THE WILL TO LOVE: INTRINSIC DIALOGISM AND
THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN MOTIVATION

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For us.

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ABSTRACT

THE WILL TO LOVE: INTRINSIC DIALOGISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN
MOTIVATION

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This work analyzes the ways in which humans, both individually and *en masse*, shape and are

shaped by discourse and social exchange. Additionally, this work examines the systemic means

of social organization and structuralized power inherent in human existence and ways in which

these structures influence human motivation. Although the source(s) of motivation in the entire

social collective of humans *qua* humans is the subject of this work, the majority of source

material derives from concentrated social contexts that serve as microcosms of human existence.

Both the American prison system and university system provide extremely befitting

representations of human existence and interaction within a manageably sized social

environment for the purpose of examining a highly organized social system of power, the

structural division of individuals, the development of human identity (within a power structure),

the various forms of interpersonal relationships, instances of high emotional and psychological

stress, and the role of language within each aforementioned area. The author addresses

contemporary thanatological and psychological notions of joy and meaning making in human life

and offers a nuanced, rhetorically grounded theory of human consciousness and intrinsically

dialogical motivation. *Intradialogism*, as the author suggests, understands humans as an

authentically social species wholly reliant upon dialogical processes and emphasizes the innate

human desire to experience new experiences regardless of any inhibiting means of systemic or organizational control. The author rejects current theoretical models of human life as an extrinsically motivated activity and cites social constructivist theoretical framework such as Mikhail Bakhtin's *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* and Hannah Arendt's *Human Condition* to support the aforementioned intradialogical theory of human existence. Ultimately, the author suggests the intrinsic joy found in discourse and social experience is *love*—love is the primary, authentic motivation according to an intradialogical theory of human existence.

INTRODUCTION

> *I wish I could have slipped surreptitiously into this discourse . . . rather than have to begin it myself. I should have preferred to become aware that a nameless voice was already speaking long before me . . . . Thus there would be no beginning.*
> — *Michel Foucault*

Indeed, beginnings are impossibly paralyzing. In fact, the "materialization" of an "original" utterance, from a rhetorical standpoint, seems paradoxically impossible, noting Mikhail Bakhtin's suggestion that *every* utterance, regardless of length or author, "*is only a moment in the continuous process of verbal communication*," which is itself only a fragment in the never-ending chain of human dialogue (*Marxism* 1221; emphasis in orig.).[1] More importantly, our sense of "'creative individuality' is nothing but the expression of a particular person's basic, firmly grounded, and consistent line of social orientation [or interaction]" (1220). The speech we consider "unique," Bakhtin notes, is essentially a "process of *assimilation*—more or less creative—of others' words . . . [and] all our utterances (including creative works), [are] filled with others' words" (*Problem* 89; emphasis in orig.). This is, of course, Bakhtin's dialogism: a heteroglossic philosophy of language as "*another's speech in another's language*" (*Dialogic* 324; emphasis in orig.). Although I have indeed initiated this moment of *written* utterance unaccompanied by the physical presence of another's voice, the actual discourse in which this transitory utterance exists began over a year ago and involves an array of voices in addition to my own. The thoughts and phrases in the following pages are simply a dialogical assimilation of countless written and verbal interactions in my current social context; thus, this work is the work of many—a multiplicity of voices—as knowledge cannot originate in isolation or without discourse. Accordingly, this work—a mere moment within the continuous dialogue of

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[1] *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* was originally attributed to V. N. Voloshinov; see Bizzell and Herzberg 1206.

my existence—will begin with the words of another, an utterance that remains vivid in my memory. Albeit the most salient in *my* perspective, I cannot rightly suggest my choice to begin with this utterance marks the *true* beginning of this discourse, as we may find retrospective traces of *beginnings* throughout our lived experience and beyond our existence entirely. However, in my current state of reflective thought, I find clarity in opening this document with the following experience.

During the second semester of my graduate studies, I received a comment from a professor whom I greatly respected and admired: *If you cannot do a better job of evaluating the claims & evidence of scholars, I worry very much about your readiness to teach those skills to students*. After reading this criticism of my work (an essay that admittedly was indeed poorly written), neither the subsequent discussion in the professor's office nor the offer to submit a revision could alleviate my catastrophic sense of failure, both as an academic and as an aspirant teacher of academics. I could only see the situation in absolutes—all or nothing, control or subjection, life or death—and I felt as though my career had been taken from me before it had even begun. Although I was able to revise and resubmit my work, the event's exposure of prior personal missteps and a subsequent series of negative interactions solidified my inability to repair the relationship this professor and I had built together. In other words, my essay (a *product* of discourse) was replaceable, but our dialogical relationship (the *process* of discourse) had ended.[2] After months of retrospective obsession and self-inflicted psychological torment, sleepless nights and second-guessing prose, I realized I could not erase what had happened and if I did not allow myself to grow from it, it would destroy me. The entirety of this document *is* that

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[2] I use the term "dialogical relationship" to identify a form of partnership between individuals in which intimate discourse is central to the pair-bonding process.

growth. I am not simply the hand of this document's composition but one of the many subjects of its analysis as well. Ultimately, the text itself, this utterance, is its own topic.

To both clarify my use of personal experience and further develop the Bakhtinian approach in this work, I must note that I am not assuming an "I-experience" ideological structure nor an entirely "we-experience" structure, but rather the "individualistic *self-experience*" social structure (*Marxism* 1216-17; emphasis in orig.).[3] Unlike the "I-experience," Bakhtin explains, *self-experience*, or "Individualism," is an "ideological form of the 'we-experience'" insofar as it acknowledges that one's "individual personality is just as social a structure as the collective [experience]" (1217). Although the source(s) of motivation in the entire social collective of humans *qua* humans is the subject of the forthcoming analysis, the majority of my source material derives from concentrated social contexts that serve as microcosms of human existence. Attempting to address the immeasurable amount of social potentialities within the human realm of existence is not only unwise (if not impossible) but, in fact, unnecessary. Both the American prison system and university system provide extremely befitting representations of human existence and interaction within a manageably sized social environment for the purpose of examining a highly organized social system of power, the structural division of individuals, the development of human identity (within a power structure), the various forms of interpersonal relationships, instances of high emotional and psychological stress, and the role of language within each aforementioned area. As I will discuss in greater detail throughout this work, humans, regardless of social context, exist in structuralized systems of power and control, most of which we do not consciously register as forces of movement. The systems of organization in the academy and the prison, however, are more visible and, though extreme, serve as

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[3] For further explanation of Bakhtin's forms of ideological experiences, see *Marxism* 1216-18.

representations of those we cannot immediately identify. Therefore, I will examine human interpersonal experience and existence in both the academy and the prison system to further understand how we find motivation and meaning in our systemically organized lives.

Symbolic of the large-scale social division of humans by race, class, gender, nationality, etc., the structural separateness of the university, for example, divides "academics" into a multiplicity of specialized disciplines—each forming a unique language within its distinct discursive formation—and thus destabilizes the "collective" ideology. However, these disciplines are still social microstructures driven by discourse and comprised of socially constructed individuals. Experiential commonalities among academics do, in fact, exist—most notably during graduate-level studies and the early (pre-tenure) years of teaching. Moreover, these shared experiences often involve emotional states and interpersonal relationships rather than education and scholarship.[4] Seemingly, my own aforementioned experience was indeed far from an anomaly. According to Page Smith, a former professor at the University of California Santa Cruz, "Everyone who has spent any time in the academic world has a veritable anthology of horror stories" (116). The detailed accounts of both graduate student and faculty experiences Charlotte Bloch provides throughout her 2012 study of social relations in the university illustrate Smith's validity and illustrate precisely how psychologically and emotionally charged the profession can become: "Self-esteem, belief and trust are not only dependent on the activity of doing research, but also on the comments and assessments of the PhD fellow's project offered by supervisors and other members of staff" (19). For example, one of Bloch's interviewees, a PhD student, explains, "I've also been informed in writing: 'You do not have what it takes, but you're

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[4] Admittedly, this is a rather sweeping generalization (of course individuals share similar academic struggles), but the disproportionate ratio nevertheless illustrates that the primary commonality among academics is not intellectually specific but rather a social aspect shared (to varying degrees) by all humans.

welcome to surprise me.' I felt just so . . . just so helpless . . . . When someone else has power

over you, that's when you feel really helpless, isn't it?" (qtd. in Bloch 22). In this situation,

similar to others both within and beyond the academic context, Bloch finds that "displays of

power provoke fear and anxiety, while behavior that is perceived as denigrating one's status

triggers hopelessness and depressive feelings" (21). However, the power dynamic in intimate

relationships becomes increasingly complex, as "emotions are not so much evoked by the

personalities of individuals as by the character of particular social structures and social relations"

(1). The power in a social interaction, its resonating effect, lies not in the hands of one or both

individuals involved but in the social context of the interaction itself (the process).

Only in retrospect has my vision cleared to recognize the actual source of grief following

my own aforementioned conflict: the loss of a dialogical relationship, the death of a discourse. A

poor grade is indeed microscopic in relation to losing the respect of a mentor, a colleague, a

friend, and a discourse partner insofar as discourse (or the ability to engage in a complex system

of linguistic communication) is perhaps the most significant distinction between modern humans,

Homo sapiens sapiens,[5] and all other species of living organisms. Consequently, to be cast from

one's immediate discourse community (regardless of size or access to others) is to be removed

from the social intercourse that defines one as *human*.

In the following pages, I will examine the role of dialogical interaction within human

existence and the unique relationship(s) we have with our environment, our social circles, our

generative productions, and with our discourse itself to further understand human life as an

attempt to experience the new in the face of overwhelming structuralized social organization, to

control the uncontrollable, and to find clarity in chaos. Because this analysis requires the

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[5] Genealogists now distinguish anatomically modern humans as a separate subspecies of *Homo sapiens* with an additional "*sapiens;*" see "Homo sapiens."

examination of both language and human experience/interaction, I will adopt an interdisciplinary theoretical model of analysis, a model in which the rhetorical study of language and the thanatological study of human life and death inform each other, and when applied to the sociological and psychological study of human interaction, reveal the rhetorical framework of discourse as it applies to human motivation. By analyzing the academic and correctional social environments and moments in human life beyond the aforementioned structures' contextual walls, my work will reveal the ways in which our dialogical interactions shape and are shaped by the systems of organization in which we exist; however, I will also illustrate how this systemic aspect of our existence cannot entirely dictate *who* and *what* we are as humans *qua* humans— that our systemic means of organization is, in fact, a reaction to elements of life beyond the scope of human control.

CHAPTER ONE – CONFLICT: THE DEATH OF A DISCOURSE,
DENIAL OF IDENTITY, AND SOCIAL SEPARATION

> *He was angry, disappointed and upset by the assessment committee's recommendation . . . . In the end, he declared that he would not speak one more word to me again in his life. Since then—and that was years ago—he has looked right through me whenever we met, and we have never said hello to each other.*
> — *Associate Professor*[6]

According to Bloch, situations such as the epigraph above emphasize "the strong feelings of anger, disappointment and irreconcilable hatred that can arise when colleagues evaluate, criticize and assess each other's work" (1); however, the retaliatory action this professor's colleague (the assessed individual) chooses reveals far more about the academic community's complex value system. This individual, having faced rejection by a committee of his fellow faculty, the gravity of which is contingent upon the subject of denial (a grant vs. tenure appointment), does not react with a violent outburst, cursing the committee members and the wretched institution he may perceive as *clearly* undeserving of his contributions, nor does he announce his resignation (though this may, in fact, have been the committee's recommendation) and eviscerate his presentation portfolio/notes while exiting the room. Though hyperbolic (to an extent), these hypothetical reactions to rejection, particularly in the face of those whom we consider collegial partners or for whom we have great admiration, are far from abnormal in the behavior of humans *qua* humans. In situations of extreme rejection, humans tend to feel backed into a metaphorical "corner," a position in which we often surrender logic and reason to instinctual (usually emotional) impulses in decision-making; when the consciousness feels powerless, the subconscious takes control.

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[6] Quoted in Bloch, 1, 64, and 103.

Although this epigraph depicts an individual maintaining professional composure following his subjection to the power of others, the single reaction we *do* see is still indicative of the visceral *fight-or-flight* reaction to conflict: the immediate move to violence or escape in response to danger (whether actual or perceived).[7] We might initially consider this reaction as *flight*; however, if we understand this particular action (the denial of discourse) as wholly determined by the speaker's socially constructed consciousness, we might find this retaliation an act of *social* violence—that is, human consciousness, according to Bakhtin, contains no preexisting substance and only becomes a consciousness "once it has been filled with ideological (semiotic) content, consequently, *only in the process of social interaction*" (*Marxism* 1212; emphasis added). Ideologies, in the form of signs, create and give meaning to the reality in which we exist, yet ideological signs are exclusively a social phenomena (1210-11), which suggests that the language we use, how we use it, and its meaning are dependent upon both our social environment and our interactions with other members of this specific social context. Since the meaning of these ideological signs *only* materializes in the dialogical interaction between individuals of the *same* social organization (1212), our speaker's promise to "not speak one more word to [the committee member] ever again" (qtd. in Bloch 1)[8] is indeed a conscious and meaningful act of symbolic violence, as both members of the exchange exist within an "academic" social organization and within the realm of human affairs.

The promise of permanent silence toward an individual, the denial of any further discourse, is an act of symbolic violence among humans within the academic social structure as well as humans in general insofar as "there is no knowledge without a particular discursive

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[7] For additional discussion on adaptive stress response, see Cannon 2-17 and Weems 113-20.
[8] Considering readability, all consecutive parenthetical citations of testimonial dialogue from Bloch's case study will be hereafter abbreviated as (qtd. page number), given appropriate in-text reference to Bloch.

practice, and any discursive practice may be defined by the knowledge that it forms" (Foucault, *Archaeology* 183). Paying particular attention to the word *forms*, we find that Foucault suggests we should understand discourse between humans as the means of producing ("forming"), and thus attaining, knowledge. By viewing discourse through Foucault's *will to know*—specifically, understanding discourse as the *creation* of knowledge rather than the *exchange* of preexisting meaning—we begin to recognize and appreciate the enigmatic role of discourse and mutual dialogic relationships in human social structures.[9] Further underscoring the fundamental necessity of dialogical meaning-creation, Bakhtin suggests, "If we deprive consciousness of its symbolic, ideological content, it would have absolutely nothing left" (*Marxism* 1213). In the complete social isolation of *nothingness*, the human consciousness is without the material required to actually *be* conscious; the mind and soul wither in starvation. Indeed, we should view the impossibility of all future discourse as a symbolic *death*: "A life without speech and without action," Hannah Arendt affirms, "is literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men" (176). Certainly, the aforementioned academic conflict and its consequential taciturnity between two particular humans do not signify the death of these individuals, as both remain free to participate in discourse (speech and action) with other humans; however, we should understand the promise of silence as a death of the *unique discourse* that existed between these two scholars, a matchless dialogical experience only located between these two specific humans. Any knowledge or semiotic content generated in discourse is wholly dependent upon the inimitability of the discourse from which it emerges—that is, unique humans engaging in unique discourse reveal unique knowledge. It follows then, if one is denied

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[9] For further discussion of Foucault's "will to know" and "will to truth," see *Order* 1462-63 and *History Vol. 1* 93-102.

access to another's unique speech, this particular discourse ceases to exist, along with any

possible knowledge awakened in its dialogical process.

On Isolation: Imprisonment and the Value of Social Exchange

Can discourse be as necessary to human life to warrant Arendt's assertion that a life

without speech and action is no longer a human life? Can the denial of discourse, in fact, be an

act of *punishment*? We need not look further than our own legal system of penance to examine a

life without speech or action and determine the human value of discourse and social interaction.

The American penal system relies almost exclusively on *imprisonment* as its primary means of

criminal punishment, second only to formal execution: the death penalty. However,

imprisonment (or incarceration) as a relatively universal means of punishment—that is, as the

primary penalty in response to a sweeping variety of significantly distinct offenses—is unique to

modern penal systems. During the early-modern reformative system of civic punishment, "the art

of punishing," according to Foucault, was considered "an art of conflicting energies, an art of

images linked by association, the forging of stable connections that defy time: it is a matter of

establishing the representation of pairs of opposing values, of establishing quantitative

differences between the opposing forces" (*Discipline* 104). In this system, a punishment must

signify its corresponding offense. In ideal practice, the signifying link between these binary

forces would solidify, permanently associating offense to penalty and penalty to offense,

regardless of orientation. The very thought of committing the offense would, therefore, evoke a

natural fear of the punishment and render an individual incapable of malicious transgression.[10]

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[10] This logic is not unlike the psychological conditioning illustrated in Anthony Burgess' 1962
novella *A Clockwork Orange*, in which the young, *ultra-violen*t Alex is repeatedly given nausea-

Although the reformative penal system was, perhaps, an attempt to civilize the actual form(s) of punishment in contradistinction to the public displays of torture and execution in antiquity, the fundamental logic of punishment-as-symbolic-of-crime can be traced to the laws of conduct set forth by the Babylonian king Hammurabi around 1754 BCE.[11] Nearly two-thousand years prior to Le Peletier's reformative penal legislation, "he who has used violence in his crime must be subjected to physical pain; he who has been lazy must be sentenced to hard labour; he who has acted despicably will be subjected to infamy" (qtd. in Foucault, *Discipline* 105), Hammurabi decrees, "If a son has struck his father, his hands shall be cut off. / If a man has destroyed the eye of a free man, his own eye shall be destroyed" (61; Laws 195 and 196). Perhaps these two millennia of sustained disciplinary logic—action must have an equal signifying re-action—informed the common initial objection to imprisonment, "with its duration as the sole principle of variation," as a punishment "incapable of corresponding to the specificity of crimes" (Foucault, *Discipline* 114). Yet, as we know, imprisonment became the primary means of punishment, not only in the United States but internationally. How could the established logic and practice of civic punishment have changed, as Foucault asserts, so drastically from reformative to "corrective" punishment (126-28)?

Foucault denotes this shift from reformative to corrective as the departure from punishment-as-signified-offense toward a power to "the will to punish" as well as a disparity between the transparent and social "signs of punishment" to a coercive and secretive "exercise of punishment" (*Discipline* 130-31). However, while this shift from social to secretive punishment is indeed evident in our current penal system, I am still less certain of such a swift departure

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inducing drugs and forced to watch depictions of violence as rehabilitation until he ultimately becomes unable to encounter any form of conflict without experiencing crippling nausea.
[11] For the date range of Hammurabi's rule, see Richard Hooker's 1996 edition.

from the signifying model of punishment. Could this shift, in fact, illustrate a modern redefining of *offense* and the consequent reorganization of punishment itself? Imprisonment, by necessity of its form, is the forced removal of an individual from his or her social context—indeed, from society in general. To define this act as a "punishment," though, Foucault explains that it must 1) inflict pain or deny access to an essential happiness in order to provoke fear and prevent future transgression and 2) interminably remind the offender *and* the public of the offense through a transparent signification between the offense and the punishment (*Discipline* 104-5).

Assuming no divergence from legality (by guards or otherwise), incarceration in the American prison system, in design, does not inflict bodily pain upon an offender. Imprisonment is, however, the systematic removal of an individual from his or her citizenry and social relations: the denial of access to the social collective of humans *qua* humans. In fact, a prison sentence, aside from occasional service labor, is fundamentally defined by the enforcement of *inactivity*—that is, imprisonment attempts to strip a human of the ability to act autonomously, and as the human is a *relatively* autonomous creature capable of chaotic action,[12] the only possible means of doing so is to separate the human from all action *qua* action, to remove the human from civic humanity. Accordingly, the imprisoned human is confined to a singular space devoid of unrestricted social stimulation for a prescribed period of time. Imprisonment is ultimately an existence of *waiting*, of not-doing—of *nothingness*. Yet, how, as Foucault and the reformists assert, could this uniform punishment signify the vast array of offenses for which it is a sentence? To be sure, homicide is wholly distinguishable from larceny, which is itself distinguishable from rape. All three acts, however, share a single commonality in that they are all

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[12] I am aware of the tremendous contradictive danger in using the term "autonomous" here, but to clarify, at present, a point of extreme importance to which I will return throughout this work, I understand the human as *autonomous* solely in our ability to act unpredictably in the bounds of ubiquitous social and systemic influence/limitation; see Arendt, 190-91.

social actions—that is, transgressions *by* a human and *against* a human. They are actions that exist *between* humans, all requiring by necessity an offender *and* an offended. The specificity of reformative punishment relied upon a distinctiveness in the offense; the variation in punishment was informed by the variation of offense. Similarly, the modern form of corrective punishment relies upon a distinct offense; the punishment is in effect uniform, but its duration is still informed by the variation of offense. We have not, therefore, departed from the acknowledgement of distinct offenses.

Perhaps the discrepancy manifests not in offender or offense, but in the consideration and redefinition of the *offended*. The modern system seems to treat all offended persons as one indistinguishable collective: society (or humanity). To be sure, any action containing two or more human identities is a social action (Arendt 188); therefore, to commit *any* malicious act is to offend not an individual but society as a whole. A proper punishment in signification of a social offense would be, in fact, a removal from the social collective. The enclosing concrete walls, razor wire, and private existence are a constant reminder of one's social separation just as the same walls and wire, in addition to the restricted knowledge of the inside, serve as a constant reminder to those *outside* the prison of the punishment. The shift from public sign to private punishment, then, is itself a social sign of punishment. While sentencing an offender to a town's wooden stocks, a punishment reminiscent of colonial America, is indeed a publicly transparent display, the offender fundamentally maintains his or her social membership insofar as public humiliation is a form of social action. An offender's complete social disappearance during imprisonment, however, is the severance of his or her connections to external society. If punishment aims to deny an offender that which they cherish most—a symbolic (or psychological) rather than physical torture—this shift suggests a further understanding of general

human desire. That is, our most cherished condition, considering the widespread use of imprisonment as a universal punishment, appears to be unrestricted access to social contact. We simply cannot deny the significance and sheer motivational force of societal membership, access to unrestricted discourse, and the will to interact if the denial of which is the *sole* form of punishment for the most inexcusable acts of human violence. If social excommunication and isolation are the signified consequences of both homicide and sexual violence, the taking of a human's life and the taking of a human's body, then social exchange is conversely equivalent, in our social value system, to the creation of life and preservation of body.

Although basic imprisonment certainly strips a human of his or her social citizenship and immediate relations, it is nonetheless not what we might consider true *isolation*. Indeed, the prison's lodging of exiled individuals within a singular environment is the formation of its own homogeneous society. Albeit unwelcome and uncomfortable, modern basic imprisonment allows varying degrees of human interaction. To clarify, we must understand "interaction" here as *any* social exchange between humans, both positive and negative. Acts of intimidation and brutality are fundamentally equal to acts of compassion and kindness insofar as these actions require multiple humans, and thus acknowledge a social connection in its most basic substance. Similar to societies beyond a prison's walls, the social system within a prison is regulated and controlled by a code of conduct and its own disciplinary penalties. We find *true* isolation here, in the punishment of the punished: solitary confinement.

Total isolation as the maximum form of in-prison punishment has existed since the birth of the prison itself (Foucault, *Discipline* 122). This "solitary confinement" form of punishment, according to Bruce Arrigo and Jennifer Bullock, has become widespread in the American prison

system through "the use of secure housing units (SHUs)" (622).[13] During the early nineteenth century, the Pennsylvania and Auburn prison systems developed in the United States, the Auburn system was "characterized by silent but congregate labor" and the Pennsylvania system "by the rigid isolation of prisoners both from society and from each other" (623). According to an 1890 U.S. Supreme Court hearing, the Pennsylvania system isolated an individual "from all human society . . . so arranged that he had no direct intercourse with or sight of any human being, and no employment or instruction" (*In re Medley* 168). Initially, one might perceive this means of punishment far more *humane* than the barbarous public tortures of antiquity, the only key component being the denial of social organization; yet, the Supreme Court noted that in this total isolation, "A considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to arouse them, and others became violently insane; others still, committed suicide" (*In re Medley* 168). In fact, the resultant psychological damage was so severe and widespread the Pennsylvania system was discontinued in 1871 (Kahan 109). Despite this early acknowledgement of the damaging effects of total isolation, the use of solitary confinement (as a means of *further* punishment rather than basic) emerged again within the U.S. prison system in 1963 and has since remained (Arrigo and Bullock 623-24).

According to Arrigo and Bullock, "prisoners in the SHU are housed in small cells (often 6 x 8 feet) with solid steel doors. Incarcerates are confined in this manner for 22 to 23 hours per day" with any remaining hours reserved for solitary showers or exercise (624-25). For the duration of an individual's holding in the SHU, he or she is "not permitted any contact visits"

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[13] Also denoted as: Special housing unit, supermaximum custody unit, administrative/disciplinary segregation, etc. See Arrigo and Bullock 622-24; and Judicial Administration 541.3.

and cannot possess any personal belongings or reading materials (625), both of which could serve as reminders of one's social existence external to the SHU and thus render the punishment a lesser means of organizational control. Further severing any remaining sense of social context, "SHUs lack windows, so incarcerates are not exposed to natural light" or sight of the environment from which they were removed (625). Arrigo and Bullock cite testimony from the 1995 class-action suit against California's Pelican Bay State Prison regarding the conditions of its SHUs, which depicted "rigid conditions of solitary confinement [that] offer[ed] individuals no opportunity to engage in social reality testing" (627). "Human beings," Arrigo and Bullock explain, "rely on social contact with others to test and validate their perceptions of the environment. Ultimately, a complete lack of social contact makes it difficult to distinguish what is real from what is not or what is external from what is internal" (627). The majority of individuals confined to these conditions inevitably develop irreversible forms of mental psychosis.

Considering the severe psychological ramifications of total isolation, we might assume our current penal system reserves its use for only the most extreme of internal offenses; however, the prison's internal social structure mirrors the external society's value system in defining *offender*, *offense*, and *offended*. In other words, if an offense to society results in imprisonment—the removal from society—any act deemed *offensive* to the organizational means of controlling the imprisoned society results in total isolation—the removal from humanity. Contemporary punishment—the most current refinement to the act of civic penalty—then, is simply the enforcement of gradational isolation—that is, each subsequent offense results in an offender's further removal from society and basic human contact. Nevertheless, to definitively understand isolation as a continued means of punishment-as-offense-signified, we must examine the

causative actions resulting in such a punishment. Title 28 – Judicial Administration of the U.S. Department of Justice's Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) divides offenses within the prison system into "four separate categories based on severity: Greatest; High; Moderate; and Low," each with a corresponding list of "available sanctions" (Judicial, sec. 541.3). Codes 105 and 106 under "Greatest Severity Level" offenses are "Rioting" and "Encouraging others to riot," and are punishable by "12 months" in "disciplinary segregation;" however, we must note that *rioting* is distinguished from code 212 of "High Severity Level" offenses: "Engaging in or encouraging a group demonstration," which is punishable by "six months" in the SHU (sec. 541.3). Further, code 315 of "Moderate Severity Level" offenses: "Participating in an unauthorized meeting or gathering" is punishable by "three months" of solitary isolation (sec. 541.3). Each of the aforementioned offenses share a common element: the forming of a social group, from a prison-wide riot, to a cell block hunger strike, to a gathering of only a few individuals.

Large-scale congregate defiance, however, is by no means the only social action punishable by total isolation. In fact, the CFR notes virtually any social act between two inmates or any unsupervised attempt to access external society as deserving of disciplinary segregation: "Engaging in sexual acts" or "Being in an unauthorized area with a person of the opposite sex" results in six months in the SHU; any "Unauthorized contacts with the public" or "Conducting [of] a business" earns three months; and finally, all "Unauthorized physical contact (e.g., kissing, embracing)," if observed twice within six months, results in one month of isolation to three months for any additional offense within the six-month period (sec. 541.3). Complete social isolation, then, is very much a punishment designed to signify a particular offense in its denial of that which the penal system deems prohibited: human connection. Moreover, the domination of an individual's social interaction is more than a mere means of organization; it is the removal of

human's inherent dialogical capability, an essential, defining quality of human existence. Dialogical interaction is to a human as aquatic maneuverability is to a dolphin or flight is to a hawk—that is, the severing of discourse equates to the severing of a fin or a wing.

On Education: Coda - Discourse and Identity in the University

Not unlike the prison system, the university system functions according to the structuralized exclusion and isolation of its own version of *prisoner*: the scholar. Paradoxically, the university *demands* production whereas the prison enforces strict nonproduction; however, both certainly exemplify an attempt to control and organize a human's means and use of discourse—to fabricate a *predictable* human. We must understand the *predictable* as that which exhibits a structuralized beginning and anticipated ending and exists wholly according to the successful completion of pre-mandated *requirements* and adherence to organizational *policies*. Additionally, most systems of predictability are certainly neither infallible nor absolute; however, we may understand these systems as a means of *limitation*, as directional force in a *series of moments* rather than a constant suppression. In fact, the only structuralized form of seemingly absolute human predictability is perhaps the prison system's aforementioned use of total solitary confinement, a point to which I will later return.

As illustrated in the preceding section, the prison system renders a human predictable by the *sentencing* of time—a beginning and determined ending—and the forced seclusion in a social enclave of restriction. Likewise, the academic profession functions according to the prescription of *time* and the division of humans (and discourse) into departmental enclaves. We may, for example, understand the required years of post-secondary education (four in Bachelor's work, two in Master's, and four to six or more in Doctoral) as an academic *sentence*: one cannot

proceed in this lifestyle/profession without serving the appropriate time. Further, an academic is subject to structural division during this sentence according to his or her departmental discipline, a division that indeed grants mastery of a hyper-specific body of knowledge, yet limits access to knowledge external to this body. This organizational control of knowledge, according to Foucault, dictates the control of discourse as well: "The discipline is a principle of control over the production of discourse. The discipline fixes limits for discourse by the action of an identity which takes the form of a permanent re-actuation of the rules" (*Order* 1467). That is, to spend an academic *sentence* devoted to the study of English is to develop a discursive identity fashioned by the Institution of English. Accordingly, one becomes a perceived *outsider* of other fields of study (the physical sciences for example) and cannot *speak* outside of his or her discipline.

This segregation, again all too similar to civic imprisonment, ultimately leads to social isolation in accordance to the university's production requirements of its faculty. University-employed academics *must* publish scholarship, first to attain tenure and keep one's position, but also to maintain and display appropriate academic status upon tenure review. Smith denotes this means of organization as "the publish-or-perish standard" (180). Although the formation of ideas and strategy (the pre-writing phase) is generally a social activity, the composition and organization of said discourses is, comparatively, a solitary activity. To be sure, a PhD fellow in Bloch's study asserts, "You're so isolated . . . you are wrapped up inside your own little cocoon, without a clue about what's going on out there" (qtd. 19). In addition to this individual's sense of isolation, we must note the dichotomous formation of *in here* and "out there" (qtd. 19). Although cement walls and razor wire do not surround the university, this academic nevertheless recognizes the very real division of access between *society* and *academe* and his or her own isolated position in this division. Another of Bloch's participants notes the largest difference he

perceives "between the labor market and academia . . . is that you spend so much time on your own [in the university], and that's why your ups and downs are more pronounced in both directions. Everything is just so much more uncertain" (qtd. 19). In other words, an academic career, according to this interviewee, is more solitary than other careers, and consequently, one becomes suspended in uncertainty. Without the dialogical acknowledgement of oneself (through another's response), one's own reality becomes unclear. This ensuing sense of uncertainty during prolonged solitary activity results from the same social *nothingness* we find in isolation and imprisonment. If devoid of immediate dialogical interaction with an external consciousness during the research and composition processes, the academic, indeed, becomes the prisoner, but a prisoner seemingly of one's own choosing; the systemic organization and imprisonment of the academy is simply far less opaque than that of the prison.

Even as I compose this section of this document, this very sentence, I too find myself unsettled by my current seclusion from the *outside*. My fiancé is currently visiting her family in Baltimore, and without her external interaction with my composition schedule, I have existed locked away from all things that may interfere with this document's completion by the allotted deadline. Upon momentary retrospect, I realize I have not stepped outside of my apartment or gazed at the sun for four days, and as I look around my writing area—the closed doors, the complete silence, the blackout curtains with every border fashioned to the wall (eliminating the window entirely), and the single illuminated lamp—I cannot help but recognize my own confinement in an *academic* Secure Housing Unit, a SHU of my own design and by necessity of producing this text *in time*. Indeed, I could simply quit on my own accord, but I could no longer exist in my current social structure nor could I engage in further dialogical interaction with my

current *academic* social circle. I must submit to the university's organizational regulations or face the death of every academic discourse in which I participate.

The social power structures within the university dictate an academic's every decision and action insofar as we cannot even define the university or its practices without employing, and in turn perpetuating, hierarchical and exclusionary language. For example, Bloch suggests "the structure, culture, and career ladder [of the organized university] can be seen as the tools of the organization, which serve to ensure not only outstanding research, but also the selection of the best candidates" (1). Yet Foucault asserts, "any system of education is a political way of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourses, along with the knowledges and powers which they carry" (*Order* 1469). Is an assessment committee of *humans* actually capable of *objectively* ensuring outstanding research? Moreover, *who*, in effect, determines the appropriate quantification of "outstanding"? Ultimately, as we know, each individual university system and its subordinate social structures maintain the power to define *good* scholarship: "Exchange and communication," after all, "are positive figures working inside complex systems of restriction, and probably would not be able to function independently of them" (*Order* 1468). Discourse, in all of its forms, is an individual's means to power within a given social institution, but it is equally the institution's means of controlling that power: the death of one's discourse marks the end of his or her social membership. Regardless of an individual's perceived motivation as an academic, the environment in which he or she must exist, according to this theoretical model, supersedes and alters both identity and action.

Offering particular attention to ways in which academics balance professional and personal life can provide a framework toward understanding the psychological effects of the university's system of power and discourse control. The average graduate student is within the

early adulthood stage of psychosocial development (Smith 116). According to Kenneth Doka, individuals in this stage of development are "consumed by a quest to establish identity" and are primarily concerned "with the external world—establishing intimate relationships, beginning a family, starting a career" (112). However, if "one's identity experiences psychological and social stress," the primacy of one's own mortality tends to emerge—that is, death becomes a foreseeable reality (112). Adopting a Bakhtinian approach, we should understand this notion of *identity* as synonymous with *individual consciousness*. Quoted above, Doka notes a young adult's "quest to *establish* identity" (112; emphasis added). This language positions identity as an *external* entity (thus the "quest"), which we internalize as "the self," and finally re-externalize as a socially organized individual consciousness regardless of career path or social context. The particular external identity we, as humans, inevitably internalize, then, is contingent upon the social organizations to which we have access or perhaps the social structure in which we are most immediately present.

Clearly, this formula of internalized externals by means of socialization echoes Bakhtin's philosophy of external social ideologies giving life to internal consciousness. Stress to one's identity is therefore stress to one's consciousness. Additionally, if forming one's identity is the primary concern during the early adult stage of development, academics in this stage (namely, graduate students) are vulnerable to what we might call an *identity crisis*. Once committed to a professorial career in academia, these individuals, to varying degrees, must relinquish their pre-institution identities to become the model of scholar the university demands. This is because "the individual consciousness," Bakhtin explains, "is nurtured on signs; it derives its growth from them; it reflects their logic and laws" (*Marxism* 1213). The academic social system is so incredibly wrought by restriction, prescription, expectation, and evaluation that the volume of

ideological signs one must consume in the creation of his or her social identity is daunting. Therefore, when young scholars, at a prime age for identity instability, enter the professional level of academia and experience an overwhelming lack of control and vulnerability to the structuralized power inequities inherent throughout the university, the potential developmental and psychological damage can be catastrophic.

Severe psychological stress and episodes of identity conflict have become implicit aspects of a career in academia. This psychological overload, according to Smith, "is so ingrained in our ways of thinking about higher education, that we consider it part of the natural order of the universe" (109). The majority of this stress seems to involve the demanding nature of the research and publication process and results in a form of occupational psychosis in which the academic's identity becomes synonymous with his or her scholarship. My usage of *occupational psychosis* follows Kenneth Burke's assertion that *psychosis* in this term is not "in the psychiatric sense" but "applies simply to a *pronounced character* of the mind" (49; emphasis in original). In other words, the academic social structure, through departmental division and discursive specialization, creates individuals that cannot distinguish *who* they are from *what* they are disciplined to research, teach, and further produce. For example, a participant in Bloch's study claims, "Research is an activity that involves the whole person" (qtd. 17). An entire discipline's body of knowledge could easily oversaturate one's consciousness, annexing any precious space once reserved for the "self." Dan McAdams and Regina Logan offer a similar example in their 2006 study of academic identity narratives: Professor "Laura Rubin" claims, "the line between my personal and professional life barely exists, if at all" (96). As early as graduate school, an academic's personal and professional life tends to be indistinguishable, as one of Bloch's participants admits, "For me, my project is quite simply a way of life. It is my

life, and I identify with it completely" (qtd. 17). Certainly, allotting an external project equal value as one's internal identity can be incredibly dangerous. To do so exposes one's internal consciousness to the devastating criticisms customary of assessing external productions in the increasingly competitive social milieu of the university.

Considering Bakhtin's notion that we give ourselves "verbal shape from another's point of view, ultimately from the point of view of the community to which . . . [we] belong" (*Marxism* 1215), the fusion of one's identity with one's work may result from the continuous assessment of one's scholarship. According to Smith, scholars argue "the results of research should be published . . . [because] the scrutiny of other scholars in the field is necessary to verify and improve the quality of knowledge" (180). For the developing academic, "Self-esteem, belief and trust are not only dependent on the activity of doing research, but also on the comments and assessments of the . . . [student's] project offered by supervisors and other members of staff" (Bloch 19). A doctoral student in Bloch's study, discussing her supervisor's comment that she did not "have what it takes" to complete her dissertation, explains, "You're enormously dependent on a person like that because he's such an authority, and I really wanted to hear his comments. I was at the point that every time I turned on my computer, I always thought, 'No, probably I don't have what it takes'" (qtd. 22). Senior faculty seem to have an extraordinary influence over a young academic's sense of self, an influence so powerful that a faculty member's opinion can disrupt a mentee's entire identity. This scrutiny and evaluation of an academic's scholarship is even further centralized during the tenure process, a system in which proving oneself is a permanent priority. Although academics may question this structure, they must ultimately adhere to its demands or no longer exist within its context. Before reaching this pivotal moment in one's career, Smith argues it is "difficult to imagine . . . the strain that this

barbarous system places on the psyches of the young men and women subjected to it" (116). The strain is largely a result of the sheer time these professors must spend in constant uncertainty. Smith explains:

> By the time they are considered ripe for tenure, they have spent some twelve to fifteen of the most important and formative years of their lives preparing for this moment (five or six, typically, in graduate school, six or seven in anticipation of tenure). What this does to their nerves, their families, their, as we like to say today, 'self-esteem' should be evident. They live for seven years in a state of suspended animation, not knowing whether they are to be turned out in disgrace by their friends and colleagues or retained. (116)

If, as Bakhtin suggests, "Individualistic confidence in oneself, one's sense of personal value, is drawn not from within, not from the depths of one's personality, but from the outside world" (*Marxism* 1217), what does it truly mean to have years of research rejected for publication or to be denied tenure by a committee of one's own colleagues? The denial of tenure (or *termination*) is the denial of an academic's identity and the death of further academic discourse: "I call these dreadful terminations ritual murders" (Smith 195).

CHAPTER TWO – PURPOSE: THE EXTRINSIC DELUSION
AND FINDING MEANING IN HUMAN EXISTENCE

I first published the novella A Clockwork Orange *in 1962, which ought to be far enough in the past for it to be erased from the world's literary memory. It refuses to be erased, however . . . . I should myself be glad to disown it for various reasons, but this is not permitted . . . . Life is, of course, terrible.*

— *Anthony Burgess*

By understanding an academic termination as the death of a scholar's discursive identity,

we are equating the end of a process to the end of one's life. Although hyperbolic, we cannot

ignore the fear we have of losing our sense of security, be it a career or a relationship. Generally,

we find comfort in controlling our state of being (the original purpose of tenure, for example),

and the loss of such control is the loss of safety. Vulnerability demands reaction, and the sense of

impending vulnerability incites precautionary action—pre-re-action. As conscious beings, we are

burdened with the knowledge that we will one day cease to live and are completely without

control of our own mortality. It follows then, if we are to pose a philosophy of human motivation

and attempt to decipher meaning in life, we must address the awareness of our own mortality,

our finiteness in both existence and every experience during said existence. To be sure, Jeffrey

Kauffman notes, "again and again we find that as mortality defines our very human

consciousness, it also dislocates consciousness, and prompts consciousness to go beyond itself"

("Blinkings" 76). Kauffman also suggests an expansion of thanatological focus in which the

"awareness of mortality is the light and the depth of thanatology [the study of human death]," a

philosophical thanatology ("Blinkings" 75). While death is an inevitable experience shared

among all living organisms, Galen Pletcher notes, "a chief difference from other animals is that

we alone are aware of our impending death" (72). If our species is, in fact, the only species

constantly aware of its own mortality, this awareness becomes another essential defining element of being *human*.

The sudden realization of one's own finiteness is often devastating, moving individuals to an overwhelming sense of hopelessness. Indeed, as Adrian Tomer suggests, "To contemplate my own death is to contemplate my not having a future" (91). Contemporary thanatological theorists, such as Kauffman and Pletcher, argue that "the 'fear of ceasing to be,' the fear of extinction," stems from an understanding of death as an "abrupt interruption of any plans, projects, etc." (91)—that is, an understanding of death as the premature ending of an *extrinsic*, rather than intrinsic, experience. To be sure, Pletcher explains, in activities we understand as "intrinsically good . . . some or perhaps all of the goodness of such activities lies within the activities themselves and our attitudes and experiences during them," whereas extrinsic activities are valued only by "the fruits of the activities" (64). Extrinsic activities, for example, are usually understood as detestable and only worth the effort if the goal is accomplished with visible results. In this sense, "The threat that death seems to pose to the meaning of life is very similar to the feeling we have when we discover that all of our effort toward some thoroughly unpleasant task was unnecessary" (65). In this extrinsic view of human life, Pletcher adds, we find meaning in life by the "adoption of projects," through which "we understand ourselves as working toward certain goals" (66). In an extrinsic existence, goodness and meaning hinge solely upon the completion of processes or the creation of products.

If we approach this conclusion from a rhetorical prospective, however, we find the proposition of a human life dependent solely upon extrinsic motivation highly problematic insofar as this philosophy reduces all human action and inter-action to mere means to an end and, in doing so, fails to consider the primacy of dialogical interaction—the process of discourse,

regardless of its production—in a socially organized human existence. Indeed, the role of discourse should be central to any thanatological philosophy concerning human consciousness. For example, if "mortality," as Kauffman suggests, is "the source of consciousness" and creates meaning in life ("Blinkings" 76), we must view dialogical interaction as synonymous (or of equal importance) to mortality because "consciousness takes shape and being in the material of signs created by an organized group in the process of its social intercourse" (Bakhtin, *Marxism* 1213). The significance of viewing consciousness as either deriving from self-awareness of mortality or from dialogical interaction materializes in the philosophical disparity of understanding humans as *individual* or *social* beings.

In the former perspective, consciousness and purpose can form in isolation since meaning derives extrinsically from an individual's completion of products. This extrinsic existence (or *will to produce*) is, in fact, similar to the desires of "*homo faber*," Arendt's personification of the human activity "work" (136; emphasis in orig.). Arendt explains, "The work of our hands . . . fabricates the sheer unending variety of things whose sum total constitutes the human artifice" (136). Humans can conduct the fabrication of products in complete isolation, as fabrication only requires one producer who uses natural material as a means to an end. In the latter perspective, however, consciousness and purpose can only manifest in the social exchange of action and speech *between* humans. Indeed, "Action, as distinguished from fabrication, is never possible in isolation; to be isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to act" (188). Meaning, then, derives from the fundamental condition of human plurality: that action and speech, to paraphrase Arendt, exist exclusively between humans (182). If meaning resides not in the productions of an individual but rather in the process of social exchange between humans, this social perspective ultimately suggests an *intrinsically* motivated existence.

Intrinsic and extrinsic are not as distinct as they may appear; in fact, the majority of human activities can be understood as both intrinsically and extrinsically good, depending on one's perspective. While any activity valued as extrinsically good *must* result in some form of product, those we value as intrinsically good may or may not result in a product. The key difference is in how we value the process and product: Is motivation internal or external to the action? For example, if one understands sexual intercourse as a pleasurable and intimate physical dialogue between humans regardless of successful procreation, the activity is intrinsic. Conversely, if one understands sexual intercourse solely as a means of reproduction—that is, viewing any sexual intercourse that does not result in pregnancy as a failed activity—the same activity becomes extrinsic. *Joy*, then, is the central variable in these equations: Is joy intrinsically located in the process or extrinsically in the product?

Pletcher insists that "if life were conceived of as intrinsically valuable, then we would expect that the knowledge of one's death would have an effect similar to what occurs when an intrinsically valuable experience of some other kind is found to have no extrinsic value" (65). However, considering the framing of intrinsic vs. extrinsic activities above, we must find Pletcher's assertion problematic insofar as its logic automatically imposes an extrinsic value system upon human life. Pletcher's argument assumes that the despair we experience at the end of our lives *must* be the resultant effect of finding "no extrinsic value" in life (65). This assumption fails to consider the possibility of despair following the ending of an intrinsic activity. If *life* is the activity in question and death is the forced ending of said activity, perhaps the despair we experience is *not* evoked by a lack of extrinsic productions but rather by an uncontrollable ending of a process in which we find joy. Certainly, if joy is internal to intrinsic activities, it is *not* external to the activity: that is, since pleasure and meaning are wholly reliant

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upon—and exist only during—the *process*, the ending of a process is the ending of its joy. A single moment without process is the absence of joy. Consider a massage for example. Even if a massage results in the relief of tension in one's back long after the activity has ended (an extrinsic product), the central *joy* of a massage is internal to the activity—it is the experience itself. Therefore, if something beyond our control caused the sudden ending of this activity, we would feel disappointment in the loss of *experiencing* joy. Indeed, we might all feel somewhat saddened by the ending of an intrinsically good activity: the last song of a musical concert, the last corner piece of a warm brownie, the last hour in bed before the day begins. Although there are indeed extrinsic values to nourishment or rest in maintaining the body's health, by valuing these moments (the brownie, the last hour) by their intrinsic joy, we allocate them to the realm of indulgence.[14] If we understand life as the ultimate intrinsic activity encompassing all other temporal activities, both intrinsic and extrinsic, then joy exists in simply living, in experiencing experience. Consequently, the end of one's life is the end of experience, which, in turn, is the end of *joy*; if death, then, is the ultimate, uncontrollable ending of *all* experiential and indulgent joy, of life's intrinsic goodness, would we not feel despair? It is the inescapable *ending* of all corporeal processes—not the lack of finalized products—that death presents to human existence.

On Production: Generativity and the Unreliable Artifice

Although my purpose in this work is the proposal and development of a socially intrinsic philosophy of life—an innate desire to dialogically interact with one another—I do not reject the will to produce as a specific motivating force but understand it as a psychological response to

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[14] For lack of a better word with a less negative connotation, I use "indulgence," here, to simply denote a seemingly extrinsic activity (eating or sleeping) that we more commonly value by its intrinsic goodness, a self-pleasure.

human finiteness rather than a universally inherent means of desire and motivation in the lives of humans *qua* humans. In other words, while the will to produce is an undeniable reality within the human realm of existence, it is a *reaction* to human experience, an after-thought. Dialogical interaction precedes the will to produce insofar as the will to produce exists as a coping mechanism in response to the inevitable end of the intrinsic joy we experience through the *process* of social interaction—that is, awareness of our mortality is simply the realization that our ability to experience actual experience is finite and wholly dependent upon our existence as dialogically capable beings. Confronted by the finiteness of experience, humans, like all animals in fear, react. How might one prepare for a natural disaster? The doomsday anticipator stocks emergency supplies. Comparably, once we realize that we will one day cease to exist, we may become compelled to preserve ourselves by any means necessary; thus, the reactionary will to produce.

Developmental psychologist Erik Erikson identified this psychological phenomenon to modern scientific theory in 1950, terming it "generativity" and defining it as "primarily the concern in establishing and guiding the next generation" (*Childhood* 267). According to John Kotre, "Erikson was speaking of physical procreation, but he meant more, much more" (1). For example, Erikson argues although "the concept of generativity is meant to include such more popular synonyms as *productivity* and *creativity*," these individual terms cannot reflexively define generativity (*Childhood* 267; emphasis in orig.). In other words, while these terms may explain the *means* of reproducing and preserving one's own genes or ideas (two different processes with different materials), *generativity* functions as an all-encompassing motivation, "seeking biological as well as cultural outlets" (Kotre 10). According to Robert Lifton, generativity manifests both *biologically* and *creatively* (276). The biological form, the most

transparent and rudimentary method of posthumous self-preservation, is "the sense of living on *through* and *in* one's sons and daughters and their sons and daughters" (276; emphasis in orig.). Similarly, the creative form, concerning our "work," strives for the same reproductive result, but through "the achievement of enduring human impact; the sense that one's writing, one's teaching, one's human influences, great or humble, will live on; that one's contribution will not die" (276). Both of these methods, though distinct, are nevertheless extrinsically motivated means of production—the former relying upon producing a child, the latter upon an aspect of the human artifice; therefore, we might understand both as exemplary of the extrinsic will to produce.

Generativity marks the seventh stage in Erikson's eight stages of human psychological development, which denote specific age ranges in human life, meaning generativity occurs in "middle adulthood" (Kotre 7). However, contemporary developmental psychological theorists, such as Kotre, find that the "concerns of a particular stage" are simply not consistent enough within any structured age groupings to predict an exact timing (8). While a sense of generativity can indeed occur as early as the adolescent and early adult stages, "it ordinarily does not become a dominant concern until the end is in sight—the end of one's fertility, the end of one's career, the end of one's life," and "for many, the inevitability of the end is realized at midlife" (10). Kenneth Doka agrees, suggesting, "full awareness of mortality begins to emerge in middle adulthood" (112). It follows then, that we should *not* understand life, in its entirety, as an inherent, extrinsically motivated activity demanding an end product for true meaning, as Pletcher and Kauffman suggest, because this motivation is *subsequent* to lived experience, a latter *stage* of life. That is, the will to produce cannot inherently motivate human life if the very motivation to produce is derivative of already living one's life. Regardless of instance—the ending of X, Y,

or Z—generativity is a reaction. A preceding motivation must, then, exist in order for humans to even reach the reactionary psychological desire to produce.

Although Erikson coined our modern understanding of generativity, we can find the distinguishing of biological from nonbiological means of production and perhaps a motivation preceding this desire in ancient texts as well. In the latter half of Plato's *Phaedrus*, for example, Socrates argues that the most desirable form of intellectual exchange is "when one employs the dialectic method and plants and sows in a fitting soul intelligent words which . . . are not fruitless, but yield seed from which there spring up in other minds other words capable of continuing the process forever" (166). Socrates continues, claiming this can only be accomplished with "words about justice and beauty and goodness spoken by teachers for the sake of instruction and really written in a soul" (167). These words, void of any superficial attempt at mere persuasion, "should be considered the speaker's own legitimate offspring, first the word within himself . . . and secondly its descendants or brothers which may have sprung up in worthy manner in the souls of others" (167). The significance of this passage, however, is not the notion of considering a speaker's words as offspring, but rather *which* words Plato (or Socrates) deems worthy of such regard: "words about *justice* and *beauty* and *goodness* spoken by teachers *for the sake of instruction*" (167; emphasis added). The value of these words is not in their ability to become generative products but in their purpose and process: an intrinsic value. Erikson suggests that the products of generativity, regardless of mode (biological or artificial), are equally treated as extrinsically good, pointing to "man's *love for his works and ideas as well as his children*" (*Insight* 131; emphasis in orig.); however, considering our proposed understanding of life and its processes as intrinsically valuable, is "*man's love*" actually for these products or are these products simply the results of *man's love* for the process?

This theoretical framework is applicable to contemporary studies of individuals in the academic profession. For example, facing tenure denial and a rejected job application, Emily Hinnov, an associate professor of English at Great Bay Community College, falls into dichotomous generative thinking, explaining her only options are to have "another baby while I take some time away from the market" or "just continue here and get another article out" (41). Hinnov's own thought process naturally juxtaposes having a child and publishing an article in response to the ending of a dialogical process beyond her control. In her language, Hinnov equates the production of an article to the production of a child as she faces tenure denial (the ending of a process), yet a child is certainly not an extrinsic product of tenured professing. Therefore, although the desire to *produce* in light of the premature ending of a process we might consider extrinsic (a job) may, indeed, *appear* to support an extrinsic motivation, we must understand this appearance as faulty—the frantic tossing of darts in a panicked response to the loss of control. If Hinnov perceived her career as truly extrinsic, her response to its premature ending would be the production of scholarship with no hesitation insofar as her ability to do so hinges upon her status as an academic: "A PhD is a license to reproduce and an obligation to maintain the quality of your intellectual descendants" (Gray and Drew 14). However, by including and equating procreation to the artificial production of professional development in her reaction, Hinnov illustrates a human's frantic turning to objects over which she perceives control in response to the forced ending of an intrinsic process. To be sure, Hinnov continues, "In the meantime, at least I have a fantastic boy and a wonderful husband to help keep me sane . . . . If it doesn't happen next year, I may have to find another career, or maybe just have another child" (41). Here, Hinnov not only equates a career with raising a child, but also illustrates how the assurance of her dialogical relationship with her *partner* can counterbalance the possible loss of

her academic career, the *sanity* of her social existence. This detail is crucial insofar as we must recognize this turning to social security in the face of systemic control as a gender-neutral, *human*, response. Hinnov positions her husband, a connection between humans, as her remaining grip on sanity. Moreover, the extrinsic motivation of reproduction is equally as non-gender-specific insofar as both mother and father share the reproduction and preservation of genetic code evenly. Although saddened, Hinnov ultimately does not consider her systemic, professional situation—her extrinsic existence—a life-altering crisis because she finds more value in the intrinsic goodness of her social, dialogical relationships with her husband and child—her connection to other humans.

Observance of reactions such as this, which *appear* extrinsically motivated but are simply the loss of intrinsic control and fear of human disconnection, lend to the theoretical acceptance of life as inherently extrinsic. Upon additional rhetorical examination, however, we find the extrinsic fallacy further problematic insofar as the products of an extrinsic existence cannot successfully achieve the ends for which they are produced. Noting Pletcher's notion that an extrinsic activity's success relies solely upon reaching or producing an end product with a value outweighing the effort of process in the activity itself (64-5), the product(s) of life's *process*, requisite to finding *any* meaning in life, would therefore need to outweigh death. Moreover, if death, in the most general sense, is the antithesis of life and the opposite is true as well (life is not-death and death is not-life), then life and death, existence and nonexistence, would be equivalent. Therefore, if we assume all attainable goodness is in life, we also assume no attainable goodness can be in death because all/none are, ideally, dichotomous equivalents. With life and death as counterparts and existence as extrinsic, the *products* of an existence with any

meaning whatsoever would have to be worth *more* than life to outweigh death; they would have to grant eternal life.

Indeed, Lifton argues generativity is a means of "symbolic immortality" that "represents a compelling universal urge to maintain an inner sense of continuous symbolic relationship, over time and space, with the various elements of life" (276; 275). In other words, we develop the reactionary desire to combat the inevitability of death by producing something that not only survives our death but maintains our social essence as well: the *continuous relationship*. Yet, this is *not* possible. Not all offspring survive to continue their lineage, and not all texts survive damage from the elements. Moreover, while our children carry our genetic code, a child *is not* its parent. Returning to Bakhtin's notion of socially constructed consciousness, if our consciousness were to successfully continue to experience life within our offspring, our offspring's consciousness would have to share our exact social and experiential contexts (in becoming a carbon copy of our own consciousness), which is certainly a theoretical impossibility.

Returning to this chapter's epigraph, we can find a salient example of the human artifice's extrinsic unreliability. In 1986, the first *complete* edition of Anthony Burgess *A Clockwork Orange* was published in America, twenty-four years after the novella's first American debut. In the introduction of this edition, Burgess writes, "The book I wrote is divided into three sections of seven chapters each . . . you will find that these add up to a total of twenty-one chapters . . . those twenty-one chapters were important to me" (v-vi). However, those chapters "were not important to my New York publisher. The book he brought out had only twenty chapters . . . so there is a profound difference between *A Clockwork Orange* as Great Britain knows it" (vi). In fact, the rest of the world received the twenty-one-chapter version, leaving America as the sole audience of Burgess' mangled production. Nevertheless, director

Stanley Kubrick followed the shortened American version for his 1971 film adaptation, and accordingly, the film's abrupt ending puzzled non-American audiences. "People wrote to me about this," Burgess laments, "indeed much of my later life has been expended on Xeroxing statements of intention and the frustration of intention—while both Kubrick and my New York publisher coolly bask in the rewards of their misdemeanor. Life is, of course, terrible" (vii).

Assuming an extrinsically motivated lens, Burgess' condemnation of the novella's sheer existence is troublesome. His envisioned production of *A Clockwork Orange* was by no means lost to the human realm of existence; the British publication (all twenty-one chapters) circulated the entire world, with translations in "French, Italian, Spanish, Catalan, Russian, Hebrew, Rumanian, and German" to name a few (vi). Americans were the only audience left with the omission. Though imperfect, Burgess nevertheless *succeeded* in producing something that survived throughout his life and, indeed, has survived his death. Why, then, would Burgess be so "glad to disown it" or wish it "erased from the world's literary memory" (v)? Though (in Pletcher and Erikson's theories) Burgess has generatively preserved himself across the globe, he finds no joy in it and certainly does not find his life's meaning in it. The *joy* of *A Clockwork Orange*, for Burgess is, in fact, in its composition—the process: "My own healthy inheritance of original sin comes out in the book and I enjoyed raping and ripping by proxy" (ix). Not only was Burgess' artificial production subject to external manipulation and unable to reliably preserve *who* he was, its existence, as a completed product, contained no joy for Burgess. Why, then, are we so susceptible to the extrinsic delusion and why are humans so quick to react by means of the will to produce?

On Motivation: Systemic Limitation and Intradialogism

Social severance (or aloneness) is utterly foreign to a natural human existence. The moment a fertilized egg attaches to a mother's uterine wall, we become a bonded creature, a product of two individuals, physically connected to our mother from the first division of cells to our first breath of oxygen. Our consciousness is without shape until our first interaction with another human yet from our first breath, we are *with* another human. The singular "individual self" is, therefore, simply the resultant fallacy of a structuralized system of unnatural separation in which humans are constructed to compete with one another under the guise of "purpose" and "success." That is, consciousness does not and cannot exist in solitary isolation. Each consciousness is wholly dependent upon its interaction with an external consciousness, yet our social system of division, paradoxically controlled by both no one and everyone, moves us to believe the opposite.

A human socially organized as an *American*, for example, exists within a reality of innumerable division: from gender and ethnicity to age and location. We live in a state, in a county of a state, and in a city of a county of a state. During primary and secondary education, we are in a grade-level (K-12th), in a section of a grade-level,[15] in a classroom of a section of a grade-level, and finally in a single desk of a classroom of a section of a grade-level. This system of categorization and division, in which we exist from birth, works to separate us from the human collective *qua* humans. The positioning of students to individual desks within a classroom ingrains a sense of singularity. Consequently, we are led to believe our fundamental purpose in life is to be extrinsically *successful*, ignoring that "success" is a human-made concept with no

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[15] During my own K-12 education, each grade was divided into two or three "teams" within the school, each with its own group of teachers (three teams = three math teachers, three English, etc.), and students only attended class within his or her own assigned team.

true value beyond the human artifice. The longer we participate in this strategic will to truth, the more difficult it becomes to see "success" as man-made and not simply *the natural order of things*.[16]

This invisible web of organized reality is central to many rhetorical theories, though each theorist denotes it differently. Foucault refers to it as "power" and explains that "power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical [sic] situation in a particular society" (*History* 93). Power, here, is a paradoxical element of reality; it both moves and is moved by humans, and it constructs and deconstructs everything we think we know. Bakhtin's "social ideologies" have a similar paradoxical function insofar as "every ideological sign is not only a reflection, a shadow, of reality, but is also itself a material segment of that very reality" (*Marxism* 1211). These signs are simultaneously internal *and* external to reality and give human consciousness its form. Moreover, signs form an "ideological chain [that] stretches from individual consciousness to individual consciousness, connecting them together" (1212); therefore, although a human's empty consciousness is indeed distinct from that of another, once it takes shape (through ideological social interaction) it becomes permanently linked to the collective social milieu of humans. If our first experience as living, breathing humans, the moment our consciousness takes shape, is with a human already participatory in this system of organization, our consciousness becomes instantly tangled in the web of human affairs.

A system of organization is contingent upon its ability to render *that which it aims to organize* predictable—that is, to efficiently control something is to anticipate its every movement and, ultimately, its outcome. Although certain humans indeed use control and organization as a

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[16] See Foucault, *History* 92-102.

means of malicious force, we should not allow said deleterious instances to dominate our understanding of organization as it applies to human existence. Systemic organization, to the human, is a reactionary necessity born of fear—the fear of the inherent uncertainty in existence. Human life is chaos; it is completely unpredictable insofar as human action is defined by "its inherent unpredictability . . . [which] arises directly out of the story which, as the result of action, begins and establishes itself as soon as the fleeting moment of the deed is past" (Arendt 191-92). That is, the totality of human action and interaction cannot be entirely controlled, which compromises our sense of stability and security and necessitates our reactionary urge to *fabricate* any possible (or perceivable) means of control, albeit ultimately imperfect. Indeed, action can be *limited*, and it is this limiting of human unpredictability, or the illusion thereof, that necessitates the systemic will to produce.

According to Arendt, the "frustration of action—the unpredictability of its outcome, the irreversibility of the process, and the anonymity of its authors—is almost as old as recorded history" (220). Consequently, humans in social crisis tend to a search for a proper substitute for action, which generally amounts to "seeking shelter from action's calamities in an activity where one man . . . remains master of his doings from beginning to end" (220)—that is, the substitution of action with fabrication, in which a predetermined outcome is necessity. The innate duality of fabrication, Arendt explains, is visible in its process: "first, perceiving the image or shape . . . of the product-to-be, and then organizing the means and starting the execution" (225). Certainly we find comfort in such activities, as we become lord and master of the entire moment: conception, creation, and reflection. For this reason, humans, *regarding fabrication*, tend to prefer solitary activity in contradistinction to collaborative efforts. Since the human is indeed wholly unpredictable, the more humans engaging in the fabrication of a single object of the human

artifice, the more complicated and unpredictable said object's anticipated ending becomes. For

example, I can gather material and tools and build *the chair* in complete isolation, confident that

the work of my hands *alone* will function according to *my* design; however, if I employ four

additional individuals, each to fabricate a single leg of the chair, I can no longer *fully* trust that

the end product will appear true to my initial design. I can organize these fellow individuals by

dictating strict measurement guidelines, sanding patterns, and varnish consistency; nevertheless,

my words are but mere limitation, not absolute assurance. Each of these humans has the ability to

cut short or long, sand in circles or lines, and paint in dabs or coats—I cannot anticipate action.

We must ask, then: Do we truly find joy in solitary fabrication, in the creation of *things*? And if

so, would not human life appear extrinsically motivated?

Fabrication and the will to produce are undeniable aspects of human existence. At this

moment, I am *producing* this document on my computer, an *object* of human fabrication;

however, I am doing so as a *requirement* in fulfillment of my graduate degree. Certainly, I would

much rather respond to my increasing sum of missed phone calls and messages—to

communicate with my friends and family—but I am caught in a systemic mandate, rendering my

very humanness partially predictable. The term *partially* is key here. If the university's

organizational means of control were truly flawless and my will to produce gave my life *true*

meaning, I, *by sheer necessity*, would have completed this document by its initial deadline

regardless of any interactive desire or distraction; however, this is simply not so. I am further

behind in completion than I could have ever anticipated yet the eleventh-hour state of my

work—my systemic failure—is, in fact, essential to the creation of new *ideas* insofar as

composition is the attempt to fabricate, and thus render predictable, human speech and action.

This document is an object of fabrication, but it *could not exist* without my culmination of prior social actions and experiences. The *word* indeed creates and organizes the *thing*, but the *word* only emerges through dialogical interaction—that is, the word exists *between* humans. I could not compose the words contained within this document prior to my experiencing their emergence during dialogical moments with the humans around me. Likewise, any form of fabrication cannot exist without some means of social exchange, however fleeting its moment. We may sit on a rock or stump, but we *cannot* name it a *chair*, creating *that which is **chair**,* unless we possess the word "chair," but this word and all words of the human tongue are located *socially*. We cannot know of the *thing* before its linguistic organization (its word), and we cannot know of the *word* without its emergence within social intercourse and subsequent ideological symbolization. Therefore, though we may find comfort or even joy in moments of solitary fabrication, these activities, much like their motivating will to produce, are fundamentally *secondary* to intrinsic dialogical interaction, to the realm of *humans* rather than *human*, which allows fabrication's very existence.

Nevertheless, we can observe the extraordinary power of systemic organization by noting contexts with an increased frequency of *over*-submission to various forms of institutionalized control. The academic environment, for further example, illustrates a complex value system in which the systemic will to produce and the innate desire for dialogical interaction function in both congruence *and* divergence. If we dichotomize an academic's career (remaining aware that no such binaries exist *as absolute fact*), we find that most scholarly activities fit into either *research* or *production*. To be clear, research is one's engagement with any form of *text*, but we might understand production as not only one's composing and publishing of personal scholarship, but also as one's *teaching*, which, Smith asserts, should be "designed to *produce a*

true person" (204; emphasis added). Smith's Platonic use of the word *produce* locates *the human* (students) within the realm of fabrication as material means to an end. We may understand this terminology as indicative of the university's system of social organization and dictated expectation. That is, in the university's *modus operandi*, its intangible all-moving structure, the student is indeed a mere form of *material* just as plywood is to the carpenter. The student, in this scenario, is but a means of monetary stability and ultimately a distraction from the university's true means of accreditation: its academics' scholarly productions. To be sure, Smith admits it is common knowledge among academic circles "that the most brilliant teaching will not save a young assistant professor if he/she fails to achieve the minimum standard of research/publication" (119). Therefore, the professor functioning within this structural context conditionally understands oneself as expected to perform as a wholly systemic creature with the sole purpose of extrinsic production.

Systemic triumph exists in what we may generally understand as *Research I Universities*, in which the teaching component of a professorial career is very much secondary to the production of published scholarship (Weerts 26). However, Smith cites a 1979 academic study in which "three-fourths of the faculty surveyed agreed 'that their interests lean toward teaching (as contrasted with research)'" (121). Teaching, albeit systemically organized, is nevertheless a means of dialogical interaction between student and teacher regardless of the university's limiting *modus operandi*. Yet, academics also attempt to combat this sense of complete systemic control even beyond the realm of teaching by mapping interpersonal emotions onto objects reminiscent of human consciousness during research and publication—that is, a piece of the human artifice that *seems* to retain some fragment of its human creator or perhaps *resembles* the dialogical moment itself. Bloch finds that several academics not only exhibit inseparable

personal and professional lives, but also associate the experience/act of research and scholarship with that of romantic relationships. For example, a female assistant professor in Bloch's study claims, "There's not much difference between the feeling you have when you're in love and the feeling you have when your research is going really well. It's a little bit sacred—just like when you're in love" (qtd. 1). McAdams and Logan explain a similar situation in professor Rubin's interview: "Even when the interviewer encourages her to tell separate and distinct narratives in the realms of work and love, respectively, Rubin doggedly insists that her life is an integrated whole" (100). Love, here, seems to resemble the intrinsic *joy* found only within dialogical experience, within speech and action; therefore, we may hereafter understand *love* as intrinsically pure *joy*.

Humans create and are created by both power and ideological signs *through* speech and action. It is through action, Arendt explains, that humans become the socialized masters of reality—that is, "Action . . . no matter what its specific content, always establishes relationships and therefore has an inherent tendency to force open all limitations and cut across all boundaries. Limitations and boundaries exist within the realm of human affairs, but they never offer a framework that can reliably withstand the onslaught [of action]" (190-91). Indeed, "Discourse," according to Foucault, "transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it" (*History* 101). Dialogical interaction, then, is a human's most unique means of creating, understanding, traversing, and transforming reality. The "man who is sick with the love of discourse" in Plato's *Phaedrus* is not a singular *man* but rather an everyman (139). The love of discourse, the need to interact, is a sickness of *all* humans. It is this uniquely human sickness that we should understand as the *will to love*, an *intradialogical* motivation of humans *qua* humans.

Returning to the acknowledgment of fabrication as an observable human activity, we must understand the reality created by the word as a reality of *things*—the human artifice. Consequently, intradialogism, as I offer, does not carry applicability to the rhetorical understanding of the world of *things*—the infamous chair is of little concern to the realm of human action. The word undoubtedly precedes all objects of *fabrication* insofar as we fashion the human artifice through our use of tools to shape raw material—our use of a hammer, nails, and wood in creating the *physical* chair—and like the hammer the word is a tool to fashion and organize our chaotic reality. The word is the device that precedes and makes possible all tools. Consequently, if we attempt to apply intradialogism to the human artifice, we will certainly fail. We must not confuse creation with progression but rather look beyond the world of sensory stimuli and physical objects to understand the human as it inherently functions socially and dialogically *qua* human. That is, intradialogism applies to only that which is human.

> Cabin: [Sound of several thuds] . . .
> Captain: *Engine's exploded. It's just hanging out there . . .*
> Copilot: *Yes, sir . . . Declaring an emergency . . .*
> Captain: [To copilot] *Help me. Help me hold it. Help me hold it. Help me hold it.*
> Cabin: [Vibrating sound as the stick shaker starts warning of stall].
> Copilot: *Amy, I love you.*
> Cabin: [Sound of grunting; sound of impact].
>
> — *Cockpit Voice Recorder, Flight 529*

The epigraph above derives from Malcolm MacPherson's 1998 collection of cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcriptions during in-flight accidents entitled *The Black Box*. This particular incident—Flight 529—occurred in Carrollton, Georgia on August 21, 1995 during a routine Atlantic Southeast Airlines flight (82). The aircraft, having suffered catastrophic left engine failure, "rolls to the left, pitches down, and starts to descend at 5,500 feet per minute . . . Two of the three blades from the left propeller are wedged against the front of the wing. The flight attendant looks out the window and observes 'a mangled piece of machinery where the propeller and the front part of the cowling was'" (83). In this moment, lasting only minutes, mortality is no longer a distant fear; one actualizes death *prima facie*. When we perceive our death as something impending but nevertheless distant from our *current* state of being, we have time to contemplate, to worry—to devise an escape plan. In other words, we fabricate the delusion of extrinsic meaning through our prolonged exposure to the systemic will to produce. However, during a nose-dive from 20,000 feet above the earth in a 10 ton, twin-engine "Embraer EMB-120RT airplane" (82) with four minutes to impact, one is without contemplation and reveals *true* human authenticity. At eight seconds to impact, the copilot, fully understanding he may cease to exist in the very next instant, addresses his wife in the CVR: "Amy, I love you" (87). Upon death, we do not concern our accomplishments, or even ourselves, for death *prima*

facie—its perceived actualization—is the absence of fear. We cannot fear that which *is*, only that which *might be*; therefore, once death *is*, we are absolved of its terror. In the absence of fear— fear being the ultimate systemic means of organization and control—we find love. Ergo, *love* is that which is not systemic; it is human *authenticity*. Moreover, if death, as evident in our copilot's chosen words before impact, concerns us not with ourselves or with the human artifice but with others—those we are leaving behind, then love, the moment of human authenticity, is indeed our intradialogical will to exist.

Intradialogical authenticity does not exist in the realm of fabrication, nor can we find it in any object of the human artifice or the world of natural materials. In other words, the authentic, by necessity of its form, cannot be exemplified by any tangible means or linguistic organization. To do so would render such a phenomenon non-phenomenal. If "*the word*," as Bakhtin suggests, "*is the ideological phenomenon par excellence*" (*Marxism* 1213; Italics in orig.), *the human is the authentic phenomenon par excellence*, for no *thing* precedes its word and no *word* precedes itself, yet human authenticity, by its innate unpredictability, precedes the word. We find authenticity in mystery or surprise, as each exists external to linguistic organization and only emerges in wholly unpredictable moments of social human experience: Realization in the absence of organization—that is, through human inter-action.

The entirety of this chapter thus far, for example, owes its existence to my wholly unpredictable interaction with Ben Sharp, a musician by hobby and a captain for United Express Airlines.[17] In 2013, upon discovering that Sharp's album *Beacons* derived from *The Black Box*, I attempted to contact him in hopes of perhaps sending him a purchased copy to autograph. I did not, however, expect a reply considering we had never met and, similar to most successful

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[17] Sharp's musical alias is *Cloudkicker*, see "Cloudkicker Music."

musicians in our current age of digital communication, he must (I assumed) receive hundreds of emails a day. Contrary to this uncertainty, Sharp contacted me that same day—within two hours—and offered to simply sign and send his own copy of the book. His hand-written note to me on the opening page speaks to not only the authenticity of the act itself, but to the content of *The Black Box* as well and the CVR recordings' meaning to Sharp as an aircraft captain himself:

> I believe that I bought this back sometime around 1998 or 1999, which would have made me 13 or 14. Although it piqued my interest due to my passion for aviation, there is something much more universal and much more deep on display. These men and women are often victims of either circumstance or their own mistakes, and in these moments they often shed their egos entirely in the realization that nothing more can be done. So rather than second-guess or pity, I like to respectfully appreciate the beauty of a fully realized human being, for whatever fleeting moments it lasted. Maybe after reading this you will feel the same way. (Sharp n.p.)

Within the context of rhetorical intradialogism, we may understand the *shedding* of these individuals' *egos* in the face of death as their release from systemic organization in becoming authentic, *fully realized*, human beings. The *beauty* Sharp notes speaks to the rarity of such authenticity. Indeed, the human contains the capacity to experience the authentic through social exchange, but we are not wholly authentic beings.

No human can exist entirely external to the social system of power and organization; however, the authentic human emerges in blinks, in *fleeting moments*, of action and experience. Systemic organization certainly *limits* discourse and, in turn, the authentic dialogical moment, but human speech and action, according to Arendt, *cannot* be rendered predictable (191). Indeed,

speech and action also cannot exist entirely freed from systemic structures of power insofar as

the systems in which we exist determine our dialogical identities (with whom we may engage in

discourse and with what language); however, no system of power can wholly pre-determine the

outcome of discourse. In our systemic existence, the dialogical exchange between humans is the

most intimate form of metaphysical social interaction insofar as the dialogical moment is the

actualization of internal authenticity externalized and re-internalized—that is, preexisting,

intangible authenticity emerges from within humans engaged in the dialogic and for an

indeterminable moment intertwine before returning to the consciousness. This transitory

dialogical intercourse is Foucault's conceptual creation of knowledge as well as Bakhtin's social

shaping of consciousness. These moments exist only in immediate dialogical interaction—that is,

through dialogue *between* humans and comprised of language beyond mere *words*: the language

of action. The word cannot reveal the authentic by itself; if so, writing would be flawless. Our

current popular means of written communication, the *text message*, illustrates the written word's

inability to facilitate *true* dialogical authenticity in its fundamental predictability and its limited

ability to account for the innumerable additional communicative cues in social discourse: the

creation of the *emoticon* for example. While the *word* is necessary, authentic dialogical

interaction requires language beyond language—movement, eye contact, inflection, pause,

silence, and emotion—all of which comprise the unpredictability of human interaction.

     Although we may attempt to control and predict discourse—and even succeed in doing so

at times—any organizational pattern is only temporary in the chain of utterances in a human

existence. Discourse assumes a paradoxically limited, limitless role by its powerless power in

rhetorical theory because the authentic moment in all things systemic exists only through

discourse. Social discourse is the means in which humans experience true immortality.[18] It has no beginning and no end and cannot be called upon by intention or productive purpose. It is immortal in its absolute unattainability and total unpredictability. Consequently, authentic moments are those to which we long to return and attempt so desperately to recall but, for their true immortal form, we can never entirely re-access once experienced. Memory, our only means of recovery, ultimately proves incapable of replicating the beauty of these moments. In frustration, humans have turned to the realm of fabrication for a means of preserving the immortal moment: pen and paper, microphone and record, camera and film, all devices created to preserve and organize moments of authentic beauty yet all of which only create imperfect representations of the authentic. For this reason, human existence is comprised of consecutive processes. Each subsequent process, action, or discourse is an attempt to experience the authentic moment once more. Every new and unpredictable moment is more beautiful than the last, and our death marks the point at which we can no longer experience or no longer feel true love. This is, of course, nostalgia.

Nostalgia is the impossible remembrance of a lost memory, the fractured recollection of an authentic moment. Every human, from birth, has experienced authentic moments insofar as intradialogical existence necessitates experience, and experience contains the authentic moment. We are saddened by the finiteness of these moments and driven to escape our inherent retrospective sadness by replacing those moments with new experiences. Here, we can truly understand the incomparable psychological damage found in the prison system's use of solitary isolation. In total isolation, one can no longer escape nostalgia. Without access to other humans,

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[18] Although *immortality* generally presupposes a state of ever-being, something fully permanent that we may access as we please, this presumption equates the mortal to the immortal insofar as to render something permanently accessible is, in fact, to render it predictable, and that which is immortal *cannot* be predictable or even tangible.

we are incapable of experiencing the new and the authentic—life becomes *truly* predictable; thus, we cease to live a human existence. To be isolated is to exist without love, haunted by only blurred memories of beauty. If we could strip ourselves of all contextual and systemic notions of *right* and *wrong*, all man-made concepts of *good* and *bad*, we might find that forced social isolation—the evisceration of one's *humanness*, the tearing of the soul from the living body—is perhaps the most inhumane torture conceivable. Suicide is, then, the most unpredictable, authentic human action insofar as the taking of one's own life is the ultimate uncontrollable act of control over all systemic predictability. Life is only valuable to a human if it is capable of experiencing new experience. If one perceives a systemic ultimatum, life is no longer worth living. Without the dialogic, a human is no longer able to exist as *who* he or she is, becoming only *what* he or she is.

For Arendt, *who* someone is precedes the word itself: "In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world" (179). Arendt illustrates the precedence of authenticity to the word through her use of *reveal*. We cannot *reveal* a thing that does not already exist; we do not *create* who we are through our speech but rather *disclose* who we are. Additionally, "this disclosure of 'who' in contradistinction to 'what' somebody is . . . is implicit in everything somebody says and does" (179). We can attempt to use words to denote *who* we are, but cannot escape merely articulating *what* we are: words fail us. Similar to the linguistically organized human artifice, the reality of humans created by the word is a reality of *what* humans are. I am not a Master of the Arts in English until the word is attributed to me, until it creates that reality; however, *who* I am, my speech and action, allows for the word, which allows for the *what*. The *who* exists before the word, but the word creates knowledge of the *who*; therefore, existence and acknowledgement are

distinguishable. Acknowledgement of existence (i.e. the disclosure of the *who* through dialogical interaction) *is* the authentic moment. The dialogical experience, then, contains both authenticity and systemic organization and results in the re-articulation of both (see Figure 1 below).

"Who"   "Word"   "What"
Authentic → Symbolic → Systemic   **The Past**

                "Dialogic"
                Experiential   **The Unpredictable**

"Who"   "Word"   "What"
Authentic → Symbolic → Systemic   **The New**

Figure 1: The Intradialogical Process

Rhetorical and philosophical scholars alike have perpetuated the systemic division of humans by means of denotation according to *temporary* observable motivation. For example, *Homo faber* is the man of work, *Homo economicus* is the man of self-interest (betterment), and *Homo homini lupus est* describes man as the wolf of other men—that is, the destroyer. However, rhetorical intradialogism is an attempt to mend these systemic divisions, divisions that carry dangerous implications and perhaps self-fulfillment. If we understand the human intradialogically—that is, dependent upon our connection to fellow humans, we must understand the human as *Homo humanitas*, the man of and from humanity. We can only exist as *part* of something much larger than ourselves. We take shape from each other through discourse and our shared authenticity: love. Indeed, "*Who* somebody is or was we can know only by knowing the story of which he is himself the hero—his biography, in other words; everything else we know of him, including the work he may have produced and left behind, tells us only *what* he is or was"

(Arendt 186). Thus, I cannot be *human* without you, without your retelling of me. I can be any word I could imagine, but these words will only convey *what* I am; with them, I objectify my own being. Even my name—Michael Colby Murphy, son of Michael Howard Murphy and Tina Phillips Murphy, brother of Teghan Maccall Murphy—can never account for the totality of my actions, for *who I am*. For this reason, the written *word* can never evoke the authentic moment insofar as our documents cannot reveal who we are, were, or may become.

Even as I complete this utterance, it pains me to know that you and I will never share the authentic moments for which this document is but a mere replica. Further, as I use the term "you," I am sadly aware that I am not, in actuality, even capable of referring to *you*, as we are not, at this moment, socially or dialogically connected. Certainly I can imagine my addressee—a man or a woman, an inquisitive mind or a scholar, a mother, a father—but I cannot find certainty. I am only sure that my addressee is *not* you, for you are a *who*—a living, breathing, loving consciousness—not a *what*. We cannot imagine *who* someone is, only *what* he or she is: a man, woman, mind, scholar, mother, father, because we can only know the *who* through speech and action, through immediate dialogical interaction (Arendt 186). Therefore, I cannot, at this moment, truly know *who* you are in contradistinction to *what* I imagine you are. This moment, then, cannot capture the authentic. As I complete each subsequent sentence, I am interacting with the "you" I imagine but you cannot interact with me. Likewise, as you read each subsequent word, you are interacting with "me," but I am not interacting with you. It is the inescapable necessity of the written word: It is predictable. This document and its prose have a definitive beginning and end. You can see its pages, its punctuation—its *form*. It is a wholly systemic utterance, and, in turn, only a facsimile of the crisp Appalachian air, a fractured memory of love's fingers laced between your own. It is a moment beyond recollection.

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