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Canadian foreign policy since the Second World War has passed through a number of stages, ranging from great activity in a variety of organizations and tasks to what some call a return to the isolationist policies of the 1930's. Domestic considerations, American pressure, and the flux of international events all contributed to the formulation of this foreign policy. This thesis outlines the broad picture of Canadian foreign relations between 1949 and 1973, and goes on to demonstrate that Canada's policy toward the Chinese People's Republic was a reflection of the broader course of Canadian foreign relations. Canadian Governments, and especially Liberal Governments, had for fewer reservations about recognizing or dealing with the Communist Chinese than most Western nations, but it was only when the domestic and international situations favored such action, and American objections were minimal, that the Canadians were able to act. A variety of sources were consulted for this study, both here and in Canada. The National Library and the Library of Parliament in Ottawa contained the Parliamentary <u>Debates</u>, the Prime Minister's <u>Press Releases</u>, a number of journals that are otherwise difficult to locate in the United States, and a variety of Canadian newspapers.

As official documents for the period are not yet available, newspaper accounts, and even more important, analysis and criticism in a number of Canadian magazines, were very significant in developing this study. Several book-length works, especially those of Bruce Thordarson and Peter Dobell, provided insights and details not found in other works. It is hoped that this study will not only delineate Canadian foreign policy, but demonstrate the complex situation that the smaller powers face in formulating and executing their foreign policy.

EVOLVING CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY:

CANADA AND CHINA, 1949-1973

by

Kathleen Dickerson Swiger

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the Faculty of the Graduate School at
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
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

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APPROVAL PAGE

This thesis has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of the Graduate School at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

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I. Introduction

Canadians are fond of self-examination and apparently derive great satisfaction from it, readily dissecting anything Canadian, whether it be politics, society, literature and art, or foreign policy. While other peoples engage in this pastime, Canadians seem more consistent and thorough at it. The reason for this may lie in the fact that Canada is a nation of diverse peoples and opinions, is stronger economically and more secure than many nations its size, yet is greatly influenced by the attitudes and policies of its powerful southern neighbor. Canadians have been, and still are, frank in their opinions about their nation, and the Government fosters this on-going debate about anything Canadian by subsidizing magazines, such as the _Canadian Forum_, and a variety of research organizations. Thus public debate about the great and small issues of the day is a Canadian tradition, and one in which many Canadians participate.

Though social problems and domestic policies are frequently the center of debate, another of the more popular topics for discussion is foreign policy. Canada is in a unique position because of its size, wealth and geographical location, and ties to the old Empire-Commonwealth, French-speaking nations, and western Europe. Whether the issue is the NATO alliance, nuclear weapons and NORAD, aid to developing

countries, economic policy, or the United Nations, it is usually possible to find at least two distinct opinions on the issue, and occasionally more. The "interventionists," for example, feel that Canada can aid in securing and maintaining world peace and prosperity by pursuing an active or even aggressive policy of foreign aid, United Nations peacekeeping activities, and attempts to influence American foreign policy. The "neutralists," on the other hand, feel that Canada can contribute to world peace, but lacks the diplomatic clout and economic resources to pursue many of the policies espoused by the interventionists. The neutralists favor doing all that Canada can do within its means, but not overextending itself or assuming an inflated idea of Canadian influence. For some time in the late 1960's and early 1970's many Canadians railed against the Merchant-Heeney doctrine of "quiet diplomacy," which stated that Canada should work diligently, but unobtrusively, to influence American policy in particular, avoiding any sort of confrontation.[1] Critics objected that this was simply another way of selling Canada short and simply another way of capitulating to American dictation. Scholars are now analyzing the foreign policy of the Trudeau years to determine how and why this Prime Minister's policy varies from the policies of his predecessors. Some critics and commentators argue that Trudeau has gone full circle to the non-intervention policies of Mackenzie King in the 1930's.[2]

Domestic public opinion certainly influences the course

and operation of Canadian foreign policy, but there is another factor that influences Canadian actions as much as public opinion. The American presence is a fact of life that most Canadians would rather ignore, but cannot, even if that influence is diminishing.[3] The origins of American influence are fairly obvious: geographical proximity, the penetration of American capital into many areas of the Canadian economy, the influence of American culture, even in French-speaking Canada. All these create a situation that Trudeau neatly described in his analogy of the elephant and the mouse. In the 1950's and the early 1960's this influence was extremely pervasive in Ottawa, though not without its critics. The Vietnam war and other events of the late 1960's led to a modest dimunition of the American role in Canadian foreign policy. Critics, rebelling against "quiet diplomacy," called for an independent policy for Canada. The energy and resources shortages, and a modest awakening to the realities of both American policy and aims, and the shortcomings of supposed vehicles of American imperialism, such as multinational corporation, have created yet a more independent and _Canadian_ policy, whether it is a return to isolation or not.[4]

Canadian policy toward China in many ways reflects the broader course of Canadian foreign policy. There have been differing opinions about the course of this policy, the timing of certain actions, and the reasons for acting or failing to

act. From 1949 to 1970 Canadian policy makers faced many difficulties in implementing a policy even when domestic opinion was solidly behind them because of American pressures. Recognition of the Peoples' Republic of China was not an arm of American policy, and this caused much hesitancy and no small amount of equivocation in Canada between 1949 and 1968. The idea of recognition of China was by no means a new idea, but doing so required courage, a sense of timing, and the proper circumstances. For all the American influence, it should be noted, however, that Canada never closed the door on China. Trade between the two nations continued on a very modest scale, and the grain sales of the 1960's attracted much attention and criticism. Washington might well set out guidelines, but Ottawa was not a servant of all that came from her powerful neighbor.

The source materials for this study are many and varied, though some of the most illuminating and descriptive are still classified. The debate and commentary on the subject of Canadian-Chinese relations provides many insights to complement the straight-forward narratives of events. Position papers, White papers, and statements by Cabinet Ministers provide the official version and interpretation of events, while the press and the statements of Members of Parliament frequently provide colorful or incisive commentary. Thus while information and sources deemed valuable to the historian are lacking, there is no dearth of material to provide an adequate basis for research in this topic.

Footnotes

[1]A.D.P. Heeney and Livingston Merchant, Canada and the United States: Principles for Partnership (Ottawa, 1965).

[2]Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision-Making (Toronto, 1972); J.L. Granatstein and Donald Smiley, "Full Circle in Foreign Policy," Canadian Forum 52(September, 1972): 16-18.

[3]The American influence is well-documented. See Ernest Swiger, "Canadian-American Relations and Canadian Nationalism," Annotated Bibliography, Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 1(September, 1974): 95-97.

[4]Stephen Clarkson (ed.), An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? (Toronto, 1968); Peter Drucker, "Multinationals and Developing Countries: Myths and Realities," Foreign Affairs 53(October, 1974): 121-134.

II. The Middle Power

By 1945 Canadian diplomats and policy-makers were deeply involved, with many others, in creating the United Nations and in expressing hope that this organization and cooperation among the nations would mark the origins of a new and peaceful world. Canadians were proud of their contributions to the war effort and rightly felt that they had had an important part in winning the war. Though they realized that Canada was by no means so powerful as the United States or Russia or so influential as France or China, they felt that Canada along with other relatively small nations, such as Australia or the Scandinavian states, had a particular role to play in world affairs. The "Middle Powers" should unite to see that the Great Powers did not dictate the state of world affairs or create potentially dangerous situations. Canadian officials even devised a theory to fit their perception -- "the functional theory." Though this term dropped out of usage within several years, the idea of the Middle Power, and its particular role, influenced Canadian policy and action for twenty-five years.

In the eyes of Canadian leaders during and shortly after the Second World War, one of the chief arenas for the Middle Power was the United Nations. The hope of influencing the Great Powers led to a desire to implement the United Nations

Charter. There were problems to be sure, for Canada would have to be willing to make the necessary contributions if she were to have any influence. Louis St. Laurent, Mackenzie King's successor, felt that Canadians were willing to bear the burden. He stated: " ... whatever may be required is a price that Canada is prepared to pay to make the organization effective, if it can be made effective."[1] Thus Canadians, who had treated the League of Nations with reserve, plunged into the United Nations with high hopes. Unfortunately a sense of disillusionment soon overtook many Canadians. Despite all the talk about Middle Powers, the Great Powers acted as they usually had done, ignoring the smaller countries and reserving the veto for the Security Council, which became their own preserve. Canadians did not give up hope for the United Nations because of these early actions, but began to take a realistic view of the future course of the organization.

The functional or Middle Power theory was not an iron-clad rule, however, and Canadian foreign policy, which had always been pragmatic, soon found realistic reasons to modify this theory. Since Canada was a democratic nation with historic ties to Britain, the United States, and western Europe, Canadian participation in NATO seemed a logical and practical approach to security as the Cold War began. An effective NATO would supplement the collective security to be provided by the United Nations. The North Atlantic community had always been important to Canada for reasons of defense and economics, and

NATO was now a means to strengthen older ties and thus meet a new situation.

Both the United States and Canada had emerged from their isolationist policies of the 1930's to face a grave threat in Europe. For the first time in its history, Canadian troops were stationed abroad in peacetime, marking a new departure in the growth of Canadian foreign policy. Meanwhile the Commonwealth provided an opportunity for participation in international affairs, an opportunity that was not open to many other nations. Canada had been the leader of the old Commonwealth, and Canadians assumed the leadership positions in the post-war Commonwealth that included African and Asian nations. Because of the presence of these new nations, the Commonwealth appeared to be a link between Asian and other countries or a means of sharing common interests and ideas. Canadians assisted these new nations in a variety of ways, encouraging their efforts to achieve independence, soliciting their membership in the councils of the new Commonwealth and giving aid via the Colombo Plan to a number of developing states. This Commonwealth experience enhanced Canada's status around the world, provided a link to the developing nations, and gave Canada's friends information and perspective, as well as providing useful allies in the United Nations. In these early years after the war the relationship was often close, and on one occasion Dean Atcheson sarcastically referred to Canadian-Indian-British co-operation as the " [Krishna] Menon cabal."[2]

Thus by the mid-1950's Canadian foreign policy and Canada itself had assumed the Middle Power position that gave the country importance in world affairs. The concept of the Middle Power led to Canadian participation in the United Nations, even though there were reservations about the ability of the organization. Canadian troops participated in the Korean War, and the Canadian Government worked diligently through the U.N. to solve the complicated problems associated with Palestine and Kashmir. At the same time, Canadians were among the leaders in forming NATO. Even in fostering the Commonwealth, Canada acted as a Middle Power. Part of the definition of the Middle Power was that it had the resources to aid less developed nations, and the responsibility to do so. Mackenzie King's concept, implemented by one of the brightest and most aggressive Department of External Affairs' staffs in the bureau's history, had brought Canada perhaps to the apex of her influence in world affairs.

This high point was not reached without difficulty, to be sure. Obtaining full strength for the Canadian contribution to NATO placed a strain on the Canadian Army, a strain that the Korean War made all the worse. The Canadian Government had hesitated at first to participate in Korea, but finding that public opinion demanded some action, Parliament voted to commit troops. The Canadian Government was taken aback by the invitation to join the International Control Commission (ICC) for Indo-China in 1954. Canadians had only recently

become accustomed to having troops in Europe and Korea. This invitation meant that nore troops and more money would be required. Further, the task was complicated by the lack of U.N. direction or support; the Commission itself laid plans, stationed and supplied observers and formulated policy. This meant using and supplying Canadian troops and detaching External Affairs officers for the project. There was, however, an obligation, and the Canadian Government with little support from other nations, and few ideas about organizing for this type of operation, assumed the task.[3] This stretching of material and manpower became a problem of grave importance. There were other problems as well. Being a Middle Power meant playing off one party against another in a host of situations. Within NATO, for example, Canadians could not get too close to the French without offending the Americans or the British or vice versa. Working with Nehru and Krishna Menon was bound to draw criticism from the Americans, and fostering Commonwealth activities might well be considered anti-colonial by the French or Portugese Governments. Much to the credit of the External Affairs staff and the Government in general, the problems were overcome, and Canada's star shone brightly.

The zenith of the Canadian role as the Middle Power came in 1956 with the Canadian intervention in the Suez. This action, a great success for Canada, brought much praise. At the same time, it marked a significant turning point. There were to be many more Canadian peacekeeping missions, and many other

successors, but there was also to be a rising tide of criticism, a questioning of the concept of the Middle Power, and a change in circumstances that worked to Canada's disadvantage. The middle of the road, where Middle Powers theoretically travelled, became a difficult route to follow in the late 1950's.

The Suez intervention was significant for Canada because of the boldness of the initiative and the success of the opeartion. The British, French, and Israelis had conspired in October 1956, to attack Egypt, after Egypt had closed the Suez Canal. The Israelis attacked first, and then the British and the French stepped in, ostensibly to protect the Canal. The pretext was transparent at best, and Canadians, who as a rule had closely supported the British in all matters, were now incensed. Though they did not wish to see the British dragged before the U.N. and censured, they felt that something should be done to rectify the situation. While they sought to save British and French face, they also tried to mollify the Americans who called for condemnation of the two powers as aggressors. The upshot of Lester Pearson's strenuous efforts was the creation of a U.N. peacekeeping force, which was stationed between the Egyptians on the one hand, and the British, French and Israelis on the other. A truce was effected, though no permanent settlement was achieved. Pearson won a Nobel Prize for his peacekeeping plan, which had its origins in the ICC and became an important part of Canadian foreign policy.[4] The success at Suez was sweet, indeed. Canada's stature as a world power rose, and in the next ten years

Canadians were to be involved in peacekeeping missions in Lebanon, the Congo, Yemen, India, and Pakistan, and Cyprus. Canada became the main line of communication between Britain and the United States, and Canadians attempted to restore American-British relations at every turn. Thus Canada did seem on the verge of an era of remarkable influence in world diplomacy.

Beneath the glitter of success, however, profound forces began to undermine the Canadian position as leader of the Middle Powers. First, Suez marked the end of the Canadian practice of playing the United States off against Britain, or playing the Commonwealth off against the United States.[5] Further, the victory of the Conservative Party in 1957 meant that some of the senior External Affairs staff, who were responsible for the ideas and successes of Canadian policy, left their positions, leaving new and unseasoned men in their places. Most dramatic, however, was the change in Canada's position relative to other nations. In the ten years following the Second World War, Canada had been the undisputed leader of the Middle Powers. By 1955, nations such as France, Germany, and Japan had begun their revival, and other emerging nations also took their places in world affairs. This was particularly evident in the United Nations, where an increased membership placed Canada in a large group of middle-sized, economically strong and stable nations. Though it was not dramatically apparent at the time, the Commonwealth too was beginning to

crumble as an organization, again weakening the Canadian position. The rising price of military hardware coincided with the end of the Canadian postwar economic boom, so that further strain was placed on the ability of Canada to maintain its peacekeeping and NATO commitments. Conservative foreign policy under the Diefenbaker Government from 1957 to 1963 did not differ appreciably in its aims from that of the Liberals, but for this complex set of reasons it was less successful, and was maintained at a greater price.

To this point, American influences have been mentioned only incidentally, but it was American relations that also caused some rethinking of the Canadian role and the Canadian attitude. With Canada's rise as a potent international force, it had become clear that relations with the United States could no longer assume the easy course that they once had followed. Issues extended beyond the boundary disputes, canals and tariffs. While there were many goals, such as defense, in which there were common aims, there were many other areas, such as policy toward communist China, that were a source of sharp disagreement. On the whole, between 1945 and 1955, Canadians stood up for their beliefs, but acquiesced to the American point of view where no purpose was served by criticism or conflict. In the case of Suez, for instance, the Canadians resisted American pressure to condemn the British and French, but they tended to avoid the question of American policy regarding China.

The issue of the American relationship came to a head in 1957-58 with the debate about the acceptance of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and the subsequent controversy about accepting nuclear warheads. The Liberals had all but completed negotiations for NORAD, and the Conservatives found themselves compelled to accept a _fait accompli_ in 1958. The Conservatives claimed that NORAD was an extension of NATO -- which it was not -- and thus added confusion to what was already an unclear treaty. The Conservatives also committed Canada to accepting nuclear warheads, and this and NORAD quickly became volatile political issues. Diefenbaker had been hesitant to accept the warheads for fear of a public outcry, which soon arose. The Liberals strongly criticized the acceptance of the warheads. Canada, the critics argued, was gradually easing itself out of its own defense policy by signing the NORAD agreement, leaving the DEW line to the Americans, and abandoning the Canadian-built Arrow for the American BOMARC. Later events further compounded the Conservatives problems. In 1963 Canadian military men revealed that they felt Canada was committed to accepting nuclear warheads and was not doing so. Pearson and the Liberals reversed their position on the warheads, and the Conservatives found themselves in a debate they had never anticipated. Badly divided, almost undone by the Americans, they lost the 1963 elections on this issue alone.

It is difficult for Americans to realize the heat that

this dispute generated and the depths to which it affected Canadians. Diefenbaker had, in effect, primed the nation for a debate such as this, with his anti-American attitude and his criticisms of American tariffs and American investments in Canada. Thoughtful Canadians now carried further a reexamination of their country's position, a process already under way in the late 1950's and early 1960's. One of the first full-scale criticisms was James Minifie's book Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey, in which he boldly suggested that Canada break its ties with NORAD and NATO, cast off all concern for the American reaction to Canadian policy, and make Canada the world's peacemaker, not a servant to the world's warmakers.[6] Minifie's moralistic approach had something to be said for it; many Canadians did believe that Canada's role as a Middle Power was to work for world peace, and believed that close association with the United States only served to heighten the danger of war. His critics were quick to point out that neither Canada nor the United States lived in a vacuum, and that while neutralism was a commendable policy, one could go too far in this direction, weakening the western alliance in the face of Communist pressure.[7] In the early 1960's it appeared that those in favor of close association with the United States and NORAD held the upper hand, and they produced well reasoned arguments in favor of such cooperation. R.J. Sutherland urged his fellow Canadians to stop torturing themselves with the thought that Canada was a U.S. satellite. All that was "beside

the point": no nation was or could be independent. The wisest policy was to capitalize on "our uniquely close relationship with the United States," and to use this as a source of strength in world affairs.[8] In such an atmosphere the Merchant-Heeney document was written.

The years of the Pearson Ministry (1963-1968) were years of transition for Canada, as Canadians became more and more conscious of changes in their world position. Increasingly they realized that despite attempts to loosen the American connection, there was in fact no way to undo this tie. Canadian defense planning became bound to American policy, and the indispensability of the United States in NATO had to be accepted.[9] As the American presence in Canadian affairs was examined and reexamined, the first waves of harsh anti-Americanism began to rise. When Canadians spoke out in opposition to American policy, they drew rebukes from the United States government. In 1965, for example, when Pearson in a Philadelphia speech criticized the bombing of North Vietnam, President Johnson promptly reminded him of his place.

In the last years of the Pearson Government a growing sentiment for change found expression in the press and in a number of books examining Canadian foreign policy. There was a variety of ideas, policies, and options put forward in the late 1960's. Critics suggested that Canada withdraw from NATO on the grounds that continuing in that organization only made Canada dependent upon the United States and precluded Canada from taking an active role in international affairs.[10] At the same time John Holmes noted that Canada

was no longer "a fresh young force come out of the North," and that new, realistic policies must be developed. The concept of the Middle Power, he argued, should be cast off and the idea that Canada could be a satellite should be accepted, like it or not, if that were the reality of the situation.[11] Escott Reid, the former Deputy Under Secretary of the Department of External Affairs felt that Canada should reorient its aims in the 1960's and 1970's, working to develop the Third World and to bring China into the mainstream of world affairs. Canada, in his belief, could make important contributions in these two areas by prompt and vigorous actions.[12] Others argued that Canadian peacekeeping activities should not be limited but should be extended, since they gave an important role to the smaller nations. Still others remarked and maintained that, given the rise of French-speaking Canada and the attention Quebec was receiving, Canada should put greater efforts into aiding French-speaking nations.[13]

At the heart of all these suggestions was the idea that Canadian policy had become too closely bound to American policy, and that Canada was, economically and culturally losing its independence to the United States. Some observers noted the contradiction that proximity to the United States, while giving security, limited freedom of action. Yet such observers had no positive suggestions for a Canadian course of action.[14] Stern critics of Canadian policy (and society) argued at length in favor of an "independent" policy for Canada. They felt that Canada did have choices in foreign policy areas, and

should not quietly follow along in the wake of others -- least of all the Americans. These authors were more than simply uttering anti-American slogans. They believed that, in a democracy such as Canada, all the people should be informed and consulted about foreign policy. This idea, though hardly novel, had seldom found such an extended and consistent exposition as in Stephen Clarkson's book, An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?[15] The anti-American element thus combined with a positive sentiment in some groups to create a forward-looking, if undefined, set of ideas for policy making.

Between the 1963 and the 1968 elections much soul searching took place, and the realities of the Canadian position were recognized, if no solutions to the problems were found. The concept of the Middle Power was recognized as outmoded, and some rationale for future conduct was sought. Both anti-Americanism and domestic problems entered into this reappraisal. The times were by no means easy for Canadians, at home or abroad, but the debate had been opened and the realities of the situation revealed. The wide variety of options mentioned by various authors certainly demonstrated that the nation could act in a number of ways, and what was really needed was some ordering of Canadian foreign policy priorities.

Footnotes

[1]Cited in Edgar McInnis, "A Middle Power in the Cold War," in H.L. Keenleyside (ed.), The Growth of Canadian Policies in External Affairs (Durham, 1960), 149.

[2]Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York, 1969), 700.

[3]This sketch is based upon John Holmes, "Geneva: 1954," International Journal 22 (Summer, 1967): 469-83.

[4]John Munro and Alexander Inglis (eds.), Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Honorable Lester B. Pearson (Toronto, 1973), chapters 10 and 11; Dale Thomson, Louis St. Laurent: Canadian (Toronto, 1967), 461-69.

[5]James Eayrs, Northern Approaches (Toronto, 1967), 178.

[6]James Minifie, Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey (Toronto, 1960).

[7]T.H.B. Symons, "Canada: Reluctant Satellite," Canadian Forum, September, 1960; F.A. Brewin, "Canadian Foreign Policy: The Need for Maturity," Canadian Forum, February, 1961. Hereafter cited as Forum.

[8]R.J. Sutherland, "Canada's Long-term Strategic Situation," International Journal 17 (Summer, 1962): 222-223; also Peyton Lyon, The Policy Question (Toronto, 1963) makes the same point.

[9]B.A. Crane, NATO After Ottawa," Forum, July, 1963, 76.

[10]John Warnock, "Canada and the Alliance System," Canadian Dimension 3 (1966): 39.

[11]John Holmes, "Is There a Future for Middlepowermanship," in J. King Gordon (ed.), Canada's Role As a Middle Power (Toronto: CIIA, 1966), 26-28.

[12]Escott Reid, "Canadian Foreign Policy, 1967-1977: A Second Golden Decade," International Journal 22 (Spring, 1967): 171-181.

[13]Alastair Taylor, et.al., Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response (Toronto: CIIA, 1968); Jean Morrison, "Canada's Role in a French Commonwealth," Behind the Headlines 27 (October, 1967): 16-26.

[14]Richard Preston, "Canadian External Relations at the Centennial of Confederation," in Richard Leach (ed.), Contemporary Canada (Durham, 1967).

[15]Stephen Clarkson (ed.), An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? (Toronto, 1968).

III. Canadian Foreign Policy Under Trudeau

In the years between 1945 and 1968 Canada had followed a foreign policy that entailed adherence to regional collective security organizations such as NATO and NORAD, while working diligently in international arenas such as the U.N. Collective security and internationalism were key elements of the St. Laurent-Pearson tradition, elements that even the Conservatives had to take into account in their actions. However, in the face of rising costs, diminishing Canadian influence, and increasing questioning of Canada's role in world affairs, a change in attitude and policy did not seem far off by 1968. Canadians were very much interested in what was being accomplished in foreign relations, just as they were aware of the problems they had to contend with. It thus seemed quite logical that the new Prime Minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, should call for a review of the aims and practices of Canadian diplomacy shortly after his election.

However, most Canadians had not expected such "a thorough and comprehensive review" as Trudeau proposed in May 1968.[1] He stressed a "realistic" approach in line with Canadian resources, needs, and desires, and he indicated that Canada's political "survival and independence" were at stake. He also indicated that he had already made

decisions for some important changes -- recognition of Communist China, increased emphasis on the nations of the Pacific, greater contacts with Latin America, and acceleration of international development assistance. In this statement of May 29, Trudeau clearly limited Canada's role in world affairs to the pursuit of narrow though well-defined goals. Referring to Canada as "the largest of the small powers," he said it was of little use "to pretend either to ourselves or to others that we can do things clearly beyond our national capacity."

The motives for Trudeau's review have been the subject of much debate. Bruce Thordarson in Trudeau and Foreign Policy argues that the impetus came from Trudeau's inclination rather than from internal or even external pressures. Trudeau, according to Thordarson, felt that the new Prime Minister should not simply take over Pearson's foreign policy; second, that it was part of his "image" to change and to be open to new ideas; third, that the Cabinet wished to broaden the number of persons involved in making foreign policy decisions; and, fourth, that Trudeau wished to implement policies that reflected his view of the world.[2] Thordarson's emphasis upon the personal motives of the Prime Minister and consideration for the influence of the Cabinet Ministers seems valid. Thordarson does mention public opinion and internal and external pressures, but

relegates them to a much less important role. However, the changes in Canada's position in world affairs was very striking and becoming increasingly obvious in the late 1960's. In 1945 Canada was one of the four or five greatest military powers in the world and was in much better physical and financial shape than Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and a great many other powers. By 1968 her influence had diminished considerably, while costs in both dollars and in manpower had risen. Trudeau certainly realized this. Even if public opinion polls showed little change among the people's attitudes in the 1960's, there was growing criticism that would sooner or later lead to changes in public opinion. Works such as Kari Levitt's Silent Surrender (1970), Clarkson's An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? (1968), Hertzman's Alliance and Illusions (1969), and later works such as Redekop's The Star-Spangled Beaver (1971) took the course of Canadian foreign policy to task, especially with regard to the American relationship. These and still other works claimed that Canadian foreign policy was not in line with Canadian abilities and aspirations, or the Canadian position in the late 1960's. Trudeau is a thoughtful and perceptive man, very much in tune with both public sentiment and intellectual argument. The decision to review and change foreign policy may very well have been his decision, as Thordarson suggests, but this review and

and change in all probability included much more thought about Canada's position and public opinion than Thordarson concedes. In effect calling for a change in 1968 enabled Trudeau to steal a march on his critics, present and potential.

In his 1968 list of priorities Trudeau placed national unity and the continuation of a free and independent Canada at the top, and moved peacekeeping and collective security to the bottom, and he did so for very logical and realistic reasons. Trudeau was very much concerned about Canad's future in light of the violent French-Canadian demands for sovereignty and the growth of regular political organizations espousing French-Canadian independence. There was little to be gained in Trudeau's view by being the world's peace-keeper and guardian if everything fell apart at home. At the same time Trudeau did not believe that Canada was in danger from a war between Russia and the United States; hence he thought resources allocated to collective security organizations could be freed for use in more important areas, especially at home. By concentrating Canadian foreign policy in smaller, more selective, areas where certain widely accepted goals could be achieved, the Prime Minister hoped to draw Canadians together and create a more unified and nationally-oriented country. This domestic, even political, consideration was also one of the most important in the decision to review and alter foreign policy.[3]

Not long after the 1968 statement, Canadians began to

see new policies in effect, even while the review was only beginning. In 1969, Trudeau much to the consternation of his NATO allies, decided to limit Canadian participation in that organization. This decision was made under pressure, as the Canadian budget was under consideration and NATO itself had requested statements from members about their projected participation in the organization. The decision to curtail participation was a logical one given Trudeau's aims and priorities. The Prime Minister solicited the opinions of the public, the academic community, Parliament, and his advisers before announcing the cuts in troop strength in Europe. Though Europeans and Americans were at first alarmed, the Canadian withdrawal of troops was not as substantial as feared, and the Canadian staff worked closely with NATO officials in planning and executing the cut-backs. Both friends and critics of the decision believed that the Prime Minister had already decided upon this course of action, and that the only real decision was how far to cut Canadian participation. In their opinion events had only served to force the issue, which would have come to a head sooner or later.[4]

Many Canadians applauded the move, seeing it as an important precedent in Canadian policy. It served Canada well by reducing committments, cutting expenses, and above all serving notice that Canada was to pursue a more thoughtful and Canadian policy in the future. Critics, however, were

greatly alarmed at this action, seeing in it the first stages of a return to isolationism. The purpose of the announcement was in part to indicate to Canadians that new approaches to old problems were to be considered and adopted, but this information only heightened fears that there would be other withdrawals and dramatic changes in Canadian policy. Peyton Lyon observed:

> We are retreating from Europe, failing to increase our activity in other areas or organizations to any significant degree and taking a giant step in the direction of continental isolationism. If not quite a free ride in world affairs, we are taking one that will be much cheaper, and more sharply focussed on national interests.[5]

Though this change in the NATO commitment was only one action, and what proved to be a limited one at that, it was a sign of the changes the Liberals and Trudeau wished to make.

In 1968 Trudeau had hoped to produce a "white paper" evaluating foreign policy and projecting a course of action. The process became more involved, though, as parliamentary committees, party conferences, the press, and intellectuals all joined wholeheartedly in scrutinizing Canadian diplomacy. The task was by no means an easy one; assembling the material and preparing a statement dragged on for some time. The Opposition was able to keep the issue alive in Parliament by continual questioning about the appearance of the report, a strategy that also served to give the impression that the nation was without a policy during this time. What finally appeared in late June 1970, was a set of six booklets with

with the title Foreign Policy for Canadians. The first booklet provided the reasons for undertaking this analysis and the criteria for choosing a policy, noted the difficulty of making such choices and the problems the world faced in the 1970's, and finally outlined the policies that Canada would follow in the coming decade. The other five pamphlets, or section papers, dealt with policy matters in a particular area. Europe, Latin America, and the Pacific were the three areas of greatest emphasis while the United Nations and development assistance were discussed in two other papers. The publication of these papers removed the pressure from the Government, and provided the long-awaited statement of Canadian aims.

Each of the pamphlets is a clear and succinct statement of aims and the rationale for pursuing a stated policy. The booklet dealing with Europe states that Europe is a good counter-weight to the United States, which was hardly a new idea. The Canadian policy was to increase ties to Europe, especially France, in order to strengthen Canada. In the area of Latin American relations, ways in which Canada could become more closely involved with these nations were stressed. Membership in the Organization of American States was not recommended, at least until Canada had developed independent policies with these nations, so that American influence in the OAS would not limit Canadian freedom of action. The United Nations pamphlet stressed the necessity for new activities for Canada

within the United Nations organization, Canada to have less of a political role, while playing a bigger part in economic development, international law and human rights. The paper on international development called for increased financial assistance with less aid restricted to Canadian purchases, and more assistance from the private sector. The Pacific policy booklet, which will be discussed in detail later as it pertained to China, urged the strengthening of economic connections with Japan, China, and other Pacific nations.

The reaction to the foreign policy papers was mixed, to say the least. Supporters of the Trudeau foreign policy were quite satisfied with the statements and found them a useful source for discussing policy or citing the reason for this or that action. They felt that the papers were realistic and rational, stressing the financial aspect of Canada's international relations. A number of editorial writers noted that under the new policy Canada was no longer committed to peacekeeping or to pretending to be neutral, a policy and a pretence that disturbed them.[6] Dobell also saw virtue in the papers, noting that they gave Canadians "a transcendent goal" and averring that there was no risk "of a retreat into isolationism, ... because Canada needs to express its separate identity through international action."[7] However, a great number of people found the papers a source of concern for a variety of reasons. The first, and most general criticism was simply to say "so what?" After so much preparation and fanfare, the booklets

offered little that most observers had not already seen put into effect between 1968 and 1970. The general review proved little more than a summary of the policies the Trudeau Government had implemented, and in fact reflected or expanded on Trudeau's 1968 statement. Further, some felt the review touched all points of the compass, but failed to come to any hard and fast conclusions about the courses of action that ought to be pursued.[8] A second and more penetrating criticism was that by far the most important aspect of Canadian external relations was entirely omitted in the booklets -- the United States was hardly mentioned. This represented a great omission in the eyes of many, particularly in light of the continuing anti-American sentiment stirred by criticism of American investment and by the Vietnam War. Failure to treat this important topic was seen by some as quiet acquiescence to the larger aims of American policy, particularly in view of the fact that the Canadians' economy was tied to and dependent upon the American economy.[9]

A number of vociferous critics found what they deemed deep philosophic problems in the Trudeau policy. The booklets all stress economic growth as a cardinal point in Canadian policy, a notion that had its place, but in the eyes of some critics, not as one of the main concerns of Canadian external relations. The Toronto Globe and Mail editorialized that "whether talking about Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Pacific, or Western Europe the report usually is concentrating upon one point: dollars and cents." Further, in the estimation

of the Globe, the entire policy "tipped the scale toward the dollar and away from diplomacy."[10] These were mild words in the light of Jack Granatstein's scathing remarks:

> The world is our oyster, and these are opportunities too good to be missed in the Pacific states and in Latin America. The smell is that of long green, the message that of the open door and the idealism that of the beckoning market mentality.

Granatstein concluded his review:

> The only message that comes through loud and clear is money for businessmen, profits, and dollars invested abroad. Preserve and extend the status quo.[11]

Remarks such as these indicated that by placing economic concerns at the head of the new list of priorities, and moving peacekeeping and world security to a lower position, the Government left itself open to the charge of being mercenary and Philistine, as well as of abandoning the important goals that permitted economic growth. Though the Minister of External Affairs later denied that the Government had abandoned other goals for economic aims, the damage had been done, and the critics rightly maintained that the idea of dollar-diplomacy might well damage Canada's image abroad.[12]

To many critics, Trudeau's policies also appeared to be movements toward isolation or toward an unduly modest or overly realistic assessment of Canadian influence on world affairs. Peyton Lyon's remarks about NATO applied to all phases of the new statement of Canadian aims, while Jack Granatstein labelled the policy review "no ringing manifesto" but described it as "modest and careful, cautious and imprecise, and so, so Canadian."[13] In a more extensive review Granatstein

compared Trudeau's policies to those of Mackenzie King, declaring that "our policy now is as isolationist as ever it was in the 1930's," and noting that the only difference was that "Washington [had] replaced London as the source of information and world view."[14] Of some viewed the new policies as isolationist or understating the Canadian potential, at least one critic, Claude Ryan of <u>Le Devoir</u> remarked that they lacked idealism or altruism that had characterized previous Canadian policy. He caustically commented:

> Les planificateurs fédéraux ont voulu se libérer du complexe de "boy scout" qui caracterisa naguère la politique étrangère du Canada. Le "realisme" qu'ils ont substitué à l'ancien aux préoccupations des hommes de ce temps.[15]

There was in these policy statements an apparent rejection of the role Canada had played and the success in this role that Canada had had after the war that deeply concerned these men. Though Trudeau and his advisers did not intend to dispense with these activities, it certainly appeared that way. There was very little means by which the Pearson tradition could be rejected outright, even if such were intended, but this thought did not stop the critics.

It is difficult to anaylze the Trudeau foreign policy because it is still very much with us. It certainly was a new policy, and for whatever reasons, Trudeau intended it to be that way. The emphasis upon Canada, and a policy that would better serve Canadian goals was necessary in the late 1960's and the early 1970's. Faced with great difficulties at home, the Government understandably tried to curtail

foreign ventures and limit Canadian activities to those with popular support. The 1968 statement and the policy review were attempts to head off criticism, reorient Canadian policy, and coherently state Canadian priorities. Though he did meet these two goals, Trudeau was unable to quiet his critics. He laid out his priorities, but omitted a statement on American relations, a topic of great concern to many, and in the eyes of many surrendered Canadian idealism in foreign affairs for dollar-diplomacy. A modest policy with modest aims stirred anger in others. However, in the long run Trudeau correctly assessed the situation or acted to create the situation he desired. In the past several years foreign policy has not been a great issue in Canada. American relations have always been a topic for discussion, but the general aims and actions of Canadian foreign policy seldom appear in the spotlight. One cause is that domestic concerns, such as unemployment, energy, and inflation have become the great problems that need solving. There is another cause though, and that is the fact that Trudeau defused foreign policy as a source of discontent. In a fashion, Trudeau made Canadian foreign policy so bland, so low-key and unexciting, that people did not become interested. This, indeed, may be grounds for criticism, but Trudeau's attitudes toward foreign policy do seem to be the ones best suited for the times.

Footnotes

[1]Pierre Trudeau, "Canada and the World," Statements and Speeches, no. 68/17, May 29, 1968.

[2]Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision-Making (Toronto, 1972), Chapter 4.

[3]Ibid., Chapter 3, in particular.

[4]Peyton Lyon, "A Review of the Review," Journal of Canadian Studies, May, 1970, 34.

[5]Ibid., 36.

[6]"Foreign Non-Policy," editorial, Edmonton Journal, June 27, 1970; "Foreign Policy: Some Myths Laid to Rest," editorial, Montreal Gazette, June 27, 1970.

[7]Peter C. Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles (Toronto, 1972), 151 and 154.

[8]Dale Thomson and Roger Swanson, Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives (Toronto, 1971), 154.

[9]"Dollar Diplomacy," editorial, Toronto Globe and Mail, June 27, 1970.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Jack Granatstein, "The Foreign Policy Review: 1. Lumping It," Forum, July-August, 1970, 154.

[12]Thordarson, 196.

[13]Granatstein, "The Foreign Policy Review," Forum, July-August, 1970, 154.

[14]Jack Granatstein and Donald Smiley, "Full Circle in Foreign Policy: Two Views," Forum, September, 1972, 16-18.

[15]Claude Ryan, Editorial, Le Devoir, June 27, 1970.

IV. China Policy in the 1950's and Early 1960's

Canada's policy toward China reflects many of the problems and Frustrations of Canadian foreign policy in general. The desire to carry out an independent, peaceful program that would foster economic development and world order was constantly balanced by the need for defense and the participation in military alliances that the Cold War produced. Further, there was always the American influence upon the conduct of Canadian affairs, an influence that was especially strong in the case of the Communist Chinese. American policy until very recently disdained recognition of the Chinese People's Republic (CPR), and the Americans energetically attempted to prevent others from doing so. Though Canadians in general wished to recognize Communist China from 1949 on, the flow of international events, domestic considerations, and American pressure were all factors, bearing different values at different times, that Canadian policy makers had to consider.

When the Nationalist Chinese fled to Taiwan in 1949, most Canadian officials assumed that Canada would recognize the Communist Government created by Mao Tse Tung within a relatively short time. Canadians had not been heavily engaged in the Pacific war or in China, and had no attachment to the Nationalist regime. When the Nationalists left Peking, the

Canadian ambassador remained there until February 1951, and a Canadian consulate remained in Shanghai until late 1951.[1] The Communists had invited Canada and a number of other nations to recognize their Government on October 1, 1949, and India for one had promptly done so. The Canadian Government was somewhat disturbed by the Chinese refusal to recognize Great Britain in early 1950, and had some issues, such as the treatment of Canadian missionaries and the nationalization of some business firms, to work out before recognition could be granted. However, it appears that thinking on these issues was taking place in Ottawa in 1950, even if there was no action, and recognition was by no means impossible.[2] An article in the April 1950 issue of the Canadian Forum explored in some detail the reasons for recognizing Mao's Government. First, Canada ought to seize the lead rather than to wait for the Americans, because prompt action might well ease the Chinese away from the Russian influence, precluding a feared combination of those two Communist giants. Further, it was foolish to think that "the undiluted Western democratic or American way of life" was to be the "universal pattern" for Asia, China, or other Asian nations. Some compromise and flexibility would enable Canadians to take the initiative and perhaps disarm or at least placate a potentially dangerous enemy.[3] The outbreak of the Korean War, however, took Ottawa by surprise and dampened all hope for immediate Canadian recognition of the Communist Government.

The Canadian Government's desire to recognize the CPR

did not diminish with the coming the Korean War, but the situation in which Ottawa found itself precluded any friendly action. The Government did feel that the Chinese, though not aggressors, were certainly aiding the North Koreans, and for this reason felt compelled to send troops to the United Nations forces, thus placing them in conflict with the Chinese. While contributing to the United Nations effort, the Canadians did refrain from overt propaganda against the Chinese, and resisted attempts to broaden the war in Asia, feeling that sooner or later China must be dealt with. Despite the war, there was a strong sentiment in Canada that a policy of military containment in Asia was impossible, and that only be recognizing the situation in Asia and understanding the problems to be faced, could any solution be achieved.[4] This is not to say that all Canadians favored a rapprochement with the Communist Chinese. Letter writing campaigns criticizing the CPR were organized by various groups, notably the Catholic Church, and the Conservative Party denounced any suggestion by St. Laurent or Pearson that Canada should have any dealings with the Communists. One Conservative M.P., for example, concluded an emotional speech in Parliament by asking how the Canadian Government could deal with a government whose hands were "still red with the blood of Canadians."[5] Pearson and St. Laurent thus found it to their advantage to keep the issue out of the public arena, despite their strong feelings about it.

The Canadian Government kept in contact with the Peking

Government, and negotiated directly with it about aspects of the truce settlement and the return of Canadian prisoners or war. Though Canadian policy displayed an independence and directness at this point, there were additional complications that created an uncertain air in the official Canadian attitude and prevented further progress or action. Pearson later admitted that, throughout the Korean War, American pressure had been significant, and that Australia and New Zealand also had discouraged the Canadians from becoming friendly or making overtures to the Chinese.[6] At the same time the Canadian Government had to develop a positive policy that would take into account the Nationalist Chinese, the problem of United Nations seating for the Communists, and a realistic appraisal of Communist motives and actions. Under the weight of these considerations, and some domestic criticism, the St. Laurent Government took no action to recognize the Chinese or promote better relations for some time -- from the end of the Korean War to the Conservative electoral victory in 1957.

By 1957, however, the China issue had come into its own again as an important topic for a variety of reasons, not the least of which were economic. John Harbron, a Canadian commentator, observed in the Forum that trading across ideological barriers was neither new nor unprofitable, especially in the case of trade with China, where strategic or restricted items were not at all involved. Further, Harbron suggested that Canadian trade with China might well lead to improved

United States-China relations.[7] The decision to begin the grain trade with the Communist Chinese caused some division within the Conservative Ministry, but the need to sell large quantities of surplus wheat and fertilizer overrode any such complications. This policy placed the Conservatives in the peculiar position of doing an about face on their former disclaimers about the Communists, as well as leaving them open for some humorous and telling criticism in Parliament.[8] The sales proved not only profitable in the economic sphere, going from $4 million in 1959 to $136 million in 1964, but also politically profitable, as the grain sales are credited with saving the Prairie Provinces for the Conservatives even in their losing efforts in 1963. Critics might well claim that China was not using the wheat for the mass of her people, but only for select groups,[9] but these economic and political advantages insured, at least in part, that relations with the CPR would be continued.

Under the Conservatives thought was given to recognizing Communist China, but no action was taken. Howard Green, the Conservative Secretary of External Affairs had epitomized the Middle Power syndrome in an article in 1960, stating that Canada had to take the independent approach to problems, to be the "honest broker," and to act in an "idealistic, unselfish fashion."[1] However, Mr. Green also stated in a speech in Vancouver that the Government did not intend to establish any diplomatic relations with Communist China at that time, a policy one French-Canadian

columnist applauded loudly.[11] The Quemoy and Matsu incident as well as the Chinese ventures into Tibet and India, did little to gain sympathy for recognizing China, and in fact provided much ammunition for those opposing such recognition. One M.P. pointed out that Canadian recognition of the CPR would be "discouraging [to] other nations, especially those of southeast Asia," while another pointed out that the Chinese Communist Government was a "ruthless aggressive government" that attacked even its friend.[12]

During the Conservative rule there were thoughtful critics who saw the Canadian dilemma and paved the way for the Pearson Government's attempt to resolve the complexities of the China situation with the "two China" policy. In 1958 one observer had commented that the China problem was most difficult for the Canadian Government because of the difficult situation itself and the great pressures that it created. He noted that though Canada wished to pursue an independent course that was fair to all concerned, American pressure in particular forced Canada away from her desired course of action.[13] At the same time the realization came that Taiwan was going to prove to be the biggest stumbling block to any recognition of the Communists, and might well be as big a problem as American pressure. In 1959 Chou En-Lai had declared that Taiwan was a part of Chinese territory, and that the Communist Government would not recognize any attempt to create two Chinas. This pronouncement did not go unnoticed in Ottawa.[14]

The Canadian position was an easy-going and accommodating one with respect to the CPR and the Nationalists. Most Canadian Government officials at one time or another realized that the CPR was the viable government of a great number of Chinese, and one that ought to be recognized and brought into the world community. On the other hand the Nationalists had created a viable government as well, and it was against Canadian nature to declare that Taiwan should simply be turned over to the Communists. The Canadians had no liking for Chiang Kai Shek, as he had misused Canadian assistance during the war, and had generally done little to ingratiate himself or his Government to the Canadian public. Though the Nationalists established an embassy in Ottawa, the Canadian Government did not reciprocate. Canadians tended not so much to be concerned for his Government, but rather for his people. For this reason Canadians wished to find some means of self-determination for Taiwanese rather than to make a judgement about them one way or another. Thus the hard line established by the CPR caused difficulties for the Department of External Affairs.

There were ramifications of the China policy that complicated the Canadian dilemma. Recognition and support of the Taiwan Government would clearly aggravate the Communists and create a more difficult situation for Canada. On the other hand recognition of the CPR would entail declaring Taiwan a part of the CPR, and thus antagonize the Americans as well as breaking with past Canadian policy on the subject. There was no easy solution to this. To break with the United States on

this matter, and then be snubbed by the Chinese would only make Canada look foolish, while it would be equally foolish for Canada to declare that Taiwan did belong to the CPR. Both Pearson and Diefenbaker brought the subject of recognizing China up in different conversations with President Eisenhower, and apparently both were roundly criticized for suggesting any compromise on the issue. The United States made it clear that it was committed to supporting Chiang Kai Shek, and would not tolerate any differing opinions.[15] In order to seek some accommodation Canadian policy makers began to formulate a new Canadian approach that would hopefully circumvent the impossible situation they faced in the early 1960's.

The new Canadian policy was an ingenious attempt to recognize the positions of all parties involved. In 1964 the French had granted recognition to the CPR without breaking relations with Taiwan, as mentioned earlier. Though the Nationalists broke with the French shortly thereafter this bold attempt to overlook the complexities of the situation gave the External Affairs thinkers of the new Pearson Government the idea for their "One China, One Formosa Solution." The Canadian policy was not intended to be applied in the entire international relations system, but rather was focussed at first only on a United Nations solution. Paul Martin, the Secretary for External Affairs, first made the proposal in a speech in the United Nations in which his aim was only to set forth a means to seat the Communist Chinese in that organization. To this end Martin suggested that the Communists

take a seat on the Security Council and in the General Assembly, while the Nationalists would occupy a seat in the Assembly as well. This recognized the realities of the situation without treading on the rights of either nation. It further served notice that Canada intended to take action to bring the CPR into the world community. Martin's proposal made no headway, in part because no one placed the idea that he had suggested in the form of a motion for the United Nations delegates to consider. Consequently the organization took no action, and in fact it appeared that few nations wished to bring the matter up for discussion. Pearson and Martin were quite well aware of the difficulties they faced, especially in light of the CPR attitude toward Taiwan, but they persisted in their pursuit of this policy because they felt it would "begin a process of breaking the log jam which has faced the United Nations assembly for many years." Further, they fully realized that their proposal was "not an attempt to create two Chinas," but rather was:

> an attempt to outline what might be a reasonable interim solution to the problem of Chinese representation, strictly limited to the United Nations context with no implications in respect of the questions of sovereignty or territorial rights ....[16]

The Pearson proposal for the United Nations coincided with a growing interest trading with the CPR. For example, in the spring of 1964, Foreign Trade, the international trade journal published by the Department of Trade and Commerce, published several articles on trading with Communist China.

These articles, and in particular the one by R.K. Thompson, the Senior Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong, gave detailed information about how to approach the Chinese, what types of goods were in greatest demand, and how to arrange for contacts and payments. Nowhere in any of the articles was there the slightest hint that such trade with the Chinese was improper, or even had a limited future.[17] At the same time public opinion came to favor recognitionof the CPR, and even more strongly to favor improving trade relations, a phenomena that crossed party lines as well.[18] A 1966 Parliamentary debate on wheat sales to China demonstrated that the question before most M.P.s was not whether or not to sell wheat in quantity to the Chinese, but rather how to expand the range of goods being sold to them, so that a greater sector of the Canadian economy might profit from the exchange.[19]

The Canadian Government began to feel some latitude in its approach toward the Communists in 1966. The "One China, One Formosa Solution" failed to materialize in the United Nations, but American pressure relaxed. Indeed, it relaxed to the point that Pearson stated in a New York interview that Canada would recognize the CPR, even if it were not seated in the United Nations.[20] The opportunity did not present itself, however. The Great Cultural Revolution threw China into turmoil, leading to uncertainty and hesitation in Ottawa, and a withdrawal of Chinese interest in the possibilities.

Thus Canada sought the recognition of Communist China

from 1950 on. The policy was not popular with the United States, and at the time not even with the Canadian people. The Canadian Government did what it could to maintain contact with the Communists, and was successful in this respect. Events simply did not work in favor of giving formal recognition to the Peking Government, but the growth of trade relations demonstrated Canadian interest in the CPR. The "One China, One Formosa Solution" was an attempt to introduce the CPR into the United Nations, as a first step toward a wider recognition. Canadian policy makers wished to see the CPR recognized, but at the same time be fair to the Nationalists. Taking these factors, and others into account it is not difficult to see why the Canadians made little progress toward their goal.

Footnotes

[1]John W. Holmes, "Canada and China," in A.M. Halpern (ed.), Policies Toward China (New York, 1965), 103-104.

[2]Chester Ronning, "Nanking: 1950," International Journal 22 (Summer, 1967): 441-443.

[3]C. Cecil Lingard, "Canadian-Chinese Checkers," Forum, April, 1950, 1-4.

[4]"Dilemma of the West," Forum, March, 1951, 3.

[5]Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 1953, 3375, remarks of Mr. Drew, February 12, 1953. Hereafter cited as H.C. Debates.

[6]See the Toronto Globe and Mail, April 9, 1968 and Department of External Affairs, Monthly Report, April, 1968, 47, for Pearson's remarks.

[7]John T. Harbron, "Time to Trade with Mao," Forum, January, 1957, 219.

[8]H.C. Debates, 1960-61, 5141-42, Inquiries of the Ministry, July 13, 1961, for example, records the exchange between Mr. Martin (Liberal) and Mr. Hamilton (Conservative), Minister of Agriculture.

[9]Jack Macbeth, "Red China's Racket in Our Wheat," Saturday Night, March 3, 1962, 19-20.

[10]Howard Green, "The Canadian View of World Problems," External Affairs 12 (March, 1960): 534-550.

[11]L. D'Appollina, "La déclaration de M. Green sur la Chine rouge," Relations, February, 1960, 44.

[12]H.C. Debates, 1960-61, 8098, remarks of Mr. Pigeon, September 7, 1961; and 1960, 362-363, remarks of Miss Aitken, January 26, 1960.

[13]Maxwell Cohen, "A China Policy for Canada," Saturday Night, October 11, 1958, 14-15, 48-50.

[14]H.C. Debates, 1960, 938, Mr. Green's speech, February 11, 1960.

[15]The discussion in this and the preceding paragraph is based in large part upon materials in Holmes, "Canada and China," and F. Conrad Raabe, "The China Issue in Canada: Politics and Foreign Policy," Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1970.

[16]H.C. Debates, 1966-67, 5033, Inquiries of the Ministry, May 12, 1966, and ibid., 10293-95, Supply Debate, November 24, 1966.

[17]R.K. Thompson, "Selling to Communist China," Foreign Trade 121 (April 18, 1964): 22-25.

[18]Holmes, "Canada and China," 115, cites an April 15, 1964, Canadian Institute of Public Opinion Survey in which 51 per cent of the Canadians surveyed favored recognition, and 63 per cent favored trade relations.

[19]H.C. Debates, 1966-67, 3853-3854, remarks of Mr. Sharpe, Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Caouette, April 5, 1966.

[20]This remark is reported in the Ottawa Citizen, the New York Times, and other papers in the November 26, 1966 issue.

V. Trudeau and China, 1968 to the Present

The election of Trudeau in 1968 marked the juncture of a number of positive factors with resepct to Canadian relations with Communist China. First, Trudeau had a long interest in the CPR. Though not an old China hand, he had, in his travels, visited the nation and written an account of his experiences there and the thoughts that the trip had evoked.[1] During his election campaign he had spoken frequently of diversifying Canadian foreign relations, expanding Canadian interests in the Pacific and specifically of recognizing Communist China with the understanding that Canada would not break relations with Taiwan. Thus Trudeau's interest in China and his pledge to make some arrangement with the CPR were an important part of his policy to widen the horizons of Canadian foreign policy. After his election he clearly stated his intention to pursue this policy of recognition in the near future.

Public opinion within Canada, perhaps impressed by the value of the trade with the CPR, also favored recognition, as did many editorial writers. The major political parties including the Conservatives, agreed that Communist China should be recognized, and most put such a statement into their platform or made public statements to that effect during

the 1968 election. Though all made concessions for Taiwan, the general thrust was toward recognition of the CPR. The intellectual atmosphere had been prepared for such a move as well. Foreign policy observers and analysts had favored such action, and articles such as Escott Reid's "Canadian Policy in China," strongly urged that the Canadian Government do as much as it could to promote the recognition of the Peking Government for the good of all the nations of the world.[2]

The international situation had also changed by late 1968 and early 1969. The CPR had overcome its internal problems, and was again interested in world affairs. At the same time the United Nations again renewed its interest in the Communists, and proposals such as the Albanian Resolution for seating the Communists and ousting the Nationalists were drawing more attention and support. It was increasingly obvious that it would be difficult to ignore a nation of the size and importance and population of China, despite American pressure to keep China out of the United Nations. After four years of analysis, many nations had also noted that even though the French had broken with Taiwan, there had been no grave consequences or repercussions for either party, proving that such an action could be taken without emminent disaster. The last factor, one of some significance, was that the U.S. President was talking in terms of detente, and of opening relations with China, while vowing to end the American pressure

in Vietnam. In this atmosphere the situation looked to be a most auspicious one for a Canadian initiative.

After Trudeau's statement of May 29, 1968, there was however, little action on this issue for another eight or nine months, leading some to believe that the Prime Minister had not been completely serious in his statement. Three months after the May pronouncement on foreign policy, one critic observed that Trudeau's statement amounted to an offer that the Communists would never accept, leading to speculation that the Prime Minister was only going through the motions with the CPR in order to satisfy the "well-meaning left wing," while saving Canada "the trouble of diplomatic relations with Communist China at a time when relations would be of limited advantage to both sides."[3] Such views were dismissed when representatives of the CPR and the Canadian Government met in Stockholm in February of 1969 to discuss means of opening formal diplomatic relations between the two nations. The Department of External Affairs apparently was given much latitude in conducting the talks, the only directives from the Cabinet being to support the Chinese bid for representation in the United Nations, and not to state that Taiwan belonged to the Communists.[4] With limited and well-defined aims the Canadians were in a good position and hoped to make progress without too much difficulty.

The Chinese, however, were suspicious of the Canadian motives, fearing that this might be some sort of ploy backed

by the Americans to embarass them, or lead to the adoption of some form of two-China recognition. The Chinese had three demands: recognition of their regime as the legal government of China; support of their claim for a United Nations seat; and the acceptance of their claim to Taiwan. The Canadians readily agreed to the first two items, but balked at the third. The talks began a lengthy period of no progress whatsoever. The Chinese tried alternately cajoling and threatening, but to no avail. On the other hand Canadian representatives attempted to formulate some sort of statement that would suit the Chinese without completely selling out the Canadian position on Taiwan. The talks recessed from time to time, and often showed little hope of success.[5] Events in other areas moved swiftly, however, and there was criticism that Canada was wasting time and money on these talks, while the threat of being embarassed by the United Nations passage of the Albanian Resolution grew almost daily.[6] Anti-Communist critics had a field day with the delays, noting that even if Canada did achieve some sort of solution, it was only opening the door for the entrance of a dangerous enemy.[7] By mid-1970 it did appear that much effort had gone for naught in Stockholm.

In the autumn of that year the Chinese suddenly became more receptive to the Canadian proposals about Taiwan, and the conversations picked up tempo. After some negotiating a compromise was achieved that both sides were pleased to announce. Canada recognized the Communist Chinese Government

as the sole Chinese Government, and in accordance with the implication of this statement, took steps to terminate formal relations with the Taiwan Government. Further, Canada agreed to assist the Communist Government in securing representation at the United Nations. On the issue of Taiwan, the Canadian Government "took note of" the Communist claims to Taiwan and recognized the importance of this claim. Mitchell Sharpe, the External Affairs Secretary, expanded upon this point at a later date, noting that Canada realized the Communist claim was significant to them. In accordance with past policy, the Canadian Government had no comment on the future of Taiwan.[8] Booth Governments agreed to exchange representatives, and almost a year later a full Canadian delegation was in Peking. In January of 1971 the Canadian Government sent an interim chargé d'affaires to the Chinese capital, and in June the Canadian ambassador arrived.[9] A large trade mission, headed by the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Jean-Luc Pepin, visited the CPR in early July 1971, and gained much information about commercial relations during this five day visit.[10] After twenty years of isolation the Canadians had made great progress with the Chinese in a very short time.

Though controversy about China was by no measn ended, for the question of expelling Taiwan from the United Nations still provoked debate, Canada did derive a number of advantages from this action. The country raised its stature in world affairs. It was instrumental in obtaining the eventual seating

of a CPR delegation at the United Nations. The "Canadian formula" was subsequently used by a number of nations in establishing relations with Peking. The Canadian recognition encouraged a relaxation of the American attitude toward China -- the extent to which the Canadian policy directly or indirectly guided or influenced American policy is an intriguing one. Canadian public interest was stimulated by the recognition and Pepin's trade mission in 1971. Indeed, it is in the economic sphere that Canada probably gained the most. Though there were difficulties in dealing with the Communist Chinese, as with any Communist Government, mainland China did represent a vast potential market for many Canadian products, an aspect the Canadian Government did not overlook when writing about China.

The accent on trade with China was by no means new to Trudeau, but it received additional impetus after 1968. While the negotiations for recognition of China were in progress, one business journal noted that the United States concern over these talks was probably a facade because the Americans would doubtless find it easier to approach the Chinese in Ottawa than in Warsaw.[11] The Government and the business community realized that a Chinese market would almost be a private Canadian preserve for some time if Canada obtained recognition and this no doubt accounts for the jealousy, and the vigor with which the Canadians sought Chinese contracts. The Canadian Government gave all the assistance to the business

community that it could. The principal Chinese import and export corporations, which are government administered bureaucracies were listed in Foreign Trade in February 1971, one month after the chargé d'affaires in the company of a "Commercial Counsellor" from Industry, Trade and Commerce, reached Peking. It should be noted that Pepin's delegation of eleven Government officials was accomplished by an equal number of Canadian businessmen.[12] The interest in trade continued to be lively, and some critics caustically viewed this commercial tie as the motive for the Canadian overtures in the first place. In response to a query about a Liberal failure to diversify Canadian markets, one M.P. rhetorically asked his opponent in the course of his reply:

> Does the Leader of the Opposition suggest seriously that Canadian activity in the Pacific realm and in Asia has been dedicated merely to cultural exchange and archeological studies?[13]

Later articles in Foreign Trade provided additional information and suggestions for Canadian exporters, and it is worth noting that M. Pepin, who did so much to open this trade in the early 1970's, became president of a Montreal-based trade company after he lost his Parliamentary seat in the 1972 election, and is now doing very well in the commerce.[14] Recognizing that the Canadian firms would eventually have to compete with Germany, Japan, and the United States, the Canadian Government worked not only to interest Canadian businessmen to become involved while there was time, but to obtain as large a portion of the Chinese market as possible before competition developed. In 1972 the Canadians erected

a large display, known as the Solo Fair, in Peking to exhibit Canadian products. This tactic worked well and secured good advances in Canadian sales. During his 1973 visit Trudeau also worked diligently to promote trade.[15] The Liberal Government, true to long-standing Liberal policy, has taken the maximum advantage of the commercial opportunities made available by the course of Canadian foreign policy, and in this instance by being the first to get a foot in the Chinese door.

Trudeau's China policy was certainly not original, and he would not pretend that it was. What was original or unique about it was that Trudeau, a man with some interest in China, came to power as circumstances for the first time in twenty years were proper for the implementation of his policy for recognizing China. Even the statesmanship and experience of Lester Pearson had not been met with such favorable circumstances. Domestic and international pressures were no longer opposed to his course of action. Trudeau took the initiative, and his representatives skillfully and doggedly kept the negotiations alive until a compromise with the CPR could be effected. He realized the impossibility of the two-China policy and was willing to break with the Nationalists, though he had no intention of handing them over to the Communists and thus setting an international precedent. His policy worked, and even his harshest critics had to praise his activities in this matter, if no other.[16] Beyond this, Trudeau

and his Cabinet saw the economic advantages for Canada, and exploited them. Canada had a headstart on most western nations because of the grain trade that she had developed in the late 1960's Granting recognition and exchanging representatives permitted Canadian industry to explore and mark out a vast market before competition, especially from the United States, could develop. Little time was wasted, and Canada is still reaping the benefits in terms of economics and prestige.

Footnotes

[1]Jacques Herbert and Pierre Trudeau, Two Innocents in Red China (New York, 1968).

[2]Escott Reid, "Canadian China Policy," in Contemporary China (Toronto, 1969), 130-138.

[3]Hilary Brown, "Trudeau's China Policy," Saturday Night, August, 1968, 9-10.

[4]Thordarson, 175. Thordarson interviewed many Cabinet and External Affairs officials for information about Trudeau's foreign policy, and its formulation. Many of these people asked not to be quoted or cited, and one must take his statements on faith in the lack of other concrete evidence. His reports seem in line with other accounts and the press releases.

[5]Thomson and Swanson, 114. Thomson was a long-time Liberal Party foreign affairs adviser, and one should take his account of these negotiations as being straight-forward and correct. He doubtless maintains many connections with the Trudeau Government. In light of the colorless and dull press reports of the negotiating, his and Thordarson's reports are most interesting.

[6]Peter Stursburg, "NATO and China also to the Fore," Commentator 13 (October, 1969): 4.

[7]M.C. Sekely, "Canada's Big China Gamble," Canada Month 9 (July, 1969): 10-11.

[8]"Canada Establishes Diplomatic Relations with the Chinese People's Republic," External Affairs 22 (November, 1970): 378-79.

[9]"Canada's Ambassador Accredited ...," External Affairs 23 (August, 1971): 286-88.

[10]"Canada Sends a Mission to China," Foreign Trade 135 (August 23, 1971): 10-13.

[11]"Canada, the U.S., and China," Canadian Business 42 (April, 1969): 14.

[12]"Markets in Brief: The CPR," Foreign Trade 135 February 13, 1971): 19-22, and 40. Also see Footnote 10 above.

[13]H.C. Debates, 1970-71, 7646, remarks of Mr. Perrault, September 8, 1971.

[14]John Burns, "Beating a Path to Peking," Toronto Globe and Mail, March 25, 1974.

[15]Ibid.

[16]James Eayrs, "Dilettante in Power: The First Three Years of P.E. Trudeau," Saturday Night, April, 1971, 11-15.

VI. Conclusion

Canada's policy toward China in the postwar years was a reflection of Canadian policy in general. The Liberal Government of Mackenzie King, flushed with pride in its success during the Second World War, developed the theory of the Middle Power, and St. Laurent and Pearson were able to implement the policy. Canada was economically and militarily stronger than many nations for almost a decade after the war and was thus able to make its presence felt and its views known. There were, however, two counteracting factors, one that was present from the start and a second that grew almost unnoticed in the mid-1960's. The less important factor was the decline of Canadian power and influence, relative to that of other nations in the world -- a gradual decline that only slowly came to be perceived by Canadian policy makers. The other factor was the American influence. Realistic observers knew that Canada depended in large part on the United States for her defense, and that the American economy had a massive influence upon Canadian well-being. While there was room for some latitude and freedom in relations with the United States, it was considered unwise to directly contradict American plans.

Canadians had not viewed the Communist takeover in

China as an earth-shaking event. Indeed, they seriously considered granting recognition in 1950, and would have proceeded in that direction had the Korean War not started. The desire to recognize the Chinese was never forgotten in Ottawa. Despite the Korean War, some domestic opposition to the policy, and American pressure, the Liberal Government kept the China issue in mind, even though Pearson and St. Laurent were unable to act. The ensuing Conservative Government strongly disliked the Communists, but it continued relations, if for less idealistic motives. The grain trade grew, and so did commerce in other items. Domestic and political considerations, as well as an adamant American position, again prevented any real thought of recognition. The Pearson Government took a more aggressive stance on Chinese policy, and in fact was about to fly in the face of the American line in 1966, when the Great Cultural Revolution all but removed China from the international scene. Pearson's policy was in line with the postwar Liberal foreign policy that favored an energetic and active Canadian participation in world affairs, as well as with the rising tide of criticism on the part of those who demanded a foreign policy free of American influence.

The internationalist-neutralist debate, suggested earlier, is very much manifest in this aspect of Canadian foreign relations. The Liberals under St. Laurent wished to make some accommodation with the Communist Chinese. Their attempts

were thwarted by the events of the period. The Korean War mobilized segments of Canadian public opinion and made American policy all the more inflexible. Diefenbaker and the Conservatives took a neutralist stand of sorts on China. They certainly had no liking for the Communists, but could hardly deny their existence, especially as trade grew. The Pearson Government made the last big gesture for an internationalist policy, and Pearson was perhaps the archetype of the Canadian internationalist. As Prime Minister, he seemed determined to take some action on the China issue, and in fact made overtures in the United Nations, as well as public statements to the effect that he was preparing to act. His failure to accomplish anything in this area certainly was not his fault.

Trudeau broke with the usual Liberal internationalist policy in 1968, for a number of reasons. He sensed a growing popular discontent with Canadian foreign policy, and he was more aware of the costs of such a foreign policy than Pearson. Hence he launched a reassessment, which brought policy more in line with Canadian capabilities and desires, and made it subservient to Canadian national aims. In this respect Trudeau was a neutralist for he wished Canada to participate in world affairs, but only to the extent that Canada could realisitically contribute and at the same time maintain her own interests. For Chinese relations, then, Trudeau came to power at a fortuitous time, since he was

able to pursue a moderately active and independent policy which served Canada and the world. The extent to which he looked after Canadian interests led to criticism that he was an isolationist or that he viewed Canadian foreign policy in terms of dollars and cents. In the case of China he certainly cannot be called an isolationist, and his defenders can justify his emphasis of the economic connection, as only taking advantage of a favorable situation.

Only when domestic, American, and international considerations point in the same direction, can Canadian foreign policy be formulated and executed. As for the China policy, it had both political and economic advantages. The Conservatives found it much to their benefit in the early 1960's and the Liberals, especially under Trudeau, were able to please left-wing elements at home while keeping the business community mollified by increasing sales in China. Even when there was strong, domestic sentiment on the side of a particular policy, the American attitude had to be considered. The desire to pursue an independent policy never overshadowed this consideration, and even when Canada's overtures to China came well before any American initiatives, these overtures were in large part the result of the softening of the American position. Finally, international considerations influenced Canadian diplomacy. The reassessment under Trudeau led to a more selective and realistic, if circumscribed, policy. The Government seemed more aware of the limits to Canadian

participation in world affairs, less eager to involve Canada around the world. Areas in which Canada had little interest or ability to contribute were avoided. Canada had made a first-step in Chinese relations and followed through on it. The Government was very careful not to set a bad precedent by giving up on the Taiwan issue, but at the same time was willing to work diligently for a goal that served their interests and those of others. Thus, while Canada's policy toward China certainly had its unique characteristics, it did typify the course of Canadian foreign relations between the Second World War and the 1970's.

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