AESTHETIC REPRESENTATIONS OF HISTORY: THE QUESTION OF THE
NATIONAL ALLEGORY

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ABSTRACT

This project investigates the labeling of third-world literature as national allegory. It begins with a discussion of the concepts and ideas behind the loaded terms that fuel this debate. A justification of my own use of the terms “third-world,” “allegory,” and “nationhood” are necessary. My own definitions of the above vocabulary are largely based on the insights of Frederic Jameson and Raymond Williams.

Chapter Two examines a so-called third-world piece of literature, Noor, through an allegorical lens with the aim of concluding whether or not it is a reasonable piece to represent the story of Pakistan and Bangladesh’s nationhood. By the end of the chapter, I find that though the piece is allegorical in nature, it cannot be as tightly defined as a national allegory.

Chapter Three is a third-world reading of a supposed first-world text, Dracula. What I attempted to do was establish that other works beside third-world literature can be read as national allegories. In this investigation, I find that though this piece is also allegorical in nature, like Noor it cannot be labeled as a national allegory.

The paper concludes with an explanation of my methods. I continue with a further deconstruction of some of Jameson’s ideas, mainly his thoughts on the purpose of culture in a modern world and the role of nationhood during globalization. My final thought is that a national allegory is an aesthetic representation of a culture’s reaction to its historical moment.
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DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to my parents, David and Charlene Whitaker. Thank you for everything so far, and everything else to come. I would not be here without you, and I would not be going anywhere else either.
INTRODUCTION

The aim of this project is to disprove the absolute understanding of the nature of the third-world national allegory claimed by critics like Frederic Jameson. There are two concepts that will continue to resurface in my discussion: culture and nationhood. Of culture, I am highly concerned with Jameson’s failure to see the existence of its positives. He centers on the notion as something that has outlived its original usefulness, and now is a negative factor – an obstacle that politicians must hurdle to “unite” as a globalized world. Looking at the idea of culture in a different manner, I see this is an arrogant perception formulated to discredit any resistance to the same kind of feudal/capitalist/imperial model that global society is moving towards. Culture can be an effective opposition to intellectual domination, one which is reminiscent of a capitalist fascism of sorts. Culture can also be seen more as a vital part of human spirit and individuality. The codes which unite people of the same culture, like ceremonies, traditions, and rituals are far too valuable to give up for the sake of a universal political and economic system. To say what makes societies unique - how their resourcefulness developed in certain ways over time - is useless, is to convey an attitude that basically tells marginal peoples that they are outnumbered, overwhelmed, and will be overpowered unless they succumb. Human values, and the lessons to be learned from the interaction of cultures are too important to retire; any claim that culture is archaic and not in line with current world purposes must be viewed as dangerous.

The idea of nationhood brings similar warnings to mind. Many third-world nations were sorted into neat categories according to how the occident saw fit to dissect lands. Often, that distribution involved how they, the colonizers, saw culture manifest
itself. Yet to become a nation was an invitation to the global union (which was founded on international feudalism). So becoming a “nation” really is a lack of what is implied. If a nation’s foundations are steeped in its surrounding culture, but if culture is no longer appropriate, nationhood on the world scale is an erasure of a people as they are absorbed into globalism. Nationhood is an entrance into a new system, and what was used to divide that society into a nation is now just a peripheral of the people overwhelmed by the democratic/capitalist system. In essence, a global world equals a flat world, which means nationhood, which also means the erasure of culture.

To combat the absolutist argument made by Jameson, especially the purposes he supposes for culture and nationhood, I have analyzed his argument about what constitutes the first and third-worlds, and along those same lines, what he claims is necessarily a third-world national allegory. I have manufactured some of my own definitions related to those theories during this project. An allegory is a mythical description of a new happening. A national allegory is a description of an historical event, and further, a society’s interaction with that event. A third-world national allegory is the cultural reaction to and representation of a historic event – that event being the moment of capitalist penetration and then the democratic climax which manifests itself in so-called new nationhood. What is known as the third-world national allegory is often maligned because it is the voice of resistance, and as Frederic Jameson shows, he engages that conflict through labels that seem artificially imposed, even forced.

I have chosen two novels that are both very involved in what Jameson uses to define the first and third-worlds – capitalist imperialism. The first book I will examine, Sorayya Khan’s *Noor* should fit into Jameson’s category of third-world. Being a piece of
third-world literature, it, according to his theory, must be a national allegory. By centering on the rape scenes, I will show there are two main reasons which show this book is not classifiable as a third-world national allegory. The first reason deals directly with history. This is a civil war, not a colonial one. Although it is tempting to read this as a colonial story, the rape scenes’ collective symbolism resembles more of a colonial discourse than one of Muslim on Muslim violence. But the history doesn’t match up; it is not a colonizer committing the fell deeds onto a colonized person, it is a Pakistani raping a Bangladeshi. Pakistan never colonized Bangladesh. The second reason goes beyond history. If one can read it only as an allegory, the horrors of the actual event – a gruesome rape – are ignored. Even if the women are just characters in a book, I am not willing to let them be made martyrs for the sake of historical representation.

Following Noor, I will turn my attention to Bram Stoker’s Dracula. I chose this book because of its heavy relationship with capitalist imperialism – Jameson’s allegorical yardstick. I also dealt with this book in two main ways. I tried to give it both a first-world and a third-world reading. It does not work as a national allegory in the first-world sense because of a non-colonialist discourse. There is an allegorical conflict between religion and reason, exemplified by Dracula’s battle with Van Helsing. These two concepts complimented each other during the colonization process, not as direct enemies. As a third-world text Dracula, does not work as a national allegory either. I justify my attempt at giving this sort of reading through my definition above. A national allegory is literature dealing with an historical newness, or an event or concept that affects a society. The newness I have isolated to explore in the novel is the acceptance of a combination of philosophical methods in everyday life, like the use of religion and reason, instead of
dogmatically following Christianity. The problem I encountered in trying to label this a national allegory is that this phenomenon does not encapsulate an entire historical moment. Colonialism was far too prominent in Victorian England to not accurately allegorize. If one was trying to create a national allegory, colonialism would have to be portrayed much more precisely in the novel.

In combining the two works into one project I have aimed to show that an aesthetic representation of history through literature is not simply a third-world phenomenon, alien to the rest of the globe. Though there will be differences in the way these artists, from such varied societies, deal with their history, the point is although each text is not dominated by it, history is what they are both dealing with, and more specifically, their own cultures’ reaction to the newness of that history. What is commonly called the national allegory is actually a nation’s literature that is contingent upon its place in world history.
Labels are imposed upon the third-world on a large scale, from the artificial creation of national borders and names to the categorizing of their literature. But all literature, in some way, is influenced by history. This influence stems from how a society explains itself from the very beginning – its mythology. In some cultures, this expression may seem more like an allegory than in others. With the spread of global domination brought on by colonialism, societies that seemed very different from one another were forced to interact. The trouble was, with these differences came ways of trying to explain the other cultures. My point is that many of those explanations were unfounded, even unfair. For instance, it is arrogant to think that the only purpose of third-world literature is a reaction to the first-world invasion. Furthermore, it is not only third-world writers who write stories that are affected by their history. The relationship of history and literature is based on beginnings, and all societies undergo those in one way or another.

In J.A. Cuddon’s definition of allegory, he writes:

The origins of allegory are very ancient, and it appears to be a mode of expression (a way of feeling and thinking about things and seeing them) so natural to the human mind that it is universal … Much myth, for example, is a form of allegory and is an attempt to explain universal facts and forces. (21)

To create a national allegory would be a kind of contemporary mythology which explains the forces that have caused the advent of the nation. I would argue that on some level, some third-world works deal with those facts and forces, but they go beyond just
that purpose. A national allegory only exists to the reader who is focused on historical
development, and in the third-world, imperialism is a major piece of the history in which
its literature is contingent upon. Beyond that, the fiction of a nation also performs
important cultural and historical work; it is not something to be incorrectly labeled and
cast aside.

In *Keywords* Raymond Williams traces the handling of the word “imperialism”
and its meaning to culture. Early usage signified a few things, one, “a system of
organized colonial trade and organized colonial rule” (159), or two, a “civilizing mission”
(159). Williams notes, in the 20th Century, intellectuals came up with a third meaning,
connecting, “the phenomenon of modern imperialism to a particular stage of development
of capitalist economy” (159). In “Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational
Capitalism,” Frederic Jameson’s provocative comment, “All third-world texts are
necessarily, I want to argue, allegorical, and in a very specific way: they are to be read as
what I will call national allegories” (69) has caused quite a mix of responses. Williams’s
third definition is the most useful to the understanding of Jameson’s third-world.

But Williams also warns of the dangers of a word that can have so many
meanings, like the three interpretations above. The linguistic evolution’s “main effect on
the use of the word has been an evident uncertainty, and at times ambiguity, between
emphases on a political system and on an economic system” (*Keywords* 159). Williams
concludes his definition with an important thought:

Imperialism, like any other word which refers to fundamental social and political
conflicts, cannot be reduced, semantically, to a single proper meaning. Its
important historical and contemporary variations of meaning point to real
processes which have to be studied in their own terms. (160)

For the present discussion, Jameson’s understanding of the third-world’s formation as a
result of economic imperialism explains the interconnectedness of both political and
economic systems in his version of third-world literature.

The term “third-world” is a concept that is far from concrete. It is another bulging
label that needs to be unpacked. Jameson does well when he distinguishes the third-
world from the first in terms of economic systems. He says the first-world is that which
has developed capitalism as the natural step beyond feudalism, and the third-world is that
which has had capitalism violently imposed upon it. Jameson describes the third-world
birth as “the nature and development of older cultures at the moment of capitalist
penetration” (Third-World Literature 68). Perhaps another way of thinking about this
would be to see imperialism as a form of international feudalism (services used and
abused in the guise of protection – when in fact the protection is only necessary from
other societies practicing the same type of global domination) - another type of
capitalism’s predecessor setting the stage for its unavoidable ideological takeover. This
allows me to look at the issue in colonial terms as well, not just economically. So, in this
present use (which is greatly indebted to Jameson’s understanding in the above
mentioned essay), third-world will signify the areas of the world colonized by capitalistic
imperialism.

Jameson’s broader academic project, outlined in Postmodernism, or, The Cultural
Logic of Late Capitalism, is admittedly a forced categorization of an aspect of society not
inclined to be categorized. He calls his idea an “attempt to see whether by systematizing
something that is resolutely unsystematic, and historicizing something that is resolutely ahistorical, one couldn’t outflank it and force a historical way at least of thinking about that” (Postmodernism 418). The system and the history, or more accurately the system of the history is the center of Jameson’s entire project. He attempts to “offer a periodizing hypothesis” (Postmodernism 3), and argues “that all isolated or discrete cultural analysis always involves a buried or repressed theory of historical periodization” (3). He explains that all current cultural discussions are “necessarily, an implicitly or explicitly political stance on the nature of multinational capitalism today” (3). It becomes evident that he has broken down culture into stages based exclusively on the economic and political environment. His past two periods, industrialization and modernism, have led to his present classification. This current period, late capitalism, manifests itself in the task of “coordinating new forms of practice and social and mental habits [how he explains one of Williams aspects of culture, to be discussed later in this chapter] … with new forms of economic production and organization thrown up by the modification of capitalism” (Postmodernism xiv). So to Jameson, the current global goal should be to incorporate culture into a relationship with the capitalist mode of production – a commodification of aesthetics so to speak. Jameson’s handling of allegories is a significant example of this shift of culture based on economics. He writes:

For the newer allegory is horizontal rather than vertical: if it must still attach its one-to-one conceptual labels to its objects after the fashion of The Pilgrim’s Progress, it does so in the conviction that those objects (along with their labels) are now profoundly relational, indeed are themselves constructed by their relations to each other. (Postmodernism 168)
This shift is based exclusively on a willingness to see “the inevitable mobility of such relations” (168), an entirely different kind of objective relationship between culture and society. Jameson’s theories rely on the acceptance that, in the present, culture can only be described in capitalist terms.

So, the third-world national allegory (and third-world nationhood itself) is Jameson’s device. The national allegory is projected onto the third-world by him, a member of a nation from the first-world. It is Jameson, a first-world intellectual that is giving the allegorical reading. There is no way to say otherwise, that the actual work was written as an allegory. In this way it becomes an archive of a new birth, Jameson’s reading creates a new entrant into what is occidental.

The idea of new nationhood is another concept imposed onto the third-world. Pre-imperialism, many of the nations that we now know had no notion of the unity their current borders are supposed to represent. Often, as in the case of India and Pakistan, the borders were drawn by people whose intentions were far away in the first-world. When “independence” was given to many colonized countries, it was after the capitalist mode was thoroughly instilled in the psyche of the culture. In effect, their independence was only in a national name – they moved right into the system, capitalism, that they were once conquered by. This entrance into the western systems is what makes this a first-world moment, not a third-world one.

One is tempted to raise the question: does the third-world even exist anymore? In an ever flattening, globalized world it does seem that western capitalist imperialism is turning into a world-wide monopoly. But if this is the case, then, without its binary opposition to define itself, consequently the first-world does not exist anymore; each
nation holds a place on a temporal scale, history, according to how penetrated by
capitalism they are, or of what stage of the international feudalization they have
succumbed to. The third-world is simply farther behind in its development in the global
system because it really has just been allowed to, or been forced to enter it. The
autonomy of a third-world nation was originally an illusion created by certain people
with capitalist intentions.

Aside from politics and economics, here is where I must distinguish the heart of
my project; the focus is on what Jameson actually claimed in “Third-World Literature in
the Era of Multinational Capitalism”: third-world text as national allegory. From his
argument, it is understood that the third-world is obviously at the relative beginning of
something, entrance into capitalist nationhood. It is also fair to say that, since myths deal
with origins, early writings of a group act as myth. To Jameson then, a myth would have
to be a cultural allegory. Williams writes that myths were once “treated as allegories or
confused memories of origins and pre-history” (Keywords 211). The myth usually works
to define the unity of a situation, and the basis of that unity is history. So when Jameson
says “the story of the private individual destiny is always an allegory of the embattled
situation of the public third-world culture and society” (Third-World Literature 69), I
interpret him to mean that the third-world’s assimilation into capitalism after
independence is represented in a new way of dealing with existence on a personal level.
The nation’s transformation, on some level, necessarily affects its citizens. To Jameson,
the national allegory becomes that mythology, the story of everyday life in a tumultuous
restructuring of history. But this goes beyond just the third-world because no nation can
elude history. Capitalism, Jameson’s great divider, is not a shield against history in the
first-world. A nation’s literature, any nation’s, is contingent upon its history, and more specifically, upon the newness of its history. Each development that affects who an individual is as a member of a nation is reflected in literature because, as Williams puts it, “myths are held to be fundamental expressions of certain properties of the human mind, and even the basic mental or psychological human organization” (Keywords 212). Is this Jameson’s claim that the third-world has written a mythology to account for their new place in history? No. More accurately, the reading of modern third-world literature as myth, or national allegory, is Jameson’s impulse that the individual in the third-world is representative of the public aspects of life. To read, as Jameson does, the third-world public and private as inextricable is to read the individual’s story as the nation’s. Only those who dogmatically follow Jameson’s ideas and trace his connections can read all third-world literature as national allegory.

In his curiosity to explain “why Jameson insists so much on the category ‘all’” (12), when describing third-world texts, Aijaz Ahmad, in “Jameson’s Rhetoric of Otherness and the ‘National Allegory,’” attempts to reverse Jameson’s claim to find a way to comprehend what he actually meant by his liberal usage of the term “all”: Jameson “means the opposite of what he actually says: not that ‘all third-world texts are to be read … as national allegories’ but that only those texts which give us national allegories can be admitted as authentic texts of third-world literature, while the rest are excluded by definition” (12). He goes on to explain that Jameson has partly deconstructed himself: “one is not quite sure whether one is dealing with a fallacy (‘all third-world texts are’ this or that) or with the Law of the Father (you must write this if you are to be admitted into my theory)” (12). This reversal of theory, all national
allegories are to be classified as third-world, not vice versa, is worth an answer: no. All national allegories are not third-world in Jameson’s version of third-world. But by further extending the idea of national allegory to encounter origin of historical moment (myth), the point is well taken. The third-world is at a beginning, and national allegories are about a beginning, even if that beginning is just a minor cultural change; national allegories would be about how people, any people, first encounter and deal with that newness.

The way that Jameson labels third-world national allegories in a dismissive manner goes hand in hand with his treatment of culture. His hypothesis is that culture is an archaic solution to a problem that has lived beyond its necessity. He writes:

One must imagine … cultural structures and attitudes as having been themselves, in the beginning, vital responses to infrastructural realities (economic and geographic, for example), as attempts to resolve more fundamental contradictions – attempts which then outlive the situations for which they were devised, and survive, in reified forms, as “cultural patterns.” Those patterns themselves then become part of the objective situation confronted by later generations. (Third-World Literature 77-8)

In this explanation of culture, it too becomes allegorical. If an allegory is the literary response to history, and culture is the social reaction to the environment – a peoples place in history – then both are a unique portion of a society in its relationship to history. If Jameson is really talking about national allegories, then the issue at hand should be how national identities (and the stories about it) are inextricably linked to history, and more specifically a historical moment, not how current historical conditions have rendered
culture useless. The third-world national allegory is a byproduct of third-world culture. If all third-world literature is, according to him, a national allegory, then is all third-world literature useless? The third-world does not necessarily produce national allegories as much as Jameson performs and projects allegorization upon the third-world.

Raymond Williams offers a more complete definition of culture, and through this broader discussion I want to show that Jameson’s ideas on culture are on only a part of the underlying concept of what Williams traces. About the evolution of the word, Williams writes, “The tending of natural growth was extended to a process of human development … a description of the secular process” (Culture and Society 87-9). From there he goes on to describe the “three broad active categories of usage” (90) for culture. In the first sense he calls culture, “a general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development” (90). In the second he writes, “a particular way of life, whether of a people, a period, a group, or humanity in general” (90). And finally, he describes culture as, “the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity” (90). The first meaning makes culture an ideal concept, a trait which humans strive for. The second meaning is more documentary, a way to record, or at least view a certain group. In the third, culture becomes a social byproduct, a specific way in which people of a group interact. Jameson’s claim about culture seems to only focus on parts of the whole concept that Williams explains. In his chapter “Marxism and Culture” from Culture and Society, William’s elaborates on the limits of the theoretical viewpoint. There would seem to be a general inadequacy among Marxists in the use of ‘culture’ as a term. It normally indicates, in their writings, the intellectual and imaginative products of a society … but it would seem that from their emphasis on
the interdependence of all elements of social reality, and from their analytic emphasis on movement and change, Marxists should logically use ‘culture’ in the sense of a whole way of life, a general social process. (282)

In essence, the confusion about culture itself is rooted in what Williams calls “the central question of the relations between ‘material’ and ‘symbolic’ production” (Keywords 91). Jameson sees culture as a societal commodity, the material aspect of culture, but his essay is attempting to describe a specific type of literature, an art – clearly the symbolic aspect of culture. It is that confusion that leads to his inaccurate labeling, which in turn makes his essay problematic.

Jameson also claims that the difference between the first and third world is that the public and private are separate in the first-world, but inextricably intertwined in the third. In what he calls the political safety of the first-world comes a judgment of what is unsafe, a distinct difference between the first and third-world. Jameson breaks down cultures to try to fathom what separates them, but in doing so he fragments the individuals of the third-world beyond subjectivity and into a portion of a culture.

According to Jameson, “the story of the private individual destiny is always an allegory of the embattled situation of the public third-world culture and society” (Third-World Literature 69). As a Marxist critic, Jameson tends to focus on culture in economic terms. He labels the first-world as capitalist imperialists and explains that first-world culture has formed a “radical split between the private and public, between the poetic and the political, between what we have come to think of as the domain of sexuality and the unconscious and that of the public world of classes, of the economic, and of the secular political power” (69). In other words, that society firmly differentiates between the
sphere of non-emotional, business-type interactions, and the intimate sphere of emotional relationships. He counters this first-world quality with what he sees as “something wholly different in third-world culture. Third-world texts, even those which are seemingly private and invested with a properly libidinal dynamic – necessarily project a political dimension in the form of national allegory” (69). To Jameson the first-world reader keeps these aspects (the public and private, or libidinal) separate, while the third-world culture produces works that have the private aspect representing the public sphere.

Though he does not disclaim the possibility of a first-world piece presenting an allegorical structure, he argues that since “we have been trained in a deep cultural conviction that the lived experience of our private existences is somehow incommensurable with the abstractions of economic science and political dynamics” (69), this first-world allegory will be unconscious. Conversely, he calls third-world allegories “conscious and overt: they imply a radically different and objective relationship of politics to libidinal dynamics” (Third-World Literature 80). The third-world national allegory is a result of the differences in perception between the two worlds. To Jameson, the blending of intimate society with public deeds projects a conscious allegorical dimension in third-world writing, one that is absent in first-world literature.

Though Aijaz Ahmad disagrees with Jameson’s classifications of first, second, and third worlds, he does recognize what he labels as “a binary opposition of what Jameson calls the ‘first’ and ‘third’ worlds” (3). The response continually reminds us that “Jameson’s own text is … centrally grounded in a binary opposition between first and third world” (5). Despite his conflict with Jameson’s proposition, what Ahmad’s text does is grant an important step for the present purposes. Ahmad, also as a Marxist critic,
transforms the argument from a Marxist to a postcolonial issue. He writes, “If societies here are defined not by relations of production but by relations of intra-national domination; … if the motivating force for history is neither class formation nor class struggle, … but the unitary ‘experience’ of national oppression” (9), then third-world literature can be nothing else then what Jameson claims, an allegory of nationhood. But history is not motivated solely by colonialism, and all third-world texts are not solely national allegories.

In “The Prose of Otherness” Gyanendra Pandey describes the third-world privacy coming through in public dimensions in a different way. Dealing with the horrors and violence of Partition, Pandey writes:

In part because of the way in which the historiographical agenda has been constructed, and in part because the historian’s craft has never been comfortable with such matters, the horror of [marginalized on marginalized violence resulting from postcolonialism] has been left almost entirely to [artists]. (qtd. in Singh 126)

To Sujala Singh, this means “fiction almost becomes the desired ‘Other’ of history” (Singh 127). In this way, fiction, unable to amass the scope of an entire national history, becomes a microcosmic version of that narrative, which does make it allegorical, but does not qualify it as necessarily third-world. Furthermore, the work that this art does supplements history in such a way that it becomes quite necessary, hardly the ineffectual cultural artifact Jameson would suggest.
CHAPTER TWO: DISLOCATED HISTORY AND MARTYRIZED WOMEN: THE HAVOC OF THE NATIONAL ALLEGORY LABEL

It is easy to artificially label some stories as third-world texts, but it becomes extremely problematic when it comes to finding a national allegory within them. In this chapter I will demonstrate how the historical contingency in the symbolic rape scenes would have to be shifted back over two decades for Sorayya Khan’s novel, Noor, to be allegorically defined. Even if that shift were allowed, it is more closely likened to colonizing events, not contemporary national ones. Along with this discrepancy, a focus on only the national aspect of the actual scenes reveals an atrocious human oversight that critical evidence demonstrates the danger of committing.

Khan’s novel, Noor, uses one of the most horrible aspects of colonialism’s aftermath, war, to illustrate a more graphic and horrifying aspect of the postcolonial story. Noor’s images portray a gruesome idea of the truth behind, and consequences of, colonial nation building. We are first introduced to the idea of motherhood being related to nationhood through Ali’s memory. He recalls, “The soiled maternity ward, new blood drying upon the old, the sticky sweat of desperate work” (Khan 31). This image is from a hospital Ali saw during the war. The blood is literally from mothers and babies, but the new and old blood also recalls the many conflicts between Pakistan and India that resulted from the partition of 1947. Here maternal blood is equated to the bloodshed that poured out when Britain sliced the sub-continent into pieces. In “Nationalism’s Brandings: Women’s Bodies and the Narratives of the Partition,” Sujala Singh notes that “women’s bodies often became the markers of which the painful scripts of contending nationalisms (Hindu, Muslim, Sikh) were inscribed” (122). Assigning Ali’s memory of
the maternity ward to a recollection of both Partition, represented in the blood of mothers, and the 1971 war, symbolized in the newborn blood, does just that. It makes women, specifically mothers, representative of their nation. But Singh is concerned that this assignment, correlating women and the post-partum of colonialism, “highlights the anxieties of nations searching for secure self-representations, even as the nations celebrated the end of colonialism” (123). If so, the role of women in the postcolonial story becomes varied and, as I will explore, dangerous, because the behavior of aggression, learned from “the colonialist state naturaliz[ing] the violence of its own strategic bureaucratic legalities and counter insurgency manoeuvres [sic],” (Singh 123) is displaced onto them by readers like Frederic Jameson, who see in post-colonial literature only a national allegory.

Sadly, the maternal blood from the ward is not the only blood that mothers bled as a result of the colonial imposition. Khan presents the reader with two rape scenes, both of mothers. To delve into these scenes I want to examine the conclusions drawn from calling this piece of third-world literature a national allegory, that the mother is a symbol for a colony and that man is the masculine symbol for a colonizer. I argue this claim is not accurate because the two sides of this equation do not quite match up. Man and mother are not binaries. All men are not fathers just as all women are not mothers. As I will explore, motherhood at times can strongly symbolize nationhood, especially the struggles for nationhood of a colonized country, but the shifts between motherhood, nation, and colony seem to imply artificiality to Jameson’s claim. The multiplicities of the representations mother-figures perform in Noor disallow the allegory to be as solid as
he would present. As I will also explore, the rape scenes say much more about a culture than a simple representation of history than they are contingent upon.

In the discussion of the rape scenes that follow, a binary nature is present, but that binary is a result of war, not colonization. Granted, the civil war may have its roots in Partition, but that historical relationship certainly does not constitute an allegory. This literature is contingent upon the historic moment, but it is not simply another way of relaying historical facts. In the first scene the rapist was “overwhelmed by her breasts, round and beautiful, despite the children who suckled from them. One was full with milk for the baby who had been torn from her and the other was hidden behind the coarse cloth from her sari” (Khan 76). This image provides many keys to the mother as a symbol for the country. The mother’s breasts were overwhelming and beautiful, as is the concept of a national identity. The milk that fills them is the cultural intangible that a society provides to its citizens. As one breast is suckling, the other is covered in a sari, traditional dress that emphasizes culture. Lactating breasts symbolize motherhood, and in two ways here motherhood is equated with nationhood. Next the criminal “pushes her to the floor. He pulled and stretched the breast that was large and firm until it sprayed a stream of milk. He laughed, called her a whore and much worse, stopping to lick the drops of milk that landed on his lips” (76). His pushing her and his degradation through name-calling shows the bald aggression and labeling disrespect that happens in war time. The breast was large and firm, like the pride and resources of a society pre-invasion. The healthy fullness is exactly what enticed the aggression. His spraying of her milk symbolizes the wastefulness that goes hand in hand with the take-over of a country. He
only uses the drops that hit his lips; in other words, all the resources are wasted except the small percentage that goes to benefit the attacker.

After the rape, the man “stuffed his belt between her legs letting the oversize buckle catch and tear, laughing at how cleverly he had leashed her” (Khan 76). This leashing represents national control, even if the power seriously damages the country being controlled. It is important to note that the man damages her vagina, a vital part of her ability to give birth, therefore rendering her unable to regularly produce children. This has horrendous implications on its own, when viewed in a non-allegorical manner. An allegorical analyst must be careful not to dehumanize the human aspects of such deeds, but when a country is punished in this way, through war, it too has difficulty producing people that can be substantiated and cared for in a positive manner. Resources get depleted and a virile part of the population is decimated. “The baby was dead by then, thrown to the side of the room with other corpses. After the man pulled the trigger, what was left of the woman’s body, milk still leaking from her breasts, was kicked into the same heap” (76). When the mother is assaulted to the point that she can no longer provide for her children, they die.

The man being finished with the woman kicks her to the side and into the pile of indistinguishable corpses. If this was a postcolonial allegory, his just pushing her body aside is symbolic of Britain deserting the sub-continent after Partition, with the proud culture no longer intact, constantly leaking from the wounds left behind by the empire. But this rape stems from a civil war, not a colonial one, and the rapist is Pakistani. Though colonization may have ultimately caused it, for the allegory to perfectly fit, Pakistan would have to stand in as the colonizer of Bangladesh, which is not historically
true. Again, motherhood can go hand in hand with nationhood, but a postcolonial allegory does not fit. This is a piece of third-world literature that is not a national allegory.

“According to Gyanendra Pandey: ‘history tends to produce a prose of Otherness’” (qtd. in Singh 123). The 1971 war places Pakistan and Bangladesh in binary positions. Even though both are Muslim states, the binary comes from them being enemies in the war of 1971. Just like the violent behavior, exemplified in the rape scene described above, is imitated from the colonizing state, so too is the labeling of others. But these are learned behaviors, committed against people, not stories of a nation as defined by its culture. Forgetting about the tragic and horrific demonstration against this woman in favor of an allegorical projection is unfair. I am not willing to objectify human pain for the purpose of historical understanding alone.

The other rape scene provides similar ideas and imagery, like the wastefulness that both war and rape cause, but I want to visit it because of a few more points it expands upon. When it is mentioned that this woman is a mother, it also mentions that she has been bitten. “Milk flowed from her breasts. There were teeth marks in between” (Khan 182). Milk again represents the cultural nourishment of a society to its children, but there is no suckling mentioned here. The soft gums that would naturally extract the milk are replaced by a grown man’s teeth, which leave scars on the mother. This emphasizes the damage of a nation being drained by a foreign invader - symbolized by the grown man – instead of naturally feeding the nation’s own people. The following passage, “She was ripped and pried open, the implements used to do this, the scissors, pens, a metal ruler, speckled with blood, lying to her side. The nib of the fountain pen
was missing. She was shaved between her legs. I could see her opening in the blood” (183), implies two parts of the symbol. One, the unnaturalness of war illustrated by the irregular objects chosen to enter the mother, but more importantly the transformation of a motherly body part, her vagina, into a cut. So the woman representing a nation shows us that war turns a lactating motherland into a bleeding wound. A place that could once procreate is left with a grotesque hysterectomy. It is tempting to remember colonial history on the subcontinent, and associate this scene with Britain’s imperial takeover of India, but that is too much of a leap. The history that this literature is contingent upon is the 1971 war, not a displacement of colonial imperialism allegorically told in a different time period.

Another slippery allegorical aspect comes from this passage. When Ali refuses to rape the mother, the following takes place: “‘You’re not a soldier,’ the officer said calmly. ‘You only fuck your mother’” (Khan 183). This passage deals with the legitimacy of what a soldier should be doing. The officer is disfiguring this woman, potentially a symbol of Bangladesh. Is Ali “fucking his mother” by not helping to humiliate an enemy of his nation? In other words, if the woman represents his enemy, it can be said that Ali is being anti-patriotic by not helping hurt her. Just as the original phraseology of the officer, and the image it invokes, is perverted, Ali can again be perversely seen as a “mother fucker” in another way. From a Pakistani nationalist’s perspective, his kidnapping of Sajida is perverting the stock of his mother country, Pakistan, by bringing a Bengali girl to live there. This is emphasized by the frequent mention of Sajida’s darker complexion in the novel. These differing ideas show the horrors of war. In one way, a human mother, representative of a nation, is being grossly degraded. In another,
by not degrading this woman, the nation, a symbolic mother, is being dishonored. It is exactly this difference of Ali’s responsibility to his country that makes it impossible to define this book as an allegory, and that confused responsibility highlights how problematic an allegorical reading of woman-as-mother-as-nation really is.

Mirroring the confusion of Ali’s responsibility, Monique Y. Tschofen mentions the difference between the rape of a woman by a man, and the rape of a colony by an imperial nation. Though they “may be typologically similar,” they are “produced by different ideologies, power relations, institutions, and practices, and [have] different significations” (503). Her goal is to abolish what she calls the “concept metaphor” (504) which enables rape to be an allegory of nationhood. To read all third-world work as a national allegory, every time a reader encounters a woman being raped, they would have to acknowledge it as a symbol for national takeover. Even if the women are just characters in a story, they are still becoming martyrs when raped; martyrs for the good of the national story. In other words, the violence of colonialism is again being transferred to women.

Ahmad’s reading of Jameson helps clarify that the allegory of third-world literature resides on the postcolonial level, but Tschofen questions the nature of the allegory of rape: “In my reading of the representation of rape in post-colonial allegories of resistance, I have attempted to ask not only what it means, but who benefits from its meanings – in both cases a masculinist, patriarchal order” (513). Others are still created, and women are still receptacles of violence and abuse. Tschofen brings up the question about the purpose of some postcolonial allegories of rape. What if the underlying topic is really gender, not history? “A focus on the axis of time and the question of history
produces a radically different reading than a focus on gender and its ramifications within power” (513). With these new questions, we can certainly say that Noor, a piece of third-world writing, is not specifically and directly a national allegory. It can be read allegorically (that is, contingent upon history), and should be, but as Tschofen quotes Paul Smith: “we can say that in an allegory a power is being named, symbolically. To this power a reader is bound to subscribe in order to maintain his recognizable position in a fixed system of values” (qtd. in Tschofen 512). Tschofen responds: “The power named in this post-colonial allegory of resistance, which goes forward on the figuration of rape, is a patriarchal power, and the reader is coerced into subscribing into it” (Tschofen 512). I am not willing to let Jameson’s claim that third-world writing must be national allegories coerce me into that subscription of domination. Reading Noor I can see the unity of public and private aspects of third-world life, but his claim that all third-world literature is allegorical is rather slippery, and dealing with the trope of rape, possibly misogynist when actually examining a postcolonial work.
The close examination of Noor raises the issue of how that novel is fundamentally different from something a reader may come across in the first-world. To Jameson the key difference is the public issues expressed in a private forum. He asserts that the rape must mean something else; it is more than a personal crime. But there are texts written in what is labeled the first-world that involve personal experiences of characters that seem to mean more than what they actually illustrate. Ultimately, Bram Stoker’s Dracula does not work as a first-world national allegory because key symbols in the story take away the possibility of a colonialist discourse, but there is certainly a correlation of the public and private in the novel. Dracula’s link with religion and Van Helsing’s representation of reason create a conflict that is not historically true in the colonization of the third-world. Dracula can be read as a symbol of Christianity, and Van Helsing as a symbol of reason, but the allegory is voided the instant they fight each other. Both religion and reason were used as weapons of imperialism. That leads to Ahmad’s question: can the novel be read as a third-world national allegory? I justify this third-world interpretation from my own earlier definition – a national allegory is literature dealing with historical newness. The novel fails to live up to this label of a third-world national allegory as well because it does not encapsulate the entire historical moment. The newness I have isolated is the acceptance of a combination of philosophical methods in everyday life, like the use of both religion and reason. What cannot go unnoticed is that this allegorical reading does not fully speak to imperialism, and if one was trying to create, or at least label a national
allegory, colonialism was far too prominent in Victorian England to not accurately allegorize.

In Cannon Schmitt’s chapter “Mother Dracula” he describes how the book is divided into three sections. The first one culminates with the seduction of Harker by the three vampire ladies, the second is the vamping of Lucy because of her sexuality, and the third is the race to save Mina from turning into a vampire, ending with her rescue and the birth of her child. He notes that all three divisions center upon “vampirism’s erasure of the maternal” (Schmitt 143). The destruction of the mother is reminiscent of my discussion of Noor, but maternal abuse is only at the surface of the two novels’ similarities. In Noor the mothers are abused for providing culture. I will show that in Dracula, the vampire himself becomes a symbolic mother figure, and violence against this mother happens because of a similar reason: what he provides. That product is in itself an outmoded cultural touchstone at the time that the novel is set and written – traditional religion. Martin J. Weiner acknowledges this conflict with religion as a result of the industrial advances of the time. He writes, “The decline in religion was most apparent in the southeastern urban complex … the church remained a reservoir of rural romanticism and of uneasiness with industrial development and economic growth” (117-8). Historically, it becomes evident that the guidelines set by religion for everyday living are no longer exclusive. Any force that represents an absolute, like Dracula symbolizing Christianity, then becomes a target to those who would go beyond a strictly religious devotion to living.

The vampire Dracula is symbolic of Christianity in many ways, and it is this paradox that begins the deconstruction of the novel as a national story. Many writings
have detailed the spread of that religion, especially in relation to Roman imperialism. A History of Western Society notes that “Christianity had a dynamic missionary policy, and the church slowly succeeded in assimilating – that is, adapting – pagan peoples … to Christian teaching” (McKay, vol.1, 198). An important facet to believers in the early Christian church was communion, the tasting of wine that symbolically represents the drinking of the blood of Jesus. According to Stoker’s novel, a vampiric communion takes place when Mina, after being bitten, was forced to drink Dracula’s blood to solidify her conversion into the undead. “His right hand gripped her by the back of the neck, forcing her face down on his bosom … the attitude of the two had a terrible resemblance to a child forcing a kitten’s nose into a saucer of milk to compel it to drink” (Stoker 282). The mixed image of both mother (bosom feeder) and communion receiver (blood drinker) begin to enforce Dracula as not only maternal representation, but also as a religious symbol. In this way vampires continue the chain of their procreation, converting others through this ghastly ritual. Vampirism can spread, and if unchecked, could transform the world’s population from humans into the undead; similarly, Christianity transformed nearly all of Europe’s pagans into Christians. Also, once a person becomes a vampire, some of the human traits are erased as they acquire the characteristics of the nosferatu. Other qualities are kept and assimilated, like a mostly human appearance. This parallel phenomenon is apparent in the adoption of pagan traditions, their culture, into popular religious holidays (think of the Christmas tree and the Easter bunny). As Stephen D. Arata notes, “In Dracula vampirism designates a kind of colonization of the body. Horror arises not because Dracula destroys bodies, but because he appropriates and transforms them” (630). His comments about assimilation and appropriation by the vampire apply
here; Christianity, like vampirism, transforms its converts by both this erasure and incorporation of old traditions and culture.

Dracula is not opposed by Christianity as much as he is an actual symbolic representation of it – namely that of religion’s role in a quickly changing world. This is the first example in the novel of a personal representative of something shared by the public. A History of Western Society says that religion was one of the foremost aspects of culture that the European conquerors brought to the lands they colonized. Partly as an excuse for their imperial spreading, and partly as a tool to maintain order, “peace and stability under European control also permitted the spread of Christianity – the ‘true’ religion” (McKay, Since 1300 879). The definition of religion is littered with terms like “constraint, sanction, service, commitment, devotion, and institutionalized system” (Merriam Webster 988). All of these words convey a sense of order by a dominant power over many people. The invasion was justified because the “heathens” were being brought the religion that, like feudalism, once conquered the mental and economical landscape of Europe.

Some of the values that Christianity taught also prevented the newly converted from fighting back against members of their own beliefs. Dracula shows a similar pattern. His reaction to the crucifix: “It made an instant change in him, for the fury passed so quickly that I could hardly believe that it was ever there” (Stoker 26), is not necessarily fear; it could very well be a symbolic subordination to the church’s own symbolism – a reminder that no harm shall come to a believer. Lucy’s entrapment, “for a full half a minute, which seemed an eternity … between the lifted crucifix and the sacred closing of her means of entry” (Stoker 212), shows that even her movements are controlled by
symbolic representation of the power of religion. Her inability to retreat into the night because of the cross mirrors the church’s claim that non-Christian living is unrighteous. Likewise, she is prevented from returning to the tomb, illustrating that a good Christian cannot rest in peace without subscribing to God’s laws, especially those of life and death. This episode asserts the belief that one cannot live or die without religion, and is substantiated because Lucy is allowed to do neither when she lives in such an ungodly manner. The scar on Mina’s forehead also comes from a religious symbol. “As he placed the Wafer on Mina’s forehead, it had seared it – had burned into the flesh as if it had been a piece of white hot metal” (Stoker 296). This quasi-vampire is marked with religion, a physical labeling of the impact of Christianity on the body of a vampire. In this way Stoker portrays Dracula and his kind as the representation of Christianity. They are portraits of the importance of symbols to a conqueror. Without a checking fear (like “fear of God”), a conquering government would have no way of controlling its subjects. Vampire lore is also wrapped up in that fear.

The purpose of correlating vampires with Christianity is to show that the public and private can also be combined in Jameson’s first world – Stoker’s Europe. Allegorically, through both vampirism and religion, vessels once containing the human spirit were then roaming the land, empty and separated from the natural life cycle for which their body was created. History reminds, “In times of crisis or disaster, people of all faiths have sought the consolation of religion … however [at certain periods] the official Christian church offered very little solace” (McKay, vol.1 383). When those periods came and certain principles of the church were replaced by empty symbols (like the crucifix and the idea of hellfire), the church had the ability to become this
supernatural monster, striking fear into the hearts of the masses (think of the Inquisition and of other violent religious intolerances). At those moments, Dracula, along with his slavery to tradition and ritual, very much symbolized the church. The traditions that caused such violence, the desire to wipe out alternate beliefs and methods, are also hauntingly reminiscent of Jameson’s desire to move beyond culture that I discussed above.

To make Dracula a symbol of Christianity, but then use Christianity in the fight against Dracula, is to not only show the paradox of religion, but the inaccurateness of a label like allegory. What offsets this allegorical nature is the lack of a binary. Religious symbols are not the only thing to deter the vampire. The garlic flower is just as effective. Other things in nature, i.e. nightfall and tidal movement also control Dracula. More than one way to fight the vampire becomes evident in the book. Similarly, the use of reason also becomes an option for living in the context of history. This is reminiscent of Sigmund Freud’s The Future of an Illusion: “the question cannot but arise whether we are not overrating [religion’s] necessity for mankind, and whether we do wisely in basing our cultural demands on it” (48). This reading asks the same question by making Dracula a metaphor for Christianity, and then shows throughout the novel the trend of fighting him – a prelude to the binary of reason, allegorically represented by Van Helsing. In the same book Freud also points out that “religion has lost a part of its influences over human masses precisely because of the … effect of the advances of science” (47-8). This is symbolized in the aligning of both nature and Christianity as weapons against the evil Dracula embodies. It is illogical to fight against oneself, which is what Stoker shows that Christianity does, and what Freud contends is the fatal “resemblance between the
religious ideas which we revere and the mental products of primitive peoples and times” (Future 49). Christianity’s failure to completely defend the vampire’s victims left an opportunity for another form of defense to emerge.

Stoker’s novel shows that reason and the power of the human mind were becoming stronger than the power of tradition. Innovations that were legitimizing science were coming so rapidly in the nineteenth century that the church was losing power. Followers began to question what they had been taught all their lives because of the arrival of new and exciting scientific principles. Critic Rosemary Jann writes about what was really happening historically in England, “Some who no longer accepted Christian dogma criticized as inadequate science’s claim to establish empirical methods as the sole standard for truth” (274). The fear of God that once held such a firm grip on the mind was being explained away by new discoveries. Freud, writing at about the same time as Stoker, covers the other side of this trend, “and this is not because [religion’s] promises have grown less but because people find them less credible” (Future 48-9). In Dracula Van Helsing is the allegorical representation of science’s new power. He is the hero scientist that seems to know how to control all the symbols against Dracula. Through his logical reasoning, he vanquishes the vampiric representation of Christendom and its relics. By destroying all the other vampires at Castle Dracula he ends the colonization process, conquers the conquerors, and instates reason as a new philosophy. But in this reading, if he ends religion’s reign as a colonial tool, he also works against what he represents, reason, because the principles that came from reason were very much employed in England’s colonization efforts. The point is the doctrines that came from the Enlightenment and reason also contributed to colonialism.
If Dracula can be understood as the embodiment of Christianity, then his archrival Van Helsing can be equated with the manifestation of enlightened thinking. Again, exactly where Jameson says public and private spheres cannot exist, the first-world, an allegorical representation of public consciousness personified in an individual character is present. History points out the “three central concepts stand[ing] at the core of Enlightenment thinking” (McKay, Since 1300, 604). Reason, or the idea that, “the methods of natural science could and should be used to examine and understand all aspects of life” (604), was the first. The second was that, “the scientific method was capable of discovering the laws of human society as well as those of nature” (604), and finally, “that of progress. Armed with the proper method of discovering the laws of human existence, Enlightenment thinkers believed that it was at least possible for human beings to create better societies and better people” (604). Van Helsing provides the proof that he is the agent of Enlightenment through his experiment with the lunatic Renfield. He reasons with Renfield: “you claim the privilege of reason in the highest degree, since you seek to impress us with your complete reasonableness. You do this, whose sanity we have reason to doubt, since you are not released from medical treatment for this very defect” (Stoker 245-6, emphasis added). Dr. Seward comments on the introduction of the scientific method, which would seem strange to those who are not used to anything but their belief in a creed: “I had a growing conviction that this sudden change of his entire intellectual method was but yet another form or phase of his madness … Van Helsing was gazing at him with a look of utmost intensity … as of one addressing an equal” (Stoker 245). Van Helsing’s success is evident in Renfield’s reaction, “don’t you know that I am sane and earnest now; that I am no longer a lunatic in mad fit, but a sane man
fighting for his soul? (Stoker 247). Van Helsing uses the scientific method to produce progress, creating, at least temporarily, a better Renfield. Though the story is not an allegory, there are some strong metaphorical representations that lend to that label, and that facet of this book has nothing to do with what economic world it derived in.

Van Helsing, an individual, represents an emergence of a new type of public character in what Jameson labels the first-world. In the essay “What Is Enlightenment?” Immanuel Kant describes the pioneer of reason, the sort of character that Stoker makes Van Helsing. “There will always be some people who think for themselves, [ones who] spread about them the spirit of reasonable estimate of their own value and of the need for everyman to think for himself” (409). Kant goes on to say, “The public use of a man’s reason must be free at all times, and this alone can bring enlightenment among men” (409). Van Helsing empowers his fellow vampire hunters through these methods. He was the original source of their knowledge, but he made certain that the characters were not following his lead on blind faith, but instead by thinking the actions through after he provided some proof. While proposing the plot to confront the undead Lucy at the cemetery, he makes this method clear: “‘I accept your limitation,’ said Van Helsing, ‘and all I ask of you is that if you feel it necessary to condemn any act of mine, you will first consider it well and be satisfied that it does not violate your reservations’” (Stoker 205). The representative of science invites his pupils to discover what they can; unlike Dracula, he does not aggressively force his disciples into circumstances beyond their control.

Ultimately Van Helsing does lead his followers into war. It is this war that definitively trumps any further attempt at reading this as colonialist discourse, or a national story of Britain. In “The Age of Reason” Thomas Paine writes, “my own mind
is my own church” (65). The allegorization of reason as the binary of religion, according to Paine, making the mind a metaphorical church, and placing Van Helsing as the embodiment of reason, the leader of that church, makes the conflict between Van Helsing and Dracula a holy war. Just as in history Christian crusaders fought to gain control of their holy land, the geographical location of the origins of their religion, Van Helsing led an army of “crusaders of reason” against the Christian incarnation, Dracula, and his attempted takeover of London. These “enlightened knights” were on a quest to retake their land from the grasps of the strict Christianity that dominated the times.

If colonizers use religion as a weapon, then logic is the counter weapon used by preachers of reason. But colonizers also used logic. In fact, it was logic which enabled many of the technological advances that allowed them to become a dominating superpower. What is so logical about Van Helsing’s approach is that he does not obey the borders tradition has set. In other words he combines religion, superstition, natural science, and technology in his fight against Dracula. Normally these would be considered separate fields that do not mix with each other, but by combining their strengths Van Helsing is able to make himself that much stronger. One by one the concepts from these individual beliefs fail to ward off Dracula. Harker’s possession of a crucifix may have temporarily saved him, but it did not permanently prevent the horrors he went through at Castle Dracula. The superstitious signs like the evil eye that the Transylvanian locals used certainly did not save the nightly ravaging of their children by Dracula. The tidal movements eventually subsided to allow the vampire movement at times, and the technology of the typewriter was also overcome when Dracula destroyed the records and manuscripts of his hunters. The methods that Van Helsing combined did
the most to fight off the vampire and eventually led to his success. From the natural sciences he used garlic flowers that, when allowed to remain in Lucy’s room gave her “four days and nights of peace,” allowing her to write, “I am getting so strong that I hardly know myself” (Stoker 135). The natural effects of garlic provided some relief but Van Helsing knew he could not stop there.

From technology these crusaders were able to collate their records to form a stronger knowledge and document Dracula’s habits. Another technological advance that Van Helsing used was the science of blood transfusion. He counters the vampiric draining and “rebirth” with a scientific replenishment of his own. “As the transfusion went on something like life seemed to come back to poor Lucy’s cheeks” (Stoker 122). But even with the success of transfusion, Van Helsing knew he needed more weapons against Dracula. He could not rely on technology alone, so he sacrificed his own health and exhausted himself continuously traveling back and forth between England and Amsterdam, because as he says, “there are books and things there which I want” (Stoker 124). One of the items he acquires while there is a religious object, a host wafer used for communion. This item is strictly religious, but Van Helsing does not discount it because of its origins. Instead he takes a logical approach and assimilates everything that serves a useful purpose.

The allegorical representation of reason’s emergence is most evident in the book’s resolution, but that representation goes against the actual historical context. The crusaders of reason defeat the Christian relic, Dracula, and end the reign he has over the transforming, or colonized, Mina. Quincey Morris’ last words show how the victory of Enlightenment can finally erase the bonds of oppression: “The snow is not more stainless
than her forehead! The curse has passed away!” (Stoker 378). Mina is no longer doomed
to turn into a vampire, or be enslaved by the oppressive religion it symbolizes, because
she is free from the restrictive bonds of both Dracula and what the above has shown him
to symbolize. The way in which this victory was accrued through knowledge and
methods, both logical and traditional, resembles what Kant says: “All that is required for
this enlightenment is freedom; and particularly the least harmful of all that may be called
freedom, namely, the freedom for man to make public use of his reason in all matters”
(56). They were all made safer and stronger because they used their freedom to make
their ideas public, and combine what was known in order to destroy evil, even if that
knowledge included some of the old traditions of Christianity. Jann sums up the
relationship between the cohort’s old and new beliefs: “Stoker’s narrative is … heavily
invested in valorizing the rationalistic authority conventionally associated with scientific
thought … [it] proclaims the power of faith, belief, and imagination, but the plot makes
these dependent on logic, deduction, and proof for their ultimate success” (273). In other
words, Van Helsing was the rational man needed to organize all the weapons against
Dracula. It is reason (represented by Van Helsing) that saves humanity because rationale
can organize methods capable of defeating any evil, with little regard to the strength or
validity of the original sources.

Historical change was responsible for the weakening of the kind of tradition
Dracula represents. It is that concept that makes this story allegorical, but not an allegory.
The fight against tradition, which is not too far of a stretch from culture, takes place on
many levels at this time in history. While Christianity is being challenged by reason in
the West, the West is abroad challenging native forms of culture. Schmitt notices the
grouping of Van Helsing’s band as the result of a compilation effort of many of the countries “at the zenith of European imperial expansion” (142). But history shows that these were not a single unit providing a binary structure that an allegorical reading of the novel would have us believe. Schmitt, in talking about the joint effort of these representatives of countries on the technological and logical forefront, writes: “precisely insofar as it suppresses national diversity, [the binary organization] secures imperialist unity” (142). This is reminiscent of Jameson’s ideas on culture – the suppression of third-world national unity in favor of acceptance of the capitalist first-world.

It seems that western history is constructed of what would appear to be binary opposition, inherent in the spread of Christianity to the spread of colonialism, and once the distance of history or culture is added, the stories from those times and places become the stories of those binary interactions, which again, lead to allegory-like representations. I want to stress that these depictions are only allegorical, not definite. Schmitt highlights the exact shift that prevents that label. “England’s relation to the other western nations has moved from one of synecdoche to one of metaphor – a metaphor whose vehicle usurps the place of its tenor: that is to say, at the end of the novel England is the West” (145). With the immense representational changes in the novel, the reader gets a feel of history’s fluidity, but what that shows is how writers can describe and react to a nation’s temporal place, not how they restate it in a one to one representation that an allegory would require.
CONCLUSION

This project has been a testament to the old adage that the only constant is change. It has covered alterations of history through politics, economics, philosophy, and more. If no interpretations of the above list remain definite, then how can a piece of fiction be interpreted in only one manner, even if it is a specimen of what Jameson calls the postmodern? His postmodern seems to rely too heavily on economics. I would argue that *Noor* is based on more, and should be received more broadly, than just a commentary on first-world capitalism’s invasion of the third-world.

*Noor* and *Dracula*, novels from supposedly separate economic worlds and cultures become remarkably similar. On the surface there is violence towards, and elimination of, maternal figures. Below the surface there is a potential for the private events of the characters to coincide with contemporary public happenings. More important though, both novels are full of intricate complexities that go beyond their respective cultural backgrounds. They are aesthetic works that contribute to society in more ways than a simple retelling of an historical newness.

Maud Ellmann, in her introduction to *Dracula* cites anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss’s idea that “the true substance of myth” (vii) is about the story, not the style. It is that quality which makes Stoker’s factually imperfect novel so versatile on an interpretive level. Ellmann outlines the many interpretations of what Dracula represents, then asks, “If the vampire can mean so many disparate things, does he really mean anything at all?” (xxviii). She lists the vast popular interpretations of what the character Dracula has been said to represent: “perversion, menstruation, venereal disease, female sexuality, male homosexuality, feudal aristocracy, monopoly capitalism, the proletariat, the Jew, the
primal father, the Antichrist, and the typewriter” (xxviii). By showing the innumerable ways to read *Dracula* in her introduction to the book, a novel immersed between Jameson’s industrial and modern periods, a reader has to realize that if first-world literature can be read more than one way, then it is not justifiable to give *Noor*, or any “third-world national allegory” for that matter, just one possible meaning. Yes, the novel is set in a tumultuous time that very heavily involves a shift into the postmodern, or multinational capitalism, but *Dracula*’s historical involvement certainly did not limit the magnitude of what the book does for its vast amounts of readers. Actually, texts dealing with historical newness are probably riper for multiple interpretations just because the inherent history allows at least one way to examine them.

It seems that Jameson’s literary interpretations are being invaded by a kind of economic anthropology. I hesitate to agree with this extreme classification, especially if we are all postmodern. *Noor* may be on the other side of history from the first-world, but as Jameson points out, the shifting objectives of culture in this story works to blend the first and third-worlds into what he calls late capitalism. At what point do the binary distinctions become no longer necessary for critics like him? Tschofen takes an important step to show that the trope of rape must be interpreted in more ways than in the traditional postcolonial allegorical view. I would invite readers of this project to take similar steps in that direction. It is clear that there are a multitude of ways to read *Dracula*, a first-world story very much involved in world economics and politics. How else can *Noor* or any other third-world story similarly entrenched in Jameson’s late capitalism, be read, interpreted, and used for the valuable cultural work that literature can do?


