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Law enforcement officers in the U. S. are granted the legal authority to issue commands to citizens and to compel citizen compliance through legal sanction, arrest, and even physical force. This research examines compliance interactions between police officers and citizens to examine the factors that influence voluntary compliance from citizens to officer commands.

Findings are based on content analyses of 250 officer/citizen interactions captured by police cruiser mounted video systems used by police departments in two North Carolina cities. The influence of 31 factors on citizen compliance, suggested primarily by the theories of Social Interactionism and Judgmental Heuristics, were analyzed using Ordinal Logistic Regression. Six factors were shown to have a significant effect upon citizen's degree of compliance, including: citizen emotionality, initiation of the interaction, officer use of threats, citizen initial compliance, officer respect for citizen, and department-type of the officer involved. The implications for further research are discussed, as well as the potential usefulness of "dash cam" footage from police cruiser mounted video systems for further sociological research.

WITHOUT FORCE: EXAMINING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE IN
POLICE/CITIZEN ENCOUNTERS

by

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Committee Chair

I dedicate this work to the law enforcement officers around the world, who daily go out and do their job. May this research, in some small way, help to make that job easier.

APPROVAL PAGE

This thesis has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of The Graduate School at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In modern America, those sworn to uphold and enforce the law are diverse. Federal, state, and local governments empower men and women to uphold the rule of law through a myriad of different tasks. Special agents and detectives work alongside administrators and regulators. However, it is the street level patrol officer who has become the symbol of American law enforcement. “Beat cops” inhabit the thin boundary line where the civilian world touches the criminal justice system. These men and women are the first, and usually the only, face that will personify the character of the law to the average citizen.

The patrol officer is entrusted with the responsibility of not only enforcing the law but also maintaining order and peace within his or her jurisdiction. This law enforcement and order maintenance work of a cop involves many different skills and abilities. Paper work and reporting skills are essential to the work of patrol officers, as are driving and investigative abilities. However, dealing with citizens is the key skill of a beat cop. Specifically, patrol officers must engender basic obedience from citizens. Fortunately, obedience is an almost universal attribute of human behavior, and individuals who frequently commit blatant acts of disobedience are rare. Even the most disobedient offenders are obedient in the vast majority of situations and interactions. Yet, it is the management of these atypical noncompliance situations by which law enforcement

professionals prove their worth. Police “officers routinely judge each other by their success in achieving compliance” (Mastrofski, Snipes and Supina, 1996:269).

The work of law enforcement and order maintenance cannot be accomplished by an officer without citizen compliance. However, the means of achieving this obedience can vary as much as the personalities of the cops themselves. The arsenal of the police officer would lead the average observer to conclude that it is through force and threat of force that compliance is secured and order is maintained in this country.

“Police force has long been a central focus among those who have studied the police” (Terrill and Mastrofski 2002:215). Yet, we find that the use of force is not the primary tool of influence used by law enforcement. “Examination of the communication processes between police and civilians shows that force and coercion are relatively rare in police interaction with civilians” (Sykes and Brent 1983:1). By the same token, research finds that exercising the power of arrest does not consume the time of police. “The most cursory observation of patrol officers on the job overturns the imagery of people who make their living parceling citizens into jail” (Black 1980:86). In fact, arrest often is not even a possible response to many situations. So if direct physical force and arrest are not the chief ways in which police officers achieve compliance from citizens, how are the goals of law enforcement and order maintenance achieved?

“From the perspective of law enforcement agents, then, compliance means conforming behavior to a standard of conduct that is set by normative or political means” (Reiss 1984:92). Citizen compliance can be subdivided into two types, involuntary and voluntary. Involuntary compliance is obtained through some type of use of force on the

part of a police officer. The types of physical force include, but are not limited to, the use of: soft- or hard-hand techniques, chemical sprays, less lethal technologies such as beanbag rounds, impact weapons such as collapsible batons, firearms, and the brandishing of any of said weapons. Involuntary compliance is based on a citizen following an officer's verbal command because of pain inflicted by the implementation of physical force by an officer, or because they are attempting to avoid such implementation of physical force after a weapon is brandished.

Voluntary compliance, conversely, is any obedience by a citizen to the verbal commands of a police officer without the use of physical force or the brandishing of a weapon. Richard Sykes and Edward Brent (1983:25) make the observation that “a measure of a good police officer is his ability to handle a difficult situation without use of violence, and in the case of minor violations, without arrest.” With this view in mind, I examine the factors that influence voluntary compliance in police-citizen encounters.

I examine officer/citizen compliance interactions by viewing footage from police cruiser mounted video systems. The Kernersville Police Department, located in Kernersville, North Carolina, and the King Police Department, located in King, North Carolina, both granted access to their video databases. I examine footage of interactions from each of these two jurisdictions in order to examine the question: what factors influence the likelihood of citizen voluntary compliance to the commands of a law enforcement officer during an interaction?

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

In order to investigate the factors that influence voluntary compliance by citizens, I conducted a sociological study of officer/citizen interactions. This research focused on and was guided by the social interactionist perspective and the theory of judgmental heuristics. First, however, it is necessary to briefly explore sociology's tradition concerning theories of power and obedience, concepts foundational to the investigation of my question.

Sociologists have wrestled with issues of obedience and power since the inception of the science of Sociology. Power, in all its macro and micro forms, is the term that sociologists use to understand the practice of compliance. Conflict theorists, most notably Karl Marx, believe society is primarily shaped by competition over scarce resources. All types of social and individual power proceed from this basic economic reality. This school of thought places "emphasis on how inequality and stratification generate conflicts between social classes" (Turner 2001:7) and how this conflict is expressed as power. A conflict theorist is interested in how power is exerted, by whom and against whom.

Conflict theory also applies its understanding of power to the work of law enforcement, the focus of this research. According to conflict theorists, the position of the elite is maintained because "the dominant groups can see to it that their particular definitions of normality or deviance will become enacted as law, ensconced in public

policy, and protected by the operation of the criminal justice system” (Akers and Sellers 2004:196). Thus, in a capitalist society, the elite who exercise control over the means of production have the ability to accumulate capital and then use their economic power to subjugate the working class in all other spheres of life.

The capitalistic “form of production creates its own legal relations (and) form of government” (Marx 1857:88). The elite use this cultural and social power to promote obedience to ideas, which perpetuates the status quo. Marx (1857) states that, under capitalism, “production can be carried on better under the modern police” (88). Therefore, the police simply represent the armed mercenaries of the elite, who enforce the current unequal distribution of resources with violence and incarceration of those who threaten the interests of the bourgeoisie. In the view of conflict theorists, compliance to law enforcement is a result of the violent intimidation that the bourgeois wield over the lower classes in order to maintain the status quo.

Max Weber agreed with Marx concerning the influence of economic wealth as it relates to broader social power. Weber termed this aspect of control “class power.” However, he also theorized that a second form of influence was present in society, that of “status power.” Status power is exerted based on an individual’s level of charisma. “Weber always used the term charisma in the sense of an ‘extraordinary quality’ possessed by persons or objects” (Bendix 1960:299). Weber understands the power of policing agencies as either an expression of class power, wherein economic conditions are protected, or as an expression of status power, which is passed from a dynamic leader to a stable organization. For example, in communities living under the legal code of

Sharia, those who police their communities in order to enforce adherence to principles laid out in the Qur'an draw their power from the outgrowth of the status power of Muhammad himself.

Functional theorists assume that power is given to governing bodies in an act of vested self-interest by members of society. "Functional theory always asks the question of how a particular phenomenon operates to meet the survival needs or requirements of a larger social system, as the latter seeks to adapt to its environment" (Turner 2001:6). According to Durkheim, "when society is strongly integrated, it holds individuals under its control, [and] considers them at its service" (Durkheim 1897:209). Law enforcement agencies are an example of how "society creates the machinery of control in order to protect itself against the 'harmful' effects of deviation, in much the same way that an organism mobilizes its resources to combat an invasion of germs" (Erikson 1966:8). According to functionalist theory, members of society place law enforcement officers in a position of authority because this position of authority is necessary to insure the public good. A functionalist perspective would contend that those who defy the power of the police are those who are not fully bound to society and thus not supportive of society's goals. Therefore, the degree to which individuals are bonded to society is the approximate degree to which they obey the commands of police officers.

Exchange theorists, including Peter Blau (2003), understand all social relations to be the result of social exchanges. Just as economic relations develop in a market of economic exchanges, social relations develop in a market of social exchanges. However, just as inequality develops in economic exchanges, it is similarly produced in social

exchanges. When such inequality is present, power is created, along with a variety of social methods which serve to mitigate the power disparity of the social exchange. Deference to the commands of those with power, for example police officers, serves to balance inequality in a social exchange. Thus, law enforcement's power stems from a higher social position, which demands deference in order to equalize the social exchange of the interaction. Furthermore, the ability to obtain compliance can be seen as a resource in and of itself. According to Blau (2003), "willingness to comply with another's demands is a generic social reward, since the power it gives him is a generalized means, parallel to money, which can be used to attain a variety of ends" (as cited in Allan 2006:134).

Conflict theory, functional theory and the theory of social exchange offer explanations of macro-level phenomena which influence compliance. In other words, they express an explanation of the structures and cultural forces that shape the lives of individuals. Macro theories offer an explanation of society which rests on the existence of social structures. These theories assume that every individual's "action is constrained by culture and structure, [and thus] it is more predictable" (Turner 2001:3). However, the breadth of scope of these theories diverts attention from the actual interactions of individuals. Because I am concerned with the act of compliance or noncompliance in a particular type of interaction, that which takes place between officers and citizens, it is more practical to seek out micro-level theories. These micro-level theories "give primacy to action" (Turner 2001:3) rather than social structures and thus examine the processes of

face-to-face interactions, looking for clues as to what factors influence compliance interactions.

Social Interactionism

The social interactionist (SI) perspective is first and foremost “an attempt to provide a comprehensive theory of goal-oriented or instrumental aggression” (Tedeschi and Felson 1993:295). This perspective views compliance as one of the main goals of aggression. According to social interactionism, “a coercive action [one form of aggression] is one where the intent is either to impose harm on another person or to force compliance” (Tedeschi and Felson 1993:296). Compliance interactions, according to this perspective, would be better characterized as aggression interactions. However, aggression and violence, though closely related, should not be confused with one another.

My research focuses on compliance to verbal commands, which is elicited without the use of force; yet all compliance interactions, as the social interactionist perspective points out, contain varying degrees of implicit or explicit aggression. Uniformed law enforcement officers in the United States are, with few exceptions, always armed, and thus their interactions contain an implicit element of aggression. Furthermore, when an officer issues a command to a citizen, assuming that command is legal, the citizen is under a legal obligation to obey that command with the penalty for noncompliance being an arrestable misdemeanor. In other words, compliance interactions involving a police officer are inherently aggressive due to the fact that they carry an implicit and/or explicit threat of arrest. Social interactionist theory assumes that all

compliance interactions are aggression interactions, which may or may not be the case. However, an officer/citizen interaction is much more blatantly aggressive than many.

The social interactionist perspective rests on three main assumptions concerning the behavioral patterns of human beings. First, this perspective borrows from rational choice theory in its belief that individuals weigh costs and benefits of various possible behaviors. Rational choice theory (RCT) was developed by Gary Becker in 1968 as an application of an economic theory to the study of Criminology (McCarthy 2002:417). This theoretical framework is an intellectual descendent of the classical school of Criminology. “The rational choice approach to crime assumes that crime can be understood as if people choose to offend by using the same principles of cost-benefit analysis they use when selecting legal behaviors” (McCarthy 2002:422).

Second, according to the social interactionist perspective, situational factors are influential to the progression of compliance interactions. For example, according to SI the presence of a third party will affect the development of an interaction. Any relationship that exists between actors involved in an interaction also will influence the outcome, as will “the dynamic interchange between them” (Tedeschi and Felson 1993:296). Social interactionist theorists view compliance interactions as a type of aggressively changed situation. Thus, SI theory explores the ways that location, time, and presence of other persons mitigate or contribute to “the dynamic interchange that occurs as aggressive incidents escalate” (Tedeschi and Felson 1993:2).

Third, “a social interactionist perspective requires an understanding of the phenomenology of actors” (Tedeschi and Felson 1993:296). The SI theorist takes into

account the expectations, reasoning, and principles of an individual during compliance interactions. This point-of-view also takes into consideration the belief structure of actors as they decide upon compliance or noncompliance. “Thus, beliefs about justice and equity, the assignment of blame, and the accounts that people give to justify their behavior is central” (Tedeschi and Felson 1993:2). In the view of this theory, internal factors that are unique to an individual in an interaction are crucial to understanding why decisions concerning compliance are made. However, the difficulty that arises is that decision-making processes, and personal beliefs which influence these processes, are difficult to explore.

The social interactionist perspective is useful for the examination of police-citizen encounters because it touches on a number of factors which may influence a given actor’s decision concerning compliance. “The interactionist approach adds the possibility that outcomes are not preordained by actors’ status characteristics but rather can take many paths, depending on choices made by actors as events unfold” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:272-273). This perspective also provides the possibility for the exploration of officer impact and influence on a compliance-seeking situation. This scope “allows researchers to explore many of the practical aspects of police work, things that officers can choose (how to present themselves, how to behave towards citizens)” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:273). Such an exploration can yield practical data, which might allow police officers to increase the likelihood of voluntary compliance among citizens, thereby increasing officer and citizen safety.

According to SI, individuals comply with commands for both normative and instrumental reasons. Normative reasons are defined as the tendency to conform because of a culturally standard set of behaviors expected in certain situations. In the case of interactions with police officers, it is “that one heeds the law because it seems morally right or because those who make or enforce the law have the right to tell us what to do” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:273). Thus, variables having to do with social bondedness of a citizen and a citizen’s perspective concerning the legitimacy of law enforcement and a particular officer’s commands will influence the citizen’s likelihood of voluntary compliance.

Social interactionism proposes that citizens are more likely to comply with the commands of an officer to the degree that the citizens are invested in society, as measured by the degree to which individuals are members of dominant cultural groups. SI’s normative influences correspond to Travis Hirschi’s control theory. Hirschi theorizes “that people whose bond to society is weak or broken are more likely to engage in delinquent acts” (Renzetti, Curran and Carr 2003:117). Control theory itself grew out of Durkheim’s concept of “egoism, in which the individual ego asserts itself to excess in the face of the social ego and at its expense” (Durkheim [1897] 1951:209). This idea that an alienation from conventional society decreases the likelihood of an individual’s voluntary compliance in a citizen-officer encounter also presents the possibility of a given person ascribing to an alternate subculture that proscribes disobedience to law enforcement. “Sanctions are thought in many cases to stimulate pride in the defiance of the law when

people are so socially marginalized that they identify with peers who take noncompliance as a badge of honor” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:278).

Another normative variable in the police-citizen encounter that might influence likelihood of voluntary compliance is the perceived legitimacy of law enforcement. The belief that an officer has the proper authority to issue an order, and expect compliance, can be affected by many different factors. The police organization that a patrol officer belongs to may increase or decrease his or her legitimacy in the mind of a given citizen. An agency that has developed a reputation for corruption may undercut the authority that citizens ascribe to officers. By the same token, an officer who obviously appears to be a rookie may be treated as though she/he has less of a right to demand compliance. It should be noted that a “recent study suggests that legitimacy may be a powerful element in securing compliance” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:277).

The general legitimacy of a police officer or law enforcement agency may affect the likelihood of compliance; however, the view that an officer has the right to expect compliance can vary with the type of command and the situational setting in which it is issued. Humans are sensitive to the ways in which social rules shift from one physical location to another. In the case of policing, noncompliance is more or less proper depending on location. “Police actions have greater legitimacy to the extent that they are seen to take place in domains where police authority is greatest: public places and police facilities” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:277).

The legitimacy of an officer also is dependent on an officer’s behavior during the interaction. If an officer is fair in his/her dealings with a citizen, legitimacy increases.

“The relational model of authority suggests that people evaluate group authorities in terms of fairness of the manner in which they exercise their authority: that is, via procedural justice” (Sunshine and Tyler 2003:154). Sunshine and Tyler (2003:163) make the observation that increasing legitimacy and increasing moral solidarity both function to make “people feel that they ought to comply and cooperate with the police.” They also note that when officers follow procedures perceived as being fair, legitimacy and moral solidarity are both strengthened (Sunshine and Tyler 2003). In this way, the effect of fairness upon citizen compliance is demonstrated to be a combination of legitimacy and attachment.

Similar to the effect fairness has upon citizens’ likelihood of compliance, the level of respect with which officers treat citizens is a variable which also is assumed to affect voluntary compliance. When officers treat citizens with respect or civility, it creates “a greater likelihood of (the civility) being reciprocated by citizens” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:277). The effect of respect is quite commonsensical and plays out in everyday interactions in much the same way as within officer/citizen compliance interactions. However, what is interesting is the degree to which a law enforcement officer’s status enables him/her to elicit respect from citizens “even when police were uncivil toward them” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:277). Closely related to the factor of respect, is the use of threats. Issuing threats is an obtuse and disrespectful form of communication, and thus decreases the likelihood of citizen compliance.

Thus, the normative variable of legitimacy also is affected by the characteristics of the officers involved in compliance seeking. Research on officers “shows that traits

such as race, sex, education, and attitudes have little influence on behavior and performance” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:280). However, the difference between skill levels and experience are important. Police officers themselves often note the “value of experience, of seeing the same thing reoccur” (Muir 1977:59). As police officers mature in their profession, they learn to pick up on particular cues. Muir (1977:153) states that “to anticipate what was going to happen, policemen developed a sense for the patterns in human affairs.” Terrill and Mastrofski (2002) conducted a study that found that, on average, less force was used by experienced officers. This may indicate that more experienced officers are perceived to have a greater legitimate expectation of voluntary compliance than their less senior co-workers.

In addition to the personal characteristics and experience of a given law enforcement officer, it is widely held that police departments can have an influence upon the legitimacy which is ascribed to their officers by the public. The community-policing model of law enforcement is designed to allow for more incorporation of patrol officers into the communities that they police. “Community policing emphasizes alternatives to formal sanctions when they are likely to be more effective or efficient in solving problems” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:280). This perspective theoretically encourages individual officers to work towards obtaining voluntary compliance from citizens. “Community policing means making the police more cooperative with those who are not police” (Mastrofski, Worden and Snipes 1995:540). The degree to which a given officer is affected by these policies may be influenced by how much importance the department places on this model, the particular approach that the department takes, and the degree to

which the particular patrol officer identifies with the community policing ideology. Such a policing model cannot only affect the department's reputation in the community but also the way an individual officer deals with citizens, thereby increasing his/her legitimacy in the eyes of citizens.

Normative variables are those which, according to social interactionism, influence behavior due to an individual's investment in society. However, SI describes a second group of variables that affect behavior on a much more situational level. Instrumental variables are defined as the tendency to conform in order to avoid adverse consequences. In the case of interactions with police officers, these adverse consequences can be represented by "formal sanctions (arrest, conviction, and court-imposed punishment) or informal sanctions (shaming or the disapproval of those who matter)" (Mastrofski et al. 1996:273).

It almost goes without saying that an individual's capacity for rational judgment has an effect on his/her likelihood of making decisions rationally, and the social interactionist perspective makes allowance for this factor. Officers often have encountered that "when people are intoxicated, deranged, hysterical, or enraged, they become particularly difficult to manage" (Mastrofski et al. 1996:274). Many factors can inhibit the degree of rationality with which an individual makes decisions. Those who suffer from certain developmental/communication disorders, such as Down Syndrome and autism, can lack the ability to perceive and make appropriate inferences based on information presented to them. Thus, their ability to make rational decisions is lessened.

This diminishment also is experienced by those suffering from a variety of mental disorders. For example, an individual suffering from schizophrenia may be subject to auditory or visual hallucinations, and when an individual with this malady makes decisions, he/she cannot be considered rational due to the fact that imagined data are influencing decision-making. Also, individuals can ingest a variety of substances that impair their decision-making processes. These include alcohol, legal medications and illegal drugs. Finally, emotionality tends to decrease capacity for rational choice. Just as decision-making abilities in mathematics would be disrupted if an individual were not calm, the capacity for rational decisions concerning compliance also is influenced by emotion.

One instrumental variable that may affect decision-making processes of compliance is the perceived seriousness of the problem that attracts the officer's attention. In police-citizen situations, "the severity of the punishment is largely a matter of the seriousness of the offense" (Mastrofski et al. 1996:274). The crime under investigation and the strength of the evidence linking a citizen to that crime are directly linked to a citizen's possibility of punishment. Therefore, compliance, which assists the investigation, becomes a matter of either mitigating the possible punishment or using noncompliance to thwart the investigation and thereby avoid punishment completely.

The levels of authoritativeness of an officer also is linked to the likelihood of obtaining voluntary compliance in the social interactionist perspective. Officers can influence the compliance of citizens through the use of coercion. "What makes coercion work is imparting to the target the impression that the officer can and will deliver on the

threat, implied or explicit” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:274). The authoritativeness that an officer presents when he or she enters an interaction, and the levels of authoritativeness that are used when framing commands, can be either highly or moderately coercive. Also, failing to comply with the lawful command of an officer is a crime for which an individual can be arrested. Thus, a certain level of coercion is present in any officer/citizen interaction.

Instrumental variables which can affect the likelihood of compliance are not limited to formal sanctions, like arrest. Officers often use formal sanctions as a last resort and instead utilize “informal strategies, and shaming strategies in particular, that are the currency of discipline in everyday life” (Rock 1995:23). According to the SI approach, citizens in compliance interactions consider more than the likelihood of arrest or injury. Individuals also take into account public humiliation and even the disappointment of the officer on the scene. Behavior is often guided by these more subtle, yet important, forces of embarrassment and shame. These are powerful factors in determining behavior when receiving commands from law enforcement.

The social interactionist perspective provides a method of understanding compliance interactions that is deep and rich. SI looks at the way a variety of normative and instrumental factors influence the decision maker in the interaction. According to social interactionism, actors can perform rational calculations of cost and benefit while at the same time their behavior is unconsciously influenced by his/her own investment in society and its social norms. This perspective predicts a diversity of influences on

voluntary compliance behavior and is therefore a useful tool for examining the complicated event of an officer/citizen compliance interaction.

Judgmental Heuristics

The concept that human beings consciously decide on courses of compliance or noncompliance, in a more or less rational way, weighing the factors involved, is not a universally held view. Robert B. Cialdini (2001) suggests that decision-making processes are often aided or even replaced by cognitive shortcuts known as judgmental heuristics. Complex situations or a course of events which deprive a decision maker of the time or distance necessary for rational judgment tend to necessitate judgmental heuristics. Cialdini (2001:7) states that “we must very often use our stereotypes, our rules of thumb, to classify things according to a few key features and then to respond without thinking when one or another of these trigger features is present.” This phenomenon is especially applicable to the study of compliance.

Any society has an interest in insuring the obedience of its members, which is obvious in the conditioning that takes place both in parent-child relationships as well as teacher-child dynamics. Without a system of obedience to authority, no society would be able to function. These heuristics are communicated and enforced through social norms, which “are rules and standards that are understood by members of a group, and that guide and/or constrain social behavior without the force of laws” (Cialdini and Trost 1998:152). The result of this necessary system of compliance is that “our obedience frequently takes place . . . with little or no conscious deliberation” (Cialdini 2001:185). In other words, if

an individual is identified as an authority figure, a greater likelihood exists that he/she will receive compliance from those around him/her.

Cialdini (2001) also points to some specific factors that function as triggers for compliance judgmental heuristics that are present in patrol officer-citizen encounters. According to Cialdini, individuals tend to acquiesce to the requests of a person who is perceived as having a higher social status or a position of authority. Those who hold positions of authority “whether they have acquired their positions through knowledge, talent, or power” (Cialdini and Trost 1998:170) exert a great deal of influence over those they contact. As it relates to officer/citizen interactions, the fact that an officer holds the title of police officer makes compliance much more likely. A variety of psychological experiments have discovered a “mechanical deference given to individuals whose titles bespeak authority” (Cialdini 2001:192) and a discrimination against those who possess titles which indicate a lack of authority. So too does the uniform of a law enforcement officer add to his or her likelihood of obtaining compliance.

Reciprocation is the tendency of an individual to attempt to “repay in kind, what another person has provided” him or her (Cialdini 2001:20). The assumption that others will pay us back in kind for services rendered to them is a bedrock of social interactions. The assumption of equitable dealings allows for exchanges of services, despite the fact that there is usually a necessary delay of payment to one of the parties. This judgmental heuristic “helps us build trust with others and pushes us toward equity in our relationships” (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004:599). Compliance to a request is a prime

example of this kind of repayment. To the extent that one feels indebted to another, he/she will be more likely to acquiesce to a request made by that person.

The judgmental heuristic of consistency is the tendency of an individual to maintain equivalence with his/her own previous behavior or expressed views. This mental shortcut pushes us towards decisions which are in line with the way we have presented ourselves in the past. The theory of judgmental heuristics views “the desire for consistency as a prime motivator of our behavior” (Cialdini and Trost 1998:177) which includes the behavior of compliance. For example, if an individual presents him/herself as being obedient and law abiding, he/she will be much more likely to act in a manner consistent with this characterization, which in the case of compliance interactions with a police officer would include complying with verbal commands.

Social proof is the tendency of an individual to “view a behavior as correct in a given situation to the degree that” (Cialdini, 2001:100) the individual observes the behavior being exhibited by those around him or her. Another term for this type of behavior is conformity. The actions of others act as clues which allow us “to gain an accurate understanding of and effectively respond to social situations, especially during times of uncertainty” (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004:597). In officer/citizen compliance interactions, social proof comes into play as citizens take note of the behavior of those around them in relation to the commands of an officer. If the citizen is unsure of the situation, this heuristic may be much more likely to influence compliance or noncompliance.

Liking is the tendency of an individual to acquiesce to the requests of persons toward whom they have positive feelings. It is fairly intuitive that “people are more favorably inclined towards the needs of those they know and like” (Cialdini and Trost 1998:174). This judgmental heuristic grows out of the compulsion towards reciprocation. We want those whom we like to like us, and we feel the need to like those whom we know like us. When an individual seeks compliance from us, and we have positive feelings towards him/her, we are more likely to acquiesce due to the fact that we hope to influence a reciprocation of our affection in the compliance seeker. For those attempting to gain compliance from others, strategies to engage the judgmental heuristic of liking include complimenting the targeted individual and attempting “to be perceived as cooperating partners with a target person” (Cialdini and Trost 1998:175).

Additionally, other factors increase the likelihood of liking, and thus compliance. The physical attractiveness of an individual increases their likeability, so too do similarities that exist between interaction participants. We are more likely to have positive feelings towards attractive people and those who are similar to ourselves and thus are more likely to comply with their commands/requests.

Cialdini (2001) proposes that individuals view items and opportunities as more coveted when they are scarce. In other words, “opportunities seem more valuable to us when they are less available” (Cialdini and Trost 1998:172). Thus, presenting an opportunity as being obtainable for a limited period of time can create a situation in which those targeted will be more likely to attempt to take advantage of said opportunity. This can become a compliance heuristic when a situation arises, for example, when

officers attempt to elicit confessions and present the gains of confessing as being of value for a limited time. This interaction frames the act of confessing as being the cost of a temporally scarce resource, and thus the suspect is more likely to comply with the officer's request.

The theory of judgmental heuristics describes a method of decision making regarding compliance to commands. According to this theory, an individual's decision to comply with an order is less a reasoning process than it is a reflexive cognitive reaction to one of a series of triggers. Theorists of judgmental heuristics suggest that these cognitive reactions function as mental shortcuts which abet quick and decisive decision making. As has been discussed, judgmental heuristics encompasses a variety of these compliance triggers. The processes of the cognitive reflex that is described by the theory of judgmental heuristics cannot be easily assessed. However, it is possible to investigate whether or not compliance is more likely in the presence of the triggers suggested by judgmental heuristics.

I have chosen these two theories in part because they are compatible with my data source. For example, theories requiring an understanding of the cognitions or beliefs of actors would not be observable from the video footage of interactions used here. I also choose these theories because they help to reveal the micro-level factors that can influence citizen voluntary compliance to police officer commands. Before examining the literature on compliance interactions, it is important to note how these two theoretical perspectives will be used to guide this research.

The task of studying the phenomena of voluntary compliance “requires intensive and extensive familiarity with the empirical area to which the problem refers” (Blumer 1969:128). The perspectives of social interactionism and judgmental heuristics have provided a series of variables which may influence the likelihood of citizen voluntary compliance during officer/citizen compliance interactions. For the purposes of this research, I take the view that “social theory is primarily an interpretation (of the empirical world) which orders the world into its mold, not a studious cultivation of empirical facts to see if the theory fits” (Blumer 1969:141). I see these two theories as lenses which direct my observations of an extremely complicated phenomenon. The complexity of officer/citizen interactions necessitates a study which limits the number of variables to be investigated. These two theoretical perspectives provide just such a framing of the data in this research.

I did not engage in theory testing as a part of this research. Rather than testing the comparative validity of either social interactionism or judgmental heuristics, I used them to guide my search for factors that affect the phenomenon of voluntary compliance. In choosing these two perspectives, I made the decision to restrict my focus to a certain field of variables. This necessitated neglecting an array of other factors suggested by other theories which might affect citizen voluntary compliance.

CHAPTER III

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The practices of law enforcement officers are of great interest to Sociologists and Criminologists alike, reflected in the abundance of research on the topic. Additionally, power and obedience are two concepts which have been studied extensively in Sociology as well as Social Psychology. However, there is a dearth of research concerning officer/citizen compliance interactions. The state of the literature on this topic is at first surprising, considering the levels of scientific interest concerning both obedience and officer/citizen relations more generally. Yet, the lack of investigation into this topic may be more readily understood when considering the difficulties surrounding the availability of data for this type of research. It is difficult to gain the permission of law enforcement agencies to conduct systematic observations of officer/citizen interactions, and such research can entail certain dangers to researchers.

As will be discussed at length later on, the unique status that police officers hold in our society—a position of high social status along with the legitimate authority to use force and effect arrest—necessitates study of the actual encounters of officers and citizens to understand what factors affect voluntary compliance in these situations. Other studies of compliance may give us applicable results, but all information derived from interactions not involving police officers are of questionable applicability due to the unique nature of the role of law enforcement officers.

Exploration of Research into Social Interactionism

The most focused examination of police/citizen compliance interactions to date is provided by Mastofski et al. (1996) in “Compliance on Demand.” Mastofski et al. (1996) conducted field research in 1992 through ride-alongs with the Richmond Police Department located in Richmond, Virginia. Ride-alongs involve the researcher accompanying a patrol officer in the police cruiser as they conduct routine patrol and respond to calls for service. The field researchers observed a total of 346 exchanges involving an officer requesting compliance from a citizen. They coded these interactions as resulting in noncompliance or compliance. Noncompliance included when citizens refused to comply or gave no indication of their intent regarding compliance, and compliance included when citizens promised to comply or complied with an officer’s command in the presence of the researcher. “When different requests were made, citizens were considered noncompliant if they failed to comply with any of them before an arrest was made or the encounter was otherwise terminated” (Mastofski et al. 1996:281). The focal point of this research was the “ultimate outcome” (Mastofski et al. 1996:283) of the compliance interaction in terms of citizen obedience or disobedience to officer commands.

Mastofski et al. (1996) did not draw the same distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary compliance as I do in this research. They distinguished simply between compliance and noncompliance without much inference as to whether the ultimate compliance was voluntary or involuntary. However, I assume that once physical force is used by an officer upon a citizen, the entire nature of the interaction changes. Obedience

obtained through force is qualitatively different from compliance obtained by all means short of violence. For this reason, my study differs from Mastrofski et al. (1996) by defining all interactions in which officers use physical force, to include the brandishing of a weapon, as interactions resulting in noncompliance. Though an understanding of compliance following violence may be interesting, and even useful, especially to those engaged in controlling prisoners, it is outside the purview of this research.

Mastrofski et al. (1996:281) “prepared a detailed narrative account of events and coded key items associated with those events according to a protocol.” The variables to be coded were developed based on the social interactionist perspective. These included normative and instrumental factors that might affect the probability of an officer obtaining compliance from an individual.

The normative factors which were recorded by the researchers included: the levels of respect the officer granted the citizen, the manor of initiation of the interaction, the officer’s use of threats, the strength of the evidence against the citizen, the relative public or private location of the interaction, whether or not the officer had prior knowledge of the citizen, and a variety of demographic factors of both the officer and citizen involved. The demographics measured also included rough estimates of the economic status of the citizen. Additionally, the way in which the interaction was initiated was recorded. Finally, the field researchers conducted interviews with the officers whom they were observing in order to assess the officer’s years of experience, which served as a proxy for the level of professional skill possessed by an officer. Also in the interviews researchers asked about the officers’ commitment to the concept of community-oriented policing,

allowing a determination of how the attitudes of officers about this method of law enforcement might influence an officer's likelihood of obtaining compliance.

Mastrofski et al. (1996) discovered that citizens were more likely to comply with officer commands if the strength of evidence against them was high. Also, citizens were more likely to comply with officer commands if the location of the exchange was more public as opposed to on the private property of the citizen. Citizens also were more likely to comply with commands from officers who had more years of experience as well as those from officers who were more committed to community-oriented policing. The research also revealed that males and minorities, often considered groups more likely to rebel against authority, "are more likely to show compliance" (Mastrofski et al. 1996:289). Also, minority citizens were more likely to comply with the commands of a white officer.

However, several normative factors decreased the likelihood of citizen compliance to officer commands. If an officer showed disrespect to a citizen or issued a threat towards a citizen, that citizen was less likely to comply with officer commands. If the police officer demonstrated that he/she had some prior knowledge of the citizen, or if the officer initiated the interaction, the citizen was less likely to comply with officer commands. Mastrofski et al. (1996) discovered that citizens who appeared to be poor were less likely to comply with officer commands and that white citizens were less likely to comply with the commands of a minority officer. Mastrofski et al. (1996) also investigated the effect of how the police were first called to the interaction; however, the

results did not show that this variable either increased or decreased a citizen's likelihood of compliance.

Exploration also was made of the effect of several instrumental factors. These included: the number of citizens present, the seriousness of the problem under investigation by the police, the number of officers present at the scene of the interaction, the levels of authoritativeness used by officers on first contact with the citizen, and the degree of irrationality of the citizen. Additionally, they examined the impact of citizens' possession of a weapon and the authoritativeness with which individual commands were communicated by police

Mastrofski et al. (1996) did not find any instrumental factors that significantly increased citizen compliance. However, they did discover that citizens were less likely to comply with officer commands if the crime/problem under investigation was serious. Similarly, citizens were less likely to comply with officer commands if they were less rational due to intoxication, mental defect, or emotion. Mastrofski et al. (1996) also found that citizens were less likely to be compliant if the officer used force upon first encountering the citizen. These findings reinforce my decision to define interactions where force is used as non-compliance interactions. Following the application of force by officers, citizen compliance is rare, and when citizens do obey officer commands, the behavior is a type of compliance which is qualitatively distinct from voluntary compliance.

Mastrofski et al. (1996) also discovered several instrumental variables which had no effect upon a citizen's likelihood of compliance. Neither the number of officers nor

the number of citizens present increased or decreased a citizen's likelihood of compliance. Citizens who were armed were just as likely to comply with officer commands as those who were unarmed. Also, the authority with which an officer gave his/her commands did not appear to affect that citizen's likelihood of complying.

Exploration of Research into Judgmental Heuristics

The literature concerning judgmental heuristics does not include direct study of officer/citizen interactions. Instead, research has examined variables that act as triggers of judgmental heuristics, thereby influencing or persuading compliance to requests and commands. Robert B. Cialdini, in his 2001 work "Influence: Science and Practice," reviews a wide variety of social-psychological experiments and studies that explore the nature of compliance and obedience as well as the more subtle form of compliance known as conformity. Cialdini (2001) cites a social-psychological experiment which examines the effect of a uniform on likelihood of compliance. The researchers found a striking difference in the likelihood of obedience when the independent variable of uniform dress was considered. "Nearly all of the pedestrians complied with his [the confederate's] directive when he wore the guard costume, but fewer than half did so when he was dressed normally" (Cialdini 2001:194). These findings suggest that a key to understanding voluntary compliance in citizen-officer encounters may rest on an examination of such unlikely influences as the uniform and title of the particular officer on the scene.

In a series of experiments conducted by Leonard Bickman in the 1970's (as cited in Cialdini 2001), researchers investigated the power of authority, as indicated by the

presence of a uniform, to influence compliance. The experimenters had an assistant stand by a car which was parked next to a parking meter. A second assistant, the requester, who was located approximately 50 feet away on a sidewalk would approach pedestrians and give them a command. In half of the cases, the requester would be dressed in normal fashion. However, in the other half, he would be dressed in the uniform of a security guard. “The requester, whether dressed normally or as a security guard, always said the same thing to the pedestrian, ‘You see that guy over there by the meter? He’s overparked but doesn’t have any change. Give him a dime!’ The requester then turned a corner and walked away” (Cialdini 2001:193-194). At that point, the pedestrian under observation either complied or failed to comply with the command of the now absent requester. The study revealed that 92% of the pedestrians complied with the command of the uniformed requester as opposed to a 42% compliance rate when the requester was dressed in a normal fashion (Cialdini 2001).

An experiment conducted by Dennis Regan evaluated the influence of “reciprocation” on compliance. Participants were placed in a situation with an actor who pretended to be a fellow participant in the study. The actor would go out of the room and return with either one or two bottles of Coca-Cola. In those cases where the confederate returned with two cokes, he would offer one to the participant. In both designs, the actor would proceed to attempt to sell the participant raffle tickets. The researchers found that the participants who had been offered the soft drink “bought twice as many tickets as the subjects who had not been given a prior favor” (Cialdini 2001:22).

Researchers also have investigated the judgmental heuristic of “consistency.” This heuristic theorizes that individuals will work to act in a manner which is consistent with previously expressed views or behaviors. One way that this cognitive shortcut is triggered is through the use of the Foot-In-The-Door (FITD) technique. “The procedure involves first asking a target individual to comply with a small request, typically one that is minimally invasive so that the target is almost certain to respond affirmatively. After securing compliance, either the initial requester or an associate of the requester makes a larger, often related request” (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004:602). In a study conducted by Jonathan Freedman and Scott Fraser, the effectiveness of the FITD technique was demonstrated. Researchers would go to residences and request the homeowner to consent to a large public service sign, which read “DRIVE CAREFULLY,” being placed on their property. The compliance rate, in this phase of the experiment, was 17%. However, if homeowners had agreed to sign a petition “that favored ‘keeping California beautiful’” (Cialdini 2001:66), they were much more likely to comply with the request for the placement of the sign when researchers approached them two weeks later. In fact almost half of those who expressed support for the petition agreed to the placement of the sign.

In the famous experiments conducted by Solomon Asch on “social proof” and “conformity,” the researchers used a diagram showing four vertical lines. The first line was labeled “X” and the next three lines were labeled A, B and C. Line X was the same length as line B with A being slightly, but noticeably, longer and line C being slightly shorter than lines B and X. A participant would be in a room with four other individuals who were posing as participants but who were really confederates of the researchers. A

researcher presented the diagram to the 5 individuals and asked them to choose which line—A, B or C—was the same length as line X. The confederates responded one at a time that they each believed line A to be the same length as line X, even though it was noticeably longer than line X. The researchers discovered that “approximately three-quarters of the subjects conformed at least once by responding incorrectly” (Aronson 1954:21).

The judgmental heuristic of “liking” and its effect on compliance has been studied along with the factors which increase the likelihood of compliance. One study showed that “in a fund-raising context, one study found that attractive solicitors for the American Heart Association generated nearly twice as much compliance (42 versus 23 percent) than did unattractive solicitors” (Cialdini and Trost 1998:174-175). Similar results were discovered when those who seek compliance are similar to those from whom the command is coming. “One researcher who examined the sales records of insurance companies found that customers were more likely to buy insurance when a salesperson was like them in age, religion, politics, and cigarette-smoking habits” (Cialdini 2001:151). Additionally, those who gave compliments to those from whom they were trying to elicit behavior were more likely to gain compliance. A study done by Jones and Wortman on the effect of flattery on an individual’s perception of the flatterer revealed that “compliments produced just as much liking for the flatterer when they were untrue as when they were true” (Cialdini and Trost 1998:175).

The final judgmental heuristic that has been researched is that of “scarcity.” Researchers have demonstrated that individuals are more likely to desire something that

is scarce. Thus, if a desired behavior is presented as necessary to obtain something of limited supply, compliance will be more likely. A study by Heilman in the 1970's revealed "supermarket shoppers were most likely to agree to sign a petition favoring federal price controls when the requester incited reactance by informing them that a federal official had opposed the distribution of the petition" (Cialdini and Trost 1998:173).

In addition to the research into social interactionism and judgmental heuristics, it is important to discuss research into the phenomena of dominance. Dominance is a term that is used within social psychology to express the ways that individual expresses physical or social superiority over another individual.

Obviously, officer/citizen compliance interactions are conducted in the midst of a social context marked by an unequal power relationship. The social role of a law enforcement officer has, as previously noted, authoritative superiority and physical dominance over the role of a citizen. Social situations where such substantial inequalities exist have been subjected to study by social scientists. Possibly, the most famous experiment into the affect of such unequal social situations is the Stanford Prison Experiment, conducted in 1971 by a team of psychologists led by Philip Zimbardo (Haney, Banks and Zimbardo 1973).

This experiment divided student volunteers into two randomly assigned groups, one being given the role of prison guards and the second being given the role of prisoners (Haney et al. 1973). The members of the second group were placed in a prison-like environment while the first group was divided into shifts and instructed to act as guards

of the prisoners (Haney et al. 1973). The experiment created a social environment with two roles of unequal power. The researchers found that, when placed in these roles, “prisoners immediately adopted a generally passive response mode while guards adopted a very active initiative role in all interactions” (Haney et al. 1973:79).

This research did not deal specifically with the issue of compliance, but instead focused on the degree to which individuals adopt prescribed roles and the psychologically caustic effects of the prison environment upon guards and prisoners alike. The researchers observed “extremely pathological reactions that emerged in both groups of subjects” (Haney et al. 1973:80) with some guards becoming aggressive and sadistic, while some prisoners became withdrawn and depressed. These results forced the researchers to terminate the experiment after only six days, although it had been scheduled to last for two weeks (Haney et al. 1973). This study found that “throughout the experiment commands were the most frequent form of verbal behavior” (Haney et al. 1973:80). Generally, the study found the prisoners to be compliant with the commands of the guards, with only 32 incidents of physical resistance observed, this despite an escalation in the amount of harassment the guards demonstrated towards the prisoners (Haney et al. 1973). It also was noted that as the experiment progressed, the prisoners “responded more passively to the acts of others” (Haney et al. 1973:84).

This study did not focus on the interpersonal interactions in which guards attempted to gain compliance from citizens. But, the Stanford Prison Experiment does provide a useful example of the extent to which individuals in a social setting of unequal power tend to enact dominance or submission as prescribed by the relative power of their

role. It also is important to note that the social context, and the roles themselves, tend to affect the behavior of the individuals to a greater extent than the backgrounds or character of the particular participant.

The current study is guided by these previous investigations into the phenomenon of compliance. The work of Mastofski et al. (1996) in particular has influenced not only the view adopted here as to the nature of compliance interactions, but has provided specific tools for assessing officer/citizen interactions. However, this research is unique in that it uses the theories of both social interactionism and judgmental heuristics in order to gain a deeper understanding of officer/citizen interaction. Additionally, cruiser mounted video system footage has not been previously used as a data source for this type of research.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

Research Questions

The goal of this research is to ascertain factors that influence the likelihood of citizen voluntary compliance to the verbal commands of a law enforcement officer during an encounter. Thus, the research is guided by the following questions:

1. What traits and/or behaviors, if any, on the part of the primary citizen affect, positively or negatively, the likelihood of his/her voluntary compliance with officer commands?
2. What traits and/or behaviors, if any, on the part of the primary officer affect, positively or negatively, the likelihood of the primary citizen voluntarily complying with officer commands?
3. What, if any, situational factors affect a citizen's likelihood of voluntary compliance to officer commands during a compliance interaction?
4. Does the presence, absence, or behavior of secondary officers and/or citizens affect, positively or negatively, the likelihood of the primary citizen voluntarily complying with officer commands?

Data Collection

The literature surrounding the study of officer/citizen interactions primarily focuses on participant observations using the method of patrol ride-alongs. The most

relevant piece of sociological research into voluntary compliance was conducted by Mastrofski et al. in “Compliance on Demand: The Public’s Response to Specific Police Requests” (1996). The research methods for this piece included the ethnographic techniques of accompanying patrol officers of the Richmond Police Department as they conducted the work of their shift. The researchers not only recorded their observations of the actual officer/citizen encounters, but also conducted detailed interviews with the officers involved. “Observers later prepared a detailed narrative account of events and coded key items associated with those events according to a protocol available on computers at the research office” (Mastrofski et al. 1996: 280).

The dedicated fieldwork conducted by the Mastrofski et al. (1996) research team broadened the understanding of compliance interactions. The benefits of the use of such in-depth qualitative research are advocated by many sociologists as well as scientists from other fields. Rather than forcing social interactions into the method advocated by positivistic scientific method, “the naturalist resists schemes or models which oversimplify the complexity of everyday life” (Denzin 1971:168). The byzantine nature of a police/citizen compliance interaction calls for an approach that allows the researcher to examine all of the factors that influence the exchanges and their outcomes. “The value of ethnography as a social research method is founded upon the existence of such variations in cultural patterns across and within societies and their significance for understanding social processes” (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995:9).

Yet, the methods of the Mastrofski et al. (1996) research team are not easily replicated. They require a large number of researcher hours to accumulate an adequate

number of police/citizen interactions. Furthermore, the participant/observer approach can fall prey to the critique that the observers necessarily influence the processes that they are attempting to observe (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995). This is especially relevant in a study of police/citizen compliance interactions due to the fact that police officers are necessarily mindful of the presence of a ride-along participant who is not only recording their behavior but whose safety is the responsibility of the given patrol officer. Also, the litigious environment of modern America can make institutions weary of any outside oversight. In addition, ethnographic methods of research always are limited by the individual researcher's ability to observe and record the interactions they have been witness to. This is especially true in the sometimes chaotic and dangerous processes of a police/citizen compliance interaction, where concerns of safety make calm concentration difficult.

However, a middle ground exists between the artificial but controlled setting of positivist social experiments and the authentic yet sometimes chaotic scene of a naturalistic ethnographic field study; that is a content analysis of unedited footage of interactions recorded in natural settings. Several sociologists have noted the ubiquity of methods of surveillance in our society (Staples 2000). They tend to see the dispersion of such devices of observation as part of the Foucaultian concept of the Panopticon, which allows societal power to be wielded over individuals through self-governance, which is created by omnipresent surveillance. Staples (2000:154) gives the example that "while police officers can surveil suspects with a new high tech scanner, the department can 'keep an eye' on the very officer by installing a videocam in the patrol car."

While the use of cruiser-mounted video cameras may represent the move towards a surveillance society, I view the use of in-car video systems mounted in police cruisers (usually on or above the dashboards of the cars, hence the term “dash cams”) as a technology that can supply social researchers with a new source of data. The dash cam video databases of law enforcement agencies provide researchers with unedited visual and auditory records of police/citizen exchanges. This opportunity provides for examination of interactions, while at the same time eliminating the possibility of the researcher actually influencing the actions of the participants.

Law enforcement agencies are usually resistant to the intrusion of social scientists, but access to the dash cam footage databases from the King Police Department and the Kernersville Police Department, two small police departments in the Piedmont region of North Carolina, was granted. The selection of these agencies for research was a result of geographic convenience, willingness of the agencies, and the presence of video databases. I must stress that I do not make any claims to the demographic representativeness of the cities of King or Kernersville nor, obviously, can I make the statement that these communities are geographically representative of either North Carolina much less the United States as a whole. These two communities are both relatively small, with the city of King having a population of approximately 6400, and the city of Kernersville, NC, having a population of approximately 19,000. However, communities of the size used in this research are far more common throughout the United States, than are cities the size of Richmond, VA (population of over 197,000) which was used by the Mastrofski et al. (1996) study.

Though the advantages of this data source are myriad, it also has its limitations. By using dash cam footage, the researcher has limited view of the actual police/citizen interaction. The camera only captures a certain field of vision, and the audio which is recorded using portable microphones positioned on the lapels of the particular patrol officer catches only a certain amount of the dialog or surrounding sound. Further, it is possible that the presence of the in-car video system alters the behaviors of the officers involved, making them more considerate of their behavior due to the presence of surveillance.

It is possible that a difference may exist between officer behavior in interactions with citizens where officers know that they are being filmed and those which occur outside the view of surveillance. However, dash cam systems are in all patrol cars of the two police departments involved, and their use is mandated by policy. Further, the use of these cruiser mounted video systems is very common and becoming universal to American police departments. Therefore, while the applicability of the findings may be limited to patrol officers using dash cam systems, this use is so widespread that there will be widespread applicability.

For this analysis, I conducted a content analysis of the video databases of Kernersville Police Department and King Police Department. The primary data source for this study is the video database of the Kernersville PD, which records in a digital format stored on a server inside the department's headquarters. The footage is viewed using a Windows based media player. The Kernersville PD video database contains approximately 1,720 separate video files of various lengths. The video files of the

Kernersville PD are separated into 14 different groups according to the type of police activity involved. The Kernersville PD footage database contains significantly more footage than that of the database of King PD. Additionally, at the time that I was conducting this study, King Police Department was in the process of transferring its cruiser mounted video system from VHS and 8mm film to a digital system. Due to these factors, I thought it necessary to use the Kernersville PD database as my primary data source. I take a much larger sample from the Kernersville PD database and use only these interactions to assess my research questions, rather than combining interactions sampled from the databases of both departments. However, I also conducted a much smaller scale study of the King Police Department video database. Including a smaller sample from King PD allows me to investigate the effect of the independent variable of departmental differences on voluntary compliance.

It is not possible to determine the population of all officer/citizen compliance interactions involving officers of the Kernersville Police Department, much less those concerning law enforcement officers within the United States. All face-to-face interactions that an on-duty police officer has with a civilian in which the citizen is given some kind of verbal command meet the definition of a compliance interaction. However, these events occur in a variety of places and times, some more formal and some less formal, and most are not caught on videotape. Thus, it is not possible to determine the number of these officer/citizen compliance interactions, nor is it feasible to organize a representative sample of them. Instead, I limited my population to the video databases of the police departments under study.

With regard to the Kernersville database, the number of days that a video file is stored is determined by the way in which the individual officers identify the interaction when it is saved to the server. For example, a video file which is saved in the folder for “driving while intoxicated” is not erased from the system for 365 days, as compared to the video files within the “speeding” folder, which are deleted 30 days after being downloaded into the server. The only exception to this policy is when footage is needed for court proceedings or internal affairs investigations, in which case the video file is copied onto a DVD. Thus, the database only represents the full population of officer/citizen interactions recorded on in-car mounted video systems for the past 30 days.

I sampled the available database at the Kernersville Police Department by selecting 400 video files, with the hope of viewing at least 300 officer/citizen interactions. This number of interactions would have been equivalent to the 346 compliance interactions viewed by the Mastofski et al. (1996) research project. Furthermore, 300 video files represented approximately 17% of the files contained within the Kernersville database.

As already has been discussed, the Kernersville database is designed to automatically delete video files once they reach a given age based on the category they have been assigned to. This feature of the database could not be disengaged, nor could the sampled files be transferred into a protected folder or re-categorized to prevent the ageing out of files.

However, the technical staff at Kernersville Police Department was able to mark sampled files, to differentiate them from files which were not sampled. I was able to use this same marking technique to sub-divide files into the base sample of 300 files and the remaining 100 files to be replacements in cases where one or more of the 300 video files in the base sample failed to contain an observable officer/citizen compliance interaction and thus proved to be unusable for this study.

I was informed by the Kernersville Technical Staff that marking a video file as a part of the sample caused the database to create a new date stamp for the file. Each of the sampled video files would remain in their primary categories and would continue to be subject to the automatic deletion function of the system based on that category. On December 19, 2006, I used a random numbers table to sample 300 video files, marked as the primary sample, and a further sample of 100 video files, marked as replacement files. By marking these video files, I created a new date stamp for these files and thus insured that the first of these files would not be deleted for a minimum of 30 days.

Due to the nature of the system, the database from which I drew the sample continued to change from the time that the sample was taken. New video files were added on a daily basis by the patrol officers of the Kernersville PD and video files which had not been marked for analysis continued to be automatically deleted by the system as they reached their category's age limit. Thus, the population of the database, from which I sampled on December 19, 2006, only existed for one day.

The files in the Kernersville PD database which were saved under the "Accidental Activation" category were not sampled because this category was reserved for activations

of in-car video systems which were unintentional. Additionally, video files saved under “Emergency Response” were not sampled because this footage is dedicated to times when officers are involved in responding to a given call using lights and siren, but which do not result in any additional law enforcement activity. Officer/citizen compliance interactions were not predicted to be present in any of the video files present in this categorization.

I also omitted all files contained in the “Vehicle Chase” category due to their lack of relevance to officer/citizen interactions. Once a citizen has engaged in flight from an officer, the interaction already has met my criteria for a score of 10 on the compliance scale, indicating a complete failure to voluntarily comply. Furthermore, it is standard operating procedure for officers to use the force necessary to arrest the citizens in flight. Therefore, these video files can be predicted to yield no useful examples of officer/citizen interactions because they all involve noncompliance interactions or involuntary compliance interactions, even before the officer and citizen are within speaking distance.

The files saved under the category of “10-58/10-59” pertain to both the directing of traffic and funeral escorts, and these did not contain data relevant to this study. Additionally, no sampling was conducted of footage stored under the “Default” category because these video files had not been properly placed into the appropriate category.

Of the remaining nine categories, a total of 2329 footage files were present on December 19, 2006. The footage contained was filmed between December 19, 2005 and December 19, 2006; however, as previously mentioned, only the categories of “DWI,”

“Use of Force,” and “Traffic Stop (Felony)” would have still been in the database a full year after recording, due to the database’s program of automatic erasing.

I collected a sample of 300 data files, sampling from each of the remaining categories in proportion to the percentage of the total files each category contained. I then marked for viewing a sample of video files from each category. For example, the 224 video files contained in the category of “DWI” (Driving While Impaired traffic stops) represented 14% of the total video files contained in the database of the nine usable categories. Therefore, 42 files, 14% of the overall sample of 300, were sampled from the DWI category. The sampling itself was conducted using a generated random numbers table. In addition, as a backup measure to account for any unusable files in the original sample, I took an additional sample of 100 data files, and once again sampled them in proportion to the number of data files per category.

As I conducted my research at Kernersville PD, I quickly discovered that many more data files of footage were unusable than I had anticipated. In many cases, the officer’s microphone failed to record the interaction. In others, the data files had been recorded by the dash cam footage of a backup/secondary officer. These data files almost always were unusable because the actual interaction was obscured by the primary officer’s vehicle. Additionally, because the microphone of the primary officer was not linked to the video of the secondary officer’s cruiser, no audio of the primary officer/primary citizen interaction was available.

While in some cases I was able to compensate for these unusable files by drawing from the backup sample that was not always the case. In the case of some categories, i.e.,

Traffic Stop (warning), Use of Force, Traffic Stop (felony), only a few files of footage had technical flaws and all could be replaced by the backup files. However, in the case of several of the categories--Motorist Assist, Traffic Accident, Investigation, Arrest, DWI, Traffic Stop (citation)—the number of unusable files outnumbered the number of usable backup files. As a result, the final sample consisted of 200 officer/citizen compliance interactions.

When conducting the analysis of the smaller sample of footage taken from the King Police Department, I viewed the footage inside the main office of the King Police Department. The King database was significantly smaller than that of Kernersville Police Department. Rather than being divided by categories relating to a type of law enforcement activity, the King PD database is organized according to patrol squads. King Police Department has four squads, and each squad is made up of three to five officers. Within the squad's footage folder, each officer has a folder containing the incidents that have been recorded by his/her cruiser mounted camera system. I sampled from each of the four squad folders, 13 officer/citizen compliance interactions from two of the squad folders and 12 interactions from the remaining squad folders. I used a random numbers table to select first an officer folder then used the same procedure to select a video file from within the officer's folder. If the video file was unviewable or did not record an officer/citizen compliance interaction, the procedure was repeated within that same officer's file in order to sample usable footage. I accumulated a total of 50 interactions from the King Police Department database. The footage from both departments was

coded using a coding sheet that asks questions intended to measure the following variables (See Appendix for Coding Sheet).

Measures

Quantitative Measures

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for this study is the variation in citizen voluntary compliance to officer verbal commands. **Compliance** is defined as behavior on the part of a citizen that occurs in response to a police officer's verbal command(s) and that emulates the verbal command(s) to perform a specific act or to refrain from the performance of a specific act. **Voluntary compliance** is defined as compliance that is performed without the application of overt verbal threat or physical force, to include the brandishing of a weapon. **Noncompliance** is defined as any action(s) or inaction(s) on the part of a citizen that is contrary to a police officer's verbal command(s). **Involuntary compliance** is defined as compliance that is performed following the application of overt verbal threat or physical force, to include the brandishing of a weapon. **Failure to voluntarily comply** is defined as any behavior that fails to meet the standard of voluntary compliance, to include both noncompliance and involuntary compliance.

Compliance interaction is defined as any encounter between a police officer and citizen during which the officer issues a verbal command(s) to the citizen. Compliance interactions include encounters in which officers brandish weapons (use overt threat and/or physical force) to gain compliance. A compliance interaction is the interaction in which compliance is sought in one way or another. Voluntary compliance, involuntary

compliance, or noncompliance can result within these interactions. An example of a compliance interaction that does not end in either voluntary or involuntary compliance is when the officer issues a command and then leaves the situation or when the citizen falls unconscious before having the chance to either obey or disobey.

This dependent variable was measured in two ways. The first is a bivariate assessment of the overall result of the compliance interaction. The interaction was coded as either resulting in citizen voluntary compliance or in a citizen failing to voluntarily comply. The second measure of the dependent variable recorded the voluntary compliance of the citizen on a scale using a dimensional variable assessment, with 1 indicating total voluntary compliance and 10 indicating total lack of voluntary compliance. The continuum-based method of assessing voluntary compliance of a citizen is inherently subjective to some degree, but the following criteria were used when scaling interactions along the continuum:

1. If at any time involuntary compliance is obtained by the officer through the use of force (not to include normal handcuffing procedures), the voluntary compliance of the citizen was assessed as no less than an 8;
2. If the citizen flees the interaction, the compliance of the citizen was assessed as a 10;
3. Citizens who voluntarily comply with officers' commands to the extent that they allow themselves to be handcuffed were assessed as having a compliance rating of no greater than 7;

4. Citizens who fail to comply with verbal commands due to obvious drug and/or alcohol impairment were assessed as having a lower compliance rating than those who intentionally fail to comply;

5. Those who consistently interrupt the verbal commands of the officer received a compliance rating of no less than 3;

6. Those who were disrespectful of or sarcastic towards the officer received a compliance rating of no less than 3; and

7. Citizens on whom some level of physical force was used in order to obtain involuntary compliance were coded as having a compliance score of 8 or above.

Independent Variables

A variety of independent variables taken primarily from the social interaction perspective and the theory of judgmental heuristics were measured in addition to basic demographic information about the primary officer and the primary citizen. The primary officer, in those cases where more than one officer is present, is the officer issuing the majority of commands and/or conducting the majority of the investigation. It is standard operating procedure in law enforcement for one officer to take on the role of “contact officer” while the other officers on the scene function as “cover officers” who rarely converse with citizens. However, because both King PD and Kernersville PD only maintain one officer per patrol car, few examples of multiple officer interactions were included in the study. It was a much more common occurrence for multiple citizens to be involved in the interaction. The primary citizen is the citizen with whom the primary officer converses for the majority of the interaction. In all interactions involving vehicles,

which made up the majority of the viewed interactions, the driver was classified as the primary citizen.

Social interactionism. Normative and instrumental independent variables suggested by the literature in social interactionism were measured in this study.

The normative variables measured in this study include: demographics of the primary officer and primary citizen, social status of the citizen, location of the interaction, manner of initiation of the interaction, amount of respect shown by officer(s) towards citizen(s), amount of respect shown by citizen(s) towards officer(s), whether or not an officer has prior knowledge of a citizen, the skill of an officer, and the strength of evidence against the citizen.

The demographic factors of gender, age, race and ethnicity were measured for both the primary officer and the primary citizen. The Mastrofski et al. (1996) research noted that demographic features of an individual in compliance interactions can influence that person's likelihood of demonstrating a given behavior, in the case of this study, voluntary compliance. However, the research also revealed that demographic features of both officers and citizens relative to each other can affect compliance interactions (Mastrofski et al. 1996) [see Appendix, questions #2-5 and #7-10 on the Coding Sheet]

It was difficult to assess a citizen's socioeconomic status utilizing the data source of patrol cruiser-mounted video systems. Because of this, I used the approximate monetary value of a citizen's vehicle as a proxy for SES. I took into account the make and model of the vehicle, as well as its age and state of repair. Due to the data source for this study, the vast majority of citizens observed were inside a car (see question #14 on

the Coding Sheet). Because of this measure's inherent subjectivity, I used the following procedures to standardize the ranking processes. Vehicles which had large amounts of body damage and/or cracked windows and/or were of an older vintage than 1995 were recorded as having low monetary value. Vehicles which had body/window damage and/or were at least pre-2000 vintage were recorded as having low-medium monetary value. Standard vehicles (sedans, pick-up trucks, vans, SUVs) and brands (Ford, Toyota, Chevy, Honda, Saturn.) and those of a post-2000 vintage were ranked as having medium value. Vehicles which were of higher quality manufacture (BMW, Cadillac, Lincoln, Lexus, Mercedes) or which were a specialty type of vehicle (sports car, large SUVs) were ranked as having high-medium monetary value. Vehicles which were restored-classic or custom vehicles or those which were produced by extremely high end manufacturers (Porsche, Lamborghini, Jaguar, Hummer) were ranked as having a high monetary value (see Appendix, question #14 on the Coding Sheet).

The normative variable of legitimacy is defined as the degree to which those issuing orders are perceived to possess a legal and moral entitlement to obedience. The physical location of an encounter is an important factor in judging the legitimacy of the encounter. Police actions that take place in public areas are seen as more legitimate than those that intrude on the private property of a citizen. Thus, one measure of legitimacy is the location of the interaction (see question #21 on the Coding Sheet). For this study, private property was coded as the location with the least legitimacy for law enforcement officers. Public vehicular areas are more legitimate because these are locations on private property which the public has an expectation of freedom of entrance, for example a

business's parking lot. "Streets and highways" are the most public and therefore most legitimate setting for an interaction.

A second measure of legitimacy is the manner of initiation of the interaction. Citizens tend to view police presence and orders as having more legitimacy when the officer is brought into the interaction by another citizen. Inversely, officers who initiate a compliance interaction are seen as having less legitimacy and therefore citizens will be less likely to comply with officer commands in these interactions (see question # 17 on the Coding Sheet).

Another measure of legitimacy is the politeness of the officer. Actors tend to expect respect from others and associate a demonstration of basic esteem as fundamental even in interactions with superiors. To the degree that an individual is not treated with respect, that same individual will view themselves as more isolated from social values and thus less likely to conform to socially expected behaviors. In the case of officer/citizen compliance interactions, this translates into an increased proclivity for disobedience on the part of citizens when they feel disrespected. Officer politeness was measured by whether the officer uses a title such as "sir" or "ma'am" when speaking to the citizen, as well as the officer's overall level of respect for the citizen during the interaction. This second, broader question takes into account the officer's tone of voice, word usage, and body language (see questions #40 and #41 on the Coding Sheet). Respect is an inherently subjective variable; however, the following tools were used to aid the measurement process. If an officer addresses a citizen in a demeaning tone of voice, laughs at the citizen, mocks the citizen, ignores the citizen, or uses any derogatory

nickname or slur (boy, punk, etc.), the officer was coded as showing disrespect. If the officer treats the citizen in a professional, courteous manner, uses a professional or friendly tone of voice, allows the citizen to ask questions and answers those questions in a polite manner, the officer was coded as having treated the citizen with respect. If the officer did not display any of these behaviors but instead completes the interaction in a business-like manner without showing any obvious signs of disrespect or respect, the interaction was coded as neutral. An officer's use of threat against a citizen also was recorded. Threats are an expression of disrespect and thus an officer's use of threats is expected to decrease a citizen's likelihood of compliance. If the officer issues any direct threats, of legal sanction, physical harm, or other penalty, the officer is coded as using threats (see questions #26 on the Coding Sheet).

The strength of the evidence against a suspect also is predicted to have an effect on a citizen's likelihood of voluntarily compliance. Strength of evidence was measured by noting if an officer observes a crime, has physical evidence of a crime, or obtains a confession. However, my ability to assess the evidence strength in the situation was limited by my data source. I rated the strength of the evidence against the citizen based on these three measures which in turn are based on the officer's statements and/or any visible clues present (see questions #44-46 on the Coding Sheet).

An additional normative variable drawn from the SI perspective is the officer's prior knowledge of a citizen. The Mastrofski et al. study (1996) revealed that citizens known previously by officers were less likely to comply with officer commands. This variable was measured by noting any verbal indications on the part of the officer or the

citizen that they had met previously. These include statements such as: “last time I saw you . . .,” “do you remember me?” and so forth (see question #41 on the Coding Sheet).

According to the SI perspective, an officer’s skills and abilities are factors that can affect whether a citizen voluntarily complies with commands. Citizens see officers who are more skilled as having greater legitimacy, and therefore the citizen is more likely to comply with the officer’s commands. Mastrofski et al. (1996) found that both of their measures of officer skill, years of service, and dedication to community-oriented policing increased the likelihood of compliance. However, these measures of officer skill are not available using this data source. Instead, I used the following measures to assess officer skills: the approximate age of the officer, the presence of rank insignia on an officer’s uniform, and indications that an officer is using the technique of verbal judo. Verbal judo is a highly regimented conversation style that officers across the country are taught in their in-service training. This technique prescribes the use of certain statements in a certain order both to conduct traffic stops and to combat citizen noncompliance (see questions #3, #43, #51 on the Coding Sheet).

Instrumental factors influencing compliance include those indicating the tendency to conform in order to avoid adverse consequences. In the case of interactions with police officers, these adverse consequences can be represented by “formal sanctions (arrest, conviction, and court-imposed punishment) or informal sanctions (shaming or the disapproval of those who matter)” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:273). The instrumental variables measured in this study include: the manner of initiation of the interaction, the seriousness of the crime under investigation, the number of officers and citizens present

in the interaction, the intoxication of a citizen, the emotionality of a citizen, and finally whether or not the citizen is armed.

One instrumental factor which social interactionism predicts citizens to take into account when weighing the costs and benefits of compliance vs. noncompliance is the seriousness of the problem under investigation. Mastrofski et al. (1996) found the more serious the problem under investigation, the less likely citizens were to comply with commands. I replicated the measure used in the Mastrofski et al. (1996) study which lists problems in ascending order of seriousness as: traffic, minor offense, drugs, serious offense (see question #50 on the Coding Sheet). I also added a similar question which I think is a more rich assessment of the crime under investigation. It ranks problems in ascending order of seriousness as: speeding offense, miscellaneous traffic offense, city ordinance violation, DWI, misdemeanor offense, felony offense (see question #18 on the Coding Sheet).

According to the social interactionist perspective, the number of secondary citizens and officers present at an interaction are instrumental factors that can influence compliance. Measures of both variables are included (see questions #15 and #16 on Coding Sheet).

The capacity for rational judgment is the degree to which a citizen's cognitive powers are diminished. Social interactionist theorists state that "the accuracy of the balance-of-power estimates depends on the capacity of the potential offender to obtain an accurate perception of the situation and to foresee the consequences of different levels of resistance" (Mastrofski et al. 1996:274). Therefore, if a citizen's ability for rational

thought is inhibited, the likelihood of citizen voluntary compliance is affected. Several factors can affect a citizen's capacity for rational judgment, including: emotionality, intoxication, and mental disorder/impairment. Measures of each are included (see question #11 and #47-49 on the Coding Sheet). A related variable possibly impairing rational judgment is the presence of a communication difficulty. Individuals with some form of communication disorder, or who do not speak English fluently, may have difficulty perceiving information necessary to make appropriate cost-benefit assessments. Even though such an individual may be perfectly capable of reasoning once having accumulated all the information needed, this individual may have trouble gathering such information (see #13 on the Coding Sheet).

Social interactionist theorists also predict that any factors that give citizens an advantage in a situation can decrease the likelihood of compliance. These instrumental factors include whether the citizen is armed or of a larger physical build than the officer issuing the commands (see #6, #12, and #35 on the Coding Sheet).

Judgmental heuristics. Several of the cognitive shortcuts suggested by the judgmental heuristic literature cannot be measured extensively given the data source used here, and the judgmental heuristic of "scarcity" cannot be measured at all. This study includes measures of the judgmental heuristics of "authority," "reciprocation," "consistency," "conformity/social proof," and "liking."

The role of a law enforcement officer carries with it a high degree of authority. However, I measured independent variables which can further increase the officer's level of authority. Measures of authority include: the type of clothing being worn by the

officer, the state of the officer's clothing, the presence of rank insignia on the officer's uniform, and the officer's demonstration of legal expertise. The type of clothing being worn by the officer was measured in terms of formal (class A) uniform as compared to less formal uniforms (class B) and plain clothes (non-uniform attire). Uniforms which include a tie were coded as class A. Any uniform lacking a tie was recorded as class B, and non-uniform attire included all other types of dress (suits, dresses, t-shirts, etc.) that were not departmental issue uniforms (see #51 on the Coding Sheet).

The state of the officer's clothing was measured in terms of tidiness as opposed to being unkempt. This is an inherently subjective measure, but the proxy variables used are the presence of wrinkles, dirt or stains, un-tucked shirts and worn clothing. These items caused an officer's uniform to be classified as unkempt (see #52 on the Coding Sheet). Rank insignia includes stripes on the sleeves which indicate the rank of Corporal (two stripes) and Sergeant (three stripes) as well as small metal pins on the collar of a uniform which indicate the ranks of Lieutenant (one bar), Captain (two bars), or Major (an oak leaf) (see #53 on the Coding Sheet). Demonstration of legal expertise is an inherently subjective variable; however, the proxy variables recorded to measure legal expertise include: the officer explaining a law or elements of a crime to a citizen, or the officer explaining court procedures to the citizen, the officer citing general statutes or case law to a citizen (see #54 on the Coding Sheet).

The second judgmental heuristic included as an independent variable is reciprocity. To measure reciprocity, I noted any instance of the officer providing some form of assistance to the citizen. Such assistance may engender a feeling of indebtedness

that the citizen may feel towards the officer prior to compliance being sought. A wide variety of assistance could be provided a citizen by an officer, but four common types of assistance that officers provide during traffic stops were included as well as space to code for any other type of assistance that may be provided a citizen. The most common forms of assistance are: an officer notifying the citizen of mechanical problems with the car, an officer providing navigational directions, an officer providing court advice, or an officer informing the citizen that charges against him/her will be reduced. This variable is inherently subjective; however, detailed notes were taken as to what type of assistance was provided (see #58 on the Coding Sheet).

The judgmental heuristic of consistency was measured by whether the officer triggers the “foot in the door” compliance technique by making a minor request of the citizen. If the citizen complies with a minor command/request at the outset of the interaction, according to judgmental heuristics, he/she will be more likely to comply with the officer’s commands throughout the interaction. This independent variable was measured by measuring the officer’s use of two common initial officer commands/ requests for identification and requests for movement towards an officer. The citizen’s response to these initial command(s) was recorded. An extra measure was included to record an officer issuing another small command. Detailed notes were taken explaining why a particular command meets the requirements of a small initial command. Examples of officer commands that fit into this category were commands for the citizen to make his/her hands visible, and commands to roll down a window or to lower the volume on a radio (see #60-65 on the Coding Sheet).

The judgmental heuristic of conformity/social proof was measured by noting the voluntary compliance of a primary citizen when compared to the voluntary compliance of secondary officer(s) and/or secondary citizen(s) within the same interaction. According to the judgmental heuristic of conformity/social proof, citizen(s) are more likely to comply if those around them are complying. Compliance for the primary citizens was measured on the same ten-point scale as the dependent variable measuring citizen voluntary compliance. The compliance of the secondary officer(s) and secondary citizen(s) was recorded using the same bivariate measure used for the dependent variable of primary citizen voluntary compliance (see #23 and #66 on the Coding Sheet).

The judgmental heuristic of liking is difficult to measure using this data source. The degree to which one individual “likes” another individual is highly subjective in nature, and trying to infer the degree of positive feelings one has for another by watching video of an interaction is not feasible. However, a useful proxy for this variable is the occurrence of an officer requesting leniency for a citizen from another officer in the presence of a citizen. This variable has the added benefit of measuring the affect of the “good cop/bad cop” technique. Proxies for liking then might include phrases such as: “give him/her a break,” “is there any way we can work this out,” and “why don’t we reconsider this.” Detailed notes were recorded for this measure (see #67 on the Coding Sheet).

The final influence upon compliance theorized by judgmental heuristics is that of scarcity. In many situations, the belief that an item or opportunity is of limited quality, or only available for a short period of time, might influence an individual to comply more

readily with the commands of those who offer the opportunity or item. However, this type of situation does not seem to develop in officer/citizen interactions on a typical basis, because officers, unlike car salesmen, do not have control over a valued item or typically any type of positive opportunity. The only exceptions to this include scenarios where suspects may be offered leniency in return for acting as an informant or for producing a confession. However, neither of these particular types of officer/citizen compliance interactions was likely to take place in a venue which will be recorded by a cruiser-mounted video system. Instead, they typically take place inside, usually in some sort of interview room. Therefore, I did not code for the variable of scarcity.

Qualitative Measures

This study is primarily focused on quantitative measures. The literature which speaks about compliance, in general, has traditionally treated compliance as an outcome influenced by a multitude of independent quantitative factors. Specifically, the theories of social interactionism and judgmental heuristics, which serve as the main foundation for this research, suggest a myriad of factors which influence a citizen's likelihood of compliance; however, all of the suggested factors are assessed using quantitative measures.

As will be discussed at length in the next section, the means of assessing the interactions which were viewed, and consequently the method of analysis of these interactions, was almost entirely conducted in a quantitative manner. However, there is documentation in the literature suggesting that qualitative measures and analysis could provide a richer understanding of officer/citizen compliance interactions.

A qualitative analysis of officer/citizen compliance interactions does not appear in the literature. Yet, sociologists who adhere to the theory of Dramaturgy have used qualitative analysis to assess a wide variety of social interactions, including those which are compliance oriented. The field of Dramaturgy, pioneered by Erving Goffman, is focused on the rituals within interactions. Goffman advocated the use of ethnography to examine “that class of events which occurs during co-presence and by virtue of co-presence” (Goffman 1967:1). The field of Dramaturgy studies interpersonal interactions with the understanding that social interactions involve a presentation and preservation of face, or character. In turn the other players in the interaction present their face and the conclusion of the interaction itself is negotiated with the end of preserving the face of both parties involved.

The literature does not reveal prior use of this theory to assess officer/citizen compliance interactions, though the theoretical perspective does provide an interesting perspective on social interactions in general and compliance interactions specifically. Sociologists who ascribe to the theory of Dramaturgy use the research method of ethnography in order to assess social interactions. “The value of Ethnography as a social research method is founded upon the existence of such variations in cultural patterns across and within societies and their significance for understanding social processes” (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995:9). Ethnographic research is highly qualitative, and requires researchers to assess social situations and relationships at a very deep level

While this research has been designed to serve primarily as a quantitative analysis of officer/citizen compliance interactions, in an attempt to maintain a small measure of

the potential usefulness of qualitative analysis, detailed qualitative notes were kept on the sampled interactions. In cases where the quantitative measures failed to provide a full description of the compliance interactions, the additional qualitative notes served to record some of the nuances of these interactions. Though these notes cannot be considered ethnographic research, they did provide for useful analysis and discussion concerning these social interactions, which would have been lost had this study been designed as solely quantitative.

Analysis

The data for this research are video footage of officer/citizen compliance interactions recorded by cruiser-mounted video systems. However, what exactly are such data called? The most appropriate term is a document. Documents are usually thought to be defined by their text. However, the individual officer/citizen interaction recordings also are documents comprised of the text of the dialog and the body language and voice intonations of interaction participants. I conducted a form of document analysis, termed conversation analysis, wherein I used a “technique for analyzing naturally occurring conversations” (Neuendorf 2002:7). Though conversation analysis “generally falls within the rubric of ethnomethodology” (Neuendorf 2002:7), this research utilized hypothesis testing rather than the more meticulous individual case analysis common to ethnomethodological research.

After completing a conversation analysis of a sample of footage from the Kernersville and King Police Department databases, I used ordinal logistic regression to test several hypotheses drawn from the two guiding theoretical perspectives. Again, it is

important to note that many of these hypotheses include independent variables drawn from the social interactionism and judgmental heuristics literature; however, this study does not engage in hypothesis testing for the goal of determining the value of one theory over another. The hypotheses simply guide the analysis to determine factors most influential to the dependent variable of citizen voluntary compliance.

While the majority of the hypotheses are informed by either the social interactionist perspective or judgmental heuristics, I have included several independent variables and related hypotheses that I argue may be of interest to law enforcement agencies in general and the Kernersville PD and King PD in particular. For example, I coded for whether the interaction occurs during daylight hours or after dark. This variable does not fit neatly into the theories of SI or JH; however, I anticipate that law enforcement agencies may be interested in whether officers are more likely to encounter noncompliance during day shifts or night shifts because social context shapes social interactions.

These data and the hypotheses I examine are best evaluated using ordinal logistic regression. Because preliminary analysis revealed little variation in the bivariate measure of citizen voluntary compliance, I focused the analysis on the scaled measure of the dependent variable. Ordinal logistic regression was used due to its superior ability to assess the relative effect, positive or negative, of each of the independent variables on likelihood of citizen voluntary compliance as measured as a scaled variable.

Ordinal logistic regression, as the name implies, is based on logistic regression which is utilized for analyses of variables on a bivariate dependent variable. Logistic

regression involves the creation of a model of fit, which functions similarly to the “line of best fit” utilized in ordinary linear regression. However, lines of best fit only can be created if both the independent variable and the dependent variable are measured on an ordinal scale. Logistic regression allows for analysis of the relationship between dichotomous, categorical or continuous independent variables and a dichotomous dependent variable.

Logistic regression creates a model of fit and utilizes a logarithm of odds that an event occurs, or a “logit.” Since logistic regression is performed on data with a dichotomous dependent variable, the odds of the dependent variable occurring is divided by the odds of the dependent variable failing to occur. The “number of events divided by the number of non-events” (Norušis 2007:70) is then multiplied by a coefficient, which is the change in the logit based on the value of the independent (predictor) variable. Once the model has been created, the observed cases then can be compared to the model and the fit of the model and the significance of the effect of the independent variable upon the dependent variable can be assessed.

The fact that the dependent variable in this research is ordinal rather than dichotomous precludes the use of logistic regression. However, a modified version of logistic regression, called ordinal logistic regression, can be used. Ordinal logistic regression differs from logistic regression in that “instead of considering the probability of an individual event, you consider the probability of that event and all events that are ordered before it” (Norušis 2007:70).

Ordinal logistic regression utilizes a type of model building which breaks each possible response of an ordinal dependent variable into a series of binary logistic regressions. In the case of this study, the model performs a series of simultaneous models, the first being a primary citizen's degree of compliance of 1 or below, then a primary citizen's degree of compliance of 2 or below, and so on and so forth through a compliance level of 9. The primary citizen's degree of compliance of 10 or below is not run since obviously it would encompass all valid cases. "The analysis that mimics this method of dichotomizing the outcome, in which the successive dichotomizations form cumulative 'splits' to the data, is referred to as proportional or cumulative odds" (O'Connell 1995:28). Therefore, by using this cumulative odds model, ordinal logistic regression allows for statements regarding the effect of independent variables upon an ordinal dependent variable.

The cumulative odds model, though well-suited for this study, does have the limitation that the division of the cases requires that some cases be present in each of the ordinal categories of the dependent variable. This research only included 200 cases from Kernersville Police Department. Further, the dependent variable revealed little variation in the citizen's degree of compliance, with 95.5% of cases divided between the three highest levels of compliance, and no examples of interactions where the primary citizen's compliance was coded 6, 8 or 9. Due to these considerations, I collapsed the dependent variable of citizen compliance, allowing the effect of independent variables to be analyzed. As I was conducting this recoding, I also took into consideration the format of the scale which I had used and the ease with which the findings could be presented.

Therefore, as seen in Table 1, cases where the primary citizen had been coded as 1, representing full voluntary compliance, I recoded these cases as 4, which also now represents full voluntary compliance. Cases coded as 2, representing slight failure to voluntarily comply, were recoded as 3, representing slight failure to voluntarily comply. I combined cases where the citizen had been coded as 3 or 4 as 2, representing a moderate failure to comply, and made the seven cases where a citizen was coded 5 through 10 into category 1, representing a gross failure to comply. This new division preserves an appreciation for the basic differences observed in the compliance of citizens, while at the same time conforming itself to the realities of the data and the need to perform a valid analysis. Additionally, by inverting the scale used in the coding sheet, which provided for greater ease in recording the data, it is possible to provide for a more intuitive discussion of the results, with a higher number representing a greater degree of compliance.

Table 1

Collapsed Dependent Variable

Final Coding of Compliance		Original Coding of Compliance
Gross Failure to Voluntarily Comply	1	5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
Moderate Failure to Voluntarily Comply	2	3, 4
Slight Failure to Voluntarily Comply	3	2
Full Voluntary Compliance	4	1

Research Hypotheses

In order to answer my research questions, I utilized the following specific hypotheses. I have divided these hypotheses according to the theories on which they are predicated.

Social Interactionism Hypotheses

Normative Variables

1. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the officer shows the citizen disrespect.
2. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the officer issues threats towards the citizen.
3. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the officer has prior knowledge of the citizen.
4. White citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with the commands of a non-white officer.
5. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if there is strong evidence against the citizen.
6. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the interaction occurs in a more public location.
7. Citizens will be less likely to comply with officer commands if the officer has initiated the compliance interaction.
8. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if an officer with rank is present in the interaction.

9. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if an officer uses verbal judo in the interaction.

10. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the citizen is non-white.

11. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the citizen is male.

12. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the citizen is non-white and the officer issuing the command is white.

Instrumental Variables

1. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands as the severity of the crime increases.

2. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the citizen is intoxicated.

3. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if a citizen has mental handicap/illness.

4. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if a citizen is emotional.

Judgmental Heuristics

1. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if an officer demonstrates legal expertise.

2. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if an officer's uniform is tidy.

3. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the officer has rank.

4. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if an officer is wearing a class A uniform.

5. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if an officer provides a service for a citizen.

6. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if an officer informs a citizen that he/she will be reducing the amount or severity of charges against him/her.

7. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if a citizen complies with a minor initial officer command.

8. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if other citizen's comply with an officer's commands.

9. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if secondary officers comply with a primary officer's commands.

10. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if an officer acts as an advocate for a citizen.

Additional Hypotheses of Interest

1. Citizens will be equally likely to comply with officer commands in interactions involving King Police Department officers as those involving Kernersville Police Department.

2. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the citizen has a larger physical build than the officer that is present in an interaction.

3. Citizens will be less likely to comply with officer commands as the age of the officer decreases.

4. Citizens will be less likely to comply with officer commands as the age of the citizen decreases.

5. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the citizen does not speak English fluently.

6. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the citizen is occupying a vehicle of less monetary value.

7. Citizens will be more likely to comply with officer commands if additional officers are present.

9. Citizens will be less likely to comply with officer commands if additional citizens are present.

10. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the interaction takes place at night.

11. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the officer uses methods of obtaining voluntary compliance other than threatening.

12. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the officer notifies the citizen that the interaction is being recorded.

CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS

Descriptive Statistics

This study examines factors that influence the likelihood of citizen voluntary compliance to the verbal commands of a law enforcement officer during an encounter. In order to accomplish this goal, the research is guided by several hypotheses suggested by the social interaction perspective and the theory of judgmental heuristics. Before discussing specific hypotheses, it is appropriate to provide descriptive data for the data set.

Demographics of Interaction Participants

Demographically, little variation exists among the primary officers engaged in the interactions. In only 6% of the interactions was the primary officer a female. In terms of age, 88% of the interactions involved officers who were 20-39 years of age. Every single interaction featured a primary officer who was white, and none of the interactions featured a primary officer who was Hispanic. Thus, the primary officers present in the officer/citizen interactions that I sampled were almost exclusively 20-39 year old white, non-Hispanic males.

In terms of the officers' physical builds, 86.5% of interactions featured a primary officer who had a medium or large physical build, and the description of muscular or obese physical build could be used to describe officers in less than 31% of interactions.

As mentioned earlier, this variable was subjective, and the ability of the researcher to accurately estimate the build of individuals involved was heavily influenced by lighting, the angle of the camera, and the amount of clothing worn by the officer/citizen.

At this time, it is appropriate to mention that since Kernersville Police Department employs approximately twenty-four patrol officers at any given time, the same officers appeared in the footage of multiple officer/citizen interactions. Also officer representation in the complete database of video footage, and consequently my random sample of this database, is to some extent self-selected. For example, over 33% of the original sample was from the category of traffic stop (citation) or traffic stop (warning). Traffic stops are, by in large, self-initiated activities, and consequently some patrol officers will be prone to make a higher number of traffic stops in a given shift than others.

This tendency could result in a specific officer submitting an unrepresentatively high number of traffic stop data files to the database and consequently being the recorded primary officer in a high number of officer/citizen interactions studied. Therefore, it is possible, though unlikely, that only one muscular patrol officer is employed with the Kernersville Police Department and that he/she was the primary officer in the 27 interactions involving a muscular officer that I viewed. I did not keep record of the identity of the primary officers in interactions and, thus, I have no way of either confirming or discounting this possibility.

The demographics for the primary citizens involved in the sampled interactions were more varied. Only 64% of the interactions involved a male primary citizen, while

68% involved a white primary citizen and 20.5% involved a black primary citizen. Also, 11% of interactions involved a primary citizen who was Hispanic. The physical build of the primary citizens present in the interactions was difficult to measure. The majority of usable interactions involved officers conducting some sort of enforcement action which took place directly in front of their police cruiser and involved a citizen who was occupying a vehicle.

Very often the citizen in the interaction is not visible on the video footage. In 57.5% of the Kernersville PD interactions, I was not able to determine the citizen's physical build. Of the interactions in which I was able to make a determination, 40% of the primary citizens were of a slight physical build and 45.9% were of a medium physical build. Only one interaction involved a citizen coded as muscular, and in only six interactions was a citizen considered to be obese.

Descriptive Data of Interaction Exchange

In addition to recording basic information about the officers and citizens involved in the interactions, I recorded descriptive data of the interaction itself. Though these variables are not directly tied to a hypothesis, they do help to describe the makeup of the typical interaction. As seen in Table 2, miscellaneous traffic incidents were the most common conduct under investigation at the time of the interaction. Traffic-related offenses (speeding, traffic, and DWI) account for 70% of all sampled interactions.

As Table 3 shows, the most common disposition of the recorded interactions (34%) was a citation issued to the primary citizen while 23.5% of interactions ended in

the primary officer making an arrest, and 22.5% of interactions ended in information being given to the primary citizen.

Table 2
Crime under Investigation

Crime	
Speeding	15.50% (31)
Traffic Offense	37.00% (74)
City Ordinance Violation	4.00% (8)
Driving While Intoxicated	17.50% (35)
Misdemeanor	18.00% (36)
Felony	3.50% (7)
Unknown	3.50% (7)
Other	4.00% (8)

Table 3
Enforcement Dispositions

Enforcement Disposition	<u>Information Given</u>	<u>Verbal Warning</u>	<u>Written Warning</u>	<u>Citation Issued</u>	<u>Arrest Made</u>	<u>All Other</u>
	22.5% (45)	7.5% (15)	7.5% (15)	34.5% (69)	23.5% (47)	4.5% (9)

Dependent Variables

The dependent variable, citizen voluntary compliance to the verbal commands of law enforcement officers, was coded in two ways. First, I coded compliance as a purely binary variable. All interactions were coded as either compliance interactions or as non-compliance. Only two interactions out of 200 involved instances of primary citizens failing to voluntarily comply with verbal commands of officers. While many interactions involved citizens who were at some level uncooperative, impolite, or slow to respond, only two required officers to impel involuntary compliance by the use of force.

This lack of variation in the dependent variable creates a challenge analytically; however, it is not altogether surprising or unanticipated. Voluntary compliance to officer commands was predicted by the literature to be the outcome of the vast majority of officer/citizen interactions. Both macro and micro theories of power point to the fact that individuals are extremely likely to comply with commands from an authority figure.

The lack of variation in the dependent variable of primary citizen voluntary compliance prevents meaningful analysis from being performed. Therefore, in order to allow for analysis, I also coded primary citizen voluntary compliance as an ordinal variable ranging from one to ten, which as previously mentioned, was compressed down to an ordinal variable ranging from one to four to allow for ease of analysis.

The results of this alternate coding of the dependent variable produced slightly more variation, though variation is still limited. But, by using this more nuanced classification, I was able to draw distinctions between citizens who voluntarily complied with officer commands. The shortcoming of the binary assessment of compliance is that

it forced the observer to look at the end of the interaction and classify only the outcome of the exchange. However, an ordinal assessment of citizen compliance allows differentiation between citizens who were compliant throughout from those who were uncooperative, defiant and rude, yet voluntarily complied in the end.

As shown in Table 4, the majority of interactions, 66%, contained primary citizens who were completely compliant. In other words, the citizens were polite and cooperative with officers from the beginning of the interaction until the end. However, 21% of interactions involved primary citizens who were generally compliant, but who were less than fully cooperative and/or demonstrated some level of irritation with the officers. In these interactions, the level of citizen dissatisfaction could usually be ignored by the primary officer and did not interfere with the enforcement activities being carried out.

Table 4

Adjusted Degree of Primary Citizen Voluntary Compliance

Degree of Compliance		
Gross Failure to Voluntarily Comply	1	3.5% (7)
Moderate Failure to Voluntarily Comply	2	9.5% (19)
Slight Failure to Voluntarily Comply	3	21% (42)
Full Voluntary Compliance	4	66% (132)

This type of behavior was exhibited by primary citizens in another 9.5% of interactions; however, the citizens' irritation and questioning were more extensively expressed. This degree of citizen irritation required officers to respond in some way. In some cases where the officer chose to ignore the citizen's behavior, the officers demonstrated through an even tone of voice and stiff body language that they refused to acknowledge the citizen's dissatisfaction. In other cases, the citizen's defiance required an active verbal response from an officer, to include a reiteration of commands or an expression of authority or dominance on the part of an officer.

The interactions coded as having a degree of compliance of level 1 included all interactions in which citizens continued their defiance and disrespect in the face of officer verbal responses. These citizens were aggressive in speech and body posture and evoked shows of force by officers, including calls for backup and aggressive tones of voice and body posture. The distribution of primary citizen degree of compliance is not normally distributed, but rather is skewed strongly to the right.

Independent Variables

Social Interactionism

Normative Independent Variables

The social interactionist perspective suggests two types of variables which effect citizen voluntary compliance. The first type, normative variables, are those related to a citizen's tendency to conform because of a culturally standard set of behaviors expected in certain situations. The first of these variables is the level of respect that an officer shows a citizen. In the majority of interactions, officers demonstrated general respect

and/or used titles of respect when addressing a citizen (sir/ma'am, Mr./Mrs.). This contrasts with only 9.5% of interactions where officers demonstrated disrespect for a citizen. It should be noted, however, that the use of titles was not an exact proxy for respect.

Another normative factor suggested by social interactionism is the manner of initiation of the interaction. Data reveal that 70.5% of the interactions were initiated by an officer while 12.5% of interactions were initiated by some third party request for law enforcement. Also, the normative factor of whether or not a citizen has some kind of prior involvement with law enforcement was recorded. However, I found only 9% of sampled interactions contained any indication that the citizen involved was known by the officer prior to the interaction. This lack of variation rendered this variable useless.

With regard to the normative variables of evidence strength and interaction location, I found that more often than not, at least some evidence of criminal conduct on the part of the citizen was apparent, though the amount of evidence varied (see Table 5). The majority of interactions, 67.5%, occurred on a street or highway. This reinforces the fact that the nature of the data source tends to over-represent traffic-enforcement related law enforcement activities.

Table 5

Evidence Strength

Evidence Strength	<u>No Evidence</u>	<u>One Item of Evidence</u>	<u>Two Items of Evidence</u>	<u>Three Items of Evidence</u>
	28.0% (56)	30.5% (61)	35.5% (71)	6.0% (12)

Prior research into social interactionism has considered the law enforcement skill level of officers to be a normative factor which could have an effect on citizen's level of compliance. Due to the data source, I was unable to determine factors such as an officer's years of experience in order to make an estimation of officer skill level. However, as a proxy for this variable, I did record whether or not an officer utilized the law enforcement communications technique of verbal judo. This highly structured method of officer communication currently is widely taught throughout American law enforcement. I found that in only 11 interactions did an officer use verbal judo. Once again, the lack of variation in this variable thwarted attempts to measure its effect on citizen voluntary compliance.

Instrumental Independent Variables

In addition to suggesting normative variables that affect citizen voluntary compliance, the social interactionism perspective also suggests instrumental variables. Instrumental variables are those factors which affect a citizen's likelihood of voluntary compliance as the decision to comply is effected by a desire to avoid adverse consequences. Social interactionism suggests that the decision making process of a citizen in an interaction with an officer is affected by both a citizen's ability to make rational decisions as well as the seriousness of the conduct under investigation.

In 18.5% of interactions, a primary citizen was at least slightly impaired as determined by citizen statements concerning drug/alcohol use, officer statements concerning odor of alcohol, citizen's steadiness on their feet, and citizen's slurring of speech (see Table 6). Only two interactions involved primary citizens who were visibly

mentally ill or mentally handicapped. The mental illness of the primary citizens in the two cases was revealed through statements made by the citizens themselves. In 9.5% of interactions, the citizen was notably emotional. Further, 11% of interactions involved a primary citizen who was less than fluent in English, thus creating some degree of communication difficulty during the interaction. Obviously, an individual's language proficiency does not indicate impairment in the ability to make cost-benefit analyses. However, a language barrier does decrease the likelihood that a citizen will understand the information being communicated by the officer, and thus they may be deprived of necessary data for making an accurate cost-benefit assessment.

Table 6

Citizen Impairment

Citizen Impairment	<u>None</u>	<u>Slight</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Unknown</u>
	80.5%	4.0%	9.0%	5.5%	1.0%
	(161)	(8)	(18)	(11)	(1)

Finally, social interactionism suggests one final instrumental variable which can affect citizen's decisions regarding voluntary compliance, which is how serious the problem under investigation is. As shown on Figure 1, the vast majority of offenses (70%) are traffic related with only three interactions featuring criminal activity that could be described as serious.

Judgmental Heuristics

The second theoretical perspective that informs this study is judgmental heuristics. This perspective suggests that an individual's decision regarding compliance

can be impacted by several different reflexive cognitive functions, which are triggered by different situational stimuli. For example, judgmental heuristics suggests that individuals will be more likely to comply with the orders of those who exhibit signs of having a higher level of authority, for example those wearing police uniforms. Patrol deputies, and thus the officers who would have dash-cams in their vehicle, almost always are required to wear uniforms. However, most agencies differentiate between a more formal dress uniform (class A) and a less formal, more functional/comfortable uniform (class B). I found that interactions were almost equally likely to feature officers with class A uniforms as officers with class B uniforms. I also noted that in the vast majority of interactions (97%), whether in class A or class B uniforms, officer uniforms appeared tidy and neat.




Figure 1. Problems Being Investigated In Compliance Interactions

Another obvious indication of authority is officer rank. Typically higher-ranking officers in police departments perform administrative tasks and do not conduct patrol functions. Further, patrol sergeants, who function as shift supervisors, and patrol officers are usually the only officers to have dashboard-mounted cameras in their vehicles. Sergeants have three gold stripes on the sleeves of their uniforms and thus are easily observable. Some departments also have a rank just below Sergeant called Corporal, which is marked by two stripes on the sleeves of the uniform. I observed no officers with Corporal stripes. A Sergeant was the primary officer in 14% of interactions, with patrol officers with no rank making up the rest of the primary officers in the interactions.

In addition to uniform, authority level can be revealed through a demonstration of knowledge. I attempted to note this variable by recording whether or not officers in an interaction demonstrated an advanced degree of knowledge of the legal system. Knowledge could be demonstrated through a discussion of the criminal code with the primary citizen, or information being imparted concerning the processes of the criminal courts. However, I found that in only 16 interactions did an officer demonstrate any superior knowledge of the legal system beyond basic instructions following a citation.

Officers also can reinforce their authority by informing citizens of the agency they represent, therefore linking their personal authority to a broader organization. I found that officer's used this method of reinforcement in only 7.5% of interactions. It also is logical to assume that the use of blue lights and sirens reinforces the authority of police officers, as these devices only may be used by law enforcement officers. I found that 76.5% of interactions contained examples of officers having activated their blue lights. This is to be

expected as the majority of interactions were traffic-related, and officers usually are required by policy to activate their blue lights in order to make a traffic stop. However, in only six interactions officers also activated their sirens.

According to judgmental heuristics, the authority of an officer should increase if the citizen is informed of a legitimate reason for the officer to have initiated an interaction. I found that in 76.5% of interactions the officer informed the citizen of the crime/conduct under investigation.

Judgmental heuristics suggests that individuals are much more likely to comply with a request or order if they believe that they are in some way indebted to the individual making the request. In other words, if an officer does some sort of favor for a citizen, the citizen will be more likely to reciprocate by complying with commands. I recorded whether or not officers in an interaction provided the citizen in the interaction with any form of assistance or service. I found that a variety of possible services were possible, including: notifying citizens of a mechanical problem with their vehicle, giving citizens navigational instructions, giving citizens advice about what to do at their court date, and reducing charges against a citizen during the interaction.

In 48.5% of interactions, officers offered some form of assistance to the citizen involved. I also noted that in 16.5% of interactions the officer made a concession at the request of the citizen. Usually these requests involved small favors such as being allowed to smoke or being allowed to sit down.

The perspective of judgmental heuristics suggests that individuals often make choices to behave in ways that are consistent with their prior behavior, without fully

considering the decision. In order to study this influence, I recorded if citizens were given an initial command by the primary officer. These initial commands usually took the form of requests for identification. I then recorded whether or not citizens complied with these initial commands. According to judgmental heuristics, citizens who complied with an initial command, thus marking themselves as a compliant individual, then would be more likely to comply with officer commands throughout the interaction. I found that in 85.5% of interactions, the citizen complied with the initial command of an officer.

Table 7

Number of Secondary Officers/Citizens

Number of Secondary Officers	<u>0</u> 54% 108	<u>1</u> 28.50% 57	<u>2</u> 13.00% 26	<u>3-5</u> 4.50% 9	<u>≥5</u> 0.00% 0
Number of Secondary Citizens	<u>0</u> 55.50% 111	<u>1</u> 25.00% 50	<u>2</u> 12.50% 25	<u>3-5</u> 5.50% 11	<u>≥5</u> 4.50% 9

According to judgmental heuristics, two additional variables may affect the likelihood of compliance. The first is conformity. Citizens tend to behave in the same manner as those around them. Table 7 shows that in the majority of interactions, no additional citizens or officers were present. However, in interactions where a secondary officer or citizen was present, the compliance of the additional person was measured. Secondary citizens and secondary officers complied with the commands of the primary officers in the vast majority of interactions where they were present.

The last judgmental heuristic suggested by the literature is that of “liking.” Citizens will be more likely to comply with the commands of an officer they like. This is an extremely difficult variable to measure. However, I did record whether or not officers advocated leniency for a citizen in the presence of the citizen, reasoning that an articulation of mercy by officers would create fondness in the mind of the citizen. I found that in only 7% of interactions was any such articulation in favor of leniency made by an officer.

Additional Independent Variables

In addition to the variables suggested by social interactionism and judgmental heuristics, I measured several additional variables. I measured the socio-economic status of the citizens involved in the interactions by relying on a “best guess” as to the monetary value of the vehicle occupied by the primary citizen. The research revealed that 17% of sampled interactions contained citizens occupying vehicles of low monetary value and that 29.5% and 25% of interactions contained citizens occupying medium-low and medium value vehicles, respectively. This accounts for the majority of interactions. However, 35 interactions (17.5%) involved citizens who were not occupying a vehicle at all.

I also recorded the level of respect shown by citizens toward officers. I found that in the plurality of interactions, 44.5%, both parties showed respect for one another. However, I did find that in cases where officers were disrespectful towards citizens (9.5% of interactions), citizens were either respectful or neutral in over 2/3 of the interactions.

I also recorded a few other independent variables. I found that interactions were approximately as likely to have occurred during the day as during the night. I also found that in only three interactions did an officer ever notify a citizen that the interaction was being recorded.

Results of Ordinal Logistic Regression

Each of the independent variables hypothesized to have an effect upon a citizen's likelihood of compliance was analyzed using ordinal logistic regression utilizing SPSS. I first assessed the overall model fit for each of the cumulative odds models created to compare the effect of each independent variable upon the likelihood of a specific degree of primary citizen's compliance (see Table 8).

As Table 8 demonstrates, this analysis found only eight independent variables with a significant relationship with citizen voluntary compliance. For example, the significance level for the model fit for the independent variable of interaction location is small ($p < .05$). This means that I reject the null hypothesis that the location coefficients for all of the variables in the model are zero. In other words, I reject the null hypothesis that the model without the predictor of location is as good as the model with the predictor. Therefore, the independent variable of location provides significant predictive power for citizen compliance. As Table 8 also shows, the citizen's level of impairment, the citizen's emotional state, the manner of initiation of the interaction, the officer's use of threats, the citizen's initial compliance, the officer's demonstration of respect for the citizen, and the police department of the primary officer all proved to have significant predictive power for citizen compliance.

Table 8***Overall Model Test***

	Chi-Square	Sig.
Evidence strength	1.844	0.605
Location	6.506	0.039*
Primary officer rank	0.935	0.334
Verbal judo	1.593	0.207
Citizen non-white	1.509	0.219
Citizen gender	1.106	0.293
Problem seriousness	5.25	0.154
Citizen intoxication	9.392	0.025*
Citizen mental illness/handicap	0.064	0.801
Citizen emotion	20.553	0.000***
Officer legal expertise	3.614	0.057
Officer uniform tidiness	0.256	0.613
Officer advocates for citizen	0.01	0.921
Primary citizen age	4.209	0.24
Citizen/officer physical build	6.09	0.107
Primary citizen English fluency	0.018	0.894
Value of primary citizen's vehicle	4.195	0.38
Number of secondary citizen vs. officers	4.411	0.11
Interaction initiation	4.727	0.03*
Officer threats	5.179	0.023*
Citizen notified of recording	1.29	0.256
Officer wearing class A uniform	2.1	0.147
Officer provides service	0.273	0.601
Officer reduces charges	0.039	0.842
Citizen compliance with initial command	10.909	0.001**
Secondary citizen compliance	0.835	0.361
Secondary officer compliance	1.509	0.219
Primary officer age	0.022	0.882
Officer respect	11.194	0.004**
Officer prior knowledge of citizen	1.798	0.18
Police Department (King PD vs. Kernersville PD)	9.293	0.002**

(* = $p < .05$) (** = $p < .01$) (** = $p < .000$)

The relationships between the remaining independent variables and the dependent variable of citizen compliance are not significant, and thus the predictive value for citizen

compliance provided by the other independent variables is not powerful, and they are removed from the model.

Table 9 highlights the significance of the variance between different categories of the individual independent variables. The significance level demonstrates the probability that the observed variance in the dependent variable can be attributed to chance. The coefficient indicates the direction of the variation in the dependent variable as caused by the independent variable. “A positive coefficient tells you that as the value of the (independent) variable increases, the likelihood of larger (dependent variable) scores increases” (Norušis 2007:71).

At this point, it is appropriate to state that due to the small sample size of this study, and the nature of ordinal logistic regression, validity issues do arise as the sample is divided into smaller and smaller groups. As already has been discussed, ordinal logistic regression operates by comparing all cases in which one category of an independent variable was present to all those in which that category was not present. The model continues by taking all the remaining cases and measuring the next category of the independent variable compared to all remaining cases that did not have this category and so on and so forth.

Table 9*Parameter Estimates*

		Estimated Coefficient	Sig
Interaction Location	Street/highway	0.752	0.079
	PVA	-0.076	0.877
	Private property	0(a)	
Citizen Impairment	None	0.948	0.101
	Slight	21.603	0.000
	Moderate	1.044	0.16
	High	0(a)	
Citizen Emotion	Not emotional	2.256	0.000***
	Notably emotional	0(a)	
Initiation of Interaction	Not initiated by officer	-0.693	0.026*
	Initiated by officer	0(a)	
Officer Uses Threat	No Threat	-2.331	0.005**
	Threat	0(a)	
Citizen Initial Compliance	No initial compliance	-2.691	0.001**
	Initial compliance	0(a)	
Officer Respect	Disrespect	-1.568	0.001**
	Neutral	-0.348	0.287
	Respect	0(a)	
Police Department	King	1.19	0.006**
	Kernersville	0(a)	

(*= p<.05)

(**= p<.01)

(*= p<.000)

This difficulty is exacerbated when the independent variable whose effect we are measuring has a greater number of categories. For example, the independent variable of citizen level of intoxication has four separate categories. Therefore, the likelihood is higher that no cases involve a citizen who is non-compliant and also at a specific level of impairment. At this point, SPSS gives a warning concerning validity. In the case of the independent variable of citizen impairment, SPSS gives the warning of 4 cells with zero frequencies, which does create some uncertainty in the validity of this analysis. It is due to this fact that I did not conduct any analysis of the dependent variable of citizen voluntary compliance with officer commands, with multiple independent variables simultaneously.

Based on these parameter estimates, location and impairment are no longer significant. In other words, though these two variables appeared to have some relationship with citizen compliance, further analysis reveals that the connection failed to provide predictive value. It also should be mentioned that I analyzed citizen impairment again after compressing it into a bivariate variable (some impairment vs. no impairment). However, this did not alter the outcome that citizen impairment still did not show a significant effect, positive or negative, upon citizen compliance.

This technique only can give valid results if enough variation exists between categories of the dependent variable so that each category of a given independent variable has cases corresponding to each of the categories of the dependent variable. As has already been mentioned, due to the lack of overall variation in the dependent variable of citizen degree of compliance, I collapsed the variable from a range of 1-10 to a range of

1-4. This insured that each of the categories of citizen degree of compliance would have a greater number of cases while at the same time preserving the usefulness of a more nuanced measure of citizen compliance. However, despite this precaution, the analysis is still hampered by the lack of examples of cases in which citizens were more non-compliant with officer commands.

The effect of the independent variable of citizen emotion is significant at the .05 level. The coefficient for interactions in which citizens were not emotional is positive, indicating that in interactions where citizens were more emotional, they also were more likely to be compliant with officer commands. This result is contrary to the Mastrofski et al. (1996) findings.

The effect of the independent variable of interaction initiation also is significant at the .05 level. The coefficient for interactions that were not initiated by officers was negative, indicating that if an interaction was initiated by an officer, the citizen was less compliant. This supports the research hypothesis that citizens are more likely to be compliant when an interaction is initiated by someone other than an officer.

The effect of the independent variable of officer use of threats is significant at the .05 level. The coefficient for interactions in which officers did not threaten citizens was negative, indicating that if an officer threatened a citizen, the citizen was less compliant. This evidence supports the research hypothesis that citizens are more likely to be compliant with officer commands in non-threatening interactions with officers. We can say with confidence that citizens are more likely to be more compliant with officer commands if the officer does not threaten the citizen.

The effect of the independent variable of citizen initial compliance is significant at the .05 level. The coefficient for interactions in which citizens did not comply with initial commands was negative. This is somewhat counterintuitive in that it appears that citizens who comply with the initial commands of an officer actually are less compliant over the course of the interaction. This does not support the research hypothesis that citizens are more likely to remain compliant after they have been compliant with the officer's initial commands. However, it should be noted that in only six cases did the primary citizen fail to comply with an officer's initial commands, creating validity concerns.

The effect of the independent variable of officer respect is significant at the .05 level. The coefficient for interactions in which officers demonstrate disrespect for citizens was negative, indicating that officers who showed disrespect for a citizen obtained more compliance on the part of the primary citizen in return. This does not support the research hypothesis that citizens are more likely to be compliant when officers demonstrate respect for citizens. Once again, however, the number of relevant cases is small. In only 19 cases did officers demonstrate disrespect for citizens. Therefore, rather than suggesting that officers who demonstrate disrespect get greater levels of citizen compliance, this suggests that citizen's are still likely to comply, even in interactions in which officers are disrespectful.

Finally, I examined the effect of the independent variable of the departmental affiliation of the primary officer. I analyzed a small sample of footage from the King Police Department in order to investigate the extent to which the findings at Kernersville

might be applicable to officer/citizen interactions outside of Kernersville. I hypothesized that compliance would be virtually the same regardless of the agency in which the officers are located. However, the effect of the independent variable of police department is significant at the .05 level. The coefficient for interactions which involved King police officers was positive, indicating that in interactions initiated by Kernersville officers, more compliance was shown by primary citizens. In other words, no evidence supports the research hypothesis that citizens are equally likely to comply with the commands of King and Kernersville police officers. I cannot speculate as to the full implications of this finding, given that only 50 cases were sampled in King. However, this finding does suggest the need for further research into the effect of law enforcement agencies or jurisdictions upon citizen voluntary compliance.

Overall, I found mixed results for the hypotheses suggested by the literature. It is clear that only a small number of independent variables expected to affect citizen compliance actually had a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. Of those six variables which did have a significant relationship to voluntary compliance, only the independent variables of officer use of threats and the initiation of the interaction were shown to affect citizen voluntary compliance as hypothesized. The rest of the variables demonstrated relationships opposite of those hypothesized: citizens likelihood of compliance is different in interactions involving a King PD officer than in interactions involving a Kernersville PD officer, citizens are less (not more) compliant when they are calm, when they comply with initial commands, and when officers show them more respect. These results will be addressed further in the discussion.

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION

A discussion of this research requires a look back at the previously stated goal of this study. The goal of this research is to ascertain factors that influence the likelihood of citizen voluntary compliance to the verbal commands of a law enforcement officer during an encounter. Thus, the research is guided by the following questions:

1. What traits and/or behaviors, if any, on the part of the primary citizen affect, positively or negatively, the likelihood of his/her voluntary compliance with officer commands?

2. What traits and/or behaviors, if any, on the part of the primary officer affect, positively or negatively, the likelihood of the primary citizen voluntarily complying with officer commands?

3. What, if any, situational factors affect a citizen's likelihood of voluntary compliance to officer commands during a compliance interaction?

4. Does the presence, absence, or behavior of secondary officers and/or citizens affect, positively or negatively, the likelihood of the primary citizen voluntarily complying with officer commands?

Quantitative Factors

Overall, the research revealed eight factors impacting on the voluntary compliance of a citizen to officer commands: the location of the interaction, the citizen's

level of impairment, the citizen's level of emotionality, the manner of initiation of the interaction, the officer's use of threats directed at the citizen, the citizen's compliance to the initial commands of an officer, an officer's demonstration of respect towards a citizen, and finally, the law enforcement agency of the officer. However, further investigation revealed that neither the location of the interaction nor the citizen's level of impairment could be linked to either an increase or decrease in the level of voluntary compliance of citizens.

Thus, six factors prove to influence the likelihood of citizen voluntary compliance to officer commands. None of these six factors are related to the traits of the primary citizens involved in the interactions as posited in research question 1. Factors such as citizen race, sex, physical build and socio-economic status all fail to display any affect upon the likelihood of voluntary compliance. The theory of social interactionism suggests that citizen's comply with officer commands to the degree that they feel bonded to society. "There is a widespread expectation, with some evidentiary support, that the poor, the unemployed, racial minorities, youths and males are predisposed to noncompliance because of prior unhappy experience or the perception that others like them are treated badly" (Mastrofski et al. 1996:278). This study reveals no such predisposition. The Mastrofski et al. research also found that "poor citizens are significantly less likely to be compliant, but males and minorities citizens are more likely to show compliance" (Mastrofski et al. 1996:289). However, our research reveals no support for these findings.

Only two citizen behaviors affect the citizen's likelihood of voluntary compliance. First, in cases where the citizen complied with the initial command of the

officer, the citizen was less compliant overall. The theory of judgmental heuristics suggests that individuals attempt to take courses of action which make them appear consistent with prior statements or behaviors. The reason for the contrary findings is unclear. What does seem to be apparent is that no simple causal relationship exists between a citizen's decision to comply with the first command of an officer and future decisions regarding compliance to commands.

Second, citizen's emotionality also affects citizen's likelihood of compliance. The theory of social interactionism suggests that a citizen's emotionality is an instrumental factor which influences citizen compliance. The Mastrofski et al. (1996) study found that emotionality, along with intoxication, made citizens irrational, and that "higher levels of irrationality are associated with lower levels of compliance" (Mastrofski et al. 1996:295). However, the findings here reveal that citizens who demonstrate high levels of emotion are more likely to comply with officer commands. This runs contrary to both prior research as well as conventional wisdom. One possible explanation for this is that the Mastrofski et al. (1996) study treated emotionality as a sign of irrationality. However, emotionality also may make citizens more amenable to officer commands and more flexible in their potential responses. Ethnographic notes on those exchanges reveal that as the interaction develops, officers adjust their tactics and responses to the actions and responses of the citizen, including their level of emotion, and vice versa. This dynamic exchange reveals a negotiation process through which compliance is eventually obtained.

In regards to the second question guiding this study, analysis reveals that the influence of officer demographics on citizen compliance could not be assessed. As

previously mentioned, all officers encountered in this research were white, non-Hispanic and almost entirely male. The homogeneity of officers prevents any meaningful assessment of the effect of officer demographics on a citizen's likelihood of compliance. The Mastroski et al. (1996) study found that white officers dealing with minority citizens were significantly more likely to get compliant responses than were all other pairings (Mastroski et al. 1996:289). However, due to our lack of variation in the race of the officers, this factor could not be assessed.

The only officer trait to have an effect upon citizen likelihood of compliance is related to departmental affiliation. Citizens were more likely to fully comply with the commands of officers from the Kernersville Police Department when compared to officers of the King Police Department. As will be discussed at length later in this section, this result is somewhat questionable due to the fact that the samples taken at the two agencies were of different sizes. Further, the fact that officers of the two departments were engaged in interactions within two different communities also raises the question as to whether the officers of a given department are less likely to elicit voluntary compliance from citizens, or whether citizens of a given city are less likely to comply with the commands of an officer. The variable of officer department affiliation does, in many ways, transcend the label of "officer trait." However, significant variation remains between the levels of compliance obtained by King police officers and Kernersville police officers. These findings indicate that conducting an investigation into citizen compliance involving only one law enforcement agency, as was done by the Mastroski et al. (1996) study, may produce results which are not generalizable to officer/citizen

compliance interactions outside of the jurisdiction involved. The issue of variation between departments/jurisdictions must be explored further.

Two officer behaviors were shown to have an effect upon the likelihood of citizen compliance. Officers who made threats against a citizen were less likely to elicit voluntary compliance from the citizen. This finding supports the hypothesis that officers will be more likely to obtain compliance when they use means other than threats. The Mastrofski et al. (1996) study proposed that “the more authoritative (threatening) the police intervention, the greater the threat to identity, which raises the likelihood of citizen resistance” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:275). The Mastrofski et al. study did find that officers who used a friendly approach, rather than a threatening one, were “significantly more likely to produce a compliant response” (1996:290).

Though this particular finding does support the results of prior research, the finding must still be questioned. The method of recording an officer’s use of threats, utilized by both the current study and its predecessors, does not allow for a nuanced understanding of the progression of the interaction. Once again it is difficult to consider the behavior of one actor, in this case the officer, as being truly independent from the behaviors of the other actor in the interaction. It is possible, as Mastrofski et al. (1996) theorize, that officer threats do create a situation where citizens feel compelled to be more resistant and less compliant. However, it also is possible that officers are more likely to issue threats in situations where the citizen has indicated that they already are resistant and noncompliant. Once again, the dynamic nature of the officer/citizen

compliance interaction prevents firm statements regarding the direction of causality, even when results appear to support the hypothesis.

The second police behavior to demonstrate a relationship to citizen compliance is officer's display of respect. The Mastrofski et al. study hypothesized that citizens would be more likely to comply when officers demonstrated respect towards the citizen. Social interactionism suggests that an officer's show of respect increases officer legitimacy and thus compliance. Mastrofski et al. found that "when the state's agents do things that undercut their legitimacy (show disrespect), compliance becomes problematic" (Mastrofski et al. 1996:296). The results of our study show that officers who demonstrate a lower level of respect for the citizen are more likely to elicit full compliance from that citizen.

This finding runs contrary to both prior research as well as conventional wisdom. However, once again, the question of causality rises to the surface. Our research, guided by the literature into compliance, was designed to view citizen compliance as an outcome, rather than as a process. As will be discussed at length later, the qualitative documentation regarding the officer/citizen compliance interactions reveals a much more dynamic exchange than could be adequately captured by quantitative measures of compliance. As officers and citizens act and react in an attempt to carry out a social interaction, the causal direction of the respect/compliance relationship is obscured. It is possible that a citizen's initial lack of compliance may trigger a display of dominance on the part of the officer in the interaction which involves a display of disrespect towards the

citizen. Perhaps it is the negotiation of dominance which produces a greater degree of compliance on the part of the citizen.

Clearly the relationship between officer dominance and citizen compliance is complicated. An officer's use of threats, which would appear to be an obvious display of dominance, produces less compliance while an officer's display of disrespect produces a greater degree of compliance. Achieving dominance over a citizen, and thus obtaining his/her compliance, may be dependent upon an officer's use of nuanced interpersonal communication. It is possible that issuing threats is an obtuse attempt at expressing dominance which serves to undermine the authority of the individual issuing the threats. Conversely, showing disrespect for another individual in an interaction may be a more subtle expression of dominance and therefore a more effective means of encouraging compliance. However, quantitative analysis does not reveal the intricacies of dominance negotiation within these interactions.

The third question guiding the research relates to the affect of situational factors upon a citizen's likelihood of compliance. The only situational factor shown to affect citizen compliance to officer commands is the manner of initiation of the interaction. The Mastrofski et al. (1996) study hypothesized that citizens would be more compliant in interactions initiated by citizens than officers, because responding to a call for service would be seen as more legitimate. However, the Mastrofski et al. study did not find significant evidence of a relationship between interaction initiation and citizen compliance. The current study did find that in cases where interactions were initiated by officers, the citizen was less likely to fully comply. This finding supports the hypothesis

and lends credence to the claim of social interactionism that the normative factor of legitimacy affects citizen compliance.

The initiation of the interaction is a situational factor, and thus, is not influenced by the behavioral dynamics of the interaction. Thus concerns over causality voiced to this point are not as relevant. The manner of initiation of the interaction is more of a truly independent variable, and thus the finding that officer initiated interactions produce less compliance carries more weight than some of the other findings of this study. However, it also is important to point out the degree to which this sample has been skewed towards officer initiated interactions. The vast majority of interactions viewed through dashboard mounted video footage are related to some form of traffic enforcement. Thus, it is probable that citizen initiated encounters are severely underrepresented in this sample because such interactions usually take place in a home or business, out of view of the video system.

This study also examined the possible effect of the presence, absence, or behavior of multiple officers and/or citizens on the primary citizen's likelihood of compliance. Social interactionism suggests that the instrumental factor of number of officers relative to citizens in an interaction is incorporated into the citizen's cost/benefit analysis regarding a decision to comply. Citizens will be more likely to comply to the degree they are outnumbered by officers. However, the Mastrofski et al. study found "that the number of officers present decreases the probability of compliance" (1996:295). This research reveals that the presence of secondary citizens or secondary officers does not appear to

affect, positively or negatively, the likelihood of voluntary compliance of a primary citizen.

The findings of this research reveal that voluntary compliance is impacted by an array of factors related to the participants and the situation. Interestingly, the majority of factors found to affect citizen compliance demonstrate directionality contrary to those hypothesized. Only the manner of initiation of the interaction and the officer's use of threats affects citizen's likelihood of compliance as expected. Citizen's emotionality, citizen's initial compliance to commands, officer respect, and the department of the primary officer all demonstrate relationships to citizen voluntary compliance opposite of those hypothesized. Further, twenty-five additional factors investigated and hypothesized to influence citizen compliance reveal no affect upon a citizen's likelihood of compliance. What can be discerned from these findings?

First, the findings suggest that situational factors, in general, are not influential on citizen voluntary compliance. The only situational factor shown to affect citizen compliance is the manner of initiation of the interaction. Second, the traits of those involved also are rarely influential on citizen compliance. Only one officer trait, departmental affiliation, had an effect on citizen compliance. Finally, the behaviors of the actors involved had the most influence upon compliance. Two citizen behaviors demonstrated an effect upon citizen compliance-citizen initial compliance to officer commands and citizen emotionality-and two officer behaviors also had an effect upon citizen compliance-officer demonstration of respect and officer use of threats.

Of the six influential factors, only two, the department of the officer and the manner of initiation, are truly independent of the dynamics of the compliance interaction itself. Citizen emotion, citizen initial compliance, officer demonstration of respect, and officer use of threats all are influenced by the interaction between officers and citizens.

Prior research into officer/citizen compliance interactions has viewed citizen compliance as a binary outcome, with the interaction leading to compliance or noncompliance. In this research, I also measured compliance as a bivariate variable; however, I also attempted to provide a more nuanced assessment of compliance by using a compliance scale, ranging from complete voluntary compliance to complete failure to voluntarily comply. While this measure did provide for a richer understanding of citizen voluntary compliance, it still classified the compliance as the outcome of the interaction, in the same way that a figure skater's score is the outcome of his/her performance.

However, as I viewed the footage of the interactions, I came to understand that a citizen's compliance fluctuates throughout the interaction. In cases where the citizen was coded as exhibiting full voluntary compliance, the citizen maintained the same level of deference, submission and compliance throughout the interaction. However, in the sixty-eight cases where citizens were less than fully compliant, the compliance behavior of the citizen was not static. Defiance and noncompliance were expressed by the citizen, to varying degrees. These behaviors influenced officers, who reacted in one way or another to these behaviors. The officer's actions then produced reactions by the citizens, which, combined with situational factors, led to an exacerbation or mitigation of the initial noncompliance.

Neither of the measures of compliance used in this study, or any other, fully recognizes nor accounts for this process of negotiation. Additionally, several of the factors that significantly influence citizen compliance are themselves negotiations. The respect that an officer demonstrates for a citizen is subject to the same forces of action and reaction as compliance. In such a dynamic process, it is difficult, if not impossible to separate, in a quantitative way the influence officer respect has upon citizen compliance from the influence citizen compliance has on officer respect.

Having discussed the overall results of the research with relation to the four research questions, it also is important to assess how each of the six factors shown to affect citizen compliance fit into the theoretical perspectives which guide and inform this research. The research hypotheses suggested by the literature found mixed predictive success in this study. Several of the hypotheses suggested by social interaction theory, as well as some of those put forth by the theory of judgmental heuristics, fail to be supported by the data. However, the fact that support for the hypotheses suggested by the literature is mixed does not indicate that the underlying theories are necessarily flawed. Rather, an in-depth discussion of the relationship between the sample, the resulting data, and the research hypotheses is indicated.

Social Interactionism

Social interactionism utilizes three principles in order to examine aggression or compliance interactions: rational choice of actors, situational factors, and phenomenology (the cognitive tendencies/biases) of the actors. Social interactionism sets forth two types

of independent variables theorized to affect citizen voluntary compliance—normative factors and instrumental factors.

Normative factors are those involving the tendency of a citizen to conform because of a culturally standard set of behaviors expected in certain situations. The theory of social interactionism suggests several normative independent variables to have an influence upon a citizen's likelihood of voluntary compliance; however, only three normative variables were shown to have an influence on a citizen's likelihood of compliance: officer demonstration of respect, initiation of the interaction, and officer use of threats.

Social interactionism suggests that individuals are more likely to conform to social norms to the extent that they feel those norms are legitimate. In the case of officer/citizen compliance interactions, social interactionists hypothesize that citizens are more likely to comply with the commands of officers they perceive as being more legitimate.

However, a citizen's subjective evaluation of an officer's legitimacy is exceedingly difficult to measure. Perceptions of legitimacy can be heavily affected by a citizen's upbringing and prior experience with law enforcement, neither of which can be measured by observing dash cam footage. It also should be noticed that officers utilize ubiquitous indications of legitimacy. Police uniforms, badges, and patrol cars all reinforce the official and legitimate authority of officers; however, due to the omnipresence of these tokens of legitimacy, it is difficult to evaluate their effect upon citizen compliance.

An officer's demonstration of respect for a citizen is hypothesized to be one measure of the legitimacy of the officer. Social interactionism theorizes that officer's who show respect for a citizen are perceived as being more legitimate and thus the citizen will be more likely to comply. Mastrofski et al. (1996:296) found that "officers who showed disrespect to the targeted citizen were strikingly less likely to obtain compliance." However, the analysis here does not support this finding, but instead finds a higher level of compliance in cases where the officer demonstrates disrespect towards citizens. It is unclear as to why this counterintuitive result appears. It is possible that disrespect shown by an officer is perceived by the citizen as a form of dominance, and that such a display serves to intimidate citizens into submission and consequently compliance.

The normative factor of officer use of threats is closely related to officer demonstration of respect. Social interactionism theorizes that officers who make threats against a citizen are less likely to elicit voluntary compliance from the citizen. These findings supports this hypothesis. The Mastrofski et al. study proposed that "the more authoritative (threatening) the police intervention, the greater the threat to identity, which raises the likelihood of citizen resistance" (Mastrofski et al. 1996:275). The Mastrofski et al. study did find that officers who used a friendly approach, rather than a threatening one, were "significantly more likely to produce a compliant response" (Mastrofski et al. 1996:290). In the case of officer threats, even though the findings support the results of prior research, the findings themselves must still be questioned. It is unclear whether an

officer's use of threats is a response to noncompliance or whether the threats themselves impel the citizen towards noncompliance.

Another normative factor suggested by social interactionism to affect citizen perception of officer legitimacy and thus increase voluntary compliance revolves around who initiates the interaction. Mastrofski et al. (1996) hypothesized that interactions initiated by citizens have greater legitimacy to citizens than those initiated by law enforcement, resulting in higher levels of compliance. This analysis finds support for this hypothesis, even though the Mastrofski et al. study found no such support. This difference may be accounted for by a difference in method between the two studies. The majority of interactions sampled by this study were traffic-related, and thus officer initiated; however, the Mastrofski et al. study was conducted by ride-a-long researchers who were able to record a higher percentage of interactions prompted by 911 calls or citizen calls for service.

Social interactionism also suggests that instrumental factors affect citizen voluntary compliance. Instrumental factors are those related to a tendency to conform in order to avoid adverse consequences. In other words, citizens' decisions to voluntarily comply or not are based on rational decisions to avoid both formal and informal sanctions. The theory of social interactionism suggests that citizens make decisions regarding compliance which are based on a calculation as to which course of action is most likely to allow them to avoid adverse consequences. In the case of officer/citizen compliance interactions, it is usually the case that a citizen is subject to more sanctions if they fail to voluntarily comply. A citizen who fails to comply can be criminally charged,

or the failure to comply can even be met with physical force . However, the theory suggests that citizens will be less capable of making this mental evaluation of consequences if their decision-making processes are impaired by either substance use or high levels of emotion.

This research demonstrates that in cases where the citizen is noticeably emotional, he/she is more, rather than less, likely to comply with officer commands. These results fail to support the theory of social interactionism and violate conventional wisdom that citizens are more compliant when they are calm. These results also fail to support the findings of the Mastrofski et al research, which used emotionality as a proxy for irrationality and found that “higher levels of irrationality are associated with lower levels of compliance” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:295). It is interesting to note that while the research did reveal a relationship between a citizen being noticeably intoxicated and likelihood of voluntary compliance, the direction of the affect of citizen impairment upon compliance could not be measured.

Taken as a whole, the theory of social interactionism clearly does not fully explain variation in citizen voluntary compliance in officer/citizen compliance interactions. The Mastrofski et al. study found evidence of a wide range of influential independent variables drawn from both normative and instrumental factors suggested by social interactionism. However, the only factors in this study that reveal results similar to the Mastrofski et al. study are interaction initiation and use of officer threats.

The theory of social interactionism is a broad perspective, encompassing classical school thinking in criminology, rational choice theory and criminological control theory.

However, this theory provides only two independent variables which demonstrate a significant effect upon citizen voluntary compliance in the manner hypothesized. It is possible that as wide a net as is cast by social interactions, it still fails to fully describe the morphology of a developing compliance interaction.

Judgmental Heuristics

The theory of judgmental heuristics suggests that individuals use cognitive shortcuts to determine courses of action. Judgmental heuristics suggests that individuals have numerous triggers for these shortcuts, and thus numerous factors should affect citizen compliance. However, the only variable in this study taken from judgmental heuristics that demonstrates a measurable degree of influence upon citizen compliance is the level of initial compliance by citizens. Judgmental heuristics suggests that individuals strive to appear consistent. Therefore, a citizen who is initially compliant is more likely to remain compliant throughout the interaction. This is a difficult variable to measure because an individual's score of their total degree of compliance includes their initial compliance. However, contrary to the hypothesized relationship, this analysis finds that citizens who comply with the initial commands of law enforcement officers have lower levels of compliance throughout the rest of the interaction. This result is most likely a result of the lack of variation of the sample, since almost all citizens complied with the initial commands of the officer. However, the results do demonstrate that the interaction is a process of compliance, where citizens' cooperativeness ebbs and flows. The reaction of a citizen to an officer's commands may be an indication of their behavior throughout the rest of the interaction; however, citizens' likelihood of compliance seems to be

affected by the development of the interaction, resulting in citizens who start off compliant but who may become less compliant as the interaction plays out.

While an interesting perspective on the decision-making processes used by citizens in compliance interactions, judgmental heuristics, like social interactionism, does not provide a significant level of explanation of compliance. It should be noted that much of the research supporting the theory of judgmental heuristics is based on compliance experiments involving volunteers. This type of experiment places a subject in an abnormal situation which causes unease in the volunteer and therefore makes him/her more reliant on cognitive shortcuts than they might be in a more natural setting.

As was mentioned earlier, the goal of this study is not to engage in a formal testing of the theories of either social interactionism or judgmental heuristics. These two theories have served to guide the inquiry by providing perspectives for understanding officer/citizen compliance interactions, and suggesting factors which may affect citizens' likelihood of compliance. The theory of social interactionism provides three normative factors and one instrumental factor shown to affect the likelihood of complying with officer commands. However, the normative factors of officer use of threats and initiation of interaction are the only two factors which affect citizen compliance in the manner predicted by the theory of social interactionism. However, no factors predicted by the theory of judgmental heuristics have the anticipated affect on citizen compliance to officer commands. The results of this study lead to the conclusion that neither the theory of social interactionism nor the theory of judgmental heuristics adequately describes the full complexities of an officer/citizen compliance interaction.

This research makes clear that compliance interactions involve individuals who are engaged in a dynamic interaction and who have a variety of desires and perceptions, some pre-existing and some developing during the course of the interaction, all of which influence how they respond to officer commands. To fully understand citizen voluntary compliance, it is essential to understand the role that the officers, citizens, and context play in the developing interaction.

Qualitative Factors

In addition to coding for quantitative variables, I also took notes regarding the quality and development of the interaction, specifically the dramatological factors at play in the interaction. Though not a thorough and complete ethnographic study, these notes do supplement the findings from the quantitative analysis.

The officer/citizen compliance interactions that I observed contained an obvious undercurrent of a struggle for dominance. I made note of the fact that in almost all traffic stops, the officer began speaking to the citizen rather than the citizen speaking first. In this way, officers appeared to be using a linguistic technique of dominance assertion.

For example, the officer would tell the citizen that he/she had been stopped for speeding and then would ask the citizen why they had been driving at an excessive speed. In cases where the officer maintained the conversational initiative, i.e., making statements and eliciting specific responses from the citizen, the officer appeared dominant and the citizen submissive. In such cases, citizens almost always were coded as completely compliant. However, in a minority of cases, the citizen was able to lay hold to the conversational initiative of the interaction.

In one interaction involving a female Kernersville police officer, she made a traffic stop and approached the driver, who was the only citizen present. The officer asked for the citizen's license and registration; however, while the citizen was searching for these items, he asked the officer the reason for the stop. At this point, the citizen was eliciting a specific response from the officer, and the citizen was no longer enacting a submissive role. The officer attempted to regain the conversational initiative by responding with the question, "when did you put your seatbelt on?" thus intimating that the reason for the stop was that the citizen had not been wearing his seatbelt. The officer was seeking a specific response from the citizen that would admit criminal guilt and retain the dominance of the officer. The citizen responded by stating that his seat belt had been on the whole time he was on the road.

At this time, the citizen's tone of voice became assertive and his volume increased. The citizen appeared not only to proclaim his innocence, but at the same time claimed dominance of the interaction, forcing the officer to either challenge him further by calling him a liar or to submit to his assertion of innocence and state that she was mistaken. The officer at this point stated that she had not seen the citizen's seat belt as he had gone past her, intimating that she could have failed to see the seatbelt, thus taking a conciliatory and less dominant position. The citizen again stated that he had been wearing the seatbelt the whole time and that the officer had just failed to see it. The citizen's tone remained forceful and indignant, giving the impression that the officer had no legitimate reason to detain him and that he, as the dominant actor in the interaction, expected the traffic stop to be terminated. The officer continued to respond to the citizen's remarks

and her voice took on a much more apologetic and conciliatory tone, now attempting to mitigate the citizen's assertiveness and create cooperation rather than dominance.

The interaction ended when the officer abbreviated the stop, failing to run the citizen's license and registration, as is the typical tactic of Kernersville police officers. Instead the officer gave the citizen his license and registration directly back to him and ended the interaction. The officer never took a completely submissive posture, but it was clear that the citizen had expressed a strong and dominant posture.

In a separate interaction, the Kernersville police officer arrived in a parking lot of a shopping center where a third party had called in a complaint regarding a domestic dispute between a man and woman. The officer arrived, exited his vehicle, and asked the man who had been described by the third party, "What's going on?" The officer's initial verbal contact did not assert his authority, nor did it elicit a specific response from the citizen. The citizen responded with an assertive, non-submissive tone of voice that nothing was going on. The officer explained that he had received a complaint of a domestic dispute, and the citizen responded with a very assertive tone that no fight had occurred and that he and the female were joking around. The citizen then told the officer in an indignant and aggressive tone that he should leave, thereby assuming dominance over the officer and the right to terminate the interaction. The officer responded with a very aggressive and assertive tone, informing the citizen that the investigation would continue until the officer was satisfied. The officer's tone implied threat of criminal penalty and physical force, while at the same time iterating the officer's authoritative position as a law enforcement officer. At this point, the citizen became submissive,

speaking only when directly questioned, and speaking in a much softer, less assertive tone of voice.

In the case of both of these interactions, the citizen was coded as less than fully compliant; however, in neither case was the citizen coded as completely noncompliant. The coding scheme could not encompass the dynamic and intricate nature of these dominance competitions. I was forced to make an estimation of the total compliance of the citizen over the course of the interaction, and to a great extent, the citizen's degree of compliance was closely related to his/her degree of submission. However, an ethnographic study of the dramatological factors which influence officer/citizen compliance interactions would provide a much fuller description of the nature of these complex and important social interactions.

The development of these two officer/citizen interaction provides anecdotal evidence regarding compliance interactions on the whole. However, they do offer a salient example of the dynamic nature of compliance negotiation. The change in this citizen's compliance over the course of the interaction illustrates the artificial character of describing compliance through a rating based on any single point in the interaction. Similarly, this interaction demonstrates the evolution of an officer's methods of obtaining compliance. A qualitative analysis of this interaction reveals the dynamic exchange engaged in by the officer and the citizen, which could not be captured by documentation of quantitative factors alone.

Discussion of Research Methods

Having already discussed the potential shortcomings of the theories which underpin this research, I would like to discuss the possibility that the lack of significant support for either theory actually is a result of the research methods employed. This study gathered data using a unique data source. However, the data source has some severe limitations. The point of view of the cruiser-mounted video systems insures that the vast majority of interactions viewed will be traffic-related. While this removes any potential interference of the researcher into the interactions under review, it prevents inclusion of a more varied sample of police/citizen compliance interactions. This fact may account for the extreme difference in terms of compliance levels between this study and the Mastrofski et al. (1996) study. The prior research revealed a binary noncompliance level of 22% whereas this study revealed a binary noncompliance level of 1%. Multiple factors can account for this huge discrepancy. First, this study was conducted in a less populated jurisdiction than that of Richmond, Virginia. Second, the Kernersville PD has much less officer diversity within the ranks than that of Richmond PD, with no cases of interactions involving non-white officers from the Kernersville Police Department. However, I am inclined to believe that the fact that researchers in the Mastrofski et al. (1996) study had the ability to observe officer/citizen interactions which occurred inside residences or away from the patrol vehicle might have accounted for at least part of the variation in compliance rates, and in research findings overall.

Another potential methodological problem involves the measurement of the independent variables. The nature of the data source required that proxy variables be used

to assess numerous independent variables. For example, in order to assess the normative factor of the level of authority by officers, the Mastrofski et al. (1996) study recorded the officer's years of experience and age. However, use of dash cam footage required that the officer's age be approximated, which necessitated the creation of large age ranges in order to insure some level of reliability, but which reduced variation.

Improvements

The results of this study suggest numerous avenues for improvement. First, the scope of this study should have included only officer/citizen compliance interactions initiated during traffic stops. While the data source of cruiser mounted video systems has a great deal of potential for use in sociological study, researchers should realize that, at its current level of development, the video systems were designed and are best suited for recording traffic stops. In order to study social interactions of any kind, researchers require as much sensory information as possible. Obviously, a calculated tradeoff is made when a researcher chooses to confine his/her field of observation to what has been recorded through a camera lens and on a microphone. However, in my attempts to sample a wider range of officer/citizen interactions, including interactions that did not involve traffic enforcement and thus were not in an area adjacent to the dash-cam, I ended up sampling many interactions which were unusable due to inadequate visual footage of the officer/citizen interaction. This, in part, accounts for the fact that the sample only included 200 interactions from the footage database of Kernersville Police Department, despite the fact that the goal was to view 300 interactions.

This study would have been better served to had focused solely on officer/citizen compliance interactions during traffic stops rather than attempting to make statements regarding the entirety of officer/citizen compliance interactions. Due to the decision to seek a broader field of inquiry, followed by the overrepresentation of traffic-based officer/citizen interactions in the sample, serious reliability concerns emerged.

Due to these factors, this study can only address citizen compliance during traffic stops. It is possible that the context of the interaction is an important factor to consider for understanding citizen compliance to officer commands. Additionally, the difference between the representation of traffic-based interactions sampled in current research and those sampled in the Mastrofski et al. (1996) study also may account for some of the variation in the results obtained by these two studies.

This research also would have benefited from an expanded sample taken from the King Police Department footage database. However, when planning the study, the officers of King PD were using cruiser-mounted video systems which recorded onto VHS and 8mm tapes. The database consisted of a bookcase housing these tapes. The format of this database made extensive sampling of officer/citizen interactions extremely difficult. Coding such tapes would have necessitated fast forwarding through large amounts of tape in search of useable footage of officer/citizen compliance interactions.

With such limitations in mind, the study drew primarily from the Kernersville Police Department's digital footage database, using a smaller sample from the King PD as a check on the generalizability of the analysis of the Kernersville data. During the time period during which the study was being conducted on the Kernersville PD database,

King PD switched its cruiser mounted video system from VHS/8mm to a digital system similar to the system used by Kernersville PD. I was unaware of this change until I went back to King PD to collect the second, smaller sample. However, it was still necessary to collect a smaller sample at King PD because the King PD system had been in place for only a period of months and therefore contained a smaller number of video files when compared to the Kernersville PD database.

Had it been practical, this study could have included samples from databases of more law enforcement agencies. In the future, this should become increasingly convenient as more and more law enforcement agencies change from analog systems to digital cruiser mounted video systems. The advantage of the digital system is that a researcher can sample and view officer/citizen interactions with quickness and ease.

As discussed previously, a study of officer/citizen compliance interactions would be well served by a more qualitative approach than the one used by this study. Compliance interactions are far too dynamic and complex to be adequately encompassed by a quantitative analysis. I am convinced by my experience with this study that an ethnomethodological examination of officers and citizens involved in compliance interactions could yield a great deal of added understanding to this under-researched field.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Sociological research into power and obedience has been both deep and wide. A diversity of macro and micro level theories have been put forward to explain the nature of this social phenomena (Allan 2006; Aronson 1954; Bendix 1960; Blau 2003; Blumer 1969; Cialdini 2001; Durkhiem 1897; Erikson 1966; Marx 1857) and researchers have applied these theories to a variety of social settings. However, research into the role of power/obedience between law enforcement officers and citizens has been much more limited (Mastrofski et al. 1996).

What factors influence a citizen's likelihood of voluntarily complying with officer commands? As already has been mentioned, citizens are more likely to comply if they are emotional or in interactions initiated by someone other than an officer. Citizens are less likely to comply in interactions where officers use threats. In cases where a citizen complies with an officer's initial command, citizens are less likely to comply with subsequent commands, and a citizen is less likely to comply in cases where an officer demonstrates respect for them. Also, it appears that a citizen's likelihood of compliance may vary based on the department the officer represents or the jurisdiction in which the interaction is taking place.

This study seeks to expand understandings of compliance. Every day, individuals are compelled to comply with laws, norms, and customs. Research has shown that in

most instances individuals insure their own compliance and the compliance of those around them through various informal means. In the case of the more formal social interaction of law enforcement officers and citizens, the commands of officers are supported by legal sanctions, visible displays of official authority, and an underlying threat of physical force as demonstrated by a displayed arsenal of weapons. In the vast majority of cases, whether because of social convention or submission to the aforementioned sanctions and threats, citizens are compliant with the commands of officers. Even individuals with lengthy criminal records and who have fought with or fled from officers on prior occasions are typically compliant with the vast majority of officer commands. The purpose of this research was to assess what factors might increase or decrease a citizen's likelihood of voluntarily complying with officer commands.

This research does provide greater insight into the nature of the officer/citizen compliance interaction. These interactions are complicated and dynamic. The influence of certain factors is understandable. Citizens who are threatened by officers are less likely to comply. However, the influence of some factors is counterintuitive and not predicted by the theories used here. For example, why would a citizen be more likely to fully comply with the commands of an officer who is disrespectful towards him/her? Perhaps the outcome of this research is that it explored the topic of officer/citizen compliance interactions deeply enough to discover how little is truly understood about this type of interaction.

The literature surrounding citizen compliance to officer commands has treated compliance as an outcome. If citizen compliance is viewed in this way, the goal of

research is to determine what factors allow the officer to influence a citizen to voluntarily comply with commands. This perspective views officer traits and behaviors, citizen traits and behaviors, and situational factors as variables which, when summed, produce either citizen voluntary compliance or failure to voluntarily comply. It is with this very viewpoint that the current study was conducted. However, our results reveal the shortcoming of this perspective, recognizing that judging compliance solely by the final disposition misses how that compliance has been negotiated throughout the interaction.

This research examined a total of sixty-three quantitative factors within each sampled interaction. The breadth of this examination encompassed the theories of social interactionism and judgmental heuristics, and some additional situational and demographic factors. However, of the 63 factors, only six proved to have a causal relationship with citizen compliance, and only two affected compliance as predicted by a theoretical perspective.

Yet, where the quantitative analysis failed to provide a deeper understanding of citizen voluntary compliance, the limited qualitative analysis conducted revealed a glimpse of the remarkable dynamics of officer/citizen compliance interactions. This qualitative analysis calls sociologists and law enforcement officers alike to lay aside the current view of citizen compliance as an outcome to be reached. It is understandable for researchers to view the compliance interactions as akin to a competition, with the officer seeking to obtain voluntary compliance from a citizen and either succeeding or failing. However, this form of assessment requires that the observer wait until the resolution of the interaction, assign the resolution an “outcome,” and then work their way backwards

to classify the degree of compliance which led to this “outcome.” This process is similar to observing a cinematic film and then assigning it a number of stars to denote its ranking so that it can be compared with other films. Such rankings are subjective, imposed on a film in order to create a narrative of how it ranks, while at the same time failing to provide greater understanding of the film itself.

As this research demonstrates, the vast majority of officer/citizen interactions reach their conclusion with the citizen having voluntarily complied, as defined in this study. Yet, such a classification does not express the complexities or dynamics of the compliance interaction. Theoretical perspectives of compliance would be better served to explain the processes through which compliance is negotiated, rather than focusing on factors which influence compliance. In the case of this study, the affect of traits, behaviors and situational factors failed to provide a deeper understanding of the compliance interaction. On the other hand, an analysis of the way in which officers and citizens enacted dominance and submission, compliance and noncompliance, demonstrates the non-linear nature of compliance, with peaks of defiance and valleys of submission on the part of the citizen, and corresponding responses of dominance and informality on the part of the officer.

Future research into this topic would be well served to ask the question: how is compliance negotiated in officer/citizen compliance interactions? Such a study could produce a rich narrative concerning the interplay of officer action and response with the action and response of the citizen. It is even possible that when the dynamics of these interactions are more fully understood, factors, such as traits, behaviors and situational

features, can once again be assessed to determine their affect on compliance interaction processes.

This study, hopefully, serves as a call for further research into the topic of officer/citizen compliance interactions. An increased understanding of the dynamics involved in these interactions will allow sociologists to provide policy advice to police that could save the lives of officers and citizens by preventing violence during such exchanges. Further, by understanding the social forces at work in officer/citizen interactions, sociologists can better understand social interactions of all types that involve participants with different levels of power, such as employers/employees or teachers/students.

This study sought to view officer/citizen interactions in a unique way. By utilizing the technology of cruiser mounted video systems, it was possible to assess officer/citizen compliance interactions without influencing the interaction in any way. Footage of interactions could be randomly sampled from a large population of data files and viewed in an efficient manner. Further, the same footage could be reviewed several times so that either qualitative or quantitative factors could be explored carefully.

The use of dashboard-mounted cameras in patrol cruisers has been growing throughout U. S. law enforcement agencies for well over a decade. However, as technology advances, from VHS or 8 mm tapes to digital systems, it is now a growing trend for agencies to possess a digital database of dash cam footage. This data base is easily accessible and contains high quality recordings of virtually all formal officer/citizen encounters that occur within view of the camera system.

The potential value of this new data source to sociology is quite profound. Social science researchers are forever caught between desires to view human behavior in its most natural setting, while minimizing the risk of altering that behavior due to the researcher's presence. A database of footage from cruiser-mounted video systems provides the best possible balance between the two concerns of the social science researcher. What is more, the technology has developed to the point where a random sample can be taken and viewed in a safe and convenient format.

I believe that examining footage from video databanks, such as dash-cam and other surveillance formats will prove to be a revolutionary new data source for social scientists. As our society increasingly utilizes Foucault's "panopticon," (Staples 2000) the resulting mountains of footage can be used not only by agents of social control, but also by social researchers seeking to understand the social interactions of those being surveyed. The databanks of footage will exist regardless of whether or not social scientists take advantage of them, but for now, the potential is unrealized for such information to be used to promote social understanding. If social scientists do not seek to develop this information resource, it will continue to be used as merely a tool of management and crime control.

The work of law enforcement is important for maintaining the safety of our communities. Law enforcement professionals and social scientists are constantly working to improve the tactics and strategies of law enforcement officers with the goal of increasing officer efficacy in their communities while improving officer safety. Examination of citizen responses to officer commands is a deep mine of information with

the potential to inform policy makers and law enforcement training personnel alike. This study seeks to conduct just this form of examination, adding to the literature of a crucial social interaction which has been sorely under-researched.

The administration of law enforcement agencies, no doubt, has numerous concerns regarding the potential criticisms and external interference which could result from widespread analysis of their cruiser-mounted camera footage databases. Prior to now, law enforcement has been able to maintain some degree of self-direction by asserting that outsiders cannot have a full understanding of the work of law enforcement unless they have been law enforcement officers themselves.

The possible concerns of law enforcement administrators are understandable. However, in order to attain the full potential benefits that could be wrought from systematic analysis of dashboard mounted video footage databases, law enforcement agencies and social scientists will have to work in union. Law enforcement trainers and administrators are more than qualified to assess dashcam footage for tactical and legal assessments of the work of their patrol officers. Yet, the theoretical and analytical techniques of the social scientist provide a depth of understanding of the interactions taking place which would be difficult for law enforcement agencies to acquire in other ways. A mutually beneficial relationship between these two fields could produce not only deeper theoretical understanding of officer/citizen interactions in particular, and unequal power relationship interactions in general, but practical insights which could improve the compliance eliciting techniques of officers, aiding their ability to serve the public safely and effectively.

Such a relationship will require a great deal of trust and professionalism on the part of all parties involved. Interactions between social science researchers and law enforcement officials are just as nuanced and dynamic as the officer/citizen compliance interactions that have been discussed here. Yet, the benefits to sociology, law enforcement, and the public, are far too precious to ignore.

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APPENDIX
CODING SHEET

Case Number _____

- ___ Kernersville PD traffic stop citation
- ___ Kernersville PD traffic stop warning
- ___ Kernersville PD traffic accident
- ___ Kernersville PD motorists assist
- ___ Kernersville PD DWI
- ___ Kernersville PD traffic stop felony
- ___ Kernersville PD use of force
- ___ Kernersville PD arrest (non-DWI)
- ___ Kernersville PD investigation
- ___ King PD A squad
- ___ King PD B squad
- ___ King PD C squad
- ___ King PD D squad
- ___ King PD unknown
- ___ Kernersville PD unknown
- ___ Other Specify: _____

Section A. Demographics :

(This section assumes visibility of those present in the interaction)

Primary Officer Characteristics

1. What Police Department does the primary officer work for?

- ___ King PD
- ___ Kernersville PD
- ___ Other

2. Gender ___ Male ___ Female

13. Does the primary citizen appear to speak/understand English fluently/easily?

- Yes
 No
 Unknown

Notes:

14. What is the approximate monetary value of the vehicle, if any, being occupied by the primary citizen during the interaction?

- No vehicle
 Low
 Low-Medium
 Medium
 High-Medium
 High
 Unknown

Secondary Officers and Citizens

15. How many secondary officers were present in the interaction?

- 0
 1
 2
 3-5
 >5
 Unknown

16. How many secondary citizens were present in the interaction?

- 0
 1
 2
 3-5
 >5
 Unknown
-

Section B: Description of Citizen/Officer Encounter

17. What initiates the officer/citizen interaction?

- Officer-initiated investigation
- Primary citizen request for law enforcement
- Secondary citizen request for law enforcement
- Third party request for law enforcement
- Unknown
- Other, specify: _____

18. What crime or conduct is under investigation? (check all that apply)

- Speeding offense
- Miscellaneous Traffic offense
- City ordinance violation
- DWI
- Misdemeanor offense, specify: _____
- Felony offense, specify: _____
- Unknown
- Other, specify: _____

19. What is the disposition of officer/citizen interaction?

- Information given
- Verbal warning given
- Written warning given
- Citation issued
- Arrest made
- Other, specify: _____

Notes:

(for the following question use scale 1-10 with 1 representing complete voluntary compliance and 10 representing a complete failure to voluntarily comply)

24. To what degree did the primary citizen voluntarily comply with the verbal commands of the officers present? _____

Notes:

25. How did the voluntary compliance of the primary citizen change over the course of the interaction?

26. What approach, if any, were employed by officer(s) to elicit voluntary compliance? (check all that apply)

- Encouragement
 Intimidation
 Overt threat
 Humor
 None
 Other, specify: _____

Notes:

27. In what ways, if any, did the primary officer's methods of eliciting voluntary compliance change over the course of the interaction?

Section C. Injury and Violence

28. Did the officer(s) arrive at an already violent situation? Yes
 No
 Unknown

Notes:

29. Did the interaction become violent? Yes
 No
 Unknown

Notes:

Officer(s)

30. Did the officer(s) grip/place hands on any weapon(s)? Yes
 No
Type: _____

Notes:

31. Did the officer(s) brandish any weapon(s)? Yes
 No
Type: _____

32. Did officer(s) use force? Yes No

Notes:

33. Did officer(s) meet with physical resistance? Yes No

Notes:

Primary Citizen

34. Did the primary citizen make an overt threat to use force? Yes No

Notes:

35. Did the primary citizen brandish any weapon(s)? Yes
 No
Type: _____

36. Did the primary citizen use force? Yes No

Notes:

Secondary Citizen(s)

37. Did any secondary citizen(s) make an overt threat to use force?
 Yes
 No
 N/A

Notes:

38. Did any secondary citizen(s) brandish any weapon(s)? Yes
 No
 Type: _____

39. Did any secondary citizen(s) use force? Yes
 No

Notes:

Section E: **Social Interactionist Perspective****Normative Variables**Respect

40. How do officer(s) treat the citizen(s)? Respect
 Neutral
 Disrespect
 Unknown

Notes:

41. Do the officer(s) refer to the citizen(s) by a title? (ex. Mr./Ms., Sir/Ma'am)

- Yes
- No
- Unknown

Notes:

Prior Knowledge

42. Is there any indication that officer(s) have past experience with or knowledge of the primary citizen?

- Yes
- No
- Unknown

Notes:

Officer Skills

43. Does the primary officer utilize verbal judo interaction techniques?

- Yes
- No
- Unknown

Notes:

Evidence Strength

44. Does the primary officer observe a violation of law by the primary citizen?

Yes

No

Unknown

Notes:

45. Does the primary officer obtain physical evidence (to include radar readings) implicating the citizen in a violation of law?

Yes

No

Unknown

Notes:

46. Does the primary citizen give a confession of a violation of law in the presence of the officer(s)?

Yes

No

Unknown

Notes:

Instrumental*irrationality*

47. Was the primary officer notably emotional during the interaction?

- Yes
- No
- Unknown

Notes:

48. Was the primary citizen notably emotional during the interaction?

- Yes
- No
- Unknown

Notes:

49. What, if any, was the level of impairment, due to substances, of the primary citizen?

- None
- Slight
- Moderate
- High
- Unknown

Notes:

Problem seriousness

50. How serious is the problem under investigation?
- Traffic
 Minor offense
 Drugs
 Serious
 Unknown

Notes:

Section F: Judgmental Heuristics*authority*

51. What type of clothing is being worn by the primary officer?
- Class A uniform
 Class B uniform
 Plain cloths
 Other, specify: _____

Notes:

52. What is the state of the primary officer's clothing.
- Tidy
 Unkempt
 Other, specify: _____

Notes:

57. Do officer(s) inform citizen(s) of the crime under investigation?

- Yes
- No
- Unknown

Notes:

reproportion

58. Does the officer(s) provide the citizen with an form of assistance/service during the interaction? (check all that apply)

- officer(s) notify the citizen of a mechanical problem with the citizen's car
- officer(s) give the citizen navigational directions
- officer(s) give the citizen advice on what to do at his/her court date
- officer(s) inform the citizen that charges against him/her will be reduced
- officer(s) provide other form of assistance/service to the citizen
- officer(s) provide no assistance/service to the citizen

Notes:

59. Do officer(s) make any concession at the request of citizen(s)?

- Yes
- No
- Unknown

Notes:

consistency

60. Does the officer begin the exchange by first asking the citizen for license/registration? Yes
 No

Notes:

61. Does the citizen comply with this initial command? Yes
 No
 N/A

Notes:

62. Does the officer begin the exchange by first asking for a citizen to come over to where the officer is to talk with him/her? Yes
 No

Notes:

63. Does the citizen comply with this initial command? Yes
 No
 N/A

Notes:

64. Does the officer begin the exchange by first asking for some other minor act of compliance?

Yes
 No
 N/A

Notes:

65. Does the citizen comply with this/these initial command(s)?

Yes
 No
 N/A

Notes:

Conformity

66. Do secondary officer(s) comply with the commands, if any, of the primary officer while in the presence of citizens?

Yes
 No
 N/A
 Unknown

Notes:

liking

67. Does an officers advocate leniency for the citizen in the presence of the citizen?

Yes
 No
 Unknown

Notes:

Section G: Miscellaneous

68. How does the primary citizen treat the officer(s)?
- Respect
 Neutral
 Disrespect
 Unknown

Notes:

69. Does the primary citizen refer to officer(s) by a title? (ex. Mr./Ms., Sir/Ma'am)

Yes
 No
 Unknown

Notes:

70. Does an officer ever notify the primary citizen that the interaction is being recorded?

Yes
 No
 Unknown

Notes:

71. Are there any Dramatological issues which are observable in this compliance interaction?