


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SELTZ, STEPHEN WAYNE. Ideology as Symbolic Change: A Study of Public Perception of Social Movements. (1975) Directed by Dr. Joseph S. Hines. pp. 94.

Studies in the relationship between social movements and their public perception have most generally focused on tactics and strategies as major determinants of perception. Focusing on the ideologies of social movements as cultural processes of symbol transformation, this thesis suggests the relationship between a movement's ideology and its host symbolic universe as a major determinant of a public's perception. As such, the thesis is an attempt to project select facets of Symbolic Interaction into the general area of social conflict and social movements for the purpose of predicting the public perception of social movements.

A theoretical paradigm of three symbol transformation processes is developed and then utilized as a typology by which ideologies of social movements are classified. The research hypothesis, asserting a difference of perception between the three change-process groups, and derived hypotheses, predicting the direction of that difference, are generated and then tested by administration of a research instrument to a sample of 224 students at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

The research instrument first obtains data on major cultural values and their level of acceptance for the sample population by using Robin Williams' description of major American cultural values as a beginning base. After this, it obtains perception data for fourteen recently active American social movements grouped by symbol transformation processes.

Though a non-random sample was used, data obtained from the research

instrument provide strong support for the acceptance of both the research and derived hypotheses. From these results the utility of considering symbolic change processes as predictive of the public's perception of social movements is demonstrated, and it is suggested such a theoretical framework may be useful in future research.


BY

Walter W. Davis

A Thesis Submitted to
the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

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7
ATLANTA, GA
This thesis is submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School at
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IDEOLGY AS SYMBOLIC CHANGE: A STUDY

OF PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF SOCIAL

MOVEMENTS

by


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A Thesis Submitted to
the Faculty of the Graduate School at
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

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1975

September 2, 1975
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To the members of the committee which guided this research goes my sincere appreciation. Dr. Joseph S. Himes, its chairman, Dr. Jerry Cardwell, and Dr. David J. Pratto have each given invaluable assistance in the planning and implementation of this research project. Beyond their assistance and time, I also thank them for their patience and friendship.

Also, I would like to thank the professors and instructors of the Departments of Sociology and Geography who generously made their classes available to me as a sample.

Finally, appreciation of the editorial and organizational help of Mr. Ben Calloway is acknowledged.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF TABLES	vi
LIST OF FIGURES.	vii
CHAPTER I	
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE	1
Ideology: The Particular Definition	2
Ideology: The General Definition.	6
Cultural Systems as Symbolic Systems	8
Symbolic Systems as Symbolic Universes	13
Change in Symbolic Universes	15
Ideology and the Public Perception of Social Conflict.	22
CHAPTER II	
A PARADIGM OF CHANGE PROCESSES IN SYMBOLIC UNIVERSES	26
The Question of Change	26
The Question of Meaning.	30
Ideology as a Symbolic Process of Referential Change and the Public Perception of Social Conflict	32
Universalistic Change.	36
Particularistic Change	38
Antithetical Change.	40
Mixed Processes.	40
Examples of Change Processes	41
Limitations of the Paradigm.	42
Utility and Application of the Paradigm.	42
Hypotheses	43
CHAPTER III	
RESEARCH DESIGN.	44
Logic of the Research.	44
Research Instrument.	48
Sample Selection	53
Analysis of Data	54
CHAPTER IV	
TESTS OF HYPOTHESES.	59
Legitimacy of Values	59
Consistency Between Indicators	63
Tests of the Research Hypothesis	67
Tests of the Derived Hypotheses.	70

	Page
CHAPTER V	
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.	75
BIBLIOGRAPHY	79
APPENDIX A	
THE DATA-COLLECTION INSTRUMENT	83
APPENDIX B	
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES	89
IV. Significance Level and Strength of Relationship Between Indicators of Attitudes by Values	84
V. Significance Level and Strength of Relationship Between Indicators of Perception by Movement	85
VI. Change-Process Types by Unaided Verbal Description	86
VII. Change-Process Types by Unaided Verbal Description	89
VIII. Change-Process Types by Verbal Description	92
IX. Change-Process Types by Verbal Description	93
X. Sample Distribution by Age	94
XI. Sample Distribution by Political Orientation	95
XII. Sample Distribution by Education	96
XIII. Sample Distribution by Class	97
XIV. Sample Distribution by Religion	98
XV. Sample Distribution by School Attitude	99
XVI. Social Movements by Perception	99
XVII. Social Movements by Verbal Description	99

LIST OF TABLES

	Page
I. Tentative Grouping of Social Movements by Symbol Transformation Process	46
II. Values by Sample Ranking	60
III. Value Statements by Sample Acceptance	62
IV. Significance Level and Strength of Relationship Between Indicators of Acceptance by Value	64
V. Significance Level and Strength of Relationship Between Indicators of Perception by Movement	65
VI. Change-Process Types by Combined Perception	68
VII. Change-Process Types by Combined Verbal Description.	69
VIII. Change-Process Types by Mean Perception.	72
IX. Change-Process Types by Mean Verbal Description.	73
X. Sample Distribution by Age	90
XI. Sample Distribution by Political Orientation	90
XII. Sample Distribution by Sex	91
XIII. Sample Distribution by Class	91
XIV. Sample Distribution by Religion.	92
XV. Sample Distribution by Ethnic Identity	92
XVI. Social Movements by Perception	93
XVII. Social Movements by Verbal Description	94

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER I

Page

1. Graphic Relationship of Levels of Dissonance. 29

The main thrust of this thesis will deal with ideology as an ideologically symbolic system in the already objectified but symbolic system within a given cultural group. It will be an examination of the relationship of the violence of ideology to the public perception of social conflict. In addition it will examine the relationship of ideology and the public perception of conflict as they bear on the choice of strategies and tactics for social movements.

Ideology has long been considered a crucial component of social movements. Most of the theoretical discussion concerning ideology has revolved around two definitions of the concept: the particular definition and the general definition. The former definition has been used more extensively in direct application to the study of social conflict and social movements. This definition generally holds that ideology is a type of doctrine; a very specialized, compartmentalized series of thoughts operative only in certain situations. Usually these situations are described as political (in the broadest sense) and intimately associated with power or the pursuit thereof. The particular definition implies, especially on a common sense level, that ideologies are held by only a small minority of the population who are associated directly with social change and social conflict.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE

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The general definition, not usually applied directly to the study of social movements, holds ideology to be the pervasive world view of an

individual or group. As such, ideology is not considered a specialized, compartmentalized doctrine, but as a general and non-compartmentalized process of viewing the world. In the general definition, ideology need not be tied automatically to power considerations nor to political situations. Instead, the entire population may be considered active in ideological processes as defined in the general sense.

The first section of the thesis will be a review of selected literature, while the second section will represent an attempt to formulate a paradigm outlining the symbolic and referential change processes which serve as the basis of the public perception of social conflict.

Ideology: The Particular Definition

The particular definition of ideology is well suited for the examination of social movements at levels of abstraction involving considerations of social power and specific dynamics relating to the accomplishment of change in the social order. This level of analysis has been very useful, and one explored by most conflict theorists. Ted R. Gurr makes reference to this level of analysis in stating that "interpretations of revolutionary ideology attribute its normative justification of political violence to the tactical requirements of a revolutionary movement and especially to the need to obtain mass support for violence (Gurr, 1970: 195)." Gurr's statement reiterates the particular definition of ideology by limiting it to the political sphere and, by implication, suggests ideology is simply the tool by which change is effected and tactics are justified.

In a similar vein, Toch states "the term ideology denotes a set of related beliefs held by a group of persons; the ideology of a social

movement is a statement of what the members of the movement are trying to achieve, and what they wish to affirm jointly (Toch, 1965:21)." Once again ideology is seen as the tool of change while the possible input of ideology as a "cause" is not explored.

Other uses of the particular definition of ideology are offered by Lenski and Coser:

Ideology seems to have its greatest impact in the more advanced societies. Ideological variations of great magnitude and importance for distributive systems presuppose the existence of specialists in ideology, supported by appropriate religious and political institutions (Lenski, 1966:436).

Capitalists, divided by their economic competition among themselves, evolved a justifying ideology and a political system of domination that served their collective interests. Political power and ideology thus seem to be serving the same functions for capitalists that class consciousness serves for the working class (Coser, 1967:145).

Lenski's statement points to the particular definition in two ways. First, it ties ideology to the political arena and hence links it to power considerations. Second, it suggests that not everyone may engage in ideological activity as specialists are required.

Likewise, Coser's statement points to the particular definition of ideology. It also ties ideology to political situations and power, but it also suggests that ideology comes by way of justification and as an afterthought. In considering ideology sequentially second and solely as a tool of change, its link to the larger, more general symbolic processes of human beings may be obscured.

Paralleling the theoretical use of the particular definition, ideology has come to be linked in the public's mind with proponents of some specialized doctrine. Also, since it is generally tied to power and the pursuit thereof, it may connote ruthlessness and other derogatory

characteristics. Both Heberle and Mannheim address this facet of the particular definition of ideology succinctly in stating:

In popular language the term 'ideology' is often used in a derogatory sense, as if the political opponents were intentionally dishonest in their proclamations of purposes, creeds, and beliefs. In sociological terminology, 'ideology' has no such derogatory connotation; it designates merely a type of thought structure (Heberle, 1951:28).

The particular conception of ideology is implied when the term denotes that we are sceptical of the ideas and representations advanced by our opponent. They are regarded as more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation, the true recognition of which would not be in accord with his interests (Mannheim, 1936:49).

In the treatment of ideology, focusing on its utility and functions for social movements, many theorists have developed useful theories and typologies which link it to power considerations. While most of these theorists devote the majority of their work to ideology in the particular definition, they do, at some point in their work, indicate a belief in the linkage of ideology to a larger, more general symbolic process while declining to develop it at this level of analysis for specific application to the study of social movements and social conflict.

Daniel Bell in The End of Ideology considers ideology in the more narrow particular definition (Bell, 1960). While "relative deprivation" between groups has actually increased in recent years, he makes reference to base line levels of "absolute deprivation" in asserting the motivating and recruiting power of ideology has dissipated as a result of the reduction of the gross deprivations of many groups such as laborers, racial, and ethnic groups. Such an assertion clearly implies ideology is a tool of change and hints that its utility or appeal lies in its effective use to effect change. Bell, and others, assuming the particular definition of ideology see social movements as arising first and

then generating ideologies to serve their goals. Assuming the general definition of ideology one would view ideologies as arising first (as a result of basic symbolic processes) and then social movements being generated to aid in the objectification of the ideology. Both views are useful, though derived from different theoretical levels and focusing on different facets of the change process.

Traditionally, the former view has received the most consideration. Addressing the relationship between these two views Crane Brinton states:

No idea, no revolution! This does not mean that ideas cause revolutions or that the best way to prevent revolutions is to censor ideas. It merely means that ideas form a part of the mutually dependent variables we are studying (Brinton, 1958:52).

To link ideology with power is a viable approach. However, it limits the level of analysis and precludes the formulation of more general and abstract statements concerning ideology. The level of analysis to which one is limited is, of course, the social, and this level is an unsuitable one for the linkage of ideology to basic symbolic processes. The social level is unsuitable for our purposes as power considerations will enter into the study of social movements and their ideologies, obscuring their relationship to the larger symbolic processes. Since the social level is the level upon which objectifications of ideologies are projected, and we are primarily interested in considering ideology's relationship to symbolic processes, the cultural level is a more suitable choice. The cultural level is more suitable as it is the level primarily concerned with and constructed by the symbolic processes of human beings. As used in this thesis, a working definition of "culture" contrasted with a definition of "society" will be:

In customary sociological usage, however, culture refers specifically to the values and ideas which give meaning to human social interaction but can be considered somewhat apart from such interaction. Society, on the other hand, is used to refer to human social interaction somewhat apart from underlying values and ideas (Popenoe, 1974:82).

For use on the cultural level, the general definition of ideology mentioned earlier is more appropriate than the particular definition.

Ideology: The General Definition

The second way in which ideology is used is with regard to the general definition of the concept. The general concept considers ideology as the total perspective or world view of an individual or group. Broadly speaking ideology becomes synonymous with sub-cultures. In this sense everyone (or group) has an ideology which is pervasive and non-compartmentalized with regard to behavior.

By looking at ideology from a general perspective one is focusing on cultural and symbolic systems or more appropriately on the realm of meaning. Therefore, some aspects of a symbolic interaction perspective are useful as it focuses on a primary unit of concern to our discussion, symbols and their formation. Also, Symbolic Interactionism focuses on man's interactional use of those symbols in constructing his social order and generating meaning. One disadvantage to examining ideology on this level is that facets of ideology such as tactics, recruitment of members, and social power are difficult to analyze and of less importance.

In Ideology and Utopia, Karl Mannheim addresses the general definition of ideology. He states that the general definition, compared to the particular definition, is more concerned with the ideology of a time-period or of a specific social group (such as a society, a class, or

other sub-division) and with the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind during this period or in this group. He states more precisely:

The total conception calls into question the opponents total Weltanschauung (including his conceptual apparatus), and attempts to understand these concepts as an out growth of the collective life of which he partakes (Mannheim, 1936:57).

Mannheim felt that the particular conception of ideology was useful for analysis on a psychological level while the general conception of ideology referred not to isolated cases of thought-content, but to fundamentally divergent thought-systems and to widely differing modes of experiencing and interpretation. Another difference between the particular and general conceptions of ideology is found in their respective foci and methods. Mannheim says "the total conception uses a more formal functional analysis without any reference to motivations, confining itself to an objective description of the structural differences in minds operating in different social settings (Mannheim, 1936:57)."

As stated earlier, to use ideology in the general sense is to consider it synonymous with sub-cultures. This is not as distant from social movements as it might appear as culture itself is constantly changing and in flux as a result of modified environmental and social conditions. Viewed from this perspective, social movements become part of a larger change process, though admittedly more obvious and intense than the pervasive cultural drift and evolution. It is because much of the cultural change which occurs is of low intensity, that much change goes unnoticed or passes under blanket terms of "progress" or "drift." The salient point is that all the processes of change involve change in systems of symbols and their associated referents.

Cultural Systems as Symbolic Systems

Culture is made up of symbols which are arbitrarily created through consensus among human beings. These symbols may be isolated in some instances or in formal systems of symbols which are internalized.

As Clifford Geertz states:

Symbolic systems are extensive sources of information in terms of which human life can be patterned--extrapersonal mechanisms for the perception, understanding, judgment, and manipulation of the world. Culture patterns are 'programs'--they provide a template or blueprint for the organization of social and psychological processes, much as genetic systems provide such a template for the organization of organic processes (Geertz, 1964:62).

In the final analysis, man's symbolic abilities constitute his only real qualitative difference from lower life forms.

It is important to note that the concept "symbol" connotes two separate concepts which will be useful for our analysis. First, of course, is the symbol itself (a word, sound, gesture) which is consensually validated by human beings for purposes of representing its associated referent. In all cases, the symbol is a cultural vehicle which is empirical. Second, the concept "symbol" implies its associated referent without which it would have no meaningful existence. The referents may be empirical or non-empirical, unlike their associated cultural vehicle. When the concept "symbol" is used in this thesis it is understood to imply both the cultural vehicle and the referent it represents.

Whether speaking of one symbol or a complex of interrelated symbols, man's symbolic abilities enable him to engage in meaningful communication both internally towards himself and externally towards other organisms. The symbols he creates define reality and the objectification of the meanings attached to those symbols constitute the

foundation of social order. In this sense, a symbol system constitutes the basic tool and a plan of methodology for the dissection, perception, and evaluation of those phenomena the individual perceives in a given environment.

Each society develops its own culture with regard to its environment and salient experiences. Culture, however, as a cluster of symbols is not random or unrelated. As Glenn M. Vernon states:

Man does not just attempt to develop a series of unconnected definitions about his world; he attempts to interrelate the various definitions, or at least part of them, in ways which appear to him to be logical and reasonable. He develops symbol systems wherein part of the meaning of each symbol stems from the manner in which it is related to the other symbols in the system (Vernon, 1965:171).

The symbols man uses fall into two main categories: empirically referented symbols and non-empirically referented symbols. Both types of symbols have plans of action or behavior associated with them. For the study of social movements in general, and ideology in particular, the cluster of empirically referented symbols present at any one given time in a culture generally has little bearing on conflict activities and ideological thought. Their referents are believed to be obvious, available to all, thus making for much greater consensus over the associated plan of action or behavior.

While non-empirically referented symbols have no referent that can be observed, the ontological assumption or belief that these referents are real constitute a powerful inducement for complying with the consensually validated plan of action. To modify W. I. Thomas' famous statement, this is to say a referent perceived as real is real in its consequences (Thomas, 1928:572). Regardless of the metaphysical questions involved, the behavior generated in response to the symbol is empirical.

Non-empirically referented symbols have a special importance for the study of social movements and ideology. Symbols of this type are intimately involved with conflict over meaning, and hence are crucial in ideological thought. While all symbols are subjective in meaning, both with regard to the actual linkage of symbol to referent and the plan of action associated with that symbol, non-empirically referented symbols are even more subjective and thus more open to debate. They are more open to debate as there is no empirical check that can be evoked to validate the boundary of the referent, or, indeed, the manner in which that boundary is to be drawn. This condition sets the stage for considerable variation in the plans of actions associated with such symbols. Centered primarily around the non-empirical referent of "God", the numerous and rich variations exhibited by the religious institutions of man provide a good example.

In addition, symbols of this type are generally more pervasive in their effect on human behavior than empirically referented symbols by virtue of the fact that they transcend sensory delineated reality. While empirically referented symbols connect us with the physical world and hence influence our behavior, they do so only in specific, time-limited, immediate situations. Non-empirically referented symbols may not be bound by such restrictions and thus exert a more diffuse plan of action.

As mentioned earlier, because there may be much less consensus over the meanings and associated behaviors for such symbols, non-empirically referented symbols tend to be foci of discussion, debate, conflict, and, at times, violence. Men and their societies rarely go to war or form social movements over differing definitions of the symbols "dog"

or "boat", but men seem to have a definite tendency to fight and die over referential direction and the objectification of such non-empirically referented symbols as "God", "freedom", "truth", or "justice."

Symbols with non-empirical referents are among the most powerful symbols man utilizes: powerful in their effect on behavior, powerful in their ability to cause an emotional response, and powerful in their ability to spark conflict and change. This is probably true because empirically referented symbols tend to delineate man's relationship with the physical world while non-empirically referented symbols tend to delineate man's relationship to man.

It is not surprising that symbols of this type exert an important influence on human behavior in the areas of conflict and ideological thought. Cross-cultural and historical surveys of the two main social institutions which deal primarily in generating and manipulating such symbols, religion and politics, yield an incredible panorama of human conflict and ideological activity.

As used in this thesis cultural values are understood to mean the human ranking of symbols and their associated plans of action according to functionality within a given environment. In relation to the organism and its physical environment, functionality means the economic expenditure of energy and resources to achieve desired goals or ends deemed subjectively good, beneficial, or useful on either the individual or the societal level. Most commonly there is a trade-off between these two levels.

For man, a symbolic creature, mere functionality with regard to the environment is necessary but not sufficient. By virtue of his

abilities, he transcends the physical universe and must contend with functionality in reference to both it and dimensions of a more confusing and less available nature. He must also contend with functionality in the symbolic realm which, in part, connotes a non-empirical dimension. Since each symbol derives its meaning through its interrelatedness with other symbols in a complex system, on this level functionality takes the form of internal consistency with regard to the boundaries of referents.

On both levels functionality is important and the symbols derived to explain, order, and orient man's actions are ranked according to judged cruciality. Major cultural value systems will be observed, however, to be dominated by symbols which are non-empirically referented.

The cluster of interrelated symbols which make up the culture of a group will, of course, contain both types of symbols in a ranked fashion. Regardless of the type of symbol under discussion, the symbols which make up a given group's culture are created with regard to internal consistency. This is very similar to the internal consistency which exists between the self definitions constituting the "self" of an individual. To continue this analogy, the cognitive dissonance existing on the personality level conceptualized by Festinger may be perceived as having a counterpart on the cultural level (Festinger, 1957). The cultural form of dissonance may occur in two ways. First, there may exist symbols which are incongruent with regard to referential boundary or in conflict with regard to the behavior associated with each. By virtue of existing simultaneously and being operative in terms of behavior in the same culture, tension and strain would be created. Second, there may be a chronic absence of objectification for one or more crucial symbols,

causing tension and strain. In the first case the tension or strain is located within the cultural level, while in the second case the tension or strain is between the cultural and social levels. Either may be operative in generating conflict or ideological activity.

These types of dissonance are always present in any culture, though generally of low intensity and not of great scope. Concerning cultural consistency, it is doubtful whether any system of symbols and their objectification has been developed which was completely consistent. There does exist a definite strain towards consistency which, while not automatic, is strong and effective. As Glenn Vernon states:

Since the definitions of a group are woven together into a somewhat consistent pattern, it follows that the behavior of its members will also be organized or systematized. Man's social order, whatever it may be, is a man-made order. It stems from the culture he has developed (Vernon, 1965:171).

The crucial point which is being developed in this section is that the existing order is a manifestation or objectification of the accumulated meanings man has devised--these meanings lodged in symbols and their associated plans of behavior, all of which are interrelated and interdependent.

Symbolic Systems as Symbolic Universes

In the previous section the relationship of culture to symbols was explored. Culture is, at the base level, the sum total of the meanings man has derived.

The totality of these meanings may be properly regarded as the culture of the "symbolic universe" of the population for which that complex of meanings has relevance. Berger and Luckmann offer definitions of symbolic universes in stating:

These are bodies of theoretical traditions that integrate different provinces of meaning and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:95).

The symbolic universe is conceived of as the matrix of all socially objectivated and subjectively real meanings; the entire historic society and the entire biography of the individual are seen as events taking place within this universe (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:96).

Thus a "symbolic universe" is synonymous with culture which is composed of symbol systems and the objectification or institutionalization thereof constituting the foundation of the social order.

The major function of the symbolic universe for a society is obvious: the society is the objectification or institutionalization of that universe. Society could not exist without its prior existence.

Berger and Luckmann address this relationship in stating:

The origins of a symbolic universe have their roots in the constitution of man. Human existence is, ab initio, an ongoing externalization. As man externalizes himself, he constructs the world into which he externalizes himself. In the process of externalization, he projects his own meanings into reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:104).

For the individual, the major function of the symbolic universe parallels the function of the ability to symbolize itself. Basically this entails the typification, categorization of phenomena, physical and social, within the environment of the individual, and the specification of behavior relative to that phenomena. According to Berger and Luckmann:

This nomic function of the symbolic universe for individual experience may be described quite simply by saying that it 'puts everything in its right place'. What is more, whenever one strays from the consciousness of this order (that is, when one finds oneself in the marginal situations of experience), the symbolic universe allows one 'to return to reality'--namely, to the reality of everyday life. Since this is, of course, the sphere to which all forms of institutional conduct and roles belong, the symbolic

universe provides the ultimate legitimation of the institutional order by bestowing upon it the primacy in the hierarchy of human experience (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:98).

It is important to note that no one individual or group within a society can possess the culture or symbolic universe in its entirety. Rather, each individual or group has, by virtue of life experience, a subset of the larger symbolic universe which may be called a sub-universe or sub-culture. Conceivably, any number of sub-universes may exist within a society. While discrepancies between these sub-universes are common, the variances are normally not great enough to preclude effective communication or a modicum of functionality for its possessor vis-a-vis other individuals, groups, or the physical environment.

With regard to variances between sub-universes, the more crucial symbols, being evaluated as central in a given culture and hence transformed into intensely held values, have a high probability of being included in discrete sub-universes. This may occur, as sub-universe differences generally tend to revolve around symbols relating to the particular nature of everyday life in that sub-universe, while greater consensus over symbols related to their shared cosmology might be present. This is to say that modally the variances might be expected to be primarily among empirically referented symbols rather than non-empirically referented symbols, and that these variances usually would not result in conflict behavior.

Change in Symbolic Universes

The basic impetus in the development and accumulation of culture or symbolic universes is found in the symbolic processes of human beings. As its origin is parallel, so too are the dynamics by which it may

undergo modification. The linkage between them is intimate. In its most elementary form, this process entails the perception of a phenomenon and the arbitrary association between that phenomenon and a consensually validated symbol such as a word, utterance, or gesture. Thus culture serves many functions, among the most important being meaningful, ordered communication between individuals and the motivation for individuals to participate in social activities within the group. While these may be crucial functions, they also point to one causal determinant in the development of culture. That is, functionality with regard to the organism and its environment. The symbolic universe of a group is predicated on the most salient problems and exigencies experienced in their environment. The total symbolic universe is accumulated slowly and as a result of the unfolding facets or nuances of that environment. After a period of time, this system comes close to covering all possible events which happen on a predictable basis.

In other words, except for continuing refinement or modification, the symbolic universe effectively confronts the major problems and salient features of that given environment at that given time. As Vernon has indicated, it is out of this symbolic system that man's social order is created--presumably in harmony with and consistent with the meanings or values men attach to those symbols.

In time, however, the environment (either physical or social) may change in ways which render the accepted symbolic universe and its objectification dysfunctional or inadequate. The resulting dissonance either within the cultural level itself or between the cultural and social levels vis-a-vis consistent objectification is one root cause of

conflict on the societal level. It also may give rise to renewed attempts at modifying the objectified symbolic universe to restore its functionality. This renewed effort is, of course, the same process that was responsible for the development of the original symbolic universe, the symbolic processes of human beings, and is referred to as ideological activity. Referring to dissonance in cultural systems, Vernon states:

There is a conflict potential in all aspects of culture, including value definitions. Since the evaluative behavior of the individual is in response to symbols and is relative to the audience and to the situation, it follows that changes in the situation and/or the audience may lead to value obsolescence. Once accepted value definitions may become somewhat meaningless or 'sense-less', with a corresponding decline in the legitimacy of the existing social order (Vernon, 1965:204).

The existing order's legitimacy must decline as the symbolic universe out of which it was created has been rendered partially dysfunctional. It is out of such a situation that change is indicated and conflict possible or inevitable.

Berger and Luckmann address this topic in stating that for there to exist the possibility of an alternative symbolic universe, there first must have been the objectification of an original symbolic universe resulting in an institutional order. This original symbolic universe, initially the theoretical creation of a primary group of individuals who considered the institutional order as problematic, is solidly accepted by subsequent inhabitants of that universe merely by virtue of its objective existence in the society.

As long as the symbolic universe and its objectification remains functional, there is understandably no problem or need for further legitimization. According to Berger and Luckmann:

Specific procedures of universe maintenance become necessary when the symbolic universe has become a problem. As long as this is not the case, the symbolic universe is self-maintaining, that is, self-legitimizing by the sheer facticity of its objective existence in the society in question (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:104).

The "problem" which is referred to is the same concept as "dissonance" or "dysfunctionality" mentioned previously with regard to symbol systems.

When this dysfunction is salient to a group of inhabitants within the symbolic universe and the perception of that shared dysfunction becomes a significant measure of their groupness, they may be characterized as deviant (from the perspective of the larger group of individuals still accepting the institutional order) and the carriers of an alternative definition of reality. What they are carriers of is an alternative to the official definition of reality.

The official definition of reality is maintained by a relatively small number of individuals with the full power of the status quo behind them, with all that entails--namely, the economic production of and unequal distribution of scarce material and social assets, along with whatever institutional power or authority that might have been granted to or taken by that group. To these individuals who have a definite stake in the maintenance of the status quo resulting from the objectification of the symbolic universe, and to a much larger segment of the population who simply accept that order unquestioningly, the new alternative definitions of reality are very threatening as they demonstrate the official reality is neither a sacred nor an inevitable order.

This symbolic dissonance, resulting in differing definitions of reality and revolving, as discussed earlier, around high intensity values, sets the stage for change in the symbolic universe and its

objectification through conflict.

Ideology as an Alternative Symbolic Universe

The symbolic expression of that change designed to remedy the perceived dysfunction in the existing order would be referred to as an ideology. This new symbol system, or at least part of a symbol system, along with its pressure to be objectified, represents a new definition of reality--a new perspective or paradigm for reality testing. It may emerge as a modification of the old system or as a new creation unrelated to the old system. In this manner it may exist within or stand outside of its host culture depending on how it differs.

Though addressing himself to the topic of "scientific revolution", much of what Robert Friedrichs discusses in A Sociology of Sociology is relevant to change in symbolic universes and therefore, ideology. Particularly, his coverage of the central thesis of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is most relevant. Some translation of Kuhn's terminology to converge on terminology used in this thesis is necessary. In a literal sense, since a symbolic universe is the definer of reality for its inhabitants, and science, as a cluster of normative elements relating to a disciplined mode of thought, is the reality test instrument par excellence, both share the crucial characteristic of channeling human thought and behavior. Beyond this, science and the disciplines it encompasses are merely symbolic sub-sets of the larger symbolic universe. As a result, both are paradigms which test reality: one is more diffuse and general, the other more limited and specific. With this in mind, it is suggested that "empirical and theoretical

models" as used by Kuhn may be understood to approximate symbolic universes as used in this thesis, and that "science" as used by Kuhn may be understood as the model's objectification or society.

Kuhn would argue, in fact, that major shifts in empirical and/or theoretical models are grounded in what are essentially 'conversion' experiences in which a new 'world view' competes almost ideologically with an older frame of reference. There is no simple, clean cut movement from 'error' to 'truth'. What appears is a competing 'gestalt' that redefines crucial problems, introduces new methods, and establishes uniquely new standards for solutions. At the moment of polarization the devices and procedures that mediate differences in perspective and evidence in 'normal', non-crisis science fail. Advocates of alternative models talk past one another, for there is--at least for that moment--no fully institutionalized framework of substantive assumptions that both accept (Friedrichs, 1970:2).

The crucial point here is that the new perspective represents an alternative symbolic universe that competes with the older, objectified symbolic universe. From the "particular" definition, if that new perspective evokes action, such as social movements, or touches high intensity facets of human life, it would be considered an ideology. As used in this thesis, as a result of utilizing a "general" definition, any alternative symbolic system may be considered an ideology.

Additional support may be found in the work of Clifford Geertz. Addressing change in symbolic systems, Geertz defines ideology as "a patterned reaction to the patterned strains of a social role. It provides a symbolic outlet for emotional disturbances created by social disequilibrium (Geertz, 1964:54)." From the perspective used in this thesis, the disequilibrium is thought of as existing within the cultural level itself and between the cultural level and the social level--not within the social level itself as that would include considerations of "social power". Geertz goes on to say:

It is a loss of orientation that most directly gives rise to ideological activity, an inability, for lack of usable models, to comprehend the universe of civic rights and responsibilities in which one finds oneself located (Geertz, 1964:64).

Once again a modification of this statement is suggested--namely the substitution of the term "system of interrelated symbols" for the term "models".

Thus it is a conjunction of socio-psychological strains created by the disequilibrium and a lack of cultural resources (which is to say interrelated symbol systems and the behavior patterns legitimized by them) to understand that strain that gives rise to ideological thinking. Ideological thinking being simply an effort to modify old symbols or to create new ones in order to understand and resolve that strain and act purposefully within the environment, thus restoring functionality.

Karl Mannheim approaches the same topic somewhat differently.

Concerning ideologies he states:

Every period in history has contained ideas transcending the existing order, but these did not function as utopias; they were rather the appropriate ideologies of this stage of existence as long as they were 'organically' and 'harmoniously' integrated into the world-view of the period (Mannheim, 1936:193).

Mannheim is implying that new ideas which are situationally transcendent but remain within the old order or are integrative modifications of the old do not present revolutionary potentials and are utopias. The difference between the two is found in their potential for realization and the degree to which they differ from the old order. Their similarities are that they both represent alternative symbolic systems or, at least, a part of a symbolic system.

Ideology and the Public Perception of Social Conflict

By viewing ideology from the general definition, one is constrained to analyze symbolic, and thus meaning systems. In the course of so doing, the question of the relationship of ideology to the public perception of social conflict frequently occurs. Most research assumes the relationship is that the specific tactics and strategies of a social movement are primary determinants involved in the public's perception-- particularly if those tactics were violent. At first glance, Ralph Turner seems to lend support to this view when in setting forth conditions under which one group of people will define a social conflict as a disturbance and another group as social protest, he states:

- 1) Publics test events for credibility in relation to folk conceptions of social protest and justice.
- 2) Disturbances communicate some combination of appeal and threat and the balance is important in determining whether the disturbances are regarded as protest or not (Turner, 1969:817-818).

In the first statement the possibility occurs that the symbols of "social protest" and "justice" with their associated meanings are merely part of the cultural milieu out of which the old order was created. With this in mind, "folk conceptions of social protest and justice" may be thought of as cultural values. The public is testing then for goodness of fit between two symbolic systems which must be at least partially divergent. This appears true, or why else would there be two competing symbolic systems in existence? As Turner and Killian later state, it is impossible to conceive of a social movement aside from the fact that dissatisfaction exists with the existing social order.

In the second statement the possibility occurs that the appeal Turner speaks of is the promise of eliminating some dysfunction in the existing order, while the threat is the possible destruction of that order, which implies from a human perspective a painful adjustment process to a new order. Thus the balance is between the pain of existing dysfunction against the inherent pain of change itself.

Considering Turner's statements in this manner and reflecting further on ideology as an alternative symbolic system, one comes closer to considering ideology as central in determining the public's perception of a given social movement. In doing so, curiously one comes to the conclusion that the earlier statement of the relationship of ideology to the public's perception of social conflict serves best when reversed. That is, perhaps it is the public's definition or perception which is causally linked to the choice of specific tactics and strategies. The public's perception is, of course, determined by their acceptance of the host symbolic universe in which they find themselves located. While individuals may differ in their specific choices to problem solutions and in their quickness to respond with violence, we would assume men to be basically rational and purposeful within the confines of their symbolic universe or an alternative universe--making this assumption for both the individuals in the larger society and those involved in social change movements.

At this point, it is suggested that it may be the anticipated public perception, deduced by those in the movement responsible for intellectual and ideological functions, which constitutes the rationale for the choice of tactics and strategies. If this is assumed to be true,

then one is back to the cultural or symbolic levels where meaning is couched and one is really speaking of the relationship of processes of change in symbol systems to the public perception of social conflict.

C. Wendell King offers further support for this view in Social Movements in the United States. Concerning the relationship of a social movement's consistency with the society's general culture and variance in its reception by the larger population he states:

Some degree of consistency with the society's general culture is essential if a movement is to find acceptance. But how can there be compatibility with the very culture which the movement is committed to changing? This apparent contradiction is resolved by recalling that the mass society is characterized not by a neatly integrated culture but rather by a diversity of sub-cultures. And even though certain value-orientations (for example, success and equality) can be identified amid the heterogeneity of American society, the fact remains that no movement need be compatible with all these society-wide orientations to be acceptable. Few movements have ever sought to change an entire society or, indeed, have had a relevance for every one of the major value configurations (King, 1956:86).

Movements therefore face two criteria of cultural acceptability: the broad normative code of the society as a whole and the various codes of subgroups within the society. The chance of acceptance is, of course, greatly increased when some of the objectives and activities of a movement are consistent with norms of the general society and are also consistent with norms of the particular subgroups (King, 1956:100).

Beyond the fact that compatibility of a social movement's ideology with the general culture of the society may determine its reception, it suggested that the precise way in which the ideology differs symbolically from the host culture and on what major value orientations will have important causal input into: a) the public's perception of the movement, and b) the movement's tactical response. Following these lines of thought, the second chapter of the thesis will be an attempt to look closer at the processes which may be operative and to design a

viable paradigm to represent them with "predictability" in mind.

CHAPTER II

A PARADIGM OF THE PARADIGM

IN THE PARADIGM

Before we can begin to discuss the paradigm, we must first understand what a paradigm is. A paradigm is a set of ideas or concepts that are used to explain or predict a particular phenomenon. In the case of the paradigm, it is a set of ideas or concepts that are used to explain or predict the behavior of a particular system. The paradigm is a set of ideas or concepts that are used to explain or predict the behavior of a particular system. The paradigm is a set of ideas or concepts that are used to explain or predict the behavior of a particular system. The paradigm is a set of ideas or concepts that are used to explain or predict the behavior of a particular system.

The Question of Change

The question of change is a central issue in the study of the paradigm. It is a question that has been asked by many different people at different times. The question of change is a central issue in the study of the paradigm. It is a question that has been asked by many different people at different times. The question of change is a central issue in the study of the paradigm. It is a question that has been asked by many different people at different times. The question of change is a central issue in the study of the paradigm. It is a question that has been asked by many different people at different times.

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CHAPTER II
A PARADIGM OF CHANGE PROCESSES
IN SYMBOLIC UNIVERSES

Before proceeding to isolate and describe symbolic change processes operative in symbolic universes, several preliminary topics will receive consideration. First, we will examine the question of what exactly is changing as perceived by the author, and second, the crucial question of what is meant by "meaning."

The Question of Change

This thesis has been designed to limit its discussion of ideology and conflict to the cultural or symbolic levels. Thus far the progression of the thesis has dealt with the relationships between, and dynamics of: 1) symbols, 2) their referents, 3) symbolic universes (the totality of interrelated symbols), 4) the objectification of symbolic universes, and 5) change in symbolic universes as expressed by alternative universes (ideology).

Discussion of these concepts separately was judged necessary to provide general theoretical grounding for a possible paradigm depicting the relationship of ideology as a symbolic change process to a) the public's perception of conflict, and b) the choice of tactics and strategies for social movements organized around that ideology. To go further and construct that paradigm, it is necessary to reintegrate some of these concepts with regard to their crucial similarities and dynamics. This will have the effect of projecting the discussion to another level of

analysis which in one sense is more abstract and in another sense more concrete.

By way of reintegration it is suggested, first, that the difference between symbols and symbolic universes is a quantitative one. With regard to origination, accumulation, and change therein, the symbolic processes are identical on the level of abstraction we wish to remain. Therefore, there is no further utility in considering them as distinct. Thus we will retain symbols as the basic focus of examination while deleting symbolic universes for the purpose of isolating symbolic change processes that ideology may represent.

Second, with regard to objectification of symbolic universes and symbols, it is suggested that any distinction drawn between the two is also a quantitative one--not a substantive one. Thus objectification will henceforth be limited in discussion, for the purpose of analysis, to symbols as the basic focus of examination.

Third, for purposes of clarity and to facilitate discussion, the synonymous concepts of "change in symbolic universes", "alternative symbolic universes", and "ideology" will be replaced by the single concept of ideology.

In performing this reintegration, we are left with three major concepts: 1) symbols, 2) their objectification, 3) the proposed change of both (1) and (2), ideology.

Now we may proceed with greater clarity to examine exactly what is changing. The statement that ideology is the expression of change for symbols and their objectification is both useful and at the same time misleading.

The useful part of the statement is that there does exist a consistent strain towards consistency or congruence both among symbols themselves on the cultural level vis-a-vis their referential boundaries, and between symbols and their consistent objectification on the social level. Just as dissonance was observed earlier to be possible on both levels, then the strain towards consistency must also be operative on both levels.

One level on which dissonance may occur is with regard to referential boundaries on the cultural level and has an associated effect on the social level. That is, the dissonance between referential boundaries on the cultural level will automatically result in dissonance between their respective objectifications on the social level--barring the exercise of social power to the contrary. Graphically, the relationship between the two levels of dissonance is shown in Figure 1.


This dissonance on the social level occurs concomitantly and for our purposes represents only one form of dissonance for which ideology may express remedial action. From this point on, this form of dissonance will be referred to as "referential boundary dissonance"--with the understanding that it has a concomitant form of dissonance vis-a-vis objectification on the social level.

A second major form of dissonance may be between the symbol and its consistent objectification. Leaving behind social power considerations which would entail questions of whom would actually prevail in asserting their varying definition, theoretically, to advocate change in its objectification and vice versa. Theoretically, leaving power considerations aside, it follows that to actually change the symbol's boundary is to ensure its objectification will reflect that change and

The symbols are arranged in a grid with two columns and two rows. The top row contains Symbol₁ and Symbol₂. The bottom row contains Objectification₁ and Objectification₂. The grid is defined by dashed lines. The top row is labeled "Cultural Level" and the bottom row is labeled "Social Level".

Figure 1

Graphic Relationship of Levels of Dissonance



The diagram illustrates the relationship between symbols and objectifications across two levels of dissonance. The top level is the Cultural Level, and the bottom level is the Social Level. The symbols are arranged in a grid with two columns and two rows. The top row contains Symbol₁ and Symbol₂. The bottom row contains Objectification₁ and Objectification₂. The grid is defined by dashed lines. The top row is labeled "Cultural Level" and the bottom row is labeled "Social Level".

vice versa.

Thus ideology does express advocated change on both levels and is in reference to both forms of dissonance which can occur.

The misleading part of the statement is that the symbols themselves do not change or, if they do, it is of no consequence. The symbol is an arbitrary vehicle which represents the referent. Thus symbols such as "house", "casa", "villa", or "dacha" may differ yet refer to the same referent. Any change in symbols without a concomitant change in the referential boundary is really no change at all.

To answer the question of what exactly is changing, it is the boundaries of the referents and their objectification as it reflects that change and vice versa. Ideology may be considered the expression of change aimed consciously at possibly one or the other but, most generally, both simultaneously. Whether consciously intended on both or not, the net effect is on both.

The Question of Meaning

The potential for meaning may be found in the separation of referents by their boundaries which are expressed and maintained symbolically. When a phenomenon is dissected on the basis of its relationship to other phenomena (regardless of whether it is an objectively real empirical phenomenon or a subjectively real non-empirical phenomenon) the symbolic expression and maintenance of that dissection becomes the boundary by which it is kept separated from other phenomena and hence manipulable for purposes of human thought. It is the ability to perceive this relationship or boundary and the simultaneous labeling thereof for the purpose of "re-presentation" in the human mind that is at the heart of symbol

formation.

The relationship between referents may be thought of as representing the process by which the phenomena were originally dissected on the basis of category, use, source, sequence, or other characteristics considered salient in that given environment. This relationship is the rationale for the existence of discrete referents and is responsible for any symbolic meaning that can be attached to the referent's symbol. Considered as such, meaning as used in this thesis lies in the symbolic expression and maintenance of referential boundaries with change advocated on the referential boundary changing its associated meaning. In a similar vein, since the meaning of the symbol on the cultural level is directly reflected in its objectification on the social level, to change the objectification of a symbol on the social level is to change its meaning on the cultural level in terms of its referential boundary.

To tie some of the concepts covered earlier and to lead into the actual construction of a paradigm relating to ideology and the public's perception of social conflict, it is of benefit to reiterate some central points:

First, that ideology is a symbolic process linked to the basic processes of the human mind and shares the same dynamics.

Second, that ideology is an expression of an alternative symbolic system in opposition to the official, objectified one and is in response to two major forms of dissonance. As such, it has change implications for both the symbolic (cultural) and objectified (social) levels.

Third, that on the level of symbols, ideology is the expression of advocated change on referential boundaries and/or the objectification of

same.

Fourth, that values and norms at this level of analysis represent symbols and their objectifications ranked according to judged cruciality and salience in a given environment.

Fifth, that social movements may receive differential reception from a host culture on the basis of the way in which the ideology of that movement differs or is in opposition to the major values and norms of the host culture.

From these points ideology may be considered as a symbolic process of referential boundary and objectification change having direct impact on the way the movement associated with it is received. This differential reception is associated with the precise ways in which change is advocated. The identification of those ways, with any predictive power they may have, is the crux around which the construction of the following paradigm revolves.

Ideology as a Symbolic Process of Referential Change
and the Public Perception of Social Conflict

In addition to assuming some basic symbolic interaction perspectives, equilibrium perspectives are drawn upon. Also, for purposes of analysis only, assumptions of analogous linkages between components and processes associated with the individual level and components and processes associated with the cultural level are being made. Although it is stated earlier, one of the most crucial assumptions being made is that men are basically rational and purposeful creatures. While this may not appear true from the "out-perspective" of an alien symbolic universe, it is, however, certainly true that all men, physical and mental pathologies

aside, are rational and purposeful within the confines of their own symbolic universe. Quite literally it is "man the meaning-seeker" which provides the departing point for the construction of this model.

At an earlier point in this paper the concept of "cultural dissonance" was introduced and merits further explication at this time. Cultural dissonance will also be understood to have a concomitant objectification or social dissonance as used in this paper. To further explicate the concept, an analogy must be drawn between it and the "cognitive dissonance" of the personality level.

Within individual personality structure, the concept referred to as the "self" is comprised of symbolic definitions (symbols and their associated plan of behavior), however, some of these are more salient and central than the others around it. These constitute a complex of core definitions which are more stable and less likely to change. The remainder of the self definitions are built around these in a consistent manner. If one of the core definitions is threatened the entire system is threatened. This occurs because the remaining definitions are interlinked with the one being threatened. The situation is very much like pulling out the cornerstone from the foundation of a building.

These definitions making up the self (both core and otherwise) must be internally consistent. If they are not, cognitive dissonance occurs, yielding tension which must be dealt with. Usually it takes a great deal of trauma to reach and threaten these core definitions as they are well protected and defended in accordance with their highly important role.

Just as within each individual, within each society the respective culture is made up of symbolic definitions with the society itself made up of their objectifications, though some of these definitions are more crucial, more central than the others. These constitute a complex of definitions which may be called "core cultural definitions" or core values. They are best described as being of high intensity and may be shared with other distinct cultures or they may be unique. In saying they are high intensity definitions or values it is meant they are the most important and salient definitions to that society in that environment.

Looking at American society, Robin Williams provides a list of definitions or values he has isolated as being "core values". These are not ranked according to their relative intensity, but in part, they are:

- 1) Concepts related to achievement and success
- 2) Concepts related to work and activity
- 3) Moral orientation concepts
- 4) Humanitarian concepts
- 5) Efficiency and practicality
- 6) Progress
- 7) Material comfort and wellbeing
- 8) Equality
- 9) Freedom
- 10) External conformity
- 11) Science and secular rationality
- 12) Nationalism and patriotism
- 13) Democracy

14) Individualism

While this is not an exhaustive list of the central values of American society, it does illustrate some of the more important anchors around which the remainder of the culture is built in accordance with internal consistency. Obviously these are not shared by everyone, nor does everyone mean exactly the same thing when he speaks of them. However, they are assumed to be legitimate and useful by a majority of the population who define them with a modicum of consensus. However this majority is defined (and it is rarely a numerical majority), their consensus over the meaning and objectification of these values becomes the official definition of social reality which has been discussed earlier.

When the official definitions of social reality and their objectifications in the existing order become dysfunctional, groups of individuals who are touched by that dysfunction may create new definitions of social reality. In so doing, cultural dissonance occurs, causing strain and tension which must be resolved in some way. On a behavioral level, the tactics of individuals and collectivities may vary extensively in their attempts to resolve this dissonance; however, these variances appear in part to be determined by the reaction of the host culture. In saying the host culture's reaction is based on the intensity associated with the values and norms undergoing attack, we are now bound by particular cultures with regard to the application of the paradigm under construction. At this point we have gone as far as we can in attempting to make general statements about ideology's relationship to the public perception of social conflict, and to go further it is necessary to remain strictly on the symbolic level to explore the ways in which referential

boundaries and the objectification of their meanings may undergo modification.

Examination of change in referential boundaries and their objectifications yields three processes by which change, as defined for this model, is possible. The first two, universalism and particularism, are dialectically opposed subsets of the more primary and general process of abstraction. In the case of universalism and particularism, by virtue of limitations and fixed starting points of referential boundaries imposed by the interrelatedness of the symbols composing the symbolic universe in which they occur, they are constrained to be modifying processes. They modify what is already referentially bounded and objectified and remain within the symbolic universe in which they operate.

The third process, antitheticism, is abstraction in a different situation though not bounded by the limitations described above. It is not bound by the interrelatedness of the symbols in any symbolic system and redefines referential boundaries in a radically different way which is incompatible with the previously existing system. Thus, it is outside of the symbolic universe and constitutes a creative, from scratch, process.

Universalistic Change

As mentioned above, the first process will be referred to as universalistic change (also referred to later in this thesis as Type I change). In this process, the change-oriented group or individual is seeking to enlarge or reduce the boundary of a referent or its objectification such that the net result of the action would be to make the symbol's referent and its objectification more inclusive or universal.

It would appear at first paradoxical that to reduce the boundary of a referent could make it more universal. This occurs because there is no direct link with the size of a referential boundary or the way in which it is drawn to its abstraction or concreteness. The universalistic action of the process lies in the change of the referential boundary vis-a-vis all other referential boundaries in that symbolic system. In advocating universalistic change, a change-oriented group is building or adding to what has already been referentially bounded and objectified. The larger host society does not have to give up anything or unlearn anything--either symbolic or behavioral. It must, however, accept something new such as a new degree, scope, or additional dimension of the existing symbolic definitions. As an abstract process, some of the more salient features of universalistic (Type I) change are:

- 1) It broadens the inclusiveness of the referent by enlarging or reducing its boundary.
- 2) It represents a further step in generalizing the referent in relationship to all other referents in that system.
- 3) It is basically an integrative process by virtue of consolidation.
- 4) In terms of the social action system advanced by Parsons, it represents an increase in the cybernetic potential of the symbol (Parsons, 1966). Also it is orienting or legitimizing the symbol towards the next highest level sub-system of action which, since it is already on the cultural level, is to say the "higher environment". By moving towards the higher environment, this process tends to move the referential grounding of the symbol

towards an ontological source, thus sacralizing the symbol, its boundary, and its objectification.

- 5) It implies a more pervasive behavior pattern associated with the symbol. It becomes a more powerful symbol in terms of individual behavior and general societal direction.
- 6) The process tends to elevate the symbol within the complex of core values.

Particularistic Change

Again as mentioned before, generally conceptualized, the second process will be referred to as particularistic change (also referred to later in this thesis as Type II). In this process, the change-oriented group or individual is seeking to enlarge or reduce the boundary of a referent or its objectification such that the net result of the action would be to make the symbol's referent and its objectification more exclusive, specific, or particularistic. Once again, it would appear at first paradoxical that to enlarge the boundary of a referent could make it more particularistic. As mentioned earlier, this occurs because there is no direct link with the size of a referential boundary or the way in which it is drawn to its abstraction or concreteness. Again, the particularistic action of the process lies in the change of the referential boundary vis-a-vis all other referential boundaries in that symbolic system. In performing particularistic change, the change-oriented group is obscuring or destroying part of what has already been referentially bounded and objectified before. Since that which has been previously learned and objectified behaviorally, will, in all probability, have specific relevance or impact on a segment of the larger population, its

change will be opposed more intensely than universalistic change. This occurs because it will require a more active adjustment. As an abstract process, some of the more salient features of particularistic (Type II) change are:

- 1) It narrows the inclusiveness of the referent by enlarging or reducing its boundary.
- 2) It represents a further step in specifying the referent in relationship to all other referents in that system.
- 3) It is basically a differentiating process by virtue of dispersion or division.
- 4) In terms of the social action system advanced by Parsons, it represents a decrease in the cybernetic potential of the symbol. Also it is orienting or legitimizing the symbol towards the next lowest level sub-system of action, which, since it is already on the cultural level, is to say the "social or individual" levels. By moving towards the societal or individual levels, this process tends to move the referential grounding of the symbol towards an empirical source, thus secularizing the symbol, its boundary, and its objectification.
- 5) It implies a less pervasive behavior pattern associated with the symbol. It becomes a less powerful symbol in terms of individual behavior and general societal direction.
- 6) The process tends to lower the symbol within the complex of core values.

Antithetical Change

Broadly speaking this is basically revolutionary change. It represents the total destruction or obscuring of the referential boundary and its objectification. In a theoretical vein, one can perceive antithetical (Type III) change as a final resort and a rarely occurring event when compared to the continuing interplay between types I and II.

While types I and II are on one level diametrically opposed, on another level they share one thing in common--they both are modifying processes, modifying what already exists. This is contrasted with Type III which appears more as an experimental or creative venture. Thus Type III is perceived as a result of the failure of types I and II to effectively modify the referential boundary to restore functionality. Functionality means the achievement of desired goals or ends which are deemed subjectively good, beneficial, or useful on either the individual or the societal level--though most commonly there is a trade-off between the two. Failure occurs when the environment changes enough or in a certain crucial way such that all possible combinations of the two other types of change, I and II, are insufficient and ineffective to restore functionality to an acceptable level. When this occurs one has exhausted the modifiable potential of the referential boundary and its objectification, and the only alternative is to discard the old and replace it with a new one.

Mixed Processes

The three types of change outlined earlier must be considered as ideal-types. As such there is a high probability that many social movements are advocating change of differing types on more than one core

cultural value. Thus they could be advocating Type I change on one value, Type II on another, and Type III on yet another. As conceptualized it does not seem possible that one could perform two types of change on a referential boundary simultaneously. Since the focus of this thesis is primarily on the public's perception of that movement, it is suggested that we focus on the highest cultural value undergoing change, identify that change, and then regard the movement as being primarily associated with that type of change. This assumes that within the complex of core values there is a hierarchy of values, and that all symbols are not of equal importance and ranked according to cruciality or salience. It also reasonably assumes that the public will react to the change being advocated on the highest cultural value as the major determinant of its evaluation.

Examples of Change Processes

Confining oneself to American society, illustrations of these three types of change would be as follows:

- 1) Universalistic change: The Civil Rights Movement as it is concerned with expanding the core values of freedom and equality.
- 2) Particularistic change: The Ku Klux Klan in the sense that it is concerned with the narrowing of the core values of freedom and equality.
- 3) Antithetical change: Counter-culture movements such as "flower children, hippies, or drug cultures" in the sense they are concerned with the replacement of the core values of conformity, activity, and achievement.

The example of antithetical change is also an example of a mixed process as it is expanding the core values of individuality and freedom while replacing other core values such as conformity, activity, and achievement. Within the complex of core values, it is suggested that conformity, activity, and achievement could be shown to be ranked higher than individuality, hence identifying such movements as antithetical.

Limitations of the Paradigm

One major limitation of the paradigm is by design. At this level of analysis, considerations of social power and other social conflict precepts are given scant treatment. This is purposeful as those considerations not covered in this paradigm have received most of the attention of students of social conflict in the past. Thus this treatment of ideology does not ignore other crucial factors but focuses on one which has been given little consideration and examination.

Another major limitation of the paradigm is not by design, but lies instead in the nature of the process it revolves around--the symbolic processes of the human mind. By its very nature, any conflict situation described in terms of this process is limited to specific cultures. For its application, first, the core values of a given culture must be determined and their ranking ascertained. Only then can the three change processes as outlined above provide any predictive abilities.

Utility and Application of the Paradigm

The utility of the paradigm lies in the ability to project ideology as a symbolic process of referential boundary change into two areas: the prediction of a public's perception of a given social movement, and

prediction of a social movement's response to that anticipated perception with regard to specific choices of tactics and strategies.

Hypotheses

Hypotheses can be generated by the theoretical framework of the paradigm for each of these two areas. Only a first set of hypotheses dealing with the public's perception of a social movement in accordance with the change process they represent will constitute the working hypotheses of this thesis for empirical testing.

The major research hypothesis and three derived hypotheses are as follows:

The type of symbol transformation process (I, II, or III) expressed by a social movement's ideology toward components of the already established symbolic universe accepted as crucial and legitimate is predictive of the general public's perception of that movement.

- 1) Type I movements will be less severely perceived than either Type II or Type III movements.
- 2) Type II movements will be less severely perceived than Type III movements, but more severely perceived than Type I movements.
- 3) Type III movements will be more severely perceived than either Type I or Type II movements.

In conclusion, it is not contended that ideology as treated in this thesis is the sole determinant of such public perceptions or tactical responses. Many other factors are involved such as the characteristics of the members of the movement, the past level of conflict in the society, special symbolic definitions made by all sides and towards all elements of the conflict arena, and, of course, happenstances. Rather, it is contended that ideology as treated in this thesis will yield some measure of predictability towards the two areas mentioned earlier.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design of this thesis revolves around the research hypothesis and the three following derived hypotheses mentioned in Chapter II, which were:

The type of symbol transformation process (I, II, or III) expressed by a social movement's ideology toward components of the already established symbolic universe accepted as crucial and legitimate is predictive of the general public's perception of that movement.

- 1) Type I movements will be less severely perceived than either Type II or Type III movements.
- 2) Type II movements will be less severely perceived than Type III movements, but more severely perceived than Type I movements.
- 3) Type III movements will be more severely perceived than either Type I or Type II movements.

Logic of the Research

From inspection of the hypotheses above, three variables are involved in testing the hypotheses. They are: 1) the symbol transformation process expressed by a movement's ideology toward a core value, 2) the public's perception of that movement, and 3) the acceptance of that value as crucial and legitimate by the public involved. The indicators of these variables and their relationships are best explicated one by one.

First, the independent variable of the symbol transformation process is subjective and not measured directly. It was measured, however,

by the subjective grouping of the social movements undergoing evaluation in accordance with the operational definitions of the symbolic change-processes stated in Chapter II. An empirical indicator of the effect of the symbol transformation processes on the public's perception can be found in the relationship between the "agreement" and "disagreement" with a core value and the perception of a movement modifying that value. In this case, the public's perception of the movement was seen as an inferential measurement of the symbol transformation process.

At this point, a tentative framework for the projection of this variable onto the data generated by the research instrument must be given. To do so, certain assumptions concerning the ranking and cruciality of core values were made. Essentially, these assumptions are that the values described by Robin Williams (1960) are indeed major value orientations shared by a majority of Americans and, in part, that the ranking of those values (listed in decreasing importance) is "freedom", "equality", "humanitarianism", and "morality". Making these assumptions allowed for the tentative classification of the social movements into symbol transformation process groups, though the sample itself determined the final classification of social movements by change-process type through ranking and legitimizing the values. Table I presents this information.

In the case of universalistic or particularistic relationships, the major values involved were ascertained readily. In the case of anti-thetical relationships it became more difficult. This occurred because such relationships are usually outside an existing symbolic universe. Thus, quite frequently a movement advocating such change actively

TABLE I
TENTATIVE GROUPING OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
BY SYMBOL TRANSFORMATION PROCESS

<u>Social Movement</u>	<u>Process Group</u>	<u>Major Value(s) Involved</u>
Pro-abortion Movements	Universalistic	Freedom
Women's Liberation Movement	Universalistic	Freedom, Equality
Anti-Death Penalty Movement	Universalistic	Humanitarianism, Morality
American Indian Movement	Universalistic	Freedom, Equality
N.A.A.C.P.	Universalistic	Freedom, Equality
Peace Movement Groups	Universalistic	Humanitarianism
Gay Liberation Movement	Universalistic	Freedom, Equality
Environmental Protection Groups	Universalistic	Freedom, Rationality
Ku Klux Klan	Particularistic	Freedom, Equality
John Birch Society	Particularistic	Freedom, Equality
Pro-euthanasia Groups	Particularistic	Humanitarianism, Morality
Symbionese Liberation Army	Antithetical	Freedom, Humanitarianism, Morality
Palestinian Liberation Org.	Antithetical	Freedom, Humanitarianism, Morality
Counter-culture Movements	Antithetical	Success, Activity, Conformity, Wealth

threatens the entire political and social fabric of a society. In such situations, movements advocating antithetical change may appear to oppose all major values--though this may not, nor usually is not, their conscious intent.

One value, "freedom", occurs often in Table I, and due to its complexity requires special attention. Of all the major values in Williams' list, freedom is among the most complex and abstract, having many associated dimensions. "Freedom for" and "freedom from" represent only two such dimensions. In each case where such dimensions caused difficulty, a careful determination was made to classify a movement involved with "freedom" to the correct process group by considering the most salient characteristics of the entire situation.

The second variable, the public's perception of a movement, is the dependent variable and is more directly available in terms of measurement. Two indicators for this variable were included in the research instrument. One indicator consists of the sample's expression of agreement or disagreement towards the movements listed in Table I. The other, a second indicator of perception, consists of the sample's verbal description of the same movements. The assumption here is high correlation between the severity of opinion towards a certain movement and the severity of the descriptive word applied to that movement. Both indicators were used singularly and in groupings according to change-process type for purpose of detailed analysis.

The third variable, the public's acceptance of the values undergoing modification, was also measured directly. Its indicators were obtained by soliciting the sample's response to the values in terms of

agreement or disagreement with statements depicting the values, and finally by ranking the values directly according to importance. Acceptance, then, had two dimensions: cruciality and legitimacy. Cruciality was perceived as the ranking of the core values in terms of relative importance, while legitimacy was perceived as the general response to the statement(s) depicting the value(s). Cruciality and legitimacy are no doubt highly interrelated, but enough difference exists between the two concepts to warrant obtaining separate data for each. While "acceptance" has two indicators, one for ranking and one for legitimacy, they were used interchangeably in analysis.

The means of testing the hypotheses mentioned earlier was through a survey of an appropriate sample population to see if a measure of predictability between indicators was present. As observed earlier, the hypotheses and the theoretical framework which generated them are bound in their applicability to specific cultural groups. Hence, the research instrument focused exclusively on American society.

Research Instrument

The research instrument was designed first to ascertain the core values of a specific culture and to produce a ranking of those values. Specifically, it was designed to obtain reaction to social movements whose ideologies advocate change on those core values by the three symbolic change processes isolated in Chapter II. The symbolic change processes are: 1) universalism (Type I), 2) particularism (Type II), and 3) antitheticism (Type III).

The survey instrument had a preliminary section of questions relating to personal and social characteristics of the respondent (see

Appendix A). Some characteristics such as age and college class were included to determine simply the composition of the sample. Other particular characteristics singled out for inclusion, however, were judged to be important empirical indicators for the study of values and value change. For example, earlier mention was given to "special symbolic definitions of the conflict arena" as alternative inputs into the public's perception of a social movement. Thus, since pro-abortion movements are being evaluated, the Catholicism of a respondent may constitute a special input into a given evaluation of movements beyond the types of symbolic change processes the research instrument was designed to evaluate. Likewise, since the Ku Klux Klan and the N.A.A.C.P. are being evaluated, the ethnic identity of a respondent may again constitute a special input into a given evaluation.

In addition to the preliminary section, four other major sections were included.

Section I: The first major section consisted of fifteen value statements designed to reflect the central core values of American society as isolated by Robin Williams. As the first indicator of "acceptance", this section served the purpose of ascertaining if these are indeed major value orientations of American society by the overall sample response. It also provided a measure of the individual respondent's prior adherence to those values which were of use in analysis.

Respondents were asked to indicate whether they basically agreed or disagreed with each statement. Only dichotomous responses were requested or provided for, allowing no wider latitude in potential response. This was done purposefully to force a decision on the part of the

respondents and to simplify later analysis. This response structure eliminated the possibility of an inordinate number of "don't know" or "uncertain" responses, which due to the abstract nature of the statements would be highly probable. The value statements were constructed occasionally in a negative form so that disagreement with the statement would indicate agreement with the value it depicted.

Section II: The second section consisted of the same values described by Williams with instructions to rank them according to the respondent's evaluation of their relative importance. As the second indicator of "acceptance", and specifically, "ranking", this section also asked for any additional values which, in the respondent's opinion, were important. If a new value introduced by a respondent received support from a large proportion of the sample population, it was included as a major cultural value for subsequent analysis. The probability of such an occurrence was judged to be very low; indeed, it did not occur.

The primary purpose of Section II was to ascertain the relative importance of these values to the sample population. In the case of a social movement advocating mixed change on several core values, the relative position of these values was crucial in determining the symbolic change-process type of that social movement. This section also served the secondary functions of: a) again ascertaining that the core values are as depicted by Williams, and if not, b) allowing the list of core values to be corrected by the additions offered by the respondents.

Section III: The third section was designed to provide the first indicator of "public perception". It consisted of fourteen social movements active in recent American history with instructions to respond to

each movement or its goals by indicating strongly agree (SA), agree (A), don't know (DK), disagree (D), or strongly disagree (SD).

Of the major types of attitude scales, a summated or Likert-Type scale was judged most useful. One advantage in employing such a scaling technique is that scoring is simplified--scores of 1 to 5 may be applied as appropriate to each response of SA to SD, respectively. One assumption made in so doing was that a response of SA (or 1) for Women's Liberation is essentially of the same intensity as a response of SA (or 1) for the Ku Klux Klan. This was deemed reasonable as all items under evaluation belonged to the same general class of phenomena, and items undergoing evaluation were presented in as value-free a manner as possible.

The second advantage in using a Likert-type scale is that such a scaling technique allowed respondents to express the intensity of their feelings. Unlike the dichotomous technique used in Section I, this was desirable in Section III as it provided more response categories and hence solicited more variance. While variance in this case was desirable, it had to be kept manageable. If nine response categories were provided, the variance would yield little additional substantive support for the hypotheses being tested, and, in fact, would complicate analysis. For this reason a five-point scale of agreement-disagreement was used.

The fourteen social movements in this section were chosen because each advocates change on one or more core values discussed in Sections I and II, and because each could be categorized tentatively as to which of the three change processes it represented (see Table I). Although discussed earlier, the matching between movements and change-process types

was done subjectively and by inspection against an assumed rank order in the core complex of values. Many of the movements advocate change on more than one core cultural value and sometimes with different change process types. When this occurred, in accordance with the discussion concerning mixed processes, a judgement was made as to which value undergoing modification was the highest. The tentative assignment of social movement to a change-process type was a recognition that the sample itself would determine the rank order of the values and that order might differ from the assumed order. Thus, while the N.A.A.C.P. was tentatively assumed to be universalistic on the basis of change advocated on "freedom" and "equality", if it advocated another type of change on another core value and that value was ranked higher than the first two, the movement would then be considered as representative of the latter change process. This situation was judged not likely to occur frequently; indeed, it did not occur.

Tentatively the fourteen social movements are divided into three groups--each group representing one of the three change processes. After first ascertaining the core values and their ranking to be correct, the mean scores of each group were taken as an indicator of the sample's response to the respective change process.

Section IV: The fourth and final section consisted of the same fourteen social movements in Section III with instructions to apply one descriptive word (chosen from a list of six provided) to each movement (see Appendix A). This section constituted a verbal description of each movement and served as an additional indicator of the sample's perception of each movement and the change process it represented. Six terms

were offered to provide for some variance in individual preferences in expression. For purposes of analysis, however, only four basic categories of verbal description were coded. They were: "reform and protest", "rebellion and revolution", "fad", and "crime". In the first two cases, the rationale for the coupling was that the terms are close enough both in meaning and emotive content that they would add little additional predictive ability.

Sample Selection

The sample selected for administration of the research instrument was an availability sample. It consisted of 224 students of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro in attendance during the first summer session of 1975. An attempt was made to balance the sample as to sex and among the four college classes. This sample obviously was neither random nor stratified and in terms of some characteristics such as age, occupation and educational attainment was not representative of the general population. For the following reasons, however, this non-representativeness was judged unimportant:

First, even though the sample as constructed might conceivably validate different core cultural values, it is expected their validation and ranking would nonetheless be essentially congruent with what a random sample might reveal. This is expected even though the sample might be perceived as a sub-culture or symbolic sub-universe. Since the values being dealt with are major ones, the bulk of any sub-universe differences are expected to be found in lower order, empirically referented symbols as discussed in Chapter II.

Second, a pretest of this survey instrument revealed some difficulty when administered to a more complex stratified sample. The difficulty centered around a relative unfamiliarity of some elements of the general population with recent American current events and hence, social movements. For this reason as well, a university sample was judged a better choice due to the increased interest in change processes they might exhibit as a group. Related to this a university sample may also have increased time and ease to avail itself of medias communicating such activities.

It was realized that results from such a sample could not be generalized. It was hoped, however, the sample was adequate to provide initial data for the testing of hypotheses.

Analysis of Data

Data generated by the research instrument consisted of nominal and ordinal measures with analysis of that data done on several levels. Presentation of information in tabular form was produced for the following areas: a) sample composition, b) ranking of values, c) legitimacy of values, d) consistency between indicators of acceptance, e) consistency between indicators of acceptance, e) consistency between indicators of perception, f) tests of the research hypothesis, g) tests of the derived hypotheses, and finally, if warranted, h) analysis of selected sample characteristics and their effect on perception or acceptance.

Each of these areas is described in detail below. The order of presentation is as it occurs in Chapter IV and is identical to the list above, except as otherwise noted.

a) Sample Composition: Data will be presented on characteristics of the sample in raw form (percents, frequency, etc.) for the purpose of communicating the basic composition of the sample. This information is included in Appendix B, "Supplementary Tables".

b) Ranking of Values: The research instrument provides a rank order (1 to 14) of the values described by Williams. The resulting table presenting the mean sample ranking will be used to determine the final classification of social movements to a symbolic change-process type. These data will later be recoded to two categories of response: high and low. The division between the categories was determined by the median response of the sample population, and was then used to generate more detailed analysis.

c) Legitimacy of Values: The research instrument provides percent agree and disagree scores for each value through the statements designed to depict those values. The resulting table lists all values with the percent agree and disagree.

d) Consistency Between Indicators of Acceptance: Two indicators of acceptance, specifically "ranking" and "legitimacy", are measured by the research instrument. It is of value to ascertain the consistency between these two as they supposedly measure closely correlated dimensions of the same variable. Cross-tabulations of each value ranking by its respective value statement will be prepared. Thus, the ranking of "freedom" in Section II of the research instrument will be cross-tabulated with the responses to the "freedom" value statement in Section I. The resulting four-cell cross-breaks will utilize chi-square tests for statistical significance and gamma tests for the strength and direction of

the relationship. From the 14 four-cell cross-breaks, a table presenting only the level of significance, strength and direction of relationship will be prepared.

e) Consistency Between Indicators of Perception: Two indicators of the public's perception towards certain social movements are obtained by the research instrument. Again it is of value to ascertain the consistency between the two. Cross-tabulations of each movement's agreement or disagreement scores in Section III by its respective verbal description scores in Section IV will be prepared. Before this is done, however, the data in Section III will be recoded to three response categories of 1) agree, 2) don't know, and 3) disagree. The resulting 14 twelve-cell cross-breaks will utilize chi-square tests for statistical significance and gamma tests for the strength and direction of the relationship. From these cross-breaks, a table presenting only the level of significance, strength and direction of the relationship will be prepared.

f) Tests of the Research Hypothesis: The research hypothesis in restated form asserts that when social movements are grouped by the three symbol transformation processes described in Chapter II, there will be a difference between the public's perception of those movements by group. The independent variable of the change-process does not have an empirical indicator, but is subjective and will be projected onto the data as discussed earlier. The rationale for the identification of the change-process group to which a movement belongs is found in the relationship between the value it proposes to modify and the sample's overall acceptance and ranking of that value.

To test the research hypothesis, the fourteen social movements will be placed into the three respective change-process groups. There were eight movements in the universalistic group and three in both the particularistic and antithetical groups. With a sample size of 224, this generates 3136 total possible perception responses for each indicator of perception.

Two tables, one for each indicator of perception, will be prepared from the actual combined frequency in each category of response. The resulting tables will utilize chi-square tests for the significance of any difference present and gamma tests for the strength and direction of relationship between the variables. The data in these tables and the tests of significance will then directly address the central idea of the research hypothesis--is there a significant difference in public perception by process group?

g) Tests of the Derived Hypotheses: While the research hypothesis states there will be a difference between the three groups of movements in terms of public perception, the derived hypotheses predict the direction of that difference. Tests of the three derived hypotheses in this case involve the two indicators of perception and the subjectively imposed variable of the change-process groups. The tests are performed by a comparative analysis of the combined mean scores of the three groups of movements for each of the two indicators of perception. Since the social movements were classified as representative of a change-process type, the combined mean score for a given group of social movements is considered an applicable, though indirect, score for the associated process type.

The same plan of analysis will be utilized for the second indicator of perception, with the "verbal description" of a group of movements assumed to reflect the process which the movement represents. This level of analysis will be expressed in mean percentages by response category. Two tables, one for each of the indicators of perception will be prepared to present these data.

In conclusion, if the data warrant detailed analysis of sample characteristics by any indicators, such tabular information as "sex by pro-abortion movements", "religion by gay liberation movement", or "political orientation by S.L.A." will be prepared.

CHAPTER IV
TESTS OF HYPOTHESES

Before discussing the actual tests of hypotheses, several preliminary topics will be taken up. These topics include discussion of data obtained for the legitimacy of values, and data concerning consistency between indicators of both legitimacy and perception.

Legitimacy of Values

Legitimacy of the core values for the purpose of this study had two dimensions: acceptance and relative ranking. Data on both were necessary to properly apply the typology generated in Chapter II to the social movements under evaluation.

Based on the mean sample response of the ranking of the core values, Table II presents their relative ranking. In the case of the highest (1-7) values, discrepancies between the respective mean scores was wide, while for the lowest (8-14), the mean scores tended to cluster closely together. In each case, however, enough discrepancy existed in sample ranking to allow a clean-cut decision as to relative ranking.

No additional values suggested by respondents received majority support from the sample. Those additional values which were introduced by respondents tended to be slight variations and combinations of, or synonyms for, values included in the original list.

From the data the assumed rank order of the values suggested in Chapter III is supported--especially in the case of values undergoing proposed modification by the social movements included for evaluation.

TABLE II
VALUES BY SAMPLE RANKING

<u>VALUE</u>	<u>RANKING*</u>
Freedom	1
Humanitarianism	2
Equality	3
Individualism	4
Morality	5
Success	6
Rationality	7
Activity	8
Practicality	9
Democracy	10
Progress	11
Patriotism	12
Wealth	13
Conformity	14

*Based on mean sample response; n=224

Secondarily, by virtue of no additional values receiving widespread sample adherence, some inferential support may be taken for the assumption that these values do constitute legitimate core values.

A more direct measure of legitimacy is the acceptance of a core value by indication of agreement or disagreement with a general statement designed to depict that core value. Table III, based on data from the first section of the research instrument, presents the level of acceptance for each value statement.

Majority acceptance is observed for each statement with the exception of "morality", "rationality", "patriotism", and "democracy". Several conclusions might be drawn from this, the most obvious being that these four are not core values in the sample's judgement. This, of course, may be the case; however, two other conclusions appear more plausible. First exists the possibility that special symbolic dimensions or complexities exist for these values. "Morality" is a most diverse concept and any one statement depicting it may have a high probability of generating considerable variance in a sample's response. Similar complexities for "patriotism" and "democracy" may be pointed to in explaining the lack of majority acceptance. Recent American history, both political and economic, may have played a role in such results.

While the issue of special dimensions may be raised, the second conclusion that these particular value statements were inadequately designed and improperly representative of the value in question must also be considered. It is the author's belief that this conclusion accounts for the major part of the statement's failure to generate majority acceptance, and that these four values are legitimate core values.

TABLE III
 VALUE STATEMENTS BY SAMPLE ACCEPTANCE

<u>Value Statement</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Total *</u>
Success	69.2%	30.8%	100.0%
Activity	68.3	31.7	100.0
Morality	47.8	52.2	100.0
Humanitarianism	98.2	1.8	100.0
Practicality	60.7	39.3	100.0
Progress	56.3	43.7	100.0
Wealth	80.4	19.6	100.0
Equality	65.2	34.8	100.0
Freedom	95.1	4.9	100.0
Conformity	66.5	33.5	100.0
Rationality	44.6	55.4	100.0
Patriotism	5.8	94.2	100.0
Democracy	28.1	71.9	100.0
Individualism	71.0	29.0	100.0

*n=224

These difficulties aside, on balance, the data in Tables II and III indicate ample support for the assumption that the core values are as depicted by Williams. Thus, from the support of these data, the tentative grouping of social movements to a change-process group mentioned in Table I is considered the final classification. This final classification includes eight movements in the Universalistic (Type I) group, three movements in the Particularistic (Type II) group, and three movements in the Antithetical (Type III) group.

Consistency Between Indicators

It was suggested in Chapter III that a positive correlation would exist between the two indicators of acceptance and between the two indicators of perception. The results of cross-tabulations between the respective indicators are presented in Tables IV and V.

While Table IV shows no chi-square level of significance above .05, and only three above .10, some mixed support is lent to the assumption of a positive correlation between the ranking of values and agreement with general statements depicting the values. In ten cases, the gamma statistics indicated a low positive correlation and in four cases negative gamma statistics were obtained.

The overall weak results of this analysis of consistency suggests two possible considerations. First, that while the assumption of a positive correlation between direct ranking and expressions of value statement acceptance may be a valid one, it appears to be a very low positive correlation. In retrospect, it appears probable that enough substantial difference exists between the two to make prediction of one from the

TABLE IV
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL AND STRENGTH OF RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN INDICATORS OF ACCEPTANCE BY VALUE

<u>Value</u>	<u>Level of Significance*</u>	<u>Strength of Relationship**</u>
Success	.06	+.284
Activity	.31	+.167
Morality	.18	-.193
Humanitarianism	.61	+.507
Practicality	.06	-.368
Progress	.22	+.021
Wealth	.39	+.174
Equality	.29	+.167
Freedom	.10	+.133
Conformity	.92	-.033
Rationality	.30	+.156
Patriotism	.07	+.637
Democracy	.93	+.019
Individualism	.22	+.200

*Chi-square

**Gamma

TABLE V
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL AND STRENGTH OF RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN INDICATORS OF PERCEPTION BY MOVEMENT

<u>Movement</u>	<u>Level of Significance*</u>	<u>Strength of Relationship**</u>
Pro-abortion Movements	.01	-.361
Counter-culture Movements	.02	+.249
Ku Klux Klan	.01	-.555
Women's Liberation Movement	.01	+.252
Gay Liberation Movement	.01	+.352
John Birch Society	.01	+.023
Pro-euthanasia	.01	-.335
Anti-Death Penalty Movement	.01	+.073
American Indian Movement	.37	-.057
Palestinian Liberation Organization	.01	+.156
Symbionese Liberation Army	.02	+.028
Environmental Protection Groups	.02	+.578
N.A.A.C.P.	.01	+.238
Peace Movement Groups	.02	+.238

*Chi-square

**Gamma

other difficult, and perhaps unprofitable. Second, since this analysis involved the value statements themselves, the same possible inadequacy of design cited earlier may be pointed to as a potential reason for the low and even negative correlations.

In contrast to the results of Table IV, Table V, which presents results of analysis of consistency between indicators of perception, yields more positive results. In every case but one, the chi-square levels of significance are above .02, with most significant at the .01 level. Again, however, mixed support is lent to the assumption of a positive correlation. In one case, a substantial positive correlation was found, in six a low positive correlation, in three a negligible positive correlation, and in four, negative correlations.

In the case of the negative gamma statistics several considerations merit attention. The "Pro-abortion Movement" and "Pro-euthanasia Movement" impinge heavily on values relating to morality. Specifically, these movements advocate a substantial departure from what might be described as modal beliefs concerning the sanctity of life. This involvement may have been operative in the resulting gamma statistics, causing some confusion on the part of the sample.

In the case of the "Ku Klux Klan" and "American Indian Movement", recent negative media exposure has been widespread. It is possible the negative exposure played a role in the inconsistency between agreement with goals and the application of a descriptive word.

While higher positive correlations were expected between respective indicators, the absence of such correlations do not affect the basic tests of hypotheses. As departure points for future research, the

inconsistencies do, however, raise interesting questions.

Tests of the Research Hypothesis

It has been hypothesized that a difference exists between public perception of social movements on the basis of the symbol transformation process represented by the movement's ideological relationship to the host symbolic universe.

The tests of hypotheses are, as described in Chapter III, based on an analysis of the distribution of total possible sample perception responses. With fourteen social movements and a sample of 224, the research instrument generated a total of 3136 possible perception responses for each indicator of perception (agreement-disagreement and verbal description). For each indicator of perception by change-process type, 1722 possible perception responses existed for the Universalistic (Type I) group of movements, 672 for the Particularistic (Type II) group of movements, and 672 also for the Antithetical (Type III) group of movements. The frequency for each category of response by change-process type was obtained through combining the raw data in Tables XVI and XVII (see Appendix B). The resulting data presented in Tables VI and VII, for each indicator of perception represents the combined sample response by category for the three groups of social movements.

While a cell-by-cell discussion of frequencies or percents in each table could also demonstrate perception differences between the change-process types, the most succinct support for the research hypothesis is found in the statistical tests of significance and strength of relationship.

TABLE VI
CHANGE-PROCESS TYPES BY COMBINED PERCEPTION

Type	Perception					Total
	SA	A	DK	D	SD	
I-Universalistic	17.5% (547)	22.9% (717)	8.0% (252)	6.1% (191)	2.7% (85)	57.2% (1792)
II-Particularistic	1.1 (36)	3.0 (93)	5.1 (160)	4.4 (138)	7.8 (245)	21.4% (672)
III-Antithetical	0.7 (22)	2.7 (83)	6.0 (189)	5.6 (177)	6.4 (201)	21.4% (672)
Total	19.3% (605)	28.6% (893)	19.1% (601)	16.1% (506)	16.9% (531)	100.0% (3136)

Gamma= +.615

Probability of chi-square less than .001

TABLE VII
 CHANGE-PROCESS TYPES BY COMBINED
 VERBAL DESCRIPTION

Type	Verbal Description				Total
	Reform- Protest	Fad	Rebellion- Revolution	Crime	
I-Universalistic	45.3% (1420)	3.5% (110)	7.1% (220)	1.3% (42)	57.2% (1792)
II-Particularistic	10.8 (337)	1.0 (32)	3.7 (117)	5.9 (189)	21.4% (672)
III-Antithetical	4.0 (127)	3.2 (99)	10.5 (330)	3.7 (116)	21.4% (672)
Total	60.1% (1884)	7.7% (241)	21.3% (667)	10.9% (344)	100.0% (3136)

Gamma= +.635

Probability of chi-square less than .001

In Table VI a chi-square significance level of .001 coupled with a high positive correlation of +.615 between the variables of change-process type and the first indicator of perception (agreement-disagreement) is noted. Likewise Table VII, presenting data for the second indicator of perception (verbal description), yields a chi-square significance level of .001 coupled with a high positive correlation of +.635.

For each table, neither statistic alone is sufficient to demonstrate adequate support, but when considered together they indicate strong support for acceptance of the research hypothesis. Though these results cannot be projected directly into any discussion of the general population, on the basis of results obtained in this sample, the theoretical base of the typology appears to be tentatively validated and deserving of additional research.

Tests of the Derived Hypotheses

Having discussed the research hypothesis which predicts a difference in public perception by change-process group, the tests of the derived hypotheses which predict the direction of that difference may now be presented. Essentially, the three derived hypotheses may be considered interrelated and expressed simply as hypothesizing an increasing severity of public perception from Universalistic to Particularistic to Antithetical change-process type groups of movements.

The frequencies and percentages in Tables VI and VII could be used to demonstrate the direction of the differences in perception by change-process group. Those frequencies and percentages, however, are based on the total possible perception responses generated by the research

instrument. As such, they are somewhat cumbersome to utilize in tests of the derived hypotheses. The data in Tables VIII and IX, which mirrors the data in Tables VI and XII whose statistical significance has already been discussed, presents the same relationships in a recast, simpler form. The percentages in Tables VIII and IX are based on the averaged mean sample response for each category of response by change-process type groups for each indicator of perception. Again, these tables are combined forms of the raw data found in Tables XVI and XVII.

In Table VIII the severity of perception, with a few exceptions, closely follows the predicted pattern of response. For example, the percent strongly agree ranges from 30.5% for the Universalistic group to 3.3% for the Antithetical group, with the Particularistic group in between with 5.4%. The other categories of response also follow the predicted pattern of response with two exceptions in the agree and strongly disagree categories for the Particularistic group.

Table IX shows the strongest support for the derived hypotheses. As shown, the percent response of "reform-protest" is highest for the Universalistic group and drops steadily through the other change-process type groups. One exception noted in the expected pattern of response is again found in the "crime" category for the Particularistic group.

Consulting the raw data in Appendix B, the variations noted in the expected pattern of perception center around the "Ku Klux Klan". Considerable difficulties and inconsistencies have been associated with this organization throughout the entire analysis of data. In spite of these exceptions, the author remains convinced the classification of the Ku Klux Klan as particularistic is correct and can only point to negative

TABLE VIII
 CHANGE-PROCESS TYPES BY MEAN
 PERCEPTION

Type	Perception					Total
	SA	A	DK	D	SD	
I-Universalistic*	30.5%	40.0%	14.1%	10.7%	4.7%	100.0%
II-Particularistic**	5.4	13.9	23.8	20.5	36.4	100.0%
III-Antithetical***	3.3	12.3	28.1	26.3	29.9	100.0%

* Based on evaluation of eight movements; n= 224

** Based on evaluation of three movements; n= 224

*** Based on evaluation of three movements; n= 224

TABLE IX

CHANGE-PROCESS TYPES BY MEAN
VERBAL DESCRIPTION

Type	Verbal Description				Total
	Reform- Protest	Fad	Rebellion- Revolution	Crime	
I-Universalistic*	79.3%	6.1%	12.3%	2.3%	100.0%
II-Particularistic**	50.1	4.8	17.4	27.7	100.0%
III-Antithetical***	18.9	14.7	49.1	17.3	100.0%

* Based on evaluation of eight movements; n= 224

** Based on evaluation of three movements; n= 224

*** Based on evaluation of three movements; n= 224

media exposure as one possible special symbolic complexity involved in these unexpected results.

These few exceptions aside, the data in both Tables VIII and IX do follow the pattern of perception predicted by the derived hypotheses. That is, considerable support is demonstrated to indicate that Type I movements are least severely perceived, Type II movements are more severely perceived, and Type III movements are most severely perceived. While the support is mixed, in part, it appears ample to accept the derived hypotheses as validated and deserving of additional research.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The theoretical basis of this thesis, the hypotheses generated from it, and the subsequent data collected to test those hypotheses had as their major impetus an attempt to integrate certain micro-sociological study areas with more macro- areas of study. Specifically it might best be described as a projection of select facets of symbolic interactionism into a study of the public perception of social movements.

Review of literature in the area of social conflict yields a great number of useful typologies and schemas for classifying the many diverse dimensions of social movements. With regard to the public perception of social movements many characteristics of movements such as tactics, specific forms of organization, resources utilized, type of leadership, methods of member recruitment, and others have been used with varying degrees of utility. In each case, the question of a possible unifying typology, or more directly the level of abstraction of that possible typology occurred to the author. This thesis then is an attempt to initiate an exploratory study in the area of such a possible typology, at whatever level of abstraction it might be constructed.

Of the many possible levels that such a typology might be constructed, the general area of the consensual formation, exchange, and modification of symbols appeared most promising. With this as the task, the thesis began with a review of selected literature searching for a valid theoretical basis for the projection of symbol formation into the

research area. Following this, a paradigm of symbolic change processes was constructed with symbols, symbolic universes, and their objectifications as the foci of the study. A three-fold typology derived directly from the paradigm was then tested empirically.

As discussed in Chapter IV, the empirical tests of the hypotheses focusing on the typology yielded strong support for the acceptance of those hypotheses, and hence some validation for the typology itself.

From the data obtained it has been demonstrated that a typology based on symbol transformation processes represented by a movement's ideological relationship with its host symbolic universe is useful in predicting the public perception of social movements.

Though mentioned earlier, it is believed the utility of this paradigm may extend to the prediction of tactical choices by social movements. The relationship between the anticipated public's perception and the tactical response of a movement is perceived as a close one. While not included in this study for empirical testing, the relationship between these two as they reflect the relationship between symbol sets and their objectification merits further study.

It is not contended that such an ideological-symbolic base is the sole determinant of a movement's tactical response. Nor is it contended that a typology based on such a dimension is sufficient to totally explain a public's perception of a movement. Other variables, noted in Chapter II, are also operative and the typology developed in this thesis represents only one variable in what is most probably a multiple causation situation. It has been demonstrated, however, that such a dimension is part of some regression analysis which might be more totally

explanatory.

Beyond these considerations, the results of this study are tentative. They cannot be considered conclusive for a number of reasons. First, the data were obtained from a non-random sample which has definite implications for the generalization of such results. Second, as noted in Chapter IV, several methodological difficulties related to the acceptance and ranking of core values required further attention. Finally, the typology as tested depicts "ideal-type" processes which, in the study, were measured indirectly by existing social movements. It is doubtful any social movement could be described as being purely and absolutely representative of any one of the three symbol transformation processes. Thus, there is a slight, but carefully controlled, subjective element in the design of the research.

Suggestions for possible solutions for these difficulties might properly be offered at this time. A random sample of appropriate size would deal adequately with the first difficulty. The difficulties encountered in ascertaining core value acceptance and ranking might be dealt with by a more extensive and inclusive pretest designed solely for that purpose. Finally there is no easy remedy for the empirical testing of that which is of "ideal-type" in a real world. One possible alternative might be an entirely different line of empirical inquiry. Such a research design might center around in-depth interviews, using hypothetical organizations instead of existing movements. A technique of this type might more directly test the validity of the typology and aid in controlling extraneous variables or emotional considerations which often accompany a study of social conflict.

In conclusion, none of the difficulties or limitations noted should be construed as a lack of confidence in what has been done. To the contrary, it is believed the results are sound and represent a small step in the integration of the two areas mentioned earlier.

The notation of such difficulties and limitations should, however, be viewed as a desire to improve upon what has been done. This should always be the case as no approach is an end, only a beginning point for further study.

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SOCIAL MOVEMENT STUDY

The following questions are being asked as a part of a study of the role of the individual in social movements. We will appreciate your cooperation in this study if you will answer the questions as honestly as possible. All information obtained will be kept strictly confidential and will be reported in a statistical fashion in the final report.

Please do not identify yourself in any way in your answers. All information obtained will be kept strictly confidential and will be reported in a statistical fashion in the final report.

APPENDIX A

THE DATA-COLLECTION INSTRUMENT

- 1) Age _____ 2) Sex _____ 3) Political Orientation _____
 a) 18 or under _____ 1) Liberal _____
 b) 19 to 24 _____ 2) Conservative _____
 c) 25 to 29 _____ 3) Other (Please _____
 d) 30 to 34 _____ Specify) _____
 e) 35 and over _____ 4) Liberal _____
 f) Other _____

- 4) Religious Affiliation _____ 5) College Class _____
 1) Catholic _____ 1) Freshman _____
 2) Protestant (Specify _____ 2) Sophomore _____
 3) Jewish _____ 3) Junior _____
 4) Other (Please Specify) _____ 4) Senior _____
 5) None _____ 5) Other (Please _____
 Specify) _____

- 6) Sex: 1) Male _____ 2) Female _____

Please respond to the following statements by indicating whether you basically agree or disagree. While you may not agree or disagree completely with any of the statements, try to decide which answer would best indicate your feeling toward the content of the statement.

- 1) A person will be happy or fulfilled only when he works and strives to achieve. Agree _____ Disagree _____
- 2) Even if a person were wealthy he should want to work at some job. Agree _____ Disagree _____
- 3) There is no such thing as absolute right or wrong; only shades of gray. Agree _____ Disagree _____
- 4) People should help each other out in times of disaster. Agree _____ Disagree _____

- 5) Philosophy and theology are fine but man's main goal should be to solve his practical problems on earth. Agree___ Disagree___
- 6) Some events in recent American history have been disturbing, but in the end we will emerge a better nation. Agree___ Disagree___
- 7) People should enjoy themselves as much as their finances allow and maintain as good a lifestyle as possible.
Agree___ Disagree___
- 8) I tend to believe all human beings are interrelated as in one big family.
Agree___ Disagree___
- 9) By nature people are basically competitive and conflictful.
Agree___ Disagree___
- 10) One of the most important factors in a person's life is the ability to make his own decisions. Agree___ Disagree___
- 11) Society has the right and the responsibility to control the actions of individuals for the good of the majority.
Agree___ Disagree___
- 12) All our problems are created by man, and so man has the ability to solve them. Agree___ Disagree___
- 13) A person can have no other real home outside of the country where he is born. Agree___ Disagree___
- 14) Most people are incapable of governing themselves efficiently.
Agree___ Disagree___
- 15) An individual should rely on himself to meet his needs--not the government or society in general. Agree___ Disagree___

II. Previous research has frequently shown the following values to be central to Americans. Please rank these in order of their importance to you by placing a 1 beside the most important, a 2 beside the next most important, and so on. If there are other values you feel should be included, please list and rank them in the final blank spaces.

Success_____

Activity_____

Morality_____

Humanitarianism_____

Practicality_____

Progress_____

Wealth_____

Equality_____

Freedom_____

Rationality_____

Patriotism_____

Democracy_____

Individualism_____

Conformity_____

III. In terms of your agreement with these groups or sympathy with their goals, please respond to each of the following social movements by indicating whether you strongly agree (SA), agree (A), don't know (DK), disagree (D), or strongly disagree (SD). Do so by placing an "X" in the space after the appropriate category.

- | | |
|--|----------------------------------|
| 1) Pro-abortion Movements | SA ___ A ___ DK ___ D ___ SD ___ |
| 2) Counter Culture Movements
(Hippie movements, communes, etc.) | SA ___ A ___ DK ___ D ___ SD ___ |
| 3) The Ku Klux Klan | SA ___ A ___ DK ___ D ___ SD ___ |
| 4) Women's Liberation Movement | SA ___ A ___ DK ___ D ___ SD ___ |
| 5) Gay Liberation Movement
(Homosexual Equality) | SA ___ A ___ DK ___ D ___ SD ___ |
| 6) The John Birch Society | SA ___ A ___ DK ___ D ___ SD ___ |
| 7) Pro-euthanasia groups
(Mercy killing) | SA ___ A ___ DK ___ D ___ SD ___ |
| 8) Anti-Death Penalty Movements | SA ___ A ___ DK ___ D ___ SD ___ |
| 9) American Indian Movement
(AIM--the Indians at
Wounded Knee) | SA ___ A ___ DK ___ D ___ SD ___ |
| 10) Palestinian Liberation
Organization (P.L.O.) | SA ___ A ___ DK ___ D ___ SD ___ |
| 11) Symbionese Liberation Army | SA ___ A ___ DK ___ D ___ SD ___ |
| 12) Environmental Protection Groups | SA ___ A ___ DK ___ D ___ SD ___ |
| 13) The N.A.A.C.P. | SA ___ A ___ DK ___ D ___ SD ___ |
| 14) Peace Movement groups | SA ___ A ___ DK ___ D ___ SD ___ |

IV. Assuming that you could choose only from this list of descriptive words, choose the word that best describes each movement and place the number of that word in the space next to the movement. The same word may be used more than once.

- 1) Rebellion
- 2) Fad
- 3) Protest Descriptive Words
- 4) Crime
- 5) Reform
- 6) Revolution

- | | |
|--|-----|
| 1) Pro-abortion Movements | --- |
| 2) Counter Culture Movements | --- |
| 3) The Ku Klux Klan | --- |
| 4) Women's Liberation Movement | --- |
| 5) Gay Liberation Movement | --- |
| 6) The John Birch Society | --- |
| 7) Pro-euthanasia groups | --- |
| 8) Anti-Death Penalty Movements | --- |
| 9) American Indian Movement | --- |
| 10) Palestinian Liberation
Organization | --- |
| 11) Symbionese Liberation Army | --- |
| 12) Environmental Protection groups | --- |
| 13) The N.A.A.C.P. | --- |
| 14) Peace Movement groups | --- |

TABLE X
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION BY AGE

Age	Sample Size	% of Total Sample
10 or under	21	9.4
10 to 19	133	59.5
20 to 29	77	34.5
30 and over	12	5.4
Total	223	100.0

APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES

TABLE XI
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION BY ELLIPTICAL ORIENTATION

Elliptical Orientation	Sample Size	% of Total Sample
Obtuse	112	50.0
Intermediate	78	34.8
Acute	34	15.2
Total	224	100.0

TABLE X
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION BY AGE

<u>Age</u>	<u>Sample Size</u>	<u>% of Total Sample</u>
19 or under	21	9.4%
20 to 29	155	69.2
30 to 39	27	12.1
40 and over	21	9.4
Total	224	100.0%

TABLE XI
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION BY POLITICAL ORIENTATION

<u>Political Orientation</u>	<u>Sample Size</u>	<u>% of Total Sample</u>
Liberal	112	50.0%
Conservative	78	34.8
Other	34	15.2
Total	224	100.0%

TABLE XII
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION BY SEX

<u>Sex</u>	<u>Sample Size</u>	<u>% of Total Sample</u>
Male	84	37.5%
Female	140	62.5
Total	224	100.0%

TABLE XIII
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION BY CLASS

<u>Class</u>	<u>Sample Size</u>	<u>% of Total Sample</u>
Freshman	8	3.6%
Sophomore	18	8.0
Junior	43	19.2
Senior	76	33.9
Graduate	67	29.9
Other	12	5.4
Total	224	100.0%

-TABLE XIV
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION BY RELIGION

<u>Religion</u>	<u>Sample Size</u>	<u>% of Total Sample</u>
Catholic	13	5.8%
Protestant	174	77.7
Jewish	1	0.4
Other	9	4.0
None	27	12.1
Total	224	100.0%

TABLE XV
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION BY ETHNIC IDENTITY

<u>Ethnic Identity</u>	<u>Sample Size</u>	<u>% of Total Sample</u>
White	209	93.3%
Black	12	5.4
American Indian	1	0.4
Other	2	0.9
Total	224	100.0%

TABLE XVI
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS BY PERCEPTION

Social Movement	Perception					Total
	SA	A	DK	D	SD	
Pro-abortion Movements	42.9% (96)	37.1% (83)	9.4% (21)	6.7% (15)	4.9% (9)	100.0% (224)
Counter-culture Movements	6.7 (15)	27.2 (61)	25.0 (56)	32.2 (72)	8.9 (20)	100.0 (224)
Ku Klux Klan	1.8 (4)	0.9 (2)	5.4 (12)	23.7 (53)	68.2 (153)	100.0 (224)
Women's Liberation Movement	28.1 (63)	52.7 (118)	7.6 (17)	9.4 (21)	2.2 (5)	100.0 (224)
Gay Liberation Movement	12.1 (27)	29.9 (67)	21.9 (49)	19.2 (43)	17.9 (38)	100.0 (224)
John Birch Society	2.2 (5)	4.5 (10)	37.9 (85)	25.5 (57)	29.9 (67)	100.0 (224)
Pro-euthanasia Movements	12.1 (27)	36.2 (81)	28.1 (63)	12.5 (28)	11.9 (25)	100.0 (224)
Anti-Death Penalty Movements	21.4 (48)	23.2 (52)	16.1 (36)	28.6 (64)	11.7 (24)	100.0 (224)
American Indian Movement	25.0 (56)	46.0 (103)	22.8 (51)	5.4 (12)	0.8 (2)	100.0 (224)
Palestinian Liberation Org.	2.2 (5)	8.0 (18)	43.3 (97)	23.7 (53)	22.8 (51)	100.0 (224)
Symbionese Liberation Army	0.9 (2)	1.8 (4)	16.1 (36)	23.2 (52)	58.0 (130)	100.0 (224)
Environmental Protection Groups	61.6 (138)	34.8 (78)	1.8 (4)	1.3 (3)	0.5 (1)	100.0 (224)
N.A.A.C.P.	20.1 (45)	51.3 (115)	17.9 (40)	8.5 (19)	2.2 (5)	100.0 (224)
Peace Movement Organizations	33.0 (74)	45.1 (101)	15.2 (34)	6.3 (14)	0.4 (1)	100.0 (224)

TABLE XVII
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS BY VERBAL DESCRIPTION

Movement	Verbal Description				Total
	Reform- Protest	Fad	Rebellion- Revolution	Crime	
Pro-abortion Movements	85.3% (191)	1.3% (3)	6.3% (14)	7.1% (16)	100.0% (224)
Counter-culture Movements	27.2 (61)	39.3 (88)	33.5 (75)	0.0 (0)	100.0 (224)
Ku Klux Klan	21.4 (48)	0.9 (2)	22.3 (50)	55.4 (124)	100.0 (224)
Women's Liberation Movement	77.7 (174)	6.7 (15)	15.2 (34)	0.4 (1)	100.0 (224)
Gay Liberation Movement	64.7 (145)	18.8 (42)	13.8 (31)	2.7 (6)	100.0 (224)
John Birch Society	52.7 (118)	9.8 (22)	23.7 (53)	13.8 (31)	100.0 (224)
Pro-euthanasia Movements	76.3 (171)	3.6 (8)	6.3 (14)	13.8 (31)	100.0 (224)
Anti-Death Penalty Movement	87.5 (196)	2.7 (6)	4.0 (9)	5.8 (13)	100.0 (224)
American Indian Movement	61.6 (138)	1.3 (3)	36.6 (82)	0.5 (1)	100.0 (224)
Palestinian Liberation Org.	22.8 (51)	1.8 (4)	55.3 (124)	20.1 (45)	100.0 (224)
Symbionese Liberation Army	6.7 (15)	3.1 (7)	58.5 (131)	31.7 (71)	100.0 (224)
Environmental Protection Groups	91.1 (204)	3.6 (8)	4.9 (11)	0.4 (1)	100.0 (224)
N.A.A.C.P.	88.4 (198)	0.9 (2)	8.9 (20)	1.8 (4)	100.0 (224)
Peace Movement Organizations	77.7 (174)	13.8 (31)	8.5 (19)	0.0 (0)	100.0 (224)