

MAROOONS AND THE JAMAICAN FRONTIER ZONES OF
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

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A Thesis Submitted to the
University of North Carolina Wilmington in Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

Department of History

University of North Carolina Wilmington

2005

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ABSTRACT

Throughout the eighteenth century, Jamaican maroons, or original bands of runaway slaves, utilized frontier zones to maintain independence. Frontier zones were desolate, unoccupied areas that no group fully controlled because of the harsh environments. Jamaican maroon groups lived autonomously from the late seventeenth century until the end of the eighteenth century, due to the inaccessibility of their villages and an expertise in unconventional warfare. In 1739, treaties ended years of fighting with the British colonists. The treaties damaged the frontier areas through the presence of British officers, the maintenance of clear roads, and a requirement that granted the maroons freedom for their collaboration. Despite the treaties, frontier zones remained until the Trelawny maroon rebellion in 1795. This event marked an ending point in one Jamaican frontier. Furthered colonization, along with added fears of widespread rebellion, compromised the frontier areas surrounding the Trelawny community. Only in frontier zones could maroons exist autonomously and apart from the rest of the colony. As demonstrated by the Trelawny event, without surrounding frontier zones the maroons held no place in social structure of colonial Jamaica.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my parents, my sister, Lindsie and Stephanie Albrecht. They have wholly supported me throughout this project from beginning to end. I would also like to acknowledge the help and support of Drs. Holly and John Mason. Their encouragement kept me going through difficult times.

I am in gratitude for the comments of Dr. Hal Langfur and Dr. Bill McCarthy. They introduced me to the wonder of historical research. Their criticism helped to shape my thesis into a more complete work. Most importantly, however, they inspired me to continue researching and writing about Jamaica. I would also like to thank Dr. Paul Townend for his continued patience and perseverance through this final semester. His insightful approach to history will influence my writing for years to come.

Finally, I must also acknowledge the support of my committee and faculty of the UNCW history department who encouraged and supported me throughout my years in the program. Time spent in the classroom as well as Randall Library will always remain fond memories.

DEDICATION

--If we have a prince, said Pliny to Trajan, it is so that he may preserve us from having a master.

-Pliny the Younger, *Panegyricus*

I would like to dedicate this work to Ken Stasiewicz, beloved and trusted friend. His inspiration, creativity, and knowledge will always be cherished.

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PROLOGUE

In this work, I argue that Jamaican maroon transformations from rebels to collaborators centered largely on the expansion and destruction of the surrounding frontier zones they inhabited. I will demonstrate growth and reduction of the frontier tied directly to events in the wider Atlantic World. Historian Bernard Bailyn used the term Atlantic World to describe the connections between Africa, Western Europe, and the Americas, which lasted from the sixteenth into the nineteenth centuries. The exchanges between Atlantic World people opened up new ideas, opportunities, and alliances with groups that had historically been separated geographically. In this fluid environment, transformations forced maroons, and other groups, to re-invent and adapt often. This work will demonstrate patterns of settlement, trade, and production in the British West Indies mainly influenced the development and eventual destruction of the Jamaican maroons and their frontier zones.

Chapter one, “Defining the Jamaican Maroons,” will discuss the difficulties of creating an accurate history for a group that produced no written records. Only a limited number of colonists entered maroon territory, so there were few firsthand accounts of interaction with the groups. Historians, therefore, must rely on primary sources that foster incomplete accounts of the maroon experience. This lack of source material hampered most attempts at a complete written history of the maroons. Not until the late twentieth century did accurate and unbiased accounts of the maroons appear. Present day scholars continue to grapple with this lack of primary source material from the maroon communities.

Chapter two, “Establishing Autonomy in the Frontier Zones,” will discuss the early maroons (1700-1740), or the first time maroons, as they are known to twentieth century Jamaicans. In desolate frontier zones, early maroons secured their autonomy through violence. The frontier zones were vital to maroon success in the formation of their settlements. During this critical period, maroons fought off attempts at intervention into their controlled space. Plunder and war provided the early maroons with a steady supply of men, weapons, and reinforced distinction between themselves and other blacks in Jamaica.

Chapter three, “Exposing the Frontier Zones,” will discuss the depletion of the frontier zones after the maroons signed treaties with the colonial government. An added British presence exposed frontier zones in a number of ways. British officers lived among the maroon communities to ensure compliance with the agreements. The maroons maintained clear roads and patrolled frontier zones in search of runaways. These changes, while they did not close the frontier, made certain areas safer and more susceptible to colonization. Despite this compromise, maroons survived by policing the remaining frontier zones for an allotted fee. Maroons accepted their role as collaborators and this reflected in their willingness to adopt some English customs. Collaboration allowed their communities to remain distinct, and provided the necessary subsistence to remain semi-autonomous in the desolate locations.

Chapter four, “The Destruction of the Trelawny Frontier,” will demonstrate the closing of certain frontier zones by the late eighteenth century. The rebellion of the Trelawny maroons in 1795 was caused mainly from growth into the frontier of western Jamaica. While most scholars determined local events played the largest role in the

rebellion, it is clear the gradual destruction of this western frontier played a large part as well. Through continued colonization, expansion, and the threat of rebellion, barren frontier areas diminished. The complaints of the Trelawny maroons and their decision to rebel stemmed from a loss of ample land, space, and autonomy. Most importantly to historians, however, the Trelawny group demonstrated the necessity of frontier zones for organized groups of blacks living in the colonial Americas.

Understanding the changing positions of the Jamaican maroons as related to the frontier zones better clarifies their roles. The traditional definition of frontier is mainly associated with Frederick Jackson Turner's notion that the frontier borders were meeting points between civilization and barbarity.¹ Since the early nineteenth century, historians have developed the concept of the frontier further, especially in regards to the colonial Americas. All scholars would tend to agree with Evan Haefeli's broad definition that frontiers were simply, "a meeting place of people in which geographic and cultural borders were not clearly defined."²

The difficulty historians have with describing these areas speaks to their complexity. Borderlands, contact zones, zones of interaction, and middle ground are all terms used to define these areas. Regardless of the term used, frontier areas throughout the world, although all unique, have some similar characteristics. One, the location of these areas is always difficult to proximate. Two, while conquest remains a dominant theme, there are often long periods of accommodation. Third, the period of time in which

¹ Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1921).

² Evan Haefeli, "A Note on the Use of North American Borderlands," *American Historical Review* 104 (October 1999): 1222-1225.

these areas remain a frontier is vague and difficult to define. Not every frontier demonstrates all of these criteria, but most areas share some of the characteristics.³

The Jamaican frontier zones of the eighteenth century fit all three of the characteristics. Maroons of Jamaica gathered in desolate mountain regions, sinkholes, forests, and caves. European colonizers had yet to explore these regions. Few knew of the maroons' precise locations, especially during the early period from 1700-1740. Conquest also remained a dominant theme throughout the eighteenth century Jamaican frontiers. British colonists pushed further into the interior portions of the island as colonization expanded. This was mainly to increase the number of plantations, as Jamaica went from a colony of small landowners to large-scale plantations. During this period, there were also occasional periods of accommodation as seen with the treaties signed in 1740. The Jamaican frontier areas also are difficult to place in a chronological sense. Certain areas, such as Trelawny, experienced rampant expansion and exposure to the rest of the colony much earlier than other areas, such as the Charlestown maroons in the Blue Mountains. By the nineteenth century though, frontier zones of Jamaica, in the traditional sense, diminished as all regions of the island became further cultivated and explored.

³ Characteristics developed from discussion of Jeremy Aldenman and Stephen Aaron, "From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States and the People in Between North American History," *American Historical Review* 104 (June 1999): 814-841.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the Americas, groups of runaway slaves and natives formed communities in remote areas. From the early sixteenth century well into the mid-nineteenth century, maroonage, or flight from slavery was the most significant form of resistance against the colonial system that enslaved millions of Africans and native peoples. These groups, first called *cimarrones* by the Spanish, created some of the most direct threats to European control and exploitation in the New World. Organized groups of runaways formed in Cuba, Jamaica, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, as well as portions of North America. In these areas large-scale plantations often held hundreds, if not thousands, of African slaves. The plantations provided the necessary goods and people needed for some maroon communities to exist.

Although the nature of maroon groups throughout the Atlantic World varied according to their locations, certain characteristics were true of most organized runaway groups. All known maroon groups lived in isolated areas. Most, but not all, runaway groups utilized unconventional warfare to maintain a degree of independence in these secluded areas. Lastly, successful warfare, for some maroons, was due to the information received from the slave communities.

Through these advantages, the colonial government granted some runaway groups treaties that formerly recognized their sovereignty. Treaties developed in Brazil, Mexico, Cuba, Colombia, Dominica, Suriname, and Jamaica. Initially, the treaties often benefited both the maroons and the colonial authorities. For policing their areas and preventing runaways from congregating, and for ending violence against colonists, maroons often

received stipends or gifts. Clearly most groups signed treaties as a form of self-preservation. Historian Michael Craton determined, “By hunting runaways rather than acting as a focus for slave resistance maroons preserved their communities from full dilution and reduced the threat of competition in the backlands.”⁴

Prior to treaties, for maroons in Jamaica, as with most organized groups, successful flight was dependent upon seclusion and defense. The will of the individual slave and the protection offered by the surrounding environment kept some runaways from capture. During the seventeenth century, maroon groups formed in St. Kitts, Barbados, and Antigua. In the Bahamas, a group of black Seminoles reached Andros Island from the coast of Florida. For several decades, the group maintained self-sufficiency and semi-autonomy through the protections offered by isolation.⁵ Throughout the Atlantic World, many groups lived in seclusion like the black Seminoles. They were found in the mountainous interiors of St. Domingue, Jamaica and Central America, the thick swamps of southern Florida, the Brazilian Amazon and the dense jungles of Guyana.

In some cases, maroon communities had thousands of residents and maintained a lengthy distance between themselves and the colony. The eighteenth century maroons of St. Domingue known as le Maniel were “twelve hours away from the nearest Frenchmen, without any access by road.”⁶ In Pernambuco, Brazil one *quilombo* or maroon group

⁴ Michael Craton, *Testing the Chain: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 64-65.

⁵ Rosalyn Howard, *Black Seminoles in the Bahamas* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2002), 9-15.

⁶ Gabriel Debien, “Le Maroonage aux Antilles Francaises au XVIIIe siecle,” *Caribbean Studies* 6 (1966): 3-44.

known as Palmares grew large enough in the seventeenth century for one scholar to declare it “an African state in Brazil.”⁷ Palmares, which consisted of 30,000 residents at its height, threatened Portuguese mining interests in the Minas Geraes area, posing a grave threat to the colonial enterprise. It took nearly a century of fighting and a force of six thousand men to subdue Palmares.

Organization and persistent autonomy were key distinctions between large-scale communities like Palmares and what historian Richard Price termed, *petit marronage*, or individual flight. Many times this resistance went undetected by the plantation overseers, but disrupted work and profitability. This was a common occurrence as slaves often returned after briefly fleeing to join neighboring plantations and runaway communities to see loved ones or participated in festivities. Other runaways returned after they found conditions in frontier zones too difficult.⁸ Planters realized flight and maroon groups were a danger to plantations and profitability. The communities offered a clear alternative to the harsh life of enslavement. Jamaican planter and author R.C. Dallas best described the threat the maroons posed to all slaveholders in the Americas, noting, “They remained a rallying point for all who were disposed to quit a state of labor.”⁹

Fugitive slaves caught fleeing the plantations were often brutally punished.

Records indicated the severe punishments reserved for runaways. The brutal treatment of

⁷ For more information on Palmares see, R.K. Kent “Palmares: An African State in Brazil,” *Journal of African History* 6 (1965): 161-175.

⁸ Richard Price, ed., *Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in America*, 2d Ed. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992), 8-9.

⁹ R.C. Dallas, *The History of the Maroons, From Their Origins to Their Establishment of Their Chief Tribe in Sierre Leone: Including An Expedition to Cuba, For The Purpose of Procuring Spanish Chasseurs; and the State of the Island of Jamaica for the Last Ten Years: With a Succinct History of the Island Previous to that Period* vol. 1 (London: T.N. Longman and O. Rees, 1805; Reprint, London: Cass Libraries, 1968), 27.

runaways demonstrated the enormous threat maroonage posed. Often to deter other slaves, planters performed punishments for flight in a public setting. In seventeenth century Cartagena, one runaway slave was “tied up at the city pillory...with strings of bells around his body, whipped 100 times, and left in that position all day long for other slaves to see.”¹⁰ In Dutch Suriname, punishments for runaways included a slow roasting execution, castration, and the amputation of various limbs.¹¹ Many slaves recaptured in the United States wore iron shackles, masks, muzzles and other types of headgear.¹² This practice went on until the middle portions of the eighteenth century. At that time, laws were fully enforced regarding the treatment and execution of slaves.

Successful maroonage, especially in smaller colonies, depended upon slave communities for support. Assistance included information regarding the colonists, guns and ammunition, a steady supply of men and more importantly women, and in some cases necessary goods such as food, water, and shelter. Maroon communities, initially, were comprised mostly of men. Maroons often raided plantations with the sole purpose of obtaining women. In most cases, slave communities also were a constant source of companionship, as the two communities bonded together through their African cultures and subservient status in the colony.

Besides aid from slave communities, maroon groups sustained goods through plunder and protected their inhabited land through unconventional warfare or what some

¹⁰ Aquiles Escalante, “Notas sobre el Palenque de San Basilio, una comunidad negra de Colombia,” *Divulgaciones Ethologicals* 3, (1954): 207.

¹¹ Richard and Sally Price, *Stedman’s Suriname: Life in Eighteenth Century Slave Society* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992), 39.

¹² Herbert Aptheker, “Maroons Within the Present Limits of the United States,” *The Journal of Negro History* 24 (April 1939): 167.

have termed guerrilla warfare.¹³ Throughout the Americas, the presence of maroons posed a threat of attack and possible rebellion. Maroons located near colonists, such as those in Jamaica, North America, and portions of Central America, intimidated neighboring plantations to secure goods, provisions, and slaves. In 1630, Dominican friar and missionary Thomas Gage observed a group of runaways in the Chol Maya territory of Spanish controlled Vera Paz (present day Guatemala). He noted the runaways sustained themselves through the plunder of “wine, iron, clothing and weapons” from travelers moving through their region.¹⁴

The North American South experienced instances of plunder and pillage as well. In 1711, one planter in Charleston, South Carolina noted many in the city were “in great fear and terror” as many runaways armed themselves, “robbing, and plundering houses and plantations.”¹⁵ In 1795, Wilmington, North Carolina residents were overcome by “a number of runaway Negroes, who in the daytime secrete themselves in the swamps and woods, but at night committed depredations on the neighboring plantations.”¹⁶

Plunder often allowed maroons to secure weapons and provisions that aided them in battle. One planter in Virginia noted the runaways “first objective is to obtain a gun and ammunition...as to defend themselves from attack, or accomplish objects of

¹³ Napoleon developed the term “guerilla warfare” to describe methods of Spanish resistance in the nineteenth century. The etymology derives from the Spanish word meaning “little war.” See, Anthony James Joes, *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical, Biological, and Biographical Sourcebook* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1996), 15-16.

¹⁴ Thomas Gage, *The English-American, A New Survey of the West Indies* (London: R. Cotes, 1648; Reprint, London: Routledge, 1928), 113.

¹⁵ Apthecker, “Maroons,” 169-171.

¹⁶ James Carey, *Wilmington Chronicle*, 10 July 1795.

terror.”¹⁷ When these goods could not be obtained, innovative techniques overcame the lack of supplies in the desolate regions. Contemporary accounts indicated Jamaican maroons rolled large boulders down the paths used by approaching parties.¹⁸ In Suriname, contemporary sources indicated maroons used buttons, coins, and pebbles as shot when bullets were scarce.¹⁹ With these seemingly primitive weapons and minimal supplies, some maroons were able to defeat European soldiers sent to subdue them.

John Gabriel Stedmen, a member of the Scots Brigade, spent five years hunting maroon communities in Suriname near the end of the eighteenth century. During his time there, he compiled daily diaries where he told of the tactics used by the maroons. In May of 1774, Stedmen described how neighboring groups of soldiers sent to destroy a maroon settlement were ambushed before they even reached their destination. The surprise attack left the group decimated as, “the rebels, being apprised of his intention by their spies (which they never lack), immediately marched out against him, laying themselves in an ambush near the borders of a deep marsh through which Lieutenant Lepper with his party were to pass on their way to the Rebel settlement. No sooner were these unfortunate men got in the swamp till near their armpits than their black enemies rushed out from under cover and shot them dead in the water at pleasure.”²⁰

Like the maroons of Suriname, Jamaican maroons formed in remote locations that aided their defense. From the end of Spanish occupation in 1655, the interior regions of Jamaica with large limestone deposits and towering mountain ranges provided a safe

¹⁷ Apthecker, “Maroons,” 173.

¹⁸ Dallas, *History*, 49.

¹⁹ Price, *Stedman's*, 47.

²⁰ Price, *Stedman's*, 41.

refuge. A Spanish slave named Juan de Bolas led the first maroons in Jamaica. They fled to the interior western portion of the Jamaican hinterlands several years before the English takeover of the island in 1655. Juan Lubolo, later known as Juan de Bolas to the English, led a group of rebel slaves into the mountains outside the parish of Clarendon. From here, Juan de Bolas and his men defeated Spanish and English attempts at capture. Later as his power grew, Juan de Bolas assisted the Spanish under the leadership of Don Christoval Arnaldo de Yassi who by the late seventeenth century had taken over the Spanish resistance movement against the English. The two men joined forces and used guerrilla tactics to oppose the English attempts to capture the runaways.

Unable to resolve internal disputes between the Spanish, Juan de Bolas later supported the English after they granted him land in return for his services. Juan de Bolas betrayed his own men living in the frontier in return for more land and wealth from the English. He was supposedly killed in an ambush while on an expedition to destroy a runaway settlement that he helped to create. Juan de Bolas presages the temptation other maroon leaders had when forced to become both conquerors and conquered.²¹

The group led by Juan de Bolas into the mountains formed what became known as the Windward maroons, the first of two permanent maroon settlements in Jamaica. After the English won control of Jamaica, the remaining runaways retreated east into Jamaica's tallest mountains. Throughout the later half of the seventeenth century, the Windward communities grew in scale and maintained staunch independence. Little information exists regarding the Windward maroons, especially during the seventeenth

²¹ Mavis Campbell, "Maroonage in Jamaica: Its Origins in the Seventeenth Century," In Rubin and Tuden, eds., vol. 292 of *Comparative Perspectives On Slavery In the New World* (New York Academy of Sciences, 1977), 390-393.

century. It remains unclear to scholars how large or unified this community became during the seventeenth century. Windward maroons, however, were clearly the first runaways to be termed maroons, and this indicated their longevity and likely continued existence since Spanish occupation.

It was not until after 1690 that groups, known as the Leeward maroons, consolidated in the northwestern Jamaica. The Leeward maroons, unlike the Windward group, did not become a formidable threat to the colony until around 1720. The Leeward community emerged from a series of slave rebellions in the central portions of the island. In 1663, the first of many rebellions occurred that led to their formation. In this year, about 200 slaves involved in an uprising killed a number of whites on several plantations. After this, the group retreated to the mountains and “secured themselves in difficult places between the parishes of Clarendon, St. Elizabeth, and St. Anne from whence they never were dislodged.”²²

Although on a smaller scale than the 1663 uprising, other rebellions occurred in 1670, 1673, and 1678. In 1690, another large-scale uprising led by more than 500 slaves helped formed the rest of the group, as around 200 of these slaves escaped into the wilderness. Planter R.C. Dallas noted the importance of this event. The Leeward band formed mainly from, “an insurrection of slaves in the parish of Clarendon in the year of 1690.”²³ The group was joined throughout these years by a steady flow of runaways from the plantations. By 1720, the groups were united under a colonel, as they were known to maroons, named Cudjoe. From the time of Cudjoe’s control, the Leeward

²² Long, *History of Jamaica*, 305.

²³ Dallas, *History*, 46.

maroons posed a constant threat to the plantations neighboring the foothills in the northern parts of Clarendon and southern areas of St. Anne parish.

Until the eighteenth century, runaways congregated near plantations and kept steady contact with slaves in the plantations. Soon after Cudjoe's ascent, the Leeward maroons retreated to secluded lands with better protections. This area, known as the "cockpit country," was a series of cave-like formations carved out of limestone deposits. The region was located near the parishes of St. James, Westmoreland, St. Elizabeth, and what would become Trelawny. After re-locating to the "cockpit region," the runaways consolidated their powers. Historian Carey Robinson explains, "In a short time all men ceased to call them (Leeward maroons) runaways and they too became known as maroons like the earlier runaways in the north and east."²⁴

By the early part of the eighteenth century, both maroon groups posed serious threats to economic stability of the entire island. During this period, maroon populations thrived as growing numbers of slaves were brought to the island. In 1713, the Treaty of Utrecht granted British merchants the right to supply Spanish America with African slaves. After this point, Jamaica remained a staging ground for newly imported Africans. This constantly brought large numbers of slaves to the island, which continually supplied the maroons with new members. In 1658, there were 1,400 mostly enslaved blacks living on the island. By 1700, about 45,000 slaves lived on the island. By 1740, the number climbed to about 60,000 slaves.²⁵ Increasingly unified and numerous, maroon communities grew in power from 1700-1730. This trend of growth continued throughout

²⁴ Carey Robinson, *The Fighting Maroons* (Kingston: William Collins and Sangster, 1974), 33.

²⁵ Campbell, "Maroonage," 390-91.

the eighteenth century. During this 100 year period from 1700-1800, maroon insurrections peaked among groups in Brazil, Jamaica, Suriname and Guiana.²⁶

Treaties in 1739 and 1740 ended violence between the colonists and the maroons. From 1740 until the end of the eighteenth century, both Leeward and Windward maroons willingly hunted down runaway slaves and suppressed slave uprisings. This transformation brought semi-autonomy, but ended previous informal alliances with the slave communities. Initially, the treaties proved beneficial to both the British and the maroons. The British had eradicated any safe haven for runaways and the maroons were granted land and fees for services as military auxiliaries.

This period of collaboration between maroons and the colonial governance lasted until the end of the century. By 1775, many maroon groups openly voiced their complaints about a lack of space to the colonial authorities. Expansion of sugar plantations restricted the dwindling amount of maroon land as the eighteenth century progressed. The increased number of slaves created difficulties in upholding the treaties as more slaves brought frequent disturbances to the island. This great change was a direct influence of the increased value of sugar throughout the Atlantic World. Sugar became a product no longer of luxury but that of necessity for a majority of eighteenth and nineteenth century western Europeans. Jamaican planters sought to maximize their profits and began to pursue all available land for production.²⁷

The Trelawny rebellion in 1795 was the culmination of this anger that slowly developed throughout the eighteenth century. Near the end of the eighteenth century,

²⁶ Philip Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), 12.

²⁷ Sidney Mintz, *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History* (New York: Penguin Books, 1986), 160-161.

unity among Jamaican maroon groups eroded. Maroons formerly known as the Leeward and Windward groups formed smaller, localized bands with their own distinct needs. Some maroons continued to abide by the treaties, while others were a nuisance to the colonial authorities and refused to collaborate. Former descendents of the Leeward band, the Trelawny maroons turned to armed rebellion after a number of local incidents took place. British forces that numbered about 1500 and the Trelawny maroons former ally, the neighboring maroons from Accompong, attempted to subdue the group of about 300.²⁸

Without the aid of the neighboring groups, the last remaining maroon holdouts were forced to surrender after about nine months of fighting. Governor Alexander Balcarres gave the maroons little if any time to surrender near the end of the war. In January of 1796, he issued a proclamation that ordered them to surrender in a limited amount of time. Several days after the terms of Balcarres statements, many maroons from Trelawny surrendered to the British authorities. It was not until March that all members of the rebellion had surrendered. One soldier explained, “After seven months of fighting, the Maroons capitulated to General Walpole, the commander of the troops, and laid down their arms, on the condition that their lives should be spared, and they should be suffered to remain in the colony, under the whites as before.”²⁹ Despite reassurance they would not be deported, the Trelawny maroons immediately were placed upon ships awaiting departure in Montego Bay.

²⁸ Dallas, *History*, 152-53.

²⁹ John Stewart, *An Account of Jamaica and Its Inhabitants* (London: Hurst, Rees and Orme, 1808; Reprint, Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), 284.

After subjugation the Trelawny maroons went to Nova Scotia where they stayed for several years until, upon their many requests, they were sent to Sierra Leone. Other maroon groups remaining in Jamaica continued to fight for autonomy and land throughout the nineteenth century. Slowly the rights and property they fought many decades to protect vanished. In 1842, the Jamaican government passed the Land Allotment Act officially voiding the treaty agreements signed nearly a century ago.³⁰ Nineteenth and twentieth century maroons struggled from a lack of development and willingness to interact with other Jamaicans.

³⁰ *Maroons Land Allotment Act of 1842*, No. 3465, MS Acts of Jamaica, Kingston, Institute of Jamaica; 137/79, Public Records Office, London, In Mavis Campbell, *The Maroons of Jamaica, 1655-1796, A History of Resistance, Collaboration and Betrayal* (Massachusetts Bergin and Garvey Publishers, Inc, 1988), 176.

CHAPTER 1. DEFINING THE JAMAICAN MAROONS

Both primary and secondary literature on the Jamaican maroons remains hampered by a lack of sources from the communities. Without evidence from maroons, historians struggle to balance the information recorded by planters, colonial officials, and colonists. Early secondary sources of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries added little to scholarship on the subject. They often reiterated the same views held by the eighteenth and nineteenth century British planters. As an attempt to remedy this incomplete picture, many works of the mid-twentieth century romanticized the maroon communities. Folklore written by Jamaicans was largely responsible for the revisions. They readily linked their struggle to gain independence in the twentieth century with the maroons' fight of the eighteenth century. Although this romantic theme continues in some scholarship, after 1970 historians and anthropologists constructed a more complete representation regarding maroonage and Jamaican maroons.

Despite the lack of direct sources from the communities, their service to the colonial authorities and the level of cooperation with the British ruling class in Jamaica led to several descriptions of maroons by eighteenth century Jamaican residents. Planter histories in the British colony provide ample material for a discussion of diplomacy between the groups and the threat posed by the runaway communities. Primary documents regarding the maroons in Jamaica mainly derive from the writings of planter historians and naturalists who traveled or resided in remote areas near the maroons. Although their descriptions do not provide a complete rendering of the maroons, they do express aspects of eighteenth century life among the colonial elite in Jamaica and their

interactions with all residents of the island. Planter historians such as Bryan Edwards, R.C. Dallas, and Edward Long all produced volumes of material on the maroons in eighteenth century Jamaica. These authors were either in direct contact with maroons or spoke to British soldiers and militia members who entered their communities.

Bryan Edwards, a West Indian merchant and contemporary historian, came to Jamaica in 1759 and stayed almost until his death in 1800. He took over his uncle's estate in 1773. Along with this property, he became master to hundreds of slaves who inhabited the vast acres of his estate in Trelawny parish, Bryon Castle.³¹ Besides his role as a planter, Edwards was also an avid writer. His contemporaries considered him a brilliant recorder of West Indian history and natural occurrences. His work as a plantation owner and his travel throughout the Caribbean influenced Edwards' writing. In his first major publication, *The History of the British Colonies in the West Indies*, Edwards argued a gradual reduction to end the system of slavery in order to avoid chaos and anarchy. Edwards argued this same theme in numerous public appearances to thwart growing fears of an abolition movement in the late eighteenth century.³²

Edwards writing was also influenced by what he witnessed during the revolution in the neighboring island of St. Domingue. In 1791, Edwards went to St. Dominuge at the instruction of Governor Thomas Effingham to gage the situation in the rebellious colony. The scenes of the Haitian revolution horrified Edwards and two years later he released, *A Historical Survey of the French Colony in the Island of Saint Domingue*. In this work Edwards connects the subjugation of the Jamaican maroons to the free blacks in

³¹ For a depiction of Byron Castle see, B.W. Higman, *Jamaica Surveyed: Plantation Maps and Plans of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (University of the West Indies Press, 1988), 234.

³² Bryan Edwards. *The History, Civil and Commercial, of the British Colonies in the West Indies*. 3d Ed. 4 Vols. (Philadelphia: J. Humphrey Press, 1805; Reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1972), xix.

St. Domingue. He argued for control over the maroons since much like the free blacks of St. Domingue, they too could encourage rebellion if they become dissatisfied.³³

Edwards' financial interest in the continued success of his plantation influenced his descriptions of the Jamaican maroons as well. Although his plantation was never under direct threat from maroons, many of his colleagues reiterated their concern to him about their presence. Despite his personal bias, Edwards' study has merit and certainly provided good insight into the mindset of the Jamaican planters during the eighteenth century.

Much of information Edwards used regarding the history of the early maroon groups derived directly from planer historian Edward Long. Edwards explains he adopted Long's work in some sections "because I have nothing to add."³⁴ In 1774, Edward Long published *The History of Jamaica*, which included a section on the maroons as well. Long, like Edwards, was born in England but considered himself first a West Indian. At times, his work lacks sophistication mainly due to its broad focus. Long explains his intention to cover not only political developments in Jamaica, but foreign relations, domestic topics, natural sciences, geography and social history as well.³⁵

³³ Bryan Edwards, *An historical survey of the French Colony in the Island of St. Domingo: comprehending a short account of its ancient government, political state, population, productions, and exports; a narrative of the calamities which have desolated the country ever since 1789, with some reflections on their causes and probable consequences: and a detail of the military transactions of the British army sent in that island to the end of 1794* (London: J. Stockdale, 1797; Reprint, London: T. Whitaker Publishing, 1966), 429-31.

³⁴ Campbell labeled Edwards study as useless to present day scholars. She referred that it included lengthy sections of Long's text, and therefore adds nothing new to the discussion. See, Campbell, *Maroons*, 9.

³⁵ Edward Long, *The History of Jamaica, or, General Survey of the Ancient and Modern State of that Island: with reflections on its situation, settlements, inhabitants, climate, products, commerce, laws and government*. 3 vol. (London: T. Lowndes, 1774; Reprint, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003), 345-46.

Long had few, if any, personal encounters with actual maroons. Most all of his information came from secondhand accounts of soldiers, slaves, and colonists who met with maroons. Although Long's work was some of the first produced regarding eighteenth century Jamaica, it lacks detailed descriptions of maroon communities and was incomplete in painting a vivid picture of the colony. Most all of Long and Edward's discussions regarding the maroons dealt with battle, plunder, and destruction, and made little mention of life outside these areas.

R.C. Dallas, another contemporary planter historian, held a more favorable view of the maroons than his colleagues. Dallas published, *The History of the Maroons From Their Origin to the Establishment of Their Chief Tribe at Sierra Leone*, in 1803. He expressed concern that Edward's work painted an incomplete picture of maroon life. At times, Dallas attempted to play the role of a neutral observer. His study, considered the most complete of the contemporary planters, covers the history of the maroons from the time of Spanish withdrawal into the nineteenth century. His work was without some of the bias of Edwards, Long and others who described only a warlike people. In his introduction Dallas stated, it was his intention to construct a complete rendering of the maroons. He explained, "My talk, however, would have been very brief and in-complete, had I confined myself to the events of war...I have therefore thought it proper to extend my plan including in it the whole history of the maroons."³⁶ It is from his writing, ethnohistorians and anthropologists are able to glimpse a view of eighteenth century maroon life.

³⁶ Dallas, "Preface," In *History*, iii.

Besides Dallas, official documents, particularly the treaties, are useful to the historian as they emphasize the strain the maroon groups placed on the plantation owners. The treaties describe in vivid detail the aspects of maroon life that were daily threats to the plantations. Edwards wrote the introduction to a collection of proceedings regarding the maroons he entitled, *The Proceedings of the Governor and Assembly of Jamaica in Regard to the Maroon Negroes*. Assembly proceedings described numerous disputes among the maroons and colonists. They also provided historians with good information on the changing relationships of maroons, slaves, colonists, and colonial officials.³⁷

The Trelawny rebellion also created valuable primary sources that have influenced scholars. The memoirs of Alexander Lindsay Earl of Balcarres and governor of Jamaica during the time of the Trelawny rebellion indicated the tension between the colonists and the Trelawny group. Although records from colonial governors and administrators exist, Balcarres memoirs were the only published. In letters and speeches, Balcarres displayed a growing distrust of the maroons throughout his tenure. He insisted that French immigrants from St. Domingue joined them to stir up rebellion. Scholars have perhaps overlooked Balcarres and his peers. It is his persistent fear of French emigrants that played a large role in the Trelawny deportation.³⁸

Contact from Balcarres with field commanders expressed concern about inevitable violence with the maroons and the need for deportation long before these ideas became official policy. Balcarres wrote frequently to John Wentworth, the Duke of

³⁷ Edwards, *History of the British West Indies*, xxi.

³⁸ Alexander Lindsay, Duke of Balcarres, "The Rise and Progress of the Maroon War," In *The Lives of Lindsays The Memoir of the Houses of Crawford and Balcarres*, ed., Lord Lindsay, (London: John Murray, 1849), 28-29.

Portland and governor of Nova Scotia between 1790 and 1796. In correspondence, the two men often discussed the situation of the Trelawny maroon group. The memoirs of Wentworth are also useful to historians as he described the daily occurrences of life for the maroons in Nova Scotia. The maroons, who felt that Wentworth was kind to them in their plight, openly voiced their opinions about the violence. To Wentworth, they recalled some aspects of their defiance that ultimately led to disunity, division, and war.³⁹

After the publication of Wentworth's memoirs in 1830, very little work on the maroons appeared until the end of the nineteenth century.⁴⁰ For decades, the writings of Dallas, Edwards, and Long were seen as complete depictions of the communities. Historians and anthropologists of the early twentieth century, much like Jamaican planters, often focused on the violent nature of the communities. William Gardner's *History of Jamaica*, published in 1873, largely reiterates Long's work in his sections dealing with the maroons. Gardner vilified the maroons and portrayed them as savage and barbaric.⁴¹ Joseph Williams echoed this Euro-centric tone in the 1938 publication of *The Maroons of Jamaica*. Williams also replicated much of the information discovered by Edwards, Dallas, and Long. His study, however, remained rooted in early twentieth century anthropology. Williams was the first to point to striking similarities between maroon and West African cultural practices. For the most part though, Williams and

³⁹ Lindsay, "Maroon War," 30.

⁴⁰ John Wentworth. *Extracts and copies of letters from Sir John Wentworth, Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia, to his grace the Duke of Portland respecting the settlement of the maroons in that province*. (Early Canadiana Collection, Fogler Library, University of Maine; Bangor, Maine: Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions, 1977), microfiche, CIHM 47614.

⁴¹ William Gardner, *History of Jamaica from its Discovery by Christopher Columbus to The year 1872, including an account of its trade and agriculture, sketches of the manners, habits, and customs of all classes of its inhabitants; and a narrative of the progress of religion and education in the island* (London: J. Stockdale, 1873), 75-89.

Gardner's work repeated the same ideas of Dallas, Edwards, and Long. With little to contribute to the field, they too included entire sections of writing from these men, and added little or no context to place them.⁴²

Secondary sources of the mid-twentieth century attempted to remedy this perceived bias through romanticized views of the maroon communities. In these works, the maroons were portrayed as heroic freedom fighters that overcame the bonds of slavery through defiance. This shift in the historiography occurred for two reasons. One, there was an abundance of information in primary sources regarding maroon warfare and unconventional techniques. Scholars of the mid-twentieth century simply spun tales that previous historians perceived as barbaric into acts of defiance. Two, the climate of the colonial independence movement during the mid twentieth century largely shaped the views of some historians. Post-colonial scholarship praised the maroons for their defiance and success in battle against the colonial system. Few of the works mention or fully address the maroons' role as collaborators with the colonial government. Until the 1970s, the maroon historiography remained incomplete. Many scholars refused to acknowledge the complexities of the maroons' position in the eighteenth century.

Although not without value, many accounts of the maroons as freedom fighters emerged during the mid-twentieth century at the time of Jamaican independence, in 1962, and many African nations' independence around the same period. Maroon defiance linked to the emergence of the Rastafarian movement as well. Many saw their oppressed situation in Jamaica similar to that of the maroon communities. Others found national heroes in the early maroon figures of Cudjoe, Nanny, and Accompong. Many in Jamaica

⁴² Joseph Williams, *The Maroons of Jamaica*, Anthropological Series, vol. 3, no. 42 (Boston: Boston College Press, 1939), 379-480.

viewed the eighteenth century maroon communities as mystical because it was perceived they defeated the strongest military power in the world with few resources. Twentieth century maroons were responsible for many of the romanticized views of this historic group as well.⁴³

Maroon historians Carey Robinson illuminated this romantic theme of the maroons as heroic warriors. Robinson's work is mainly a compilation of contemporary planter historian R.C. Dallas's entries, but with added folklore that glorified and vindicated the violent acts of the maroons. Besides information from Dallas, his evidence mainly derived from oral histories that developed around Accompong town, descendants of the Leeward maroons, and Moore Town, descendents of the Windward maroons. Robinson's knowledge of interior Jamaica provided first hand descriptions of many areas inaccessible to scholars, but his agenda to create a heroic account of the maroons hampers most serious historical arguments presented.⁴⁴

This genre did produce some work of value to scholars. C.L.G. Harris, a present-day maroon colonel, compiled numerous accounts of maroon life from the time of inception to present-day. In *The Maroons of Moore Town*, Harris provided a lengthy discussion of the linguistic patterns and their connections to ceremonies that invoke fallen ancestors. Through this type of literature and a persistent oral history, Nanny, Cudjoe, and early maroons achieved legendary status in twentieth century Jamaica.⁴⁵

⁴³ Marcus Garveys' father claimed Maroon roots, but it is unclear to which group. See, Walter Rodney, *Groundings With My Brothers*, (Kingston: Frontline Press, 1982); Sheila Kitzinger, "The Rastafarian Brethren of Jamaica," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 9 (1966): 33-39.

⁴⁴ Carey Robinson completed a number of works on the maroons. The bulk of his research is found in *The Iron Thorn: The Defeat of the British by the Jamaican Maroons* (Kingston: LMH Publishing, 1993).

⁴⁵ C.L.G. Harris, *The Maroons of Moore Town*, (Kingston: Kingston Publishing, 1972), 14.

Orlando Patterson's 1970 article, "Slavery and Slave Revolts: A Sociohistorical Analysis of the First Maroon War," marked the beginning of unbiased historical studies regarding the Jamaican maroon communities. He demonstrated the explicit connections between slaves and maroons, and the success achieved through rebellion during this early period. Patterson's study explained the needed characteristics for runaways to achieve success. Besides guerrilla warfare, runaways had to greatly outnumber the white planter class, maintain a low ratio of native-born slaves, sustain common ethnicity, and retreat to lands that provided favorable conditions for defense. Patterson argued through his examination of the Jamaican maroon communities that, "Large scale, monopolistic slave systems with a high rate of absenteeism will, geographical conditions permitting, exhibit a tendency toward slave revolts."⁴⁶

After Patterson's article, a number of scholarly works appeared. In 1972, Richard Price compiled, *Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas*. This collection of essays, that included Patterson's article, demonstrated both the differences and similarities of organized runaway groups throughout the Americas. Price's work emphasized the diverse nature of maroon communities. He argued that all Afro-American emigrants held onto African customs, but maroon life centered on these traditions. Maroons in the Americas held a rare freedom "to extrapolate African ideas and adapt them to changing circumstances."⁴⁷ Maroon communities formed not only based on African practices, but incorporated native and European customs as well. Price

⁴⁶ Orlando Patterson, "Slavery and Slave Revolts: A Sociohistorical Analysis of the First Maroon War," *Social and Economic Studies* 19 (1970): 289-325.

⁴⁷ Price, ed., *Maroon Societies*, 28-30.

and others work of the 1970s demonstrated throughout the Americas, maroons created communities that were based on African principles, yet unique to the American environment.

During this same period, Barbara Kopytoff added insight into the formation of the Jamaican maroon communities. Her work directly addressed the development of the communities and attempted to explain better the choices made by the maroons regarding improvement, warfare, and religion. In 1976, she published, “The Early Political Development of Jamaican Maroon Societies” in which she outlined the differences between the Windward and Leeward maroons during the seventeenth century. Kopytoff found that the remoteness of the Blue Mountains allowed the Windward maroons to remain further isolated from attempts to subdue them. This created small independent groups that cooperated, but never achieved the unity held by the Leeward maroons.⁴⁸

Kopytoff also was the first historian to outline clearly the meaning of the treaties to the maroons. She argued the agreements were sacred charters to the maroons, consummated through West African rituals and practices. Kopytoff also argued in “Religious Change Among Jamaican Maroons” that nineteenth century missionaries failed to convert maroons mainly because of their strong ties to African traditions.⁴⁹ The continuances of African customs in the Americas led many maroons to reject missionary attempts, while some slaves openly accepted conversion. Throughout these studies,

⁴⁸ Barbara Kopytoff, “Early Development of Jamaican Maroons Societies,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d Ser., 35 (1976): 287-307.

⁴⁹ Barbara Kopytoff, “Religious Change Among the Jamaican Maroons: The Ascendancy of the Christian God within a Traditional Cosmology,” *Journal of Social History* 20 (1977): 463-484.

Kopytoff defined the maroons as a community and not bands of runaway slaves. She argued this reflected in the changes made throughout their history.⁵⁰

Mavis Campbell's *The Maroons of Jamaica 1655-1795* offered the most complete picture of the eighteenth century maroons. Her use of untouched public records in both Jamaica and London demonstrated both defiant, yet subservient communities. Unlike Patterson and Kopytoff, Campbell's purpose is not to define the causes of maroonage. She is more concerned with "the sociological characteristics, the demographic and ethnic patterns, and certain ecological factors" that led to successful maroon communities in Jamaica. Campbell's work reiterated Patterson's view that after treaties the maroons did a disservice to slaves in the plantations. She indicated that while a pan-African movement created cohesion among the maroons, it never resonated to slaves in the plantations. Maroon history, according to Campbell, must include their defiance as well as their "atavistic stubbornness" in dealing with other African-Americans in Jamaica.⁵¹

Campbell's work often assumed there was a pan-African fervor among blacks in eighteenth century Jamaica. She argued that continued collaboration with the white authorities was a betrayal to the slaves in the plantations. These notions, developed first by Patterson and reiterated throughout the late twentieth century, labeled the maroons as both freedom fighters and hypocrites. Historian Hilary Beckles, however, pointed out that what appear to be "stages in the development of a black anti-slavery polity are for

⁵⁰ See also, Kopytoff, "The Development of Jamaican Maroon Ethnicity," *Caribbean Quarterly* 12 (1974): 33-50; Kopytoff, "Colonial Treaty as a Sacred Charter of the Jamaican Maroons," *Ethnohistory* 26 (1979): 45-64.

⁵¹ Campbell, *Maroons*, 260.

Campbell ideological positions.”⁵² Campbell perhaps underestimated the rapid transformation of the maroon communities in eighteenth century Jamaica as well as their distance both physically and culturally from slaves in the plantations.

Despite groundbreaking work by scholars, gaps in the field still exist. As Mavis Campbell pointed out, there has been no complete study of the Trelawny maroons deportation and eventual settlement in Sierra Leone since Dallas’s work was published in 1804. Richard Price, also explained, “The internal organization of maroon societies has received relatively little scholarly attention.”⁵³ Most likely these gaps are due to lack of available resources. While this burden of source material hampers all ethnohistorians, further studies using the existing sources need exploration. Few scholars have attempted explanations for maroon allegiance to the British and their seemingly erratic decision to end these agreements. No study has attempted to explore gender roles within the communities. The historiography is also in need of a complete depiction of the maroon communities in the nineteenth century. This study will attempt to incorporate further the frontier inhabited by Jamaican maroons. No study regarding the Jamaican maroons has focused entirely on the frontiers. This work, however, will struggle to balance the lack of primary source material from the communities, which will continue to render any study of the maroons inadequate and somewhat incomplete.

⁵² Hilary Beckles, review of *The Maroons of Jamaica: A History of Resistance, Collaboration and Betrayal*, by Mavis Campbell, *American Historical Review* 76 (1979): 579.

⁵³ Price, ed., *Maroon Societies*, 424-25.

CHAPTER 2. ESTABLISHING AUTONOMY IN THE FRONTIER ZONES

Freedom achieved by Jamaican runaways in the seventeenth century was due mostly to rugged interior portions of the island. In the Caribbean, areas of refuge for slaves were often near secluded mountain ranges, dense jungles, or isolated islands. Jamaica, unlike Brazil or portions of southern Florida, was too small to allow large-scale runaway communities. Jamaican maroons formed groups in various portions of the interior that were uninhabited. Only in these secluded locations, could bands of runaway slaves congregate and form their own independent communities. After the colonization of the frontier zones, maintaining autonomy became extremely difficult for maroons.

Frontier areas of eighteenth century Jamaica held similar characteristics to other areas in the Americas. There were several reasons for maroon autonomy in the early period. First, both maroon groups formed in isolated areas with harsh environments and few white settlers. Second, through knowledge of the terrain, maroons utilized and protected the only paths into these areas making travel extremely difficult. Third, during this early period, frontier zones were laden with carnage. Often violence became horrific as groups vied for power. Isolation, the difficulty of travel and rampant violence kept most from entering the frontier zones of the early eighteenth century.

Seclusion and violence of the frontier zones in eighteenth century Jamaica, allowed the maroons to live outside the control of colonial authorities. A military prowess ensured the maroons from intrusion into their communities. The lives of the early maroons, however, were dangerous and difficult. During the mid-1730s, British encroachments became more successful, as more troops were brought to the island.

While maroons remained independent, constant warfare led the groups to pursue peace with the British beginning in 1739. After this event, the treaties exposed the frontier to new elements, but the areas remained desolate.

Both the Leeward and Windward maroons chose isolated areas for their permanent settlements. Maroons, although they resided in remote areas, remained only a few hours travel away from white colonists. They formed two separate groups, one in the central and western portions of the island, and another in the Blue Mountains of eastern Jamaica. The surrounding environment of these areas provided necessary protections that allowed the maroons to live independently. From their retreats, maroons attacked plantations, protected all paths leading to their communities, and successfully fought off colonial militias sent to subdue them.

The Windward maroon community in eastern Jamaica date back to the time of Spanish occupation in the seventeenth century. Early runaways in Jamaica gathered in the Blue Mountains, located near the parishes of St. Thomas in the east and Portland. Few, if any, white settlers or planters entered the region until the mid-eighteenth century. It was not until 1740, after the treaty with the Windward maroons, that the first plantations were established in the parish of Portland. Bryan Edwards noted in his 1793 publication, *History of the British West Indies* that the Blue Mountains have “never have been explored.”⁵⁴ Oral history from twentieth century maroons in the Blue Mountains confirmed this idea. Maroons indicated the early groups thought themselves to be the first people to settle their areas.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Edwards, *History of the British West Indies*, xi.

⁵⁵ Joseph Adjaye, “Jamaican Maroons: Time and Historical Identity,” In *Time in the Black Experience*, ed., Adjaye, (CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 58.

The limited use of space by the Spanish and the destruction of the native population left portions of the interior regions uninhabited and available to runaway slaves from the coastal regions. Although the Spanish occupation of Jamaica lasted over 150 years, conquistadors settled in few places. Escaped slaves formed gangs in the mountainous regions, far from the coastal areas inhabited by the Spanish. The areas remained unoccupied throughout Spanish control. Arawak Indians destroyed by disease and enslavement perished by the time of English takeover in 1655.⁵⁶ Bryan Edwards noted, “Not a single descendent of either sex” inhabited the island by the time of British control.⁵⁷ This supports Mavis Campbell’s assertion that very little, if any, Native American influence existed among the Jamaican maroons.⁵⁸

During the middle of the seventeenth century, Spanish planters sought labor from imported Africans after the Arawaks became extinct. Following several rebellions and individuals acts of flight, runaways became formidable in the Blue Mountains by the late seventeenth century. In 1658, just three years after the British won control of the island, runaways in the east numbered around 250. This was a sharp increase in number. The maroons grew from small gangs who roamed the mountains during Spanish occupation into larger, organized communities.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ David Cook estimates that all of the native Caribbean population was extinct by 1520. David Noble Cook, *Born To Die: Disease and New World Conquest, 1492-1650* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 5.

⁵⁷ Edwards, *History*, 131.

⁵⁸ Campbell, *Maroons*, 17.

⁵⁹ This figure is based on the assertions of David Dalby. See, David Dalby, “Ashanti Survivals in the Language and Traditions of the Windward Maroons of Jamaica,” *African Language Studies* 12 (1971): 34-35; Philip Wright concluded earlier that the maroon population was over 500. See, Philip Wright, “War and Peace with the Maroons, 1730-1739,” *Caribbean Quarterly* 16 (1970): 5-7.




Figure 1. Maroon settlements and surrounding frontier zones.

The Leeward maroons also chose an area that was uninhabited. They migrated from portions of St. Ann and Clarendon to the “cockpit country,” a series of caves carved out of limestone deposits near central portions of the interior. The caves stretched from east to west with entrances that consisted of a fifty to an eighty-foot climb to enter the thin openings among the giant limestone. Jamaican planter R.C. Dallas described where the Leeward maroons precisely located and planned their settlements to aid them in defense. He described Trelawny Town, the main outpost of the Leeward maroons, when he asked his readers to “let your imagination help me to convey you up to the immense mountains, successively towering one above the other, presenting tangled forests or immense precipices of barren rock.”⁶⁰

⁶⁰ The term “cockpit” developed after soldiers proclaimed the areas to look similar to the arena where a cockfight might take place. See, Dallas, *History*, 79.

One British major general described the cockpit region as “perhaps the strongest and most impenetrable of any on the face of the earth.”⁶¹ Dallas described the cockpits entrance as a “great scission made through a rock by some extraordinary force or convulsion of nature and through which men can pass only in a single file.”⁶² He also observed, “Cudjoe displayed great judgment in choosing this position, as in case of alarm he could throw himself into the cockpit, where no valor or force could drive him.”⁶³ In most cases, thick brush and bodies of water hid this gateway. Slaves who visited the areas told masters and officers that this area was “impracticable to any but a maroon.”⁶⁴

The “cockpit” areas remained inaccessible to outsiders for decades. In 1739, Governor Edward Trelawny explained, “All throughout the length of the island from one end to the other the middle for some miles is full of thick woods, craggy mountains, and stony precipices, in these the rebels have their settlements which are almost inaccessible and so posted that a few can keep out fifty times their number. They have a fastness behind fastness, ambushes and narrow difficult passes one behind the other, and when with great danger and loss of men you beat them out of one they retire to another and so on.”⁶⁵

Both maroon groups controlled the only know roads and paths to their settlements. Control of the paths by the maroons made travel in the early frontier zones

⁶¹ Dallas, *History*, 60.

⁶² Dallas, *History*, 67-68

⁶³ Dallas, *History*, 69.

⁶⁴ Bryan Edwards, *Proceedings*, iv-v.

⁶⁵ C.O. 137/56, Trelawny to Newcastle 5 Mar 1739, In Philip Wright “War and Peace War and Peace with the Maroons, 1730-1739,” *Caribbean Quarterly* 16 (1970): 8.

extremely difficult for outsiders. Those attempting travel found the paths, “steep, rocky, and difficult, and not wide enough to admit the passage of two persons abreast.”⁶⁶

Straying from the paths left those searching for the maroons to wander aimlessly through dense vegetation and other perils of the sub-tropical rainforest. From the commanding portion of a mountain or treetop, maroons saw any approaching parties. Records indicated most attempts to ascend or traverse a path proved difficult. Cudjoe and his men used rocks and boulders to stop advancing parties. These large stones were rolled down the narrow paths, and often through this method, the maroons thwarted encroachments without firing a single shot.⁶⁷

Maroons relied upon superior knowledge of the terrain as well. In both locales, maroons were “thoroughly acquainted with their ground” and could “vanish almost unseen before their enemies reloaded.”⁶⁸ Governor Edward Trelawney remarked, “By knowing the country and being nimbler they are often able to surround our (British) parties and attack them on every side hemmed in within these streights.”⁶⁹ Edward Long agreed the maroons held a clear advantage in the wilderness. He explained, “They (maroons) are remarkable, like North American Indians, for tracking in the woods.”⁷⁰ The maroons could detect outsiders by “the turn of a dried leaf, the position of a small twig, and other insignificant marks, which a European would overlook.”⁷¹

⁶⁶ Edwards, *Proceedings*, x-xi.

⁶⁷ Edwards, *Proceedings*, viii.

⁶⁸ Dallas, *History*, 42.

⁶⁹ Quotations of Governor Trelawny taken from Long, *History of Jamaica*, 340-42.

⁷⁰ Long, *History of Jamaica*, 347.

⁷¹ Long, *History of Jamaica*, 345.

Maroons hidden in the brush along paths communicated through an *abeng*, or the horn of a cow used as an instrument. The horn, also utilized in West Africa, could produce various notes and scales to convey the seriousness of the call to arms. Maroons in hiding reported the number of approaching enemies, the weapons they held and the seriousness of the threat posed all with this bugle-like instrument. Dallas noted that the *abeng* “directed by its various modulations, their movements.”⁷² The horns also created chaos in battle as the constant noise led to confusion and irritation for outsiders. Innovative techniques such as this made control of paths into the desolate frontier zones even more difficult.

Tactics used in the early part of the eighteenth century by the British demonstrate the difficulty of travel in the frontier zones for non-maroons. Even after they repulsed attacks, British troops refused to pursue the maroons. Bryan Edwards described an unsuccessful ambush of militia members. In 1734, “Whilst the officers were at dinner...the Maroons rushed suddenly from the adjacent woods and attacked them. Several pieces were discharged, the report of which alarmed the militia, who immediately ran to their arms, and came up in time to rescue their officers from destruction. The Maroons were repulsed, and forced to take shelter in the woods, but the militia did not think fit to pursue them.”⁷³

During the 1720s and early 1730s, the British attempted to establish a series of forts in the dense interior. Some hoped the forts would provide effective supply to militia groups in the frontier zones. Attempts at establishing the forts were, however, were

⁷² Dallas, *History*, 44.

⁷³ Edwards, *Proceedings*, vi-vii.

largely unsuccessful. Often, maroons were able to gain control of British made forts. Once the forts were lost, the militia and soldiers were left to wander for days in wild, unknown terrain. Governor Edward Trelawny noted that the parties of British sent out failed and only aided the maroons. He explained the forts, “have generally been so unsuccessful that it is supposed that much the greatest part of the arms which the rebels now have, have been taken from those that have gone against them.”⁷⁴

With the few roads often guarded by maroons, forts also attempted to lessen travel in unknown terrain. Throughout the early period of maroon development, travel, in both the eastern and western interiors, remained extremely dangerous. Bryan Edwards wrote, “Their (Maroons) barbarities and outrages intimidated whites from venturing any considerable distance from the sea coast.”⁷⁵ He noted that the Windward Maroons “rendered every attempt to settle near them impracticable...and caused several plantations to be thrown up and abandoned and prevented many valuable tracts of land from being cultivated.”⁷⁶ Edward Long noted, in *History of the West Indies*, “Whole parishes, such as St. James and St. George were virtually desolate no man’s lands.” In these areas “traveling was not safe anywhere.”⁷⁷ In 1733, the Jamaican Assembly proclaimed the maroons “had grown very formidable in the Northeast, Northwest, and Southwestern districts of the island, to the great terror of his majesty’s subjects in those parts.”⁷⁸

⁷⁴ C.O. 137/56, Trelawny to Newcastle 5 Mar 1739, In Philip Wright “War and Peace,” 13-15.

⁷⁵ Edwards, *Proceedings*, ix-x.

⁷⁶ Edwards, *Proceedings*, x.

⁷⁷ Long, *History of Jamaica*, 163-64.

⁷⁸ C.O. 137/79, In Campbell, *Maroons*, 68.

Maroons, thoroughly acquainted with the frontiers, led their unconventional war against those who entered or ventured near their communities. Frontier zones of early eighteenth century Jamaica were known as violent places that few, besides the maroons ventured. One British soldier explained the outcome of the battles were “generally in favor of the maroons, they being more accustomed to traverse the mountainous woods, and better acquainted with the fastness and retreats they afforded.”⁷⁹ Edward Long noted, “Their mode of fighting in real war, is a system of strategy, bush-fighting and ambush.”⁸⁰ Dallas reiterated notions of their irregular methods of war. He wrote, “Surprise and ambush were the chief principles of their (Maroons) warfare; they had not confidence in themselves in open fields, and therefore seldom risked a regular battle.”⁸¹

British militia members attested to the protection provided to the maroons in the frontiers and the often violent encounters with the groups. In secluded spots, maroons waited, undetected, along paths for an opportune time to strike. Their knowledge of the terrain allowed them to ambush approaching parties. Soldiers explained to Dallas that the maroons hid, “covered by the underwood, and behind rocks and roots of trees, waiting in silent for their pursuers.”⁸² John Stewart, soldier and colonist, noted the Leeward maroons, “hardly ever were seen, nor could the troops know where to direct their fire.”⁸³

⁷⁹ Stewart, *An Account*, 27.

⁸⁰ Long, *History of Jamaica*, 293.

⁸¹ Dallas, *History*, 39.

⁸² Dallas, *History*, 35.

⁸³ Stewart, *An Account*, 31-32.

The Windward maroons remained well protected as, “every approach to their mountains was, for a mile or two, well guarded by small advanced parties.”⁸⁴

R.C. Dallas described maroon warfare as, “an art of attack and defense, which, in the difficult and hardly accessible brush of the interior of the island, has since so often spoiled the best exertions of bravery.”⁸⁵ John Stewart reflected on maroon warfare in his journal. Sources acknowledged this type of warfare was only present in the frontier zones and maroons rarely engaged the enemy in open areas. Stewart felt maroons would never conceive of European concepts of war. He wrote, “To preach this doctrine to the vindictive and cowardly savage is like persuasion to the deaf winds of heaven.”⁸⁶

The colonists connected the maroons with the wilderness they inhabited and their method of guerrilla warfare. Coastal residents saw this area as a lawlessness jungle where violence threatened all inhabitants. Horrific descriptions of violence perpetrated in these areas led many on the island to label the maroons as ferocious and kept most from entering or colonizing the frontier zones. The perceived viciousness of the maroons resonated in contemporary works. Dallas wrote their appearance differed little from slaves and freed persons of color, but “their eyes were quick, wild and fiery, the white of them appearing a little reddened.”⁸⁷ Bryan Edwards reflected, “The maroons are

⁸⁴ Stewart, *An Account*, 283-84.

⁸⁵ Dallas, *History*, 88.

⁸⁶ John Stewart attested the description of Maroon warfare was a soldier and friend who wished to remain nameless, see, Stewart, *An Account*, 279.

⁸⁷ Dallas, *History*, 138.

generally tall, well made...this owing in great measure to the wild and wandering life they lead, and to their not mixing so much with general society as other Negroes.”⁸⁸

The anarchy present in the frontier areas indicated that violent encounters took place there. Contemporary British soldiers and militia members who entered maroon territory felt that capture of an outsider by the maroons meant certain death, and likely torture. Maroons also remained aware of harsh punishments reserved for runaways. Defeat for maroons would likely lead to a life of enslavement or execution. The fears and angers of both reflected in some of the violent encounters between the two groups.

Loyal servants reporting to their masters in the plantations told of some instances of graphic violence. In their travel of the frontier areas, some slaves claimed to have witnessed violent acts in the capture of prisoners. One slave, who witnessed the detention of several white men, expressed to his master that the maroons “mutated many of these unhappy victims in a dreadful manner, and inflicted upon them a variety of studied and insulting tortures.”⁸⁹ Another slave claimed to have seen “three white men, that were taken in” by the maroons and “carried to Negro Town and there put to death.”⁹⁰

Such tales of horrific violence were commonplace in the frontier zones. Edward Long wrote of a British militia member caught by the maroons. He exclaimed “his savage pursuers, having collected the body, in order to preserve the head as the trophy of victory, roasted and actually devoured the heart and entrails of the wretched victim.”⁹¹

⁸⁸ Edwards, *Proceedings*, vi.

⁸⁹ Stewart, *An Account*, 283.

⁹⁰ Negro Town was thought to be Nanny Town, the main outpost of the Windward maroons. Edwards, *Observations*, xii.

⁹¹ Edward Long, *History of Jamaica*, 339.

British colonists noted that the savagery in the frontier zones connected largely to the desperate situation of the maroons fighting for survival. One soldier stated, “It would be painful to dwell on the various shocking barbarities exercised on the unfortunate white men who fell, in these encounters, alive in the hands of this savage foe, who glorified in having such an opportunity of glutting their blood-thirsty and vindictive spirit, by nameless insults and protracted tortures.”⁹²

Cultural exchange expressed through violence remained a prominent feature of the Jamaican frontier zones. Anthropologist Mary Louise Pratt demonstrated initially, dialogue between groups vying for control of these areas resonated through violence or constant conflict.⁹³ Historian Richard White argues that the continued exchange of various groups interacting in frontiers of the Great Lakes region leads to what he terms “negotiated middle ground.”⁹⁴ This middle ground was a neutral area that no group could fully control, yet there remained frequent interaction, conflict, and contact. Brazilian historian Hal Langfur explained how in frontier zones, groups vying for power often attempted to instill fear in others through horrific violence. This involved an intensive search by all members to gain knowledge regarding the cultural values of the perceived enemies. This type of exchange, argues Langfur, was the essential form of communication in Brazilian frontier zones.⁹⁵

⁹² John Stewart, *An Account*, 293.

⁹³ Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London: Routledge, 1992), 4-7.

⁹⁴ Richard White, *The Middle Ground, Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: UK., 1991), 50-53.

⁹⁵ Hal Langfur, “Moved by Terror: Frontier Violence as a Cultural Exchange,” *Ethnohistory* 52 (2005): 259-261.

Scholarship understands the horrific acts participated in by both sides as calculated responses to establish terror and power. Ethnohistorian Neil Whitehead asserted that horrific violence in contact areas was more than merely a biological response or a function of crude members of society. In some cases, these acts demonstrated expressive purposes in the violence. They were in fact calculated decisions, which made clear statements about who controlled territory in the interior. Whitehead found in portions of Guyana, ritualistic and violent death became “a mark of Amerindian autonomy.”⁹⁶

Jamaican maroons also adopted violence as a form of self-expression. During this early period violence kept outsiders a considerable distance from the communities. Katherine Verdery notes that corpses often carried great weight in the frontier zones and colonial societies. Disfigurement was as a method of controlling religious perceptions and beliefs.⁹⁷ Jamaican historian Vincent Brown also found that ritual executions gave the actors supernatural powers. The mutilations of dead bodies in contact zones were symbolic acts that empowered both groups. Most importantly, however, it contributed to the fear many had about entering these unknown areas, and ultimately to little development of the frontier parishes near the maroon settlements.⁹⁸

Violence for the Jamaican maroons extended beyond their areas into frontier plantations. Many times slaves, women, and children were targeted for kidnap or

⁹⁶ Neil Whitehead, *Dark Shamans: Kanaimà and the Poetics of Violent Death* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 5-8.

⁹⁷ Katherine Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies* (New York: Columbia University Press 1999), 30-32.

⁹⁸ Vincent Brown, “Spiritual Terror and Sacred Authority in Jamaican Slave Society,” *Slavery and Abolition* 12 (2003): 25-26.

murder. This fear caused many colonists to abort early attempts at colonizing areas near the maroons. R.C. Dallas stated the maroons, “In their predatory excursions greatly distressed the back settlers, by plundering their houses, destroying their cattle, and carrying off their slaves by force.”⁹⁹ One planter wrote, “By night, they seized the favorable opportunity that darkness gave them, of stealing into the settlements, where they set fire to cane fields and outhouses, killed all the cattle they could find, and carried slaves into captivity.” He added, “This was a dastardly method of conducting war.”¹⁰⁰

The early maroons of Cudjoe’s group at times targeted civilians and plantations. Stewart noted orders were “often issued from their retreats, burning and plundering, and massacring wherever they went, the defenseless white inhabitants.”¹⁰¹ Edwards expressed similar concern about the Windward group. He stated, “No settlement could be established near them; for they butchered every white family that ventured to seat itself any considerable distance inland.”¹⁰² R.C. Dallas acknowledged, “Murder attended all their successes; not only men, but women and children were sacrificed to their fury, and even people of their own color, if un-connected with them.”¹⁰³

Oral histories from the maroon communities often acknowledge this violence was a response to similar acts perpetrated against runaways and slaves.¹⁰⁴ Planters used ritualistic killings to deter slaves from running away. For instance, in 1738, two slaves

⁹⁹ Dallas, *History*, 47.

¹⁰⁰ Governor Edward Trelawney, In Wright, “War and Peace,” 18.

¹⁰¹ Stewart, *An Account*, 290-92.

¹⁰² Edwards, *Proceedings*, viii.

¹⁰³ Dallas, *History*, 34.

¹⁰⁴ For a discussion of oral histories, see, C.L.G. Harris, *Maroons of Accompong* and Carey Robinson, *The Fighting Maroons of Jamaica*.

charged with killing a white man were taken to the location where the white man was slain and subsequently put to death there. One planter in the frontier parish of Westmoreland stated “two of the rebel Negroes were tried and burnt with a slow fire (alive)” in the same location of the white man’s death.¹⁰⁵ This was a clearly calculated decision and an attempt at deterrence. It also was a form of expression and an attempt to manage areas thought to be outside the control of the colonial governance.

British violence against maroons during this period was less documented, but certainly present. Stewart explained, “Instances occurred of their (British soldiers) opening the graves, and cutting off the heads from the putrid carcasses of the maroons who had been there interred.”¹⁰⁶ John Stewart acknowledged his concern for this level of violence, “It must indeed be confessed, that the whites sometimes did things which could answer to no other end than to exasperate the maroons.”¹⁰⁷ These acts were clearly an attempt to win control of the maroon territories. Much like planters, those hunting the maroons attempted to utilize ritualistic violence to assert control of the frontier.

Some of these horrific descriptions ascribed to the maroons and the British were baseless. Contemporary R.C. Dallas admitted, “Many of the horrors attributed to them (maroons) are void of foundation.”¹⁰⁸ Long attested he did not witness these incidents, but had heard the testimony from “men of character.”¹⁰⁹ Likely, the men were fellow planters and militia members determined to dissuade any slaves that might attempt to join

¹⁰⁵ C.O. 137/56, Trelawny to Newcastle, 4 Dec, 1738, In Wright, “War and Peace,” 19-21.

¹⁰⁶ Stewart, *An Account*, 283.

¹⁰⁷ Stewart, *An Account*, 285.

¹⁰⁸ Dallas, *History*, 57.

¹⁰⁹ Long, *History of Jamaica*, 351.

the maroons. Vicious stories created by slaves in the plantations also contributed to creating a perception of the frontier zones as a dangerous place of ritualistic murders, cannibals, and barbarians.

Despite the challenge of frontier warfare, by 1735 the militias had won a series of victories that damaged the maroons. This began in 1729 as Governor Robert Hunter put forth a sustained effort to pacify the maroons and control areas around their settlements. Although the maroons remained defiant, historian Mavis Campbell pointed out these years were a time of profound crisis. From 1731-1735, nine expeditions were sent after the maroon groups. It was at this time that, “colonists resolved to make every sacrifice, to put an end to this harassing war.”¹¹⁰ One expedition consisted of upwards of 400 men and was successful in the destruction of Nanny Town (main outpost of the Windward maroons) in 1734.¹¹¹ After this victory by the militias, maroons retreated further into isolation, rarely engaging in battles from 1735-1739. At this point, maroons seemed to realize they could not defy the colonial system much longer. British regulars in Jamaica numbered around 800 by 1738, nearly double what maroons faced just a decade earlier. Frontier zones were under pressure, and eventually the protections these areas afforded began to diminish.

Cudjoe later explained that the tolls of constant warfare that once created their communities were now eroding them. One contemporary noted, “Both parties had now grown heartily wearied out with this tedious conflict. The white inhabitants wished relief from the horrors of continual alarms, the hardship of military duty, and the intolerable

¹¹⁰ Dallas, *History*, 52.

¹¹¹ Dallas, *History*, 46.

burden of maintaining an army. The maroons were not less anxious for an accommodation; they were hemmed in, and closely beset on all sides; their provisions destroyed, and themselves reduced to a miserable condition, by famine and insufficient attacks.”¹¹²

Although violence had been at the heart of their community, it was clear to Cudjoe and other maroons that constant warfare would likely result in the death, deportation, or enslavement. Dallas asserted, “If relief from the fatigues of an uncertain war was agreeable to the white inhabitants of the island, it was no less to the maroons who for some time before been kept in a state of continual alarm.”¹¹³ According to Dallas, Cudjoe acknowledged “he had for some time been in a state of want and despondency.”¹¹⁴ Dallas explained, “That if peace had not been offered to them, they had no choice left but either to be starved, lay violent hands on themselves, or surrender to the English.”¹¹⁵

For decades though, the seclusion and violence of the early frontier zones helped the early maroons remain autonomous. Historian Barbara Kopytoff notes the importance of this initial independence. She argues, “For the maroons, the entire span of their history before 1739 is especially important because it was the only time when they were able to develop political institutions outside the sphere of influence of the colonial society.”¹¹⁶ During this period, they were largely outside the control of the colonial governance living

¹¹² Edwards, *Proceedings*, xiii, xiv.

¹¹³ Dallas, *History*, 59.

¹¹⁴ Dallas, *History*, 56.

¹¹⁵ Dallas, *History*, 57-58.

¹¹⁶ Kopytoff, “Early Development of Jamaican Maroon Societies,” 306.

in frontier zones that offered ample protection from outsiders. Harsh and isolated environments, maroon knowledge of the terrain and paths and persistent violence allowed the maroons to develop autonomously. These protections would diminish throughout the 1730s, and eventually by the end of the century, they disappeared. As the frontier zones became smaller, maroon groups pursued collaboration with the colonial authorities for their long-term survival in the frontier.

CHAPTER 3. EXPOSING THE FRONTIER ZONES

Most scholars have suggested the treaties signed between the maroons and colonial authorities to be entirely in favor of those authorities.¹¹⁷ There clearly were reasons to read them this way. A number of clauses restricted maroon freedoms such as methods of punishment, ministering of justice, and control over foreign affairs. Immediately after 1739 until the 1770s, however, the treaties remained beneficial to the maroons. They ended warfare, granted them allotted space, brought the maroons into the colonial economy, and most importantly signified their right to exist. Maroons during the post-treaty period fully recognized these benefits and primary source material indicated they willingly complied with the set terms of the agreement.

Initial benefits for the maroons of this period, however, exposed the frontier zones in a number of ways. Treaty provisions placed an added British presence in the maroon communities and the surrounding frontiers. The treaties also required the maroons to police the frontier zones to keep runaway slaves from gathering and becoming a threat. Both resulted in the areas becoming safer and easier for production and colonization. The statistics of the later quarter of the century demonstrated this reflected growth. Despite the maroons' control, a number of revolts, runaways, and renegade maroons threatened the frontier zones throughout the post-treaty period. This demonstrated while the areas were easier to access, neither the colonial government nor the maroons controlled all areas of the interior. There remained frontier zones in the cockpit region and Blue Mountains that offered protection and defense for some rebel groups.

¹¹⁷ See, Campbell, *Maroons*, 190; Kopytoff, "Colonial Treaty," 45-46; Robinson, *The Iron Thorn*, 79-83; Craton, *Testing the Chains*, 32; Patterson, "Slavery and Slave Revolts," 289-92.

Both treaties contained clauses that ended the secrecy of maroon locations. Clauses 13 and 14 of the Leeward treaty and clauses 3 and 5 of the Windward treaty required clear paths to maroon towns and for British officers to live among the communities. British superintendents, as the officers were known, maintained friendly relations with the maroons. Communities once secret to outsiders, were now closely watched and monitored.

Other stipulations made the frontier zones safer for travel. The first clause of both treaties ended hostility between the groups.¹¹⁸ Both the maroons and the British, weary of battle, agreed and abided by this regulation. Other stipulations required the maroons to hunt and suppress runaways that inhabited the remaining barren regions of the interior. Clause 6, 9, and 10 of the Leeward treaty and clauses 8 and 9 of the Windward treaty stipulated the maroons patrol the surrounding frontier zones in search of runaways.¹¹⁹ The clauses further stated that the maroons aid the plantocracy in the suppression of slave rebellions. For a steady source of income, the maroons willingly accepted their role as enforcers. Essentially, the maroons solved the colonists' problem of having a large refuge for runaway slaves. Since the British occupation, runaways remained one of the most difficult obstacles to safer travel and colonization within the interior.

With a lack of ample frontier space, slaves had difficulty retreating and plundering of neighboring frontier plantations. The treaties stated, "That the said Captain Cudjoe, and his successors, do use their best endeavors to take, kill, suppress or destroy,

¹¹⁸ Treaties are found in the Public Records Office, London, under C.O. 137/23 and C.O. 137/56. Also at the National Library of Jamaica (*Institute of Jamaica*), *Jamaican Assembly Journals* 3 (1739): 457-8. Complete versions of the treaties are also found in Campbell, *Maroons*, 126-28 and 135-37. To view both treaties please see Appendix A, B.

¹¹⁹ C.O. 137/23, In Campbell, *Maroons*, 126-28.

either by themselves or jointly, with any other number of men commanded on that service by his Excellency the Governor or Commander in Chief for the Time being, all Rebels wheresoever they be throughout this Island.”¹²⁰ According to contemporary accounts, maroons hunted down individual runaways and suppressed any attempts at large-scale rebellions or alliances between renegade maroons and slaves.

The policing made areas of the frontier zones much safer for outsiders. Maroon groups eradicated safe havens for runaway slaves, and pursued with vengeance slaves in the frontier zones. Dallas explained that runaways captured by the maroons would “immediately be sent back to the Chief Magistrate of the next parish where they are taken; and those that bring them are to be satisfied for their trouble as the legislature shall appoint.”¹²¹ One planter explained that after the treaties, maroons “proved themselves a useful body” to the colonial government. Governor Edward Trelawny agreed. He remarked the post-treaty maroons “hold a perfect harmony with the country and render themselves as useful as possible by taking up our runaways and returning them of their own accord.”¹²²

While flight remained a problem on the plantations, it reached nowhere near the levels of previous generations or other colonies with the maroons patrolling the interior.¹²³ There was an increase in the number of slave rebellions, but perhaps this could be attributed to the distraught slaves having fewer choices. Individual flight was now much more difficult and dangerous. For centuries, the wilderness provided hiding

¹²⁰ C.O. 137/23, In Campbell, *Maroons*, 126-28.

¹²¹ Dallas, *History*, 94-95.

¹²² Lt. Sadler addressing Governor Trelawny, February 18, 1739, “Minutes of the Jamaican Council,” In Michael Craton, *Testing the Chains*, 89.

¹²³ Craton, *Testing the Chains*, 75-78.

places for many runaways. Unable to control and patrol the areas, the British employed the maroons. With superior hunting skills, maroons easily tracked most slaves that fled into the desolate areas that remained. Often this capture was violent, vengeful, or deadly for the runaway slaves.

A lack of space in which slaves could retreat rendered flight difficult, if not impossible in some locations. This area was frequently traveled by whites and heavily patrolled by the maroons. Dallas explained the merits of the alliance,

but who can say what other communities of slaves might have been formed in the woods and mountains, and what other wars might have been the consequence? It is very probable that assemblages of fugitives would have been formed in the woody and almost inaccessible retreats of the country, had it not been for the frequent scowering of the woods by the maroons, in search of run-away Negroes. These assemblages would in time have formed new maroon bodies, as difficult to be subdued as the former; and so far more dangerous than the original Maroons were in their outfit, that their connection with the slaves would have been more general.¹²⁴

Techniques utilized in hunting wild hogs, aided the maroons in their pursuit of runaways. The maroons who patrolled the wilderness were excellent hunters and trackers. One contemporary noted, “they placed a considerable dependency on hunting.”¹²⁵ The process of hunting wild game was a daily aspect of life for maroon males. John Stewart exclaimed, “The constant exercise of their limbs in ascending and descending, and their custom of exploring the vast mountains and precipices of the interior country in pursuit of wild boar, contributed to their strength and symmetry.”¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Dallas, *History*, 100.

¹²⁵ Stewart, *An Account*, 297.

¹²⁶ John Stewart, *An Account*, 297. The daily pursuit of wild hog was useful in policing the frontier. The maroons roamed the frontier zones in bands of no more than twelve men hunting, capturing and many times killing any intruders or fugitives. For a description of Maroon hunting techniques see,

Contemporary literature indicated the maroons pursued runaways with the same skill they had shown in decades of battles with the British regulars. These activities demonstrated areas of interior Jamaica remained that no group completely controlled. Guerrilla war tactics and a superior knowledge of the frontier zones continued to benefit the post-treaty maroons. Violent encounters between newly imported Africans and maroons lasted throughout the post-treaty period. Primary sources noted the severity with which the maroons treated the captured runaway slaves. Edwards stated, “In their treatment of fugitive slaves, they manifest a blood-thirstiness of disposition, which is otherwise unaccountable.” He added, “Although their vigilance is stimulated by the prospect of reward, they can have no possible motives of revenge or malice towards the unfortunate objects of their pursuit.”¹²⁷

These actions were likely calculated responses with a clear message to the slaves to remain out of maroon controlled territory. Such violence reflected competition over space that went beyond assurance of reward money. According to one colonist, many times the maroons, “with nothing more than a pretense would put the poor wretches to death.”¹²⁸ Another contemporary noted, the fugitive slaves were “frequently maimed without provocation, oftentimes bringing home the head of the fugitive, instead of a living man; making their plea of resistance an excuse for their barbarity.”¹²⁹

C.L.G. Harris, *The Maroons of Moore Town*, (Kingston: Kingston Publishing, 1985), or Carey Robinson, *The Fighting Maroons of Jamaica*, (Kingston: LMH Publishing), 1993.

¹²⁷ Edwards, *Observations*, xii.

¹²⁸ Dallas, *History*, 97.

¹²⁹ Stewart, *An Account*, 279-281.

At first, planters encouraged this type of violence. They too had utilized terror tactics for deterrence. Dallas noted that soon after the treaties the maroons made few efforts at capturing runaways alive. He stated the maroons were, “careless whether they brought in a runaway alive, or only his head.”¹³⁰ After about a decade though, execution became counterproductive to the profitability of plantations. With the price of labor importation climbing, the colonial government acted to ensure better the return of healthy runways. In 1751 and 1753, laws passed by the Colonial Assembly safeguarded that runaways returned alive by granting the maroons more rewarded money. Dallas explained the first law of 1751 that applied to the Leeward community. He wrote, “A law was passed, with great policy, allowing, besides the usual reward, mile-money for every runaway produced alive.”¹³¹ Maroons, in part, depended upon the income earned from catching slaves. The importance of this income reflected in their willingness to halt executions, ritual violence, and ruthlessness toward runaways after they were granted a higher bounty for the return for healthy runaways. The decrease in violent acts was also another reflection of a slowly depleting frontier.

Besides their pursuit of individual flight, maroons also helped to stop large-scale rebellions from forming in the interior. One colonist told Edwards that, “Besides their utility in preventing assemblages of fugitives, they had been active in the suppression of rebellions.”¹³² In the mid to late eighteenth century, numerous slave rebellions occurred in Jamaica. Revolts shook the whites’ confidence and challenged their ability to maintain

¹³⁰ Edwards, *Proceedings*, xxxv.

¹³¹ Dallas, *History*, 97.

¹³² Long, *History of Jamaica*, 351-53.

the established power structure, which now included the maroons. Without areas of retreat, rebels however, often were put down quickly with the aid of maroons.

The first uprising suppressed with the help of maroons involved some of their own renegade members. In 1742, some of Cudjoe's headmen, dissatisfied with the treaty aligned themselves with slaves from a nearby estate in an attempted rebellion. The group expressed anger over the recent treaties. Slaves and maroons, both of Akan (West African) origin, attempted to lead an uprising that planned to destroy both loyal maroons and the neighboring plantations. The ambitious plan was for the rebellious maroons “to cut off all those there that were born in the woods, or came from other countries.”¹³³ Rebellious slaves on the plantation would gain control of the plantations and meet their allies in the interior.

This plan failed to materialize as Cudjoe “immediately armed a sufficient number of the most faithful of their (his) people, attacked the rebels, killed some, took others and chased the rest home to their plantations.”¹³⁴ Cudjoe later brought the conspiracies leaders to the colonial officials where he recommended execution for their actions. The rebels who joined their cause were easily defeated in battle, subdued, and sent into slavery. The defeat persuaded many maroons to adhere to their colonels’ demands to abide by the treaties. After this event, instances of large, organized dissent diminished among the maroons until 1795.

The Windward maroons also demonstrated their lack of support for other groups of runaways forming in the remaining frontier areas. A group known only as the Congo

¹³³ *Jamaican Assembly Journal* 3, May 1, 1742, (Kingston: Institute of Jamaica), In Campbell, *Maroons*, 148-9.

¹³⁴ *Jamaican Assembly Journal* 3, May 1, 1742, In Campbell, *Maroons*, 149.

Settlement, lived autonomously and outside the control of both the maroons and the colonists for some supposed twenty years. Descendants of the Windward maroons discovered the settlement in a small area south of the Blue Mountains as they policed the interior. The Congo group was quickly defeated by the maroons and “was dispersed with some of the Negroes returning to the estates to which they formerly belonged, and others surrendering with the maroons.”¹³⁵

In 1760, maroons aided the suppression of a large uprising in which slaves retreated to the outskirts of the plantations near the frontier zones. The revolt, which started in the parish of St. Mary, moved west to St. Anne, and included slaves from the parishes of St. James and Trelawny. Led by a slave called Tacky, the rebels claimed the early maroons provided inspiration for their rebellion. The slaves claimed, like the pre-treaty maroons, they too fought to obtain their freedom. Some planters suggested this connection might have contributed to the maroons’ slow reaction to the crisis. Edwards noted at first some maroon groups refused to participate in the fighting against Tacky’s men. Dallas explained though maroons insisted they “regularly be paid their head money allowed by law for every runaway and rebel they had taken up previously” before they joined in the battle.¹³⁶ After granting this request, the maroons fully participated in the suppression.

Contemporaries described the aid the maroons gave to the colonial authorities during Tacky’s rebellion. After both the Leeward and the Windward groups reached the rebels, they suppressed the rebellion within six months of fighting. One contemporary

¹³⁵ Dallas, *History*, 102-03.

¹³⁶ Very little is known about the Congo Settlement. Dallas was the only contemporary to mention the group. Dallas, *History*, 96-99.

described the final battle as the maroons at first, “lined the wood to the right and left, to prevent ambush (of the British).” Later they “penetrated the wood at the foot of the hill, and ascending it on the opposite side, and spreading themselves, suddenly assaulted the rebels (Tacky's men) in flank, who were instantly routed, and a great number killed, or taken prisoner.”¹³⁷

Other contemporaries noted of the maroons' aid in this suppression. Dallas stated the maroons “stood forth with a determined spirit against the insurgents; and in the conflicts of the year of 1760, lost several of their people.”¹³⁸ Westmoreland planter Thomas Thistlewood exclaimed, “Cudjoe's men behaved with great bravery” during Tacky's revolt.¹³⁹ Maroons again aided the planters when smaller uprisings took place in 1761, 1765 and 1766. The involvement of the maroons in these rebellions was less documented. Historian Michael Craton pointed out that the 1760 rebellion was not equaled in scale until the revolts of 1831 and 1865. With the aid of the maroons, most rebellions ended in a matter of days and weeks. In 1768, for their services in these supportive roles, the former descendants of the Leeward maroons received a reward of four hundred and fifty pounds. The bonus granted to the Accompong and Trelawny maroons was not only a debt of gratitude, but also “to encourage their future service.”¹⁴⁰

It is too difficult to determine the extent of maroon involvement in some slave uprisings as contemporaries expressed varied accounts of their activity. For the most part

¹³⁷ Long, *History of Jamaica*, 454.

¹³⁸ Dallas, *History*, 111-13

¹³⁹ Trevor Burnard, *Mastery, Tyranny and Desire: Thomas Thistlewood and His Slaves in the Anglo-Jamaican World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 175.

¹⁴⁰ Long, *History of Jamaica*, 449-50.

though, the maroons accepted their role as enforcers. This reflected in the little success of eighteenth century slave revolts in Jamaica and the 1768 bonus payment from the British. Despite some discrepancy, post-treaty maroons were willing participants against any organized attempts at overthrowing the colonial governance or the established terms of the treaties.

Besides the safety provided from the maroon patrols, the frontier zones became more secure due to the presence of British officers. All maroon settlements were required to have at least two resident British officers.¹⁴¹ The officers, known as superintendents, maintained their presence by “preserving the peace in their (Maroon) settlements, preventing the concourse of slaves in the towns, and sending parties out on duty (in search of runaways).”¹⁴² Officials also kept a close watch of the maroon population, tracking the number of able-bodied males and new births.¹⁴³ Throughout the post-treaty period, maroons accepted the officers, despite their obvious role as spies.

British resident officers also oversaw the regulation and maintenance of paths and roads. According to the treaty, the Leeward maroons were required, “to cut, clear and keep open, large, and convenient Roads from Trelawny Town to Westmoreland and St. James’s, and if possible to St. Elizabeth’s.”¹⁴⁴ Dallas also stated that every three months the resident officers completed detailed reports on the state of the roads into maroon settlements. The reports were then brought before the Colonial Assembly who monitored

¹⁴¹ The Windward maroons were required to have four officers, although there has never been an explanation for the increase. C.O. 137/23, In Campbell, *Maroons*, 135-37.

¹⁴² Dallas, *History*, 66.

¹⁴³ Dallas, *History*, 69.

¹⁴⁴ Few of the superintendents’ reports remain. Mavis Campbell discovered several in the Institute of Jamaica in Kingston. C.O. 137/36, In Campbell, *Maroons*, 140-42.

the transportation of people, goods, and services in these areas. Clear paths led to easier travel to and from the coastal areas and ended the secrecy of maroon locations.

Officers developed further control of the areas through their cordial alliance with maroon leaders. Colonels ruthlessly controlled nearly every aspect of maroon life, even in the post-treaty period. R.C. Dallas noted after the treaties, “The successors or Cudjoe maintained a degree of influence and authority.”¹⁴⁵ Another contemporary observed, “All their disputes were subject to the determination of their chiefs, to whom they looked upon with implicit confidence, and whom they usually obeyed without argument.” He added, “They were governed in a very despotic manner.”¹⁴⁶

Colonels embraced their new allies, and the British officers repaid their loyalties. In the years following the treaties, colonels received numerous gifts. The gifts included inscribed silver chains, gold locket, weapons, and leather boots. Long felt the gifts were necessary to continue to win the allegiance of the maroons. He noted, officers often bestowed to maroons, “some mark of favor, such as a waistcoat, a hat, a sword, fusee, or any other articles of like nature which seem acceptable.”¹⁴⁷ According to Long, the maroons were “pleased with these distinctions, and a trifling douceur of this sort bestowed annually, accompanied with expressions of favor, wins their hearts and strengthens their dutiful attachments.”¹⁴⁸

Along with gifts, maroons adopted English fashion. Contemporary discussions of encounters mentioned the change of dress among the maroons. This alteration indicated

¹⁴⁵ Dallas, *History*, 135-36.

¹⁴⁶ Edwards, *Proceedings*, xv.

¹⁴⁷ Long, *History of Jamaica*, 347.

¹⁴⁸ Long, *History of Jamaica*, 348-49.

the maroons' willingness to collaborate with the colonists. Early maroons wore little clothing and no shoes or boots. Pictures of Cudjoe, prior to this period, portrayed a short stocky man with modest clothing. After the treaties, maroon dress became much more extravagant. One maroon colonel from Accompong wore a "ruffled short, blue broad cloth coat, scarlet cuffs to his sleeve, gold buttons...white cap and hat, white linen and breeches puffed at the knee."¹⁴⁹ Many maroons also wore feathered caps. In the post-treaty period, one planter who met a colonel felt he had "somewhat of a majestic look" in English attire.¹⁵⁰

Besides fashion, the post-treaty maroons also adopted English names. Early maroon colonels used West African names such as Cudjoe, Nanny, Quao, and Accompong. By 1760, however, many maroons took English names such as Johnny, James, and Reid. Dallas stated in a footnote that it became the maroon custom of "adopting the names of the gentlemen of the island."¹⁵¹ Edwards agreed that it was, "universally practiced among the Maroons (in addition to freed blacks) of attaching themselves to different family names among the English, and desiring gentlemen of consideration to allow the Maroon children to bear their names. Montague James, John Palmer, Tharp, Jarrett, Parkinson, Shirley, White, and many others, are names adopted this way."¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ See Figure 2, *Old Cudjoe Making Peace* for a depiction of Cudjoe prior to signing the treaty. Also, see, Dallas, "Preface," In *History*, v.

¹⁵⁰ Burnard, *Mastery, Tyranny and Desire*, 23.

¹⁵¹ Dallas, *History*, 70.

¹⁵² Edwards, *Proceedings*, xxvi.




Figure 2. "Old Cudjoe Making Peace." In R.C. Dallas, *History of the Maroons*, v.

By all indications, maroon leaders maintained their agreements with the British, and this reflected through their willingness to adopt some British customs. This strengthened alliance reinforced a British presence in the frontier zones. Areas that were once impossible to locate for the militias of the 1720s were, by 1750, under a greater British influence. Through their presence, British officers helped to gradually erode the protections afforded to the early maroons in the rough interior.

Through the maroons' compliance and an added British presence, frontier zones gradual shrunk from 1739 until the end of the century. The depletion of the frontier zones reflected the complaints made by maroons near the end of the eighteenth century. Colonial expansion did not resonate immediately among the post-treaty maroons, but after decades of expansion. While the Jamaican economy thrived after 1750, it was not until the 1770s that large-scale production took place in the frontier parishes of Westmoreland, St. James, St. Mary, and Portland.¹⁵³

Treaties exposed the frontier zones through the patrolling by the maroons and an added British presence. These actions compromised the frontier and made once violent locations much safer. During this post-treaty period, however, frontier zones were not fully closed. For a few decades, maroons subsisted in the frontier by patrolling runaways and maintaining cordial relations with the colonial government. This collaboration, however, drastically changed the maroons' quasi-allegiance with most of the slave communities, and perhaps diminished any chance of a large-scale rebellion. Without safe havens to retreat to, there was little chance for successful resistance against the colonial authorities. Despite this absence of warfare, as long as areas of unoccupied land

¹⁵³ For more information on this growth see, R.B. Sheridan, "The Wealth of Jamaica in the Eighteenth Century," *The Economic Historical Review* 18 (1965): 292-311; Peter Coclanis, "The Wealth of Jamaica on the Eve of the Revolution," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 21 (Autumn 1990): 245-260.

remained available for the maroons to patrol, they could exist in the colony as distinctive, semi-autonomous communities.

CHAPTER 4. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TRELAWNY FRONTIER

Frontier zones slowly diminished throughout the later half of the eighteenth century. Autonomy for the maroons connected largely to desolate areas where they could either wage guerrilla campaigns against the colonial authorities or work as enforcers patrolling the areas for an allotted sum. To eighteenth century colonists and planters, it was unclear how the maroons would fit into the colony outside of these roles. By the end of the eighteenth century, two factors had greatly compromised the existence of one particular frontier zone in western Jamaica close to the Trelawny maroons. This subsequently challenged maroons' survival in that area as well. One factor was increased colonization after these areas were made safer by the treaties. Expansion constricted the maroons, and groups throughout the island complained of a lack space. Many found stipulations of the treaties too difficult to abide by while living alongside more plantations. Another factor that led to destruction of the Trelawny frontier was the slave rebellion in neighboring St. Dominuge. This uprising, which lasted from 1789 until 1804, sent Jamaica into a panicked state. Fearful colonial officials attempted to control every aspect of the colony, including the remaining frontiers.

Ongoing colonization proved difficult for all maroons, but expansion particularly threatened the areas around Trelawny in western Jamaica. In 1795, the Trelawny maroons, burdened with additional colonization and a colonial government bent on further control, eventually rebelled. Complaints of the Trelawny maroons centered largely on the two issues of increased colonization and the threat of rebellion. An incident involving the punishment of two maroons for theft as well as their unhappiness with a newly appointed superintendent were seen as direct challenges to their autonomy.

Contemporaries and historians both agreed these events led to the eventual uprising.

Governor Alexander Balcarres thought it was probable “that this insurrection is owing to private disputes.”¹⁵⁴ Maroon historian Carey Robinson asserted the main grievance of the maroons was that the whipping was done by a runaway slave who had earlier been captured by maroons from Trelawny.¹⁵⁵ Most scholars who have studied the 1795 war, determined the causes were mainly local disputes between the Trelawny maroons and neighboring planters regarding methods of punishment, land rights and hunting grounds.

The occurrences, however, were themselves connected to the destruction of the frontier zones surrounding the Trelawny maroons. Placing the Trelawny maroons in a frontier context allows historians to understand the complexities involved in this uprising. While distraught over immediate occurrences, Trelawny maroons were the first of many Jamaican maroon communities to have their very existence challenged through the destruction of their surrounding frontier areas.

The Trelawny maroons provided the substance of their disagreements to the magistrates of St. James parish in 1794. The disputes of the Trelawny maroons submitted were:

1. An infringement of their treaty by the magistrates of Montego Bay, in causing the punishment of whipping to be inflicted on some of their people by the hand of a slave.
2. That the land originally granted to them for their subsistence was worn out, and, being not sufficient for their support, they required an additional quantity, saying that the penns of several settlers in the neighborhood would suit them.

¹⁵⁴ Balcarres, *Lives of Lindsay*, 59.

¹⁵⁵ Robinson, *Fighting Maroons*, 82.

3. That Captain Craskell, their superintendent, was, on account of his timidity, unqualified for his office; and as they had experienced the disposition and abilities of Major James, they were desirous of his re-appointment, and averse to receiving any other.¹⁵⁶

The complaints demonstrated the frontier areas were compromised through colonization and reactions to the war in St. Domingue. The first two complaints were derived from increased colonization of the areas around Trelawny. A lack of space for movement, production, and growth angered the Trelawny group. Often the pursuit of goods brought them into closer contact with the colonists. The third complaint tied into the colonial authorities concern over exiles from the St. Dominuge entering the maroon communities. To keep closer watch of the Trelawny maroons, officers who were less friendly took positions held by long time allies of the maroons. These incidents were the climax of ongoing problems steaming from the reduction of frontier space. Frontier zones were essential for the maroons to maintain autonomy. Without appropriate space for production, autonomy and growth, maroon existence remained uncertain and ambiguous.

John Stewart claimed a maroon named Johnson spoke with him regarding the maroons' situation on the eve of the Trelawny War. Johnson reiterated the same concerns given to the magistrates. The maroon stated (according to Stewart):

No be afraid, we won't hurt you, we won't burn your house down;
but we give key, we want what you have in your house to eat and drink.
When we gone, no stay here; go to Buckra, and tell them, say, Johnson no
been want for trouble them; him been want for keep for himself to
himself; but Buckra come and burn him house; them rock out him ground;
them say, they want for kill me; my wife and pickininnie no have house;

¹⁵⁶ Alexander Lindsay, Duke of Balcarres letter to the Duke of Portland, John Wentworth, 30 May 1795, In *The Lives of Lindsays*, 41-43.

no have victual. Well! So long as Buckra trouble me first, I will shew him something too.¹⁵⁷

Stewart later described Johnson as “grateful and considerate,” although he “breathed revenge and threatened destruction.”¹⁵⁸ The anecdote reiterated the same troubles the magistrates described, and alluded to many worries that faced the communities by the 1790s. The angry maroon referenced the rocky ground and restrictions that allowed to British to burn any Maroon settlement, field, or land outside their allotted areas. He also expressed concern about a dwindling food supply because of this perceived loss of farming land. It cannot be certain whether these were words taken directly from a maroon or merely fabricated by Stewart. The quote, however, expressed the same wants and needs of the Trelawney maroons that they had stated to the magistrates. It provides no contrary evidence and only further supports the ills of the Trelawny group.

Tension between the maroons and British colonists climaxed after the punishment of several maroons for stealing hogs from a white farmer. Edwards noted, “Two Trelawny town maroons were convicted by the magistrates of Montego Bay of stealing a hog from a white settler of St. James’s, and were sentenced for this crime to be whipped publicly by the work-house driver.”¹⁵⁹ The maroons caught in the incident were of little consequence to the Trelawny community. They later told colonists “that, if the whites had put their companions to death, they would not have complained, but to disgrace and

¹⁵⁷ This is the only known anecdote recorded in dialect by any of the contemporaries. Orlando Patterson and Kenneth Bilby doubted its authenticity. Stewart, *An Account*, 287-88.

¹⁵⁸ Stewart, *An Account*, 288.

¹⁵⁹ Edwards, *Proceedings*, xvi.

degrade them was an injurious insult to the whole tribe.”¹⁶⁰ After the incident the maroons “wished for permission to hang both of them, having long considered them as runaways and thieves.”¹⁶¹

The main concern of the Trelawny maroons was the method of the punishment, which publicly demonstrated their subservient status by having a slave whip members of their community. The incident directly challenged the maroons’ ability to maintain autonomous communities outside the realm of punishment intended for freed blacks in the urban areas and slaves in the plantations. This complaint to the magistrates also reflected the lack of space for the Trelawny maroons. Clearly, the maroons saw this as an infringement of their sovereignty. The incident, however, demonstrated the distance between the rest of the colony and the maroons became much smaller. The fight for resources, like wild hogs, reflected this closing gap.

The loss of land was a problem for maroons throughout interior Jamaica. Sugar expansion, however, in the frontier province of Westmoreland greatly threatened the towns of Trelawny and Accompong. The Trelawney group threatened from nearly all directions seemed the most desperate of the five maroon settlements on the island. As one soldier exclaimed in 1790, “The Trelawny town maroons were by far the most fierce, daring, and warlike of these people.”¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ Dallas, *History*, 58.

¹⁶¹ Edwards, *Proceedings*, xvii.

¹⁶² Stewart, *An Account*, 292.




Figure 3. Sugar and coffee exports of Jamaica, 1700-1900.

Much of this anger resonated around increase sugar production that fueled territorial expansion. Throughout the eighteenth century, sugar production soared in Jamaica. Plantations expanded throughout the island to meet demand abroad. Sugar production made up ninety-percent of British investment in the Caribbean during the mid to late eighteenth century, and some scholars have suggested this figure was even higher in Jamaica.¹⁶³ Soil exhaustion on smaller islands such as Barbados shifted production around the turn of the seventeenth century to larger operations in Jamaica, Brazil, and Cuba. Jamaica produced such an abundance of sugar from 1750-1800, historian Eric Williams declared this era the “Silver Age of Sugar.”¹⁶⁴

The added sugar production burdened the maroons in a number of ways. British planters sought uninhabited frontiers where the maroons once roamed freely. In 1750,

¹⁶³ Higman, *Jamaica Surveyed*, 8-9.

¹⁶⁴ Williams, *From Columbus to Castro*, 125-27.

around 1,600,000 acres of land in Jamaica still lied idle.¹⁶⁵ Colonists were eager to expand on what they thought to be fertile land. In the parish of Westmoreland, sugar plantations expanded rapidly, threatening the Leeward descendants in Trelawny and Accompong. In 1754, Governor Charles Knowles described the uninhabited region of Westmoreland as “tolerable even ground and what hills are in it are pretty easy of access and the soil is fertile.” Patrick Browne, in his 1756 publication, *A Natural History of Jamaica*, exclaimed these hills were “most agreeable for sugar cane.”¹⁶⁶ Development in Westmoreland reflected this desired growth. In 1738, this area included about 443 whites with 7,137 slaves producing 5, 450 hogsheads of sugar a year. By 1768, whites numbered well over 1,000, with over 15,000 slaves producing about 13,000 hogsheads of sugar per year. A province once barren in the 1730s, produced twelve percent of Jamaica’s sugar by the late eighteenth century.¹⁶⁷

During this time of immense growth, the maroons’ living space became constricted. Maroon groups grew somewhat after the treaties, but had fewer resources to provide for an expanding population.¹⁶⁸ Maroons found living at least three miles from any white settlement increasingly difficult. Besides their allotted 1,500 acres, maroons utilized lands around their communities for hunting and farming. Contemporaries

¹⁶⁵ Williams, *From Columbus To Castro*, 126.

¹⁶⁶ Patrick Browne, *A Natural History of Jamaica, containing an accurate description of that island, its situation, and soil; with a brief account of its former and present state, government, revenues, produce, and trade*. 3 vols. (London, White and Son, 1789; Reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1972), 25.

¹⁶⁷ A hogshead of sugar was a large wooden barrel used to transport either processed sugar or molasses. Mostly used to hold liquids, a hogshead could weigh anywhere from 60 to 120 pounds. For further information on hogsheads and population figures see, Trevor Burnard, *Mastery, Tyranny and Desire*, 14-15.

¹⁶⁸ For a lengthy discussion on the health and demography of the maroon communities, see Richard Sheridan, “The Maroons of Jamaica, 1730-1830: Livelihood, Demography and Health” *Slavery and Abolition* 6 (Dec. 1985): 152-72.

expressed that land was important as “besides their provisions, the maroons had a stock of cattle and they kept mares, from which they bred horses for sale. These fed in the woods and on neighboring heaths.”¹⁶⁹ The horses also proved useful for travel in the desolate areas. Without available areas outside of their allotted space, maroons found self-sufficiency much more difficult.

The treaties initially attempted to make certain areas more manageable for the British to control. After several decades, restrictions were still difficult to enforce. In 1761, the Jamaican Assembly passed a law that further restricted maroon space to their allotted 1500 acres. The law read, “If any maroon absented himself from his town without leave of the commanding officer, or, if he obtained leave, continued to absent himself for seven days after the expiration of such leave, then upon complaint made to any magistrate of the parish where the truant was found, (where) he was sent to jail.”¹⁷⁰ Confinement such as this led to a lack of proper farming ground or ample grazing land, but secured once barren areas for colonial production. This forced the maroons to interact with the colonists for goods that were once readily available in the frontier zones surrounding maroon communities. The disruption of grazing land and hunting rights in the frontiers were the root causes of many disputes between the maroons and British throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

By the 1770s, maroons expressed their anger over the growth into the interior and the added restriction to their movement. The grievances of all maroons mirrored the second complaint of the Trelawny group to the magistrates. George Gray, an officer who

¹⁶⁹ Dallas, *History*, 85-87.

¹⁷⁰ C.S.F., 154/4 *Acts* 332-33, In Campbell, *Maroons*, 185.

lived with the Charles Town maroons, noted the dwindling amount of space. He demonstrated that in 1756 when he arrived there were no whites near their settlement. By 1776, “several sugar works and other plantations have been settled in the neighborhood of their town, and upon the lands where their stock formerly used to range; by which means, they cannot raise stock of any kind, without encroaching on the neighboring plantations, as the land allotted for them is steep and hilly.”¹⁷¹ Planters grabbed available fertile land and maroons farmed exhausted or rocky soil. Land that once contained sugar plantations was also difficult to revive. Sugar plantations required living quarters for slaves, a boiling house and distillery as well as acres of land for production. Soil erosion often occurred within a matter of decades for some plantations. Richard Pares in his 1929 discussion of the West Indies noted the difficulty and cost associated with converting “a factory into a field.”¹⁷²

As the century progressed, maroon agriculture, therefore, became much more limited and constrained. The restrictions on acreage and colonial expansion confined the maroons to land that was largely un-productive, either overworked from former farms and plantations or too steep and rocky. Maroons that inhabited areas near the parish of St. James complained “a great part of that (maroon land) which was run out for them, is rocks and cockpits.”¹⁷³ Another contemporary observed, “The soil of their mountains was unfavorable, being either moist or clayey.”¹⁷⁴ They felt forced to move closer to

¹⁷¹ Petition of George Gray and others to the Assembly, November 28, 1776. In Campbell, *Maroons*, 197.

¹⁷² Richard Pares *A West Indian Fortune* (New York Longman, 1950), 320.

¹⁷³ Dallas, *History*, 142-43.

¹⁷⁴ Dallas, *History*, 106, 120.

white settlements to sustain themselves and their growing population. Trelawny Town petitioned for a new survey of the land surrounding their designated area in 1770.

Contemporary sources indicated that in Trelawny “of the 1500 acres of which their territory consisted, a third was merely rock, about a hundred acres worth cultivating, and the rest of it was over-run with a species of fern and Foxtail grass, which are certain indications of poor soil.”¹⁷⁵ This allowed a population of around 470 only about 100 acres of usable land.¹⁷⁶

Besides these troubles, Trelawny maroons also expressed concern over a change in their superintendent. The final complaint of the Trelawny maroons stemmed from the appointed British officer in their town. Colonial officials excused the maroons’ long time leader Major John James, who had served for nearly thirty years. The Trelawny group had grown accustomed to his presence and valued his opinion. He also kept a considerable distance from himself and the maroons, and only intervened at the instruction of the colonel. By 1790, the colonel of the Trelawny maroons had adopted his surname to become Colonel Montague James. Over Major James tenure, he came to hold a substantial amount of power due to his aid and insight.

In 1791, planters complained to the Colonial Assembly that Major James had spent too much time at his residence some five miles away from Trelawny Town. Colonial officials found James in dereliction of duty and replaced him with Captain Thomas Craskell, a surveyor bent on keeping a close watch on the communities.

¹⁷⁵ Stewart, *An Account*, 280-81.

¹⁷⁶ Post-treaty Maroons grew in number. Dallas estimated that in 1739 they numbered 600, in 1770 the maroons numbered 885 and in 1780 “about 1400.” There can be no confirmation of these figures though. Throughout Maroon history, the number of Maroons remained in question and continues to remain unknown to scholars, Campbell, *Maroons*, 183.

Colonial officials hoped he would keep a closer watch on the community, as they become more convinced that a wide spread rebellion would take place. The maroons were upset at Craskell's timid nature and his unwillingness to engage in their affairs as James had done. Ironically, they too were upset at Craskell's constant presence. A key demand to the magistrates was the re-installation of James and the removal of Craskell.¹⁷⁷

Unbeknownst to the Trelawny maroons, attempts at reassignment were poorly timed, as the colonial government was in a panicked state. Despite the fact that the maroons lived peacefully for some fifty years, colonists were convinced that they wanted only war. Those living in urban or developed areas of the colony remained somewhat unaware of the dramatic changes that had taken place in the maroon communities during the last forty years of the eighteenth century. They associated the Trelawney group with the warlike entities of the 1730s largely because they still inhabited the wild frontiers. The rebellion of St. Domingue further confined and restricted all non-white inhabitants of colonial Jamaica. Colonial officials exacerbated the situation between the colonists and the maroons mainly due to their own fear of a large-scale revolt. The plantocracy felt that if a rebellion among the maroon groups occurred, "Jamaica would have exhibited a scene of general conflagration, havoc and ruin."¹⁷⁸ The combined grievances of the maroons as well as the fears of colonial officials eventually led to sustained armed conflict between colonial officials and maroons for the first time since the treaties nearly fifty-five years ago.

The fears grew mainly from a large slave rebellion that overtook the French colony of St. Domingue beginning in the late 1780s. In 1793, Governor Adam

¹⁷⁷ Campbell, *Maroons*, 211-14.

¹⁷⁸ Stewart, *An Account*, 289.

Williamson left to lead an expeditionary force to St. Domingue and Governor Alexander Balcarres ascended to command of the island. Balcarres felt that preemptive action would save Jamaica from revolt and chaos. Planters, colonial officials, and colonists in Jamaica feared a similar rebellion among the slaves. The situation in St. Domingue influenced Jamaican officials in dealing with their plantations and the neighboring maroon communities as well.

Tales of violence in St. Domingue horrified colonists in Jamaica. By 1789, a slave rebellion in French province of St. Domingue spread across most of the colony. At the time of the uprising, the colony contained an estimated 465,000 slaves. In the Northern Province of Le Cap Francois over 100,000 slaves united with free blacks and destroyed nearly 300 plantations. An eyewitness observed that the slaves “massacred a great number of whites, and have taken as prisoners some females of that complexion, whom they forced to do the duties of a servant.”¹⁷⁹

Bryan Edwards described his own apocalyptic version of what he felt could happen in Jamaica if a maroon-slave alliance occurred. If successful, they “would have had it in their power to destroy the property of the country; and many slaves, seeing their successes and their desperate exploits would have been tempted, by a view of independence, to have joined their banners and to have massacred the few whites who had been left in care of the plantations.”¹⁸⁰ Edwards warned his fellow Jamaican planters of the disaster nearby and urged preemptive action to maintain security on the island. He

¹⁷⁹ Edwards, *Historical Survey of St. Domingo*, 408-410. For a complete history of the Haitian Revolution see CLR James, *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1963); David Geggus, ed., *Haitian Revolutionary Studies* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2002); Thomas Ott, *The Haitian Revolution* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1973).

¹⁸⁰ Stewart, *An Account*, 290.

explained, “Nothing can afford solid and permanent security to Jamaica, but tranquility at home.”¹⁸¹

Many were convinced that immigrants and bandits would ruin Jamaica by instilling ideals of liberty and justice among their own slaves. Edwards wrote of the dangers his island could face, “The island of Jamaica must have a vigilant eye to its own safety. Its trade, both outwards and homewards, will be exposed to capture; and such devastation may be spread over the windward parishes by hordes of banditti, coming either in open canoes from the southern parts of St. Domingo, and may destroy the labor of years, before the squadron at Port Royal can give the smallest assistance to the inhabitants.”¹⁸²

By the spring of 1795, only two years after Balcarres appointment, British officials felt that war was inevitable with the Trelawny maroons.¹⁸³ The situation in St. Domingue had worsened and there was growing concern about emigrants arriving in Jamaica from the war torn areas. In a letter to Governor Alexander Balcarres, the magistrates of St. James Parish expressed their concern over a possible rebellion stirred by French exiles. Colonists and planters accused the maroons of working with French emigrants to stir up rebellion in the frontier zones and on the plantations. Many of the officers in Jamaica had fought previously in the American Revolution and remained angry over French interference in that conflict. Officials linked the maroons and their

¹⁸¹ Edwards, *Historical Survey of St. Domingo*, 430.

¹⁸² Edwards, *Historical Survey of St. Domingo*, 422.

¹⁸³ John Stewart, Bryan Edwards and Governor Balcarres all reiterated that the war was unavoidable. See, Stewart, *An Account*, 291; Edwards, *Proceedings*, vix; Balcarres, “Maroon War,” 34-36.

foreign enemies together as forces who sought to oust them from their powerful positions.¹⁸⁴

Governor Alexander Balcarres was certain of French involvement in Jamaica during his tenure. He insisted there was an attempt by French emigrants “to burn Kingston in the beginning of April.”¹⁸⁵ He noted, “Several attempts have also been made to bribe my secretary and immense sums have been offered for his interest.”¹⁸⁶ Balcarres pointed to French involvement in many different unexplained instances. By the end of May 1795, his statements echoed the widespread paranoia in Jamaica. He stated, “I shall allow no foreigner whatsoever to remain on this island, unless I know what he is, and where he is; and I positively will not suffer any man capable of bearing arms to remain here.”¹⁸⁷ He later reiterated his concern, but assured the people of Jamaica in his leadership. He wrote, “although attempts have been made with much assiduity to introduce French principles into this island, I think they have made no impression at all, and it shall be my anxious care to suffer no inlet whatsoever for their doctrine.”¹⁸⁸

Colonial officials readily connected the Trelawny Maroons to other problems said to have derived from the French. This led to increased control and observation of Trelawny town. In 1791, Governor Williamson reiterated the tone Balcarres later adopted. Williamson stated shortly before his departure to St. Domingue, “I am

¹⁸⁴ Alexander Lindsay, Duke of Balcarres letter to Henry Dudas, Secretary of War, 21 July 1795, In *The Lives of Lindsays*, 40-41.

¹⁸⁵ Lindsay to Dudas, 21 July 1795, In *The Lives of Lindsays*, 41.

¹⁸⁶ Lindsay to Dudas, 21 July 1795, In *The Lives of Lindsays*, 42.

¹⁸⁷ Alexander Lindsay Letter to Duke of Portland, K.G., Secretary of State for the Home Department, 21 July 1795, In *The Lives of Lindsays*, 33-34.

¹⁸⁸ Alexander Lindsay to K.G. 21 July 1795, In *The Lives of Lindsays*, 34.

convinced that the ideas of liberty have sunk so deep in the minds of all Negroes, that whenever the greatest precautions are not taken they will rise.”¹⁸⁹

A portion of a speech given by Balcarres on August 2, 1795 summarized his reasons for the belief the French had plotted with the maroons. He explained, “I am of the opinion that the minds of the Trelawny Town maroons have been corrupted by incendiaries from the enemy. That the enemy have felt the pulse of this country is notorious. The attempt to burn Kingston-the intemperate expressions of Frenchmen, whom I had taken up as spies-the circumstance of some Frenchmen of the worst characters hovering at large about the country-these and many other indications have also given the alarm to my mind.”¹⁹⁰

No direct evidence linked the Trelawny maroons with activities of French insurgents or spies. The claim, however, reflected the chaotic period of late eighteenth century Jamaica. Organized communities of freed blacks had aided slaves during the uprising in neighboring St. Domingue. Jamaican authorities remained convinced of a maroon-slave alliance, if a large-scale slave rebellion occurred. This anxiety produced policies, which compromised the Trelawny frontier and pushed an already exasperated group to war.

From their complaints to the magistrates, records of colonial planters in frontier provinces and Johnson’s statement, it is clear that by the time of Governor Williamson’s departure in 1793, the Trelawny maroons had grown uneasy over more than just

¹⁸⁹ Alexander Lindsay, Letter to John Wentworth, Governor of Nova Scotia, 28 July, 1795, In *The Lives of Lindsays*, 48.

¹⁹⁰ Alexander Lindsay, Speech to the Council of War, 2 August, 1795, In *The Lives of Lindsays*, 46-47.

restrictions to their space or perceived violations of their sovereignty. They felt the alteration of their superintendent, the loss of land and the punishment of their fugitives clearly violated the treaties that had offered protection and ensured survival. The panicked government only added to this pressure. A combination of local events shaped by occurrences in the greater Atlantic World eventually led to the destruction of the frontier areas that surrounded the Trelawny maroons and that destruction left the community vulnerable and desperate enough to rebel.

From their pleas to John Wentworth in Nova Scotia, it appears the Trelawny maroons held no plans of widespread rebellion, but sought only self-preservation.¹⁹¹ The reasons for the 1795 rebellion connected to immediate occurrences, but also reflected in the gradual changes that took place beginning in 1739. The stealing of hogs, the re-assignment of Craskell, and the complaints of rocky ground demonstrated the maroons were upset over the changes that had taken place since the frontiers were exposed. As Dallas suggested in 1804 “The causes of the Maroon insurrection are too fought in events and objects remote and more serious than the occurrence which immediately preceded their taking up arms.”¹⁹²

By the 1790s, the Trelawny maroons no longer had aid from neighboring communities, once secure paths had been cleared, and colonels had become strong supporters of their British allies. Damaged relations with the slave population also diminished any ability to remain autonomous. Slaves aligned with colonial authorities after the maroons’ ruthless pursuit of runaways and suppression of rebellions. The

¹⁹¹ Wentworth, *Extracts*, microfiche, CIHM 47614.

¹⁹² Dallas, *History*, 123.

frontier zones, which once served as a refugee for slaves and maroons, were no longer outside the control of the colonial authorities. A larger maroon population was forced to adapt to fewer resources, which led to a change in diet, trade, and lifestyle.

These events, combined with reactions to the situation in St. Domingue, best explained the rebellion of 1795. Clearly, events outside of Trelawny and western Jamaica factored into the rebellion. Despite all the disadvantages the maroons confronted, they still managed to keep the British soldiers busy for several months. One observer noted, “A small body of Negroes defied the choicest troops of one of the greatest nations in the world, kept an extensive country in alarm, and were at length brought to surrender, only by a means of a subvention still more extraordinary than their own mode of warfare.”¹⁹³

The limited success demonstrated small retreats were still beyond any groups’ control. The war of 1795, which lasted a little over nine months, initially began in May, when the maroons launched several successful attacks. This success incited colonial fears as officials pleaded for additional resources. By the middle of August 1795, 1,000 additional soldiers were sent to Jamaica from St. Domingue.¹⁹⁴ Despite this presence, the maroons continued to be an annoyance for British soldiers. Trelawny maroons, however, had few resources. They were surrounded and outnumbered, pursued by dogs, and hunted by vengeful soldiers who sought revenge for executed compatriots. By January 1796, most of the Trelawny maroons surrendered, but it was not until March that all

¹⁹³ Stewart, *An Account*, 291.

¹⁹⁴ Dallas, *History*, 117-18.

maroons were subdued. By the end of May, the Trelawny maroons left on two ships for Nova Scotia.¹⁹⁵

The war of 1795 was a defining moment in the history of all maroons living in Jamaica, but it was also significant because it marked the end of one frontier zone. After the Trelawney group was deported, other maroons continued their complainants over the expansion into the frontier. Disputes over land, hunting rights and later the introduction of Christian missionaries continued into the nineteenth century. By the mid-nineteenth century, maroons who remained in Jamaica were confined to many of the same restrictions as slaves on the plantations. In 1842, an Assembly act voided the treaties signed with the maroons. This point truly marked the end of autonomy for all maroons, and would seem to signify the end of all frontier zones in Jamaica. This destruction, however, was uncertain, as there remained large tracts of uninhabited land throughout the nineteenth century. Frontiers remained difficult to approximate both physically and chronologically as they were by nature ambiguous and undefined.

¹⁹⁵ For complete depiction of the events of the 1795 War, see, Campbell, "The Trelawny Town War," In *Maroons*, 209-60.

EPILOGUE

Few scholars emphasized the frontier zones when treating the Jamaican maroons, despite growing literature that demonstrated the importance of this space. The history of the Jamaican maroons exemplified the correlation of maroonage and frontier environments. Scholars, who have acknowledged the importance of the Jamaican frontiers, perhaps have overestimated their value initially and underestimated the regions' role in the post-treaty period. The frontiers were not impenetrable, but merely difficult to negotiate, as it took years of fighting for the British to gain concessions with the maroons. By the end of the eighteenth century, however, frontier zones were in rapid decline, and this greatly threatened the maroons' ability to survive autonomously.

From the time of their origin, maroon groups found protection and independence in the frontier zones. They utilized the secluded locations and harsh environments to remain autonomous. Early maroons demonstrated a thorough knowledge of the frontier terrain. This familiarity allowed them to stop aggression into their areas by controlling the only known paths into their settlements. Early maroons also benefited from the constant violence of the frontier zones. Violence kept most out of these areas and allowed the maroons to develop independently.

For decades, maroons utilized the cockpit regions or Blue Mountains to thwart any aggression into their communities. In areas un-inhabited by colonists, runaways and those born free lived without the constraints that dominated the coastal cities and towns. Legendary figures such as Cudjoe, Nanny and Quao reinforced their political and military power through religious practices such as the obeah and sorcery, observations forbidden

in the plantations. Maroons built their own unique communities that combined elements of African culture but adapted them to fit their new world environment and experiences.

The forty years in the wilderness allowed the maroons to develop permanent, autonomous settlements with cultural distinctions apart from slaves in the plantations or free blacks in urban areas. Maroon historian Mavis Campbell explained, “The maroons, over time, had developed an inordinate sense of their own importance and a marked feeling of superiority over the other blacks of the island.”¹⁹⁶ Contemporaries described the maroons as distinct entities, unlike other enslaved West Africans in the plantations. This clear distinction perhaps was the reason maroons suppressed slave rebellions and captured runaways. The maroons calculated their relations with slaves according to their value. Early communities depended upon the slaves for goods, information, and companionship. After the treaties, many maroons viewed slaves as nothing more than economic opportunities, not as fellow Africans united in a struggle against the colonial system.¹⁹⁷

Post-treaty communities remained dependent upon the frontier for distinction, but in other ways. The nature of the frontier changed drastically after the treaties along with maroon allegiance. The treaties made frontier zones much safer and more susceptible to colonization. Treaties forced the maroons to patrol remaining frontier zones in search of runaways and brought an added British presence into the areas. British influence

¹⁹⁶ Campbell, *Maroons*, 5.

¹⁹⁷ Historians and anthropologists discovered Maroon communities maintain distinct dialect of Jamaican Creole. Maroons also maintained distinct religious practices, that were largely West African based. For more regarding language see, Kenneth Bilby, “How the Older Heads Talk: A Jamaican Maroon Spirit Possession Language and its Relationship to the Creoles of Suriname and Sierra Leone.” In *Nieuwe West Indische gids* 57 (2003):57-80. Regarding religious differences see Kenneth Bilby and Jerome Handler “On the Early Use and Origin of the Term Obeah in Barbados and the Anglophone Caribbean.” In *Slavery and Abolition* 22 (2001): 87-100.

resonated in the language and naming practices of the post-treaty maroons. Most maroons accepted some of these changes because they felt there were adequate protections in the treaties signed with the British colonists. As frontier zones grew smaller, however, maroons became even more dependant on the treaties for their survival and less dependant on the environment.

Like the frontier zones, the treaties ensured maroon survival. The documents were sacred to the communities and this was reflected in the lack of maroon cooperation by the time of the Trelawny War. This spilt indicated that frontier zones were either closing or rapidly changing. Maroons no longer sought protections in the frontier zones by the turn of the century, but looked for aid in the treaties. Historian Barbara Kopytoff believed the source of conflict between the Trelawny maroons and the neighboring Accompong maroons developed over the possession of the original treaty signed with the Leeward maroons. Dallas also suggested that the groups “were related to each other, but had quarreled for the custody of the original treaty of 1739.”¹⁹⁸ The battle over the treaties reflected a loss of ample space. This fight should be seen as a last attempt by the maroons to maintain autonomy.

Not only treaties, but also large events in the Atlantic World challenged frontier zones and maroons. Increased colonization, sugar production, war in Europe and war in neighboring St. Domingue all played a role in the destruction. Eventually, the closing of the frontier zones brought the Trelawny community to war. Without frontiers to patrol, or validation through treaties, it was clear, the maroons had no place in the colony to live independently. Large communities of free blacks posed a threat so long as slavery

¹⁹⁸ Those visiting the Accompong attest to have seen the treaty, but the group seems un-willing to verify this claim. See Campbell, *Maroons*, 230.

remained. The threat became even more menacing in times of crisis, such as the one in late eighteenth century with the situation in St. Domingue. Placing the maroons in a frontier context demonstrates that local events were not entirely to blame for the rebellion of 1795.

Frontier zones were constricted and expanded according to events that happened as nearby as Kingston and Port Royal, yet as far away as St. Domingue, France and England. Like most occurrences in the colonial Americas, the story of the Jamaican maroons in the eighteenth century was linked to developments in the Atlantic World that surrounded them. The maroons emerged out of colonization and war between the Spanish and British. As the colony expanded, maroons altered their allegiances to remain independent. In that decision, they helped to further colonization. After the British-maroon alliance, the island saw an increase in sugar production as Jamaica became one of England's wealthiest colonies. Areas that were once considered dangerous expanded rapidly with production. Eventually this growth confined the maroons to areas that were uninhabitable. The panic state of Jamaica in the 1790s, due to rebellions in the United States, France and St. Domingue, also largely contributed to the destruction of the frontier zones the Trelawny maroons needed for survival. Viewing these changes as related, albeit distantly, to the story of the maroons better explains their roles as both collaborators and rebels. The history of the maroons, like all residents of eighteenth century Jamaica, was derived from the momentous events happening around them.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A.

Treaty signed between British colonists and Leeward maroons, 1739.

In the Name of God , Amen. Whereas Captain Cudjoe, Captain Accompong, Captain Johnny, Captain Cuffee, Captain Quaw, and several other Negroes their Dependants and Adherents, have been in a State of War and Hostility for several Years past against our Sovereign Lord the King, and the Inhabitants of this Island: And whereas Peace and Friendship amongst Mankind, and the preventing of Effusion of Blood, is agreeable to God, constant to Reason, and desired by every good Man; and whereas his Majesty George the Second, King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, and of Jamaica Lord, Defender of Faith, etc. has by Letters Patent, dated February the Twenty-Fourth, One-thousand seven hundred and thirty eight, in the Twelfth Year of His Reign, granted full Power and Authority to John Gutherie and Francis Sadler, Esquires, to negotiate and finally conclude a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the aforesaid Captain Cudjoe, the rest of his Captains, Adherents, and others his men, they, mutually, sincerely, and amicably have agree to the following Articles,

1st, That All Hostilities Shall Cease on both Sides for ever.

2dly, That the said Captain Cudjoe, the rest of his Captains, Adherents and Men, shall be for ever hereafter in a perfect State of Freedom and Liberty, expecting those who have been taken by them, or fled to them within the two Years last past, if such are willing to return to their said Masters and Owners, with full Pardon and Indemnity, from their said Masters and Owners for what is past. Provided always, That if they are not willing to return, they shall remain in Subjection to Captain Cudjoe, and his Friendship with us, according to the Form and Tenor of this Treaty.

3dly, That they shall enjoy and possess for themselves and Posterity for ever, all the Lands situate and lying between Trelawny Town and the Cockpits, to the Amount of Fifteen hundred Acres, bearing North-west from the said Trelawny Town.

4thly, That they shall have Liberty to plant the said Lands with Coffee, Cocoa, Ginger, Tobacco, and Cotton, and to breed Cattle, Hogs, Goats, or any other Stock, and dispose of the Produce or Increase of the said Commodities to the Inhabitants of this Island. Provided always, That they bring the Said Commodities to Market, they shall apply first to the Custos, or any other Magistrate of the respective Parishes where they expose their Goods for Sale, for License to vend the same.

5thly, That Captain Cudjoe, and all the Captain's Adherents, and people not in Subjection to him, shall all live together within the Bounds of Trelawny Town; and that they have Liberty to hunt where they shall think fit, except within three Miles of any Settlement, Crawl or Pen. Provided always, That in case of Hunters of Captain Cudjoe, and those of other Settlements meet, then the Hogs to be equally divided between both Parties.

6thly, That the said Captain Cudjoe, and his Successors, do use their best Endeavors to take, kill, suppress or destroy, either by themselves or jointly, with any other Number of Men commanded on that Service by his Excellency the Governor or Commander in Chief for the Time being, all Rebels wheresoever they be throughout this Island, unless they submit to the same Terms of Accommodation granted to Captain Cudjoe, and his Successors.

7thly, That in case this Island be invaded by any foreign Enemy, the said Captain Cudjoe, and his Successors herein after named, or to be appointed, shall then, upon Notice given, immediately repair to any Place the Governor for the Time being shall appoint, in order to repel the said Invaders with his or their utmost Force; and to submit to the Orders of the Commander in Chief on that Occasion.

8thly, That if any white Man shall do any Manner of Injury to Captain Cudjoe, his Successors, or any of his or their People, they shall apply to any commanding Officer or Magistrate in the Neighborhood for Justice; and in case of Captain Cudjoe, or any of his People, shall do any Injury to any white Person, he shall submit himself or deliver up such Offenders to Justice.

9thly, That if any Negroes shall hereafter run away from their Masters or Owners, and fall into Captain Cudjoe's Hands, they shall immediately sent back to the Chief Magistrate of the Next Parish where they are taken; and those that bring them are to be satisfied for their Trouble, as the Legislature shall appoint.

10thly, That all Negroes taken since the raising of this Party by Captain Cudjoe's People, shall immediately be returned.

11thly, That Captain Cudjoe, and his Successors, shall wait on his Excellency, or Commander in Chief for the Time being, every Year, if thereunto required.

12th, That Captain Cudjoe, during his Life, and the Captains succeeding him, shall have full Power to inflict any Punishments they think proper for Crimes committed by their Men among themselves (Death only excepted) in which Case, if the Captain thinks they deserve Death, he shall be obliged to bring them before any Justice of the Peace, who shall order Proceedings on their Trial equal to those of other free Negroes.

13th, That Captain Cudjoe with his People shall cut, clear and keep open, large, and convenient Roads from Trelawny Town to Westmoreland and St. James's, and if possible to St. Elizabeth's.

14th, That Two white Men to be nominated by his Excellency, or the Commander in Chief for the Time being, shall constantly live and reside with Captain Cudjoe and his Successors, in order to maintain a friendly Correspondence with the Inhabitants of this Island.

15th, That Captain Cudjoe shall, during his Life, be Chief Commander in Trelawny Town, after his Decease the Command to devolve on his Brother Captain Accompong; and in case of his Decease, on his next Brother Captain Johnny; and, failing him, Captain Cuffee shall succeed, who is to be succeeded by Captain Quaco, and after all their Demises, the Governor or Commander in Chief for that Time being, shall appoint from Time to Time whom he thinks fit for that Command.

In Testimony of the above Presents, we have hereunto set out Hands and Seals the Day and Date above written.

John Gutherie (L.S.)
Francis Sadler (L.S.)
The Mark X of Captain Cudjoe (L.S.)

Appendix B.

Treaty between British colonists and the Windward maroons, 1740.

Whereas his Excellency Edward Trelawny, Esquire; Governor and Chief in Command of the Island aforesaid, hath given Power and Authority to Colonel Robert Bennett to treat with the rebellious Negroes, this day, Being The Twenty-third Day of June, One thousand seven hundred and thirty-nine, Captain Quao, and several other under his command, surrendered under the following Terms, viz.

First, That all Hostilities on both sides shall cease for ever, Amen;

Second, That Captain Quao and his People shall have a certain Quantity of Land given to them, in order to raise Provisions, Hogs, Fowls, Goats, or whatsoever Stock they may think proper, Sugar-Canes excepted, saving for their Hogs, and to have Liberty to sell the same;

Third, That Four White Men shall constantly live and reside with them in their Town, in order to keep a good Correspondence with the Inhabitants of this Island;

Fourth, That Captain Quao and his People shall be ready on all Commands the Governor or the Commander in chief for the Time being shall send him, to suppress and destroy all other Party and Parties of rebellious Negroes, that now are or shall from Time to Time gather together or settle in any Part of the Island, and shall bring in such other Negroes as shall from Time to Time run Away from their respective Owners, from the Date of these Articles;

Fifth, That the said Captain Quao and his People shall also be ready to assist his Excellency the Governor for the Time being, in case of any Invasion, and shall put himself, with all his People that are able to bear Arms, under the Command of the General or Commander of such Forces, appointed by his

Excellency to defend the Island from the said Invasion;

Sixth, That the said Captain Quao and his People shall be in Subjection to his Excellency the Governor for the Time being, and the said Captain Quao shall once every Year, or oftener, appear before the Governor, if thereunto required;

Seventh, That in case any of the Hunters belonging to the Inhabitants of this Island, and the Hunters belonging to Captain Quao, should meet, in order to hinder all Disputes, Captain Quao will order his People to let the Inhabitants Hunters have the Hog;

Eighth, That in case Captain Quao and his People shall take up any runaway Negroes that shall abscond from their respective Owners, he or they shall carry them to their respective Masters or Owners, and shall be paid for so doing, as the Legislature shall appoint;

Ninth, That in case Captain Quao and his People should be disturbed by a greater Number of Rebels than he is able to fight, that then he shall be assisted by as many White People as the Governor for the Time being shall think proper;

Tenth, That in case any of the Negroes belonging to Captain Quao shall be guilty of any Crime or Crimes that may deserve Death, he shall deliver him up to the next Magistrate, in order to be tried as other Negroes are; but small Crimes he may punish himself;

Eleventh, That in case any White Man, or other Inhabitants of this Islands, shall disturb or annoy any of the People, Hogs, Stock or whatsoever Goods may belong to the said Captain Quao, or any of his People, when they come down to the Settlements to vend the same, upon due Complaint made to a Magistrate he or they shall have Justice done them;

Twelfth, That neither Captain Quao, nor any of his People shall bring any Hogs, Fowls, or any other kind of Stock or Provisions to sell to the Inhabitants, without a Ticket from under the Hand of one or more of the White Men residing within their Town;

Thirteenth, That Captain Quao nor any of his People, shall hunt within Three Miles of any Settlement;

Fourteenth, That in case Captain Quao should dye, that then the Command of his People shall descend to Captain Thomboy, and at his Death to descend to Captain Apong, and at his Death to Captain Blackwell shall succeed, and at his Death Captain Clash shall succeed; and when he dies, the Governor or Commander in chief for the Time being shall appoint whom he thinks proper;

In Witness to these Articles, the above named Colonel Robert Bennett and Captain Quao have set their Hands and Seals the Day and Year above written,

Robert Bennett (L.S.)
The Mark of X for Captain Quao