God realizes "nonsocial" value totally apart from any and all universes. And I suggest that God's "nonsocial" creativity is not exhausted in any complete set of values, but is truly
inexhaustible, which is at least as protective of
divine power and majesty as the unchanging possession
of (allegedly) all possible nonsocial value. And, in
the following ways, I believe I have advanced a
Tillichian theology that is sensitive to his sense of
the divine power and majesty and holiness, as above,
and that is truer to his panentheistic intent and to
his desire to affirm a living God in living
relationship to a world with freedom, than he was
himself. I have suggested a God who is intrinsically
temporal in eminent and ultimate fashion, who can
without possible contradiction contain the temporal
world (or worlds). I have affirmed that we have some
genuine freedom in determining the quality of our
relationship with God, though the glory should go to
the God who is immediately working through or coin-
heringly empowering us even in this. And I have
insisted that the degree of value or happiness in the
divine experience can be affected by the free actions
of the creatures God immediately embraces and that God
is negatively affected by the creaturely sufferings
that are a very part of God. Yet I have also insisted
that God’s power ensures that creaturely experience on
the whole will be enjoyable, that God realizes much
value and happiness apart from inclusion of the world
and any worlds, and that God enjoys the value of a
general sense of divine existence and power. Thus, we
have a truly living relationship that yet does not
undermine the divine ultimacy and beatitude.
ENDNOTES


ii.  *Man's Vision of God*, p. 238.  See p. 120 above for full quote.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Works by Charles Hartshorne

Books

Anselm's Discovery. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1965.


The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1962.


A Natural Theology for Our Time. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1967.


Articles, Chronologically Ordered


"God as Absolute, Yet Related to All." Review of Metaphysics 1 (September 1947):24-51.


Works by Paul Tillich

Books

Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality.


Articles


**Works on Hartshorne**


**Works on Tillich**


Works Comparing Hartshorne and Tillich


INDEX

A
active aspect of God,
  4-5, 14, 157ff,
  279, 283
actuality and potentiality, see "potentiality and actuality"
actus purus, 191,
  203-5, 212ff
aseity, 14-15, 22-23,
  192, 244-45, 280,
  284-86, 288, 292,
  300

B
beatitude, divine,
  244-45, 248ff, 263,
  287ff, 302
becoming, 207ff
being-itself, 85-86,
  133ff
as embracing everything, 82, 85-86
body analogy for God-world relationship, 8-10, 129ff

C

chaos, 175, 185

E
eternity, 228ff, 253
classical, 210, 229-30, 284-86
externality, 5, 48ff,
  117ff, 280ff

F
finitude and God, 50-57
freedom, indeterminate, 4-5, 159, 161,
  164-65, 202, 236ff,
  245, 262-63, 278ff,
  301

G
God
as a being, 135ff
as all power, 4, 159,
  161ff
as datum, object,
  166ff, 186ff
as loving self through creation, 76-77
as impersonal, 64ff
as personal, 62ff, 138-40
as preceding structure, 20-21, 67-68
as unconditioned, 242ff, 260ff
as undifferentiated, 82ff
"God above God," 22-23
governance, divine, 160-61, 169, 174ff
direct control, 187ff, 301
ground of being, 86ff

H
happiness, divine, see "beatitude, divine"
holiness, 78, 189ff

I
immutability, 7, 291
impassibility, 6-7, 51ff, 249
indeterminate freedom, see "freedom, indeterminate"
inexhaustibility, 297ff
infinite as embracing the finite, 81-82

L
language about God, 15ff
laws, divine, 175ff

M
majesty, divine, 189ff, 300-301
modal coincidence, 116ff, 161-62
mysticism in Tillich, 71ff

P
panentheism, defined, 2ff
pantheism, 10-13, 276
passive aspect of God, 3-4, 13, 201ff, 279, 283
persuasion, divine, 183
potentiality and actuality, 27, 52-53,
116-17, 203ff, 259
power of being, 86ff
preferences, divine,
   177ff, 182ff

S
spatiality and God,
   54-55, 65, 68ff,
   278
subject-object structure, 49f, 53, 54,
   65
Suffering and God,
   246ff, 263, 302
supranaturalism, 51-52

T
temporality, divine,
   203ff, 278, 297-98, 301
closed, 210ff
theism, classical or
   traditional, 6ff,
   285ff

U
ultimate concern, 21-
   22, 140-41