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Spruille Braden is an enigmatic figure who has not been widely studied by historians. In fact no serious studies have appeared on the analysis of his career. Braden's Memoirs are available to the public; however, they must be read cautiously. The Memoirs contain no documentation and its veracity should, unfortunately, be questioned often. Perhaps part of the problem involves the fact that the author published the Memoirs in his seventy-seventh year. Despite this handicap there is a plentiful supply of primary sources by Braden which are readily accessible.

Braden was a very flamboyant ambassador in the 1930's and 1940's. He built the reputation of being tough, dedicated, intelligent and hard working. He also proved to be an invaluable asset to his country in the years before and during World War II. Braden was considered a liberal and a progressive and a strong advocate of Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy. Braden served his last ambassadorship in Argentina in 1945. It lasted nearly five months after which he was brought to Washington and made Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs. While in the capital Braden became more and more a virtual anonymous figure in the State Department. After less than two years at this post he resigned; his robust pride would not

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allow him to continue in such a role. Braden spent the following years reacting against what he felt was a communist conspiracy against him emanating from the State Department. Over the coming years he evolved into an arch-conservative which gave rise to his enigmatic character.

The purpose of this monograph is to show what caused Braden's transition from left to right. His speeches and his career are thoroughly analyzed so as to discover the salients that comprise the clues to the unraveling of his nature.

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SPRUILLE BRADEN: SLAYER OF DRAGONS

RIGHT AND LEFT

by

Michael George Theodorakis

A Thesis Submitted to  
the Faculty of the Graduate School at  
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Approved by

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## CHAPTER I

### SPRUILLE BRADEN: AN INTRODUCTION

Spruille Braden served in the United States State Department from 1933 through 1947. During most of those 14 years he carried the credentials of ambassador to various Latin American republics. Braden proved during those years to be a champion of Democracy and a battler against fascism. He was also a proponent of Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy in the years before and during World War II. In those years he had the reputation of being a progressive and a liberal, but then in 1945 he went to Washington to become Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American affairs. In less than two years he was to resign from the State Department bitter and totally disillusioned. He was to spend much of his remaining life reacting against the unhappy time he spent in Washington. He became an arch-conservative and abandoned many of his political beliefs of previous years. The goal of this project is to explain Braden's evolution from liberal to conservative.

There has been only one book written about Spruille Braden. Diplomats and Demagogues is the memoirs of the former ambassador. Although it is used extensively herein, it is not a totally reliable source in that there are many notable omissions in its text. These omissions speak poignantly of Braden more so than all the material that is included; for in his memoirs Braden likes to dwell on the

happier times. It is because of this the memoirs are not very valuable but they are widely used to fill in information gaps. Other sources of information include the New York Times which has nearly 400 articles on Braden. The rest of the source material is derived from magazines, journals, history books and United States documents. Forty-five of these sources are speeches or articles written by Spruille Braden which comprise one-third of the total number. In a monograph whose purpose is to trace the ideological dynamics that caused Braden's transition from left to right it is essential that one rely on the man's thoughts and words. In this respect there is an abundance of primary sources.

Spruille Braden was born March 13, 1894, in a log cabin at a mining camp in Elkhorn, Montana. William and Mary Braden had been in Elkhorn in connection with William Braden's profession of mining engineer. Spruille was to spend his early years following his parents from Elkhorn to New York City to Mexico and then St. Catherines, Ontario, where at the age of nine Spruille first went to school. A year later the Bradens moved to Santiago, Chile. William Braden had acquired a small fortune in the years since Spruille's birth. He was to make a greater fortune mining copper in Chile.

In 1910 at the age of 16 Spruille Braden qualified to enter the Sheffield Scientific School at Yale University;

in 1914 he graduated with a Ph.B. in mine engineering. During his junior and senior years at Yale, Braden distinguished himself as an all-American goalie on the water polo team. Incidentally a teammate of his was the poet Archibald MacLeish. After graduation Spruille returned to Chile to work with his father. He had gained practical experience from his father before he entered Yale and during summers<sup>1</sup> which he spent at the mines away from school.

Soon after returning to Chile Braden went to work for the Andes Exploration Company which had been formed by the Anaconda Company and William Braden in order to locate, acquire and develop untapped sources of ore. He began as an engineer and assistant general manager and in 1916 ascended to acting manager. He also held the same position for the Santiago Mining Company and during World War I was the President of the Red Cross Society of Chile. He also<sup>2</sup> was to become president of the American Society of Chile.

In 1921 as President and Director of the Bolivia-Argentina Exploration Company the 27-year-old Braden negotiated for and contracted to buy 5,320,000 acres of Bolivian land for the purpose of drilling for oil. In acquiring the Bolivian land for his company he revealed that British and German interests gave him stiff competition in the negotiations<sup>3</sup> for "perhaps one of the highest grades of oil ever found." Later in 1921, Standard Oil of New Jersey acquired the oil<sup>4</sup> fields from the Bradens. This coup by the young Braden



was preceded by a few days with another financial prize in competition with Germany over the electrification of the Chilean railroad system. The entire operation would cost \$10,000,000 and the contract was secured by Spruille Braden with Messrs. Errazuriz, Simpson and Company for Westinghouse Electric International Company, who would be responsible for the electrification of the railroad. This contract according to Braden represented the largest "railroad electrification contract in the world since the beginning of the war in 1914."<sup>5</sup>

Braden made a fortune in Latin America during the years after 1918. He received many commissions as financial advisor to several Latin American countries besides the commissions he received from the mining and exploration companies.

Braden next came to the United States and purchased control of the Monmouth Rug Mills in New Jersey and made changes that developed it into a lucrative business. He was also to become an official in several large companies. In 1920 he was asked to become a delegate to the second Pan-American financial conference because of his knowledge of things monetary. In 1932 he established the Rehabilitation Corporation which assisted potentially profitable enterprises.<sup>6</sup>

By the time Spruille Braden arrived in the United States he was probably a millionaire. In October of 1922, one year



after the conclusion of the Bolivian oil field transaction, Braden and his wife Maria (Braden met and married Maria Humeres Solar in Chile in 1915) moved into the Stonehurst estate, just outside New York City, after Spruille purchased it for \$200,000.<sup>7</sup> Braden was to continue to be a successful businessman until after the crash of 1929. Braden remained, relatively speaking, politically unaware until the age of 30. In the election of 1924 he voted Democratic for the first time, although he was a registered Republican. He explained his lack of political awareness with the statement: "Like<sup>8</sup> most young people, I had inherited my party affiliation." It was not until the election of 1928 that Braden registered as a Democrat. At this point he could delineate accurately the party whose principles most closely resembled his own sentiments. In 1928 Braden voted for Al Smith and publicly expressed his reasons. He listed ten, the most significant of which was Smith's stand as an anti-prohibitionist since<sup>9</sup> prohibition only led to an increase in crime.

In 1931 Braden returned to Chile for a visit during a time when revolution was a palpable threat. He was questioned as to the possibility that Chile might become communistic. He answered: "There is no danger of Chile going Communist, and even if by some combination of circumstances a soviet government should be set up as a result of the present disturbances, it could not last."<sup>10</sup> He went on to point out that there was little class difference in Chile,

that there had been a significant leveling off. He then naively gave an example of the closeness of the classes. "Where there used to be many beautiful cars, on this trip I saw only one old Rolls-Royce."<sup>11</sup> At a time of depression, such as existed in Chile, everyone suffers but to peasants even an old Rolls-Royce would be a symbol of the real difference in the classes. As late as 1945 Braden would admit to ignorance about Communism. After 1947 he would over-compensate for that ignorance.

William and Spruille Braden had invested heavily in the stock market but anticipated the crash and sold a good deal of their stocks before it actually occurred and were saved from losing everything; however, they re-invested in the market prematurely, after which the value of their stocks plummeted and they barely escaped bankruptcy. The Bradens were not totally ruined; they both possessed exceptional financial expertise and their services were in demand so they got by without further difficulty.<sup>12</sup> Spruille Braden was not tied to any obligations and so welcomed an interesting change. The change came early in 1933.

## Chapter I--Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>Spruille Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues: The Memoirs of Spruille Braden (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1971), pp. 1-24; hereafter cited as Memoirs.

<sup>2</sup>"Spruille Braden," Current Biography: Who's News and Why, 1945 (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1946), p. 71.

<sup>3</sup>"Americans Acquire Bolivia Oil Lands," New York Times, Oct. 4, 1921, p. 21.

<sup>4</sup>Leslie B. Rout, Jr., Politics of the Chaco Peace Conference: 1935-1939 (Austin, Texas: The University of Texas Press, 1970), p. 46.

<sup>5</sup>"Americans Acquire Bolivia Oil Lands," p. 21.

<sup>6</sup>"Spruille Braden," p. 71.

<sup>7</sup>"Mining Engineer Buys Perkins Country Home," New York Times, Oct. 11, 1922, p. 21.

<sup>8</sup>Memoirs, p. 95.

<sup>9</sup>"Three More Shift Support to Smith," New York Times, Sept. 14, 1928, p. 4.

<sup>10</sup>"Thinks Chile Safe from Reds Control," New York Times, Sept. 6, 1931, p. 9.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Memoirs, pp. 87-88.

CHAPTER II  
MONTEVIDEO TO BUENOS AIRES:  
AN AMBASSADORIAL CAREER BEGINS

Early in the year 1933, Spruille Braden pondered new beginnings. He casually asked a dinner guest what he should do next. The dinner guest, Benjamin Cohen, was the United States Charge d'Affairs to Chile. Cohen suggested to Braden he try diplomacy and offered that the embassy in Chile was now vacant. Spruille and Maria Braden waxed enthusiastic as Maria was a native of Chile. Braden had several friends who were advisors to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. He spoke to them and they were supportive of the idea. Homer Cummings and William Woodin spoke to the President and to Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State. The President had been reminded that Braden had made a notable contribution to his 1928 campaign. Woodin and Cummings informed the President and Secretary of State of Braden's ability and background in Latin American affairs and more particularly with his close ties to Chile. The President was suitably impressed and promised the Chilean embassy to Braden. Braden was amazed as to how such things came about; but if Braden was awed by the manner in which he seemed to have become a diplomat he must have been equally dismayed a few weeks later when he received a telephone call saying

that he was out as ambassador to Chile. As it turned out political patronage cost Braden the post. Vice President John Nance Garner owed a political favor in his native state of Texas and thus Henry Sevier became ambassador to Chile.

A few months later Braden received a far more realistic appointment for a beginning diplomat. He was selected to be a delegate to the Seventh International Conference of American States which would be held in Montevideo, Uruguay.<sup>1</sup> What was known as the Montevideo Conference would meet from December 3 to December 23, 1933. The American delegation was led by Cordell Hull. There were many issues to be presented and debated. Some of the more noteworthy issues involved Cordell Hull's explanation of the new administration's policy called the "Good Neighbor."<sup>2</sup> The Pan American republics sought and exacted a non-interventionist promise from the United States in regard to Latin American affairs.<sup>3</sup> And toward the close of the three-week conference Spruille Braden delivered a speech at the personal request of President Roosevelt. It concerned the President's preparations to abandon gold as the standard for American dollars.<sup>4</sup> In his memoirs, Braden stated he sided with the President on the gold issue though he later changed his mind: "I had been so impressed by the spectacle of values wiped out during the depression that I fell for the idea of substituting government monetary controls for the automatic braking effect of the gold standard....The President decided I should make the



speech. It had a remarkably soothing effect on the assembled delegations, and I was vindicated. Today I am thoroughly ashamed of that speech. I believe the abandonment of the gold standard was morally wrong. It was an economic blunder that deprived the American people of their right to a redeemable currency, something strongly opposed by the Socialists and Communists."<sup>5</sup> At this point Braden makes an ominous comment concerning the more recent past and written from the perspective of 1971. "Yet today supposedly responsible bankers oppose our return to the gold standard and even advocate doing away with our gold certificate reserve."<sup>6</sup>

According to Braden the most notable result of the Montevideo Conference was the improving, on the whole, of inter-American relations. He attributes a great deal of this success to the efforts of Cordell Hull. Hull's attitude revealed an honest, sincere and friendly person to Latin Americans and this attitude went a long way in creating a freer trade among Western Hemisphere nations. Had he tried to reduce tariffs unilaterally back home he most certainly would have met with defeat. But the mandate Hull received at the Seventh Inter-American Conference indicated a hemispheric willingness to reduce protective tariffs, thus making<sup>7</sup> his task back in the states more palatable to the Congress.

While in Montevideo Hull had to deal with Carlos Saavedra Lamas who was expected to make things difficult for the American delegation from his post of Minister of

Foreign Affairs for Argentina. Argentina's main export was beef, a product which traveled almost exclusively to Great Britain. The Argentines felt no great need to ingratiate themselves with the Americans and so were expected to be troublesome.<sup>8</sup> Saavedra Lamas was a vain and ambitious man but he also had ability, a necessary complement for the other two characteristics. As expected, when the conference convened the Argentine minister began to be troublesome. Hull approached him and offered a bargain. In return for Saavedra Lamas' supporting Hull's programs, the Secretary of State would endorse his anti-war pact and back him in seeking an end to hostilities between Paraguay and Bolivia in the contesting of the land known as the Chaco Boreal. The bargain was made and Argentina ceased to be a thorn in the side of the United States delegation.

Braden said that the anti-war pact lacked originality. He cited the Gondra treaty which was ratified at the Inter-American Conference at Santiago, Chile, in 1923 and the Kellogg Pact of 1928 as having precedence in such matters. Saavedra Lamas' lack of originality kept several nations from endorsing the pact calling it "silly." But Hull saw the advantage that might be gained by endorsing the redundant pact. He exchanged his support of the innocuous anti-war pact for the acceptance of a meaningful commercial policy for the hemisphere.<sup>9</sup> Ironically, the anti-war pact was a contributory factor in Saavedra Lamas' winning the Nobel peace prize a few years later.



The Chaco dispute was an issue worthy of immediate concern and settlement. The conflict between Paraguay and Bolivia lay over the Chaco Boreal. Efforts to settle the dispute began in 1879. From 1887 through 1927 four major efforts at arbitration were made, all ending in failure. In 1932 a bloody, savage and costly war broke out between the disputants. Most of Latin America wanted a cessation of hostilities.<sup>10</sup> When Argentina, through the person of Saavedra Lamas sought, through the auspices of the Pan American Conference, a final settlement between the two countries, it was not entirely for selfless purposes. Argentina was the primary foreign investor in Paraguayan properties; thus Saavedra Lamas was not exactly pleading the altruistic concerns of Argentina at Montevideo. Before the Montevideo Conference came to an end the member nations arranged an 18-day cease-fire between Paraguay and Bolivia. Fighting was to resume and continue for another year and a half. The conference closed on December 26, three days<sup>11</sup> later than planned, and the outcome was termed a success.

In 1934 Spruille Braden remained fairly inactive in State Department work. Braden was named a delegate to the twenty-first National Foreign Trade Convention which was held in New York City from October 13 through November 2, 1934. He spoke on the topic "Inter-American Commercial<sup>12</sup> Arbitration: A Working Plan." In his speech Braden pointed out that international relations had become more involved with trade and finance at the expense of the

formerly predominant political issues. He went on to say: "The misunderstandings and disputes now prevailing between the peoples of the world largely will be found to grow out of matters relating to trade and finance."<sup>13</sup> Making a settlement of a commercial claim involving the laws of two nations could prove to be lengthy and costly. As an alternative to the legal approach, Braden offered the standardization of arbitration law throughout the hemisphere. He pointed out that an interest in international arbitration, within the hemisphere, had a long history, citing the first Pan American Conference in 1826 and the first Pan American Financial Congress in 1915.

The outstanding feature of Inter-American arbitration would be that the parties who undertook to go through the process would waive the right of appeal and the arbiter's decision would be binding. This would eliminate the need for contesting an unpopular decision, on the behalf of one party within the courts, which would only serve to destroy the original intent of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission's goal of a speedy and fair justice.

Braden proudly added that although the arbitration commission does not officially belong within the auspices of the United States Department of State, it is consistent with the President and Secretary of State's program of the Good Neighbor Policy. Before the end of Braden's speech he urged that the nations of South, Central and North America

impress upon the businessmen of their countries to include the "arbitration clause" within all written contracts.

Braden's address in New York City in 1934 would not be his last encounter with commercial arbitration.<sup>14</sup>

The next year, 1935, proved to be a very busy one for Spruille Braden, particularly the last two-thirds of the year. The Pan American Commercial Conference was to meet in Buenos Aires on May 6. Braden was to be second in command of the American delegation. Unofficially, he was the de facto leader. Alexander Weddell as ambassador to Argentina had to be named delegation chairman. Weddell knew little about commerce and less about Spanish. He was glad to let Braden have the controls since he would have to deal with Carlos Saavedra Lamas, the Argentine Foreign Minister.

The Pan American Commercial Conference proved very successful. It ran from May 6 through June 29, 1935. During that time more than 50 issues became resolutions or agreements; some of greater and some of lesser importance. One important issue concerned the defining of "immigrant." When the topic came up Braden said: "This word is defined by law in the United States, and we will accept no other definition."<sup>15</sup> Braden asked for and received permission to translate into Spanish the United States version of "immigrant." When it was time to decide the definition the delegates were at a loss. Braden suggested that they first try to decide what an immigrant is not. The idea worked, with the prompting of Braden. When they at last finished defining

"immigrant" they were unaware that they had recorded a<sup>16</sup> verbatim translation of the United States law. Thus Braden related some of the goings on at the conference.

Perhaps the most important speech delivered at the conference was on the occasion when Braden delivered the closing talk. He noted in his speech that over the years many fine agreements and resolutions had been made at Pan American conferences but that when delegates returned to their various countries they forgot them or never impressed their importance on their governments in order to ratify them. He charged the delegates to return to their countries and see to it that the work done at the conference was not in vain. They applauded him heartily.<sup>17</sup>

After the conference officially closed Spruille and Maria Braden went to Chile for a vacation. It was their second trip there in recent years. They had gone to Maria Braden's native land after the close of the conference at Montevideo. On that occasion Braden received the Grand<sup>18</sup> Cross, Chile's highest decoration, while in Santiago. This most recent visit found Braden delivering a speech in which he explained President Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy. He stressed that the policy was designed to erase some of the resentment that existed among Latins for North Americans.<sup>19</sup>

Maria and Spruille Braden sailed for home. Unbeknownst to them they would be back in Buenos Aires before the year

was out and Spruille Braden would be faced with the most difficult task of his diplomatic career.



## Chapter II--Footnotes

- <sup>1</sup>Memoirs, pp. 96-98.
- <sup>2</sup>Jonathan Mitchell, "'Intra-Nationalism' at Montevideo," The Literary Digest, Dec. 2, 1933, p. 5.
- <sup>3</sup>Memoirs, p. 134.
- <sup>4</sup>"Braden Forecasts Commodity Dollar," New York Times, Dec. 22, 1933, p. 2.
- <sup>5</sup>Memoirs, p. 100.
- <sup>6</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 133.
- <sup>8</sup>Mitchell, p. 37.
- <sup>9</sup>Memoirs, pp. 133-134.
- <sup>10</sup>Spruille Braden, "Inter-American Commercial Arbitration and Goodwill," The Arbitration Journal, Oct. 1938, pp. 388-391.
- <sup>11</sup>Memoirs, pp. 134-135.
- <sup>12</sup>Spruille Braden, "Inter-American Commercial Arbitration: A Working Plan," Official Report of the Twenty-first National Foreign Trade Convention Held at New York, N. Y., Oct. 31, Nov. 1-2, 1934 (New York: National Foreign Trade Convention Headquarters, 1934), p. 306.
- <sup>13</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 307-313.
- <sup>15</sup>Memoirs, pp. 137, 138.
- <sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 139.
- <sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 142.
- <sup>18</sup>"Chile Decorates Spruille Braden," New York Times, Jan. 27, 1934, p. 6.

<sup>19</sup>"United States Amity Stressed to South Americans,"  
New York Times, July 16, 1935, p. 6.



## CHAPTER III

## THE CHACO PEACE CONFERENCE

On the same day Spruille Braden made his country's closing speech at the Pan-American Commercial Conference a major break occurred in the Chaco conflict. Both Paraguay and Bolivia agreed to meet at the bargaining table to seek a pacific solution to their disputes. The agreement was known as the Protocol of June 12, 1935. One of the stipulations of the Protocol provided for Argentina to act as host country for the peace talks. Besides Paraguay and Bolivia six mediating powers would also gather in Argentina; they were to be the United States, Uruguay, Brazil, Peru, Chile and Argentina. The news that the peace talks would begin there, in Buenos Aires, on July 1, brought cheers from the assembled delegates at the Commercial Conference.

After returning to the United States Spruille Braden sought out the Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles in Washington, D. C. When Braden found him the Under Secretary was enthusiastic that Braden should become the next ambassador to Peru. He stated that the President and Cordell Hull were anxious that he should accept. Without qualification Braden said he would accept. Welles said that there might be a delay of a few weeks, but he would

get in touch with him as soon as he knew something definite. Several weeks went by and Braden returned to Washington. By now it was early September and he had not heard from Welles. On his return to the capital Braden was told that Secretary Hull was trying to locate him in New York. The next day Braden contacted Hull.

The Secretary revealed that problems were developing in the Chaco Peace Conference. From the beginning of the peace conference the United States ambassador to Brazil represented the United States at the bargaining table in Buenos Aires. Ambassador Hugh Gibson had had enough of the Chaco Peace Conference and was anxious to return to his embassy in Brazil. It was decided that Braden would succeed at that post. Braden was at first reluctant to accept the position but after speaking to Sumner Welles he became convinced of the importance of the task required of the United States ambassador-at-large in Buenos Aires. Welles showed Braden a draft of a letter, written by President Roosevelt, to be sent to the presidents of the Latin American republics. The President spoke of an impending war in Europe and that it was imperative that the Western Hemisphere remain isolated from European hostilities. Paramount to that end was a swift solution to the Chaco dispute.

Braden was already aware that Hitler was preparing for war. A friend of his had gone to a Krupp plant to inspect some turbines for the power company for which he was chief

engineer. He had been a World War I artillery officer. As he walked through the Krupp plant his trained eye recognized parts of weaponry that by their numbers indicated a massive arms build-up. The rest was obvious; Ger-<sup>1</sup>many was preparing for war.

In 1946 Spruille Braden published an article titled "The Germans in Argentina." Braden gathered much of the information from a source discovered in 1941. In it Braden quoted a German professor, Walter Sievers of Giessen University:

If the German empire proposes to reconquer the position of a ruling power in the world...then let its aim be to acquire a decisive influence in the region where such influence is still possible, namely, in South America, and this is not merely by occupying territory... but by forming there a base of operations, of a financial, politico-commercial, industrial and even--in case of necessity--military nature, for the State of South America, against the increasing avidity of the United States.<sup>2</sup>

Braden pointed out that Germans had been in South America for over a hundred years and that they had already betrayed some of the characteristics suggested by Professor Sievers in 1917. He cited the Argentine President Domingo Sarmiento who said in 1882 that he was wary of the German settlers who were gaining a foothold in southern Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. He feared that one day they would be powerful and they would feel no love or obligation to their South American home but would remain true to the Fatherland.<sup>3</sup>

Braden went on to show that in more recent years the network of German influence had increased to include Chile, the foothills of the Andes, Bolivia and the area of the Chaco. It is interesting that the Chaco war broke out at about the time Hitler brought National Socialism into ascendancy in Germany. According to the plan of the European fascists, the Chaco Peace Conference was to be a failure. Italian and German diplomats busied themselves with efforts to destroy the conference, using ridicule to demoralize the peacemakers. Hostilities came close to being renewed as the conference made little progress for long stretches of time but finally the Chaco problem was arbitrated. In Braden's words: "a disastrous general conflict had been avoided, the kind of war Germany had hoped would send the hemisphere asunder and make impossible the nearly united front with which she was later faced."

Before Braden made a decision as to whether or not he should go to the Chaco Peace Conference, he spoke to friends among the press and within the State Department. Their consensus was that the conference was near dissolution and the resumption of the war imminent. These were not encouraging words but Sumner Welles and Maria Braden appealed to his pride and said in effect that if anyone could save the conference it was he. They also reminded him that he could best deal with Saavedra Lamas. Braden finally accepted. He had been properly flattered and his salary was an added

inducement. In fact Braden called himself the "second<sup>5</sup> highest-paid employee of the United States government." Before departing for Argentina Braden felt the need to go to Washington and get thoroughly briefed on the history of the Chaco dispute. He would not leave until he had a complete knowledge of the situation, despite the protestations<sup>6</sup> of Welles and Hull.

Braden had learned that the Chaco dispute was one that concerned the delineation of the boundaries between Paraguay and Bolivia at the point where they met, that being the Chaco Boreal. Both countries had claimed the Chaco since colonial times when the Spanish kings on different occasions granted the Chaco Boreal to both Paraguay and Bolivia. Despite this early lack of certainty as to whom the Chaco belonged it was not a serious topic of contention. Bolivia's interests lay in the Pacific where she had a port in what is now the coast of Chile, and the aristocratic character of the Bolivian government cared little for the diverse ethnicity of her peoples, which resulted in natives on the borders seeking to be incorporated within the frontiers of neighboring countries. During this period, from about 1825-1885, much of Bolivian soil was ceded to the surrounding countries. The biggest loss to Bolivia came in 1884 when she lost her only port and entire coastline to Chile. Prior to this tremendous loss, Paraguay and Argentina, in 1852, signed a treaty guaranteeing both banks of the navigable



Rio Paraguay to Paraguay. Bolivia protested claiming riparian rights to the bordering west bank but to no avail. Between 1865 and 1870 Paraguay was engaged in war with Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Bolivia remained idle as she was assured by the Triple Alliance that she could keep the west bank of the Paraguay River which she still claimed as her own. When the war ended, with Paraguay defeated, Bolivia sought to force her claims further. She wanted the allies to sanction her precedence in the Chaco. They would not have this. Instead the Chaco was divided into three parts by Argentina and the defeated Paraguay. Negotiations concerning the proper division of the Chaco broke down. Both countries appealed to Rutherford B. Hayes, President of the United States, to arbitrate the issue. Hayes ruled that Paraguay was legally entitled to the area in dispute. Bolivia would never accept the Washington decision, as she had no part in the arbitration, nor were her legal claims even heard.

In 1879 there was a mutual effort between Paraguay and Bolivia to reach an accord beneficial to both, but it proved an abortive effort as the Paraguayan Congress defeated the treaty. By 1885 Paraguay was in desperate need of capital; so she began the sale of public lands including land in the Chaco. As things turned out most of the area acquired went to Argentina. In 1886 an effort was made to ratify the treaty that had tacitly been agreed to in 1879. Dr. Isaac

Tamayo of Bolivia and Dr. Benjamin Aceval of Paraguay met to see if an amicable treaty might be finalized between the two countries. The two foreign ministers signed a treaty on February 16, 1887. It divided the land of the right bank of the Paraguay River into three areas, one belonging to Bolivia, one to Paraguay and the third to be arbitrated by King Leopold II of Belgium. The treaty went a full year without being ratified by either country. The time limit was extended for nine months; finally, Bolivia ratified it but Paraguay would not and the treaty failed.

On January 12, 1907 the Pinilla Soler Protocol was signed. Under its terms, the President of Argentina was to arbitrate the zones of division within Paraguay. He declined, however, due to the fact that Bolivia and Argentina had a temporary rupture of diplomatic relations. The failure of this effort to sign a workable treaty was due to the lack of preparedness or even a preliminary consensus among the ministers as to the essence of the treaty. Before the term could expire without an agreement the Moreno-Mujía Protocol extended the time limit for framing a treaty to July 28, 1916. Two subsequent Moreno-Mujía protocols were needed, lasting until 1919. Just as the others, they proved to be failures. The last failure came with the Gutiérrez-Díaz León Protocol which was signed on April 22, 1927. This protocol came to an end on June 28, 1928, without deciding the terms for either arbitration or a direct agreement.



By the 1920's Bolivia was building small military posts known as fortines, which she used to encroach upon the Paraguayan Chaco. The Bolivian belief was that Paraguay was so poor and weak she wouldn't be able to resist effectively. In 1921 the Paraguayans started building fortines of their own in direct opposition to the Bolivian fortines. The Paraguayans were also in the process of colonizing on the exterior and thus their fortines served the dual purpose of preventing further encroachment and protecting her colonizing citizens.<sup>7</sup> The military pressure on the opposing frontiers eventually led to an armed skirmish in December of 1928. It was not until September 13, 1929, that this "Vanguardia Incident" was settled by the International Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration with a special Commission of Investigation. Actually the only thing that was really accomplished was the obtaining of a cease-fire. All efforts to get the belligerents to sign a treaty failed.

The Chaco War began in earnest in late summer of 1932. Bolivia initiated hostilities by seizing a Paraguayan fortín. Paraguay retaliated in kind. Both belligerents increased hostilities. Finally as both sides were mobilizing for war neutral republics tried to exact a 60-day truce. It failed and the Chaco War was on. Before it would come to a close 130,000 lives would be lost, all of them in an effort<sup>8</sup> to gain possession, for their countries, of the Chaco Boreal,

which consisted of great swamps and vast arid tracts that alternately flooded during seasonal tropical storms.<sup>9</sup>

The Protocol of June 12, 1935 brought hostilities to an end. It was not until July 1 that delegates from the six mediating powers and representatives of the former belligerents arrived in Buenos Aires and began the peace conference. Spruille Braden did not arrive until the fall of that year. He was to replace Hugh Gibson, the ambassador to Brazil, who was anxious to return to Rio de Janeiro and could afford but a little time to counsel Braden about the present situation and personalities at the Chaco Conference.

If there was an imminent danger to be averted it was that the conference might collapse, initiating the resumption of hostilities. Indications were that if the fighting was renewed there would be four belligerents involved instead of two. There was a belief that there was oil in the Chaco. Braden implied that this theory was promulgated by John Kenneth Galbraith. He went so far as to suggest that Standard Oil of New Jersey was financially backing Bolivia in the war effort and that Shell Oil was siding with Paraguay. Although Braden sold the Bolivian oil fields to Standard Oil, he denied that the Chaco War had its basis in petroleum speculation and was financed by oil companies. To date the Chaco has been found to be void of any significant oil deposits. Paraguay was being backed but not by Shell Oil. Her military benefactor was Argentina which

owned considerable property in Paraguay. On one occasion Argentina put \$10,000,000 worth of arms into Paraguay, as well as giving her arms throughout the war along with the use of Argentine military advisors. Chile, which borders both Argentina and Bolivia, sided with the bolivianos. President Alessandri of Chile addressed a letter to his Argentine counterpart Augustin P. Justo, to the effect that if peace did not come about soon, Argentina might be facing Chile in a widening conflagration. The letter was dated exactly five months prior to the date when the belligerents met at the peace table.

When Braden arrived at the dying Chaco Peace Conference the nations involved were aligned thus: Peru, Uruguay and the United States were essentially neutral, while Argentina supported Paraguay and Chile and Brazil leaned toward Bolivia. Brazil's support of Bolivia went back to a defensive agreement among Brazil, Chile and Bolivia, all of which bordered Argentina, and was meant to prevent the latter from any untoward ambitions. <sup>10</sup> It was Braden's task to reinvigorate the then pallid conference or settle for the option: chaos in the Western Hemisphere while Nazi Germany sped up an irreversible timetable.

Three weeks into 1936, a major victory for the peace conference was achieved with the signing of the Protocolized Act which extended the truce without a deadline and made provisions for the exchange of prisoners of war. It was

decided that each belligerent would pay the other for the maintenance and transportation of the prisoners. Paraguay benefitted greatly in this exchange. Paraguay paid an indemnity of 400,000 Argentine pesos while Bolivia paid 2,800,000 or a net gain to Paraguay of 2,400,000 Argentine pesos.

One of the articles of the Protocolized Act was a reiteration of the June 12 Protocol concerning the build-up of weapons along the Chaco. It was stated that neither belligerent could add in the number of weapons that it held "except for the amount indispensable for replacement."<sup>11</sup> A neutral military commission was formed to investigate and see if the article was being upheld. The methodology employed by the commission was suspect but their conclusion that Paraguay and Bolivia acted in accord with the provisions of the Protocol was received as good news. Apparently it was the news they wanted to hear, for their conclusions went unchallenged, lest something unpleasant be uncovered. The commission was still functioning when Bolivia began purchasing weapons from the United States. In June of 1936 an American and a Brazilian military observer were appointed by the Chaco Conference to investigate. They reported that both Paraguay and Bolivia had violated the Protocolized Act.

Spruille Braden was the first to state that it behooved the conference greatly to make certain that the belligerents remained true to their ratified agreements. As early as

February of 1936 he called for the investigation of arms shipments sent to either belligerent. He requested that the nations manufacturing and exporting arms to the countries in question keep the conference informed. Although Braden's idea would have provided an excellent check on the former belligerents, the suggestion was put aside.

The violations uncovered in June of 1936 went unpunished. This was due to the fact that Bolivia and Paraguay assured that they were strictly abiding by the tenets of the Chaco Peace Conference. Just as whistling in the dark is a prophylactic to danger, by some, so too these assurances were accepted and unbiased reports discarded. Sensing that the peace conference would do nothing should they discover hard evidence of an arms build-up both Paraguay and Bolivia blatantly proceeded to carry on an arms race. On July 12, 1937, the members of the peace conference decided they had had enough. They voted to investigate arms build-ups and troop movements of both countries. Before they could the Paraguayan delegation protested stating that Paraguay had never violated an article of the Protocolized Act. The members of the peace conference then reconsidered. Would pursuance of the investigation constitute an affront to the government of Paraguay? Would that nation withdraw from the conference? Worse, would fighting be renewed? The investigation was cancelled. Actually, Saavedra Lamas knew something that would have prolonged the investigation had he



informed the peace conference of what he knew. The president of the Paraguayan delegation, Juan Isidro Ramírez, had told him confidentially that Paraguayan troops near the Chaco numbered 10,000, twice the permitted total.<sup>12</sup>

During the years 1936 and 1937 there had been two revolutions in both Paraguay and Bolivia, which could have caused considerable trouble at the peace conference. Each new government wanted to repudiate the actions of their predecessors at Buenos Aires. Clearly, this could have led to chaos but it was made clear to each of them that requisite to their gaining diplomatic recognition was the honoring of commitments at the Chaco Peace Conference.

Late in 1936 the Maintenance of Peace Conference convened in Buenos Aires. Just prior to its opening Carlos Saavedra Lamas was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in getting Bolivia and Paraguay to the peace table. President Roosevelt suggested that the conference be held at Buenos Aires for the same reason he backed Saavedra Lamas for the Nobel Peace Prize. As Argentine foreign minister, Saavedra Lamas would be chairman of both conferences, thus adding to his esteem. The President hoped to placate the Argentine Foreign Minister by boosting his ego. The plan worked until Saavedra Lamas won the peace prize.

In his memoirs, Spruille Braden charged Saavedra Lamas with starting rumors about him. One rumor began to circulate in Paraguay concerning Braden's former interest in Bolivian

oil; it suggested that the interest was still there. The idea, it seemed to Braden, was that the Paraguayans should protest his presence at the Chaco Peace Conference. The rumors were traced to a new military attache, recently from Argentina. Braden said that nothing came of it as he "had the confidence of the Paraguayan delegation." Braden alleges that Saavedra Lamas made other efforts to spread damaging rumors about him but ceased his machinations when they all proved failures.<sup>13</sup>

A dramatic change occurred in the conference in February of 1938. The newly elected president of Argentina, Roberto Ortiz, removed Saavedra Lamas as Argentine Foreign Minister. He was replaced with Jose Luis Cantilo, a man generally believed to be more agreeable to work with than was his predecessor. In May 1938, Spruille Braden suggested to the peace conference that they send committees, formed of delegates, to Paraguay and Bolivia. He wanted to reproduce the psychological conditions that existed when the June 12 Protocol was agreed upon. Braden was to travel to the Bolivian capitol of La Paz accompanied by Manini Rios, who headed the Uruguayan delegation, and Orlando Leite Ribeiro, a Brazilian delegate. The committee Braden headed would be in audience with the government headed by German Busch, who was the only military hero for the Bolivians in the disastrous war. President Busch staffed his cabinet with members of his military junta. The foreign minister was a civilian

diplomat but unfortunately was terrified of his military colleagues and proved to be tight-lipped with information, and the military men proved laconic. Braden decided he would stir some excitement. He stated that he had learned from various sources that the Bolivian government had, within five months, purchased twelve to fifteen million dollars worth of military equipment. Colonel Olmos, the Bolivian Minister of War, responded in a surprising manner; he told Braden that his information was correct except that his total was short by ten million dollars. He continued, saying that the initial setback suffered by the Bolivians was due to German generals who were employed in guiding Bolivian fortunes. Bolivia, he said, was remiss in that it had not bothered to chart the Chaco Boreal and had no knowledge where the precious waterholes were located. He went on to say that Bolivia had corrected her mistakes.

Braden and the other delegates could see what was happening, "the Bolivians were ready to defeat the Paraguayans, and wanted no part of any peace treaty. They were going back to war."<sup>14</sup> Braden rhetorically asked if they were blatantly disregarding their country's pledge to seek peace. He accused them of a breach of faith and charged them with "flagrantly violating your country's pledged word in the Protocol and the Protocolized Act....I want you to know that my government will consider that an unfriendly act." Braden went on to commit all the mediatory powers and the rest of

Latin America in his bluff. His gamble paid off and the Bolivian junta capitulated, agreeing to continue negotiations.<sup>15</sup>

Near the end of June, Bolivia felt certain that the peace conference would fail. Bolivia began to make further preparations for war. On July 2, President Busch called for a national mobilization and Bolivian troops were sent into the Chaco, perhaps with the idea of intimidating Paraguay. The situation at this point was very tense, and for more than one reason. Not only was Bolivia prepared and aligned for war, but Germany had annexed Austria. The Anschluss was complete in March, 1938. The war that seemed inevitable in Europe, since the rise of Hitler, was now approaching palpable reality. The Latin America that the National Socialists wanted in a state of confusion was now<sup>16</sup> on the verge of just that.

The Bolivian movement into the Chaco caused a lot of anxiety in Buenos Aires. Braden cites the Paraguayan delegation as being difficult to deal with, particularly since they had the most to lose, having made the greater gains in the Chaco. Geronimo Zubizarreta was the president of the Paraguayan delegation. Braden described him as having integrity but said he was very stubborn. The recent Bolivian action caused a lot of pressure to be put upon Zubizarreta. One day during the crisis Braden received a telephone call from Dr. Efraim Cardozo of the Paraguayan

delegation. He said he wanted to meet with Braden and Zubizaretta later in the day. When Braden arrived he was presented with a memorandum. Braden was elated. He said of it: "essentially it was the treaty of peace."<sup>17</sup> Zubizaretta had written the draft; incorporated within it were the ideas the mediators had been trying to get across. Cardozo and Zubizaretta authorized the United States ambassador to continue negotiations using the memorandum as a guideline; but he must tell no one of it. Braden protested. He must tell the State Department and he had to tell Diez de Medina, the Bolivian foreign minister with whom he would have to work closely. They agreed but disapproved of his telling José María Cantilo, the chairman of the Peace Conference; apparently they distrusted him, but they relented slightly and allowed Braden to inform Argentine President Ortiz.

Braden immediately went to speak to the President. The President read the memorandum and expressed his feelings that the draft was doomed to failure. Braden insisted that it would work and after considerable persuasion Ortiz came to see things as Braden did. Ortiz went further saying, "Consider yourself my ambassador....Any commitments or any statements you make for your own government I authorize you<sup>18</sup> to make for me and my government." Spruille Braden spent the next two days developing the document into a workable peace treaty.



It was now Braden's task to get the approval of the other mediators. Most of them would be tractable but he expected trouble from Barreda Laos of Peru so he used a ploy on him. He got into a discussion with Barreda Laos concerning the Chaco. Braden pretended to interpret something he said as being a brilliant idea. It concerned the concept of two zones in the Chaco whose frontier would be decided through arbitration. Barreda Laos was convinced that that was what he had said. Diez de Medina's approval of the idea convinced him of his own brilliance and he certainly would not stand in the way of his "own" idea being approved by the mediators.

The peace conference was now receiving some difficulty from an unexpected source. Gerónimo Zubizarreta, the drafter of the original document, had gotten cold feet. Braden interpreted this as a move to get some political recognition to enhance his presidential ambitions. Braden took a rough initiative and accused Zubizarreta of violating the June 12 Protocol. Braden and the president of the Paraguayan delegation became involved in a heated quarrel. Finally, Chairman Cantilo adjourned the session declaring that it would sit again in two days. When it next sat the Paraguayan foreign minister, Cecilio Baez, spoke. He said that Paraguay would honor her solemn pledges; in short, she would continue negotiations with an aim toward resolving peace. Braden boldly asked who spoke with the sovereign

authority of Paraguay, Baez or Zubizarreta. Baez insisted that what he said would stand and at this Zubizarreta resigned as chairman of the Paraguayan delegation. Fortunately, for the Paraguayans and the conference, the Paraguayan war hero Jose Estigarribia was in Buenos Aires. He came into the peace conference and filled the void left by Zubizarreta. He did so despite lacking the authority for such action. Nevertheless, he was more than welcome; Estigarribia was the only Paraguayan who could make a concession without diminishing his popularity. After Estigarribia was seated there was no further trouble from the Paraguayan delegation.

There was one last false alarm, this coming from Chairman Cantilo. The last days of conference negotiations were becoming bogged down. Cantilo declared that the situation was hopeless, and was ready to dissolve the peace conference, but before he could Braden called for an adjournment. That night at a dinner Maria Braden spoke to Cantilo and persuaded him to continue, saying that the peace would soon be finalized. On July 9, 1938 the Chaco peace treaty was signed, just a week after Bolivian troops moved into the Chaco; but there were still things yet to be done. <sup>19</sup> Both Bolivia and Paraguay had to ratify the peace treaties, which they did during the following months. Lastly, the six mediating powers were to arbitrate the frontiers of the Chaco. The arbitration was finalized on October 10, 1938. Paraguay

received large gains in the Chaco and Bolivia had to be satisfied with the retention of her oil fields.<sup>20</sup> (For further details on the awards of the Chaco arbitration see the Appendix.)

Spruille Braden was the hero of the Chaco Peace Conference. He contributed more than anyone else in keeping the conference together so that an amicable settlement might be reached. In 1959 John W. White, former correspondent for the New York Times, sent Braden a letter outlining his contributions at the conference:

The death of Saavedra Lamas calls to mind...one of the greatest injustices....It was you who should have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. It was you, working single-handed...who brought about a peace agreement....You asked me not to report to the New York Times your participation in bringing about the peace agreement....I did as you asked....It was the only instance in my forty-five years of newspaper reporting that I ever allowed anyone to persuade me not to tell the truth about the situation I was covering.<sup>21</sup>

## Chapter III--Footnotes

- <sup>1</sup>Memoirs, pp. 142, 144-145, 58.
- <sup>2</sup>Spruille Braden, "The Germans in Argentina," The Atlantic Monthly, April, 1946, p. 37.
- <sup>3</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 37, 39.
- <sup>5</sup>Memoirs, pp. 145-146.
- <sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 146.
- <sup>7</sup>David H. Zook, Jr., The Conduct of the Chaco War (New Haven, Connecticut: United Printing Services, Inc., 1960), pp. 15, 25-37.
- <sup>8</sup>Braden, "Inter-American Commercial Arbitration and Goodwill," pp. 390-391, 388.
- <sup>9</sup>Rout, Politics...Chaco Peace, p. X.
- <sup>10</sup>Memoirs, pp. 149-151.
- <sup>11</sup>Rout, Politics...Chaco Peace, pp. 231-233, 224.
- <sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 116-121.
- <sup>13</sup>Memoirs, pp. 170-172, 174, 177-179.
- <sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 183-184.
- <sup>15</sup>Ibid., pp. 184-185.
- <sup>16</sup>Rout, Politics...Chaco Peace, p. 211.
- <sup>17</sup>Memoirs, pp. 187-188.
- <sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 188.
- <sup>19</sup>Ibid., pp. 188-191.
- <sup>20</sup>"Text of Award Fixing the Chaco Frontiers," New York Times, Oct. 11, 1938, p. 17.

21 "On Spruille Braden's Contribution to Solution of the Chaco Dispute," Inter-American Economic Affairs. Vol. XIV, Fall, 1960, p. 105.

## CHAPTER IV

## THE CHACABAMBAS MOUNTAINS

As early as 1937 Spruille Braden had been working for the United States Government by various means to bring about a settlement of the Chaco Dispute. He had been working for the United States Government for many years and had been working for the United States Government for many years.

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#### CHAPTER IV

#### THE COLOMBIAN EMBASSY

As early as 1937 Spruille Braden had been promised the Colombian Embassy by President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull. Prior to Spruille Braden there had been no Colombian Embassy. It had just recently been elevated to that status and Braden was to be the first ambassador assigned to that post.

After returning to the States and being greeted by President Roosevelt, Braden made several speeches praising the merits of the Good Neighbor Policy. He spoke of the liberal trade practices of the United States and cited Latin America's adherence to democratic principles which formed a tie that bound the two peoples together.<sup>1</sup> Braden pointed out that Americans had fewer wars than Europe and he gave three reasons as an explanation. One--"a spirit of brotherhood among American peoples;" two--"the functioning of Democracy;" and three--"respect for law and international agreements."<sup>2</sup> These slightly naive notions would change in the future.

After spending some time at the State Department to brief himself on the situation in Colombia, Braden set sail for his post late in January 1939. During his briefing period in Washington Braden came across some information

that had he been a less thorough diplomat might have altered the outcome of World War II. He was studying some data concerning Scadta, a German owned airline of Colombia. The airline employed several German pilots who remained military reserve officers. Reportedly some were "anti-American and ardently pro-Nazi."<sup>3</sup> Some of the Germans had become naturalized Colombians but that did not mitigate any danger that might have existed since German reservists were subject to the commands of Berlin. Another factor worthy of consideration was that German citizenship was considered permanent; the change of nationalities was merely symbolic. Allegiance was still owed to the fatherland. The danger presented by Scadta did not reside alone in the fact that pro-Nazi pilots were in their employ. The existing threat was that the Panama Canal was nearby and that Scadta controlled "virtually all the landing fields and radio services in Colombia."<sup>4</sup> Another problem existed; the Panama Canal was virtually without defenses. It was particularly vulnerable to an air attack. Should a global war take place it would behoove the enemy to destroy the Canal. Spruille Braden worked from that premise and presumed that the Nazis in Colombia were proceeding on that same premise.

The information he uncovered was more in the form of vague hints. Those hints suggested that there was some connection between Scadta and Pan American Airways. Braden

confronted the State Department with the theory. They knew nothing. He questioned the Navy and War Departments. They were also in the dark as to a possible link between the airlines. Some flatly denied the existence of a relationship. Braden decided he would go directly to Pan American. He had an appointment made for him in the name of Sumner Welles, with Juan Trippe, President of the Airways.

The appointment as it turned out was for the day prior to Braden's departure for Colombia. Braden went to the Pan American office on the agreed date only to find Juan Trippe had been called out of town on important business. Braden was infuriated. He told the State Department "to raise hell with Pan American;" he demanded to see someone<sup>5</sup> with authority that same day.

He received an appointment that afternoon with Evan Young, a former member of the foreign service and now a vice president of the airline. When the angry Braden arrived he immediately asked about the relationship between the two airlines. Young employed evasion and implied there was no connection between the two. Braden angrily beat the table with his fists and insisted, "Mr. Young, Pan American Airways has an interest in Scadta, and I propose to know<sup>6</sup> what that interest is." Apparently, Mr. Young was sufficiently impressed with Braden's insistence and rough manner. He told him what he wanted to hear. Pan American

owned 84 percent of Scaats. Braden felt certain that had Juan Trippe kept his appointment that he would have been able to preserve his secret; with the possibility that Braden would not have found out until it was too late.

After Braden and his family arrived in Bogotá, the new ambassador was in for a surprise. A pro-Nazi attitude did not exist solely among expatriated Germans. It had been discovered that Spanish priests of the Urabá area of Colombia were aiding and engaging in espionage with known Nazis. (It was known that often where there was a Spanish clergy in Latin America it was pro-Nazi in philosophy and volition.) Braden found that a gulf of Urabá religious order preached a vigorous anti-American doctrine. There were Jesuits that were tainted with the same sentiments. However, the most significant anti-American feeling within the church came from the Archbishop of Colombia. On the whole, from bottom to top the clergy of Colombia was considered to be pro-Nazi.

An expected result of a widespread pro-Nazi clergy would be the growing of that sentiment among the laity. The knowledge that Colombian citizens were sympathetic to the Nazi cause was not surprising. On one occasion Braden's daughters Pat and Laurita went riding with some friends, and some Colombian army officers joined them. The girls spoke perfect Spanish and there were no inquiries as to their identity. The group stopped at a restaurant for

some refreshments. The army officers made no secret of their pro-Nazi attitudes. The infectious enthusiasm of the officers spread to the restaurant owner who too waxed enthusiastic. He was so delighted with this party that he took them into a back room and displayed to them his bullet-making machine. When the girls returned home they reported to their father. A few days later the restaurant was raided and the machine was removed.

As it turned out, one of the officers in the party was the illegitimate son of the Colombian Foreign Minister, López de Mesa. López was a democrat and a bachelor and he had the reputation for being a playboy. The mother of his illegitimate son was known to be pro-Nazi and rumor had it that López was one of the lovers of a German woman, a known Nazi agent. The Foreign Minister was characterized as quixotic and with his head in the clouds, but nevertheless was an able administrator.

The President of Colombia, Eduardo Santos, was found to be pro-American and Democratic in attitude. Braden found him to be of great help in all matters that required his counsel. Braden did have a criticism of Santos which was that the President was "politically timid" and "indecisive."<sup>7</sup> Perhaps part of this was due to the criticism received by the previous two presidents concerning the charge that they were being dominated until they had become virtually the puppets of the United States. Despite the



President's efforts to avoid such an opprobrium, Braden and Santos had a good working relationship.

Laureano Gomez was a Colombian Senator and commanded the Conservative Party. Gómez owned El Siglo, one of Colombia's foremost newspapers. He was also very anti-American. Braden arranged a meeting with Gómez soon after he arrived in Bogotá. Gómez had been making his fervent anti-Americanism known in the Senate and through his newspaper. Braden asked the Senator the source of his anti-Americanism. Gómez spoke of "Yankee Imperialism" and the American "steal" of the Panama Canal. He went on to say that he was glad that the Panamanians lost the Canal Zone to the Americans because they were a very inferior people. Curiously this man who would later become President of Colombia had written a book espousing his theory that all peoples living in equatorial regions were useless and below standard. Laureano Gómez had many business dealings with Germans, and when we consider his thesis we are not surprised that his political proclivities coincided with those of the "master race," the Nazis.

Braden and Gómez spoke for several hours and they parted amicably. Surprisingly, Braden found that Gómez eased upon his anti-American diatribes both in the Senate and within his newspaper. His newspaper spoke of the Ambassador in glowing terms. This pleasant state of affairs lasted for about six months; then, without warning, Gómez

attacked Braden and the United States. Braden felt it was time for another long talk. The result was the same as the first meeting. Gómez could see no reason why the United States and Colombia could not be good friends. Gómez returned to his friendly attitude toward the Ambassador and the United States, privately and publicly.

After getting himself sufficiently acquainted with the personality and political environs of Bogotá and Colombia, Braden returned to the task he considered of foremost importance. It was paramount that the Germans and Nazi sympathizers be removed from Scadta. Just as the United States slept in regard to the danger at Pearl Harbor so too was the peril at the Panama Canal ignored. Braden requested money from the State Department so that he could form a system for gathering information. The request was denied. Braden's naval attache was given \$1,500.00 per annum to pay informants, but after a half a year passed the funds were cut off. It was apparent that Braden would have to be extremely resourceful to prevent a catastrophe at the Panama Canal.

Scadta had been created in Colombia by Peter Paul Von Bauer, a German as were all the employees of the airline, from mechanics to pilot. Braden remembered what he heard from his friend Eddie Rickenbacker who quoted Hermann Goering:

Our whole future is in the air....We will do three things. First we will teach gliding as a sport to all our young men. Then we will build up a fleet of commercial planes, each easily converted to military operation. Finally we will create the skeleton of a military air force. When the time comes, we will put all three together--and the German empire will be reborn. We must win through the air."<sup>8</sup>

It appeared to Braden that Scadta was part of that movement and a clever way of by-passing the Treaty of Versailles, which limited German military build-ups.

Evan Young had assured Braden that Peter Paul Von Bauer was not German but Austrian, that he was anti-Nazi and even partially Jewish. He was supposed to hold the view that the United States should be dominant in hemispheric aviation.

Braden first met Bauer in April 1939. After arranging a little ruse he discovered that Bauer had lied and that he couldn't be trusted.

In September 1939, David Grant, an attorney of Pan American, reported to the Ambassador to inform him that the airline had dismissed ten Germans working for Scadta and seven more dismissals were pending. Grant said he would travel to Medellín to make certain that the seven were dispatched from their duties. By the time he returned to Bogotá, Braden had come to realize that the dismissal of the original ten was a fabrication. It was now October and World War II had already begun. Braden castigated Grant for his deception.

Grant then had the gall to tell Braden that he was going to President Santos to inform him that Peter Paul Von Bauer

owned 51 percent of Scadta. Braden told him he would not be allowed to tell Santos that since Pan American owned 84 percent. Apparently Grant was in the dark as to the truth of the ownership; he confessed, "Trippe is the only one who knows what's going on."<sup>9</sup>

When the war began, Braden decided he must tell President Santos about the Scadta situation. Braden was flabbergasted when Santos would not believe him. The President told him "only two weeks ago Bauer sat just where you're sitting now and gave me his solemn word of honor that he owned 51 percent of Scadta."<sup>10</sup> He added that the Minister of War could produce an affidavit belonging to Bauer showing 51 percent ownership of the airline. It took a while for Braden to convince the War Minister and the President of Bauer's spurious claim but he succeeded in doing so without producing documentary evidence, which he was willing to do. Braden was now convinced that Bauer and Pan American were involved in a conspiracy which at the very least was geared to keep Scadta and its personnel intact. Santos was willing to co-operate. He said he would work to get leading Scadta personnel removed from the airline. He also said he would put armed officers of the Colombian Air Corps aboard Scadta flights as co-pilots to prevent the planes from flying off course.

Immediately after the David Grant incident Braden wired the State Department and made the demand that they

insist upon Pan American sending an executive of the company to Bogotá to consult with him on Scadta. George Rihl, Pan American executive Vice-President, arrived in Bogotá on October 16. During the next four months Rihl would repeatedly lie and renege on Pan American promises concerning the elimination of Germans within Scadta. Braden was fed up. On February 15, 1940, he issued an ultimatum. He told Rihl that he had until 6:00 p.m. next Monday to remove certain Nazis from the employ of Scadta and replace them with Americans. If they did not do that by the time allowed Braden promised to wire the State Department and state that he could no longer feel responsible for the safety of the Panama Canal. "Moreover, I would denounce Pan American to the President, to Congress, and to the American people." The threat produced a good deal of discomfort. Juan Trippe went to Washington and protested to the State Department. They expressed concern but cabled Braden giving him a free hand in the matter. Finally, when 6:00 p.m. arrived Braden's naval attache informed him that Rihl had completed the first steps in removing the Nazis from Scadta.

The removal of top Nazi officers and the insertion of American administrators into the airline by no means served substantially to diminish the threat to the Canal. One night after the transition had already been made American officers entered the Scadta office in Baranquilla; there they found Hans Hasendorf, Scadta communications chief, in



conversation with Berlin. He was using a radio which supposedly had enough strength to reach only the airport. At about the same time as this event a letter was intercepted addressed to a German pilot for Scatta. It was sent by a former German pilot of the airline who left Colombia to join the Luftwaffe as a fighter pilot when the war broke out. In the letter he related how Hermann Goering reproached him for leaving Colombia, where his presence was of value and returning to Germany where there was an abundance of fighter pilots.

One of the weaknesses of the Panama Canal defense was the fact that the installation there employed a single radar unit that had a range of fifteen miles and could only scan one direction. Part of the understanding Braden worked out with George Rihl was that Pan American would install three Adcock Directions Finders. They were to be installed at three different locations, in Cali, the Gulf of Urabá and at Barranquilla. The juxtapositioning of the Direction Finders would be designed to place accurately any aircraft within a general area of the Canal Zone by means of triangulation. Through this method, should a plane veer off its designated course and head toward the Canal adequate warning would prepare the Canal Zone with its anti-aircraft artillery. It seems that the Direction Finders were somehow delayed. Braden expressed his concern once again through the auspices of the State Department. Sumner

Welles was told by a representative of Pan American that the first Adcock Direction Finder would arrive in Colombia and that the remaining two would be there during the following weeks.

Eventually, the Adcock Direction Finders were installed and the Panama Canal was provided with an adequate warning system. Still there were other problems not yet eradicated. There had been 134 Nazis employed by the airline; after the initial removal of the officers 84 remained. It was now May 10, 1940, the day Adolf Hitler began storming Europe with his Blitzkreig. On that day Spruille Braden was in Washington, D.C. He was to have been going over strategy for the situation in Colombia. When the news broke concerning Blitzkreig their plans had to be altered. President Santos wanted the transition of airline personnel to be done more slowly than Braden had proposed; so Braden acquiesced to the President's wishes, since he had been very helpful previously. The German offensive in Europe meant that Nazi personnel now had to be removed immediately. Braden wired Santos and told him of developments. He backed Braden completely. Then Braden made a trip to New York City where he met with George Rihl. Rihl was told that American replacements had to be sent right away. Pan American would have to pay the bill for the immediate transferral of personnel. However, Braden promised that he would do what he could to get the government to reimburse the airline for its expenses.

Braden returned to Colombia after the arrangements had been made and one month to the day on June 10, 1940 the changeover was complete. Braden and Santos could be satisfied that the Panama Canal was safe. It was not long after that they received vindication for their efforts. Santos' approval and support of Braden's actions brought on a heavy attack from the conservatives and Laureano Gómez but they ceased after many efforts were made to sabotage Scadta flights, apparently caused by former airline employees. Maps used by the Nazi pilots were found to have mountains charted 1,500 to 2,000 feet shorter than they actually were. Seemingly these maps were made in anticipation of the time when Americans took over the airline. The maps would be a built-in form of sabotage. However, neither the maps nor the more overt attempts at sabotage ever succeeded. At most they were responsible for delays. A further vindication came directly out of Berlin. On at least three occasions short-wave dispatches threatened the lives of Spruille Braden and President Eduardo Santos for expelling German nationals from Scadta.

Despite the fact Braden lacked the funds he managed to establish a highly competent intelligence "staff." It was led by a German Catholic priest who was violently anti-Nazi. He had immigrated to Colombia after receiving a brutal beating at the hands of Nazis. He received the same treatment in Bogota by other Nazis. He was glad to tell what he knew

about Nazi sympathizers in Colombia. He enlisted other anti-Nazis both native and German. This staff enabled Spruille Braden to compile a blacklist of Colombians who had betrayed an antipathy toward America.<sup>12</sup>

In a New York Times article dated August 16, 1940 and titled "Nazis use U. S. Funds in Colombia for Economic War on Democracies," German-American sales agents operating in Colombia were using profits from American goods to promote anti-American propaganda. Germany, which was cut off from trading with Colombia, wanted trade rapprochement with that country. She promised a 25 to 30 percent undercutting of United States prices. She also predicted the imminent subjugation of all of Europe and warned that Colombia had best be co-operative lest she develop a powerful enemy.<sup>13</sup>

The situation described in the Times had little to do with that in which Spruille Braden was involved. His main "economic" concern was the stealing and smuggling of platinum out of Colombia which made its way to Germany. Germany had also gotten the Colombian metal through more legitimate avenues. Platinum was sold to Argentina where German agents could obtain it for the Fatherland. When the war started the United States wanted to eliminate the flow of Colombian platinum to Germany. Braden spoke to President Santos and persuaded him "to issue a decree that no platinum could be sold or imported except against an irrevocable letter of credit in a New York bank." Except for occasional thefts<sup>14</sup> Colombian platinum was cut off from Germany.

With December 7, 1941 came Pearl Harbor and with it came a unified Colombia. As recently as June 2, 1941 there had been an attempt at a coup d'etat by some military officers. Two weeks prior to the attempt Ambassador Braden warned President Santos. The warning went unheeded but fortunately, the attempted coup d'etat proved a failure. When the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor the Conservatives headed by Laureano Gómez joined forces with the Liberals to vote<sup>15</sup> a severance in diplomatic relations with Germany.

On December 17, 1941 Braden was nominated Ambassador to Cuba where he would take his post after the beginning of the new year. Before he left Colombia he addressed the American Society of Colombia which he had founded two years previously. The object of the Society was to build better relations between the peoples of two countries. On a whole the Society was a success. Braden gave a short speech and it dealt with the recent attack on Pearl Harbor. He praised the unity of Colombia and the United States and stated that the common Democratic cause would prevail. "Because of our moral strength and physical power, we shall be invincible and, what is more vital, our might is based on right."<sup>16</sup> While Ambassador to Colombia, Braden made two trips to the United States, during the spring of 1940 and 1941. On each trip he made a sojourn in New York City where he spoke to the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission and to the American Arbitration Association. Braden



spoke to the former April 11, 1940 on the topic "Arbitra-  
tion and Other Aspects of Inter-American Relations."<sup>17</sup>

On May 8, 1941 Braden spoke on the occasion of the dedica-  
tion of the American Arbitration Association's Headquarters<sup>18</sup>  
at Rockefeller Center. When Spruille Braden eventually  
left the State Department he played a more prominent role  
in arbitration.

## Chapter IV--Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>"Roosevelt Greet Envoy," New York Times, Oct. 29, 1938, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup>"Lauds 'Neighbor' Policy," New York Times, Nov. 7, 1938, p. 10.

<sup>3</sup>"U.S. Envoy Denies Asking Colombia to Take Airline That Could Be Menace to the Canal," New York Times, April 23, 1939, p. 27.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Memoirs, pp. 196-197.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 197.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 197, 206-210, 205.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 207-209, 243, 229.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 231-232.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 233.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 233-234, 236, 235.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 236-244.

<sup>13</sup>Russel B. Porter, "Nazis Use U. S. Funds in Colombia for Economic War on Democracies," New York Times, August 16, 1940, p. 5.

<sup>14</sup>Memoirs, p. 259.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., pp. 246, 208-209.

<sup>16</sup>"The American Society of Colombia: Another Hemisphere Asset," Foreign Commerce Weekly, Feb. 14, 1942, p. 8.

<sup>17</sup>"Arbitration Plan for World Urged," New York Times, April 12, 1940, p. 24.

<sup>18</sup>"Inter-American Arbitration Headquarters Opened Here," New York Times, May 9, 1941, p. 11.

CHAPTER V  
WORLD WAR II AND THE CUBAN EMBASSY

As he had on previous occasions, Spruille Braden went to the State Department for extensive study to prepare himself for his new Ambassadorial post in Cuba. Braden was soon to find out that there was something different at the State Department. He knew that Nelson Rockefeller was the coordinator of the newly created Office of Inter-American Affairs. He later discovered that the State Department had developed into a state of bureaucratic disrepair. He found it very difficult to locate the necessary documents to complete his study of the island. Before he left for Cuba Braden felt that he wisely exacted a promise from Rockefeller that he not impose anything on Cuba without his<sup>1</sup> knowledge or prior approval.

Braden was to become ambassador to a country whose president, Fulgencio Batista, had been labeled a dictator by an influential United States newspaper. Batista was to say of the stereotype, that he was making an effort to be a "pro-American democratic dictator."<sup>2</sup> Spruille Braden and Fulgencio Batista would quarrel with each other officially and unofficially and they would, at the same time, be good friends and develop a mutual respect and admiration, one for the other. Mario Iazo, the Cuban lawyer and author,

revealed a pro-Batista sentiment and spoke favorably of Spruille Braden in his book Dagger in the Heart. He referred to Braden as "vigorous, tough, forthright to the point of bluntness, and a man of the highest principles. Braden proved to be the antithesis of his predecessor."<sup>3</sup> His predecessor was George Messersmith of whom we will speak more later.

When Braden arrived in Havana he found that graft ran rampant in the Cuban bureaucracy and on all levels of professional life. The political machinery of Cuba would have come to a halt if there had been no one to grease the palm of an official hand. But at that there was enough for Braden to complain about; the task of completing official business was painfully slow. After assessing the situation, Braden made it very clear that Americans in Cuba had better not be found engaging in transactions that were not completely aboveboard. One unfortunate North American was caught ethically amiss and found himself handcuffed and removed from the island of Cuba by the Cuban government and through the arrangements of the United States Ambassador.<sup>4</sup> There was another occasion that Spruille Braden had to take such action during his stay in Cuba. An acquaintance of Braden's at Yale University was an executive for a large American firm in Cuba. He boasted that he and Braden were college pals. When Braden's "pal" was implicated in a Cuban kickback deal, Braden called the head of

the company in New York and brought about the man's separation from his company. American involvement in graft ceased except for the possible exception of those who came to Braden and asked permission to pay a bribe! The request was denied.

When Braden came to Cuba he had many problems with which to contend. German U-boats had sunk several Cuban vessels off the island. Braden did not have the money to establish an intelligence network, although he did have the promise that agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation would be sent to the island to assist him. Espionage existed in Cuba and its source had to be found and eliminated. The answer to the first problem lay within the domain of the Navy Department. The needed intelligence force would be left to the resourcefulness of Braden. Spruille Braden proved to be very imaginative. He enlisted the services of the writer Ernest Hemingway, who had been living in Cuba for a few years. Hemingway knew a great variety of people ranging from vagabonds to Spanish noblemen. Braden knew that knowledge would be valuable and that Hemingway would probably be fascinated and co-operative. Braden told him that there were 300,000 Spaniards living on the island and it was estimated (by Prime Minister Saladrigas) that up to 30,000 of them were pro-fascist. They would have to be watched particularly since it was not yet known if the Third Reich's machinery would be geared toward the west.



Hemingway readily agreed to help and then went about the task of recruiting priests, former bullfighters, gamblers, bartenders, exiled dukes and counts and some Spanish loyalists. According to Braden they did an excellent job keeping him up on information of which he would not normally have access. When the Federal Bureau of Investigation came to Havana, Braden wrote a letter to Hemingway thanking and commending him for his patriotic actions. There is a postscript to this story. Hemingway came to Braden and demanded repayment for services rendered. The payment was to be in the form of a bazooka, several machine guns and grenades, all to be used on his fishing boat. Should a Nazi U-boat surface to buy his food, as had been a common practice, Hemingway intended to blast it from the water. Braden went against the regulations and gave Hemingway what he wanted. Fortunately Hemingway never had the chance to sink a U-boat. The literary world benefited from that lack of opportunity and his death wish would have to be satisfied later.

There were two major instances of espionage while Braden was in Cuba. One involved Major Juan Govea who headed the Cuban radio. Enough evidence gathered so that he could be removed from his position. Batista would not have it. It seems that Batista was involved with some gangsters, one of whom was Govea's brother. On another occasion Major Govea was caught making a broadcast in which he blatantly described the position, cargo and tonnage of numerous

vessels in and around Guantánamo. This time the new Prime Minister Ramon Zaydin fired Goves without consulting the President. Later Batista was to strip him of his rank as well. He did this in hopes of achieving rapprochement with Braden, with whom he had quarreled over the incident.

The second case of espionage was detected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the United States. They were to place broadcasts they heard as coming from Havana. The Federal Bureau of Investigation in Cuba handled the case with some Cuban assistance. The spy's name was August Lüning. He kept an apartment full of chirping canaries to cover the sound of his radio. It was decided to let Lüning continue to operate. He was fed false information and it was hoped he would lead them to other spies. They didn't count on General Manuel Benítez, the Cuban Chief of Police, to intercede in the matter. Benítez had nothing to do with the locating of Lüning but when he heard of the spy's location he went over and arrested him and claimed full credit for his apprehension. The well planned operation was destroyed. General Benítez shall be heard from again shortly. As for the now exposed Lüning, he was tried and convicted of espionage. The death penalty could be invoked under military law but Batista hesitated to make that decision; instead he asked Braden to decide for him. Spruille Braden felt no qualms in sentencing him to death; although, he later stated "I will confess I found his picture in the

paper a bit disturbing." <sup>5</sup> Technically this was an example of intervention on Braden's part. He accepted an invitation to make a tough decision on a problem that Batista could not morally afford to relegate to a surrogate. It seems clear that from the harsh way Braden dealt with the two Americans who questioned the sincerity of his spoken word, that Lüning was to become an example to spies that the Americans, in the form of Spruille Braden, would be difficult to deal with and a new occupation might be in order. Lüning as it turned out was the only man in all of Latin America to be executed for war crimes during the Second World War.

Before Braden left Cuba a crisis arose in which an imminent coup d'etat threatened the stability of the island. Braden was asked to assist in the attempt to prevent the military take-over. He refused as he felt any action he took would be construed as intervention but then he changed his mind on the rationale that his assistance would really be intercession. There was an upcoming election to take place on June 1, 1944. Fulgencio Batista decided he would not run for re-election but would back his own man Carlos Saladrigas for the presidency. Running against Saladrigas would be Ramón Grau San Martín, described by Braden as a leftist with a broad mass appeal. Braden evaluated that appeal as being messianic and spoke of people leading their sick children up to him so that Grau's touch might heal them. <sup>6</sup>

As early as July of 1943, Spruille Braden put out the word that Americans would not be allowed to contribute to the election. For any monetary investment in either party could not help but be construed as American intervention; an epithet Braden would just as soon save his country. Apparently Braden's stiff ethical policy and the punishment for its violation were persuasive enough to prevent any untoward political contributions. At the beginning it seemed certain that Saladrigas would be the new president. Even Braden was convinced of the outcome, scheduling a Washington visit for him for discussions of United States-Cuban problems. The odds on Saladrigas' victory were somewhere between five and six to one. Then Grau began to grow in popularity because of his charisma. A few weeks before the election Saladrigas tried to reinforce his diminishing lead by touring the provinces. His plan backfired because more and more of the electorate saw he lacked the magic personality that his opponent had. The tally of the June 1, 1944 election read Saladrigas 837,230 and Grau 1,042,874, a 54 percent victory over Grau in a record turnout election. Perhaps the best thing that came from the election was the popular belief that it was an honest election, mostly due to America's lack of intervention, a rarity in recent times. <sup>7</sup>

The fact that Cuba had had a rare honest election did not prevent General Manuel Benítez from disliking the results of the election. On June 3 just two days after

the polling Braden and his wife Maria were attending a dinner party when the vice president-elect and a newly elected senator approached Braden, both of them uninvited to the party. They had to speak to Braden immediately. Drawing him aside, they told him that several important military officers and General Benítez were just outside Havana with the intent of forcibly wresting the power from President Batista and nullifying the election. Braden was told he would have to intervene in the matter or there would be a violent revolution. Braden appreciated the gravity of the situation but insisted he could not intervene, but then relented and offered to intercede in behalf of the legitimate Cuban government saying that he was at Batista's command. He went on to say that the United States government would not recognize any Cuban government other than the present one and the duly elected one to take office in October. Any other Cuban government would not be recognized and the United States government would be compelled to quarantine Cuba in the form of America's ships blockading Cuban harbors disallowing any vessels to either enter or depart from Cuba. This message was to be delivered to President Batista and to the conspirators.

Apparently Braden's threat was enough to frighten many of the Army officers from Benítez's intent. Benítez did not give in immediately but attended a formal meeting held by Braden. At that meeting Benítez several times hurled



the appellative "Cabron" toward Grau and Batista. "Cabron" was a term that ascribed canine antecedents to the intended. Batista then took action. He fired Benítez from his job and the army. Braden issued a hurried visa and Senor Benítez<sup>8</sup> departed for Miami.

Ramón Grau San Martín became the next president of Cuba without further incident. As president of Cuba he proved to be pro-American. He wanted the already established United States military air bases to remain in Cuba after the war to contribute to the defenses of the Americas and to extend Cuban-American cooperation.<sup>9</sup> Even Braden was delighted to see that Grau was doing a good job not only in relation to the United States but in Cuba as well. Grau was trying to create an honest government but in an effort to remove the crooked people from the previous administration Grau developed problems of his own. In his zeal to replace offenders he was charged with nepotism. Urban violence increased. Mass firings caused chaos in the government and<sup>10</sup> Grau was deficient in the ability to delegate power. Braden saw only the beginning of the Grau administration for in the spring of 1945 he found himself ambassador to troubled Argentina.

## Chapter V--Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>Memoirs, p. 262.

<sup>2</sup>Mario Lazo, Dagger in the Heart: American Policy Failures in Cuba (New York: Twin Circle Publishing Co, 1968), p. 78.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 80, 79.

<sup>4</sup>"The Building of Nicaro," Fortune, July, 1945, p. 180.

<sup>5</sup>Memoirs, pp. 282-284, 287-288.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 298.

<sup>7</sup>Irwin F. Gellman, Roosevelt and Batista: Good Neighbor Diplomacy in Cuba, 1933-1945 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1973), pp. 208-213.

<sup>8</sup>"Plot Foiled," Time, August 7, 1944, p. 38.

<sup>9</sup>R. Hart Phillips, Cuba: Island of Paradox (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, Inc., 1959), p. 221.

<sup>10</sup>Gellman, p. 220.

CHAPTER VI  
ARGENTINA: "PERÓN o BRADEN"

The issue of non-intervention defined at Montevideo was capable of causing many problems for American diplomats. It had a great potential for inhibiting their actions. In order to keep himself as flexible as possible, Spruille Braden further interpreted the concept of non-intervention. It was a nuance shared by President Roosevelt. The idea was fairly simple. A powerful country such as the United States would be in effect giving its tacit approval of a policy practiced by another country if it did not intervene, but this would have the effect of influencing other countries and would thus be intervention. Since the United States would be in the position of being damned if it did and damned if it did not she might as well intervene in her own interests. The ambassador who understood and appreciated this interpretation need not feel shackled in his duties.

The Argentina to which Spruille Braden would become Ambassador was the most pro-Nazi nation in all of Latin America. Furthermore, Argentina had ambitions of unseating the United States as the dominant influence in Latin America. On June 4, 1943 duly elected President Ramón Castillo fell from power as the result of a coup d'etat. At first the

State Department considered this a blessing as Castillo was pro-Nazi but it was soon realized that the generals who now grasped the reins of power were more ardently pro-Nazi than was the President. By January of 1944 the United States had received conclusive evidence that Argentina had been involved in the fascist revolution in Bolivia, that she was receiving arms from Germany and that she had aggressive designs on other Latin American countries. At the end of the month Secretary of State Hull announced that Argentine assets within the United States would be frozen. Argentina acted quickly breaking diplomatic relations with Germany in exchange for the release of her funds in the United States. General Ramírez who was now president did not bother to consult with the other generals on the action and they did not look upon it favorably and thus Ramírez was supplanted by Colonel Juan Perón and General Farrell who was made President but was Perón's puppet. With this Hull asked other Latin American nations to withdraw recognition of Argentina as had the United States.

In November of 1944 Cordell Hull retired as Secretary of State and Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., succeeded him. Stettinius took a conciliatory stance in relation to Argentina. Ultimately they were invited to join the United Nations without having complied with the Chapultepec Agreement established at the Mexico City conference. The agreement stipulated that the defensive alignment of the

hemisphere should be in accordance with the prevailing<sup>1</sup> political principles.

Although Rockefeller and Stettinius personally asked Braden to become ambassador to Argentina, it is rather certain that it was Roosevelt's appointment. Rockefeller and Stettinius were not likely to suggest such a rugged diplomat to perform a program of appeasement in Argentina. The fact is that they sent Avra Warren and Lieutenant-General George Brett to Buenos Aires a month before Braden arrived and without his knowledge. Their purpose was to evaluate the situation and to create a friendly atmosphere<sup>2</sup> for negotiations.

Spruille Braden was to test his strength the moment he stepped off the plane in Buenos Aires. He had heard that a good friend of his, Enrique Gil, publisher of the pro-American newspaper La Semana, was in jail being held incommunicado. Braden arrived in Buenos Aires in mid-May 1945. The war in Europe was coming to an end and Argentina had found it expedient to declare war on the Axis. In conjunction with this action Perón found it necessary to call for a state of siege so that he could silence the din of dissidence to the fascist regime. Argentines were without their constitutional rights.<sup>3</sup> After deplaning Braden encountered several reporters. He said so they could hear, "I wonder where my old friend Enrique Gil is? I must look<sup>4</sup> him up soon." A few hours later Gil was released from jail. Apparently the fascist Peron could be intimidated.



The next few days in Buenos Aires consisted of fulfilling the obligatory duties of protocol. He was taken to the Casa Rosada, the Argentine White House, to present his credentials to President Farrell. He spoke at a press conference where reporters were shocked to find that Braden's policy would not be that of Brett's and Warren's. He stated that America had been involved in World War II to provide defense for representative government around the world and that it felt compelled to do the same during peace time. Braden was to meet Juan Domingo Perón for the first time. The Colonel had something on his mind. He wanted the United States to help Argentina develop military parity with her huge neighbor Brazil. He pointed out that the United States had not given her military aid during the war. He did not mention that Argentina sided with the Axis at the time. Braden told him that before such a consideration could be taken by the United States, Argentina would have to comply with the Chapultepec Agreement. The first meeting with Perón was cordial.

The second meeting between Braden and Perón was held on June 1. This time the Argentine Vice President seemed conciliatory toward Braden's demands. Braden spoke to Perón not as an ambassador, but as an American friend. He told him that in order for him to get what he wanted from America he would have to rectify what Americans could not abide about Argentina. There were 1,203 political prisoners in

Argentine jails. They would have to be released. Censorship had been imposed on both Argentine radio and press. Those restrictions had to be lifted. One final stipulation existed and that was that Argentina must turn over to the United States and her allies all Nazi agents and their assets in Argentina. Perón agreed to lift the state of siege and to appoint representatives to seek out and apprehend Nazi agents. Perón had a request to be made also; he asked that certain American journalists be silenced from writing lies about himself and Argentina. Braden said that he would see to it that any American journalist that wrote an untruth about Argentina would be made to recant publicly or would be exposed as a liar. On the other hand a journalist would be permitted a free hand to print anything that was uncovered and was factual. Braden and Perón parted cordially.

Peron seemed to be sincere in his acquiescence. Within a few weeks all the political prisoners had been released. Perón also saw to it that censorship be removed from the Argentine media.<sup>5</sup> These positive signs toward a democratic acceptance threatened to dissolve on June 29, the date of the third meeting between Braden and Perón. Braden entered Perón's office after a notable lack of pomp and ceremony which accompanied him on the previous visits. The Vice-President roughly ordered Braden to sit down. He then accused him of being part of a conspiracy to undermine

the present Argentine regime. He said that such activities must cease as he had many fanatical followers who were extreme enough to assassinate anyone they felt might be doing him harm. The point was clear. Braden and other trouble makers were being officially informed that their persistence might result in death. Since the state of siege had been relaxed the clamor against the fascist regime had grown and was no longer limited to the foreign press. Braden vehemently protested this blatant threat.<sup>6</sup> He told Perón that Argentina was obligated to protect every American in the country. Perón said it was not obligated to protect Americans under the circumstances implying that Americans were responsible for their actions and would reap the just consequences. Braden left the Vice-President's office when it became obvious that he would remain adamant on the subject. When Braden returned to the embassy his staff members reported several phone calls from American reporters saying their lives had been threatened. Protests to the Argentina Foreign Minister and to the Argentine Ambassador in Washington were made. On July 5 the Foreign Minister informed Braden that measures were being taken to protect Americans in Argentina. Just to be sure, Braden was assigned an F.B.I. man as bodyguard.

After the commotion of Perón's threats died down the Colonel attempted several times, half-heartedly, to gain rapprochement with Braden and on each case it would have

meant a compromise of Braden's dignity. He therefore declined.<sup>7</sup> July would prove to be a spectacular month in the battle between Braden and Perón. After the time Braden brought about the release of political prisoners and the resumption of the freedoms of the press and radio Argentina became a country seething with turmoil. The Latins of Argentina for the first time in years could identify with the democratic ideology and Spruille Braden was their hero as he had made it all possible by intimidating the fascist regime into restoring their constitutional rights. Braden became known as "El Dormedor de Coroneles" or "the Tamer of Colonels."<sup>8</sup> People in all walks of life clamored for the overthrow of the fascists. They participated in riots denouncing the regime. People were killed and many others injured in clashes with the army and police.<sup>9</sup>

By the middle of July President Farrell announced that an election would be held by the end of the year. (It actually took place in February of 1946.) It was to be the first election in Argentina since 1938. It was important that Argentina have an election. The election would help soothe the angry sentiments of the people toward the current regime and it would also be in compliance with the Chapultepec Agreement. Soon after Farrell's revelation a great catastrophe which had recently occurred in Chile was exploited and with the influence of Peronists propaganda

served to considerably diminish Braden's mass appeal in Argentina, temporarily.

The Braden Copper Company lost 500 of its Chilean miners when a fire broke out in a mine, entrapping its victims. The mine had belonged to William Braden, Spruille's father, who had sold all interests in the mine in 1912. The Braden Copper Mines of Chile now belonged to the Kennecott Company. This did not deter the printing of handbills and posters defaming Braden in various ways. It was called "the Braden crime!" Posters spoke of the Chile-<sup>10</sup>ans as "victims of the Bradens." It evoked the old American imperialism likening it to Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy and spoke of "the strong and haughty dollar."<sup>11</sup> Printed was a spurious quote by Braden. It said that he would "tame" Argentina inside a month. The attack became slightly ludicrous when Braden was compared to an Al Capone trying to blackmail Argentina. During the height of the propaganda war against Braden on July 20, a memorial ceremony for the dead miners was held at a theatre. Leaflets condemning Braden were showered on the audience from the balcony. Cries of "Throw out the Yankee pig" and "Death to Braden"<sup>12</sup> could be heard throughout the theatre. Apparently the whole campaign against Braden was financed by the government. It was too massive and therefore too costly to have been sponsored by some fanatics. Police support was even seen to be lent to the movement. A Buenos Aires



ordinance forbade the distribution of handbills on the streets of the city but distributors under police scrutiny passed them out with impunity and police were even seen to take part in their distribution.<sup>13</sup>

On July 21 Braden was to speak at the University of the Litoral in Santa Fé. Maria and Spruille Braden traveled by train. On reaching their destination they found the station platform strewn with leaflets denouncing Braden for the Chilean tragedy. That evening Braden spoke to enthusiastic students on the topic "The Good Neighbor Policy."<sup>14</sup> In it he traced American policy toward Latin America beginning with the Monroe Doctrine and ending it with an explanation of Roosevelt's policy.<sup>15</sup> His treatment and popularity at the University heartened him for his return to Buenos Aires. When the Bradens returned to the capital they found three thousand demonstrators awaiting them at the station. All were pro-Braden and pro-American and they demonstrated in repudiation of the Braden smear. Saavedra Lamas was in the crowd. He took Maria Braden's arm and escorted her to an awaiting car. They were told that a larger demonstration awaited them within the city. At this point Braden felt he had been exonerated by the people and their faith in him.<sup>16</sup>

Braden was to have identified the source of his attack as being "instigated by foreign and Nazi elements."<sup>17</sup> However, in his memoirs Braden said "the entire costly attack

had been planned and carried out by Communists working from the top floor of the presidential palace....Perón and the Communists were working hand in glove and forming a menacing alliance."<sup>18</sup> He had received information from Ambassador Alfonso Quintana Burgos of Chile, who at one time was in charge of the Chilean police as Minister of the Interior. Braden had as early as July 5 sent "top secret" cables to President Truman (President Roosevelt died before Braden could take his post in Argentina) and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, who had recently succeeded Stettinius. He told of the Communist activities he was aware of and wanted the Secretary and President to question Joseph Stalin at the upcoming Potsdam Conference about Communist interest in Latin America and their friendliness toward Peron. Braden never received a reply to his cables. A year later he was to find out that they were never delivered. Braden felt that his messages were intercepted by a Communist in the State Department.<sup>19</sup> The belief expressed by Braden that the Fascists and Communists conspired together in Argentina is unsubstantiated elsewhere and seems to have come into existence in the years after he left the Argentine embassy.<sup>20</sup>

Braden's popularity remained at a high after Peron's campaign to discredit him failed. By the middle of August James F. Byrnes made preparations for significant changes in the State Department. Nelson Rockefeller soundly

denounced the activities of the Argentine government. He then resigned as Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs. Byrnes accepted the resignation and nominated Spruille Braden to the post. Byrnes' action was a repudiation of the Stettinius-Rockefeller Latin American and, in particular, Argentine policy. The difference between the Braden and Rockefeller policies was the difference between their interpretations of non-intervention. Rockefeller chose to take the strict interpretation and remain silent in relation to Argentina and tacitly approve of the fascist regime. He even went so far as to invite Argentina to the San Francisco Conference before they complied with the pre-requisite, the Chapultepec Agreement. Braden's interpretation of non-<sup>21</sup> intervention would not allow silent approval. By using binding legalistic reminders such as Argentina's adoption of the tenets of the Mexico City conference, Braden had exacted a cessation of the terrors evoked by the state of siege and helped bring about a democratic election.

When Byrnes telephoned Braden and told him he wanted him to come to Washington as Assistant Secretary he found that the ambassador was reluctant to take that post. Braden felt that his job in Argentina was not complete but that progress was being made and that he would be of greater use in Buenos Aires than Washington. Byrnes was adamant and so Braden was virtually ordered to leave. He said he would and managed to delay his departure until the end of September.<sup>22</sup>

Braden's last weeks in Argentina involved several speech-making occasions. During the last week in August Braden spoke at a luncheon given in his honor by the Argentine-American Institute of Culture. His speech was described as a "pledge of American friendship and a philippic against totalitarianism." In his speech Braden made a mockery of the fascist regime of Argentina without resorting to naming names (whenever Braden made public statements about Fascism within Argentina he never identified culprits, feeling that this would constitute intervention; whereas his speeches were such that only the most obvious would be unaware of whom he spoke). His speech aroused many "bravos" and much laughter from the animated audience. He ended his speech with a powerful declaration:

...Nobody should think that my transfer to Washington will mean the abandonment of the task which I am carrying on. The voice of liberty has always made itself heard in this land and I believe that no one can suffocate it. I shall hear it from Washington with the same clarity with which I hear it here in Buenos Aires. I know it to be the voice of the Argentine people...which...is calling for a new life, based on confidence and mutual respect. If during my stay with you I have respected faithfully the feeling of the people of the United States--which is no way different from that of the government--I hope to be able to interpret with equal faithfulness, once I reach Washington, the feelings of the Argentine people.<sup>23</sup>

Braden was to hold true to his speech when he returned to America as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs.

Four days before the Bradens were to depart from Argentina a huge demonstration was organized. The "March of Liberty and Constitution" proved to be the largest democratic demonstration ever in all of Latin America. A half million people turned out for this occasion. The cry for Democracy was growing to a crescendo and the fascist regime was in dire straits. Three days after Braden left Buenos Aires for Washington, Argentines were once again victimized by the state of siege.



## Chapter VI--Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>Joseph M. Jones, "Good Neighbor, New Style," Harper's Magazine, April, 1946, pp. 317-320.

<sup>2</sup>Memoirs, pp. 319-320.

<sup>3</sup>Harold F. Peterson, Argentina and the United States, 1810-1960, (New York: University Publishers, Inc., 1964), p. 446.

<sup>4</sup>"One-Man Crusade," The Inter-American, July, 1945, p. 6.

<sup>5</sup>Memoirs, pp. 323-327.

<sup>6</sup>"Braden Says Perón Threatened Death," New York Times, Sept. 11, 1951, p. 16.

<sup>7</sup>Memoirs, pp. 329-332.

<sup>8</sup>Allen Haden, "Spruille Braden: The Colonel Tamer," Free World, Nov. 1945, pp. 69, 72.

<sup>9</sup>Joseph Newman, "Diplomatic Dynamite," Colliers, Nov. 10, 1945, p. 11.

<sup>10</sup>"Argentina: The Braden Smear," Newsweek, July 30, 1945, p. 50.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Memoirs, pp. 332-333.

<sup>15</sup>Spruille Braden, "The Good-Neighbor Policy," Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 2, 1945, pp. 327-332.

<sup>16</sup>Memoirs, p. 334.

<sup>17</sup>"Viva Braden," Time, August 6, 1945, p. 52.

<sup>18</sup>Memoirs, p. 334.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., pp. 334-335.

<sup>20</sup>Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and Argentina, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 249-250.

<sup>21</sup>"Democracy's Bull," Time, Nov. 5, 1945, p. 46.

<sup>22</sup>Memoirs, p. 337.

<sup>23</sup>"A Pledge of American Friendship and a Philippic Against Totalitarianism," The Review of the River Plate, August 31, 1945, p. 25.

<sup>24</sup>Newman, "Diplomatic Dynamite," p. 45.

## CHAPTER VII

## SPRUILLE BRADEN AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Spruille Braden's Senate confirmation as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs was achieved after some difficulty. Braden made it clear that his policy in Argentina was anti-fascist and that those who opposed his handling of the situation were putting themselves in the position of lending aid to a fascist regime. This distinction<sup>1</sup> put the vote in Braden's favor.

One of the first things Spruille Braden was to do even before his confirmation was to cancel the Inter-American Conference on Peace and Security which had been planned for Rio de Janeiro on October 20, 1945. The purpose of the conference was to gather the twenty-one Pan American republics together so that they might re-confirm the war-time Mexico City and Chapultepec Agreements and make them a permanent hemispheric security pact. The reason for its cancellation was that Argentina was to be part of this pact and she still continued to renege on the adherence to the original agreement.<sup>2</sup> Although Braden took the responsibility for the cancellation of the conference, it was President Truman who made the decision as early as September 29, even before Braden returned to Washington. Despite this fact Braden's detractors<sup>3</sup> accused him of having influenced the President's decision.

After Braden left Argentina, developments unfolded rapidly. Perón reinstituted the state of siege to quell the mounting clamor for democracy. Some 2,000 Argentines were immediately imprisoned, including Carlos Saavedra Lamas. All civil liberties were revoked. Perón's police force, known for their brutality, clamped down on the people.<sup>4</sup> Instead of this action causing dissent to silence it grew loud in defiance of brutalities. Argentina was on the verge of civil war. Several military officers decided to take matters into their own hands. On October 9 they forced Perón to resign as Vice President of Argentina and he was to be banished to Martín García island. Having accomplished the removal of Perón from office the officers set about the task of organizing a new government. Ineptitude and division within their ranks caused repeated failure. While the officers remained disorganized, Perón's loyal forces rallied to his cause. Perón had made the laborer his favorite while in office, and now in his absence they demonstrated in support of him. The police too remained loyal to Perón. Chaos in the government and a significant populace vocal for their former leader compelled President Farrell to return Perón to power. He returned and received his full authority on October 17, 1945, and on that same day<sup>5</sup> announced his presidential candidacy.

The campaigning began almost immediately after Perón's return. He established the new Partido Laborista or the

labor party. His opposition was José P. Tamborini, representing the Unión Democrática Party. Tamborini was a little known and colorless senator who was to provide token resistance to the Peronistas' juggernaut. Actually as things stood in October any opposition to Perón had good reason to believe that they might be elected. The democratic euphoria aroused by Braden was still being felt but the election was not scheduled until February 24, 1946. There was enough time for moods to change and events to occur to alter opinions.

When Peron began his campaigning he tried to find an external evil that by its condemnation might unify Argentina in his favor. He found a foreign demon but it did not carry much clout. He attacked the money-hungry British and North American capitalists. He attacked the United States in general as the dreaded "colossus of the North."<sup>6</sup> He had previously stated that due to Spruille Braden's rabble-rousing he was exiled and almost committed to political oblivion. Perón's triumphant return to power added a new dimension of charisma or magic to his personality which had formerly relied mostly on his ample machismo,<sup>7</sup> no small quality in a Latin American dictator-politician. Some of the Peronistas resorted to what had become a common practice and that was to become the party that championed the persecution of the Jews. Policemen watched indifferently as Jews were kicked, beaten, stoned, and maimed. Posters read<sup>8</sup> "Kill a Jew and be a Patriot!" Mobs shouted "Death to the



Jews!"<sup>9</sup> and indeed many were killed. One of Perón's deputies offered that "it was a pity a much larger number of Jews weren't killed."<sup>10</sup> On December 21, Colonel Perón officially denounced the anti-Semitic activities stating that the offenders were "outside all democratic standards,"<sup>11</sup> a strange phraseology for a fascist dictator.

As late as a few weeks before the election political observers were predicting a Tamborini-Union Democratica victory, but Tamborini's forces sensed an increase in Peron's popularity. They began to look toward the north for the aid Spruille Braden promised. Braden was in the process of preparing a document that would once and for all cause the Argentine repudiation of Juan Perón. It was titled Consultation Among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation. It became known as the Blue Book. In it, the book relates many examples in which the Argentine junta supported Nazi interests in Argentina, showing that Vice-President Perón was among those who assisted in lending aid to the enemies of democracy. Eighty-six pages of quantitative and qualitative evidence was presented to show that the then current Argentine regime was in league with the German Nazis.<sup>12</sup> This State Department document was prepared and distributed throughout Latin America just two weeks prior to the February 24 election in Argentina. As it turned out, the Blue Book proved to be the instrument by which Perón would secure the presidency.

He treated the Blue Book as an example of the notorious interventionism practiced by the North Americans. He went on to identify Braden as a typical American in that respect, which justifiably served to tarnish his democratic halo. Finally, Perón applied the coup d'grace in his counter attack. He made Braden his opposition to the Argentine presidency by creating the slogan: "Perón o Braden." Its implications were clear: Do you want an Argentine or a United States citizen ruling Argentina? Most important it did much to eliminate José Tamborini as a viable presidential candidate. After all Spruille Braden had not picked on him. There is no hard evidence to explain what role the Blue Book played in the outcome of the election but the consensus was that if it played a role at all it did so in the favor of Perón.<sup>13</sup> At the end of the balloting Perón received 1.5 million votes to 1.2 million votes for Tamborini. Perón's Partido Laborista won two-thirds of the seats in the House of Deputies and all but two Senate seats. Perón had won 56 percent of the vote and Tamborini 44 percent, but the margin in the electoral college was even higher. Perón received 304 electoral votes to 72 for Tamborini.<sup>14</sup> Braden related, ironically, "I knew that by hook or by crook he would win."<sup>15</sup> He did not add that he had provided the hook by which Perón would latch on to victory.

Perón's political victory in Argentina was more than just a mandate by the electorate. It symbolized a victory over Yankee imperialism and to Perón it meant a personal victory over his antagonist Spruille Braden. In a way Argentina proved to be the zenith and the nadir in Braden's career. He enjoyed his work there feeling that his attack on fascism was justified. He received positive reinforcement from the Argentines but not by the bulk of those on Capitol Hill. He was bound to have found it ironic that his government would endorse the Chapultepec agreement and then turn around and abrogate it in the appeasement of a nation whose political ideology was similar to that of the nations against whom World War II had been fought. He was made to leave Argentina before his job was complete and his efforts to finish his task from Washington proved disastrous. Strangely enough the election of 1946 has been called the most honest in Argentine history, which served to vindicate Perón but not his Yankee adversary. George I. Blanksten in his Perón's Argentina attempts to single out Braden's primary mistake. He points out that World War II was virtually over when Braden arrived in Argentina. The Axis had already expired but Braden persisted as if the war were still active and fascists represented the principal threat to democracy when the legitimate concern of the United States was communism.<sup>16</sup> This may not be a wholly proper criticism of Braden in Argentina, but he was to state

in his memoirs that when he became Assistant Secretary of State he felt fairly naive about communism.<sup>17</sup> Spruille Braden received great success and adulation in Argentina; later it would prove to be the great failure of his career. His remaining time in the State Department would not progress much better and it would cause a permanent change in his political outlook.

The United States did not immediately replace Spruille Braden with an ambassador to Argentina. On February 26, 1946, President Truman named George Messersmith as the new ambassador--the man whom Braden replaced in Cuba. Messersmith was to go to Argentina and cause a lot of trouble but not for the Argentines and not in the way that Spruille Braden caused trouble. Messersmith was criticized for representing "the Perón point of view in Washington rather more ardently than his own government's point of view in Buenos Aires."<sup>18</sup> He even went on to refer to Perón as being a "True Democrat." He felt no qualms about contradicting Secretary of State Byrnes publicly and even sending a 10,000-word diatribe about his superior, Spruille Braden,<sup>19</sup> to a publisher. It seems that George Messersmith represented the opinion of some that Pan American solidarity was paramount even at the expense of paying obeisance to a recalcitrant nation. The United States Army and Navy shared the views of Messersmith. Despite the fact that the Argentine government more closely resembled Fascism than any

other form of government and they still harbored sought-after Nazis, the Army and Navy were in favor of shipping arms to Argentina as part of a hemisphere defense policy that would standardize the various armies of the hemisphere along United States military lines, technologically and methodologically. It would be done in such a way so as not to disturb the prevailing balance of power in Latin America. Argentina had now voiced her ambition to reach parity with Brazil militarily. Brazil received military aid during the war when her troops joined the United States Fifth Army in Italy. Argentina took no active role in World War II for the Allied cause. Furthermore Argentina had abrogated the Havana Conference Agreement of 1940 which was a defense pact calling for the mutual aid of American republics after Pearl Harbor. Argentina sought to establish a bloc of neutrals. Despite having a long list of reasons for not giving military aid to Argentina the Army and the Navy took the stance that if we gave Argentina what it wanted it might start seeing things as the United States saw them. George Messersmith took this same position in Argentina. In the spring of 1946 Congress prevented the passage of the "Inter-American Military Cooperation Act."<sup>20</sup> In effect it repudiated George Messersmith as well. At the same time Spruille Braden's policy was exonerated.



Spruille Braden was ultimately to resign from the State Department over the Argentine issue. On April 1, 1946, President Truman issued a memorandum to the American republics stating that he was willing to renew discussions furthering the accomplishments of Mexico City and Chapultepec. Braden was not involved in the formulation of this memorandum nor was he advised as to its existence until it became public knowledge.<sup>21</sup>

Two days later Braden resigned his State Department position. President Truman's action was tantamount to firing Braden for it indicated a repudiation of his Argentine policy. Less than a year previous to that the President had asked Braden to draft a memorandum outlining the United States' attitude concerning the Argentine situation. The memorandum read as Braden had expressed it while he was Ambassador to Argentina. The United States would not do business with a nation that was essentially a fascist regime and one that would conceal enemies of the allied effort in World War II. The more recent memorandum reversed the former and welcomed with open arms the still recalcitrant Argentina to the Rio Conference.

The President's change in attitude was not a vindication of George Messersmith's Argentine policy per se. George Marshall, the new Secretary of State (Byrnes resigned in January of 1947), fired Messersmith from his post or rather accepted his resignation without his having submitted one. Braden's resignation would not be official until

June 30. Before that time he would receive America's highest civilian award, the Medal of Freedom. Tradition held that the President would award this most prestigious medal. But when Spruille Braden received the medal it was pinned to his lapel by Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson and had to be considered a slight of protocol.<sup>22</sup>

Spruille Braden was to leave the State Department a disillusioned man. In 1971 he revealed in his memoirs that while in the State Department he noticed many curious things afoot. Subordinates seemed to be running the entire department. He said he was aware of a movement to have him replaced at his post or shoved aside and rendered ineffectual. He charged that there were a number of communists in the Department at the time. In 1954 Spruille Braden appeared before a Senate subcommittee analyzing communist infiltration. Braden gave testimony concerning the time he spent in Washington in service of the State Department. He made the charge that then (during the Eisenhower administration) there were holdovers in the State Department from the time of the Truman administration that "are still bending United States foreign policy to fit the Kremlin pattern."<sup>23</sup> He added that there had not been much change since he left in 1947. On the topic of communism Spruille Braden could speak out as a militant propagandist filled with clichés and rhetoric. In a statement in which he described his

impressions as to the depth of communist infiltration in the State Department Braden said, "My feeling was there were relatively few Communists, but there were an awful lot of state interventionists, collectivists, 'do gooders,' misinformed idealists and what not, that were easily led and were in effect the puppets of the unknown." <sup>24</sup> Such a description would seem to describe a Satanic plot as well as communist machinations within the State Department. Braden never said so but it would appear that he held these "Puppets of the unknown" responsible for his timely departure from the Washington scene. To Spruille Braden the Communists were a far more pernicious lot than were the Fascists. Fascists could be quickly and easily labelled as such but not so the Communists. Take for example Fidel Castro who since the mid-fifties fought for what seemed a democratic revolution only to reveal, in 1961, after he was victorious that he was a Marxist-Leninist. Spruille Braden would virtually spend the rest of his active life in a crusade against Communism.

Although there had been several changes in key personnel in the State Department the underlings had remained basically the same and it was this "anonymous" staff that controlled the State Department, Braden claimed. He went on to explain how from Secretary of State Byrnes to John Foster Dulles this State Department conspiracy prevented

them from running the Department. They were made to keep moving from the United Nations to paying calls on foreign ministers and once at the State Department they were confronted with some important decisions that needed immediate attention. Often the Secretary would sign a document without having read it in its entirety and this was how underlings might determine State Department policy. Braden stated that he was amazed how a "young Soviet" as he called them, could walk into his office with seemingly the same authority as his own and would over-rule a decision of his.<sup>25</sup>

One of the anonymous staff members in the State Department while Braden was there later became a controversial figure, and the name Alger Hiss became well known. In his memoirs, Braden stated that the Federal Bureau of Investigation circulated a report among high ranking officials within the State Department identifying certain government employees as Communists. One of these was Alger Hiss. Perhaps the Federal Bureau of Investigation was remiss but Spruille Braden omitted the inclusion of the damning evidence as well.<sup>26</sup> In his testimony before the Senate subcommittee Braden detailed an incident of large proportions within the State Department involving himself and Alger Hiss. The incident, of international scope, took place in 1946 and involved American military bases in the Panama Canal Zone. A United States agreement with

Panama which allowed 134 military installations for defense of the Panama Canal provided for the removal of the wartime defense bases one year after a peace pact was signed. The peace treaty was not yet signed but Russia made anti-American propaganda out of the bases. They suggested Panama was an occupied territory and aroused Panamanians to demand the removal of the bases. According to Braden, Hiss insisted that a routine report be submitted to the United Nations explaining the presence of the bases in Panama. Braden said he saw no sense in submitting the report, that "It was just going to enrage the Panamanians."<sup>27</sup> Braden would not approve such actions so Hiss appealed to Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson and won approval. Acheson would not even listen to Braden's pleas. Braden described the aftermath of the report to the United Nations:

Imagine my utter astonishment when one morning I picked up the Washington Post and here on the front page was an announcement that we had reported to the United Nations on the Canal Zone as an occupied territory. When I read that, I realized that was really putting fat in the fire in our relations with Panama in the substantiation of the Russian allegations and in our relations with all of the American republics. It was such a nasty situation.<sup>28</sup>

The fact is that Braden heard of the contents of the report through the newspaper. He was never consulted about the finished product nor was he asked to advise on its preparation. Braden rushed to the State Department



immediately after reading the article. He asked the source of the report and was told that it had emanated from the Office of Special Political Affairs which was headed by Alger Hiss. Braden went on to say that the military bases in the Canal Zone had to be relinquished by the United States as a result of the State Department. At the time Spruille Braden was giving his testimony, Alger Hiss was serving a five-year jail sentence for perjuring himself in denial of passing on government secrets to Soviet spies. Braden must have felt vindicated by the conviction of Hiss.<sup>29</sup> This vindication would carry Braden far in the future--far to the right.

## Chapter VII--Footnotes

- <sup>1</sup>"Democracy's Bull," Time, p. 46.
- <sup>2</sup>John K. Jessup, "Spruille Braden," Life, March 25, 1946, p. 60.
- <sup>3</sup>Memoirs, p. 334.
- <sup>4</sup>Stanley Ross, "Perón: South American Hitler," The Nation, Feb. 16, 1946, p. 193.
- <sup>5</sup>Peterson, Argentina and the United States, p. 449.
- <sup>6</sup>Frank Owen, Perón: His Rise and Fall (London: The Cresset Press, 1957), p. 58.
- <sup>7</sup>Peterson, Argentina and the United States, p. 449.
- <sup>8</sup>Owen, Perón: His Rise, p. 59.
- <sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 60.
- <sup>10</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 60n.
- <sup>12</sup>U. S. Department of State, Consultation Among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1946).
- <sup>13</sup>Whitaker, The United States and Argentina, pp. 148-149.
- <sup>14</sup>Marvin Goldwert, Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina, 1930-1966: An Interpretation (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1972), p. 93.
- <sup>15</sup>Memoirs, p. 356.
- <sup>16</sup>George I. Blanksten, Perón's Argentina (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 411.
- <sup>17</sup>Memoirs, p. 317.

<sup>18</sup>Robert Bendiner, "Braden or Messersmith?" The Nation, Feb. 1, 1947, p. 116.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 117.

<sup>20</sup>Graham Hovey, "Getting Tough with Peron," New Republic, Nov. 25, 1946, pp. 685-686.

<sup>21</sup>Alberto Conil Paz and Gustavo Ferrari, Argentina's Foreign Policy, 1930-1962, translated by John J. Kennedy (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), pp. 143-144.

<sup>22</sup>Memoirs, pp. 369-370.

<sup>23</sup>"Turmoil in State Department: Spruille Braden Says Holdovers are Still in Power," U. S. News and World Report, April 9, 1954, p. 30.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Memoirs, p. 345.

<sup>27</sup>"Turmoil in State Department," U. S. News and World Report, p. 33.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., pp. 33, 32.

## CHAPTER VIII

## DENOUEMENT

In 1947, much to Spruille Braden's chagrin, a book appeared out of the Dominican Republic charging him with being a communist and intriguing with communists through much of Latin America. It was an absurd book filled with many unsubstantiated charges and erroneous facts. Braden was contrasted against the author's list of those "crowned with a halo of dignity and loyalty, the postulates of Democracy." Included in that list were such names as Generals Eisenhower and Marshall, George Messersmith, Rafael Trujillo and Juan Perón.<sup>1</sup>

The author of this spurious distribe on Braden was José Pepper, a Venezuelan. An argument can be offered that Pepper may have been commissioned to write I Accuse Braden by Rafael Trujillo, the dictator of the Dominican Republic. Trujillo spoke of a "Communist conspiracy against the Dominican Republic since 1945."<sup>2</sup> Trujillo alleged that among the communist conspirators was Spruille Braden. It seems that the official nomenclature for a critic of the Trujillo regime was "communist" and that Spruille Braden earned that appellation in 1945 when as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs he denied a Dominican request to buy 20,000,000 American cartridges. Braden offered three

reasons for denying the sale: (1) the ammunition would be directed against the Dominican people or a neighboring republic; (2) it would not prove to be an addition to continental defense; (3) the bullets would not serve to facilitate Democracy in the Dominican Republic.<sup>3</sup> Braden made an enemy in the Dominican Republic and two years later a book was published there accusing him of being a communist.

Besides being involved with the Argentine problem and the "communists" in the State Department, Spruille Braden wrote and spoke on various topics relevant to his State Department post. On some occasions he spoke as the Under Secretary of State and during others he spoke as Spruille Braden. Both voices were illuminating. In 1946 Braden published an article titled "Latin American Industrialization and Foreign Trade;" in it he explains what is needed to be done by Latin Americans to bring their various economies to a relative par with those of North American countries. Braden worked from the premise that what is good for Latin America is good for the United States. He felt that it is essential that Latin America become industrialized for her own good and for ours. He pointed out that the United States exports more to Canada annually than it does to Latin America although the latter has ten times the population of the former. The difference between Canada and Latin America relative to United States imports is not one of location but rather industrialization. Canada is



industrialized whereas Latin America is not. The country that produces more sells more and therefore can buy or import more. Braden spoke as a liberal when he wrote:

Lest there be a misunderstanding on this score, we wish to emphasize that the United States government rejects the view that the industrialization and diversification of the Latin-American economies are threats to the maintenance of our own export markets in that area. The ancient mercantile fallacy that an industrial exporting nation should strive to impede the industrialization of its overseas markets was ridiculed and exploded nearly 200 years ago by Adam Smith; but like mistaken theories, this one dies hard.<sup>4</sup>

Braden not only had ideas as to how the implementation of Latin American industrialization should occur, but was adamant about its being done a certain way. He felt that United States businessmen should make investments in Latin America and not the United States of America. In short Braden was against foreign aid as a means to industrialize the nations to the south. American taxpayers should not have to fund such a venture. He added another objection common to those who protest foreign aid, that the United States cannot buy friendship abroad through "Dollar Diplomacy." The point was made that giving something for nothing<sup>5</sup> is done at the cost of losing respect.

Speaking in favor of private enterprise, Braden cited the Mexico City Conference of 1945 as an example of Latin American republics, in concert, approving the promotion of ideals involving freedom of volition and opportunity and the

"encouragement of private enterprise, elimination of the excesses of economic nationalism and assurance of just and equitable treatment to foreign capital, management and skills." <sup>6</sup> Braden went on to say that in the United States private enterprise is the cornerstone to liberties and implied that Latin America will experience a greater degree of independence by adopting these same economic standards and it must be done with the help of the United States, not by giving or lending foreign aid but by allowing private enterprise from the United States to initiate industry in Latin America. Braden went on to say that investors in Latin America should be forewarned, that eventually their property, in all likelihood, would be repatriated, which is to say that the government of the Latin American country would take over the industry and would reimburse the owner. Ideally it would not involve confiscation or expropriation. Braden pointed out that foreign investment in the United States helped the financial development of this country. Eventually all foreign enterprise was repatriated and without the United States losing friends among nations. <sup>7</sup>

During a speech in 1946 Braden described himself as a Jeffersonian Democrat while discussing Inter-American arbitration. He was in agreement with the ideal that "government is best which governs least" and he naturally favored a laissez faire governmental approach to business.

He went on to show that with the help of the various arbitration associations private enterprise has prospered and has advanced the Jeffersonian ideal showing that business can remain virtually aloof from the encroachment of government controls. He referred to arbitration as a lubricant that prevents government and business from creating friction.<sup>8</sup> On the same evening that Braden delivered this speech he was presented with the Western Hemisphere Commercial Arbitration Award. On the introduction he was referred to as the "eminent and distinguished pioneer in the organization of commercial arbitration in the Western Hemisphere."<sup>9</sup> It would not be many years before Spruille Braden would become president of the American Arbitration Association.

Some of the other speeches during Spruille Braden's tenure as Assistant Secretary of State concerned the general area of peace. In a radio broadcast early in January 1946 Braden spoke on "Our Inter-American Policy." He made the point that the United States policy toward Latin America was essentially the same as our world policy. "We know that we can only have regional security in a secure and peaceful world."<sup>10</sup> In conjunction with this he said it was paramount that we encourage individual freedom and representative government in opposition to tyrannical and arbitrary government. During this radio broadcast Braden spoke in favor of foreign aid which he called "collaboration

for mutual benefit." He explained that by using foreign aid the United States would be helping a nation raise her standard of living or improving health; in return the United States would expect to be able to work more closely with that country which is no longer quite as dependent as previously. He went on to say that this attitude stems from his continued faith in the "Good Neighbor Policy" with each neighbor interacting with the other, each earning respect and self-respect which reinforces the need to honor agreements and obligations.<sup>11</sup> When Braden spoke approvingly of foreign aid he seemed to be speaking more as Assistant Secretary of State rather than as Spruille Braden in the light of his "Latin American Industrialization" essay discussed above, which he published in his own name later in the year.

On February 13, 1946 Braden delivered an address in New York City in which he reiterated his views of the radio broadcast. He spoke in positive terms of the efficacy of foreign aid, adding that this must include a cultural and social uplifting of the Latin nations because they generally aspire to such advancement. He called this attitude "altruistic self-interest."<sup>12</sup> By way of explanation he showed that with a selfless handout of aid and the subsequent raising of standards in Latin America the foundations of security are being strengthened on both sides with the economic, social, and cultural facelifting of these countries.<sup>13</sup> It is difficult to believe that Braden said and

meant these words but perhaps he again spoke as the Assistant Secretary of State and not as himself.

Early in March Spruille Braden talked of the importance of cultural relations programs and the exchange of students and professors, stating: "For governments that represent and serve peoples cannot possibly collaborate in harmony if the peoples themselves misunderstand and mistrust one another."<sup>14</sup> He pointed out that during the middle of the twentieth century international relations no longer depended solely upon heads of state but upon peoples as well.<sup>15</sup>

On the previous day, March 1, 1946, Braden spoke on the occasion of a dinner for Wendell L. Willkie awards for Negro journalism. It was the time when separate but equal was equal and Spruille Braden spoke as a liberal. During his address Braden showed that the term liberal had of late been misused. He said that dictatorships had applied the term "liberal" to their own governments. He then went on to say that it was not merely coincidence that etymology connected the words "liberalism," "liberality" and "liberty." He said that a free society enhanced liberalism and created a "spiritual magnanimity and tolerance, an outgoing generosity toward one's fellow man."<sup>16</sup>

Braden went on to equate freedom within a society to a peaceful society. Braden's equation was dependent upon freedom of information so that the public can become and remain informed. Liberalism and freedom of information



go hand in hand, one perpetuating the other. Braden went so far as to say that if freedom of information were universally practiced tyranny would come to an end and world wide peace would reign. He charged the journalists of the world with the responsibility of keeping the public informed so that the tomorrows might be freer and more liberal.<sup>17</sup> Braden's speech seemed somewhat idealistic and slightly naive. He did not remember that one of the drawbacks of freedom is the right to remain ignorant which makes accessibility to information less than the political cure-all Braden suggested.

On several occasions during his address Spruille Braden made reference to Wendell Willkie's "one world" concept. He referred to that ideal as a "highly practical objective."<sup>18</sup> In future years he would not speak so kindly of "one world" or other liberal phrases and institutions.

Three weeks later Braden spoke on the topic "Purposeful Peace." He said that the United States should take the initiative around the world in bringing about peace because democracy by its nature promulgates peace. He went on to suggest that the United Nations be given the clout to enforce a universal peace, saying that the United States intended to support that body to its fullest. Later on during the address, Braden refuted critics and defended the view that the United States was not at present overzealous in its pursuit of granting civil rights and

individual liberties at the expense of other worthy goals.<sup>19</sup>  
In the following years Braden was to speak less and less of individual freedoms.

Once Spruille Braden left the State Department, he and his wife Maria pondered whether it would be wise to return to Chile. They were both in agreement that they in their future should reside in New York. Braden made a living doing various things during that time. He earned an income as a lecturer and as a consultant to several large corporations. He was even asked to head a United States delegation to Canada for an informal discussion of Canadian-American political and economic problems in Europe and the Far East. Braden published his memoirs in 1971, delineating the political leanings of the American delegates to the<sup>20</sup> conference and listing himself among those on the right. The conference took place in June of 1951 and Braden wrote of it from a perspective of nearly twenty years. Can we trust Braden's statement that in 1951 he stood on the right? It is important to evaluate his speeches and writings during that time so as to understand his political stance.

On July 26, 1949, Braden spoke at Colgate University. The topic was similar to the one he developed while in the State Department. It concerned the industrialisation of Latin America. The same attitude was taken as in the former article concerning the virtues of private investment over

foreign aid to Latin America in the industrialization of the southern republics. The difference this time was the strength of the words used in criticism of the then current policy. He was critical of the millions of dollars that were spent abroad for foreign aid while aid for some American problems went undelivered. He seemed bitter when he said, "Certainly, with the world in its desperate economic and political straits, this is no time for our government to dash forth in pursuit of Utopia...."<sup>21</sup>

He then goes on to criticize liberalism. "We Americans, are innately optimistic and, therefore, always ready to try something new, especially if it promises reform or a speedier approach to the millenium."<sup>22</sup> Finally Braden ascribed a macho quality to business when he suggested private enterprise will overcome governmental intervention. "It is my belief that the majority of American business leaders still have too much virility to be led astray by the debilitating paternalism of government guarantees."<sup>23</sup>

In 1949, Braden became president of the American Arbitration Association. He was asked by the association if he would become its president. He said he would under the condition that some procedural changes would be made. These changes were made and Braden accepted the post.<sup>24</sup> Braden wrote several articles on arbitration while president of

the association. He wrote mostly on a branch of the arbitration known as the I.B.R.C. or the International Business Relations Council which had been founded in 1947. The international branch worked on the same principle as the American Association except that it was on an international basis. Whenever a business dispute existed between two parties arbitration could be sought out and either one or three arbiters would be sent in to settle the dispute. The arbiters would consist of volunteers from all walks of life. In most countries arbitrated judgments were considered legally binding. Perhaps the most important aspect of arbitration was that it was a speedy, relatively uncostly and just process. The non-profit organization would charge a standard rate of 1 percent of the arbitrated amount, which often meant payment would be but a few dollars. Arbitration both abroad and domestically became very popular since it precluded lengthy and costly court settlements. An outside virtue of international arbitration was that it showed that doing business with Americans was no longer risky.<sup>25</sup> Arbitration is even mentioned in the United Nations charter in Article 33 in reference to settling disputes. Braden wrote that the United Nations was in 1949 considering the adoption of arbitration principles for the international law commission of the General Assembly.<sup>26</sup>

In 1951 Spruille Braden entered a new line of work as chairman of the Anti-Crime Committee of New York City. He

had been asked by several prominent citizens who were civic-minded. Braden protested saying he had no crime-fighting experience. They countered that he had often spoken of the breakdown of morality as a threat to national security. Before Braden accepted he made a list of "guiding principles" for the organization. When the committee approved them Braden accepted the post of chairman. Braden saw the purpose of the committee as a watchdog of the courts and the police in their handling of the law and the administration of justice. The New York City Anti-Crime Committee stayed in existence 5½ years before its funds were dried up and it could no longer function.<sup>27</sup>

In an article titled "More Dangerous Than Spies," which appeared in Readers Digest, Braden showed that the extent of crime and corruption in the United States had a demoralizing effect on her citizenry. Furthermore, reports of New York policemen involved in criminal activities depreciated America's credibility abroad. From this Braden suggested that the communists might be backing organized crime:

Stalin could not find a speedier, surer way to defeat the democracies than by subsidizing gangsters and foul politicians. Actually, since I have seen in other countries how closely the gangsters and communists work together, I sometimes wonder if the Soviet is not in some measure inciting these vermin to defile our system of law and order. But whether or not this be so,...this scum and the corrupted law enforcement officers are among the Kremlin's best allies.<sup>28</sup>



In the following years Braden would be numbered among those who saw a communist threat around every corner. The above statement is merely an example of his qualifications.

On October 13, 1952 Spruille Braden delivered an address to several press associations in Chicago, Illinois. He spoke on a very familiar topic, that of non-intervention. He defined it to the press in the same terms he had used throughout his diplomatic career since the policy was adopted at the Montevideo Conference. Braden did take opportunity to articulate a new twist on the term "Intervention" and at the same time to take another slap at foreign aid. He called foreign aid another example of American intervention. It seemed that whenever the United States loaned or granted money abroad she also felt she had the right to supervise its implementation; technically this was intervention. Braden went on to say that United States intervention was proportionate to the money distributed to the nations around the world. He then quoted George Washington on the topic of foreign aid:

'Tis folly in one nation to look for disinterested favor from another; that it must pay with a portion of its independence for whatever it may accept under that character....There can be no greater error than to accept or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. 'Tis an illusion, which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard.

Foreign aid, Braden said, caused in the peoples receiving it a disintegration of pride and morales which translated  
29  
into a resentment of the donor nation--the United States.

Ironically just five months later Spruille Braden was to sound an urgent alarm under the roof of Dartmouth College. He said that currently there had been a "Hate the U.S.A." campaign going on throughout the Western Hemisphere, calling it a "conspiracy to destroy the United States," and that it emanated from the Kremlin.<sup>30</sup> In his speech he gave several legitimate examples of communist activities in Latin America; other examples seemed like allegations and neither could it be proven to have had a Soviet origin. The irony in this speech occurs with the recollection of the speech previously cited. He mentioned that the United States had brought about a feeling of resentment by Latin Americans due to her monetary intervention. Just five months later he attributed this resentment to communist influence. In this second speech he does make a connection with the thesis of the former speech when he said the "give away" programs, unless executed with maximum wisdom, may promote rather than diminish communism.<sup>31</sup> He made a weak connection between the two theses but we are left with the impression that Latin American resentment of the United States has two distinct sources of origin and perhaps each is dependent upon the audience gathered.<sup>32</sup>

Braden has been called a Social Darwinist, and in a continuation of the previous quote Braden went on to say about the communists, "Inferentially they promise an economic equality which is unattainable, since inequality is

a coefficient of all life." <sup>33</sup> Braden seems to be implying here that there is a natural hierarchy in life which is the basis for Social Darwinism. Those most suited for survival will adopt and their fitness to their environment will manifest itself in the accumulation of wealth. At the base of Social Darwinism is Capitalism and it is this that communism rejects as the prime human motivator. Personal wealth makes men unequal and a sharing of the wealth frees men to work for the common good. If communism appeals to Latin Americans it is because of the combination of the United States flaunting of the dollar at the expense of Latin American liberties. Braden was right; Latin American hostility to the United States had two causes, (1) the resentment created by large sums of money spent in Latin America and (2) that created by communist propaganda, which found the time ripe to help create an anti-United States sentiment.

In August and September of 1956, Spruille Braden published articles in the Saturday Evening Post and the American Mercury. He wrote on the same theme, foreign aid in each article. The second article, "Billions for Blunders," was larger and included the earlier, "Why Let United Nations Bureaucrats Dole Out American Foreign Aid?" He noted that the United States is virtually a unilateral funder of the United Nations and that her monies are dispersed among the needy nations anonymously through the

auspices of the United Nations. Some of the nations receiving United States capital through this organization are communist countries. Braden found this absurd and suggested that the United States take cognizance of the fact that it had spent, over the past ten years, \$55 billion in foreign aid.<sup>34</sup>

He contended that the American tax payer should not have to bear the responsibility for the welfare of the world. In fact, he said, the task Americans had been asked to undertake would be financially impossible to achieve. He pointed out that the \$55 billion spent over the previous ten years was equal to the net worth of the thirteen largest cities in the United States. It is significant that the United States goes many billions of dollars into debt annually without the burden of foreign aid. The insistence on giving out monies to foreign countries, which only serves to create resentment abroad, can only be motivated by madness or by "misguided idealists, do-gooders, collectivists, socialists...with a sprinkling of communists," operating within the United States government.<sup>35</sup>

Just as Braden could see communists operating in the State Department when he was Assistant Secretary, he could also see them as having gained influence on foreign policy, destroying America from within.

Speaking at the American coalition of patriotic societies in Washington on January 31, 1958 Braden brought God and country together in an attack on foreign aid. He

said "that the United States is 'disobeying God's will' by its economic help to other countries and peoples." <sup>36</sup> Braden not only spoke as an enemy of foreign aid but as a proponent of a neo-isolationism. During the 1940's Spruille Braden had battled dictators and in the fifties he became an outspoken enemy of a foreign ideology, communism, although in reference to the mid-forties he stated he knew little about communism at the time. After going to Washington as Assistant Secretary of State and being allowed to languish at that high post and eventually being edged out of the Department, Braden saw it as the product of the insidious communists who had the ear of the President and Secretary of State. He would never come to conceive of himself as an anachronism as suggested by George Blanksten, when Braden doggedly pursued World War II well after its conclusion. The fact that Braden ceased his attacks on fascist dictators after his stay in the State Department, save one, Juan Perón, who occasionally emerged in speeches, indicates that he took the struggle against Peron personally as if it were a case of demagogue versus demagogue, who was the more macho? When he was more or less forced from the State Department he felt the need to alert the nation about the communists from whom he had learned, first hand, their pernicious nature. Braden felt that what they had done to him could not go unpunished and so he became a Paul Revere warning of a new peril in red.



In the 1960's Braden's attack on communism took different forms and by the end of the decade he had faded into virtual oblivion. After the revolution in Cuba produced a communist dictatorship there, Braden expressed his views as to what should be done about it to the Long Island Federation of Women's Clubs on May 20, 1960. Besides some of the more obvious recommendations like breaking diplomatic relations, he foresaw the building of Russian missile pads and submarine bases and suggested,

We must give full financial and military aid to responsible Cuban groups now, both in Cuba and in exile. They are ready to organize armed opposition to the Castro regime. The Cubans will free themselves if the U.S.A. promptly will give them the means to do the job.<sup>37</sup>

In essence Braden outlined the conduct for the Bay of Pigs invasion which was to follow a year later.

A few days before the abortive Bay of Pigs incident the State Department issued Publication 7171 of the Inter-American Series 66. It was simply titled "Cuba" but became known as the "White Paper." Published by the Kennedy administration, the White Paper placed blame on former Cuban President Fulgencio Batista as having created conditions in Cuba so as to make revolution an acceptable alternative to that of the then present conditions. The demoralized state of the Cuban military, as a result of Batista's cynical treatment of government, precluded success against the communist forces who were fighting for a cause.<sup>38</sup> In short

the "White Paper" was a justification of what the United States had planned to do with the Bay of Pigs invasion. It was saying "we are just undoing what Batista had allowed to be done."

Fulgencio Batista, in exile, took exception to the "White Paper" and published in 1964 The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic. In his book, Batista quoted a speech by Braden made a month and a half after the issuance of the "White Paper." The speech was before the Cuban Chamber of Commerce in the United States. Braden characterized the "White Paper" as "one of the most indefensible documents I have ever seen issued by a presumably responsible foreign office."<sup>39</sup> Braden went on to point out that Cuba had enjoyed, prior to 1959, "the largest per capita income of any Latin American Republic."<sup>40</sup> The "White Paper" had described economic conditions as being poor as a result of Batista's second presidency.<sup>41</sup> To this Braden retorted,

The White Paper's direct and implied animadversions as to the poverty and bad economic conditions of Cuba, prior to the coming of Castro, are inaccurate and evidence the socialistic prejudices of its drafters....The best that can be said for it is that it displays such ignorance and lack of understanding as to explain in considerable the tragic bungling of the catastrophe in Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs).<sup>42</sup>

On April 1, 1961 just two days before the "White Paper" was published, the New York Times revealed in an article on the John Birch Society that Spruille Braden was

a member of that ultra conservative organization. Included in the Times of that date was a pamphlet that listed the members of the John Birch Society's council. The list included Spruille Braden and an explanation of the council's function. It was created (1) to show the stature of the society, (2) to keep Robert Welch, Jr., (founder and head of the society) informed, and (3) to provide a successor when Welch died.<sup>43</sup>

Braden described Welch as "a man convinced, as I am, that communism is a present danger that should be exposed.... He is trying to show the individual how he can help through individual action."<sup>44</sup> The New York Times published several articles on the Society on April 1, 1961. One of these articles reached the front page. It was the occasion when the John Birch Society called for the impeachment of Chief Justice Earl Warren and stated that Warren had "voted 92 per-cent of the time in favor of communists and subversives since joining the court."<sup>45</sup>

In July of 1961 the Times published an article that revealed a rift between Braden and Welch. Braden was critical of Welch's campaign to uncover and classify communist sympathizers, i.e. liberals. He felt it was more important and more easily accomplished to uncover the "pattern rather than the individuals" and expose it to the public.<sup>46</sup>

In 1964 it was disclosed by the Times that Braden had quit the society some two years previously. He indicated he disputed some of the things Welch had said. Welch called former "President Eisenhower a dedicated conscious agent of the communist conspiracy,"<sup>47</sup> which Braden could not accept. Perhaps the real problem was stated by Braden elsewhere in the article. "I don't want to be a director of anything I don't direct," he said.<sup>48</sup> That would seem to be consistent with Braden's independent nature.

It is interesting to note here that Braden does not make a single mention of his association with the John Birch Society in the length of his Memoirs. Is it an indication that he was not proud of his association with the society? Or is it a bad memory as was his role as Assistant Secretary of State when he was a director who could not direct.

Perhaps a partial answer to the above questions may be derived from a statement made in Diplomats and Demagogues, which was published in 1971. Braden described a situation that was created in Valparaiso, Chile, when he was a youth. It dealt with the aftermath of an earthquake.

The quake had smashed open the Valparaiso prisons and a horde of criminals was released in the city. Civilian officials were anything but courageous. But a young captain of the port, Commander Gomez Carreño, was equal to the occasion. He declared martial law in the most severe terms, and ordered it applied with deadly effectiveness....It was said that Captain Carreño took advantage of the situation to kill off a number of well known dangerous criminals. However that may be, he certainly made crime

unhealthy in Valparaiso after the earthquake....  
We could use such a hardheaded man in some of our  
cities today.<sup>49</sup>

This statement indicates that almost a decade after his departure from the John Birch Society Spruille Braden was not ashamed to espouse anti-liberal and ultra-conservative sentiments. All this indicates that Braden was not disenchanted with the goals of the Society but only with the route chosen by which to achieve them as he indicated in the Times article. What did alienate Braden was that he had no voice in formulating policy direction; this must have left him with a feeling of impotence something akin to the frustration he felt in the Department.

Braden remained active until the mid-sixties attacking liberals and communists. Often his themes dealt with morality and immorality but along the same lines. He called "for a moral revolution" and wrote about "immorality and communism," making the statement, "I have acquired quite an experience in fighting a variety of demons,"<sup>50</sup> which is not inconsistent with the title of this monograph.

The last public statement by Spruille Braden appeared in the form of an essay written for the New York Times and titled "A Return to Morality." Writing in 1973 at the age of 79 Braden continued to attack communism as the greatest of all immoralities. He called for the termination of the ever-expanding inflation that keeps America from becoming



as defensible as possible. Though the article itself speaks  
 little of morality,<sup>51</sup> this and the other essays concerning  
 the same topic of morality encourage one to believe that  
 Braden's preoccupation with morality was a personal plea for  
 justice as he felt himself a wronged man. If one reads  
 Braden's Memoirs he is struck with the fact that Braden is  
 never "wrong" and because of that we are tempted to believe  
 that Braden was an unfulfilled demagogue.

## Chapter VIII--Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>José Vicente Pepper, I Accuse Braden, edited by Editors Montalvo (Trujillo City, Dominican Republic, 1947), p. 30.

<sup>2</sup>Jesus de Galíndez, The Era of Trujillo: Dominican Dictator, edited by Russel Fitzgibbon (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1973), p. 244.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 235, 243-244.

<sup>4</sup>Spruille Braden, "Latin American Industrialization and Foreign Trade," in Industrialization in Latin America, edited by Lloyd J. Hughlett (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1946), p. 488.

<sup>5</sup>Spruille Braden, "Private Enterprise in the Development of the Americas," Department of State Publication 2640, Inter-American Series No. 32, 1946, pp. 2, 5, 6, 9.

<sup>6</sup>Spruille Braden, "Notes for Private Enterprise," Modern Mexico, Nov. 1946, p. 9.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 9, 8.

<sup>8</sup>Spruille Braden, "Arbitration in Inter-American Affairs," Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 27, 1946, pp. 778-779.

<sup>9</sup>James S. Carson, "Western Hemisphere Commercial Arbitration Award Presented to the Honorable Spruille Braden," The Arbitration Journal, Fall, 1946, p. 296.

<sup>10</sup>Spruille Braden and Ellis O. Briggs, "Our Inter-American Policy," Department of State Publication 2456, Inter-American Series No. 28, p. 15.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>12</sup>Spruille Braden, "Our Foreign Policy and Its Underlying Principles and Ideals," Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 24, 1946, p. 296.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Spruille Braden, "International Understanding Through a Cultural Relations Program," Department of State Bulletin, March 10, 1946, p. 397.

- <sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 396.
- <sup>16</sup>Spruille Braden, "Freedom of Information--A Check to Irresponsible Power," Department of State Bulletin, March 10, 1946, p. 392.
- <sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 393-394.
- <sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 394.
- <sup>19</sup>Spruille Braden, "Purposeful Peace," Department of State Bulletin, March 31, 1946, pp. 535-537.
- <sup>20</sup>Memoirs, pp. 382-383.
- <sup>21</sup>Spruille Braden, "Diligence and Thrift," Congressional Digest, May, 1950, p. 149.
- <sup>22</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 153.
- <sup>24</sup>Memoirs, p. 398.
- <sup>25</sup>Spruille Braden, "Arbitration Pays," Christian Science Monitor Magazine Section, Sept. 17, 1949, p. 2.
- <sup>26</sup>Spruille Braden, "International Arbitration: Umpire for World Trade," United Nations World, Nov. 1949, pp. 52, 50.
- <sup>27</sup>Memoirs, pp. 384-385, 395.
- <sup>28</sup>Spruille Braden, "More Dangerous Than Spies," Readers Digest, June 1951, pp. 6-7.
- <sup>29</sup>Spruille Braden, "Non-Intervention: The Conduct of International Relations," Vital Speeches of the Day, Oct. 13, 1952, pp. 102-104.
- <sup>30</sup>Spruille Braden, "The Communist Threat in the Americas: The Enemy at Our Portals," Vital Speeches of the Day, May 1, 1953, p. 432.
- <sup>31</sup>Ibid., pp. 437, 436.

<sup>32</sup>Robert F. Delaney, "Diplomats and Demagogues: The Memoirs of Spruille Braden," The Library Journal Book Review 1971 (New York: R. R. Bowker Company, 1972), p. 97.

<sup>33</sup>Braden, "Communist Threat," p. 436.

<sup>34</sup>Spruille Braden, "Why Let United Nations Bureaucrats Dole Out American Aid?" Saturday Evening Post, August 11, 1956, p. 10.

<sup>35</sup>Spruille Braden, "Billions for Blunders," The American Mercury, Sept. 1956, pp. 23, 24, 27.

<sup>36</sup>"'God's Will' and Foreign Aid," America, Feb. 15, 1958, p. 561.

<sup>37</sup>Congressional Digest, Nov. 1960, p. 287.

<sup>38</sup>"Cuba," Department of State Publication 7171, Inter-American Series No. 66, April, 1961, p. 2.

<sup>39</sup>Fulgencio Batista, The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic, translated by Blas M. Rocafort (New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1964), p. 103.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 269.

<sup>41</sup>"Cuba," Department of State Publication 7171, p. 2.

<sup>42</sup>Batista, Growth and Decline, pp. 268-269.

<sup>43</sup>"Pamphlet Listing Birch Society Council is Released," New York Times, April 1, 1961, p. 5.

<sup>44</sup>"Salesman of the Right," New York Times, April 1, 1961, p. 5.

<sup>45</sup>John D. Morris, "Birch Unit Pushes Drive on Warren," New York Times, April 1, 1961, p. 1.

<sup>46</sup>Peter Kihss, "Birch Society Building Files on Leading 'Liberals'," New York Times, July 7, 1961, p. 9.

<sup>47</sup>"Braden Discloses He Quit Birch Post," New York Times, March 19, 1969, p. 26.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>Memoirs, p. 20.

<sup>50</sup>Spruille Braden, "Immorality and Communism: Respect in Foreign Relations," Vital Speeches of the Day, April 1, 1965, p. 365.

<sup>51</sup>Spruille Braden, "A Return to Morality," New York Times, April 15, 1973, Sec. 4, p. 17.



## SUMMARY

Spruille Braden had always been successful in business; in the early 1930's he attempted to test his fortune in diplomacy. Braden had an excellent background concerning Latin American life, having spent many years there. Once given the opportunity to perform for his government he proved to be a valuable asset. In 1935 Braden was appointed ambassador-at-large to the Chaco Peace Conference in Buenos Aires. When the three arduous years were completed Braden received much of the credit for keeping the conference together and bringing about peace at a time when the conference seemed it would fail. The little known Chaco War fought between small Paraguay and Bolivia loomed a far more significant event than it may have seemed at the time. Nazi Germany began its aggressive designs leading to World War II before the Chaco Peace Pact was signed. It was Germany's hope that the peace conference would dissolve and hostilities would renew, with Argentina, Chile and Brazil joining in the fray and essentially casting the Western Hemisphere into chaos. The peaceful resolution of the Chaco Peace Conference put an end to Germany's hope.

Braden's next assignment was as ambassador to Colombia; there he encountered an airline staffed and operated by Germans. He sensed a great danger as the Panama Canal was very near. Braden discovered some very important information

about the airline, that 84 percent of it was owned by Pan American. After many months of dogged work Braden brought about the removal of the Germans from the airline. The Germans were replaced by United States pilots. The Panama Canal was safe.

Spruille Braden next became ambassador to Cuba where among other things he was credited with helping to bring about an honest presidential election and preventing a coup d'etat that would have nullified it. Braden also did something in Cuba that spoke significantly of his character. A convicted spy was ordered to his death by Braden when President Fulgencio Batista asked him to decide the man's fate. August Lüning was the only spy executed in Latin America during World War II. During Braden's stay in Cuba he seemed to reveal a new tough style of diplomacy, particularly with fellow United States citizens. He made it apparent that he wanted his words heeded.

In the middle of 1945 Braden became the ambassador to Argentina where he dealt with a fascist regime. Individual rights had been discarded and freedoms of press and speech had been suppressed. Spruille Braden informed Vice-President Perón that before the United States could do business with Argentina, the "state of siege" would have to be lifted and other stipulations had to be met. The Argentine fascists complied, at least partially, and Spruille Braden became a hero to Argentines who wanted democracy restored. Braden did

all he could to discredit the fascists while at the same time Perón used smear tactics to defame Braden. By September 1945 Braden was recalled to Washington where he became Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs. From Washington he continued his attack on Peron but ironically Braden helped bring about his election as President of Argentina.

Spruille Braden gradually lost authority within the State Department and eventually retired in 1947 an embittered man. In the following years Braden reflected as to what happened to him in Washington. He came to the conclusion that communists in the State Department were responsible for his political demise. Spruille Braden had had the reputation of being a progressive and a liberal when he was an ambassador. In the 1950's he evolved into a strong critic of government policy and a herald of insidious communist conspiracies. He became more and more conservative and when the John Birch Society was founded Braden was made one of its directors. He was to quit the society a few years later because he had no voice in policy direction. Thereafter Braden was content in continuing to write and speak out about communism.

## CONCLUSION

Spruille Braden was a bona fide hero of World War II. He was instrumental in bringing about a settlement of the Chaco dispute and in effect uniting the hemisphere against the vagaries of chaos that would have resulted. In Colombia he virtually fought alone but succeeded in expelling Nazis from a Colombian airline that presented an immediate danger to the Panama Canal and hence to the security of the Western Hemisphere. Neither of these achievements by Braden were ever acknowledged in a perspective of "What would have happened had he failed?" and hence history has never given him the credit he was due.

When Braden resigned from the State Department he was a frustrated and disillusioned man. He had been ordered from Argentina before his mission, as he saw it, had been completed. He could not see that he was perhaps beating a dead horse by pursuing World War II beyond its conclusion or that maybe he was engaging in a battle of personalities with Vice-President Perón. Braden continued the battle in Washington and when Peron was elected President of Argentina he became more and more an obscure figure in the State Department. It seems certain that either or both of these reasons contributed to Braden's political downfall.

Braden's failure to see these things about himself caused bitterness within him and a change toward the far

right politically. His sense of reality saw communists in every corridor of the State Department who helped bring about his downfall. To maintain this fallacy and avoid the truth, Braden spread the warning of the communist threat to the United States as late as 1973. Despite the results of his failure to see the truth about himself Spruille Braden was a hero of the Second World War who did not receive the proper recognition and we must treat him like Sophocles' Ajax who was remembered for what he was and not by the nature of his demise.



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## APPENDIX

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1938.

# Text of Award Fixing the Chaco

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.  
WASHINGTON, Oct. 10.—The State Department gave out the text of the arbitral award in the Chaco as made in Buenos Aires, Argentina, today, as follows:

The undersigned plenipotentiary delegates, representing the Presidents of the Republics of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, United States of America, Peru and Uruguay, authorized by their respective Executives with full powers, are annexed to the present award, to wit:

José María Cantillo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic; Ambassador Dr. Isidoro Ruiz Moreno and Minister Dr. Pablo Santos Muñoz, representing His Excellency, Dr. Roberto M. Ortiz, President of the Argentine Republic.

Ambassador Dr. José de Paula Rodrigues Alves, representing His Excellency, Dr. Getúlio Vargas, President of the United States of Brazil;

Ambassador Dr. Luis Barros Borgoño and Dr. Manuel Bianchi, representing His Excellency, Dr. Arturo Alessandri, President of the Republic of Chile;

Ambassador Spruille Braden, representing His Excellency, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America;

Ambassador Dr. Felipe Barrera Laos and Minister Luis Fernán Cisneros, representing His Excellency, General Oscar R. Benavides, President of the Republic of Peru;

Ambassador Eugenio Martínez Thedy, representing His Excellency, General Alfredo Balomir, President of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay;

## Treaty Provisions Cited

Considering

That the treaty of peace, friendship and boundaries signed under the auspices of the Peace Conference in Buenos Aires on July 21, 1935, by the representatives of Bolivia and Paraguay, ratified in accordance with Article XI, provides as follows:

"Article 2. The dividing line in the Chaco between Bolivia and Paraguay (Paraguay and Bolivia) will be that determined by the Presidents of the Republics of Argentina, Chile, United States of America, United States of Brazil, Peru and Uruguay, in their capacity as arbitrators in equity, who, acting *ex aequo et bono*, will give their arbitral award in accordance with this and the following clauses.

"A. The arbitral award will fix the northern dividing line in the Chaco in the zone comprised between the line of the Peace Conference presented May 27, 1938, and the line of the Paraguayan counter-proposal presented to the consideration of the Peace Conference June 24, 1938, from the meridian of Fort 27 of November, i.e., approximately meridian 61 degrees 55 minutes west of Greenwich, to the eastern limit of the zone, excluding the

littoral on the Paraguay River south of the mouth of the River Otúquis or Negro.

"B. The arbitral award will likewise fix the western dividing line in the Chaco between the Pilcomayo River and the intersection of the meridian of Fort 27 of November, i.e., approximately 61 degrees 55 minutes west of Greenwich, with the line of the award in the north referred to in the previous paragraph.

"C. The said line will not go on the Pilcomayo River more to the east than Pozo Hondo, nor to the west further than any point on the line which, starting from d'Orbigny, was fixed by the Neutral Military Commission as intermediary between the maximum positions reached by the belligerent armies at the suspension of fire on June 14, 1935."

## Arbitrators Will Pronounce

"Article 3. The arbitrators will pronounce, having heard the parties and according to their loyal knowledge and understanding, taking into consideration the experience accumulated by the Peace Conference and the advice of the military advisers to that organization.

## Frontiers

"The six Presidents of the republics mentioned in Article II have the faculty of giving the award directly or by means of plenipotentiary delegates"; and whereas the six Presidents have been requested by the Governments of Paraguay and Bolivia to act as arbitrators and have accepted and, using the right conferred upon them by Article 2 of the above referred to Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Boundaries, have delegated their functions as arbitrators to the plenipotentiaries above mentioned.

By Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Boundaries above referred to, Bolivia and Paraguay have established that the award shall be one of equity, the arbitrator to act *ex aequo et bono*;


## Parties to Dispute Heard

The parties, in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 of the said treaty, have been heard in special audience in which they each presented briefs accompanied by abundant documentation;

An advisory military commission has made an aerial photographic survey and an inspection of the terrain in the zones determined by the treaty of July 21, 1935, and has presented the corresponding report;

Moreover, the arbitrators have taken into account the antecedents accumulated by the Peace Conference as well as the needs of the parties with regard to their mutual security and geographic and economic necessities.

The examination of these ante-



### PARAGUAY-BOLIVIA BOUNDARY IS DETERMINED

An arbitral award by the Presidents of six American nations has finally ended the Chaco dispute. The new frontier is shown by the black line. Paraguay holds the military gains of the recent war, but does not get a foothold in Bolivia's oil fields.

of the military advisers have convinced the arbitrators that within the zones submitted to arbitration the line determined below is equitable; therefore:

The undersigned plenipotentiary delegates, acting in the name of the Presidents of the republics of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, United States of America, Peru and Uruguay, by unanimity make the following award:

The dividing line in the Chaco between the republics of Bolivia and Paraguay is the following:

In the northern zone will go from the intersection of meridian 61 degrees 51 minutes 57 seconds west of Greenwich and parallel 20 degrees zero five minutes 01 seconds latitude south (27 of November - Cabino Mendoza) to continue in a straight line to the highest point of Cerro Capitan; thence in a line to intersection of the Ravello-Ingavi road with the southern limit of the Cordoba del Talar de las Islas; from this point also in a straight line to the intersection of the meridian of Fort Ravello; thence in a straight line to the highest point of Cerro Chovoreca; thence it will descend in a line to Cerrito Jarai; thence also in a straight line to the intersection of parallel 20 degrees 40 minutes 40 seconds latitude south with the Rio Negro or Otucusi and following the thalweg of the said river, will end at the mouth of the same in the Paraguay River at 20 degrees 01 minutes 35 seconds latitude south and 38 degrees 10 minutes 12.9 seconds west of Greenwich.

In the western zone the line will go from the intersection of meridian 61 degrees 51 minutes 57 seconds west of Greenwich and parallel 20 degrees zero five minutes 01 seconds latitude south (twenty-seventh of November or Cabino Mendoza) and will descend in a straight line in a south south-westerly direction to the place called Villazon, fifteen kilometers southwest of Irindague; thence in a straight line southward to intercept the road from Estrella to Capirenda (Captain Carreras Saguer) at a point ten kilometers west of Estrella; thence in a straight line to end in the thalweg of the Pilcomayo River at 62 degrees 37 minutes 19 seconds longitude west of Greenwich.

Given in Buenos Aires the tenth day of October, 1938, in three copies: drafted in Spanish, English and Portuguese, the Spanish text controlling in case of doubt.