Democracy, the Two-Party System and the Transition
Imbroglio in the March Toward Nigeria’s Third Republic
1985-1992

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It is not just by talking about democracy that African countries will become
democratic. We must act more and talk less. To build a truly democratic society
and culture, we must plant the seeds of democracy, enable them to germinate by
nourishing them and watering them regularly, and when the plants begin to
emerge and grow by carefully and tenderly nursing them until they become as
strong as Iroko trees.

Adebayo Adedeji

All the problems surfacing now are the result of internal defects of the [Nigerian
transition] program [and] its contradictions. That is why I have called it voodoo
democracy.

Wole Soyinka

It is paradoxical that a military institution that is hardly known for its
democratic culture should assume the onerous task of gestation and nurturing a
polity that is as complex as Nigeria into democratic governance. Perceptually,
here probably lies one of the dilemmas and contradictions that bedeviled the
transition process. And this was a particularly frustrating and perturbing situation,
given the painstaking efforts adopted by the Armed Forces Ruling Council
(AFRC) to transfer power to a democratically elected government in 1993. But
again, it could be argued that Nigeria represents a peculiar case in the somewhat
evolutionary, democratic metamorphosis in the African continent, because of its
population, cultural characteristics and composition of its intricate society.

The complexity of Nigeria’s democracy burgeons from the fact that in over
three decades since its birth as an independent sovereign state, the military has
governed intermittently for twenty-two years. Thus, it could be contended that
western-style democracy has no firm roots in the country. Nigeria was born
a sovereign nation-state after about forty-six years (1914-1960) of British
gestation. Its political history has been fraught with turbulence brought about,
inter alia, by economic, social, and political mismanagement and disorder. It has
had five successful and two unsuccessful military coups and a civil war (1967-
1970) to “boast” of. Probably, fatigued from military coups and the cumbersome
burden of governing a resilient and sophisticated polity, the military regime decided to relinquish power to democratically elected civilians.

First, this study attempts to discuss briefly the concept of democracy which has become a national shibboleth, with confusing and sometimes conflicting interpretations. Second, it examines concisely the activity of the two parties sanctioned by the AFRC to contest the elections leading to the emergence of the Third Republic. In particularly, the analysis focuses on the gubernatorial and presidential elections.

But the issue that has confounded many political observers is whether the political elites are "genuinely" prepared for democratic governance, or if the process is going to become elusive as has been two previous attempts.

The Concept of Democracy

It is true that democracy (in its various forms) thrived on the African continent before the advent of colonialism. It was also true as L. Rubin and B. Weinstein, have argued that due to ethnocentricism, the colonial powers and many political scientists failed to recognize this phenomenon because the African systems were not identical to the system in Europe.  

For example, Ali Mazrui has argued that among the Tiv society in pre- and post-colonial Nigeria, democracy "flowered." The Tiv society had no rulers. So, the elders met when necessary to discuss village problems. In Tiv democracy, accountability was a central principle. Debate among them could be fierce as the elders talked and talked until they could reach a consensus. At the end, they took an oath to abide by the decision; this gave it legitimacy. Also, many scholars are irritated, if not indignant, when some African politicians make a "mockery" of democracy, given the fact that it is not alien to traditional Africa. In fact, Chinua Achebe chafed at the notion that democracy is foreign to Africans when he said: "Nobody can tell us about the value of government by discussion and consensus. The African notion of democracy went far beyond what is practiced elsewhere."

In my own [Ibo] community, [in Nigeria] there is discussion when things are happening. If you don't participate, it's your own fault - nobody stops you. So the notion that we are learning something new is absurd." If this notion is plausible, arguably, the political actors are responsible for its weakness in Nigeria, principally, because they have failed to adhere to the rules of the game in the quest to pursue their parochial interests.

Basic to the argument being propounded here is that since democracy is not alien to the Nigerian polity, its success could be possible, if the lawmakers are committed to it. But democracy, it has been contended elsewhere is not monolithic and hence the need to concoct a genre that is favorable to the
In his presidential address to the twenty-fifth annual meeting of the (American) African Studies Association in 1982, Richard Sklar presented five variations of democracy in Africa.

In brief, the first was liberal democracy. In this system, characteristic of the government bequeathed the African countries (as for instance, Nigeria) by the colonial administrators, power was limited by law, and citizens were free to form political associations and to compete for office in open elections at regular intervals.\(^9\)

The second type of democracy in Africa, contended Sklar, espoused the notion that rulers should be accountable to their subjects, but dismissed the idea of multi-party electoral competition. This form of democracy, he dubbed guided democracy, since the guardians insisted upon political uniformity.\(^10\)

The third type of democracy was social democracy which burgeoned from the desire by some African states to address the key issue of social justice. It was argued that in order to further social justice, it was imperative for the government to promote an egalitarian system, while simultaneously accentuating the government's accountability to the people. Tanzania, under the leadership of Julius Nyerere, exemplified this form of democracy.\(^11\)

The fourth type was what Sklar termed participatory democracy, which though familiar, remained elusive. According to him, the theory of participatory democracy assumed the existence of a relationship between political institutions run along democratic lines and participative social institutions.\(^12\) As the argument goes, these institutions should be able to provide the pedagogical laboratories or milieus for education on democratic principles and participation. This line of thinking originates from the assumption that the people spend most of their time in the work-place, hence the need to teach democratic ideals in these institutions. Zambia, under Kenneth Kaunda, illustrates this experiment in action.\(^13\)

The fifth variation was consociational democracy, which might not have a legal guardian in Africa, noted Sklar, but which has had some allure. Arend Lijphart described consociational relationship as a mutual consensus building device among diverse elites for the purpose of successful governing.\(^14\) Since ethnic clashes in the politics of who gets what, when and how have become endemic in Africa, with few exceptions, such a system has been considered apposite.\(^15\) Sklar argued, though, that consociationalism was "a version of liberal democracy with the addition of special arrangements meant to protect the vital interests of cultural groups."\(^16\)

The basis for the above discussion stems from the sometimes vociferous debates as to whether Nigeria should adopt one of these forms of democracy, concoct an eclectic form, or even implement a "no-party"\(^17\) democracy. In spite

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of conflicting opinions, there has always been a general consensus, however, that regardless of its various forms, democracy in Nigeria must take cognizance of the country's political conditions and cultures. This is a view that Claude Ake has eloquently articulated elsewhere. Celestine Bassey, echoed a somewhat similar sentiment especially as it concerned the issue of political stability, which a viable democratic practice is intended to establish. He said, "It would...be a grave mistake to ignore the past entirely, since predisposing factors in the political process such as belief systems and values (i.e., political culture) are in the main, historically conditioned." Larry Diamond contended that if a third endeavor at democratic governance was to be successful, it must design democratic institutions to fit Nigeria's unique heritage.

Sam Egite Oyovbare has argued rather confidently that, "We hold the view that democracy in Nigeria is not something prior to or above Nigerian politics. ...It is rather the very stuff of politics." He sees democracy as a controlled form of representation. Thus, he described democracy as "a political framework from which public policies emerge and are administered for society...by means of a political class—a class ideally open to recruitment and exit and assumed to possess the confidence [and hence legitimacy] of the entire citizens of the political system."

Sklar himself noted that democracy came in different forms in Africa, and borrowing from C. R. D. Halisi, he affirmed that "democracy in Africa was an experimental process in a new generation of countries."

The need, therefore, to adopt a suitable genre of democracy, or an eclectic form of the aforementioned typologies that could become part and parcel of the political culture, and nurtured through political socialization is imperative. But the adequacy of a democratic system is one thing, however, applying its tenets to govern effectively is another. In general, the activities of political parties that may be in a position of furthering a democratic culture because of their contacts with the grassroots could make or break a system, at least in the Nigeria case.

Party-system and the Third Republic

The history of political parties in Nigeria is quite intriguing. The function of political association as forces for the mobilization of the people is indisputable. But the purpose for which political parties mobilize their masses could unite or disunite a polity; and indeed, they may sometime be dysfunctional to the political system in plural societies if inadequately structured. For instance, it was such a realization that, arguably, prompted the military to encourage a constitutional approach in the design of the parties prior to the Second Republic. In spite of the meticulousness, and political engineering, the parties failed to meet the challenge of nation-building. What this suggests, therefore, is that it takes more than rules
or institutional architecture to create a viable party system. In a real sense, "attitudinal" changes or adjustments in the way Nigerians view and practice the political game is a sine qua non for successful governing. Claude Ake chafed at the political behavior among Nigerian politicians when he said: "There is a willingness by [political actors] to violate the legitimate method of contestation, if necessary, to achieve the goal of power..." This attitude tends to result in the problem of legitimacy since the losing parties end up with-holding their support from the party in government. It was, however, assumed that these weaknesses would be addressed in the party-system of the Third Republic.

So, when on May 3, 1989, President Babangida lifted the ban on politics, promulgated a "new" constitution, and ordered the politicians to resume partisan politics, there was hope that the era of genuine multi-party democracy had finally dawned on the country. Following the president's declaration, Humphrey Nwosu, chairman of the National Electoral Commission (NEC), released the guidelines for party formation. In brief the requirements contained the following provisos:

1. It must be "open to all Nigerian citizens" not below the age of 18 and must be "well-established" in the federal and state capitals, and local government areas;
2. It must state the number of its registered members showing names, age and residential address of each member to facilitate physical confirmation;
3. The administrative organization of each political association seeking registration must be so strong at all levels of government that it must employ "adequate full-time administrative personnel" such as administrative secretary, financial secretary, accountant, auditors, a publicity/organizing/welfare officer and a librarian;
4. A political association must submit to the NEC a statement of its assets and liabilities at the time it is applying for registration;
5. A political association must submit together with its constitution a manifesto which should place "greater emphasis on the concrete problems facing the country" and not on theoretical questions, for "one cannot govern by theories alone...;"
6. Application for registration...must be accompanied by receipt of N50,000 paid to NEC...

These guidelines, while providing the general framework for party formation and character, were probably problematic. In any case, political parties are generally concerned with capturing power than with the nuances of their structures.
The Two Party-System

The AFRC in August 1985, in its inchoate attempt to hand over power to a civilian rule, set up a 17-member Political Bureau (PB). The Bureau's mandate was: 1. The review of Nigeria's political history; and 2. Indentifying the basic political imbroglios which led to failure in the past and suggesting ways of ameliorating and coping with these complicated problems. Following the deliberations, the PB recommended to the AFRC (among other dimensions) that the number of political associations in the country be limited to two in order to further a politics based on principles rather than ethnicity. Indeed, the AFRC may have philosophically assumed that since politics in Nigeria has tended to be based on parochial, geographic, religious and ethnic manipulations and interests, that the two-party system would blur these geo-ethnic and religious chasms.

It, nevertheless, affirmed the following as the rationale for a two-party system: 1. Political associations were dominated by a few rich individuals; 2. Associations were interested in serving their parochial interest instead of the nation; 3. The groups showed the very deficiencies of intolerance and self-aggrandizement which brought about the collapse of earlier experiments in democracy; 4. The association paid little attention to the organizational structures at the grassroots level.

Ideologically, Sam Oyovbare (a PB member) argued that the two-party system would "set the stage for the gradual clarification of our choice or locus in accordance with the great historical systems - i.e., capitalism and socialism [with NRC leaning toward capitalism and SDP, socialism]." Arguably, though, what is important in Nigeria's democratic experiment is not whether it adheres to a theoretical or an ideological paradigm. What is significant is the extent to which the parties are determined to function with the rules of the political game in the struggle for power. This has been one of the basic problems in the past, and may be the major issue in the political process leading to the Third Republic and after.

For example, Neal Reimer and Douglas W. Simon have hypothesized that successful patterns for furthering cooperation, advancing accommodation and handling conflicts in politics require:

1. Agreement on certain constitutional fundamentals. The assumption is that such agreements facilitate consensus and trust among political cleavages. What it implies is that political actors must accept the rules of the constitutional game such as voting, freedom of speech, majority decision, which should enable participants to "tame" the struggle for power. This would make politics less a matter of life and death.
2. Meaningful opportunities for the expression of needs, interests, and desires - i.e., interest articulation. This involves the ability of actors to
articulate their needs, interests and desires through the media and other public fora. It is assumed that the existence of opportunities are likely to facilitate cooperation and accommodation that are required to sustain a political system.

3. Sound mechanisms for the wise selection of priorities - i.e., interest aggregation. This implies that political actors may build support for certain proposals that are generally in their interests while ignoring the less important policies. It is assumed that political actors and parties can play key roles in building support for priorities that are beneficial for the country [irrespective of their party affiliation.]

4. Acceptable ways of legitimating public policy choices. This involves the willingness of citizens to obey the laws, principles, rules, regulations that are made by the legislators and the legal system because they confide in the political system.

5. Effective governance which calls for a government that is capable of maintaining law and order, raising the necessary revenues with which to implement its policies effectively...

6. Regular and effective controls of government. This involves constitutional devices to ensure that those that are elected to serve in government are servants, and are not predisposed to using this instrument of power for terrorizing its citizens.¹⁴

These premises are “enshrined” in the 1979 and 1989 constitutions, and are perhaps not unfamiliar to Nigerian lawmakers. But seldom do legislators review the constitution (given the centrifugal pressures from their constituencies) after an electoral process, to fully imbibe the political wisdom of its tenets with which to govern effectively. Nigeria has come a long way in its quest for a durable and sustainable democracy, and probably an adherence to the above dimensions could mean that Nigerians may never see the military at the helm of its government. Admittedly, it was the desire to see that the Third Republic does not mimic the previous two republics that led to the designing of an incremental electoral process by the AFRC and the sanctioning of two political parties.

The Gubernatorial (and State Legislative) Elections of 1991

A number of factors may have conspired to make the primary elections held on October 19, 1991, for the state governors and legislators perplexing. The first is the open ballot system which superseded the secret ballot system of previous elections. The open ballot system involves the electorates queuing up in front of the portrait of the candidate of their choice where they would be counted and the result announced instantaneously. Although the system was criticized as
"undemocratic," it was said to have been relatively successful in the local elections of December 1990. The second major factor was the "exorbitant" fee demanded by the political parties on gubernatorial aspirants. For example, it was reported that close to N5.6 million accrued from the National Republican Convention’s (NRC) 194 candidates who paid N25,000 each. The Social Democratic Party (SDP), on the other hand, garnered N2.3 million from its 223 contestants. Having doled out this much money, the actors were determined to reap the fruit of their robust investment in the political fray that ensued. Furthermore, there may have been the assumption that their control of power and the governor's mansion would provide the springboard from which to indulge in the politics of "prebendalism." This precipitates a third factor which was to win at all cost. Although Nigeria is not unique in the instrumentalities of this political game, the strategies and modalities are peculiarly Nigerian, as for instance, the contentious elections of 1979 and 1983.

The primaries supervised by the two parties were intended to elect candidates to vie for the December 14, gubernatorial election. From every indication, the political parties (SDP and NRC) made a series of faux pas -- mistaken steps that revived the angst of previous endeavors, and raised the question as to the preparedness of the civilians to accede to power.

The political climate was so murky that the NEC had to intervene. It canceled the results of the October 19, gubernatorial primaries and the subsequent November run-offs in nine of the thirty states. It also disqualified 12 controversial candidates and demanded other primaries in the areas affected by December 3, 1991.

The rationale for the NEC actions rested on the following charges: a. Non-availability of membership lists in many voting centers; b. The failure in accreditation as stipulated in the guidelines and as jointly agreed upon by the parties and NEC; c. The use of fake membership lists rather than the list submitted to the commission; d. Arbitrary and unauthorized change of venues contrary to the provisions of approved guidelines; e. Blatant corruption and inducement of voters; f. Falsification and alteration of results; and g. Refusal to give copies of results to NEC.

The outcome of this polling exercise was indeed ominous in that those who instigated, and carried out this wanton practice of rigging and other malpractices were the "newbreed" politicians. Ironically, they were expected to belong to a special breed of politicians unseised by the evils of the corrupt politics of "antiquities." Very few, if any, really considered these actors to be political virgins. And here lies one of the paradoxes of the transition process.

And if corruption has become endemic and not eradicable, one could construe from this behavior pattern that Nigerian politicians may be suffering from what
Zaki Ergas termed “pathological patrimonialism.” Human fallibility and occasional political anomalies aside, could it be contended that these problems emanate from the short history of partisan democratic practice in Nigeria since independence? Does the polity need the military to serve as a watchdog and to “diaper” the nation’s democracy into maturity?

Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, has argued for a diarchy - i.e., a government made up of civilians and the soldiers as a strategy for avoiding political instability in the country. President Babangida, in his opening remarks to the annual conference of military chiefs on December 9, 1991, issued a “subliminal” message, when he asserted that: “any future political authority to which the military is expected to play a subordinate role must itself be democratic in every sense of the word. ....It is for this reason that there should be no communication gap between our politicians and the military.”

That notwithstanding, following the political imbroglio of the October elections, the NEC not only undertook the onerous task of supervising the run-offs, but also took charge of December 14, 1992 states’ executive and legislative elections. It was assumed that the NEC did a relatively adequate job, albeit, with the colossal might and support of military decrees. The outcome of the turbulent gubernatorial election was 16 governorships for the NRC and 14 for the SDP. In the legislative branch, the SDP garnered more seats than did the NRC in the 30 states. No matter how one viewed the result, it was reasonable to contend that the outcome represented a political equilibrium, which one could further argue provided an overall sense of legitimacy. In other words, the result represented a variable-sum-game of some sort since it was not extremely lopsided. The breakdown of the result is represented in Table 1.

But the political tussle did not culminate here. The parties construed their control of the governor’s mansion as a likely springboard from which to capture the presidency—the crown jewel of the political process.

The Presidential Election

The presidential primaries, staggered within the 30 states, were scheduled from August 1, through September 5, 1992. Twelve contestants vied to become the flag bearer of the SDP, and eight participated in the political fray to produce a leader for the NRC. To be eligible to compete within the SDP, a candidate would have to pay a nomination fee of N500,000 (approx. $25,000) and N400,000 (approx. $20,000) for the NRC. Whereas this kind of fee may have been instituted to prevent a mob of candidates from seeking their party’s nomination, it was clear that this stipulation made it possible for only the wealthy and not necessarily the most qualified to participate. Indeed, few aspirants would like to lose their “investment” and
prestige in this struggle for power. This attitude may have accounted for the stultifying political development at the polls.

The massive rigging and debauchery that accompanied the August primaries almost derailed the entire electoral process. Indeed, in the words of Karl Maier, what the Nigerian witnessed was the politics of “moneytocracy” in which “money, fertilizers and even salt, rather than ideology or campaign platform became the big vote getters.”

Following the failure of the August 1, 1992 primaries, the NEC rescheduled primaries for September 5, 19, and 22 respectively. The vexing issue in Nigerian politics is the manner in which the political game is played, and the high premium placed on winning. Rigging aside, many false steps were said to have been made, and there was enough blame to go around. The issue was clear. Nigerians were only treating the symptoms of the problem and not the actual problem itself — i.e., playing according to the rules.

The rescheduled elections of September 5, 1992, which was claimed to have been velvety, produced two front runners, namely, Olu Falae for the SDP, and Adamu Ciroma for the NRC. It was, however, predicted that the second round of primaries which was to take place in Anambra, Katsina, Lagos, Bauchi, Benue, Akwa Ibom, Kaduna, Oyo, Rivers and Yobe, was more likely to favor Shehu Musa Yar’Adua over his SDP rival Falae. In the NRC, it would be a neck-and-neck battle between Adamu Ciroma and Umaru Shinkafi.

In what was alleged (in spite of the prediction) to be the most controversial election in Nigerian political history, Shehu Musa Yar’Adua emerged the winner of the SDP. He polled about 1,326,294 votes while his rival Olu Falae polled 942,278 votes. This placed him ahead of Olu Falae in the two contests within the SDP.

For the NEC and the AFRC, in particular, this latest blatant malpractice was the coup de grace. The discrepancy created by the political arithmetic in which party stalwarts manipulated the results in favor of one candidate over the other was troubling, but not anomalous to Nigerian politics. And this was particularly disturbing given the watchful eyes of the military (with its power) as the “safety valve.” If there was any lesson to be learned from this discordant development, it was that the road toward democracy in Nigeria was more tortuous than may have been earlier conceived.

While assuring the nation that the transition to democratic governance was still on course, the AFRC let it be known that its patience had petaed out with the flagrant way the parties conducted the second round of primaries. Reacting to the egregious political malpractices Babangida told the nation that: “The raison d’etre of the administration’s transition to civil rule program initiated in 1986...is that
Nigerians should make a clean break from the unmediating history of political brinkmanship that had been her unfortunate lot hitherto...indeed it can be said that the history of the past seven years had been of an epic battle waged relentlessly by the forces of change against the cliques and cabals that profited immensely from the retrogressive politics which we seek to supplant.\(^{48}\)

The politics of the First and Second Republics were marred by identical behavior patterns. The electoral fraud was particularly baffling given the painstaking and incremental approach taken by the AFRC to avert this endemic problem and thus usher in an orderly change to civilian rule. In light of these developments, however, could it be argued that the quest for a successful democratic governance in Nigeria has attained an unreachable apogee? And if so, why?

**Conclusion**

It may be foolhardy to endeavor to develop a probabilistic theory of political instability in Nigeria as Celestine Bassey has contended.\(^{49}\) This was because of the intricacy and unpredictability of the republic's politics. Despite that, however, Samuel Huntington has argued that for political order and stability to be established in any polity "the creation of political institutions involving and reflecting the moral consensus, mutual interest, principle, tradition, myth, purpose, or code of behavior is a sine qua non."\(^{50}\) He further explained Nigeria's and the emerging nations' political difficulties and instabilities within the context of institutional theory. In brief, Huntington affirmed that the ubiquitousness of violence, irregularities, and hence political instability in modernizing societies (such as Nigeria) was due in part to the "rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions."\(^{51}\) Put another way, "social forces were strong, political institutions weak."\(^{52}\) Admittedly, Nigeria's political institutions have not had longevity which would have allowed political actors to adjust through trials and errors to the institutional mechanism and dynamism. Further, the "appearance" of the overzealous newbreed politicians schooled in the politics of the previous republics seemed to have brought pressure to bear on the system because of conflicting interpretations of the modus operandi of the inchoate institutions. Thus, the debilitating effect caused by the manipulation of the institutions in the actors' attempts of promoting their parochial interests may have resulted in the existing political problem and instability.

B. J. Dudley probably epitomized one of the fundamental causes of instability in Nigeria in his game theoretical framework. He contended that the issue of instability was attributable to constitutional impropriety of the elite. He argued persuasively that "stability can only be maintained if the behavior of
leadership and political actors is consistent with the rules of the game or if the boundaries determining rules are respected. When Baba Gana Kingibe (chairman of SDP) and Tom Ikimi (NRC chairperson) did not conduct their party's presidential primaries within the rules of the game, the result was instability and national angst. This led to the dissolution of the party leadership by the NEC and AFRC and the substitution of these leaders with caretaker committees for both parties.

Arguably, the political unsteadiness in Nigeria should not be linked to the lack of adequate institutions alone, or in the words of Huntington, weak institutions. The instability in the country tends to be related to the inability and indeed, conscious strategy by the political actors not to play by the rules of the game, because of the belief that if they did, they might be on the losing end. This was so because the political parties did not trust each other to play according to the established rules. This view is buttressed by Claude Ake's insightful analysis of the politics in new states when he affirmed that, "political instability [in Nigeria] is explicable in terms of the high propensity among political elites to invest in the goal of controlling or capturing the reigns of government." In such a political milieu, they adhered to the Machiavellian metaphor, "the end justifies the means," in their quest for political power. The strategy, therefore, was to exploit some of those factors that have become somewhat "atavistic" in Nigerian politics. Thus, they have applied rigging, monetocracy, and other forms of malpractices within their political repertoire to vie for and control government and power. Regardless of political engineering, the ultimate survival of the Third Republic may depend on the willingness of the political parties and elites (military and civilians) to play according to the principles they have established for political competition. In particular, they must adhere to Dudley's game theoretical framework, and demonstrate their belief in constitutional supremacy.

Endnotes

1. This paper is an abridged version of a chapter in a forthcoming book on, Nigeria: The Politics of Survival. The author wishes to thank the following for their constructive suggestions to the original work: Professors: A. Lockyer (FMU), B. Odunsi (Jackson State University) and D. Williams (Western New England College).


12. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
13. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
46. Ibid, p. 1604.
49. Bassey, op. cit., p. 98.
51. Ibid., p. 4.
52. Ibid., p. 11.
55. In 1989, this author was with a high school classmate in Sapele (Bendel, but now Delta state of Nigeria). He was a NPN political stalwart who in a conversation told the author that NPN rigged the election in Bendel state. He insisted, though, that NPN rigged the 1983 election because it was clear to the party that if it did not, the UPN would, and they were not ready to take chances.
Table 1
Party Control of State Governor, State Assembly and Federal Senate and House of Representatives, based on majority votes and seats 1990-1992.

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*In Katsina, Abu Ibrahim (NRC) won Funtua District, and Iro Sannah (SDP) won Katsina District. The third result was unavailable at the time of writing (probably due to litigation).