An analysis of a sparse linearization attack on the advanced encryption standard

UNCG Author/Contributor (non-UNCG co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
Stephanie D. Rednour (Creator)
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG )
Web Site:
Shan Suthaharan

Abstract: "Since Rijndael was accepted as the new Advanced Encryption Standard by the NIST, several techniques have been developed to attack it. One of the more controversial techniques is a relatively new mathematically based attack known as Extended Sparse Linearization, or XSL. Estimates for a successful attack on AES using XSL are extremely large (best estimate is 2100 encryptions), so no attempt to implement the attack has yet been made. To show that the attack is viable, a reduced version of AES can be implemented and a modification of the XSL attack can be used on the reduced version. I have implemented the reduced version of AES, referred to as rAES, as well as the attack. In this document it will be shown that the attack fails. Since the attack failed on the reduced version, the result can be extended to show that it cannot be made on the full version either. "--Abstract from author supplied metadata.

Additional Information

Language: English
Date: 2006
Rijndael, Advanced Encryption Standard, NIST, Extended Sparse Linearization, attack technique
Data encryption (Computer science)
Computer networks--Security measures

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