Privatization, bureaucracy, and risk aversion
- UNCG Author/Contributor (non-UNCG co-authors, if there are any, appear on document)
- Dennis P. Leyden, Associate Professor (Creator)
- Albert N. Link, Professor (Creator)
- Institution
- The University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG )
- Web Site: http://library.uncg.edu/
Abstract: The role of governmental risk aversion in the decision to privatize the production of goods and services has not been examined closely. Using a model of a risk-averse, single-service Niskanen bureaucrat, we determine the conditions under which a bureaucrat will prefer to privatize rather than produce in-house. If the private-sector firm is risk neutral, the result will be a fixed-fee contract with complete insurance. If the private-sector firm is risk averse, the result will be a cost-plus contract with the degree of cost sharing determined by the bureaucrat's share of total risk aversion. In both cases, the bureaucrat's sponsor may affect the likelihood of privatization by manipulating the rewards and penalties imposed on the bureaucrat.
Privatization, bureaucracy, and risk aversion
PDF (Portable Document Format)
499 KB
Created on 9/3/2010
Views: 3218
Additional Information
- Publication
- Public Choice, 1993, 76(3:199-213.
- Language: English
- Date: 1993
- Keywords
- Privatization, Risk aversion, Government contracts, Bureaucracy