

INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONGO LABYRINTH

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I. INTRODUCTION

Even an investigation confined, in so far as it is at all possible, to the narrative of events taking place within the Congo's own borders, would encompass a labyrinth of paths and movements. Amidst the turmoil and confusion attributable to tribalism, to the many phases of Congolese and United Nations action within the Congo, and to the false dawns especially with relation to Tshombe and the reentry of Katanga into the Central Government, even the most avid student of the Congo crisis is at first belabored not to fall into an abyss of confusion while trying both to follow and to see in relation to one another the many and tortuous paths of action taken by the various elements and their leaders.

However, even though the events of the Congo may provide in themselves a maze of entanglements, any attempt to examine them separate from their international drama would be pure artifice, appropriate for no more than laying a foundation of reference. Even from the first as indicated by the United Nations Security Council Resolution of July 14, 1960, it was agreed that the situation in the Congo was a danger to international peace and security. Moreover, it has been not only the world-wide effects of what has happened in the Congo that has made such events of international concern, but it has also been the degree of international intervention related to the causing of these events. In short, the Congo has been a theater of an international drama, and as such the

events which are so frequently referred to as the Congo crisis have been not just a crisis for the Congo and the Congolese people but a crisis for Africa, for the Cold War powers, and for the United Nations itself.

Whether looking at the Congo crisis as a crisis to the Congo, the African nations, the Cold War, or the United Nations, we do so with the view expressed so well by E. M. Miller in his comparison of the "effect" of a crisis to that of a "flash of lightning":

It not only casts a sharp light on the scene; it illuminates as well a wide expanse of the surrounding area and, in its glare, many once-hidden features of the landscape may be seen clearly for the first time.¹

Although Mr. Miller makes this statement solely in relation to the effects of the Congo crisis on the United Nations, bringing to light "both pitfalls and potentialities" which had not previously been conspicuous, yet it can be meaningfully and fruitfully applied to the other designated world forces to which the events in the Congo have proved a crisis. As I hope this essay may in its own way relate, the Congo crisis--as one instance of national and international policies in action--also throws light on many of the past, present, and future areas of world concern, and national reactions to them.

The Congo crisis has at all times had at least two main theaters of action: the Congo (Leopoldville) and New York. As nations assumed their various roles their actions in the two theaters have not always coincided nor have they in some cases even seemed to be a part of the same policy. Similarly the words of nations have not always been in

¹E. M. Miller, "Legal Aspects of the United Nations in the Congo", The American Journal of International Law, LV (Spring, 1961), 28.

accordance with their activities. Thus, there is often confusion about the real nature of a nation's policy: Is it according to what it says or what it does? Is it in accordance with its action in New York or in the Congo?

Nations themselves are made up of individuals, individuals whose views and interests differ and who, at least in Western democracies, have much freedom to act as they themselves desire as well as to influence those in their government. Thus, it is no wonder that there appears to be internal division and that the actions of a nation and of its nationals do not always seem of one accord.

Even with world communication such that we can be aware of the many aspects and fluctuations of the policies and activities of nations according to time and place, yet this more complete awareness does little to remove the different interpretations given to a nation's course of action. Newspapers, magazines, and even books, the authors of which usually have accessible to them the same basic information, although perhaps from different sources, nevertheless can render almost completely different interpretations according to where they place their emphasis and what points they highlight. And, the fact is, that few sources can be dismissed as having no basis of truth. For instance, British policy and action as seen and portrayed by Arthur Burns in the book Peace-Keeping by U.N. Forces: From Suez to the Congo and by Conor Cruise O'Brien in his To Katanga and Back would hardly be identified by a reader as being of the same substance. Within both books British policy in the Katanga situation is dealt with, yet when one arises from reading O'Brien's version, he is condemning the British for their inaction and their subtle encouragement which though usually

indirect was nevertheless that which at acute moments was responsible for Tshombe's holding out for Katanga's separation, and thus, making things much more difficult and expensive in lives and money for the UN.² However, after reading what Burns has to say, one has quite a different impression of the British and their policy with regard to Katanga and UN actions. Rather than being left with the feeling that perhaps the British were greatly responsible for the UN's ineffectiveness and even guilty of using devious means, one is instead impressed with the maturity and wisdom shown in the British policy such as reflected in its concern for precedents being set by the UN's use of force, while other younger and less experienced nations were more preoccupied with UN effectiveness in this one situation. Not only do both authors present their respective views quite effectively, they also have something of value to say, which cannot be discounted as in O'Brien's case by saying his is just an Irishman's prejudice. The issues in the Congo crisis are many and the actions and motives of a nation are complex and not always of one mind. Such issues as the setting of precedents for the use of force by a peace-keeping organization or for internal intervention are greatly debatable and will come up again and again and not just in context with British policy.

From the very beginning of the United Nations Operation in the Congo, the events which have taken place and the UN resolutions that have been passed have held various meanings to the various parties involved, depending on from where one was viewing the situation. In the July 14 Security Council Resolution the situation in the Congo

²Conor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and Back (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1962), p. 304 et passim.

was deemed a danger to "international peace and security." Yet what constituted this danger was not the same to all nations and peoples: To some, it was solely the intervention of the colonist "aggressor," (Belgium); to others it was not so much the Belgians who were to be feared, but the possibility of there being Communist intervention to exploit the situation and fill the vacuum; and still to others it was very much the Belgians but also the probability that the Congo would become an area subject to Eastern and Western intervention, and thus, become caught up in the throes of the Cold War.

Nations from Western Europe which were colonial powers tended to emphasize in their interpretation and speeches the internal turmoil within the Congo as being the real cause of the danger. However, to Russia and her satellites it was solely the Belgian "aggressor," later to be broadened to the NATO "imperialists." The Soviet Union paid little attention to the lack of law and order in the Congo, although it was the reason purported by Belgium as making necessary its intervention so as to protect its nationals. To the Africans, it was both the Belgian intervention and continued presence--although most of them did not support the Soviet Union all the way in its attempt to get Belgium denounced in the UN as an "aggressor"--and the threat of the Congo becoming an area of East and West competition that made the situation so dangerous. The speeches of the African delegates to the United Nations did not dwell upon the incapability of the Congolese themselves to maintain law and order. To the United States, Belgian intervention and the lack of law and order in the Congo of course constituted a great danger; however, these facts were largely seen in light of the greater

danger of Communist intervention and exploitation of the Congo situation, bringing the Cold War struggle to the Congo and to Africa.

It is perhaps only natural for the nations to evaluate the Congo situation in terms of their own experience and from the viewpoint of their own situation in it. Yet one can see where there could not help but be much controversy and confusion about the implementation of resolutions that from the first were often only a vague common denominator of the different national views, and which, thereafter, were interpreted by each nation according to its own views. And with time, the situation in the Congo became even more complex and more highly explosive, and thus, the carrying out of resolutions became subject to more and more controversy.

In the Congo crisis, as had been the case in other crises in which the UN attempted to exercise its preventive diplomacy, the UN rushed in, according to the Secretary-General, with one of its reasons being to fill the existing power vacuum before it became enveloped in the Cold War struggle. However as can be seen, the UN itself has not escaped the taint of the Cold War, but has in fact too often been used, or at least attempted to be used, by or for the purposes of the opposing blocs. Conor Cruise O'Brien has paraphrased Rajeshwar Dayal, an Indian serving as the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Congo, as saying: "Every great power . . . wished to turn the United Nations into an instrument of its own policy, but some powers were in a better position than others to do so."³ The implications of this statement

³Ibid., p. 63.

especially with regard to the Western nations' actions and policies are worthy of investigation. It is not that the Soviet Union did not try as hard as the Western powers to use the United Nations to further its own policy. This could in no way be said while looking at its tremendous activity in New York both directly in relation to the UN's Congo policy and in areas fundamental not just to its operation in the Congo but to all United Nations actions. Yet conditions are such that some powers have had more success in their efforts than others. Thus, there may be some inkling of truth in the Soviet Union's claim, made over and over again in the General Assembly in defense of its own criticized activities, that what it has been called to account for doing outside of the UN umbrella has been done by other powers shielded by the UN cloak.

Not only has the United States at times been denounced by Russia and its satellites as attempting to make the United Nations an instrument of its policies, but there has even been some quite candid statements written by our own countrymen and by those of Western Europe in regard to the excessive influence of the United States in the United Nations. Even though there was a noticeable change in United States policy and action in the United Nations with regard to the Congo crisis occurring when the new administration reconsidered many of United States policies in light of the ever-changing African and world situation, nevertheless, the charges and inferences made against the United States for use of the UN have not terminated. United States policies have changed with the new administration--and changed in such a way, I think, that they take into account more realities and needs of the world--yet there is

accusation that once these policies are composed or adopted as U.S. policies, they continue to be pushed through. The specifics of such accusation such as U.S. pushing the seating of the Kasavubu delegation in the UN General Assembly, the U.S. relationship to Kasavubu and Mobutu elements in the Congo and its opposition to Lumumba need to be examined. Similarly the wisdom of such a policy deserves discussion. There are those in the United States who view the value of the United Nations only in so much as it can be used as an arm of the State Department, an arm which is less expensive for the U.S. to operate and less likely to backfire because of anti-imperialist sentiment. However, there are others who see the United Nations if maintained in so far as possible as an impartial world force--the instrument of no single nation or group of nations--as having present value and future potentialities far beyond that of our State Department, and as being to our world in its present divided state a necessity for survival. Thus, not only may excessive U.S. influence in pushing a particular policy, action, or leader be unwise in a specific UN operation, but in the long run the effects of such influence may be detrimental to the organization, the world as a whole, and even to the best interests of the United States itself.

One could never really say that the United Nations Operation was successful in keeping out the Cold War when, as we can see, Russia and the United States in their own ways played their respective roles and often were too ready to play an even greater one in the Congo. Yet, by its filling the existing vacuum and its continual efforts to prevent unilateral interference, the UN did

prevent another Korea or Viet Nam, or another Spanish Civil in the Congo. It was not only at the beginning of the UN operation in the Congo that the danger of the Cold War involvement was great and immediate; this factor weighed heavily for more than two years. However, international sympathies and support were too complex just to be divided along Cold War lines. The Cold War was very much involved, as the division and struggle between East and West is very much a reality of our present world, yet there are other realities. Although perhaps a little exaggerated, the following statement conveys the general nature of the significance of the Congo to the many nations and the fact that their interests in it were by no means always determined by Cold War factors:

Never before has a single territory been the object of such unanimous covetousness. Everyone is hoping--and preparing--to get something out of it. The Vatican and Britain, Russia and the U.S., Tunisia and Israel, China and Yugoslavia, Guinea and Ghana--all have some kind of stake in the Congo's future, to say nothing of South Africa, the Rhodesias and the Portuguese colonies, whose own future may well be settled by what goes on in Leopoldville and Katanga.⁴

The actions of Belgium, Britain, and France cannot always be explained along Cold War lines and even less frequently can their actions be understood by looking solely at Cold War factors. These nations are in the Western bloc, but their past experience, and thus, what they see as the present realities for them, include many other factors, basic of which is their experience as colonial powers. Similarly, whether looking at the actions of South Africa, the Rhodesias, and the Portuguese colonies or at those of the states of North and West Africa, one's understanding of their

⁴Jean Daniel, "The Drama of Katanga," New Statesman, LX (August 13, 1960), 205.

motivating concerns would be greatly confined if they were only seen in terms of the Cold War.

I am suggesting that Americans are in great danger of being trapped into seeing everything in Cold War terms since that is what seems uppermost in our minds and most real in our experience. There is the danger of our being victims of our own habitual thought patterns, and thus, blind to fundamental realities of large parts of the world, or at least regarding as secondary those things which are in fact primary in world conditions. I agree that there may have been at least some movement away from this confinement among American foreign policy decision-makers in the past three or so years, however, so far this seems to be only a movement among the few and just a beginning in an area where there is far to go. Too often those who have wanted and needed to make Americans sit up and listen, have had to talk in Cold War terms citing the Communist infiltration and using the Communist label.

There are concerns of the world, as one can so easily see when looking from an African viewpoint, that are real whether or not there is a Cold War. There are those who speak of the division of the world not just as between East and West but as between the North and South, the division between the "developed" and the "underdeveloped", the rich and the poor, and the white and the colored. And problems to the African nations such as neo-colonialism, secession, balkanization, economic viability, and racial equality are fundamental not only to them, and not only to us as seen through the Cold War threat, but to us as part of a world in which no longer can any nation's well being and prosperity be preserved apart from the whole.

There has been some question as to what extent Americans would be concerned with the welfare of the peoples of the world if it were not for the Cold War with its constant reminder of the threat of Communist take-over of the world. How much interest would we show and how much would we give of ourselves and our prosperity to aid in the solving of these problems which are so very real to the Africans and many other parts of the world? How many of us would really pledge ourselves and uphold such a pledge as that of the late President Kennedy made by him in his inaugural address:

To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves for whatever period is required--not because the Communist may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right.⁵

Although a consideration of the Congo crisis involves one in an international drama that illuminates certain policies and actions of nations and the ways in which they perceive world problems, yet in regard to the UN itself such a consideration throws one right in the midst of what has been probably the greatest challenge to the Organization. This challenge "has tested the assumptions which had been made--by scholars as well as by the late Secretary-General--about the role of the UN, its possibilities and its limits, and about the relations between its principal organs and its main groups of members."⁶ Dag Hammarskjold in his dynamic interpretation of the office had hitherto shown the importance of the Secretary-General to the effectiveness of the UN's peace-keeping activities. However, in the United Nations

⁵President Kennedy's Inaugural Address, cited by Arnold Rivkin, "Principal Elements of U.S. Policy toward Under-developed Countries", International Affairs, XXXVII (October, 1961), 453.

⁶Stanley Hoffman, "In Search of a Thread: The UN in the Congo Labyrinth," International Organization, Spring, 1962, p. 331.

Operation in the Congo the importance of the Secretary-General's ability to carry on an operation while the Security Council was deadlocked, was made evident as never before. Yet it was during this same crisis that the very nature of the office of the Secretary-General was challenged by the Russian "troika" principle. The "troika," even more than the bankruptcy threat which had resulted from certain members refusal to pay their assessments for the peace-keeping operations, was a threat that would endanger all UN activities and would completely undermine the effectiveness of any peace-keeping force. This is only one example of how the Congo crisis both allowed for illumination of the Organization and gave the instance for its challenge.

There has of late been much discussion about UN peace-keeping forces, even with regard to establishing a permanent force. This interest does not seem out of place when looking at the world in which we live, divided and yet one, with certain nations possessing nuclear destruction power over which there is no supranational authority. Thus, the need for continued operations of preventive diplomacy to step between the two power blocs and the necessity of a force accompanying disarmament measures, draw men to consideration of such a force. And it is only natural that it be to the Congo operation, not only the most recent but by far the largest and most complex operation of the UN, to which they most readily turn to obtain data on practical difficulties and to use as a testing ground for the support of their own theoretical arguments. The information that the Congo operation has made available in regard to the possibilities and difficulties of an international organization's launching and maintaining a peace-keeping operation of such size and complexity as that in the Congo, has been invaluable to researchers and to future operations.

The United Nations Operation in the Congo has revealed fundamental difficulties faced by a peace-keeping organization in carrying out such an operation. Basic to these difficulties is that of being both effective in the mission it has undertaken and yet remaining impartial and in the character of a peace-keeping organization. Although it is often argued that "the United Nations is a mirror of the world around and that if the reflection is ugly the organization should not be blamed,"⁷ yet at the same time when the UN goes into action such as in the peace-keeping operation in the Congo, there are innumerable strings held upon its operation by the arguments that the United Nations is an organization for the maintenance of peace and as such must not act in such a way or use means which are contrary to the nature of its peace-keeping objective. Thus, even though we admit in our more realistic moments that the UN can not help but reflect the realities of the world including the Cold War and the attempts by member states to further their national interests, yet in such an action as the Congo operation we seem to expect the UN to act as a filter purifying what goes in as national interests and Cold War maneuvers making them come out as impartial UN actions.

The action taken by the UN in its operation in the Congo has received much criticism among the nations and the peoples of the world. The Secretary-General has been criticized both for doing too much and for doing too little even with regard to the same action. Some of this criticism is understandably due to national

⁷Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "New Diplomacy in the United Nations," The United States and the United Nations, ed. Francis O. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland, Jr. (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins Press, 1961), p. 51.

interest, however, as one can see by examining the events and the arguments, some of the critical discussion cannot be explained away so easily. The operation in the Congo has exposed the United Nations to problems and difficulties that in the event of other peace-keeping operations, will have to be met once again. The United Nations Operation in the Congo has also set a variety of precedents from which the future peace-keeping missions will have to choose, and the choice of which will do much to determine what the United Nations will be to the world in its future.

It has been said that "in the Congo, African-age (tribal and Stone-age) and modern-age contemporaries."¹⁰ As we focus on the United Nations' intervention on June 30, 1960, an awareness of this fact is basic to an understanding of what has happened in the Congo. Tribal wars continue to exist right along side of modern, and sometimes wars may magnify one without reflection of the other, but more often the influence of both tribalism and modernity may be seen. When Belgian control began to be loosened, and especially after the withdrawal of the national security forces, tribal feuds against intertribal rivals were revived and even though some of these men were in the Belgian era been the "white-collared" staff and mine-workers of the mining complex, many of them now reverted to the customs and priorities of tribal warfare.¹¹ However, even such tribal violence may not be accurately looked upon as purely the original offspring of the African tribal past. Peter Gougeon, a Belgian, from his position within Katanga as the representative of the United Nations, has made observations that inter-tribal hatred and violence in Katanga were being provoked by the authorities there and used by them for their purposes.¹²

¹⁰ Brittonis Calder, "Chaos in the Congo," New Statesman, LX (November 12, 1960), 927.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Gougeon, pp. 230-43.

II. THE CONGO LABYRINTH

It has been said that "in the Congo, Atomic-age Man and Stone-age Man are contemporaries."⁸ As we focus on the period since its independence on June 30, 1960, an awareness of this fact is basic to an understanding of what has happened in the Congo. Tribal ways continue to exist right along side of modern, and sometimes events may magnify one without reflection of the other, but more often the influence of both tribalism and modernity may be seen. As Belgian control began to be loosened, and especially after the breakdown of the national security forces, tribal feuds against traditional rivals were revived and even though some of these men such as the Balubas had been the "white-collared" staff and mine-workers of the mining complex, many of them now reverted to the horrors and primitivism of tribal warfare.⁹ However, even much of the tribal violence may not be accurately looked upon as purely the natural offspring of the African tribal past. Coner Cruise O'Brien, from his position within Katanga as the Representative of the United Nations, has made accusations that inter-tribal hatred and violence in Katanga were being provoked by the authorities there and used by them for their purposes.¹⁰

⁸Ritchie Calder, "Chaos in the Congo," New Statesman, LX (December 10, 1960), 927.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰O'Brien, pp. 240-43.

In the Congo we see an area of more than 900,000 square miles, a country of four times the size of France striving to make out of itself a nation shaped upon the modern form, however, having practically no national feelings and loyalties among its tribal and local parts; and unfortunately having little time in which these feelings might most likely develop as is possible during the period in which all are striving for a common purpose--for independence from a colonial power. Not only was the voting in the first elections which were held in 1957 for communal councils generally according to tribal loyalties but that of the elections just before independence also demonstrated their continued strength as opposed to national consciousness.¹¹ The length of time given for national movements to work before independence is actually granted is crucial to the development not only of national consciousness but to the ability to make a peaceful and orderly transition, a fact brought out so well by Melville Herskovits:

Congo events stood out in stark contrast to the peaceful transition from colonial rule to independence that prevailed in West Africa highlighting the role of these nationalist movements in preparing African colonial peoples, psychologically no less than organizationally, for the changes to come, when the direction of their affairs would be in their own hands. The difference in the degree of orderliness in the transfer of power could be directly correlated with the extent to which nationalist movements has the time to organize, maneuver, and thus undergo a process of natural selection of political leaders. . . . In the Belgian Congo, however, nationalism had no opportunity to serve the apprenticeship it served elsewhere. There was no time either to exert pressures on the colonial administration to place Africans in positions of responsibility, or to perfect an organization which could provide

¹¹"The Congolese Vacuum," The Round Table, LI (December, 1960), 41,43.

experienced, responsible leadership for self-government, when it came.¹²

In fact, in 1960, the time cited for the Belgian Congo's independence the nominal national parties were actually still overwhelmingly tribal in feeling. Nevertheless, Belgium granted the Belgian Congo independence on June 30--a little more than three years after the first sign of any independence movements--and thus, "the prod to unity--than is colonial rule--" was removed.¹³

There will be no attempt in the scope of this paper to evaluate the policies of Belgium during its colonial rule nor to evaluate Belgium's intention and motives for granting the Congo's independence so quickly. Its purposes are not to place the blame on a particular group, nor even to find out who deserves it, but rather to see the resulting factors as they exist in Congolese difficulties and potentials after June 30, 1960. Belgian paternalism did have its effects; so did the more specific aspects of its policies, its economic developments, its views and provisions for education, and its failure to provide political experience for the Congolese so as to allow for their understanding of the workings of Western democracy.¹⁴ The material benefits of Belgian policy of paternalism were numerous and its effects on the Congo's economy were climaxed by the costly capital developments under the Belgian Ten Year Plan during the decade of

¹²Melville J. Herskovits, The Human Factor in Changing Africa (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 345.

¹³Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Independence (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1961), p. 87.

¹⁴Alan P. Merriam, Congo: Background of Conflict (Northwestern University: Northwestern University Press, 1961), Chapter II, pp. 29-63.

¹⁵Patrick O'Donovan, "The Precedents of the Congo," International Affairs, XXXVII (April, 1961), 144.

1949-1959. However, the unpreparedness of the Congolese to assume the responsibilities of independence in 1960 was likewise the result of Belgian policy. Belgium had viewed the creation of an educated elite as dangerous and had tried to keep the education of all more or less equal. Thus, we find a solid and broad foundation of primary education, but those among the Congolese with secondary education are much fewer, and those with post-secondary training are practically non-existent. In accordance with this educational policy aimed at keeping all the Congolese at the same level, there were practically no Congolese with any experience in administration, whether in government or business, and none trained as doctors, lawyers, or engineers. Thus, when independence came so suddenly and the Belgians departed in such great numbers especially with the mutiny of the Force Publique (national security forces), there was little that could be done to prevent a breakdown of practically all administration and service. In short, the situation in the Congo when the Belgians withdrew was as follows:

The twenty-three political parties in the country, and the provincial governments, represented tribal organizations and alliances rather than ideas. There was no real nationalism as we know it in other countries in Africa. There were virtually no technicians left. Nearly three-quarters of the Belgians had gone. There were engine drivers but no maintenance men. There were men, for example, who knew how to put chemicals into water cleansing plants but had no idea at all why they did it.¹⁵

Independence meant many things to many people. In general the Congolese expectations of what independence would bring were characterized by such naivete that there could be no avoidance of great disappointment on its arrival. Neither was the Force Publique

¹⁵Patrick O'Donovan, "The Precedents of the Congo," International Affairs, XXXVII (April, 1961), 184.

exempt from having such expectations, and when independence came and yet the Belgian officers remained, standing in the way of Congolese advancement, the men were frustrated especially as they saw their fellow Congolese advancing so suddenly to the highest positions of the government.¹⁶ Thus, as other elements such as the workers in Coquilhatville rioted because their expectations had not been fulfilled, so did the Force Publique express its frustration by its mutiny, a decisive factor in the developing chaos in the Congo. Although the Belgians had begun to depart before independence, now with the mutiny of the Force Publique the situation became "self-fueling":

The Belgians were clearly on the run, more and more posts of responsibility were abandoned and could not be filled by the Congolese, businesses were closed and the ranks of the unemployed swelled enormously, and the government leaders were unable to control the situation because they had no forces at their disposal to do so.¹⁷

In the days following July 6, 1960, when the mutiny of the Force Publique started, the European population in a state of panic tried to escape by the thousands, often only to find escape routes cut off, and as Lumumba and Kasavubu rushed from one place to another trying to reconcile the rebels with promises of pay raises and promotions, disturbance and violence spread. The situation was such that on July 10, Belgium intervened in Elizabethville and sent forces into various other parts of the Congo to protect its nationals.

As a result of the "self-fueling" breakdown as described above,

¹⁶Merriam, pp. 83-87.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 286.

there was a vacuum in the Congo that had to be filled, whether by the United States, the Soviet Union, or the United Nations. A request of the Congolese Government for troops to restore order was turned down by the United States, who referred them to the United Nations. The Secretary-General received on July 12, a cable from Lumumba and Kasavubu requesting UN military assistance "to protect the national territory of the Congo, against the present external aggression which is a threat to international peace" and on July 13 a second one saying that unless UN military forces were sent to the Congo immediately the Congo would have "to appeal to the Bandung Treaty Powers."¹⁸ Thereupon the Secretary-General called a Security Council meeting which in the early hours of July 14 adopted a resolution with a vote of eight (Argentina, Ceylon, Ecuador, Italy, Poland, Tunisia, USSR, and U. S.) to nil, with three abstentions (China, France, and United Kingdom) calling upon Belgium to withdraw its troops and authorizing the Secretary-General:

To take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks.¹⁹

With the passing of the July 14 Security Council resolution and the immediate efforts of the Secretary-General to arrange for troops and the multitude of factors which are necessary for their transportation and maintenance, and his efforts to work out an

¹⁸United Nations, (S/4382, July 12 & 13, 1960) pp. 11-12.

¹⁹United Nations, (S/4387, July 14, 1960), p. 16.

agreement with the Congo Government, the UN Operation in the Congo was launched. The UN troops began arriving in the Congo on July 15, the first of which were largely African. As had previously been determined and referred to by the Secretary-General, the troops used in the Congo Operation, although not just from one region--Africa, would not include those of the permanent members of the Security Council. Other basic principles derived largely from precedents set in the UN interventions in Suez, Lebanon, and Jordan which were referred to by the Secretary-General as being followed in the Congo Operation were: The UN Force was under the exclusive command of the UN and would not become party to any internal conflict; it should have freedom of movement and the facilities necessary for its tasks; and it should not take the initiative in the use of armed force but was entitled to respond in self defense. These were some of the guidelines used by the Secretary-General in implementing the Security Council resolutions in regard to the Congo. As terms of reference they did provide him with some sense of direction in interpreting the mandates which were often so general and vague; however, as principles derived from situations very different in the respect that the UN had not in them been responsible for internal law and order, their application in the Congo Operation brought many difficulties for the UN forces in the field. The attempt to adhere to the principles set up in previous UN experience prevented or delayed much action that was needed to halt the reign of confusion after the Central Government broke down and action needed to deal effectively with the problem of Katanga.²⁰

As we have seen even before the Security Council authorized

²⁰Arthur Lee Burns and Nina Heathcote, Peace-Keeping by UN Forces; From Suez to the Congo, (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 28, 31-32.

military assistance to the Congo, the Congolese officials had related in a cable that it would be forced to appeal to the Bandung Treaty Powers if UN forces were not sent immediately. The Congo Government wanted to get rid of the Belgian "aggressors," and if the UN would not or could not secure their removal either directly or indirectly, then it had the sympathies and soon had the assurances of help from Red Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and Russian Premier Khrushchev. Thus, from the beginning of its Congo operation the UN worked under the pressure of threats of unilateral intervention, threats which seemed to increase as Prime Minister Lumumba became disillusioned with the UN when it refused to become an extension of his own arm in bringing Katanga, which had seceded on July 11, back into the Central Government.

The UN was trying to get the withdrawal of Belgian troops as can be seen in the resolution of July 22 which calls not just for Belgium to withdraw its troops as did that of July 14, but authorizes the Secretary-General "to take all necessary action to this effect."²¹ With the Belgium Government saying that their troops in the Congo would be withdrawn as UN troops were able to maintain law and order so as to protect its nationals, the Secretary-General with his efforts to implement the Security Council mandates, secured August 29 as the planned date for the completion of Belgian withdrawal of its military units from the Congo. Although when this date arrived there were still some Belgian military units in the Congo, they were removed shortly. However, securing the withdrawal of the Belgian military units did not solve the Belgian problem, which was the object of so much criticism from many nations, but rather only switched it to another phase

²¹United Nations (5/4405, July 22, 1960), p. 34.

in which Belgium, although sometimes singled out as chief, was only one of a number of countries with elements accused of aiding and abetting Tshombe and the Katanga secession.

From the beginning the Katanga problem had proved an area of friction for the UN operation. As the UN spread out its forces until all areas had been entered except Katanga, there was much pressure from the Central Government that this province too had to be entered and the Belgian troops evacuated. However, the initial UN plan to enter Katanga on August 6, 1960 was met by Tshombe's threat to use force to prevent its entry. Learning the reality of this threat from Dr. Bunche who had been sent to Elizabethville for talks on August 4, the Secretary-General canceled the sending of UN troops into Katanga on August 6 and requested a meeting of the Security Council to deal with the situation and clarify the UN's position. On August 9, 1960, the Security Council adopted a resolution which contained the following substantive measures:

Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw immediately its troops from the Province of Katanga under speedy modalities determined by the Secretary-General and to assist in every possible way the implementation of the Council's resolutions;

Declares that the entry of the United Nations force into the Province of Katanga is necessary for full implementation of this resolution;

Reaffirms that the United Nations force in the Congo, will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise.²²

Although on grounds of logic one may be able to defend the possibility of a path of action that would include the UN's entry into Katanga and yet avoid the intervention in or influence of the outcome of an internal conflict, but in the field such an attempt proved

²²United Nations (S/4426, August 9, 1960), pp. 91-92.

impossible.²³ In some sense whether the UN acted or did not act in a situation it influenced the internal conflict. Its efforts to secure the entry of UN forces into Katanga included the Secretary-General's talks with Tshombe in Elizabethville and the assurance that the UN would not interfere in internal constitutional matters; however, Lumumba was greatly provoked, asserting that such talks with Tshombe were in fact recognition of his secession and a violation of the Security Council resolutions. Thus, although UN forces gained entry into Katanga at the end of August, the friction which had been created between the UN Operation and the Central Government opened wide other problems with Lumumba without really settling very much of the problem of Katanga.

In July and August, 1960, the task which the UN faced in the Congo seemed to border on the impossible. There were emergencies of hunger and disease, the disintegration of the economy entailing further unemployment and rioting, the chaotic security situation, the provoking presence of Belgian military units, and the problem of gaining entry into Katanga. Yet there was at least the surety of a Central Government and no doubt as to which officials were to be consulted with in this capacity. However, in September developments in the Congo moved the situation into a new phase, one in which there were three men claiming power, but where there was actually a vacuum in which "the United Nations was the only approximation to an effective government left in the Congo."²⁴ This situation was the result of President

²³Stanley Hoffman, "In Search of a Thread: The Un in the Congo Labyrinth," International Organization, p. 338.

²⁴"Indispensable UN," The Economist, CXCVI (September 17, 1960), 1069.

Kasavubu's ousting of Premier Lumumba in a radio address on September 5 and a little more than an hour later in a broadcast from that same station, Lumumba's ousting of Kasavubu. In the confusion and struggle for power that followed Joseph Mobutu announced on September 14 that the military was taking over neutralizing both Kasavubu and Lumumba until the end of the year. After September 5 the struggle for power between Kasavubu and Lumumba seemed to penetrate every aspect of life in the Congo, making law and order only secondary to itself. Making it even more difficult for the UN Force which sought to restore law and order without influencing the outcome of the internal crisis between Kasavubu and Lumumba--an impossible task in which its efforts drew much criticism--was the factor that nations had taken sides in the internal struggle and some had sent or promised to send assistance to one of the parties. Any action that the UN might take in its efforts to restore law and order, such as its shutting down of the Leopoldville radio station and the closing of all airports in the Congo to planes not serving the United Nations, had its effects on the internal struggle. Because of the circumstances it was usually Lumumba who suffered most and his supporters who yelled first and loudest their threat of unilateral intervention.

The months following September, 1960, have been most appropriately called "the winter of everyone's discontent."²⁵ It was a time of great difficulty for both civilian and military aspects of the UN Operation in the Congo, and a time of relative stagnation and great discontent in New York. "The collision of governments in Leopoldville

²⁵Hoffman, International Organization, p. 337.

brought about fresh collision of governments in the United Nations."²⁶ Thus, the secretary-General had difficulty in getting guidance or a clearing up of his mandate so as to deal with the new situation. The Security Council in its meetings on September 16 and 17, unable to get the unanimity of the permanent members on a resolution containing a restriction on the sending of aid of a military nature to the Congo except through the UN, called for an emergency special session of the General Assembly which on September 20, passed a resolution containing a recommendation to this effect:

Without prejudice to the sovereign rights of the Republic of the Congo, calls upon all States to refrain from the direct and indirect provision of arms or other material of war and military personnel and other assistance for military purposes in the Congo during the temporary period of military assistance through the United Nations, except upon the request of the United Nations through the Secretary-General for carrying out the purposes of this resolution and of the resolutions of July 14th and 22nd and of August 9th, 1960, of the Security Council.²⁷

It was not until in February, 1961, after the occurrence of many events including the death of Lumumba which is said to have "acted as a sudden catalyst,"²⁸ that the Security Council was able to break its deadlock, and thus, provide the Secretary-General with a mandate, taking into account the conditions that had emerged in the Congo since September.

During this "period of everyone's discontent" when it was difficult to reach agreement in New York, the nations were by no means inactive in letting their voices be heard and in pursuing their own

²⁶"Stormy Vacuum," The Economist, CXCVI (September 17, 1960), 1062.

²⁷United Nations (A/1474 ES-IV), (September 20, 1960), p. 1.

²⁸"Wider Still Wider," The Economist, CXCVIII (February 25, 1961), 730.

national policies. Nations lined up behind their choice of Kasavubu or Lumumba. This division, splitting the world and even Africa itself, is illustrated in the debate--a debate which revealed the varying viewpoints of those not only who disagreed on the main issue but those whose vote was the same--preceding the seating^{of} the Kasavubu delegation as the representatives of the Government of the Republic of the Congo in the General Assembly. Although this seating of the Kasavubu delegation was considered a great victory by the Kasavubu backers, this was done in New York and was seen by some as simply the result of the United States "railroading tactics."²⁹ However, as for the reality of the situation in the Congo itself, it was touch and go. The legality of Kasavubu as President was not disputed; however, as for Mobutu's military take-over there were no grounds of legality although he did in fact hold control. And as for the Ileo government which Kasavubu had appointed after he had dismissed Lumumba, it had never been recognized by Parliament which had reaffirmed its confidence in Lumumba on September 6 and then had been sent on its way by Mobutu.

Although Lumumba had received Parliament's vote of confidence, many things had gone badly for him. First of all, he had not been able to obtain access to a radio station when the UN took over that of Leopoldville and perhaps even more consequential he had not been able to fly supporting troops into Leopoldville since the UN closed the airports. After September 16 Lumumba had been more-or-less confined to his residence by Mobutu troops. The troops of Mobutu were later replaced by UN troops whose purpose was not to confine but merely to guard him. However, Lumumba left his residence only to be arrested

²⁹Alex Quaison-Sackey, Africa Unbound (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 90.

by Mobutu, mishandled, and later killed in Katanga, where he had been handed over by Kasavubu and Mobutu to perhaps his worst enemy, Tshombe.

Lumumba's murder was not a solution to Western problems in the Congo, although thought so by "some misguided men of the lunatic fringes in Brussels and Paris."³⁰ The Lumumbist elements were still in the Congo led by such men as Gizenga, and Lumumba's murder naturally served to inflame opinion among the nations of the world, creating a real opportunity for Mr. Khrushchev to launch a fresh attack on the UN role in the Congo and the Secretary-General. However, this event--bad in itself and most dangerous to world peace and settlement in the Congo--did seem to mark a turning point. It seemed to so arouse the nations that they were now more of one mind in the realization that something must be done. They had already been advised by Dag Dag Hammarskjold who, under the pressure of the threats of certain nations to withdraw their contingents because of their discontent with the UN role in the Congo, had warned that the breakdown of the UN operation would mean "immediate civil war, degenerating into uninhibited tribal conflict and the complete disintegration of the remaining fabric of national unity."³⁰ Likewise, he had warned that the existing mandate did not allow the UN Force to deal with the present situation in the Congo which bordered on civil war, and thus, requested from the Security Council a reinforced mandate. On February 21, the Security Council adopted a resolution by a vote of nine to nil with two abstentions (France, USSR) that marked a sharp departure or rather a long jump from what had been authorized in the more limited earlier

³⁰"Down with Peacemakers," The Economist, CXCVIII (February 4, 1961), 438.

resolutions. However, as we give consideration to the significance of this resolution, let us keep in mind the actual circumstances in the Congo, the desperateness of the situation which the UN faced and the probable consequences for the Congo and the world if it should fail.³¹ In this February 21st resolution for the first time the use of force was authorized for purposes other than self-defense: "In the last resort" force could be used by UN troops to prevent civil war. Also, the necessity for the UN to take steps to make available aid in regard to conciliation and the convening of parliament was recognized, whereas hitherto such moves had been hindered by arguments that such measures constituted internal intervention.

Kasavubu reacted with great irritation to the February 21 resolution, thinking that it tried to tell him what to do as in regard to the convening of parliament and the reorganization of the Congolese security forces. However, with time he gradually came to see that he had more to gain by working with the UN than by opposing it.

The next months were filled with efforts by the UN and by the Congolese leaders themselves as urged on and aided in every way possible by the UN, to achieve reconciliation and the restoration of a legal government for the whole of the Congo. Finally in July, Parliament was convened in Leopoldville with deputies coming from all over the country except Katanga. Tshombe and his Conakat deputies, although having participated in many of the conferences seeking reconciliation, and thus, having flirted with the idea, yet in the final and actual coming together, refused to be persuaded. Nevertheless, on August 2, 1961,

³¹See Appendix I. S/4426, August 2, 1961, pp. 42-43.

Kasavubu named a new government headed by Cyrille Adoula and consisting of ministers representing all political factions in the five provinces. This new cabinet received unanimous approval of both houses and the new government of national unity was resolved to be the legal successor to the first Central Government of the Republic of the Congo. Thus, a chapter of the Congo story was ended and another, in which there was once again a legal Central Government with which the UN could consult, began.

The attempted secession of Katanga had been a problem for the Congo since Tshombe's declaration on July 11, 1960. It had been from the beginning a source of great difficulty to the UN Force whose mandate applied to the entire Congo, a country of six provinces, one of which was Katanga. Not only had Katanga been the last and by far the most difficult province from which to obtain the withdrawal of Belgian military units and to gain UN entry, but in the process of doing so the Central Government had been antagonized. The dilemma of the UN in regard to Katanga as noted in the Security Council resolution of August 9, 1960, had been that UN troops had to enter the province of Katanga but at the same time it could "not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of an internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise."³² However, now a year had passed and Katanga was still very much a problem to the Congo and to the UN. The near-anarchy which had existed for some time after the collapse of the Central Government and the following struggle for power, and then the very slow course back to having a new government

³²United Nations (5/4426, August 9, 1960), pp. 91-92.

of national unity, could hardly help but have made a deep impression on the UN operation and all who were involved. Also to be remembered, is that Adoula was quite different from Lumumba as a person. Although very much committed to the reintegration of Katanga into the Republic of the Congo and perhaps even with the endurance of his government dependent upon his success in this venture, Adoula's ways of seeking UN help differed greatly from those of Lumumba. Keeping these things in mind as well as the provoking events in Katanga itself and the shifting policies of some nations as they realized the multi-implication of the continued Katanga secession, we can more nearly understand the gradual change in the UN approach to the problem of Katanga and the fighting between the UN forces and Katanga gendarmerie that occurred in September and December, 1961 and in December, 1962.

In considering these three occurrences of fighting between UN and Katangese forces, each must be seen in relation to what had come before it. In the September, 1961, operation the UN, more hesitant and unsure of its path, was quick to respond both to the criticism of some of the European nations and to the slightest hope given them by Tshombe by calling a cease-fire. However, in the December, 1961, and even more in the December, 1962, operations, not only was the UN force as the result of equipment available to it more capable of dealing with the situation effectively, it was also a little more hesitant to accept Tshombe's words until they were evidenced by some action.

On each occasion there was much opposition and criticism of the UN action by some sources. There were those individuals and nations who were just generally against the use of force by the UN, a peace-keeping organization. Even though each of the operations was defended

by the UN as required in self-defense, there were groups (e.g. investors in Union Miniere) who sought to prove the actions of an offensive nature and even set up a propaganda machine emphasizing the violence involved and perhaps fabricating or staging their own scenes with the help of Tshombe. Also there were breaks in communication between New York, Leopoldville and the field in Katanga that were not only a source of difficulty for the UN in carrying out its activities, but led to contradictory statements by UN officials that were quick to be seized as opportunities by opposing propagandists.

The stakes, economic as well as otherwise, in the Congo were high, and thus, there were elements in various countries, especially in Belgium, Britain, France, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa, if not the countries themselves, which could afford to invest a lot in attempting to insure that its outcome be in their favor. It was, in fact, these elements of foreign intervention which made the Katanga secession so blatantly an international problem. That the Katanga province remain within the Congo was seen by the Central Government and by the other African states as necessary for the economic viability of the Congo and for the prevention of a precedent that could lead to the balkanization of the Continent. However, it was the belief, substantiated by much evidence, that the Katanga secession was provoked and maintained by foreign elements working with Union Miniere and the white population and had little of an African indigenous basis, that made it so clearly an international, rather than just an internal situation in which the UN could not interfere. As time went by and circumstances changed and international ramifications became more complex, UN approach to the Katanga problem came to reflect

more and more the African viewpoint toward secession and territorial integrity. ^{This trend} as evidenced in the Security Council's resolution of November 24, 1961, adopted by a vote of nine to nil with two abstentions (France, United Kingdom). This resolution with its strong language conveys a new seriousness in tone. No longer is there any hesitancy with regard to backing the Central Government. The Secretary-General is even authorized to use force if necessary for the apprehension deportation of a foreign military personnel.³³

During this period from September, 1961 to January, 1963, inclusive of the three short fighting involvements of the UN force in Katanga, Tshombe continued as before to flirt with the UN and the Central Government in regard to reentry into the Central Government, saying one thing and doing another, bringing false dawns with the reconciliation agreements to which when in a tight spot he would agree but then fail to implement to any significant degree. By July, 1962, it was becoming clear once again that the Katangese authorities were stalling for time and that they had no intentions of carrying out the terms of the Kitona Declaration--a basis for the reintegration of Katanga into the Republic of the Congo agreed upon after the December, 1961, cease-fire. Not only were the Katangese authorities not making any forward moves toward a united Congo there was an increase of violent acts against the UN Force in Elizabethville and indications of an excitement of anti-UN sentiment among the people.

On July 31 the Secretary-General appealed to member states to use all their influence and efforts to bring about a settlement of the Katanga problem and in August he submitted a plan of national reconciliation for the approval of the Central Government and the

³³See Appendix II.

Katangese authorities. This plan, having been worked out in consultation with nations which were in special positions to influence or put pressure on Tshombe, had the teeth of national power behind it.³⁴ Attached to it was a four-phase course of action entailing the planned attempt for the member states to try to bring their influence to bear on Tshombe so that he would accept this peaceful solution; if he did not accept the Plan within the ten-day period, then they would be requested to apply economic sanctions; if in turn the economic sanctions were not effective, then consultation to determine other applicable measures would be in order.³⁵

The Central Government and the Katangese authorities approved the plan, but as to its implementation, the Katangese authorities continued their old routine. However, this time, with the accompanying four-phase course of action and the growing support of the nations, the UN operation was more prepared to demand that Tshombe back his words with actions. And when Tshombe, finally backed into a corner from which he found it more and more difficult to talk his way out, responded with gendarmerie attacks on the UN forces in Elizabethville, after six days without retaliation, the UN force on December 28, 1962, returned its fire. This time being better prepared, and perhaps somewhat because of failures in communication, the UN force pushed on to obtain its freedom of movement not only in Elizabethville but as far as Jadotville. Although Tshombe continued to threaten for some time with a "scorched earth" policy and a fight to the last man, by

³⁴King Gordon, The United Nations in the Congo: A Quest for Peace, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962), p. 179.

³⁵Yearbook of the United Nations, 1962 (New York: United Nations Publication, 1964), p. 72.

January 21, 1963, UN troops peacefully entered Kolwezi, the last Tshombe stronghold. UN troops now held the important centres previously held by the Katangese gendarmerie and the mercenaries, which the UN for so long had tried to apprehend, were now on the run, mostly toward the Angolan border. With these actualities and with Tshombe stating his determination to carry out the Secretary-General's Plan of National Reconciliation, there was once again the dawn of hope that Katanga's attempt at secession--which U Thant had cited only a few months before as the main cause of the continuing state of affairs in the Congo³⁶-- had ended.

After two and a half years the Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council on February 4, 1963, was able to say that "a decisive phase in the United Nations Congo experience has been concluded."³⁷ Although military assistance would continue to be required for some time to ensure that what had been achieved in the two and a half years did not fall apart, to aid in the delicate problem of the reintegration of Katanga into the Central Government, and to assist the Central Government "in coping with endemic problems of tribal warfare and maintenance of law and order,"³⁸ yet beginning in February there would be a gradual phasing out of the military forces.

In a later report the Secretary-General noted that by September

³⁶Gordon, p. 178.

³⁷U Thant, "The Congo: An Account of United Nations Action and a Look Ahead," United Nations Review, X (February, 1963), p. 12.

³⁸Ibid.

13, 1963, the force in the Congo which had once numbered 20,000 had been reduced to 7,975.³⁹ As he continued to report he noted that the mandates in large measure had been implemented, that at present there was no danger of secessionist movements, that territorial integrity and political independence had been maintained, that civil war had been prevented and there were at present no serious threats. Basic to all these, the Secretary-General also reported that "for the first time in its more than three years of independence it would appear that no organized and subversive military groups under the leadership of foreign military personnel are active on Congolese territory."⁴⁰ However, at the same time that the Secretary-General reported the definite turning point which this year had brought about in the implementing of the mandates for the Congo, he noted the persisting problems of tribal conflict and the lack of discipline in the ANC (National Security Forces). It was in recognition of these problems and other "uncertainties and imponderables in the Congo situation" that the UN not only is continuing its technical assistance on as large a scale as is financially possible but has agreed to the request of Premier Adoula to continue a small force until June, 1964.

³⁹U Thant, "Military Disengagement in the Congo," United Nations Review, X (October, 1963), p. 44.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 45.

III: BELGIUM, BRITAIN, AND FRANCE

In many respects we can fruitfully look at the policies of Belgium, Britain, and France together. All three nations had been involved for some time with their colonies in Africa--a factor which greatly colored their present approach to the Congo. They also had economic interests in the Congo. As investors especially in Union Miniere de Haut Katanga, Belgian, British, and French citizens were greatly interested and often involved in events in Katanga. These similar interests and experiences often resulted in Belgian, Britain and France following a similar policy with regard to the UN Operation in the Congo.

It is not my purpose to castigate Belgium for possible failures and shortcomings of its colonial policy in the Congo, although many others have done so. Let us rather look at what its policy has been since the Congo's independence and the launching of the UN operation. When the Force Publique mutinied and there was no protection for the Belgians and other Europeans in the Congo against the increasing violences, Belgium, without being asked by the independent Congo Government, nevertheless sent in its troops from the two bases in the Congo and dispatched others from Belgium itself. Although this intervention has been defended by the reasoning that "it would have been completely impossible for the United Nations, with every State possessing serious defense forces barred for ideological reasons,

to have found the number of troops required in time to save the situation," and thus, "there can be little room for doubt that Belgium saved her nationals from a final disaster by her action,"⁴¹ yet Belgium did violate another country's sovereignty.

Having said that the reason for its troops being there was to protect its nationals, Belgium, as logically expected, agreed to withdraw its troops whenever the UN forces were able to take over the responsibility of law and order and the protection of individuals. This process, however, was not just the UN going in and the Belgians going out; there were the complications of Katanga, and of what "out" really meant. For a while the Belgians maintained that a withdrawal to the Belgian military bases of Kamina and Kitona, held according to the Loi fondamentale, constituted "withdrawal." With time and much effort by the UN, Belgium responded to the demands of the Security Council and the efforts of the Secretary-General, and its military units were withdrawn from the Congo, including Katanga and the military bases.

The presence of the Belgian military units, however, had been only the most obvious element of foreign intervention. Belgium, if subject at all to the pressures of world opinion, could hardly have avoided withdrawing its military units; however, it was much easier to be evasive along with others, with regard to the withdrawal of individual "military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under United Nations command, and mercenaries."⁴² Katanga especially, with its economic stakes due to the large mining complex and

⁴¹Cyril Falls, "The Congo Tangle Still Unravelling," The Illustrated London News, August 6, 1960, p. 218.

⁴²United Nations (S/4741, February 21, 1961) pp. 147-148.

its already relatively large European community, had proved to be quite a harbor for such elements.

Since the Belgian network had been so extensive before the Congo's independence, there were many factors leading to the return of the Belgians, a return which was sharply criticized in November, 1960, in the second report of Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo. There were so many going back to the Congo that Sabena had to have extra airlines to carry them. Many of these returning Belgians were employees of private firms, for which the Belgian Government said it was not responsible, but others were returning to employment in Congolese administration.⁴³ Although the Belgian Government had been asked to withdraw its "officials and experts" from the Congo and to channel its aid through the UN, "it retorted that all who had returned to the Congo were there by invitation of the duly constituted authorities--a reply that must have jarred on the ears of UN officials, who invited in by the 'Government of the Republic of the Congo,' have since been unable to identify their host."⁴⁴ The Belgians, aided by the belief that they knew more about the Congo and its administration than anyone else, sometimes assumed a rather superior and uncooperating attitude toward the UN operation. This attitude, which added to the difficulty of the UN task, is conveyed very well in an article written by Belgium's Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1958-61--Pierre Wigny.⁴⁵ However, as far as the substance of

⁴³"Belgians Return to the Congo," The Economist, CXCVII (November 5, 1960), p. 57.

⁴⁴"Belgium's Return," The Economist, CXCVII (November 19, 1960), p.765.

⁴⁵Pierre Wigny, "Belgium and the Congo," International Affairs, XXXVII (July, 1961), pp. 273-284.

the argument of the Belgian experts knowing more about the country, knowing the African dialects, and in general, being able to fill in this emergency the vacuum left by themselves, there is much to be said. So much in fact that before the end of the UN operation there was much use being made of the Belgian experts; however, before this came to be, there had been a change of attitude brought by the intervening events.

There has been much discussion about the part that Belgium's economic interests in the Congo has played in determining its recent policy. Britain, Belgium, and France all had great stakes especially in Union Miniere de Haut Katanga. What happened in the Congo, especially in Katanga was very important. If the mining complex was nationalized as they feared might be the case if there were a united Congo with the "leftist" Lumumba at its head, they stood to lose immensely. Even if the lack of law and order brought about a standstill in production, their loss would be great. The official policy of the Belgian Government had been from before independence to support a unified Congo. Even after the attempted secession of Katanga in which Moise Tshombe expressed the desire to continue economic ties with Belgium and requested more Belgian troops to maintain law and order, Belgium maintained a formal policy of non-recognition. However, this official policy of non-recognition, which was necessary for the world scene, did not mean that Belgium refused "to register its separation as a fact."⁴⁶ There must have seemed many benefits to Belgium as well as to British and French investors in having the most economically important

⁴⁶Wigny, International Affairs, p. 282.

province cut off from the danger of Lumumba and the general turmoil in other parts of the Congo.

Belgian policy, however, did not stay the same throughout the UN Operation in the Congo. Changing circumstances in the Congo and in the world as well as changes in Belgian administration had their effects. With Paul-Henri Spaak's entry in the Belgian Cabinet in 1961 there came a different outlook which reflected a wider and farther-seeing approach to the Congo situation and UN policy. There was more of an attempt to work with the UN operation such as in its collaboration in August, 1962, in regard to the Secretary-General's Plan of National Reconciliation, with Mr. Spaak even going so far as to back the possibility of economic sanctions which would have been harmful to his own economy. Of course, public opinion in Belgium remained divided and Mr. Spaak's policies were greatly criticized by some.⁴⁷

France, with economic interests in the Congo closely tied to those of Britain and Belgium, and with interests resulting from its close ties with many of the African nations, followed a policy similar to that of Belgium and Britain, but not losing its peculiarly French character in its attitude toward UN enterprise. As explained by one source: "Incensed by the Suez incident, and angered by the repeated needling they regularly received from the Assembly on Algeria, the French have been somewhat less than enthusiastic about the Organization during the past few years."⁴⁸ These specifics however were only aggravations

⁴⁷"Belgians and Katanga," The Economist, CCV (December 22, 1962), 1213.

⁴⁸Francis O. Wilcox, "United States Policy in the United Nations," The United States and the United Nations, ed. Francis O. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland, Jr., p. 163.

of an already existing antipathy to UN enterprise in so far as it puts any restraints on national power.⁴⁹ France, by abstaining from voting on all of the Security Council resolutions on the Congo situation with the exception one--that of July 22, 1960, which was in large measure repetitive of what had previously been passed--and by refusing to pay any of its assessments for ONUC, continued to show its feelings toward the enterprises of the Organization in general and to the Operation in the Congo in specific. (A veto on the Security Council resolutions which were disagreeable to French sympathies with Katanga would have been most unlikely since the U.S. and the Afro-Asian countries were in agreement.)⁵⁰ At the same time, France along with Belgium and Britain, although not officially recognizing Katanga, encouraged Tshombe and gave local support to the secession of Katanga in the hopes of best protecting its economic interests. French policy on the whole went hand in hand with Belgian, as many of their interests were the same; however, in the latter days of the UN Operation when Belgium was being noted for various constructive plans, France and Britain were seen to still be "dragging their feet in the usual colonialist manner."⁵¹

Many things have been said and many interpretations made of Britain's policy in the United Nations and in the Congo. Britain has been both praised and denounced for its actions. Arthur L. Burns praises its "legal and statesmanly scruples" and castigates Britain in this respect

⁴⁹"How to Use the UN," The Economist, CCII (January 20, 1962), 202.

⁵⁰Brien, p. 98.

⁵¹"A Kaunde-Tshombe Axis," New Statesman, LXIV (December 28, 1961), 918.

only for allowing them to be "overcome by a fear of disagreeing too openly with the U.S."⁵² However, quite oppositely, other commentators have objected to Britain's conduct saying that in regard to Katanga it has been "hypocritical and underhand":

While publicly endorsing the object of UN Congo operation, the British government has, in practice, sought to prevent its attainment. Its UN delegation has, on a number of occasions proved obstructive; its local Congo representatives have brazenly interfered in UN operations; and its response to UN requests for arms and munitions has been arbitrary and disingenuous.⁵³

Conor Cruise O'Brien after the September, 1961, military operation in Katanga, saw the British Government as "principally responsible for the survival of the State of Katanga."⁵⁴ In explaining and justifying his judgment, Mr. O'Brien after discussing what subjective factors may have prejudiced him then enumerates the objective which to him seem to incriminate the British.⁵⁵ The incriminating specifics which Mr. O'Brien is able to present because of his inside view in Katanga tend to back up the more generalized statements made not only by him but by so many other commentators in regard to Britain's two-fold policy which allowed its ministers to claim that "they have 'all along' supported a strong united Congo; supported the UN; opposed only the use of force"⁵⁶ while at the same time giving active local support to

⁵²Burns, p. 66.

⁵³"Obstructing the Law," New Statesman, LXII (December 29, 1961), 977.

⁵⁴O'Brien, p. 304.

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 305-306.

⁵⁶Erskine E. Childers, "The O'Brien Indictment," The Spectator, CCVII (December 8, 1961), 852.

Tshombe through the British Consul in Elizabethville and Sir Roy Welensky, Prime Minister of the Federation of Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Opinion in Britain as to the policy to be followed with regard to the UN and the Katanga problem was greatly divided. Also, the considerations which were before the British Government were perhaps more numerous and complex than these seen and faced by many governments. It was a fact that British financial interests in the Union Miniere were extensive and that those directly involved attempted to influence the British Government. However, how great their influence was and how much British policy was determined by commercial motivation is debatable.

There are those who attribute British position in regard to Katanga almost solely to commercial motives, saying that those with financial interests in Union Miniere "ruthlessly and successfully persuaded the government to lend devious support to the Tshombe regime."⁵⁷ There does seem reason to believe that not only private British citizens, but also government officials and policies did give local support to Tshombe and the Katangese regime not only by their actions, but even more often by their inaction. However, to explain many of British actions such as the calling for a cease-fire each time there was fighting between the UN Force and the Katangese troops or its continual opposition to the use of force by the UN as a means of ending the Katanga secession, as being solely attempts to protect British financial interests through the preservation of a separate Katanga would of course be foolishly misleading and gross oversimplification.

⁵⁷"Lord Home's Pocket Suez," New Statesman, LXII (December 8, 1969), 865.

In objecting to the use of force in Katanga, Britain argued that such a means was "alien to the nature of an organization such as the UN, whose proper function is prevention of war by means of conciliation and mediation."⁵⁸ The concern which Britain showed for the UN's setting a precedent in using force as a means to achieve its objectives was highly warranted. Such a precedent perhaps entailed a devastating danger for the future of the United Nations as a peace-keeping organization. According to some interpretations, British concern reflected a diplomatic maturity and regard for "legal and statesmanly scruples," lacking in other nations which were more preoccupied with success in this one situation.⁵⁹ However, the effects of British scruples on this specific situation were such as to perpetuate the Katanga secession, and thus, to cast some doubt on the purity of British motives.

Britain disapproved not only the use of military force but economic pressures as well. Quite an argument can be made to show the wisdom of Britain's policy against the use of military force by the UN; however, Britain did not propose or support any alternative solution. Both Britain and France "failed to say what should happen when a mandate is resisted with force or where arbitration does not succeed."⁶⁰ Even when economic pressures were seen as the only possible way to save the UN from either using military force or abandoning the Congo to chaos, Britain refused to support economic sanctions against Tshombe.

With regard to the plan of economic sanctions incorporated as a part of the four-phase course of action attached to the Secretary-

⁵⁸Burns, p. 110.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 66, 111, et passim.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 110.

General's Plan of National Reconciliation, Britain's support, along with that of Belgium and the United States which had already been pledged, could have been of crucial importance. What Britain was in a position to do is made evident in the following statement:

Tshombe's significant neighbors are North Rhodesia, which has a British Governor and belongs to a Federation for which Britain is internationally responsible, and Portuguese Angola, whose railway line into Katange is owned by Tanganyika Concessions, a largely (though not entirely) British company. If there are to be any economic sanctions, so as to avoid the need for force, Britain must be primarily instrumental in applying them.⁶¹

However, Britain did not choose, by taking a primary part or even supporting at all the plan for economic sanctions, to thereby defend itself against earlier accusations in New York in regard to its "failing to support, if not actually sabotaging the UN action,"⁶² or to make evident its professed sincerity with regard to opposing Katanga secession. Instead Britain remained prominent among those too many governments which desire "to believe that the United Nations can be more than the sum of its parts while working busily to ensure that it is not."⁶³ Its proposals of cease-fire and its opposition to the UN's use of force may have been in the best long-run interest of the United Nations, but what alternatives did Britain help provide?

⁶¹Keith Kyle, "Britain, the UN and Katanga," The Spectator, CCIX (August 17, 1962), 212.

⁶²"Britain and the UN", The Spectator, CCVII (December 15, 1961), 887.

⁶³"Crisis of Confidence," The Spectator, CCVIII (January 5, 1962), 3.

IV: COLD WAR ASPECTS

Recognizing that the situation in the Congo was a danger to international peace and security, the United Nations rushed in to aid the Congolese in this emergency and to attempt to insulate the crisis from the great power rivalry. To the extent that the UN was able to do this, it showed itself "the embryo of a third Force" able to intercede between the committed power blocs, keeping them from a further clashing.⁶⁴ However, did the UN Operation really succeed in keeping the big powers out of the Congo? Or, was its success in that it prevented a head-on clash by making big power intervention more indirect, and thereby, less explosive? It is true that the UN helped to prevent the Congo becoming either another Korea or the scene of another Spanish Civil War, however, not even the UN Operation itself was free from being influenced by Cold War maneuvers. Thus, the struggle of the blocs continued both in New York, where nations attempted to shape UN policy so as to bring about in the Congo situation that which they considered favorable to them, and in the Congo where they supported their choice of leader, if not with armed intervention or quantities of military supplies, at least with recognition, promises, and indirect aid.

Some nations because of the very nature and purposes of the United Nations, because of the voting strength of member nations which usually

⁶⁴"The Missionary without a Dogma," New Statesman, LX (August 13, 1960), 201.

agree with them, and perhaps somewhat because of their financial support, have succeeded more often than others in influencing UN policies and actions to go along with their national policies rather than working against them. The clearest example of this is the influence in the United Nations of the United States in contrast to that of the Soviet Union. Of course, it is argued that according to voting, the U.S. is less able than ever to be assured of an automatic majority in the United Nations. (Is this the result of many nations turning toward agreement with and backing of Russian measures or is it rather that more and more nonaligned countries are making up their minds according to the facts of a specific situation instead of voting in bloc style, and that Russia in attempting to play their "most loyal friend" often is found voting with them?)

The Soviet Union, although trying in every possible way to increase its influence generally of UN policy by changing the structure and membership of the Organization and to influence specific operations by its hammering away with speeches, accusations and other attempts to create support for its proposals and its views of implementation, nevertheless, just has not been successful in getting its objectives achieved through the United Nations. In fact, in the Congo situation, the Soviet Union would have had not just to supplement the United Nations activities in order to ensure favorable results in the Congo, but as it learned soon after the launching of the UN Operation, it would probably have to work the harder to counteract the "natural" effects of the UN being there.

From the beginning of the Congo situation, Russia labeled the Belgians as "aggressors" and at every opportunity it continued to

denounce Belgium "aggression" and to keep this issue primary in the nations' eyes. This denunciation of the "colonialist" was only a part of Russia's attempt to use African sensitivity and emotionalism in regard to their fear of the reimposing of a form of colonialism or neo-colonialism, not just against Belgium but against the other NATO powers, especially the U.S., and even against the UN itself. However, Soviet efforts to show itself to be black Africa's best friend did not all take a negative cast as its being against any form of colonialism. The Soviet Union also offered and gave support to Lumumba and his followers in the Congo, who more than any other represented the nationalist movement cutting across tribal lines. This support took both the form of indirect aid through attempts to get the UN to take actions against the Belgians and in Katanga according to the desires and expectations of Lumumba, and also direct unilateral aid, such as the trucks, planes, and technicians sent to Lumumba for pursuance of his objectives in Katanga. However, the increasing Soviet activity in the Congo which scared the West as it saw Lumumba turning more and more to the Soviet Union, was given a startling blow when Mr. Mobutu took over after the Kasavubu-Lumumba schism and sent warnings to the Russian and Czechoslovakian diplomats that if they had not left the country by noon the following day (September 17, 1960) they would be arrested and deported.

Russia in its efforts to extend its influence in the Congo and in the United Nations had been given quite a set back by the events and actions during September, 1960. Not only had the effects of the UN Force attempts to restore law and order after the Kasavubu-Lumumba schism, such as its closing of the Leopoldville radio station and the

airports, been disfavorable to Lumumba, but soon thereafter in New York Russia found it necessary to veto a Security Council resolution which was supported by the Afro-Asian countries, ~~Russia, thus,~~ lost the possible support that might otherwise have been derived from the recent UN activities disfavorable to Lumumba. With the exception of the African states in the French Community, Africa and the other neutral countries backed Lumumba as the Congo's nationalist leader. They thus took affront or were at least very concerned with the September activities of the UN Force in the Congo. However, they were strongly against foreign intervention in the Congo whether of the Belgian or the Russian type. Therefore, after Russia vetoed the Security Council resolution which would have required of all countries that all aid of any possible military nature be sent to the Congo only through the UN operation, a similar resolution was passed by an Emergency Session of the General Assembly called according to the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950. The Soviet Union, its interests suffering in both the Congo itself with the anti-Communist Mobutu in power and Lumumba somewhat undercover, and in New York, "let loose the full force of its propaganda against Hammarskjold, and began to campaign for the 'troika'."⁶⁵ As commented on by one astute observer:

This was hardly surprising, for the Soviet Union had seen resolutions, for which it had voted, used in such a way--even stretched in such a way--as to bring about the closing of its own Embassy. I am not a supporter of the international policies of the Soviet Union, but I cannot say that I find its reaction on this occasion so 'irrational', 'incomprehensible', or 'blindly destructive' as many Western commentators found it, or affected to find it. Granted that

⁶⁵O'Brien, p. 96.

the Soviet Union was 'interfering in the internal affairs of the Congo', so also were the United States, Great Britain and almost everybody with an Embassy in Leopoldville--not to mention Belgium. The difference was that the Western powers 'won'--with considerable help from at least one United States citizen. Any great power similarly treated would have reacted similarly.⁶⁶

The Soviet Union's attack on the Secretary-General and the UN Operation was not supported by the Afro-Asian nations, which, although somewhat disillusioned by the recent activities of UN Operation, showed great wisdom in realizing the importance of the UN and its Operation in the Congo for their future. However, this attack did not consume all of Russian energies for it was only one portion of their efforts and policies toward the UN and its Operation in the Congo. Seemingly, according to many of Russian reactions, its policy was in general that if it could not capture then perhaps it could kill. However, its hopes to capture, or at least influence things somewhat its way, flickered enough throughout the operation to keep its efforts high in the UN. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union continued to threaten with its support and possible interventions in the Congo to aid the Lumumbist elements. The threat of Russian intervention towered over the heads of the West, especially the U.S. whose fear of an "African Cuba" determined much of its resoluteness in areas where decisions had hitherto proved difficult to make.

Cold War aspects played their part in determining the actions and policies of all nations. African nations feared the possibility of the Cold War rivalry on the Continent. Belgium, Britain, and France--nations whose local support of the Katanga secession made somewhat

⁶⁶Ibid.

dubious their formal expressions--nevertheless found it necessary with the rest of the states in the Western bloc, not to recognize Katanga. Consideration of Cold War factors demanded precedence:

To recognize Katanga would offer the Russians the chance not only to set the rest of the Congo against Katanga, but also to turn all Africa north of Katanga against the white-dominated territories south of it No western state--and certainly no Nato state--will want to present the Russians with such an opportunity to assume the guardianship of black Africa--a feat which might well end with communist penetration not only of the Congo, but of other African states as well.⁶⁷

However, even though the policies of all nations were influenced somewhat by the fear of the Cold War being brought into the Congo and Africa, it was U.S. policies which were so obviously and totally determined by Cold War considerations.

Surely, one might ask, the United States is not to be criticized for letting what is the most real and immediate danger to its national interests determine the nature of its policies. No, this is not the substance of this criticism, for is it not true that every nation's policies are shaped by the dangers, needs, and opportunities which are real to them? However, as with the lives of individuals, do not national policies reflect a variance of the breadth and depth of reality with which nations see the world? Is the United States not more capable than is shown in some of its policies of having made real to its people more than just their immediacies, and having this reflected more wisely in its policies?

The United States had supported the launching of the UN Operation in the Congo as authorized by Security Council resolutions which included measures to be taken toward obtaining Belgian withdrawal.

⁶⁷"Salvage, not Sabotage", The Economist, CVC (July 23, 1960), 334.

However, there was no evidence of any real pressure put upon Belgium by the United States in these early months as was later to be seen. The U.S. seemed to more or less condone Belgian activities in the Congo or at least devoted its full attention to Soviet activities. This is illustrated by one observer who even as late as January, 1961, writes:

Last week, instead of supporting Mr. Hammarskjold's strictures on the Belgians for allowing Mobutu's troops to pass through Ruanda-Urundi, the West chose to chase the Soviet hare in the Security Council-- thereby tactily endorsing the Belgian action.⁶⁸

The U.S. in these early months of the Congo Operation seemed hesitant to step out from its fellow Western bloc members. Although there was the existing danger of the Belgian and rightist intervention in Katanga-- a situation which had brought such concern to African nations and to Lumumba--the United States was pre-occupied with the seemingly "leftward" turn of Lumumba. Thus, in the September Kasavubu-Lumumba schism the U.S. put its influence and support behind the moderate Kasavubu and even Colonel Mobutu who "seemed more pliable, to have some sort of military force, and to be anti-Communist as well."⁶⁹ Not realizing or disregarding the strong views of the African nations "that legitimacy is the strongest safeguard against the return of colonialism" and that "whatever Lumumba's faults" most Africans believed him to be the legal premier of the Congo,⁷⁰ Eisenhower pursued his policy of vigorously backing Kasavubu and of subsidizing the coup d'etat of Mobutu.⁷¹

⁶⁸"The weakening of the Triumvirate," New Statesman, LXI (January 20, 1961), 78.

⁶⁹"Last Chance for the Congo," New Statesman, LX (December 17, 1960), 953.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Anthony Hartley, "By Confusion Stand," The Spectator, CCV (December 23, 1960), 1010.

There has been much concern in regard to the excessive influence of the United States on the United Nations, this concern has been generated frequently by doubt as to whether this is best in the long run for the ability of the UN to meet the world's peace-keeping needs. It is a reality that the U.S. with its national purposes largely in agreement with UN aims and its position as a world power is in a natural position of influence in the United Nations; however, whether it uses its influence blatantly to carry out its national will or whether it allows it to bring its natural toll while in making decisions taking into consideration the views which others hold, is dependent upon U.S. attitude and policy. During the operation in the Congo, the UN activities have generally been in accordance with U.S. national policy, so much so, that the West has secured even through the UN a westward leaning of the Congolese leaders. However, U.S. policy or the nature of its influence has by no means remained the same throughout the course of the UN Operation in the Congo. The U.S. may have continued to see its policies carried out by the UN Operation but after the first half year or so the determination of its policies became more subject to the realities of the Congo situation and the viewpoints of the Afro-Asian nations.

An example of more blatantly offensive imposition of U.S. policies in the United Nations occurred in November, 1960. By looking at this one situation in some detail, one can get some insight into many of the workings and policies in New York. At this time the situation in the Congo was so uncertain due to the Kasavubu-Lumumba schism and the Mobutu coup in September, and the nations were so divided in their views and support. Nevertheless, the U.S. holding an "automatic majority" in

the Credentials Committee, a committee which consisted of the U.S., Costa Rica, Haiti, New Zealand, the Philippines, Spain, Morocco, UAR, and USSR, succeeded in getting the Kasavubu delegation seated in the General Assembly. Briefly, the circumstances in which this took place were as follows. Both Kasavubu and Lumumba had sent delegations to the UN after their split; however, with things as they were in the Congo itself there was uncertainty not only about the legality, but perhaps more important, about the effect which the seating of one delegation would have on the internal power struggle. The UN had committed itself to a policy of noninterference in the internal political struggles in the Congo even though its efforts to restore law and order did have political effects. Upholding the right of the Congolese to determine for themselves their government and leaders, the Advisory Committee of the Secretary-General on the Congo had, however, agreed to send in a Conciliation Commission to aid the Congolese. Thus, to some nations the seating of ^{one} delegation would not only be aiding one faction, and thereby, effecting the internal struggle, but at this time would be most disastrous, endangering any positive results of the Conciliation Commission. The views expressed by the member states in the General Assembly debate showed much variance of attitude and considerations, however, in the end the vote was largely along Cold War lines. As described by an African delegate:

So strong were the railroading tactics, so furious the charges and countercharges, and so thick the suspicions that all delegations, including the African ones, seemed divided solely along the lines of Cold War allegiances-- for or against the United States or Russia.⁷²

The United States achieved its objective in seating the Kasavubu

⁷²Quaison-Sackey, p. 98.

delegation even though at that very time Kasavubu refused entry to the Conciliation Commission and UN forces were being attacked by Kasavubu-Mobutu troops. Although this achievement of the U.S. corresponded with its other efforts since it had panicked at Lumumba's leftward movement, yet was it really in the best interest of the Congo, the UN, or even the U.S.? Certain British subjects had indicated their doubt in the wisdom of this action by expressing the hope that Britain and the Western powers would not support the U.S. in its "attempts to force the United Nations to a quick recognition of Mr. Kasavubu as the legitimate governing authority in the Congo at the expense of Mr. Lumumba."⁷³ Their reasons for taking this position were not that they thought Lumumba would be such a good prime minister for they agreed that he was "certainly emotional, unstable and paranoid" but that he seemed to be the only person widely enough known and "free enough from sectional interest" to be Prime Minister.⁷⁴ There was a grave danger of similar mistakes being made in Africa as had been made by the West in the Far East and in the Middle East resulting at best in "a collection of insecure leaders of ineffective small states, upheld in their positions-- and only shakily upheld--simply because their opponents had talked to the communists."⁷⁵ The situation in the Congo and the policy the U.S. had hitherto taken made this danger very real. In March, 1961, it was reported by some that the Kasavubu Government was "largely a sham," and that except for his own tribal area, his support depended on money coming from Belgians and "quiet Americans" which enable Mobutu to

⁷³T. P. M. Creighton, "Congo: The Need for Compromise," The Spectator, CCV (November 18, 1960), 768.

⁷⁴Ibid. "Crisis in Congo," The Economist, CXCVII (November 26, 1960), 653.

⁷⁵"Black Man's Burden," The Economist, CXCVIII (January 21, 1961), 230.

pay regularly the National Security Forces.⁷⁶

Not only did the attempts of the U.S. to set up Kasavubu to the exclusion of Lumumba perhaps endanger the long-run possibility of establishing a stable central government in the Congo, but the seating of the Kasavubu delegation was a decision which split the African members of the UN, a situation which is regarded by many to be most unwise for the welfare of Africa and for the United Nations.⁷⁷ The U.S. in pushing such a determined policy of support for Kasavubu and opposition to Lumumba offended many African nations and leaders, who could not share with the U.S. its Communist phobia, with regard to Lumumba who they saw as an African nationalist, and At the same time, it gave to the Communists an opportunity for criticism of the UN as a Western dominated organization.

As with other powers, the policies of the U.S. with regard to the UN Operation in the Congo were by no means static. With time and the changing of circumstances in the Congo and especially with the change of national administration bringing with it a reevaluation and revamping of policy, there was the emergence of a more positive role in regard to anti-colonialism and the African nations, which was especially timely in regard to the Congo situation. In general, President Kennedy began to show that his policy toward the NATO countries would not follow the maxim "love my Nato ally, love his colonial policy."⁷⁸ The U.S. began to show a willingness to approach its Western allies with a firm policy on Katanga and even, increasingly with time, to

⁷⁶Basil Davidson, "Facts about the Congo," New Statesman, LXI (March 10, 1961), 373.

⁷⁷"The Blamed Tool," The Economist, CXCVII (November 26, 1960), 865.

⁷⁸"Open Line to Moscow," The Economist, CXCVIII (February 25, 1961), 748.

apply pressure on them in its regard.

Although for different reasons the U.S., like the African nations, began to see that it could not allow the secession of Katanga to continue. The secession of one part of the country would serve as a precedent for the secession of another part and the United States was greatly concerned over the possibility of secession around Stanleyville, "leading to 'a Central African Cuba.'"⁷⁹ Thus, with a determination and a pursuance of its objectives no less than earlier, the U.S. proceeded to use its national influence and other means open to it to bring an end to the Katanga secession. However, now the U.S. had to its advantage the fact that it was pushing in a direction that corresponded with the views of the Afro-Asian nations and that future events and circumstances seem to call for more and more.

It was not just in its views on Katanga that the U.S. showed some shift in tone and policy. As interpreted by some there were even hints being let out just before Lumumba's death of an "American New Deal for the Congo" which included support of an effort to bring all Congolese leaders together in a federal union.⁸⁰ As compared to the staunch attitude previously taken in opposition to Lumumba and in support of Kasavubu, these hints were at least indicative of a change of tone and perhaps, if not a more flexible, at least a more encompassing and longer view of the realities of the Congo situation. Not only did the U.S. continue its support of first Dag Hammarskjold and then U Thant in their efforts as Secretary-General even at times when they were deserted by all

⁷⁹O'Brien, p. 59.

⁸⁰"Open Line to Moscow," The Economist, p. 747.

others, but the support which the U.S. gave tended to be more in accordance with the Secretary-General's conception of the UN role. This new U.S. view indicated its having at least a glimpse of the fact that the viability of the Congo as a territorial whole supported by all elements of the country would be in the long-run Cold War interest of the U.S. Of course, the threat of a civil war with the Lumumbist-Gizengist element backed by the Soviet Union and the Kasavubu element by the U.S. was most conducive to the producing of moderation so as to avoid this clash. Whatever the reasons, far-seeing or immediate, the new face of American policy brought it nearer to the views of the Afro-Asian nations and put new strength behind the UN Operation in the Congo.

Although the UN Operation in the Congo brought about many of U.S. objectives with regard to the Congo, the U.S. did continue somewhat to supplement this with national action. What happened in the Congo, central to Africa, was of crucial importance to what would happen in the whole of Africa in the future. Thus, the U.S., although seeming to have caught a glimpse of the reality that what is productive of a strong, viable Congo Government, handmaiden to no one and founded upon a growing national loyalty of all its tribal and factional elements, would in the long run be best for the U.S. in keeping out Soviet influence; nevertheless, when frightened by immediate circumstances such as the increasingly precarious hold of Prime Minister Adoula over his left-wing extremists and the chances of increasing Communist influence, the U.S. often reverted to more direct measures to ensure the Congo's Western leaning. However, the effects of such national initiatives as the military mission sent by the U.S. to the Congo in late 1962 were not only to give the Soviet Union propaganda weapons but to cause real concern among other nations of Africa and the world.

Although many nations share the U.S. concern with regard to Communist aggression and some to quite a large extent, yet there is often both criticism of and an attempt by some elements to use the U.S. extreme sensitivity toward and fear of the spread of Communist influence. Moise Tshombe from the day that he announced Katanga's secession tried to use the Communist scare by accusing the Central Government of trying to establish a Communist state. A later occurrence which illustrates the attempts to play to the American ear was when Ralph Bunche, a member of the UN Secretariat, went to talk with Tshombe, and Tshombe, knowing that Bunche was an American, hence "described at length the Communists on Lumumba's staff."⁸¹ That there be any suggestion of such gullibility is not very flattering to the American ego. We can perhaps look at Mr. Tshombe's display as mere farce, however, of more substance is the following criticism which reaches for the heart of the matter:

Many Americans hasty to find an enemy in Mr. Gizenga, still speak of 'Lumumbist' as so many black Khrushchevs. In fact, Mr. Gizenga's followers attended the session at Leopoldville against the advice and predictions of Moscow radio. The sensible view of a 'Lumumbist' is to see him as no more than a militant African nationalist--as capable as anyone else of being driven into the communist camp, but not eager to go.⁸²

Americans seem to fail to realize that the ways of survival and well-being for the rest of the world may not be the same as those in the United States nor may they be seen in the light of a choice between two alternatives--the Russian and the American systems. Lumumba and

⁸¹Jean Daniel, "The Drama of Katanga," New Statesman, LX (August 13, 1960), 204.

⁸²"Humpty Congo," The Economist, CC (August 12, 1961), 609.

his followers, as other African nationalist, asked aid of both the United States and Russia and seemed not to be too concerned about where the aid came from as long as it came. The important thing for these Congolese nationalists was the Congo's survival as an independent and prosperous African nation. Perhaps Lumumba, with his eccentric and unstable ways, was from the beginning handicapped in his relations with the West or the U.N., and perhaps he was beginning to play a dangerous game with the Communists in seeking their aid "without any strings," but were the policies of the U.S. as far seeing as they might have been, or were they too often aimed at trying to get rid of what to the U.S. was undesirable, merely to attack rather than prevent?

The problems the Congolese were facing and the attempt of the United States to aid in the transition from colony to independent nation were of great significance to all Africans. In a speech to the General Assembly, Hédi Sidi, Chairman of the Tunisian Delegation to the United Nations and President of the Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly, indicates the significance of the Congo situation to Africa:

The experience in the Congo has far more a symbolic significance in that it has raised the problem of decolonization in one complete instance and in all its aspects—administrative, political, economic, and social"

This viewpoint of Africa is further related by the President of the Republic of Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah who says:

The Congo question is a test case for Africa. What is happening in the Congo today may happen in any other part of Africa tomorrow, and what the United Nations does today may be a precedent or a barrier for what it may have to do tomorrow."

"America Speaks to the UN: A Symposium of Reperations and concerns voiced by Representative Leaders of the UN," International Organization, XVI (Spring, 1962), 315.

V. THE CONGO AS A CRISIS TO AFRICA: THE AFRICAN VIEWPOINT

Although Africa does not speak with one voice, the African states do share many common concerns and aspirations. Varying to some degree in their outlook and political orientation, they nevertheless have many fundamental similarities causing them to act with unity on problems crucial to African interests. The events in the Congo following its independence brought great concern to all African states. Both the problems the Congolese were facing and the attempt of the United Nations to aid in the transition from colony to independent nation were of utmost significance to all Africans. In a speech to the General Assembly, Mongi Slim, Chairman of the Tunisian Delegation to the United Nations and President of the Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly, indicates the significance of the Congo situation to Africa:

The experience in the Congo has for us a symbolic significance in that it has raised the problem of decolonization in one complete instance and in all its aspects--administrative, political, economic, and social⁸³

This viewpoint of Africa is further related by the President of the Republic of Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah who says:

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⁸³"America Speaks to the UN: A Symposium of Aspirations and Concerns voiced by Representative Leaders of the UN," International Organization, XVI (Spring, 1962), 315.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 317.

African leaders saw the problems of the Congo as part of a larger picture of the postcolonial problems of Africa. Thus, they were intimately involved with the decisions that were being made and the precedents that were being set. They sought at all costs to prevent foreign intervention in the Congo. It was for this reason that even when many of them were dissatisfied--even disillusioned--by the course of action of the UN Operation after the Kasavubu-Lumumba schism, they nevertheless gave their support to the General Assembly Resolution to prevent unilateral military aid to the Congo while the UN Force was there. As the same time that the African states sought to rid themselves of the colonial vestiges they sought to prevent any part of the Continent from becoming an area of big power rivalry. Their desire was to have Africa for the Africans, without any foreign interference. This desire entailed not only having the Congo maintain its political independence but also for it to attain economic independence.

For the Congo to be economically viable it was necessary for it to maintain its territorial integrity. Although as with the rest of Africa boundaries had been drawn arbitrarily by colonial rulers without regard to tribal factors, yet African leaders realize the necessity of maintaining these "legal fiction" borders so as to avoid complete anarchy and economic ruin. To admit the possibility of secession, such as attempted by Katanga, would set a precedent for the balkanization of Africa.

Every African nation, large or small, federal or unitary, has its Katanga. Once the logic of secession is admitted, there is no end except in anarchy. And so every African government knows that its first problem is how to hold the country together when it is threatened by a wide disintegration.⁸⁵

⁸⁵Wallerstein, p. 88.

The danger of balkanization is perhaps the greatest problem facing Africa today.⁸⁶ Balkanization is seen by the African states as an "instrument of neo-colonialism" in that a nation must be at least a certain size if it is to become economically viable.⁸⁷ African states could not countenance Katanga's secession which endangered the Congo's economic independence and encouraged "every divisive tendency" in any of the African states.

The situation in the Congo was a crisis for the African continent. There were many reasons for the great concern shown by the African states as to what was going on in the Congo. Whatever happened in this vast country in the heart of Africa could be influential to the futures of other African states. The political and ideological fluidity in Africa only increased the possible impact of events and outcome in the Congo. Should foreign intervention be substantial, then there would be a danger of the spread of foreign influence in Africa. Also, the steps taken to solve the decolonization problems in other emerging states. Precedents set in the Congo might work for good or ill.

As the United Nations moved into the Congo situation this only heightened African involvement. The African states were concerned with the results of the United Nations involvement because they viewed the Organization as important to their future well-being. Also, the majority of UN troops in the Congo were provided by African states and through being on the Advisory Committee to the Secretary-

⁸⁶Peter Duigan and Lewis Gann, "A Different View of United States Policy in Africa," Western Political Quarterly, XII (December, 1960), 923.

⁸⁷Herskovits, p. 371.

General, many of them were most intimately and influentially involved with the UN Operation in the Congo. These factors indicate the many ways in which the situation in the Congo and the UN efforts to deal with it so concerned the other African nations. As noted by the Secretary-General and as believed by the African nations, in the Congo crisis, the future of Africa was at stake!

To understand the positions taken by the African states in the United Nations and their actions with regard to the Congo, one must attempt to see the Congo situation from the African viewpoint. African nations have looked upon the events occurring in the Congo and in the United Nations from the context of the problems which are to them most real. The newly independent African nations are faced with the difficulty of preserving their political independence and attaining economic viability. The danger of secession leading to a balkanization of the continent is an ever-present problem. Such balkanization would make impossible the attaining of economic independence by the nations of Africa and would relegate the continent once again to an inferior position in the world. Thus, many of the nations of Africa live in fear of attempts of neo-colonialism, while faced with internal problems of trying to make into a nations diverse populations with little or no national feeling. They are faced with the need to make their nations economically viable, yet at present are necessarily subject to the dangers accompanying the receiving capital and technical aid from the East or West.

The concerns of the African nations as they see them derive not so much from the Cold War as from "colonial experience and post-colonial aspirations." They involve not so much a choice between the

"free world and the Communist world, democracy and authoritarianism, or economic systems of East and West" as a fight against any form of imperialism and for the nourishment of their own "cultural uniqueness."⁸⁸ Thus, much of African efforts is as follows:

It is the effort to gain greater access to the economic levers of power--skills, productivity and capital--so that the new state will, more and more, be in charge of its own destiny. It is the search for the proper relationship of the new states to their former metropolises, to the great powers, and to one another, and the creation of a new order in those vast regions recently vacated by the imperial powers.⁸⁹

Of course, the African nations are very much effected by the rivalry of the two world power blocs. It is a reality of our present world that has largely shaped the international scene onto which the African states have recently been emerging. As a result of this rivalry, the African states are placed in a unique bargaining position with both sides, and their foreign policies are formulated in view of this reality.⁹⁰ However, just because African nations are aware of and formulate their policies in light of the circumstances of the Cold War, this does not mean that they are absorbed by Cold War concerns. African has problems and aspirations of her own and to most of the African nations the concerns of the competing power blocs are of importance to them only in so much as they effect their more fundamental African problems.

The problems which the African nations are facing are viewed

⁸⁸Robert C. Good, "The Congo Crisis: A Study of Postcolonial Politics," Neutralism and Nonalignment, ed. Lawrence W. Martin (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 38.

⁸⁹Ibid., pp. 38-39.

⁹⁰Herskovits, pp. 342-43.

especially by some of them as calling for more than the grafting of one system or another from older nation states. They do not want to be carbon copies of older states, and the problems which they face in this age along with their tribal traditions seem to call for new measures even to reach old ends. Thus, in dealing with their problems often they do not hesitate to extract what they need from various systems of government without necessarily taking all the ideology etc. that comes with it. One noted anthropologist explains:

The fallacy that the political structures of self-governing Africa would be replicas of their Euro-american models, or would take over foreign socialist or communist forms whole-cloth, arose from an under-estimation of the vitality of aboriginal political institutions.⁹¹

As the result of this extraction from many systems and of the modifying so as to make such forms and ways of doing things fit the African situation, the African picture cannot just be looked at through the lens of the Cold War. The world is not that easily divided. Even when speaking of socialism and nationalism in Africa, one needs to speak specifically of African socialism and African nationalism. African thinkers emphasize "that African socialism is somehow distinctively African, rooted in African tradition, and therefore not intrinsically related to socialism anywhere else."⁹² Nationalism in Africa has also been of a specific nature related to African tradition. It has not been as defined by Hans Kohn in Encyclopedia Britannica "a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due to the nation state, but rather has been "movements

⁹¹Ibid. p. 355.

⁹²Wallerstein, p. 148.

striving for independence from colonial rule!"⁹³ Even more striking with regard to nationalism in Africa is that it is not placed in opposition to supranational unity, at least not ideologically:

African nationalist feel that in a real sense their struggle is an unfinished business and will continue to be so until unity is achieved. The objective of nationalism was not independence. This was only a means . . . to their real goal, political equality. At one level, independence assures equality in that each nation is sovereign and is legally free to pursue its own national interests. On another level, in the international arena, small and poor nations are scarcely able to compete on equal terms with big powers. Thus, there appears the old political theme: in unity there is strength.⁹⁴

In Africa, national leaders take the lead in Pan-African movements and amongst the people there is no stronghold of national loyalties to stand in the way of Pan-Africanism. This suggests that perhaps nations coming of age in Africa today are least a little more open to the realities of the interdependence of nations than those nations which have existed through several centuries in which the nation state has been supreme.

In large part, the African nations supported the United Nations at every point in its Operation in the Congo. That the difficulties in the Congo be smoothed out by the UN Operation rather than by the intervention of any one foreign nation or any bloc of nations was important to the future of the Congo and of Africa. Also, that the United Nations be successful in this Operation in the Congo in which it had become so involved was of staggering importance to the Organization, and thus, to the African states which saw the United Nations

⁹³Herskovits, p. 305.

⁹⁴Wallerstein, p. 106.

as most significant to their future. Since the question for the newly-emerging, under-developed states is "not whether external power is going to be applied in their internal affairs, but whose external power is going to be applied and to what degree,"⁹⁵ it was important for the UN capabilities to be maintained so that it could be that external power. The United Nations has sometimes been thought of as the "missionary without a dogma." In comparison with receiving aid from the West "whose technicians were tainted with the stigma of colonialism" or from Russia "whose help can only be obtained at a unknown price," the United Nations "offers a third and acceptable choice" for the African states.⁹⁶

As a whole, the African states during the Congo crisis have shown much "maturity and good sense" in their support of the United Nations. Even when Khrushchev chose tempting moments to denounce the Secretary-General's activities in the Congo, he did not receive African support.⁹⁷ Some of the African states were for some time dissatisfied with the way things were going in the Congo. They did not approve of the way Lumumba and his followers were being treated by UN Forces in the Congo. Some of these states even threatened to withdraw their troops unless Lumumba was treated differently. However, even though many of them regarded Lumumba as the legal Prime Minister and as the nationalist leader, yet as a whole the African states were careful not to support such moves as Khrushchev's which would hamper, if not make impossible, future UN

⁹⁵Harlan Cleveland, "The Capacities of the United Nations," The United States and the United Nations, ed. Francis O. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland, Jr., p. 134.

⁹⁶"The Missionary Without a Dogma," New Statesman, p. 201.

⁹⁷"UN Heads and Tails," The Economist, CXCVI (September 10, 1960), 970.

operations. Thus, the African nations which supported Lumumba and his followers did all they could to influence the UN Operation just as they did with regard to the attempted Katanga secession. However, at the times when they did not get their way, they were wise enough to see that by striking out at the UN they would be hurting themselves.

The majority of the independent African states have recognized the United Nations as the only body which can help them to solve their continental problems. Ever more suspicious of 'neo-colonial' interference from both East and West, Nkrumah and Bourguiba in particular realize that if the UN fails in the Congo it will become virtually impossible for Africa to secure the economic and technical help which she so profoundly needs, without being embroiled in the Cold War.⁹⁸

In the long run the Afro-Asian viewpoint was very influential in determining the natures of the UN Operation in the Congo, especially with regard to Katanga. Although the African states were cautious with regard to allowing the UN to set a precedent of violating the supreme sovereignty of a state, they were not nearly so concerned about the possibility of the UN effecting the internal situation in the Congo when it was with regard to ending Katanga's secession. Their staunch position with regard to the UN's action in Katanga is easily understood when seen in context with the dangers threatening Africa. So are many of the other positions taken by Africa with regard to the Congo and the UN Operation when seen in context with the concerns and aspirations primary to the African leaders. Although sometimes agreeing with one or the other, the African nations were not looking at the situation in the Congo from the viewpoint of either the West or East but rather seeing it as a crisis to Africa. And, the greatest

⁹⁸Bloomfield, "New Diplomacy in the United Nations," The United States and the United Nations, p. 63.

danger to the new African nations, whether because of balkanization, neo-colonialism, racial wars, or lack of capital and technical assistance, "is that they will not go forward."⁹⁹

VI. THE UN AS ILLUMINATED BY THE CONGO CRISIS

Although it is true, at least in the short run, that the Congo crisis is a mirror of the world around it, it is not only the Congo crisis, especially with the Congo crisis, which has shown the world a mirror reflecting the world around it. The Congo crisis has marked a significant point in the development of the United Nations. With its Operation in the Congo, the United Nations has never been before, given evidence of its capacity to do more than just reflect, it also has a responsibility of its own, that although originally derived from the Charter, it has not only continued of itself at least for a short period of time, but has also put together partial and inadequate aspects of international law to make a somewhat effective force for peace.

The situation faced by the UN Operation in the Congo was by no means without precedent in UN experience. Although the UN had never before peace-keeping operations, the UN had before the Congo crisis engaged in a task of the same and complex nature as that of the Congo. Also, the very nature of the United Nations Operation in the Congo was unique even from the very beginning, in that the UN had the responsibility of assisting the Congolese Government even in the maintenance of internal law and order. Thus, the situation in

⁹⁹Bloomfield, "New Diplomacy in the United Nations," The United States and the United Nations, p. 63.

VI. THE UN AS ILLUMINATED BY THE CONGO CRISIS

Although it is true, at least in one sense, that the United Nations is a mirror of the world around it, yet has not the UN, especially with the Congo crisis, shown itself to be much more than a mirror reflecting the world around it? I would suggest that the Congo Operation has marked a significant point in the development of the United Nations. With its Operation in the Congo, the United Nations has more than ever before, given evidence of its potential as a power. The UN does more than just reflect; it also has a determining influence of its own, that although originally derived from the nation states yet can continue of itself at least for a short period of time, and can piece together partial and inadequate support from many of the nations to make a somewhat effective force and policy.

The situation faced by the UN Operation in the Congo was in reality without precedent in UN experience. Although there had been other peace-keeping operations, the United Nations Emergency Force being especially significant, yet never before had the United Nations attempted a task of the size and complication of that in the Congo. Also, the very nature of the United Nations Operation in the Congo was unique even from the very beginning in that UN Forces were given the responsibility of assisting the Congolese Government even in the maintenance of internal law and order. With time, the situation in the Congo called for more and more unprecedented actions from the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Secretary-General.

The challenge provided by the Congo crisis and the measures attempted by the United Nations in order to deal with it serve to illuminate more than ever before both the potential and limits of the Organization in our present world.

The UN assistance to the Congo--both military and civilian operations--was an attempt to aid the Congolese with their decolonization problems until they could handle them alone. The UN attempted to insulate the Congo from foreign intervention while the Congolese faced their problems. However, the developing complications within the Congo--the schism among the leaders of the Central Government and the attempted secessions, especially that of Katanga--endangered the success of the UN Operation. Not only did these internal developments make the carrying out of the UN mandates difficult especially in the field itself, but the positions taken by the nations of the world often led to deadlock in New York. With vague directions, often issued by the Security Council when circumstances were quite different in the Congo, the Secretary-General had to carry on the UN Operation. With practically all nations expressing at one time or another their dissatisfaction with the UN Operation in the Congo and all too often there being widespread discontent and threat of withdrawal of support, the Secretary-General nevertheless carried on. Had the Secretary-General been restricted to mere administrative duties or had his undertakings been subject to first reaching agreement with another person, the Operation would have been greatly handicapped, if not impossible to carry out. The Congo Operation showed the necessity of the executive action of the Secretary-General. In this executive authority of the Secretary-General lay the ability of the United Nations to carry on its peace-keeping operations

even when nations are at odds or have temporarily withdrawn their support.

Both Secretary-Generals Dag Hammarskjold and U Thant have shown their ability and willingness for executive action. Dag Hammarskjold had so evidenced his capacity for independent planning and execution of UN action in the Middle East and then in the Congo, that Russia began to realize the inherent danger that lay in the UN's having an office of such power free from their national veto. The UN action in the Congo which as early as September, 1960, had showed itself contrary to Russian desires and policies, was enough to set into motion all the resentment and anger which had been building up among Russian leaders as they watched the "independent" power of the Secretary-General grow.¹⁰⁰ Thus, at the same time that the Congo crisis revealed the necessity of the executive authority of the Secretary-General for carrying on peace-keeping operations by a UN force, it "supplied the requisite drama as well as the conclusive reason" for Soviet onslaught on Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold and the office of Secretary-General.¹⁰¹ The Soviet Union has shown its opposition to the UN Operation in the Congo and to the general development of the UN's ability to take action at times free from Soviet veto in many ways including with-holding its financial support of the Operations. Yet none of her attempts have struck any more fundamentally at UN capacity to act in the present world than her attempt to change the nature of the office of the Secretary-General. Had Russia's "troika" principle been carried through, it would

¹⁰⁰Bloomfield, "The New Diplomacy in the United Nations," The United States and the United Nations, p. 67.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

have dealt a death blow to the carrying out of any future UN peace-keeping operations. It would have confined the United Nations to being little more than an international forum with no capacity to act.

As with the office of the Secretary-General in specific, the Congo crisis has shown the potential and the limitation or dangers to the United Nations peace forces. In attempting to meet the challenge of the Congo crisis, the UN placed itself under a spotlight. What was its capacity to act in such a situation? Could it gather enough troops with enough speed so as to penetrate the vast area of the Congo before it became subject to other foreign intervention and embroiled in world issues? Could the troops taken from different nations, speaking different languages and having different customs, be supplied and maintained? Could they work together effectively and uphold the principles of a peace-keeping force? The questions--both theoretical and practical--to be asked with regard to the setting up and maintaining of a peace force by an international organization are innumerable. The Congo Operation has been somewhat of a test case with regard to the United Nations capacity. Scholars, as well as persons involved directly with UN operations, have studied the UN experience in the Congo to determine what can be done to meet other and future needs of the world. Some persons are even investigating the possibility of a permanent UN Peace Force which would remove some of the difficulties of getting contingents in a hurry when launching an operation. However, whether thinking in terms of the possible problems facing a permanent force or thinking of how to be more effective in meeting the next emergency which requires a UN force, scholars and planners have turned to the UN Operation in the Congo for information and answers.

The UN Congo Operation has provided invaluable experience. It has shown some of the great difficulties facing an international organization dependent on its member states even for provision of its contingents. The Secretary-General was all too often under the threat of nations withdrawing their contingents because they disagreed with UN directives. On the personal level, there was the difficulty of having men carrying out under UN orders actions which were contrary to their national policies when it would be to their own nations that they would return after a short period of service with the UN Force. Although there proved to be innumerable difficulties in the carrying out by an international organization an operation such as the Congo in a world still characterized by national sovereignty, yet the UN Operation demonstrated somewhat its real possibilities even in our world today. As a whole, the men who served in the UN Force in the very difficult situation in the Congo were able to live up to the ideals of the peace-keeping mission. Not only were they able to make a satisfactory distinction between their national loyalties and their duty as impartial UN contingents, they were also able to maintain the necessary self-restraint to often take the condemnation of a people they were trying to help and sometimes see their fellow-members killed without taking revenge.

I will not attempt within the confines of this paper to present the many arguments with regard to the need, the possibility, or the practicality of a permanent peace force. However, a study of the UN Operation in the Congo must lead one to the deliberation of such a possibility. One thinks of the needs of the present world, and the possibility and practicality of a permanent force coming into being

within the structure of the United Nations. To present some of my own views and sentiments I quote from a recent speech of Secretary-General U Thant:

In my opinion, a permanent United Nations force is not a practical proposition at the present time

- Personally, I have no doubt that the world should eventually have an international police force which will be accepted as an integral and essential part of life in the same way as national police forces are accepted. Meanwhile, we must be sure that developments are in the right direction and that we can also meet critical situations as and when they occur.

There are a number of reasons why it seems to me that the establishment of a permanent United Nations force would be premature at the present time. I doubt whether many Governments in the world would yet be prepared to accept the political implications of such an institution and, in the light of our current experience with financial problems, I am sure that they would have very serious difficulties in accepting the financial implications.

I believe that we need a number of parallel developments before we can evolve such an institution. We have to go further along the road of codification and acceptance of a workable body of international law. We have to develop a more sophisticated public opinion in the world, which can accept the transition from predominately national thinking to international thinking.

We shall have to develop a deeper faith in international institutions as such, and a greater confidence in the possibility of a United Nations civil service whose international loyalty and objectivity are generally accepted and above suspicion. We shall have to improve the method of financing international organization. Until these conditions are met, a permanent United Nations force may not be a practical proposition.¹⁰²

It is with this look into the future, attempting to "be sure that developments are in the right direction" that I conclude this present investigation of the international ramifications of the Congo crisis. Until we have some of these parallel developments there will be other emergencies such as that in the Congo that will have to be met using what is now available. The UN Operation in the Congo has encountered

¹⁰²Secretary-General U Thant, "United Nations Stand-By Peace Force," United Nations Review, X (July, 1963), 56.

many problems and set many precedents. The ability to learn from this experience in the Congo and the choice of precedents set therein will do much to determine the role which the United Nations will play in meeting the needs of the world in the future.

(Resolution 1502 adopted by the Security Council on February 11, 1961)

A.

The Security Council,

Having considered the situation in the Congo,

Having learned with deep regret the announcement of the two Katanga leaders, Mr. Patrice Lumumba, Mr. Moïse Tshombe and Mr. Joseph Kasili,

Deeply concerned at the grave repercussions of these actions and the danger of widespread civil war and chaos in the Congo and the threat to international peace and security,

Having the report of the Secretary-General's Special Representative (S/4021) dated February 12th, 1961, which in light of the development of a serious civil war situation and preparations therefore

1. Urges that the United Nations take immediate and appropriate measures to prevent the resumption of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for carrying out the halting of all military operations, the withdrawal of troops and the use of force, if necessary, to the last resort;

2. Urges that measure be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all foreign and other foreign military and para-military personnel and military advisers not under United Nations command, and mercenaries;

3. Calls upon all States to take immediate and appropriate measures to prevent the departure of such personnel from the Congo from their territories and for the denial of transit and other facilities to them;

4. Decides that an immediate and impartial investigation be held in order to ascertain the whereabouts of the French and Belgian forces and his colleagues and that the perpetrators of these crimes be punished;

5. Reaffirms the Security Council resolutions of July 1960, July 22nd and August 9th, 1960, and the General Assembly resolution 1574 (XS-IV) of September 20th, 1960, and stresses all States of their obligation under these resolutions,

B.

The Security Council,

Deeply concerned at the continuing disturbances in the Congo, and the prevalence of conditions which seriously threaten peace and order, and the unity and territorial

APPENDIX I

(Resolution S/4741 adopted by the Security Council on February 21, 1961)

A.

The Security Council,
Having considered the situation in the Congo,
Having learned with deep regret the announcement of the
 the Congolese leaders, Mr. Patrice Lumumba, Mr. Maurice
 Mpolo and Mr. Joseph Okito,

Deeply concerned at the grave repercussions of these
 crimes and the danger of widespread civil war and blood-
 shed in the Congo and the threat to international peace
 and security,

Noting the report of the Secretary-General's Special
 Representative (S/4691) dated February 12th, 1961, bringing
 to light the development of a serious civil war situation
 and preparations therefore

1. Urges that the United Nations take immediately all
 appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil
 war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires,
 the halting of all military operations, the prevention of
 clashes and the use of force, if necessary, in the last
 resort;
2. Urges that measure be taken for the immediate with-
 drawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and
 other foreign military and para-military personnel and
 political advisers not under United Nations command, and
 mercenaries;
3. Calls upon all States to take immediate and energetic
 measures to prevent the departure of such personnel for the
 Congo from their territories and for the denial of transit
 and other facilities to them;
4. Decides that an immediate and impartial investigation
 be held in order to ascertain the circumstances of the death
 of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues and that the perpetrators
 of these crimes be punished;
5. Reaffirms the Security Council resolutions of July 14th,
 July 22nd and August 9th, 1960, and the General Assembly
 resolution 1474 (ES-IV) of September 20th, 1960, and reminds
 all States of their obligation under these resolutions.

B.

The Security Council,
Gravely concerned at the continuing deterioration in the
 Congo, and the prevalence of conditions which seriously
 imperil peace and order, and the unity and territorial

integrity of the Congo, and threaten international peace and security.

Noting with deep regret and concern the systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the general absence of rule of law in the Congo.

Recognizing the imperative necessity of the restoration of parliamentary institutions in the Congo in accordance with the fundamental law of the country, so that the will of the people should be reflected through the freely elected parliament,

Convinced that the solution of the problem of the Congo lies in the hands of the Congolese people themselves without any interference from outside and that there can be no solution without conciliation,

Convinced further that the imposition of any solution, including the formation of any Government not based on genuine conciliation would, far from settling any issues greatly enhance the dangers of conflict within the Congo and threat to international peace and security;

1. Urges the convening of the parliament and the taking of necessary protective measures in that connection;
2. Urges that Congolese armed units and personnel should be recognized and brought under discipline and control, and arrangements be made on impartial and equitable bases to that end and with a view to the elimination of any possibility of interference by such units and personnel in the political life of the Congo;
3. Calls upon all States to extend their full co-operation and assistance and take such measures as may be necessary on their part, for the implementation of this resolution.

APPENDIX II

(Resolution S/5002 adopted by the Security Council on November 24, 1961)

The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions S/4387, S/4405, S/4426 and S/4741,

Recalling further General Assembly resolutions 1474 (ES-IV), 1592 (XV), 1599 (XV), 1600 (XV) and 1601 (XV),

Reaffirming the policies and purposes of the United Nations with respect to the Congo (Leopoldville) as set out in the aforesaid resolutions, namely:

- (a) To maintain the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo;
- (b) To assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order;
- (c) To prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo;
- (d) To secure the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all foreign military, para-military and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries; and
- (e) To render technical assistance,

Welcoming the restoration of the national of the Congo in accordance with the Loi fondamentale and the consequent formation of a Central Government on August 2nd, 1961,

Deploring all armed action in opposition to the authority of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, specifically secessionist activities and armed action now being carried on by the Provincial Administration of Katanga with the aid of external resources and foreign mercenaries, and completely rejecting the claim that Katanga is a 'sovereign independent nation',

Noting with deep regret the recent and past actions of violence against United Nations personnel,

Recognizing the Government of the Republic of the Congo as exclusively responsible for the conduct of the external affairs of the Congo,

Bearing in mind the imperative necessity of speedy and effective action to implement fully the policies and purposes of the United Nations in the Congo to end the unfortunate plight of the Congolese people, necessary both in the interests of world peace and international co-operation, and stability and progress of Africa as a whole.

1. Strongly deprecates the secessionist activities illegally carried out by the provincial administration of Katanga, with the aid of external resources and manned by foreign mercenaries;

2. Further deprecates the armed action against United Nations forces and personnel in the pursuit of such activities;

3. Insists that such activities shall cease forthwith, and calls upon all concerned to desist therefrom;

4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to take vigorous action, including the use of requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries as laid down in paragraph A.2 of the Security Council resolution of February 21st, 1961.

5. Further requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary measures to prevent the entry or return of such elements under whatever guise and also of arms, equipment or other material in support of such activities;

6. Requests all States to refrain from the supply of arms, equipment or other material which could be used for warlike purposes, and to take the necessary measures to prevent their nationals from doing the same, and also to deny transportation and transit facilities for such supplies across their territories, except in accordance with the decisions, policies and purposes of the United Nations;

7. Calls upon all Member States to refrain from promoting, condoning, or giving support by acts of omission or commission, directly or indirectly, to activities against the United Nations often resulting in armed hostilities against the United Nations forces and personnel;

8. Declares that all secessionist activities against the Republic of the Congo are contrary to the Loi fondamentale and Security Council decisions and specifically demands that such activities which are now taking place in Katanga shall cease forthwith;

9. Declares full and firm support for the Central Government of the Congo, and the determination to assist that Government in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations to maintain law and order and national integrity, to provide technical assistance and to implement those decisions;

10. Urges all Member States to lend their support, according to their national procedures, to the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo, in conformity with the Charter and the decisions of the United Nations;

11. Requests all Member States to refrain from any action which may directly or indirectly impede the policies and purposes of the United Nations in the Congo and is contrary to its decisions and the general purpose of the Charter.

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