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THE DOMESTIC FORMATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY
TOWARDS THE BARBARY POWERS,
1784-1808

by

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The purpose of this study was to investigate the development of American policy towards the Barbary States in terms of domestic political opinion and partisan debate. Previous studies have been primarily concerned with naval policy or diplomatic negotiation.

The method followed was to evaluate the previous scholarly literature and the opinions of the primary actors in the policy formation process, through their published writings. The goal of this method was to obtain a clear picture of the domestic political significance of the establishment of a policy towards the Barbary States.

It was found that the American policy began as a nonpartisan political problem that evolved during the debates over the nature of the Constitution and the establishment of a navy into a partisan issue. The policy was associated with the grand issues upon which the political factions differentiated themselves. A policy of inaction resulted when the Barbary issue became submerged under more pressing political problems: the policy was held *in stasis* by equality of support and rejection by the political factions.

An active policy was initiated by Jefferson. The particulars of his relationship to the Barbary issue and to both political factions allowed him to return the issue to a nonpartisan status, by Executive action.

APPROVAL PAGE

This thesis has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

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To Dr. Richard Current for patience and Dr. Richard Bardolph for confidence.

"Bombardments are but transitory"
Count D'Estang to Thomas Jefferson

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INTRODUCTION

American independence from England created an entire new set of problems for the American revolutionaries. As colonies of England, the Americans enjoyed privileges of diplomatic representation, protection of merchant shipping, and favorable trade relationships that ended with American independence. Moreover, the independence of America created an entirely new context: somehow, the Americans had to create a viable international existence for themselves, allied neither with France nor England to such an extent as to jeopardize freedom, yet capable of defending financial and ideological interests abroad.

The early history of the Republic is largely, and rightly, concerned with the establishment of a stable relationship for America between the two large powers. But these more visible events tend to obscure the long, difficult process whereby the United States established an independent policy in the Mediterranean. The Barbary Pirates is a term that recalls the marines "on the shores of Tripoli" and shattering naval engagements to the casual student of American history but not the twenty-five-year struggle to decide upon a policy and implement it.

The process whereby America established a policy in the Mediterranean is characterized by the chronic perception that America had insufficient resources to deal with the problem and domestic disagreement over the most suitable means to establish a policy.

The essence of the problem was how to regain a place in the Mediterranean trade for American exporters and shippers without the protection of England against the depredations of the Barbary Pirates. The approaches taken to the problem fall into three segments: obtain a new patron or pay to join the tributary system, payment and unsatisfactory membership in the tributary system, and the beginning of a vigorous policy of force. The body of this paper falls into these divisions but is particularly concerned with the domestic political evolution of the Barbary issue. While events in Europe and on the North African coast had very significant impact on policy formation, the decisions were made in America and were influenced by the ongoing debate upon the great issues of the day.

It is to the great credit of America that while simultaneously establishing a neutral role between England and France, a distinctly unneutral policy was established towards equals, that in the Mediterranean was to lead to the downfall of the tributary system in which England and France were silent partners.

PART ONE

THE COMMISSIONERS

Captain James Erving, master of the United States brig Betsy, passed by Gibralter in mid-October 1784 with a crew of twenty-one and cargo for Teneriffe. He and his crew were to have the unexpected distinction of becoming the first vessel of the American Confederation to be captured by the Barbary Corsairs.[1]

The Barbary States of Algiers, Morocco, Tripoli and Tunis were situated along the north coast of Africa, across two thousand miles of treacherous shoals and reefs, pounded by gales during the winter and spring months.[2] The history of the area is one of an unbroken succession of wars reaching back to the Punic Wars of 200 B.C.[3] The Moorish conquest which had reached its furthest point in 1492 with the capture of Granada, left the Barbary powers under the spiritual leadership of the Sultan of Turkey. The traditional enmity between Mohammedan and Christian was to provide a basis for a foreign policy both profitable and long-lived in Mediterranean waters.

By the time of the American Revolution, the Barbary powers enforced a long-standing system of bribes and tribute thinly disguised as treaty relationships. All nations that wished to engage in Mediterranean trade were compelled by threat of piracy to seek treaties from each Barbary nation.

The larger nations, France and England, had fairly stable relationships and long histories of regular payment of all demands.

The smaller nations, like Portugal and Naples, faced the foreknowledge of piracy and the uncertainty of receiving trade privileges even if the demands were met. These unfortunate states were then compelled to raise their tribute offer, forego Mediterranean trade, accept the loss of an indeterminate number of their vessels and citizens, or go to war.

Like all international blackmail, the demands were not bounded by reason or tradition but conformed to the immediate needs of the treasury or the capriciousness of the reigning clique. On at least one occasion, the ruling council of Algiers debated as to which nation should lose its treaty so that the treasury would be refilled.[4] Near the end of the eighteenth century the Consul of Denmark at Algiers reported that the Dey had announced that in order to keep the throne, he had to allow his subjects to continue piracy.[5] At the most basic level, this system insured that if peace was made with one nation, war would be declared on another: money would flow from bribes and tribute simultaneously with money from the ransom of prisoners and the sale of captured ships and cargos.

They were indeed dangerous men that Captain Erving and other American merchantmen began to face:

> Their mode of attack is uniformly boarding. For this their vessels are peculiarly constructed. Their long lateen yards drop on board the enemy and afford a safe and easy conveyance for the men who man them for this purpose; but being always crowded with men, they throw them in from all points of the rigging and from all quarters of the decks, having their sabres grasped between their teeth and their loaded pistols in their belts, that they may have the free use of their hands in scaling the gunnels or netting of their enemy. In this mode of attack, they are very active and very desperate. . . .[6]

The crew of the Betsy was held by Morocco for six months and then released. This was an obvious hint that the time had come for the United States to join the tributary system on her own. American vessels had previously been seized during the early colonial period,[7] but during most of the eighteenth century American ships enjoyed the same privileges as English merchantmen in the Mediterranean, privileges purchased by annual tribute and the British fleet's threatening ships of the line.

This prerevolutionary Mediterranean trade was considerable. Exact import-export figures are incomplete because of the English predilection during the Revolution for burning American custom houses. This trade was estimated as

> . . . about one Sixth of the Wheat and Flour exported from the United States and about one Fourth in value of their dried and pickled Fish, and some Rice, Found their best Markets in Mediterranean Ports: that these articles constituted the principal part of what we sent into that Sea: that the commerce loaded outward from Eighty to one hundred ships annually, of Twenty Thousand Tons, navigated by about Twelve Hundred Seamen.[8]

Soon after the American Revolution began, England revoked the passports that identified American merchant ships as under English protection in the Mediterranean.[9] This trade was abandoned during the war, ". . . and after the Peace which ensued, it was obvious to [American] Merchants that their Adventures into that Sea would be exposed to the Depredations of the piratical States on the Coast of the Barbary."[10]

This trade, if it could be regained, was thought to be ". . . as profitable to [America] as any part of our european trade."[11] By 1784, American vessels were beginning to enter the Mediterranean again, some with forged or purchased passes, some flying the British colors to pass as Englishmen, and a few in convoy with Spanish or Portuguese warships.[12]

American policymakers were faced with a distinct set of choices:

1. Cease all trade in the Mediterranean

2. Seek a new sponsor to fill the role England played until 1776
3. Join the Barbary tributary system by treaty, paying annual tribute and frequent "gifts"
4. Declare, and fight, a war.

The resolution of the Barbary question was finally to extend over the first formative thirty years of the American Republic. The question was to figure prominently in the philosophical and political disputes that led to the making of the Constitution, the formation of formal political parties, and the founding of the Navy. Every foreign policy executive during the period had to contend directly with the problem itself or with its ramifications in American relations with the other nations concerned.

Thomas Jefferson and John Adams represent the most central actors in the formation of American policy towards the Barbary pirates. The stereotypes of history picture Jefferson as being both a pacifist and an opponent of the establishment of an American Navy, and they show John Adams as favoring those things Jefferson opposed.[13] These images do neither man justice and inhibit a complete understanding of the subterranean political debate and maneuver that characterized the various stages of decision-making.

It is reasonably easy to understand how these stereotypes evolved and easier still to see how the slender thread of the Barbary problem has become lost in the internecine struggles of the period. The quasi-war with France, the British interference with American shipping, the problems of neutrality, domestic political turmoil, and the Napoleonic wars--all serve to obscure the fact that the American policy of 1801 to 1806 which led to the end of the Barbary tribute system did not spring to life full grown, but evolved with America's growth as an independent nation.

The careers and opinions of Jefferson and Adams offer a close parallel to the evolutionary growth of the Barbary policy. They were to serve the nation first as Commissioners in Europe, Adams assigned to London and Jefferson to Paris. Their collective additional duty was to direct negotiations concerning the Barbary Powers.

On May 7, 1784, Congress commissioned them, along with the venerable Dr. Franklin (who was to resign within the month), to enter into negotiations with the Barbary Powers to secure ". . . treaties of amity and commerce . . ."[14] This direct approach to the problem resulted from the earlier failure of France to fulfill her obligation under Article VIII of the Treaty of 1778, in which France had agreed to employ "good offices and interposition with," the Barbary States "in order to provide as fully and efficaciously as possible for the benefit, convenience and safety of the said United States."[15]

Jefferson and Adams directed negotiations from their posts in Europe by instructing various agents on the North African coast by letter until late 1789, when both returned to the United States after the ratification of the Constitution. Both found the supervision of their Barbary agents difficult: tradition and protocol had not been yet established for missions abroad such as their own, so that frequent requests for instruction had to be addressed to John Jay, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to the Congress. Their own instructions from America frequently took as long as four months in transit, followed by several more months to instruct and receive a reply from the African agents. Adding to this the return trip of their letters to America, and any debate upon their recommendations by the Congress, it becomes easy to understand, in light of this six to ten month cycle, how events outpaced direction.

America wanted the Mediterranean market for her exports, as indicated by the Congressional commissioners, but Adams and Jefferson disagreed about the proper mode by which to regain it. "Shall we have peace or war," Adams asked Jefferson, going on to elaborate the problems that faced their mission:

> (1) We may at this time have a peace with them, in spight [sic] of all the Intrigues of the English and others to prevent it, for a Sum of Money.
> (2) We never shall have Peace, though France, Spain, England and Holland should use all their Influence in our favor without a Sum of Money.
> (3) That Neither the Benevolence of France nor the Malevolence of England will ever be able to Materially Diminish or Increase the Sum.
> (4) The longer the Negotiation is delayed, the larger will be the demand. From these Premises I conclude it to be wisest for us to negotiate and pay the necessary Sum, without loss of time . . . [16]

Adams, later in the same letter, summarized his position: "At present we are Sacrificing a Million annually to Save one Gift of two Hundred Thousand Pounds. This is not good Economy."[17]

Suspicions that the influence of England and France was devoted to the maintenance of their special interests in the Mediterranean were shared by Adams, Jefferson, Jay, and others. In 1783, Benjamin Franklin wrote to the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert Livingston, "I have heard in London that it is a maxim among the Merchants, that if there were no Algiers, it would be worth England's while to build one."[18] Louis XIV of France is said to have remarked earlier, "If there were no Algiers, I would make one."[19]

There can be no question that England and France had special interests within the tributary system. The Barbary nation's own import-export trade was carried on neutral vessels, of which it was reported that the French had ". . . 4/5 of the commerce . . ." and were ". . . the chief carriers of its produce."[20] Britain's interest is clear: American shipping represented more serious competition in the world's markets, and if the Barbary States closed off the Mediterranean to American vessels, English merchants would prosper. There appears to have been no shortage of ill feelings across the Atlantic, as represented by the defeat in Parliament of a free trade bill in 1783.[21] American feelings toward England are well illustrated by the polarization of the political wings of the American revolutionaries, and their clashing opinions on England's relationship to, and effects upon, American independence.

The tensions between these two senior participants in the Barbary system may not be discounted, however. These tensions followed from the adversary positions they took on commercial, military and, increasingly, political affairs. Because of this rivalry and American domestic perceptions of the two participants, it became difficult to describe the motives behind various maneuvers France and England made. If either influenced American chances in the Mediterranean indirectly by tactics directed at the other, at least one political faction in America would ascribe damming motivations.

Jefferson's reply to Adams' letter set out the position he was to retain towards Barbary policy throughout the duration of the question:

> of the four positions laid down in your letter of the 3rd instant, I agree to the first three . . . As to the 4th, . . . this will depend upon the immediate captures, [The Maria of Boston and the

> Dauphin of Philadelphia, with crew of twenty-one, were captured by Algiers in late October, 1786, indicating impatience with the slowness of America to enter the system.] However, if it is decided that we shall buy a peace, I know no reason for delaying the operation, but should rather think it ought to be hastened. But I should prefer the obtaining of it by war. (1) Justice is in favor of this opinion. (2) Honor favors it. (3) It will procure us respect in Europe, and respect is a safeguard to interest. (4) It will arm the Federal head with the safest of all insterments of coercion over their delinquent members and prevent them using what is less safe. I think so far you go with me. But in the next two steps we shall differ. (5) I think it less expensive (6) equally effectual. I ask a fleet of 150 guns, one half of which shall be in constant cruise. This fleet built, manned and victualled for six months will cost Ŀ450,000 sterling . . . But so far I have gone with the supposition that the whole weight of the war will rest on us. But (1) Naples will join us (2) every principle of reason tells us Portugal will join us.[22]

The capture of the Maria and the Dauphin had occurred because Spain had completed an expensive treaty with Algiers in August 1785, ending a brief conflict important only because the Algerines had been blocked out of the Atlantic. With the peace, they were quickly through Gibralter and into the intra-European coastwise shipping lanes.

The twenty-one American captives created a special and continuing problem for the Commissioners, for they were not specifically empowered by Congress to pay ransoms.[23] They dispatched agent Charles Lamb to Algiers on their own authority to negotiate the release of the twenty-one captives at up to $200.00 each.[24] Lamb quickly discovered that $200.00 each was inadequate: the Dey of Algiers wanted $59,496.00 for ransom without a treaty.[25] Jefferson and Adams, in frustration, referred the specific question of redemption to the Congress, for their total budget for all four treaties was only $80,000.00.[26]

The question of American citizens thrown into slavery by Moors created considerable emotion in America but it did not result in the quick release of the captives. The problem created by the captives for the Commissioners in Europe had two tactical facets to be resolved.

Jefferson had sought during the winter of 1784-85 to determine what prices the European nations had paid historically for treaties and redemptions. "This they will not tell us," Jefferson wrote to James Madison, "yet from some glimmerings it appears to be very considerable."[27] Money usually obtained the captives' release, but the practice of holding captives until a treaty was reached could not have been unknown on the Barbary. Redemption was such an important item that "there was maintained an 'Order of the Holy Trinity and Redemption of Captives' with headquarters in Paris and agents throughout the Barbary," an order known as the Malthurians, from the Church of St. Malthurin.[28] Jefferson sought their aid in obtaining the prisoners' release, but the effort was not to be successful.[29]

The second approach Adams and Jefferson took was to determine the possibility that the Porte of Turkey, to whom the Barbary States stood in theoretical vassalage, could moderate the demands for treaties and redemptions. To this end, Jefferson consulted French Foreign Minister Vergennes, who had served in Constantinople. Vergennes replied that such an approach would "not procure [America] a peace at Algiers one penny the cheaper." and that "money was the sole agent at Algiers, except so far as fear could be induced also."[30]

Without the funds or the authorization to raise them in Europe, the Commissioners chose to display an attitude of disinterest towards the plight of the prisoners in hopes of moderating the Algerine demands. "This was to prepare their captors for the ransoming of them at a reasonable price." Jefferson wrote to Jay, ". . . their own intrest requires that I should leave them to think thus hardly of me."[31] This final pose of disinterestedness remained the Commissioners' public face throughout their term of service.

Their efforts had some success. A satisfactory treaty was negotiated by Thomas Barclay with Morocco on June 28, 1786. This treaty, which called for no annual tribute but a one-time payment of $10,000, was to remain in effect throughout the period, with but one exception. Congress ratified the treaty on July 18, 1787.[32]

Portugal, during the winter of 1786-1787, stepped into the breach that the Spanish settlement [with Algiers] created by declaring war on Algiers. The Portuguese chose to prosecute their conflict by a constant blockade of the Algerines at Gibralter, a blockade that was to last until 1794. The loss of only two American vessels between Spain's peace with the pirates and 1794 is directly due to Portugal for, as Jefferson noted, the Algerines had to search the entire Mediterranean for their neighbors' vessels but could pounce on Americans at the entrance.[33] This phenomena may be interpreted in several ways. As the cause for fear of more immediate captures was removed, the plight of the twenty-one captives at Algiers became less pressing and efforts for their release less compelling. Another view could be that this "breather" period allowed American trade with Europe to grow and, with it, the pressures for American participation in the Mediterranean.

But still the basic question was whether to fight or pay as a matter of long-running policy. Adams and Jefferson, as sincere and energetic as their efforts were, could not alone establish either: this was the prerogative of the Congress. But as Adams perceptively noted on July 31, 1786

> I perceive that neither force nor money will be applied. Our states are so backward that they will do nothing for some years. . . . A disposition seems rather to prevail among our citizens to give up all ideas of navigation and naval power, and lay themselves consequently at the mercy of foreigners . . .[34]

On at least one level the argument that Adams presented was academic: the lack of disposition to pay or fight may be traced to the poor financial status of the Confederation, or the perception of the Congress of the financial problems of the nation. Adams and Jefferson computed estimates of the cost of their respective opinions to treat or fight,[35] to little avail, for the Congress was not willing to fully fund either. In relation to the American captures, this is particularly curious. In light of John Adams' ability to borrow one million florins in Holland without the commission of Congress to issue bonds,[36] it is difficult to understand why the Congress would not allocate the necessary $56,000 to release the captives of Algiers.

Adams went to the center of the difficulties faced by the Continental government in a letter to Jefferson on June 6, 1786, and it is as informative for emotion as content

> We are fundamentally wrong. [in our argument as to means of meeting the piratical threat] The first thing to be done is for Congress to have a Revenue. Taxes [and] Duties must be laid on by Congress on the Assemblies and appropriated to the Payment of Interest. The moment this is done we may borrow a Sum adequate to meet all our necessities. If it is not done in my opinion you and I as well as every other Servent [sic] of the United States in Europe ought to go home, give up all points, and let our exports and imports be done in European bottoms. My indignation is raised beyond all reasonable patience to see the People of all the United States in a torpor, and see them a prey to every Robber, Pirate, and cheat in Europe.[37]

Adams' statement centers on the frustration felt by many Americans at the lack of a compelling ability or authority for the federal government. John Jay, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in a report to the Congress on a request by the Commissioners for additional funds to treat with Tripoli and Algiers, said ". . . your Secretary doubts the policy of it."[38] Jay said, going on to elaborate his pessimism:

> . . . the Federal Government, in its present state, is rather paternal and persuasive than coercive and efficient. Congress can make no certain dependence on the States for any specific sums to be required and paid in any given period . . .[39]

Jay had previously made his preference for war clear in his recommendations of 1785 to start a navy and arm merchant ships against pirates.[40] Not many months later, he modified his ideas: "If our government could draw forth the Resources of the Country, which notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary, are abundant, I should prefer War to Tribute . . ."[41]

These various opinions, and their progression, raise in regard to Jay's motivation some questions that become somewhat clearer in light of his response to a proposal by the Virginia delegates to the Congress on July 27th to 30th, 1787 to create a confederacy of nations to fight the Barbary States.

Close comparison of the Virginia proposal, brought forth by William Grayson (later to gain the reputation as a rabid anti-navy man) with an earlier draft by Jefferson, results in the inescapable conclusion that Jefferson slipped a copy of his proposal to Grayson.[42] A reasonable supposition, although unproven, would be that Jefferson's friend and Virginia political associate James Monroe provided the conduit.[43]

A probable basis for this indirect approach to the Congress was the disagreement between the Commissioners over the most effective means of regaining a Mediterranean trade. As Jefferson's administrative superior, Jay also seemed to be backing away from advocacy of force and as Jefferson's commission did not include the powers to establish military relationships with other nations, prudence seemed to be in order.

The proposal itself called for the Minister to France alone "to form a Confederacy with the Powers of Europe who are now at war with the piratical states . . . or may be disposed to go to war with them."[44] It further specified methods of quotas, command, cruising stations, and mutual guarantees against aggression. A motion was proposed and passed to refer the matter to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

Jay replied within the week, recalling his preference of "War to Tribute" but refraining from comment on the proposal's merits or economies, counseled for ". . . Congress to delay entering into the proposed, or indeed any other Engagements, until the Means of executing them appear to be clearly within their Reach."[45]

This argument, resting upon the distressed finances of the Confederation, caused the rejection of the plan by the Congress.[46] Jefferson, late in his life, accepted it as valid, and, generally, historians have embraced the idea.[47]

Clearly, if the United States lacked the ability to "draw forth the Resources of the Country," as Jay claimed in 1786 and again in 1788, then the United States lacked the ability in 1785, when Jay advocated the foundation of a navy. Jefferson had previously responded to just such an argument in a letter to Monroe: "There will never be any money in the treasury 'till the Confederacy shews [sic] it's teeth."[48] If coercive abilities were lacking in the Confederation, then also lacking was the will to utilize the means available.

Jay seemed to believe that the plight of the prisoners and the mounting insult and hostility of Europe would draw the nation towards a more powerful federal state.[49] On the occasion of the Algierian declaration of war in 1785, Jay noted that the war would ". . . tend to draw us more closely into a federal system."[50] Before the federal convention was in session, Jay declared that they would ". . . require the Aid of Calamity to render their Dictates effectual."[51]

George Washington's beliefs were much like Jay's but perhaps more militant. "In such an enlightened, in such a liberal age," Washington asked, is it possible that "the Great Maritime powers of Europe should submit to pay an annual tribute to the little piratical states of Barbary?"[52] He thought it "the highest disgrace on them to become tributary to such banditti, who might for half the sum that is paid to them be exterminated from the Earth."[53] Yet when the Marquis de Lafayette laid the plan for confederacy against the pirates before him Washington responded that it was "vain to talk about chastising the Algerians, . . .'til the wisdom and force of the Union can be more concentrated and better applied."[54]

An attempt to estimate the exact degree of influence such politically motivated opinions had on Barbary policy would be a highly subjective matter, but well within the bounds of reason is the supposition that Barbary policy was becoming politicized. General beliefs that were beginning to coalesce into specific political programs carried issues before them. During the process the power "to provide and maintain a navy" became politically connected to North African policy. Arguments for and against ratification of the Constitution well illustrate this issue.

Reviewing the debate of the Constitutional Convention reveals little discussion of naval power outside the general war power.[55] Supporters of the Constitution, who came to be called the Federalists, maintained that if the Constitution were ratified a navy would be one of the good results. The opposition to this conception of government, known interchangeably as anti-Federalists or Republicans, held either that a navy was a bad thing or that, if desirable, one could be provided by the Confederation.

These two positions, generally, took on a sectional character that did not perfectly mirror support for a navy. The particular economic conditions of the states in regard to debt and trade tended to define their attitudes towards naval aspirations.

South Carolina and Georgia possessed the less than 2% of America's white families that sold one fifth of America's exports and purchased one fifth of the imports. In direct exchange with the world, only the ports of Charleston and Savannah showed a favorable trade balance.[56] It comes as no surprise that vigorous support for a navy came from that area,[57]

The tobacco growing area between North Carolina and Maryland showed a different attitude. While tobacco accounted for one third of American exports,[58] it did not enter into the Mediterranean trade at all.[59] The prewar debt of the region to England, wiped out by the legislatures, was again a threat as a result of the possibility that

Federal courts would allow suits by foreign creditors. This area provided voracious support for the anti-Federalist naval position. At the Virginia Ratifying Convention in June of 1788, the same William Grayson who had introduced the Confederacy of Nations naval proposal in 1787, ridiculed the need for a navy by citing the Algerines as the chief foe to "fill the Chesapeake with mighty fleets . . ."[60]

Actually, although Grayson ridiculed the idea, it was not so far-fetched. On May 9, 1788 the Moroccan foreign secretary, still waiting for the $10,000 the treaty with America called for, sent a note to the consuls at Tangiers, saying that while Morocco was not presently at war with any nation, if war did occur:

> His imperial majesty will also send his frigates to America, provided with European pilots, and if they make any prizes, they shall be dealt with as above mentioned [burned with cargos, crews enslaved], as his majesty stands in no want of Worldly effects; and he trusts God will make him a conqueror.[61]

This same theme was played by Madison in the Federalist Papers, a collection generally regarded as nearly an "official" compilation of Federalist views during this tangled period. "The [naval] batteries most capable of repelling foreign enterprises on our safety," Madison said in No. 41, "are happily such as can never be turned by a perfidious government against our liberties," a sentiment identical to that of Jefferson in his letter of July 11, 1786 to Adams.

Madison goes on to observe that

> no part of the Union ought to feel more anxiety . . . than New York. . . . The Great emporium of [America's] commerce, the great reservoir of its wealth, lies every moment at the mercy of events, and may be regarded as a hostage for ignominious compliances with the dictates of a foreign enemy or even with the rapacious demands of pirates and barbarians.[62]

This appeal went to the citizens of the wheat belt that stretched from northern Maryland to the Hudson Valley, who exported wheat and flour, and to New England, whose economy developed by adversity to concentrate in the carrying trades.

But even within these sectional preferences, diversity flourished. Republican Melancthon Smith published a pamphlet in New York State meeting the Federalist argument that a Constitution was necessary to begin a navy. The Confederation could either fight or make a treaty, Smith said, it only required money, and he, for one, would be willing to allow reasonable powers to raise it.[63] At the Massachusetts Convention, an old soldier encouraged his Republican comrades to oppose Federalist designs, and spoke to the naval invasion argument, saying ". . . they can not starve us out; they can not bring their ships upon the land. . . ."[64]

This sectional, partisan approach to a navy was recognized by arch-Federalist Alexander Hamilton, writing as "Publius" in The Federalist, No. 11. "There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of America," Hamilton began, "has already excited uneasy sensations in several of the Maritime powers in Europe." Thus establishing a reason to have a navy, Hamilton went on to make his sectional pitch:

> It happens, indeed, that different portions of Confederated America possess each some peculiar advantage for this essential [naval] establishment . . . the difference in duration of the ships which the navy might be composed, if chiefly constructed of Southern wood, would be of signal importance, either in the view of naval strength or of national economy. . . . Some of the Southern and of the Middle states would yield a great plenty of iron. . . . Seamen must be chiefly drawn from the Northern hive.[65]

Later in the series, Hamilton made his position as clear as possible: "If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on our Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a Navy. To this purpose there must be dockyards and arsenals . . ."[66]

When the Constitution was ratified in 1789, navalists were rewarded with several provisions. Congress had the power "to provide and maintain a navy," to regulate such a force, and to have exclusive legislative powers over dock yards. The President was made commander-in-chief of the navy. The states were forbidden to own ships of war during time of peace.[67] These powers did nothing to help the diplomatic efforts of Adams and Jefferson. The combination of a lack of funds, the inability to compel an agreement by force, and the ever inflating demands of the piratical states frustrated efforts at diplomacy. The twenty-one prisoners at Algiers had been reduced to eleven by disease and overwork by 1788, when the Commissioners returned to America.[68] The Mediterranean trade had not been regained and the convolutions in Europe over the French Revolution made a trade restoration appear even more unlikely. American trade with Spain and Portugal was safe only as long as Portugal remained at war with Algiers.

PART ONE

NOTES

[1] Gardener Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs (New York: Houghton, Mifflin, 1905), p. 13 cites Stephen Blyth, History of the War Between the United States and Tripoli (Salem: 1806), p. 41-43.

[2] Ibid., p. 1.

[3] Louis Wright and Julia MacLeod, The First Americans in North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), pp. 1-15.

[4] And, literally, to keep his head. Stanley Lane-Poole, The Story of the Barbary Corsairs (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1890), p. 270.

[5] P. E. Skjöldebrand to D. Humphreys November 13, 1793, American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832-61), class I (Foreign Relations) vol. I, pp. 414-415. (Hereafter: ASPFR)

[6] Allen, Our Navy, pp. 10-11 cites Charles Prentiss, The Life of the Late General Eaton (Brookfield, Mass.:1813), pp. 92-93.

[7] Allen, Our Navy, p. 13.

[8] "Report on American Trade in the Mediterranean" December 28, 1790. Julian Boyd (ed.) The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950-),vol. 18, pp. 423-424.

[9] Committee of Secret Correspondence to Franklin, Lee, and Deane December, 1776. Francis Wharton (ed.), The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889), vol. 2, p. 230.

[10] "Report on American Trade in the Mediterranean," Boyd, Jefferson, vol. 18, p. 424.

[11] Stephen Higginson to John Adams August 8, 1785. Boyd, Jefferson, vol. 18, p. 371 cites the Adams Manuscripts of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.

[12] Allen, Our Navy, p. 15.

[13] Julia Macleod, "Jefferson and the Navy: A Defense," Huntington Library Quarterly, vol. VIII (February, 1945), p. 153.

[14] Boyd, Jefferson, vol. 8, p. 19.

[15] Ray W. Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers (New York: Russell and Russell, 1970, originally published by the University of North Carolina Press in 1939), p. 21.

[16] Adams to Jefferson, July 3, 1786, Boyd, Jefferson, vol. 10, p. 86.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Emphasis in the original, Samuel Flagg Bemus, American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1927), vol. 1, p. 266.

[19] Lane-Poole, Barbary Corsairs, p. 257.

[20] Richard O'Brien to Jefferson, September 25, 1787, Boyd, Jefferson, vol. 12, p. 182.

[21] Allen, Our Navy, p. 26.

[22] Jefferson to Adams, July 11, 1787, Boyd, Jefferson, vol. 12, pp. 123-124.

[23] Jefferson to Adams, September 19, 1785, Boyd, Jefferson, vol. 8, p. 526.

[24] Charles Lamb to Jefferson, May 20, 1786, Boyd, Jefferson, vol. 9, pp. 549-53.

[25] Lamb provided Adams and Jefferson with a chart of the cost of redemption on the Barbary coast, complete with a schedule of bribes to public officials. Ibid.

[26] Jefferson to Adams, May 11, 1786, Boyd, Jefferson, vol. 9, pp. 506-507.

[27] Jefferson to Madison, November 11, 1784, Boyd, Jefferson, vol. 7, pp. 511-512.

[28] Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, p. 11.

[29] Jefferson to Jay, September 26, 1786, ASPFR, vol. 1, p. 100.

[30] Jefferson to Jay, May 23, 1786, Boyd, Jefferson, vol. 9, pp. 567-569.

[31] Jefferson to Jay, May 4, 1788, Boyd, Jefferson, vol. 13, p. 134.

[32] Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939), vol. 1, pp. 6-9.

[33] Boyd, Jefferson, vol. 18, p. 425.

[34] Adams to Jefferson, July 31, 1786, Naval Documents, vol. 1, p. 12.

[35] Adams' estimate: June 6, 1786, Boyd, Jefferson, vol. 9, pp. 611-612; Jefferson's estimate, July 11, 1786, Naval Documents, vol. 10, pp. 123-124.

[36] Jefferson to Jay, March 16, 1788, Naval Documents, vol. 12, p. 672.

[37] Adams to Jefferson, June 6, 1786, Naval Documents, vol. 9, p. 612.

[38] Jay to Congress, May 29, 1786. Henry Johnson (ed.) The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay (New York: Burton Franklin, 1970, originally published in 1830), vol. 3, p. 198.

[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 198-199.

[40] W. C. Ford et al. (eds.) Journals of the Continental Congress 1784-1789 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904-1937), vol. 29, pp. 842-844.

[41] John Jay to Jefferson, December 14, 1786 (emphasis added) Boyd, *Jefferson*, vol. 10, p. 599.

[42] Ford, *Journals of the Continental Congress*, vol. 33, pp. 419-420 provides the Grayson text and A. A. Lipscomb (ed.) *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, "The Memorial Edition" (Washington: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903-04) provides the earlier Jefferson draft in the "Anas," vol. 1, pp. 96-99.

[43] Jefferson to Monroe, November 11, 1784, Boyd, *Jefferson*, vol. 7, pp. 508-513.

[44] Ford, *Journals of the Continental Congress*, vol. 33, pp. 419-420.

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 451-452.

[46] Congress did authorize funds to ransom the prisoners, with the proviso that no more be paid than the European states usually paid. Those funds were not made available by the treasury by 1790. See Jefferson to Jay, August 27, 1789, Boyd, *Jefferson*, vol. 15, pp. 110-113.

[47] Marshall Smelser, *Congress Founds the Navy, 1787-1797* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 41; Irwin, *Diplomatic Relations*, pp. 47-50; Allen, *Our Navy*, pp. 39-41, and Bemus, *Secretaries and their Diplomacy*, vol. 2, p. 89.

[48] August 11, 1786, Boyd, *Jefferson*, vol. 10, p. 225.

[49] Bemus, *Secretaries and their Diplomacy*, vol. 1, p. 269.

[50] Jay to Adams, October 14, 1785, Johnson, *Jay Papers*, vol. 3, p. 173.

[51] Jay to Jefferson, April 24, 1787, Boyd, *Jefferson*, vol. 11, pp. 312-314.

[52] Washington to Lafayette, August 15, 1786, J. C. Fitzpatrick (ed.), *The Writings of George Washington* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931-1944), vol. 28, p. 521.

[53] Washington to Lafayette, March 25, 1787, Fitzpatrick, *Writings*, vol. 29, p. 185.

[54] *Ibid.*

[55] Smelser, Congress Founds the Navy, p. 6.

[56] Forrest McDonald, The Presidency of George Washington (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1974), pp. 11-12.

[57] Smelser, Congress Founds the Navy, p. 14.

[58] McDonald, George Washington, p. 12.

[59] "Editorial Note," Boyd, Jefferson, vol. 18, p. 371.

[60] Smelser, Congress Founds the Navy, p. 8 cites Jonathan Elliot (ed.), The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Washington: 1845) vol. 3, p. 277.

[61] Naval Documents, vol. 1, p. 18. As late as 1817, pirates from Tunis took Hanse ships in the North Sea. Allen, Our Navy, p. 12.

[62] Clinton Rossiter (ed.), The Federalist Papers (New York: New American Library, 1961), p. 261.

[63] Smelser, Congress Founds the Navy, p. 9 cites "An Address to the People of the State of New York" (April, 1788) in Paul L. Ford (ed.) Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States, Published during its Discussion by the People (Brooklyn, 1888), pp. 112-113.

[64] Ibid., p. 8 cites Elliot, Debates, vol. 2, p. 80.

[65] Rossiter, Federalist Papers, no. 89.

[66] Ibid., no. 24, p. 162.

[67] U.S. Const. art. I, secs. 8 and 10, art. II, sec. 2.

[68] Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, p. 54.

PART TWO

THE NAVY

The selection of George Washington as the United States' first President was as closely foreordained as an electoral process may allow. The General's immense prestige made the election practically a consensus. John Adams, elected Vice President, would chair the Senate. Col. Alexander Hamilton, Washington's wartime aide de camp, was selected to head the Treasury Department, Henry Knox was appointed Secretary of War, and Edmund Randolph was appointed Attorney General. Thomas Jefferson, sincerely desiring retirement at Monticello,[69] finally succumbed to the blandishments of Washington and became the Secretary of State ". . . it is not for an individual to chuse [sic] his past." He wrote to Washington on December 15, 1789, "You are to marshall us as best may be for the public good."[70]

Washington was rightly pleased with this galaxy of talent. "I feel myself supported by able coadjutors." he noted, going on to add prematurely that the cabinet members "harmonize extremely well together."[71]

As the new government established itself, the rhetoric of the constitutional debate concerning the dangers of Barbary policy receded before other pressing issues. Washington's message to the Congress of December 8, 1790, indicated the reduced importance of Mediterranean trade by the award of thirty lines to Indian affairs as compared to six for the Mediterranean problems.[72] But that paragraph did ask Congress to deliberate on the question.[73]

Thomas Jefferson held the immediate responsibility for Barbary affairs, which remained static throughout the first year of the administration. The first matter of official business Jefferson discussed with the President was the situation of "the unfortunate Christians in captivity among the Barbarians."[74] Unfortunately, the human proclivity to take advantage of others had also led to a widespread confidence game: the families of missing sailors were being bilked by swindlers who reported the seamen captured by the pirates, and represented themselves as agents collecting the "ransom."[75]

Private schemes for the redemption of the prisoners had multiplied until they threatened the continuing official efforts. Jefferson discouraged such attempts as best he could, explaining, ". . . the more all voluntary interpositions are discouraged, the better for our unhappy friends."[76]

Jefferson's passive role did not extend to the domestic sector: Washington's December 8th, 1790, Message to Congress presented another opportunity to present his opinion to the nation and the Congress. James Madison, on December 11th delivered a request by the House to the Secretary of State to report on the Mediterranean problem. Jefferson replied on December 28th with a package of documents: "A Proposal to Use Force against the Barbary States, A Report on American Trade in the Mediterranean, A Report on American Captives in Algiers" and several documentary enclosures.[77]

"The Proposal to Use Force . . . ," the major statement of the package, represents Jefferson's plan for a naval confederacy against the Barbary powers. Senator William Maclay, in one of the few congressional comments on the proposal, noted, quite correctly, in his Journal that Jefferson's message ". . . seemed to breathe resentment and abounded with martial estimates in a naval way."[78]

The Federalists, during the debate on the Constitution, had pleaded the presumed impotence of the Confederation to create or fund a navy as a reason to ratify the new government; now they were confronted with Jefferson's recommendation to use force. The positions that the Hamiltonians had taken on the Algerine piracy issue, theretofore identical to Jefferson's ideas, were to be promptly forgotten when the powers of the new government came to be wielded.

On February 1st, 1791, the Senate resolved that the President should proceed to take measures to ransom the captives in Algiers. On February 22nd, Washington informed the Senate that, the Emperor of Morocco having died, a new treaty would be necessary. The Senate resolved that the prisoners should be redeemed, at a cost not to exceed $40,000.[79]

But the House, in heavy debate March 1st through 3rd, declined to fund ransoming or navy building, instead appropriating $20,000 for the renewal of the Moroccan treaty. Any other projects would have to wait until "the situation of the Treasury shall more clearly authorize appropriations for this purpose."[80]

This decision has been attributed to the members' revulsion at the staggering appropriations made during the session, which was besieged by "a cloud of claimants."[81] That declaration treats the problems of tax and tariff that were to underlie the future financial system of the country overly lightly but it may be inferred that the members continued to think the nation's finances precarious. Without vigorous follow-up support by the President, Jefferson's leadership in advocating force again failed. When the option was to arise again events, not men, would provide the spur to action.

The conflict between Britain and France in Europe carried over to North American affairs, threatening war with England, then war with France. The issues formed around respect for American neutrality and neutral wartime rights.

On April 20, 1792, France declared war on Austria and Prussia, opening the War of the First Coalition for a five-year run. France, assuming that America would honor the treaty of 1778, sent Citizen Gênet to the United States to cement the alliance.

At the bottom of the Hamiltonian financial system of planned reduction of debt was the federal revenue, based largely upon import duties. By habit or preference, American imports came mostly from England, although France went so far as to put American goods on the same footing as those of her own citizens in February 1793.[82] Superimposed upon the conflict between England and France were the political and emotional identifications of the factions that were to form political parties.

The Federalists felt that to support France would be to go to war with England, and thereby destroy the Federal government by ending its source of revenue. Jefferson and the Republicans saw the First Coalition as the means by which democratic republicanism would be crushed in France, then in America, by the forces of autocracy.

Fisher Ames, an arch-Hamiltonian Federalist from Massachusetts, provides an unknowing commentary over the emotionalism of the issues.

> France has stopped more than a hundred sail of our vessels at Bordeaux. We sit still; we say nothing; we effect to depend on their justice; we make excuses. England stops our vessels with a provoking insolence; we are in a rage. This marked discrimination is not merited by the French. They may rob us; they may, as it is probable they will, cut off Tom Paine's head, vote out the Trinity, kill their priests, rob the merchants and burn their Bibles; we stand ready to approve all they do, and to approve more than they can do. This French mania is the bain of our politics, the moral poison that makes our peace so sickly.[83]

One need only consult the Republican press of B. F. Bache's General Advertiser (later Aurora) or Phillip Freneau's (National Gazette, et al.) for the period to get an equally damning indictment of England.

British spoliation of American neutral commerce and British insistence on non-reciprocal agreements regarding trade enraged public opinion. But British diplomacy created another threat to British-American relations. England, perhaps in order to gain another ally against France, arranged a truce between Portugal and Algiers, ending the blockade at Gibralter. The effect was immediate.

Edward Church, American Consul at Lisbon, Portugal wrote the Secretary of State on October 12, 1793 that

> The conduct of the British in this business leaves no room to doubt or mistake their object, which was evidently aimed at us, and proves that their envy, jealousy, and hatred will never be appeased, and that they will leave nothing unattempted to effect our ruin. As further confirmation, it is worthy of remark, that the same British agent [Charles Logie, consul at Algiers] obtained a truce at the same time between the states of Holland and the Dey, for six months, whereby we and the Hanse towns are now left the only prey to those barbarians.[84]

Although Consul Church sent a circular warning to American citizens in all the ports of Portugal on October 13th, 1793,[85] the pirates took a dozen American ships and in excess of one hundred more American captives during October and November.[86]

Jefferson finally gave in to his urge for retirement, formally resigning on December 31, 1793. As Jefferson wrote to his successor, Edmund Randolph, at the State Department, "No circumstance . . . will ever tempt me to engage in anything public . . ."[87] While this statement became less than true in 1796, Jefferson's resignation left James Madison as titular leader of the Republicans in the government.

Madison met the further piratical depredations head on by associating them directly with other grievances against Britain. The best way to meet the pirates' threat, Madison felt, was to retaliate against the nation that had unleashed the pirates.[88] Temporarily, at least, the ongoing American diplomatic attempt to reach a settlement with Algiers ended, when the Dey of Algiers, presumably overcome by joy at the financial prospects of more easy captures, refused to negotiate further.[89] Madison's "Commercial Propositions" were intended to subject England to the same trade regulations that England imposed on neutral American shipping in the continental trade, and to act as a punitive measure to discourage perceived English support of the pirates.

The Federalist forces, cut off from diplomatic settlement possibilities with Algiers and reluctant of the expense, proposed a naval bill that separated the policies towards Barbary and England; policies that had been connected by the "Commercial Propositions." The Federalists seemed to operate on what may be called the "Theory of Certain Loss": America was certain to lose money in case of further political attack,[90] and was certain to lose still further if the large trade with England was interrupted but naval expenditures were not a certain loss.

A synopsis of the House debate on this measure has been preserved in the Annals of Congress. The Senate, meeting in secret session, left few records. The bill's vocal supporters in the House were largely Federalists and Northerners, while the opposition was Republican, three (Madison, Nicholas, Giles) out of four (John Smilie of Pennsylvania) from Virginia. Both sides realized that while the procuring of the proposed ships was directed towards Algiers, the passage of the bill might lead to the permanent establishment of a navy. This may help explain the partial reversal of positions in debate: the Republicans appealing to Federalist fence-sitters by citing the national debt, for example, or Federalist Benjamin Goodhoe of Massachusetts observing that "He had no doubt that the Algerines were let loose [by England] on American commerce to prevent supplies going to France . . ."[91]

William Giles [Republican: Virginia] spoke to the "Certain Loss Theory" at the height of debate:

> [a] . . . objection to the measure consists of the certainty and enormity of the expense, with a total uncertainty of its efficacy; whereas the plan of purchasing a peace regards economy, if its efficacy should be doubted. In this case, if the object be not effected, the money will not be expended.[92]

Giles went on to appeal to Federalist and Republican theory. He viewed

> The establishment of a navy as a complete dereliction of the policy of discharging the principal of the public debt. History does not afford an instance of a nation which continued to increase their navy and decreased their debt at the same time. . . . A navy is the most expensive of all means of defense, and the tyranny of government consists in the expensiveness of their machinery.[93]

William Smith [Federalist, South Carolina] then rose to counter Giles' arguments

> If it were the design of the House to incur a vast expense in the establishment of a navy, merely for idle purposes of vain parade, there would be force in some of the objections. . . . The question

> was simply whether our commerce required protection against the Algerine corsairs, and whether this was the best mode of protection. . . . [Giles] would consider the proposed substitutes for a naval armament . . . (1) to purchase peace of the Algerines (2) to depend on Portugal breaking her truce with Algiers (3) to pass commercial regulations against Great Britain (4) to subsidize other nations to protect our commerce. To these several substitutions, [Smith] might, in a few words, object that the first was impractical, the second, precarious, the third inoperative and the fourth, dishonorable.[94]

Mr. Giles replied to Mr. Smith

> . . . The gentleman calls upon our humanity to ameliorate the conditions of the captives, by a declaration of war against a barbarian . . . or perhaps the gentleman conceives that, after the frigates have performed wonders upon the water, they would leave the element, boldly march upon the land, and break the chains of the prisoners.[95]

The Naval Act of 1794[96] carried, 50 yeas to 39 nays, with a Republican-inspired proviso that naval construction must cease if peace with Algiers was attained. The Naval Act passed not by a Federalist majority over a Republican minority, nor by a Northern-Southern split but by an urban-coastal coalition over the representatives of rural, inland areas.[97] Simply stated, those congressmen who represented areas with maritime interests supported the measure, those whose inland constituents had little or no concern with the economics of trade voted against the bill.

The Naval Act of 1794 authorized construction of four ships of 44 guns and two ships of 36 guns and the hiring of 2,060 sailors to man them. Construction went forward at six separate sites, dispersed to share the benefits of the construction fairly.[98] The modesty of this enterprise is realized when it is recalled that the Royal British Navy possessed about 115 ships of the line, France 76, Spain 56, and Holland, 49. The United States was constructing a navy slightly larger than that of the Kingdom of Naples (4) and at parity with that of Portugal.[99]

George Washington, under Congressional direction, continued to attempt to reach settlements with Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. He appealed to Congress on March 2, 1795 to fund positions for three separate consuls on the North African coast, "[for] the more successful conduct of our affairs on the coast of Barbary."[100] This the Congress approved. The results of this act were rapid. Peace with Algiers was obtained in September 1795 by diplomatic means. The cost would amount to about $763,000 plus $10,000 a year as a "present" and $20,000 upon the appointment of a new consul.[101] The Congress approved the treaty on February 29, 1796, with provision for payment by the issue of $800,000 in 6 percent Bank of the United States bonds. These bonds were sold by Baring Company of London for sterling. As of January 4, 1797, $240,000 remained unsold; the general European war having soaked up specie to the general detriment of all bond issues.[102] While the American prisoners were finally released in June of 1796, the slow sale of bonds and accompanying slowness of payment were to create future problems. European states were already outraged because this lavish overpayment threatened to upset established methods of dealing with the Barbary States.[103]

Treaties were concluded with Tripoli (1796) and Tunis (1797) through the interposition, by threat, of Algiers. The costs were, respectively, $56,486 and $107,000. The Senate ratified the treaty with Tripoli on June 10, 1797 and the treaty with Tunis on March 6, 1798.[104]

The most immediate effects of the treaty with Algiers were the stoppage of naval construction and an increase in Mediterranean trade. Washington, on March 15, 1796, recalled to both houses of Congress that "if a peace shall take place between the United States and Algiers," section nine of the Naval Act of 1794 required "that no further proceedings be had under [the] Act."[105] Actual construction on three of the vessels continued because contracts were already in force, but when they were to expire with the ships still uncompleted, they would not be renewed.

American trade in the Mediterranean multiplied fivefold between 1797 and 1799. The American Consul at Gibralter, James Simpson, reported that twelve or fourteen American merchant ships were to enter the Mediterranean in May, 1797.[106] Eighty U.S. vessels were to enter the Mediterranean during the spring of 1799.[107]

Between 1797 and 1801, the Barbary Coast remained quiet, at a cost of some $926,000. Domestic political conflict settled into other areas as the relationships between the United States, Britain, and France evolved. George Washington refused to serve a third term as President, which brought Thomas Jefferson out of retirement to stand as the Republican candidate. The Federalist forces split: Hamilton, because of the notorious Reynolds affair, could not run himself, so his supporters engaged in a scheme to throw the election to the Federalist Vice Presidential candidate, Thomas Pinckney of South Carolina.[108] John Adams, the nominal Federalist Presidential candidate, supported by the moderate wing of his faction, won the election by a narrow three vote margin over Thomas Jefferson, who became Vice President.

The Adams administration "was born to trouble,"[109] much of which was not of his making. John Jay had gone to England in 1794 to negotiate a variety of diplomatic matters, the most important of which were British impressment of American sailors and treatment of American neutral rights.

Jay's agreement eased the tense relationship between England and the United States in particular cases, but Jay's failure to obtain general recognition of American neutral rights caused the ideologically anti-English Republicans to believe that the Federalists had purposely given those rights to England in exchange for a special relationship. Jay was hanged in effigy by some of the more enterprising Republicans, and his treaty passed the Senate by the barest two-thirds majority, twenty to ten, in 1795. Protests against the treaty were too late to affect the Senate vote, but certainly damaged the Adams candidacy in 1796.

Jay's treaty enraged the French, who felt it violated the Franco-American treaty of 1778 and specifically damaged their interests. The French Minister to America, Adet, campaigned openly for the election of Jefferson in 1796. When the British withdrew from the West Indies to meet pressing naval needs elsewhere, the French promptly filled the void. The French, on March 2, 1797, issued a decree which authorized the seizure of neutral vessels laden in whole or in part with enemy property.[110]

Secretary of State Pickering reported in June that 316 American vessels had been taken by the French since July, 1796.[111] As the undeclared "Quasi War" with France broke out in the West Indies, the Federalists moved into the position of favoring war.

Where were the frigates now? Three were to be completed during 1797: Washington's "Farewell Address" of December 7, 1796 had flatly stated from experience that

> The most sincere Neutrality is not a sufficient guard against the depredations of nations at war. To secure respect to a neutral

> flag, requires a naval force, organized and ready to vindicate it, from insult or aggression.[112]

William Smith of South Carolina, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, persuaded the House to appropriate the money necessary to complete the United States (44), the Constitution (44) and the Constellation (36) during the winter of 1796-97.[113]

Feelings between Federalists and Republicans over the French actions ran high, it is fair to say. The breach that Jay's Treaty had caused in the Congress had not healed, and the Federalists were now possessed by war fever. "When we [the Senate] get upon [the subject of] Vessels of War for the protection of our commerce," Vice President Jefferson wrote to Madison, "I fear they [the Federalists] will give [have] their way."[114]

Jefferson was not indifferent to the "atrocious depredations . . . committed on our commerce" by the French but did not feel that war was the best redress for America's grievances.[115]

By a series of acts during the years of 1797 to 1799 the Congress, under Federalist leadership, brought the strength of the navy up to thirty vessels, exclusive of revenue cutters and galleys, by completing the vessels of the Naval Act of 1794, constructing new frigates, and purchasing other, smaller vessels.[116] The great popular reaction to the "XYZ affair" of 1798 ended the Republican ability to block or amend the later legislation. The new American Navy requited itself well in single ship combat with the French in the West Indies.

President Adams' Address to the Congress of November 22nd, 1800 contained the recommendation for "reasonable and systematic arrangements" for the navy, with the unstated admission that the naval war with France of the past several years was winding down. The Congress seized the idea in the interest of economy and produced the Naval Peace Establishment Act of 1801.

The testimony of Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert on January 12, 1801 had called for reduction of the fleet to thirteen frigates, the rest to be sold for reasons of insufficient size or quality for purposes of a permanent national defense.[117] After the ratification of a new treaty with France, these recommendations were passed by substantial majorities in both houses. The signature of President Adams made the Act law on March 3, 1801, the day before he left office.[118]

Conditions on the North African coast were becoming again unsettled during this winter of 1800-1801. Harassment of the growing American trade, though short of the rough treatment of 1793, caused the American consuls on the coast to advocate a more vigorous policy. James Cathcart at Algiers expressed a conviction that war alone would make the United States respected in Algiers.[119] When Consul William Eaton at Tunis expressed a similar conviction to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, Pickering replied that the Adams administration thought it unwise to employ naval vessels in the Mediterranean until a peace with France was on a firm foundation. In that event, Pickering wrote to Eaton in January, 1800, the United States would send a naval squadron "sufficient to destroy the corsairs of any one, or of all of the regencies together."[120]

Later that year, the last Secretary of State of the Adams administration, John Marshall, turned down a proposal by Denmark and Sweden to join an armed confederacy against the corsairs. In a letter to John Q. Adams, Marshall cited the obligations imposed by the existent treaties, however burdensome, and the hazard of stationing naval units in the Mediterranean while hostilities with France continued as his principal reasons for the decision.[121]

Another reason could be the earlier formation by Sweden and Denmark of the League of Armed Neutrality to extract trade concessions from both belligerents in the general war. Concern for ongoing negotiations with France could have precluded participation in such a confederacy for fear that association with such a league would weaken the American bargaining position as an independent neutral desiring only equal rights.

PART TWO

NOTES

[69] Jefferson expressed this desire at every turn. See Jefferson to Madison, August 2, 1789, Boyd, Jefferson, vol. 15, p. 369.

[70] Jefferson to Washington, December 15, 1789, Boyd, Jefferson, vol. 16, p. 35.

[71] Washington to Lafayette, June 3, 1790, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, vol. 31, p. 46.

[72] President to Congress, December 8, 1790. Annals of the Congress of the United States: The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (Washington, Gales and Seaton, 1834-56), vol. 2, p. 1730.

[73] It appears that this paragraph was inspired not by Jefferson but by Alexander Hamilton. Compare Jefferson's "Draft of Items for the President's Message to Congress," Boyd, Jefferson, vol. 18, pp. 98-100 with Hamilton's "Notes for Consideration by the President," Harold Syrett, et al. (eds.) The Papers of Alexander Hamilton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961-),vol. 7, p. 173.

[74] J. C. Fitzpatrick (ed.) The Diaries of George Washington (New York: Houghton, Mifflin, 1925), vol. 4, p. 106.

[75] For an account in the [New York] Daily Advertiser of June 24, 1790 of a sailor calling himself Archibald Ross, see Boyd, Jefferson, vol. 16, pp. 562-564.

[76] Jefferson to William Short, April 25, 1791, Jefferson, vol. 18, p. 125.

[77] Ibid., pp. 416-444.

[78] E. S. Maclay (ed.), The Journal of William Maclay, United States Senator from Pennsylvania, 1789-1791 (New York: A. C. Boni, 1927), p. 364.

[79] Washington to Senate, February 22, 1791, ASPFR, vol. 1, p. 128.

[80] Annals of Congress, vol. 2, pp. 1774-75; 1781.

[81] Smelser, Congress Founds the Navy, p. 41, 43.

[82] McDonald, George Washington, p. 119.

[83] Ames to Christopher Gore, March 26, 1794, Seth Ames (ed.) The Works of Fisher Ames (New York: Dacappo Press, 1969 originally published in Boston in 1854), vol. 1, p. 139.

[84] Edward Church to Jefferson, October 12, 1793, ASPFR, vol. 1, p. 133.

[85] "Circular to Citizens of the United States," Naval Documents, vol. 1, p. 50.

[86] Allen, Our Navy, p. 16.

[87] Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, September 7, 1794, Paul L. Ford (ed.) The Writings of Thomas Jefferson "The Federal Edition" (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1904-05), vol. 6, p. 512.

[88] Gilbert L. Lycan, Alexander Hamilton and American Foreign Policy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), pp. 208-210 and Smelser, Congress Founds the Navy, p. 66.

[89] M. Skjöldebrand to Humphreys, November 13, 1793, ASPFR, vol. 1, p. 414.

[90] Marine insurance rates on American shipping leaped from ten to thirty per cent. Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, p. 60.

[91] Annals of Congress (February 7, 1794), vol. 4, p. 441.

[92] Ibid, (March 10, 1794), p. 489.

[93] Ibid, p. 490.

[94] Ibid., p. 492.

[95] Ibid., p. 497.

[96] C. O. Paullin, History of Naval Administration 1775-1911 (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1968), p. 92 cites George Sharswood (ed.), The Public and General Statues Passed by the Congress of the United States from 1789 to 1836 (Philadelphia: 1837-40), vol. I, pp. 350-351.

[97] Smelser, Congress Founds the Navy, p. 49.

[98] Boston, New York City, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Portsmouth, [N.H.] and Baltimore were selected. Paullin's History, pp. 94-95.

[99] McDonald, George Washington, pp. 135-136.

[100] Washington to Congress, March 2, 1795, ASPFR, vol. 1, p. 470.

[101] Ibid., p. 528.

[102] Ibid., p. 555.

[103] Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, p. 80.

[104] Wright and Macleod, First Americans, pp. 26-27.

[105] Washington to Congress, March 15, 1796, Fitzpatrick, Washington's Writings, vol. 34, p. 500.

[106] Simpson to Secretary of State, May 14, 1797, Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, p. 101 cites the Archives of the Department of State, "Dispatches, Gibraltar" vol. 2.

[107] Allen, Our Navy, p. 80.

[108] Ralph A. Brown, The Presidency of John Adams (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1976), pp. 1-2; 15-18.

[109] Lycan, Hamilton and Foreign Policy, p. 299.

[110] S. F. Bemus, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1942), pp. 111-114.

[111] T. A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1974), p. 93.

[112] Fitzpatrick, Washington's Writings, vol. 35, p. 314.

[113] Brown, John Adams, p. 72.

[114] Jefferson to Madison, April 12, 1798, Smelser, Congress Founds the Navy, p. 149 cites the Jefferson Collection, Library of Congress.

[115] Lipscomb, Writings of Jefferson, vol. 10, pp. 78-79.

[116] Macleod, "Jefferson and the Navy," p. 160.

[117] Paullin's History, p. 118.

[118] Macleod, "Jefferson and the Navy," pp. 163-164.

[119] October 21, 1800. Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, p. 102 cites the correspondence of James Cathcart, New York Public Library.

[120] *Ibid.*, p. 103 cites the Timothy Pickering Collection, Library of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.

[121] John Marshall to John Q. Adams, September 6, 1800. Bemus, Secretaries and their Diplomacy, vol. 1, pp. 280-281.

PART THREE

VIGOROUS POLICY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The election of 1800 surpassed even the election of 1796 for depth of subterranean political plotting. John Adams, in a letter to his youngest son, Thomas, summed up his feelings about the election: "My little bark has been oversett [sic] in a squall of thunder and lightening and hail attended with a strong smell of sulphur . . ."[122]

Jefferson, in a letter to Madison, thought that such an election was appropriate to an era characterized by "maniac proceedings."[123]

Once again, Alexander Hamilton had directed his followers to support Pinckney over Adams. The Federalists had already demonstrated their lack of touch with the people by the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts, in a heat of nationalistic fervor. Adams continued negotiations with France were unpopular, as were the dismissals of Pickering and McHenry from the cabinet.[124] The Republican candidates, Jefferson for President and Aaron Burr for Vice President, were both popular with the people and in possession of the most potent party electoral organizations yet seen in America.

Hamilton, with unparalleled indiscretion, prepared a personal attack on Adams to be distributed to leading Federalists. It fell into hostile hands and was rushed into print by Burr and his New York associates. Hamilton's description of Adams as ". . . a man of imagination sublimated and excentric; propitious neither to the regular display of sound judgement nor to steady perseverance . . ."[125] further divided the Federalist party and injured the Adams candidacy.

A number of disgruntled Federalists, fearing Jefferson, threw their electoral votes to Burr when it became clear that the Federalist candidates were going to lose. The result was a tie between Jefferson and Burr, throwing the election into the lame duck, Federalist dominated House of Representatives.

There exists a lack of consensus among historians over Hamilton's role in influencing the outcome of this election: Nathan Schachner feels that Hamilton wanted a "deal" with Jefferson on defense measures, Ralph Brown believes that Hamilton actively opposed throwing the election to Burr, and Adrienne Koch states that Jefferson "repudiated with vigor every suggestion of a political deal."[126]

It is easy to understand how, in the midst of these tangled theories of the election of 1800, the Naval Peace Establishment Act of 1801 might be overlooked. It is unfair then, as Jefferson's critics have charged, to blame Jefferson alone for selling off the navy, where there was clear Congressional direction to do so.[127]

When Thomas Jefferson became President in March 1801, he received word that Tripoli had repudiated the treaty of 1796 and demanded $250,000 for a new settlement. Tunis followed suit in May, having signalized its intent by chopping down the flag pole at the American Consulate. Consul Cathcart later described the conversation he held with the son of the ruling bashaw upon the occasion. "It is a difficult thing to get a flag staff put up once it comes down," said the Bashaw's son. "When the American flag comes down, it will take a great deal of green [money] to get it up again."[128]

Jefferson, following the practice of both Washington and Adams, placed written questions before his cabinet. On May 15, 1801, he posed two questions for immediate discussion and later written responses: "Shall the squadron now at Norfolk be ordered to cruise in the Mediterranean?" and "What shall be the object of that cruise?"[129]

Jefferson's cabinet was divided over the specific object of such a venture but united in support of the policy. Levi Lincoln, Attorney General, felt that U.S. vessels should only defend shipping against attack. Albert Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, did not quibble: "To declare war and make war are synonomous. The executive can not put us in a state of war, but if we put into that state either by decree of congress or of the other nation, the command and direction of the public force then belongs to the executive."

Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith felt that "If a nation commences war, the executive is bound to apply the public force to defend the nation." Secretary of War Henry Dearborne believed that the expedition should ". . . go forth openly to protect our commerce . . ." Secretary of State James Madison thought that "the cruise . . . be undertaken and the object openly declared to every nation."[130]

A four-ship squadron under the command of Commodore Richard Dale set sail for the Mediterranean from Norfolk on June 1, 1801. The reduction of the naval establishment went forward simultaneously. It had been Jefferson's contention since 1784 that only a small fleet would be necessary to subdue the pirates, which let him go forward with the reduction of the fleet for the financial savings which he and Albert Gallatin thought would result. By laying up seven frigates in what modern parlance would call "mothballs," leaving only six on active duty, the expenses of the fleet would be reduced to about $500,000 annually.[131] Jefferson wrote his nephew, Thomas Randolph, that while Congress required that six frigates remain armed that ". . . three of them would have been quite enough."[132]

This naval reduction program was just a part of Jefferson's conception of a limited federal government. Dumas Malone describes that program of government economy, reduction of taxes, and payment of the national debt as based not merely on the expectation that peace could be maintained, but was "inseparable from his concept. . . ."[133] Naval expenditures fell to $915,000 in 1802, benefiting from the sale of naval vessels, about one half the level of funding the Federalists passed for 1801.[134] Naval expenditures never again fell so low, for peace, that essential factor for the forwarding of Jefferson's conception, eluded him in the Mediterranean. The Dale squadron's arrival in the Mediterranean coincided with further hostile acts by Tripoli and Tunis towards American vessels, and conflict ensued.

Jefferson was exceedingly careful in his first message to Congress of December 8, 1801, to remark that, under the Constitution, actions beyond those that he had taken for the defense of American vessels would require the consent of the Congress. Alexander Hamilton, writing in the New York Evening Post as "Lucius Crassus," was furious over Jefferson's disavowal of executive prerogative. "The enigma is now solved, and we are presented with one of the most singular paradoxes ever advanced by a man claiming to be a statesman," Hamilton wrote, ". . . it amounts to nothing less than this, that between two nations there may exist a state of complete war on one side--of peace on the other!"[135]

But the chief obstacle would be the Congress. In response to Jefferson's message, the Congress, after extensive debate, passed the Act for the Protection of American Seamen and Commerce of February 6, 1802, which specifically set out the defensive character of the naval force in the Mediterranean.[136] Not until 1804 did the Congress make provision for the conduct of the war. The USS Philadelphia (44), commanded by Captain William Bainbridge, engaged in the blockade of Tripoli, ran aground, with the capture of three hundred American seamen. Public opinion was shocked in Spring, 1804; Congress authorized more vessels and established a special "Mediterranean" fund to prosecute the war.[137] This fund was raised by a two and one half percent advalorem duty.

Of the actual movement of ships and strategy of battle, little need be said, for a number of excellent accounts exist.[138] Still, as in 1784, the cycle of dispatch and reply of orders to the Mediterranean took about six months, rendering tactical control to the naval commanders on duty in the Mediterranean. Four squadrons were sent successively to the Mediterranean, each slightly larger than the one before. The Dale squadron served from June 1801 until Spring of 1802, when relieved by Commodore Richard Morris and his squadron. Morris was relieved by another squadron commanded by Captain Edward Preble during the summer of 1803. Finally, during the summer of 1804, Preble was relieved by Commodore Samuel Barron, with the largest fleet yet.

The commanders' services are difficult to evaluate. The activities of these four squadrons were quite in keeping with the naval philosophy of the day. These ships escorted merchant vessels, sought out the privateers for battle, and blockaded the ports of the warring nations.

Although the American Navy quickly built up a reputation in the Mediterranean for bravery and initiative, the treaties concluded with Tunis and Tripoli, in 1807 and 1805, respectively, still cost the United States $70,000.[139] The asset of the presence of a fleet, it seems, was not well utilized by American civilian negotiators.

Treaties that were signed were not observed: Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis would again break their treaties in 1810, 1812 and 1815. But by late 1807, the Napoleonic wars of Europe created an exceedingly poor climate for armed neutrals of any kind, and the American vessels were withdrawn. The final chapter would not be complete until after the War of 1812, when two American squadrons returned to the Mediterranean and obtained treaties with Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis by the kind of diplomacy the pirates understood: destruction of ports and the capture or sinking of hostile vessels. The Barbary Coast sank thereafter into richly deserved obscurity.

But the United States had not simply chosen from among the available options this most effective method and applied it. A tremendous distance separates the Continental Congress, sending a Commission, hat in hand, to seek European protection for the infant American trade from the activities of Dale, Morris, Preble and Barron. A far shorter span separates the later gentlemen from the final gasp of Barbary piracy. When England and France refused to protect American trade, more pressure was applied to America to actually be independent, and to seek a solution to the Barbary problem that uniquely suited American resources and character.

Throughout the period of 1785 to 1807, sincere American efforts were made continually to reach diplomatic agreements with the Barbary States:

their yield was poor in the face of cost and national dishonor, but the growth of American trade to the Mediterranean was to provide the raison d'etre for the despatch of the Dale squadron in Summer, 1801. The payment to Algiers of annual tribute was a grave error in judgement by Congress, made across partisan lines over the issue of economy. When the sum of $1,000,000, paid to Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis, is compared to the average cost of $305,420 for each of the first three frigates completed[140] in 1797, the "efficacy" of such arrangements appears diminished.

No single individual invested more ink and paper in the idea of a naval confederacy than Thomas Jefferson. He brought the idea up in 1784-5 with Adams, Jay, Lafayette and others: he arranged, it appears, for the introduction of the Virginia Resolution in 1787: and he presented the plan on a third occasion as Secretary of State in 1791.

When the option again presented itself to Adams' Secretary of State, John Marshall, the time was still wrong, but for different reasons. The previous failures could be attributed to the financial state of the Union, or to perceptions about that state. The fourth occasion failed because it threatened to interfere with more important negotiations. Adams was not indisposed towards using force on the pirates, simply the lawful treaties and the strategic situation with France would not permit it. His administration provided the naval tool that the Republicans probably would not have provided.

If one engages in a certain style of speculative thought, the connection between Barbary policy and political development becomes somewhat clearer. The Confederation followed a basically apolitical policy, the "factions" as yet invisible. During the ratification of the Constitution, certain aspects of the relationship with the Barbary States were associated with large issues like defense, economy and peace. After the new government was established, questions concerning the Barbary remained connected to the ideological arguments of the Constitutional debate, and became politicized in congressional actions. Jefferson, by making the relationships with the Barbary States a matter of Executive discretion, took the issue out of partisan politics. Although the war was not popular, Jefferson's actions were sufficiently modest to appeal to moderates of both factions to pass continuing appropriations for the navy.

The perspective of familiar American history shows only a small Barbary Coast in the background, with a huge England and France in the foreground. Other small nations were not newly independent ex-colonial possessions, but they did face similar problems with the two "super powers" of the time, who were less than respectful, on occasion of rights unmatched by power. In this way, policy towards France and England always contained elements of dependence, for it was difficult, if not impossible, to compel them to agree. In direct opposition to this dependence, was the evolutionary course of American policy towards the Barbary: if the figure of Barbary should not, indeed, be somewhat larger in relationship to England and France, it should be moved closer to the foreground, out of the mists.

Jefferson best characterized this policy in a letter to Adams in 1813, when distasteful events were far enough in the past to resume their broken friendship, "If I have differed with you on this ground it was not on principle, but on time. . . . But I respect too much the weighty opinions of others to be unyielding on this point, and acquiesce with a prayer 'quod felix faustumoue sit' . . ." [may this be favorable and auspicious . . .].[141]

PART THREE

NOTES

[122] Brown, John Adams, p. 204 cites Lyman Butterfield, (ed.) The Papers of John Adams: Microfilm Edition (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1954-1959), reel 399.

[123] Jefferson to Madison, November 9, 1800, Adrienne Roch, Jefferson and Madison: The Great Collaboration (New York: Knopf, Inc., 1950), p. 213 cites the Jefferson Collection, Library of Congress.

[124] Lycan, Hamilton and Foreign Policy, pp. 407-408.

[125] H. C. Lodge (ed), The Works of Alexander Hamilton, "The Constitutional Edition," (New York: 1904), vol 7, p. 314.

[126] Nathan Schachner, Thomas Jefferson: A Biography (New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1951), vol. 2, p. 653; Brown, John Adams, p. 201, and Koch, Jefferson and Madison, p. 213.

[127] Macleod, "Jefferson and the Navy," p. 163.

[128] Cathcart to Madison, January 4, 1801, ASPFR, vol. 2, p. 354.

[129] Ford, Writings of Jefferson, vol. 1, pp. 365-366.

[130] All statements recorded by Jefferson. Ibid.

[131] Schnachner, Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, p. 682 cites Jefferson Collection, vol. 112, p. 19296, Library of Congress.

[132] May 14, 1801, Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time, Volume Four: Jefferson the President, First Term (New York: Little Brown, 1970), p. 103 cites Jefferson Collection, vol. 113, p. 19483, Library of Congress.

[133] Ibid., p. 102.

[134] Ibid., p. 103.

[135] December 17, 1801, Lodge, Hamilton, vol. 8, p. 247.

[136] U. S. Congress. Annals of Congress, 7th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 146-152; 405-406; 472-474.

[137] Act of March 26, 1804.

[138] Allen, Our Navy and Wright and Macleod, First Americans.

[139] Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, p. 152; 166.

[140] This figure was then considered to be an extravagant price. Paullin's History, p. 49.

[141] Lester Cappon (ed.), The Adams-Jefferson Letters (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), vol. Z, pp. 324-325.

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Accounts of American relations with the Barbary powers fall into two general groups: those whose emphasis falls on the particulars of actual diplomatic negotiation and those which concentrate upon the naval engagements and naval establishments that characterized the later phases of the American policy. Within these groups have occurred revisionist insurrections, seeking each to speak upon particular sins of commission.

The most useful single work of the diplomatic histories is Ray Irwin, _The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers_ (Chapel Hill, 1939). Masterful in the use of primary source materials, Irwin analyzes American policy in terms of the opinions and direction of the consuls in North Africa. Louis Wright and Julia Macleod, _The First Americans in North Africa_ (Princeton, 1945), James Field, _America and the Mediterranean World_ (Princeton, 1945) and C. O. Paullin, _Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778-1883_ (Johns Hopkins, 1912) continue the tradition of primary emphasis on diplomatic affairs.

The navalists' foremost advocates are Gardener Allen, _Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs_ (Boston, 1905) and C. O. Paullin, _History of Naval Administration_ (Annapolis, 1968). Allen is concerned, through great exactitude, with the movements and actions of American naval operations in the Mediterranean. Paullin's _History_ is a collection of early essays (1905-14) on the development of the naval establishment, with particular emphasis on political issues.

Marshall Smelser, Congress Founds the Navy, 1778-1798 (Notre Dame, 1959) regards, with Paullin, the navy as an essentially Federalist creation, but approaches the navy through political processes, rather than approaching the political process through the navy, as Paullin does. Smelser believes that the Barbary problem had considerable relevance to the establishment of a navy.

Julia Macleod's article "Jefferson and the Navy: A Defense," Huntington Library Quarterly (February, 1945) is a brilliant revisionist approach to the overemphasis of sectional and partisan (Federalist) influences in Smelser and Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power (Princeton, 1939). Macleod firmly establishes Jefferson's naval ideas as arising from his concern with the Barbary issue, and divides Jefferson's opinion from those of his Republican comrades.

General diplomatic histories tend to be brief: Robert Ferrell, American Diplomacy (New York, 1975) and Thomas Baily, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New Jersey, 1974) spend, respectively, three pages and four paragraphs on the Barbary Wars. Both agree that the foreign threat of the Barbary pirates contributed to domestic unity, but both also fail to make clear that policy towards the Barbary States underwent a long evolution.

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SCOTT, JEAN PEARSON. Construction of an Objective Instrument of Moral Stage Preferences from the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview. (1975) Directed by: Dr. Rebecca M. Smith. Pp. 109.

The purpose of the study was to construct a valid and reliable objective instrument which would assess moral stage preferences. Validity was measured in terms of how well the scores of the proposed instrument correlated with the scores from the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview (1975).

Two objective instruments, a Likert and a forced-choice measurement, were devised and administered to the subjects. The Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview, form A, (1975) was also administered.

A non-random sample of 20 seventh grade students from a small southern town and 21 undergraduate students who attended a state-supported southern university were randomly assigned to groups that varied in the order of presentation of the three instruments. Based upon previous research (Kohlberg, 1958; Turiel, 1966) demonstrating the developmental nature of moral reasoning, it was anticipated that college subjects would show significantly higher stage scores than the seventh grade subjects on all the instruments.

Analysis of the data for differences between groups and within groups was done by procedures of analysis of variance and _t_-tests. Test-retest reliability coefficients were computed by the Pearson product-moment statistic as were the validity coefficients.

The college sample showed a higher moral stage than the seventh grade sample on all three instruments, but to a significant degree ($p < .01$) only on the interview. The validity correlation coefficients for the comparison of the Likert instrument and the forced-choice instrument with the interview were .41 and .68, respectively. It could not be concluded that the two instruments were valid measures of the thinking that would presumably be elicited by the interview. However, with revisions, it is believed that a valid objective instrument is quite feasible.

CONSTRUCTION OF AN OBJECTIVE INSTRUMENT OF MORAL STAGE PREFERENCES FROM THE KOHLBERG MORAL JUDGMENT INTERVIEW

by

Jean Pearson Scott

A Thesis Submitted to
the Faculty of the Graduate School at
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science

Greensboro
1975

Approved by

Rebecca M. Smith
Thesis Adviser

APPROVAL PAGE

This thesis has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

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December 4, 1975
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Historically, the goal of moral education has been the development of character. Responsibility for moral education or character development lay primarily with the public schools, Boy Scouts, and other organizations interested in teaching virtues. Morality was conceptualized as a set of character traits (e.g. honesty, trustworthiness) which were internalized by the child through moral training. Thus, moral education stressed obedience to the conventional moral code and the planning of group or individual activities which would manifest virtue or good works in terms of this code (Jones, 1936). Research evaluation of the results of moral education classes in the public schools during the 1920s and 30s was based on tests of increased moral knowledge (verbal espousal of conventional rules) and an increase in virtuous behavior as experimentally measured. Hartshorne and May (1928) found no significant change in the moral behavior of the moral education classes. Considerable doubt was thrown on the notion that moral traits or virtues could be taught and, consequently, a decline in formal moral education programs followed.

Recent theoretical development and research efforts have shifted the emphasis from a concern about morality or support of societal right and wrong to a concern about moral development. Piaget (1932), and most recently, Kohlberg (1958) have used a cognitive-developmental approach to the study of moral development. The cognitive-developmental approach is based largely upon Piaget's theory of cognitive development in that moral development is viewed as an intellectual process that parallels cognitive development (Kohlberg, 1969). Moral thinking, like cognitive development, results from a continuous interaction between the structures of the environment and the structures of the organism. As the organism interacts with his environment new structures of adaptation develop which are qualitatively different from the previous structural mode. Kohlberg (1958) has formulated a hierarchy of six stages of moral development each of which is more integrated and more structurally advanced than the previous stage.

A cognitive developmental approach to moral development has generated not only research but also a renewed interest in moral education. On the basis of recent research findings (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1973; Turiel, 1966; Turiel & Rothman, 1972), Kohlberg (1973a) has elaborated a cognitive-developmental approach to moral education for use in the public schools. The approach is based on cross-cultural and longitudinal research providing evidence that moral development is an orderly process of passage through culturally universal, sequential, and invariant stages. In contrast to conventional moral education, Kohlberg's approach stresses arousal of cognitive dissonance in students' thinking about moral issues and the exposure of students to reasoning one stage above (+1) the student's own stage.

The first research to apply developmental principles to a moral education program explored the effects of guided peer discussion about moral dilemma situations (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1973). The Blatt and Kohlberg (1973) study demonstrated the effectiveness of a program of guided moral discussion in the public school milieu. The study has been replicated in six classrooms, in work with prisoners, and with undergraduate students (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1973).

The curriculum of the developmental approach focuses on a series of moral dilemmas which both the students and teacher discuss. Each dilemma situation is designed to create dissonance with the students' currently held moral beliefs. Discussion between students at adjacent moral stages is encouraged by an examination of the adequacy of the reasoning behind the student's arguments. The teacher will begin by supporting and clarifying statements one stage higher than the lowest stage held by the group. Later, the teacher will challenge the reasoning at the +1 stage by supporting and clarifying reasoning at two stages higher than the lowest represented stage. This procedure requires that the teacher assess each student's present moral stage, use the knowledge of this stage by clarifying arguments one stage higher, focus on reasoning, and help students experience the kind of conflict that will facilitate movement to a more adequate organization of belief (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1973).

In order to assess students' current stage of moral reasoning, Kohlberg has used an individual, oral interview which gets at students' underlying moral reasoning structure through questions and through in-depth probing of responses. The interview is lengthy and difficult to score without considerable training.

Realizing the impracticality of administering Kohlberg's interview to large groups of students in school situations, Schwarz (1974) designed and validated a written instrument similar in content to the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview (1958). Two instruments were designed and used in the study, one of which was an open-end questionnaire requiring self-structured responses, the other was an objective multiple-choice instrument with each of the six stages represented in the choices. The multiple-choice instrument was not validated because all subjects regardless of age picked high stage responses. Schwarz (1974) suggested that subjects may have responded to "best"-sounding items rather than to answers which were truly comprehended. Rest's (1958) study corroborates this explanation.

Thus, the following question poses itself. Can a valid, objective test of moral developmental stage preferences be designed? The present study addressed itself to this problem.

Presently, scoring of the open-end instrument (Schwarz, 1974) is an involved, time-consuming procedure. However, the preliminary work by Schwarz (1974) needs to be continued. An objective test that can be administered in a relatively short amount of time and can be accurately and quickly scored by classroom teachers is urgently needed if programs of moral education are to be implemented and evaluated in the public school system.

Definitions

Moral development.

> A continual process of matching a moral view to one's experience of life in a social world. Experiences of conflict in this process generate movement from structural stage to structural stage. (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 119)

Stages of development. Equilibrated modes of interaction or modes of thought characterized by the following:

> 1. Stages imply distinct or qualitative differences in structures (modes of thinking) which still serve the same basic function (e.g., intelligence) at various points in development.
>
> 2. These different structures form an invariant sequence, order or succession in individual development.
>
> 3. Each of these different and sequential modes of thought forms a 'structural whole.'
>
> 4. Stages are hierarchical integrations... stages form an order of increasingly differentiated and integrated structures to fulfill a common function. (Kohlberg & Turiel, 1973, p. 4)

Morality. Morality refers to the process of labeling behavior as right or wrong in accordance with cultural codes or a prescribed set of beliefs. Morality is a result of socialization or conditioning and is not developmental in nature.

Objective test. While there are varying degrees of objectivity in research instruments, for the purposes of this study the following definition will be used: A measurement instrument in which scoring variance is at a minimum. The scoring method permits a high degree of inter-observer agreement because subjects make marks on paper, the marks being restricted to two or more choices among alternatives supplied by the researcher (Kerlinger, 1964).

Scope and Limitations of the Study

The purpose of the study was to design a valid and reliable objective test of preference for moral developmental stage. Validity and reliability were assessed by the procedures of concurrent validity and test-retest reliability, respectively.

The study was limited to two, non-random population samples including a group of 20 seventh graders enrolled in a public elementary school in a small southern town and a group of 20 college students attending a state-supported university located in a small southern city.

CHAPTER II

THE REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The review of literature will include a summary of the research pertinent to the cognitive developmental theory of moral development. A detailed discussion of the cognitive-developmental theories of Piaget and Kohlberg (which form the theoretical basis for the present study) were presented by Schwarz (1974). To avoid redundancy they will not be dwelt upon here. A description of moral education in historical perspective will provide the background in which to consider Kohlberg's moral education program. The cognitive-developmental approach to moral education will be discussed as well as its relationship to other contemporary programs that deal with moral values.

Moral Education in Historical Perspective

Traditionally the term "moral education" and "character education" have been used interchangeably in the literature. In order to avoid confusion the term "character education" will be used to refer to traditional attempts at moral education while moral education will be used to refer to Kohlberg's cognitive developmental program.

The close association of church and school in colonial times prompted an emphasis on development of character early in United States educational history. Moral education and religious education were considered one and the same. Often the same building was used for both worship and school. Equally as often, the minister was the teacher, and usually religious materials--Bibles, hymnbooks, and catechism--were used regularly in schools. Many of the first textbooks were expressly moral in their material. With the separation of church and state, secularization of American education followed. Parkin's (McKnown, 1935) investigation of moral and religious content of 1,291 American school readers covering the period 1776 to 1920 illustrates the shift from religious and moral content to subject matter of a nonmoral nature. From 1776 to 1786 100% of the content was religious or of a moral nature, but by 1916 only 5% of reading material contained moral content. State laws prohibiting religious instruction in the schools led to further deemphasis on moral instruction. In 1894 Charles De Garmo deplored the lack of moral instruction in the schools. He believed character education to have an important place in the regular subjects of the curriculum, particularly social science. Teachers, schools, and some school systems began to implement programs of character education, usually on their own initiative. McKnown (1935) described a number of the successful programs.

By the turn of the century educators believed character education to be one of the primary objectives of the public school system. However, controversy centered around a host of issues, the primary ones being these: (a) what was the nature of character; (b) what place did it have in the school curriculum; (c) how was it to be taught; and (d) what were the objectives of character education.

Central to a theory of character education was the resolution of the question: Is character what a person is or what he does? For some educators, character was conceived as the learning of socially acceptable habits of behavior and thought. Moral behavior became automatic through the practice of good habits, such as courtesy, so that thought was required only for new situations. Indeed, it was feared by some that conscious attention to matters of right and wrong would instill doubt in students. Self-questioning could be a dangerous consequence of moral instruction (Dept. of Superintendence, 1932) if children were left with doubts about correct behavior. Another predominant view held that morality was a composite of character traits. By the learning and practice of certain virtues, the student became virtuous. Regardless of whether character was some personality construct or a set of virtuous habits, both views centered upon the internalization of good behavior as defined by prevailing convention. McKnown gave this definition: "Character is the sum total of an individual's inner traits as represented by his conduct" (McKnown, 1935, p. 1).

In 1932, the Commission on Character Education under the Department of Superintendence, attempted to formulate some guides and clarify some of the issues surrounding character education. At this time whether character consisted of conformity or self-determinism was in dispute. While the Committee believed that conformity to conventional mores was an incomplete definition of character, the definition proposed by the Committee was vague and equally inadequate. The definition emphasized doing the best thing possible in each situation.

> The objective remains the discovery or creation of a way of living which conserves and produces as many values as possible for as many persons as possible over as long a time as possible. Character education is the facilitation of this way of life. (Dept. of Superintendence, 1932, p. 59)

Seventeen other major types of objectives for character education were listed and their strengths and inadequacies discussed (Dept. of Superintendence, 1932). The Committee concluded that not enough scientific evidence was available to resolve all questions about the nature of character.

By the early 30s the literature was full of demands for more character education in the schools (Charters, 1928; Fishback, 1928; Heaton, 1933; Jones, 1936). Schemes were devised that ranged from a direct method of teaching of a carefully planned formal course of instruction through a less formal method of using slogans, codes of ethics, and observing special days, to the indirect method of informal character development through the curriculum and regular school activities. By the mid thirties these trends were noted in the character education movement: (a) decreasing use of formalized methods and an increase in the utilization of opportunities in the school setting affording the student practice in his real world; (b) a decreasing emphasis on personal goodness and an increasing attention to social responsibility and citizenship; and (c) an increasing emphasis on the completeness of the student's life rather than to particularized and separate elements in the pupil's life (McKnown, 1935).

By 1950 emphases in character education had changed only slightly. The major emphasis was on the involvement of the student in real life experiences appropriate for his age and ability to promote optimum character development. Character education was considered coextensive with the entire educational development of the child (Metropolitan School Study Council, 1950).

Methods of evaluating the students' character and the curriculum in terms of character development were needed by educators. Aided by the impetus of the research movement, several advancements in the development of measurement techniques for character were made in the 1920s. Shuttleworth (1930) noted some of these changes: (a) the improvement of rating devices, (b) the measurement of moral knowledge, (c) the use of pen-and-paper tests for the measurement of certain aspects of character, (d) an emphasis on the study of conduct, and (e) a refinement of the technique of controlled observation. The variety of pen-and-paper tests included opinionnaires, self-description measures, measures of significant knowledge, and disguised tests that included nonrelevant items. Other methods of evaluation included the measurement of conduct in controlled situations, evaluation of reputation, and frequent reports of certain kinds of behavior. The Hartshorne and May character studies (1928-1930) contributed significantly to the development of measurement techniques. The Department of Superintendence (1932) listed nearly 100 tests designed to assess character. The difficulties in attempting to evaluate character stemmed from the multitude of inadequate definitions about the nature of character and the constantly changing standards of society. Measures of all-around character capable of administration in an hour or less were not believed to be feasible.

The early research in character education included correlational and experimental designs. While the studies were numerous--particularly correlational studies--the methodology and controls were unsatisfactory. The most significant and intensive study, that of the Character Education Inquiry directed by Hartshorne and May (1928-1930), collected a great many correlational observations about character traits, specifically honesty, service, self-control. A major finding was that behavior was situation specific. The average correlation coefficient between one behavior test and another of the same trait or virtue rarely exceeded .20. Most of the educational forces studied were found to bear little relationship to the behavior measured. Physical condition, school grade, character building clubs, Boy Scouts, and summer camps seemed to have no general effect on virtuous behavior. The finding of greatest educational import was the difference in honesty of children in "old-type" and "new-type" schools. There was a greater tendency for children attending modern schools to cheat less on tests. These modern schools were described as those which used a "project" approach to studies and put less emphasis on grades and tests and more emphasis on the intrinsic value of the activity itself. It was concluded that character was a social phenomenon, heavily dependent upon the particular situation. Formalized instruction for the teaching of ideals and standards was of little value as a method of character education (Hartshorne & May, 1928-1930).

Moral Developmental Theory

Piaget (1932) was probably the first investigator to view moral development as a decision-making process that was dependent upon the individual's level of cognitive ability. He identified two stages of moral development--the heteronomous stage and the autonomous stage. The latter stage was believed to be reached by the age of 11 or 12, after a transition from heteronomous thinking, and to persist throughout adulthood.

Influenced by Piaget, Kohlberg undertook a study to analyze moral judgment in subjects aged 10, 13, and 16 (Kohlberg, 1958). The cognitive levels of these ages were assumed to be different as theorized by Piaget. An interview consisting of nine hypothetical moral dilemmas where obedience to authority conflicted with human need or the welfare of other individuals was conducted with each subject. From these data, Kohlberg formulated six stages of moral development grouped under three levels as follows:

TABLE OF MORAL STAGES

Preconventional Level

At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right and wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages.

Stage 1

The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being stage 4).

Stage 2

The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the market place. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical, pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.

Conventional Level

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages.

Stage 3

The interpersonal concordance or "good boy--nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention--"he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice."

Stage 4

The law and order orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

Postconventional or Principled Level

At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level again has two stages, which are as follows.

Stage 5

The social-contract legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon,

> the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation.
>
> Stage 6
> The universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative): they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons. (Fenton et al., 1974, p. 2)

Analysis of difference in groups in usage of all types of thought but one (stage 3) were found to be significant beyond the .01 level.

Kramer (1969) followed up Kohlberg's subjects in a longitudinal study in which subjects were again tested for stage of moral thinking at the age of 25. Two of Kramer's hypotheses were supported, the first being that mature moral thinking is achieved by the mid twenties. Secondly, high school scores are highly predictive of adult scores. Kohlberg and Turiel (1973) reinterpreted these findings after their research produced evidence that the first hypothesis was not supported. Although Kramer found that subjects in college appeared to regress in moral thinking to a typical stage 2 orientation, upon reexamination, it was found that a major difference between college regressors and stage 2 thinkers was the relativism and the higher level of abstraction of the former group. What was morally right was based upon the subject's wishes, but the relativism of the decision was also expressed. The structure of the responses of "college regressors," which was then designated stage 4B, instead of stage 2, was a transition stage that indicated some advancement over the "law and order" stage 4, however, reasoning was not structurally differentiated to a degree to be a stage, separate and apart from, and higher than stage 4. Interestingly, college students interviewed in the last year (June '74-June '75) have not been found to be using stage 4B thinking but tend to use more conventional stage 4 (Kohlberg summer workshop, 1975).

It was postulated that perhaps a different type of experience is required to attain principled levels of moral judgment than is required for the previous stages (Kohlberg & Turiel, 1973). Social experiences appear to play an increasingly important role in higher stage development. Kohlberg's subjects who attended college eventually reached stage 5 thinking while subjects not attending college had not attained principled levels of thinking (Kohlberg & Turiel, 1973). Kohlberg has further hypothesized that moral development continues throughout the adult years and that a possible seventh stage exists (Kohlberg & Turiel, 1973).

No research has been reported to substantiate the presence of this stage 7, however.

Basic to a developmental stage typology were the following stage characteristics postulated by Kohlberg:

1. Stages imply distinct or qualitative differences in structure (modes of thinking) which still serve the same basic function (e.g. intelligence) at various points in development.
2. These different structures form an invariant sequence, order or succession in individual development.
3. Each of these different and sequential modes of thought forms a "structural whole."
4. Stages are hierarchical integrations...stages form an order of increasingly differentiated and integrated structures to fulfill a common function (Kohlberg & Turiel, 1973, p. 4).

Kohlberg's (1958) study did not demonstrate that the attainment of one stage was prerequisite to the attainment of the next higher stage of thought. Turiel (1966) tested two propositions from Kohlberg's stage theory:

> (a) that stages form an invariant sequence, and, thus, more learning results from exposure to the stage directly above one's level than to stages further above; (b) that passages from one stage to the next involves integration of the previous stages, and thus, more learning results from exposure to the stage directly above than to the stage directly below. (p. 11)

Forty-four subjects designated as being at either stages 2, 3, or 4 were distributed among three experimental groups and one control group. The treatment condition consisted of subjects' being exposed to reasoning either on the stage directly below, the stage directly above, or two stages above the initial dominant stage. The hypotheses were confirmed as exposure to the stage directly above was the most effective treatment.

A study to replicate Turiel's (1966) findings of invariant sequentiality of the six stages was conducted with 22 fifth grade subjects and 23 eighth grade subjects (Rest, Turiel, & Kohlberg, 1969). In addition, Rest _et_ _al_. were interested in investigating the relationship of a subject's own mode of reasoning with comprehension, preference, and assimilation of other stages. It was hypothesized that (a) subjects would prefer stages higher than their own stage and reject those stages below their own; (b) subjects would comprehend all stages below their own and find higher stages increasingly difficult to comprehend; and (c) these two tendencies--to prefer higher stages, but to find higher stages increasingly difficult to understand--would interact so that subjects would assimilate a stage that was (+1) one higher than their own stage of reasoning most readily into their existing scheme of moral reasoning. Each subject's predominant stage was assessed by means of a pretest interview consisting of five stories from the

Kohlberg interview (1958). During the experimental session the subjects were exposed to stories with conflict situations. Three sets of advice were presented which posed possible solutions to the conflict. Two bits of advice represented one stage (-1) below the subject's own predominant stage. Likewise, two bits of advice were at a stage (+1) higher than the subject's own stage and two bits of advice represented two stages (+2) higher than the predominant stage of the subject. The two bits of advice were alternative courses of action given for each stage so that answers would be based on the reasoning given and not on the behavioral decision. The subjects were asked to indicate their preferences for the given advice, to explain the given advice in their own words based upon recall, and to give their own solution to the dilemma. The results substantiated Turiel's (1966) findings of invariant sequentiality and thus supported Kohlberg's stage hypotheses. Children preferred higher stage statements regardless of whether the statements were +1 or +2 stages above theirs and rejected statements a stage below theirs. However, stages above the subject's own stage were increasingly difficult to comprehend as ascertained by the subject's ability to correctly recall the advice at the given stage. In order to determine the degree of assimilation of the experimental advice, stage usage on the pretest interview was compared to the stage usage of the subject's own advice given in the experimental session. Usage of +1 advice definitely increased over that expected from the frequency of pretest +1 usage. There was no increase in +2 usage and only a slight increase in -1 usage. It appeared that the combination of preference and comprehension of stages other than the subject's own stage resulted in optional assimilation of +1 reasoning. This was the first study to investigate stage preferences elicited from a written instrument. Consequently, this study has special relevance for the purposes of the present study.

Kohlberg's major assumptions have been supported by the research to date. Studies have provided substantial evidence of an invariant sequential hierarchy of Kohlberg's six developmental stages (Kohlberg, 1969; Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Kohlberg & Turiel, 1973; Rest, Turiel, & Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1966). There are many areas which are yet unexplored--preschool reasoning, adult moral development, environmental factors affecting moral development, as well as the nature of stage transition periods.

A major impediment for investigators attempting to replicate Kohlberg's work is the interim nature of the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview and the complex scoring procedure. The format of the interview itself and the scoring procedure have undergone continuous revisions reflecting new theoretical understanding. Revised scoring procedures have made as much as a 20% difference in the scoring of studies completed five years ago and earlier (Kohlberg summer workshop, 1975). Therefore, results of older studies cannot be taken literally. There is definitely a need to produce a final form of the interview and a simplified scoring system or a more objective instrument. Recognizing this need, the Moral Education Center at Harvard, under the direction of Kohlberg, has plans underway to further revise the scoring procedure.

Prerequisites for Moral Reasoning

Two conditions necessary for moral reasoning stage transition are these: (a) attainment of certain levels of cognitive ability and (b) attainment of certain role-taking abilities. Individuals pass through stages of logical thought and stages of role-taking ability as well as through stages of moral reasoning in a parallel fashion. The first step involves the acquisition of certain cognitive structures. Piaget found that individuals pass through major sequential periods: (a) the sensorimotor period, (b) the operational period, and (c) the formal operational period. Around age 7, children move into the concrete operational period. The child is able to make logical inferences, classify things, and handle quantitative relations about concrete phenomena. At adolescence, most, but not all, individuals enter the formal operational stage. At this stage the ability to reason abstractly, to consider possibilities, to consider the relations between elements in a system, and to form hypotheses are acquired. Many individuals do not reach the higher levels of formal thought. While they may be able to consider all the relations of one thing to another they may not be able to form hypotheses and deduce implications from hypotheses to be tested. While a certain level of logical reasoning ability is necessary for moral reasoning ability, it is not sufficient for the attainment of moral stage. It follows that an adult who can use abstract thinking at higher levels may not necessarily be able to think in terms of moral principles (stage 5 or 6). Because logical reasoning puts a ceiling on what stages of moral reasoning can be developed, an individual at the concrete operational stage of thinking cannot attain stage 3 moral reasoning without movement first to the lower levels of formal operational thought. Moral development depends upon logical development, but logical development does not depend upon moral development.

Next, after stages of logical thought, comes the stage of social perspective which is the ability to take social roles. Kohlberg defines social perspective as "the level at which the person sees other people, interprets their thoughts and feelings, and sees their role or place in society" (Kohlberg, 1975, p. 6).

Selman's research (1975) into the development of interpersonal cognition or perspective-taking ability has led to the definition of six stages of social perspective-taking. In keeping with developmental theory, Selman and colleagues have found in investigations of subjects, aged 4 to young adulthood, that each perspective-taking stage is a more integrated reorganization of the preceding stage and paves the way to the next higher stage. Children may go through each stage at different rates but always in the same order (Selman, 1975). These stages are very closely related to moral stage, but do not involve decisions of right and wrong. An individual may be able to take the perspective of a general member of society but not be able to resolve a moral issue in terms of societal welfare. To make a decision in terms of values of justice is more difficult than to see the world from a social perspective (Kohlberg, 1975). The preconventional reasoner (stage 1 or 2) takes the perspective of a concrete individual considering his own interests and those of other individuals. The conventional reasoner is able to take a member of society perspective. He identifies with societal rules and expectations. Post-conventional thinkers must take on a "prior to society" perspective. The postconventional person questions the member of society perspective from an individual perspective that can be universal for all individuals, not just those individuals of a particular society. Subsumed under each of the three social perspective levels are two stages which further define and differentiate each level. For example, the first stage of the "member of society" perspective considers the relationship of others in a shared relationship. The stage 3 perspective of a member of society is that of the average good person. The individual sees things from the point of view of shared relationships between two or more individuals. This is a less mature point of view than a point of view of the societal system or of society as a whole. Social role-taking is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for progression to higher moral reasoning levels (Kohlberg, 1975).

While there is a vertical sequence in movement from moral stage 1 to moral stages 2 and 3, there must be a horizontal movement from cognitive ability to social perspective to moral reasoning. This vertical and horizontal progression is summarized below:

Cognitive Stage[a]	Social Perspective[b]	Moral Stage
Sensorimotor Period	Egocentric perspective taking	Stage 0
Concrete Operational Period	Individual Perspective	Level I
substage I	1. isolated individual point of view	Stage 1
substage II	2. view of others in terms of self	Stage 2
Formal Operational Period	Societal Perspective	Level II
substage I	3. mutual perspective taking	Stage 3
substage II	4. qualitative-system perspective taking	Stage 4
	Prior to Society Perspective	Level III
substage III	5. symbolic interaction perspective taking	Stage 5 Stage 6

[a] Taken from Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971.
[b] Based upon Kohlberg, 1975; Selman, 1975.

First, a person attains a logical stage (e.g. formal operations) that allows him to see systems in the world and to view himself as a general member of society (stage 4). Eventually he is able to define right and wrong in terms of that system's welfare (moral stage 4).

Conditions for Moral Behavior

The terms "moral reasoning" and "moral behavior" are often confused. While moral reasoning involves judgments, behavior in moral conflict situations results from an interaction of moral reasoning level, personality factors, and many environmental factors. The ability to reason maturely about issues of fairness does not guarantee moral behavior. All the variables represented in the diagram below must be considered:

Moral reasoning level + situational factors + personality factors + factual information → Behavior
(Kohlberg summer workshop, 1975)

Several studies have shown an examination of the effects of moral reasoning level on behavior. Turiel and Rothman (1972) designed a study to determine the effects of exposure to moral reasoning on behavioral choice. Forty-three seventh and eighth grade boys were pretested using Kohlberg's moral judgment interview. The experimental session required subjects to choose between two actions. Before choosing, the subjects were exposed to two lines of reasoning. The first was one stage above the subject's own stage and the second line of reasoning was one stage below that of the subjects. A posttest revealed no significant stage changes. However, while subjects at stage 2 or 3 did not make any change in behavioral choice, stage 4 subjects did make a change in behavioral choice when exposed to reasoning one stage higher. These findings suggest that further investigations into the relationship between the individual's reasoning, the reasoning of others, and their behavioral choices would be valuable (Turiel & Rothman, 1972).

Kohlberg (1969) reported that when college subjects were exposed to an experimental session where they had a chance to cheat, only 11% of the principled subjects cheated as opposed to 42% of the conventional subjects. He explained this finding by the fact that principled subjects defined the issue as one involving maintaining an implicit contract with the experimenter and also as one reflecting the inequality of taking advantage by cheating. These conditions still would hold even in situations with ambiguous social expectations. The conventional subjects, on the other hand, found the experimental condition one of confused social expectations--the authority figure (experimenter) had not expressed any opinion about cheating and had left the experimental room unsupervised. While the issue for the conventional subject was to uphold conventional expectations of the authority figure or expectations of others, he was provided with no real reason not to cheat if the authority figure did not care and others were cheating. The critical break appeared to be between conventional subjects and postconventional subjects. This finding was also substantiated in other studies (Kohlberg, 1969).

Milgram (1963) set up a situation where subjects were faced with disobeying the rules formulated by an authority figure who was violating the rights of another individual. The experimenter ordered the subjects to give an increasingly severe electric shock to a confederate of the experimenter who had agreed to participate in a nonsense-syllable learning experiment. In this study 75% (of a group of six) of stage 6 subjects quit the experimental session as compared to 13% of the remaining of 24 subjects at lower stages (Kohlberg, 1969).

It must be pointed out that moral behavior is not virtuous in and of itself. Rather it is the reasoning behind the action which incorporates aims of justice which makes an act morally just. In fact, most moral dilemmas dictate several courses of action none of which would be an exclusively principled action. A study of Berkeley students who did and did not participate in a free speech sit-in indicated that 80% of the stage 6 subjects sat-in as compared to 10% of the conventional subjects and 50% of the stage 5 subjects. A majority of the stage 2 subjects sat-in, but for much different reasons than the stage 6 participants (Kohlberg, 1969).

Results of the moral action studies tend to concur that there is a meaningful relationship between principled level thinking and mature moral action. These findings offer additional support for moral education programs. While the immediate goal of moral education is the facilitation of more adequate modes of weighing decisions of fairness, ultimately it would be most validly predicated on the desire for more moral behavior.

Cognitive-Developmental Moral Education

Kohlberg presents a program of moral education that is grounded in both psychology and philosophy. The program combines what moral development "is" as indicated by the research, and what moral development "ought to be" with regard to ends and values. While science can speak to causal relationships it cannot speak about questions of virtue, truth, and values. These value questions must be carefully considered as they are intrinsic to any moral education program.

From the philosophic point of view, Kohlberg embraces a Platonic view of virtue or the good. Virtue, rather than being a composite of parts, is one ideal form--called justice--which does not vary across cultures. Knowledge of the good is philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal form of the good; it is not based on opinion or conventional beliefs. The good can be taught because it is known intuitively at a low level and its teaching is, therefore, a "calling out" rather than instruction. The teaching of virtue is the "asking of questions and the pointing of the way" rather than the giving of answers (Kohlberg, 1970).

In contrast, the Aristotlian approach considered virtue to be either intellectual or moral virtue. Moral virtue came about by example and practice until virtuous habits were learned. This philosophy was carried over in traditional practices of character education. Traditional educational practice divided the personality into traits of character or a "bag of virtues" as described in a preceding section.

Kohlberg criticizes the "bag of virtues" approach just on the grounds that there is no such thing. Virtues and vices are merely labels of praise or blame that people award to others and which seem to have no direct influence on the individual faced with a moral conflict. The list of virtues is long and every "bag" can be composed of any number or combination of virtues. The result, concludes Kohlberg, of striving to acquire the virtues of everybody's "bag" is trying to be all things to all people. The work of Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) demonstrated most convincingly the weaknesses of this approach.

Basic to Kohlberg's moral education approach is the universal nature of moral development. In studies of diverse cultures (Malaysia, Taiwan, Mexico, U. S., and Turkey) Kohlberg found the same developmental sequence of his moral stages (Kohlberg, 1973b). Age trends of urban middle class boys in Mexico, Taiwan, and the United States found the same sequence of use although Mexican and Taiwan subjects were a little slower in development. The presence of stage 5 thinking in other countries indicated that the legal-contractual view was not a purely democratic moral value system (Kohlberg, 1973b). The same stage sequence was found for lower class urban subjects and isolated village subjects of differing cultures. Subjects, regardless of religion or culture, tended to base moral decisions upon a developmental orientation to values of justice (Kohlberg, 1973b).

The only legitimate form of moral education is one that is based upon principles of justice, argues Kohlberg. The teaching of values of justice prohibit in and of themselves the imposition of beliefs of one group upon another. The Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution requires the recognition of equal rights of individuals. The recognition of equal rights of individuals necessarily implies values of justice, not a "value-neutral" stance. Individual rights may be respected without necessarily accepting a value system as equal as any other.

According to the United States Constitution the rationeale for government is the maintenance of justice or the preservation of the rights of the individual. The public school as an institution is as much committed to preserving justice as is the government or court. The school, then, transmits values of justice upon which any society is based.

Justice is not a character trait nor is it a concrete rule of action. Rather it is a moral principle or as Kohlberg defines it, "a principle is a mode of choosing which is universal, a rule of choosing which we want all people to adopt in all situations" (Kohlberg, 1970, pp. 69-70). Because morally mature men are governed by justice rather than by a set of rules, there are not many moral virtues, but one. Drawing upon the Platonian view, what makes an act virtuous is knowledge of the good. A courageous action based on ignorance of justice is not anymore a just act than a courageous act based on ignorance of danger. It follows then that if virtuous action is based upon knowledge of the good, then virtue is one, since knowledge of the good is one (Kohlberg, 1970).

Contrary to the bag of virtues approach, teaching knowledge of the good is not an easy task. Using a Socratic model, Kohlberg described the first step in the process of the understanding of the "good" as helping the student create dissatisfaction with his own thinking and secondly, exposing him to disagreement and argument about the reasoning with others. As a result of this process the student will begin to see more adequate conceptualizations and the inadequacies of his reasoning.

Blatt and Kohlberg (1973) carried out a moral discussion program in a Sunday school and in a public school. The Sunday school study involving 30 children, aged 11-12, served as the pilot study for the public school study. Three comparable control groups from Turiel's experiments (1966; Turiel & Rothman, 1972) were used as controls. Pretests to determine the subjects' present moral stage were administered using items from the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview. The experimental group began a twelve week teaching program involving a total of 12 hours of discussion that was centered on a series of moral conflict situations different from those used in the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview. The situation exposed students to moral dilemmas aimed at arousing genuine moral conflict as to reasoning and choice. Posttests demonstrated a significant ($\underline{t}$=38, $\underline{p}$ $<$.01) increase in moral stage scores as compared to the controls after the 12 week period as well as one year later. Sixty-three percent of the experimental children moved up one stage or slightly more, 9% moved up half a stage, and 28% remained at the same stage on the posttest. In contrast, 5% (one of 21) of the control subjects showed a one stage increase from pretest. Results from the one year follow-up were basically unchanged.

The second phase of the study (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1973) was an extension and replication of the first phase using subjects in a public junior and senior high school setting. Procedures were basically identical to the pilot study. The two experimental groups met twice a week in 45 minute sessions for a total of 18 sessions. As in the first study, the experimental classes attained significant increases in moral stage maturity as compared to the controls and this increase was evident one year later. The Blatt and Kohlberg (1973) study demonstrated the effectiveness of a program of guided moral discussion in the public school milieu. This study has been replicated in six classrooms, in work with prisoners, and with undergraduate students (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1973).

Presently, Kohlberg and colleagues are engaged in pilot studies of public schools being run by the "just community approach." Kohlberg argued that it is ludicrous to expect classroom moral education efforts to be effective when students spend their day in a school community that operates by authoritarian ideas of justice. In the pilot studies the entire school community attempts to live within a just system as opposed to restricting moral education solely to the classroom. Students make their own rules and regulations and determine punishment for offenders. Reports are that the program has been successful, although no results have been published (Kohlberg, summer workshop 1975).

The Relationship of Values Clarification to Moral Education

The problem of dealing with moral values has long presented educators with an almost unresolvable dilemma. The issue has generally focused upon criticisms of programs that were indoctrinating or took a relativistic stance. A do-nothing approach obviously was not a satisfactory alternative because teachers must constantly be engaged in decisions of right and wrong. The moral atmosphere of the classroom is set by the way in which the teacher handles conflicts and by the values that are espoused as justification of the decisions made. Inevitably, values are transmitted in the school environment regardless of whether the teacher consciously attempts to espouse them. Those who attempt to teach a set of prescribed virtues have no justification for the particular values they wish to instill in students and thus the program cannot adequately counter the criticism that indoctrination is its aim. A popular contemporary approach that has taken the route of relativism will be briefly considered.

The values-clarification approach to values education was an outgrowth of the humanistic movement in education. It was recognized that the technological innovations in society, the rate of change, and the number of alternatives with which the average individual had to deal had made it increasingly difficult for the growing child to develop clear values of his own. Educational methods were needed to help students learn to function in a complex and confusing world. The values-clarification approach, developed by Louis Raths, is a system of teaching designed to help students learn the process of valuing. Values are viewed as relative, personal, and situational. Therefore, the approach focuses on how values are developed, not upon the teaching of a specific set of values (Raths et al, 1966).

Persons experiencing value confusion have been identified by idiosyncratic behavior patterns--"apathy, flightiness, extreme uncertainty and inconsistency, drift, overconformity, overdissention and chronic posing, and frequently underachievement" (Raths, 1966). Persons who have attained value clarity are described as "positive, purposeful, enthusiastic and proud." The basic hypothesis of value theory is,

> If children are helped to use the valuing process, they will behave in ways that are less apathetic, confused, and irrational and in ways that are more positive, purposeful, and enthusiastic. (Raths *et al*., 1966, p. 11)

Raths *et* *al*. have identified seven valuing skills and have devised classroom techniques to help students learn those skills. The skills are these:

1. choosing from alternatives
2. choosing after careful consideration of the consequences of each alternative
3. choosing freely
4. prizing, being glad of one's choice
5. prizing, being willing to publicly affirm one's choice
6. acting upon one's choice, incorporating choices into behavior
7. acting upon one's choice repeatedly, over time

(Raths, Harmon & Simon, 1966, p. 259)

All seven criteria must be met for something to be called a value. Through these processes of choosing, prizing, and behaving individuals arrive at values through an intellectual process. The critical thinking process is applied, however, to elements in the behavioral and affective domains

Value theory has been subjected to very little empirical examination. At the time of Rath's first book describing values clarification, he reported 12 preliminary research studies, most of which lacked good design and control. Acknowledging the fact that the research was weak, Raths believed that taken as a whole, there was evidence that values clarification techniques did change patterns of behavior (e.g. from apathetic to purposeful and active). Recently Kirschenbaum (1975) has summarized 11 studies, many of which are unpublished or in press which appear to further substantiate the success of values clarification strategies. Most of the studies employed a more sophisticated methodology and used larger samples than the studies first reported by Raths. However, there remained some lack of control and some questionable measurement techniques.

A major problem with values clarification research is the lack of accurate measurement techniques. In most cases behavioral observations have been used with the aid of rating scales and some self-report measures. Paper-and-pencil tests of values are not appropriate for an approach which focuses on behavior change. Some paper-and-pencil measurement tools which assess self-actualization, self esteem and locus of control have been used to ascertain the effects of values clarification on these constructs.

In an attempt to critically examine values clarification, Lockwood (in press) has focused on several problem areas. Lockwood's strongest criticism of values clarification was the moral position it assumes--that of the moral relativist. A moral relativist position asserts that everyone is entitled to hold the values he wants; there is no way of saying that one set of values is better than another. A fundamental argument against this approach is that relativism can be used to justify virtually any activity an individual engages in. Relativism provides no consistent guide for behavior.

In addition, relativism provides no satisfactory method for dealing with inter-personal conflicts of value. Although the relativist may say that each individual's values are right for him there are times when a resolution over conflict is necessary. No satisfactory methods for resolving conflict can be justified as superior to others when taking the relativist stance. Blackmail, majority rule, bribery, rational debate or physical force are any number of ways that might be consistent with values people hold.

Lockwood (in press) concluded that values clarification can not deal adequately with the complexities of value conflict issues. It is quite possible that a program grounded in ethical relativism will influence students to take a relativist position, too.

Similarly, Kohlberg (1973b) argues that relativity cannot be morally justified anymore than authoritarianism. Values clarification is in one sense an indoctrination of the belief that all values are equally valid. Kohlberg asserts that this position is scientifically and philosophically invalid and presents his research into moral development to support his contentions.

The values clarification approach is a much broader program intended to deal with all types of values than

Kohlberg's moral education program. Kohlberg believes that the values clarification approach is a positive method for dealing with values that do not involve moral issues. Whether or not an individual wishes to leave his bed unmade is not a matter involving moral values. On the other hand, if an individual is faced with reporting a dishonest friend or lying to authorities clear moral issues are involved.

The strategies devised to clarify values can be useful tools in stimulating moral reasoning and for this reason values-clarification can be a useful component of moral education.

Focus of the Research

Kohlberg's proposed moral education program would avoid the problems of a nonempirical and indoctrinating stance that was taken by proponents of character education. It is argued that values clarification, a contemporary teaching approach, is a useful teaching strategy, but that its value-neutral stance on moral issues is inadequate. Character education and value education have had difficulty in assessing their program objectives due to inadequate measurement techniques for assessing behavior. Kohlberg's theory and investigations into moral development suggest that moral reasoning is an empirically valid and universal construct that can be measured. These research results provide a basis for implementing programs in the school curriculum which would match students' level of moral reasoning with the next higher stage in the structural hierarchy. Research results also provide a legitimate base for investigating practical means of assessing moral reasoning.

CHAPTER III

PROCEDURE

The purpose of the present study was to design and validate an objective measure of preference for moral stage. The design of the study will be presented first followed by a description of the sample. The major efforts of the study were directed toward the development of the research instruments. This preliminary work will be reported and the scoring procedure for each of the instruments will be detailed in a final section.

Research Design

Three instruments to assess moral developmental stage were used in the study. These instruments were (a) a Likert questionnaire designed by the researcher (see Appendix A), (b) a forced-choice questionnaire designed by the researcher (see Appendix B), and (c) the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview (1975) (see Appendix C).

Both age groups were administered all three instruments. Each age group was randomly divided into these four experimental groups (five subjects in each group) which determined the sequence of administration of the three instruments.

Experimental Groups

A	B	C	D
Interview	Interview	Forced-choice	Likert
Likert	Forced-choice	Likert	Forced-choice
Forced-choice	Likert	Interview	Interview

A time period of one week was interposed between the administration of the interview and the two objective instruments.

A verbal introduction of the interview described the nature of the interview and what was expected of the interviewee. Emphasis was given to the fact that there were no right or wrong answers. Care was also taken to avoid the use of terminology such as "moral" or "moral judgment." The interviewer read aloud each dilemma situation and allowed the subject to read along on his copy of the dilemma situation. Time was allowed for the subject to reread the situation. Questions were asked in exactly the same manner as they appeared in the interview manual and additional probe questions were asked when necessary. The questions pertaining to the issue of keeping promises were not included in the interview to avoid any influence of the objective instruments. The sequence in which the dilemma situations was presented was changed randomly for each subject. All the interviews were administered individually and were recorded. Both age groups took approximately 30 minutes to complete the interview. Subjects were instructed not to discuss the interview with anyone until the conclusion of the experimental sessions.

Subjects took the objective instruments either one week prior to the administration of the interview or one week after the interview, depending upon the experimental group in which they were placed. Directions for each questionnaire were read by the researcher who also answered any questions about the questionnaire. The amount of time necessary for the completion of both instruments varied a great deal. Average time needed for the college group was 15-20 minutes with seventh graders taking a little longer. Subjects were asked not to discuss the questionnaires with anyone until the completion of all experimental sessions.

All instruments were administered by the researcher for the college sample. An assistant administered the instruments to half of the seventh grade sample. Counterbalancing was done to offset any experimenter bias with the seventh grade sample in the following manner:

Researcher I	Researcher II
A_1, A_3, A_6, B_2, B_4, B_6	A_2, A_5, A_4, B_1, B_3, B_5
C_1, C_3, C_5, D_1, D_3, D_5	C_2, C_4, C_6, D_2, D_4, D_6

Note. Letters designate experimental group and subscripts designate the subject in each group.

As is indicated in the above table, six subjects were actually included in each of the four experimental groups, however, absences from school resulted in only five of each group completing the entire experiment.

Testing of the seventh grade sample took place in two rooms of the school building during the regular hours of the school day. Testing was completed on two days one week apart. Testing of the college group took place in a conference room on the university campus. The first half of the testing took place over a period of three days and was completed a week later at the same times.

Description of the Sample

A sample of 20 seventh graders and 21 college students were included in the study. The seventh grade sample attended a public elementary school located in a small southern town. The sample was randomly selected from a non-random sample of all students enrolled in the seventh grade whose reading achievement level, as ascertained by the California Achievement Tests, was at grade level or above. Students in the seventh grade were divided into class sections according to achievement level, therefore those students selected for the study were from the most advanced sections of the seventh grade. The reading level limitation was imposed to insure the ability of all subjects to read the test and to furnish some control on the reading level variable. The sample ranged in age from 12-13. All of the sample was Caucasian and included both males and females.

The college sample was undergraduate students (predominantly juniors and seniors) enrolled in a family relations course at a state-supported university located in a small southern city. The subjects were Caucasian and were predominantly female.

Development of the Instruments

The first step taken by the researcher was a revision of the objective instrument designed by Schwarz (1974) to include two alternate statements at each of the six moral stages. Subjects continued to select higher stage statements similar to the Schwarz study (1974).

With the objective of eliminating the subjects' tendency to select "best"-sounding statements, an objective instrument with a forced-choice format was devised. Thirteen items representing paired comparisons of stages 3 and 4 and thirteen items representing paired comparisons of stages 4 and 5 were included. Statements representing prototypical responses at each stage were taken from examples in the Kohlberg Standard Scoring Manual (1975). All items on the test dealt with one issue of moral judgment--promises. The question, "Why should promises be kept?" was selected because it was not necessary to link the question to a specific dilemma situation. In addition, the question was not of the kind that required both negative and positive responses. Thus all paired statements represented a variety of reasons for why promises should be kept. Subjects were instructed to select the responses most characteristic of a response that they would give. Pilot groups were three non-random samples including nine 10-year-olds, 39 undergraduates, and 20 graduate students. Age differences in stage preferences for statements on the pilot test gave a good indication that a response set had been eliminated. All 10-year-olds overwhelmingly selected stage 3 responses as opposed to stage 4 responses (a mean of 10.5 statements out of a possible 13 selected). Undergraduates generally selected more stage 4 responses (a mean of 8 out of 13 possible) as opposed to stage 3 and more stage 4 responses (a mean of 7 out of 13 statements) as opposed to stage 5. Graduate students selected the stage 5 statements (a mean of 8 out of 13 statements) as opposed to stage 4 statements to a greater degree than the undergraduate group. The graduate students' comments and suggestions were used in the revision of the test. Revisions were made by rewording statements and eliminating items not distinguishing between groups.

The revised test was administered to a non-random group of 35 undergraduate students. The 35 subjects also completed a written interview adapted from three of the dilemma situations in the Kohlberg interview (1975). The forced-choice format considerably reduced--although not completely--the tendency for subjects to select a higher stage of reasoning than the subjects' own stage of usage. Of 11 subjects who took the entire forced-choice instrument and were interviewed to ascertain actual stage, eight subjects scored the same stage on both the interview and the objective measure.

In an effort to reduce the length of the instrument and further eliminate a response set, a Likert scale using the same statements from the paired comparison instrument was devised. Six statements for each stage excluding stages 1 and 6 were randomly combined for a total of 24 items. The response scale allowed five alternatives for each statement which indicated the degree to which the statement was characteristic of the subject or most like a response he would give. The possible alternatives were these: (a) strongly characteristic, (b) characteristic, (c) undecided, (d) not characteristic, (e) strongly not characteristic. Thirty-nine undergraduates were administered both the Likert and the paired-comparison instruments. Scores for the college group were similar on both instruments. A pilot group of 25 seventh graders were also administered the Likert instrument. A comparison of the college and seventh grade groups indicated that college subjects preferred the statements in the following order of highest to lowest: stage 3, stage 4, stage 5, and stage 2. The seventh grade sample preferred the statements in this order: stage 3, stage 2, stage 4, stage 5.

A second and final form of the forced-choice instrument (see Appendix B) was devised using the following combinations of stages in statements: 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 3-4, 3-5, and 4-5. Three sets of statements representing each possible combination were randomly combined for a total of 18 items. The forced-choice instrument was administered to 31 undergraduates who had previously taken the Likert form. A comparison of the stage scores for the two instruments, Likert and forced-choice, indicated similarity in stage scores. Differences most often involved stages 3 and 4.

Both Likert and forced-choice instruments were used in the study in order to determine the instrument correlating most highly with the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview (1975).

The final form of the Likert instrument (see Appendix A) consisted of six statements for each stage (2, 3, 4, and 5) randomly combined for a total of 24 items. Students were instructed to circle the letter which indicated the degree to which the statement was characteristic of them or most like a response they would give. For statements that were not understood, the students were instructed to draw through all the letters.

Stages 1 and 6 were not included in the final version of the instrument. Current thinking is that fully functioning stage 6 is very rarely reached and that attainment of stage 6 is a development of the adult years (Kohlberg & Turiel, 1973). Therefore moral educators would not be concerned with ascertaining students' thinking at stage 6. Stage 6 is so rarely found that it is not included in the most recently revised scoring guide for the Kohlberg interview (1975). Assessment of stage 1 was not considered important for purposes of moral education since most children progress through this stage easily without need of special educational efforts. According to age trends reported in the literature, adolescents generally move from preconventional thinking to conventional thinking between the ages of 10-13 (Kohlberg & Turiel, 1971). By age 16, middle class urban boys were found to be predominantly stage 3 (Kohlberg & Turiel, 1971). It was assumed that educators would be most concerned with raising seventh grade moral reasoning from stage 2 to stage 3 rather than from stage 1 to stage 2.

Scoring of the Likert Instrument

Scoring of the Likert instrument followed this procedure:

1. Points were awarded on the basis of the letter selected for each statement. Five points were awarded for SC--strongly characteristic; four points were awarded for C--characteristic; three points were awarded for U--undecided; two points were awarded for N--not characteristic; one point was awarded for SN--strongly not characteristic; and zero points for statements whose letters were crossed out. The stronger the degree of preference for a statement the higher the number of points awarded.

2. Points for each statement were added to the points of the other statements representing the same stage. Each stage received six scores which were added for a total score for each stage. A total of 30 points was the highest possible score for any one stage.

3. The stage having the highest number of points was designated the dominant stage. For example, one subject's

score of $\frac{\text{stage}\ \ 2\ \ 3\ \ 4\ \ 5}{\text{points 28-25-23-19}}$ would be described as having a dominate stage 2. In the case of tied scores a transition stage was designated (e.g. a score of 25-25-24-18 was scored 2-3).

Scoring of the Forced-choice Instrument

Scoring of the forced-choice instrument followed this procedure:

1. The number of times a stage was selected over another stage was counted.

2. A tally for each stage was made. One subject's score of $\frac{\text{stage}\ \ 2\ 3\ 4\ 5}{\text{points 4-7-4-3}}$ would indicate that the subject selected stage 2 statements four times over other stage statements, selected stage 3 statements seven times, selected stage 4 statements four times, and selected stage 5 statements three times over statements of another stage.

3. The stage receiving the highest number of points was designated the dominant stage on the questionnaire. All subjects received 18 points; one point for each item. The highest possible score, 0-3-6-9 would indicate that the subject selected the higher stage in all combinations. All scores for each stage were dependent upon the other. If a subject selected a stage 3 statement over a stage 2 statement, an addition of one point to the stage 3 column and zero points to the stage 2 column would result.

Scoring of the Interview

The scoring procedure for the interview (see Appendix C) and the format of the interview itself has undergone a series of revisions since its first use by Kohlberg in 1958. The present scoring procedure is only considered an interim version. A brief description of the development of the interview and the scoring procedure will give the reader some perspective in which to view the present scoring method.

The 1958 interview consisted of nine moral dilemmas and took approximately 2 hours to administer. Kohlberg devised two methods of scoring the interview. The first was a sentence scoring method in which the basic unit of analysis was the sentence. Sentences were scored according to 25 defined aspects of moral judgment. Stage typical sentences representing aspects in the moral dilemmas comprised the guide for scoring. The following is an aspect of moral judgment at stage 3 for the Heinz dilemma:

> Rules
>
> Aspect 22--Reaction of Authority
>
> Exaggerated sympathy for authority, says authority will allow Heinz to get drug legally. (Kohlberg, 1975, p. 82)

Scores for sentences across all stories were converted to stage percentages.

The story rating method used the same nine stories, but used the story rather than the sentence as the unit of analysis. Scores for all stories were converted to percentages and a global score for the entire interview was determined. The model for scoring was stage-typical orientations to the story rather than stage-typical sentences as in the first method.

In 1972 a structural issue rating method reflecting advances in moral developmental theory was devised. The unit of analysis was an "issue" defined by Kohlberg as the "general thing being solved, judged, or reasoned about in the particular dilemma" (Kohlberg, 1975, p. 11). There were generally 5-10 issue scores depending upon the stories used in the interview and the use of issues by the subject. Scores for each issue were converted to percentages and a global score across issues obtained. A structural description of stage orientation on the issues was used as a model for scoring.

In 1974 the standardized issue scoring method was devised. This is the most recent scoring procedure and the method used in the present study. The mimeographed scoring manual (1975) has been expanded to include five parts totaling approximately 500 pages of material. Consequently, only an overview of the procedure will be attempted here. Basic advancements over the structural issue rating method will be described and a step-by-step procedure for scoring by the standardized scoring method will follow.

While the structural interview with its emphasis on freely initiated probes is still the best method for interviewing higher stage subjects who must be probed more thoroughly to articulate their complex ideas, it is a very difficult interview to score. For this reason, a standardized scoring version of the structural format was devised. Standardized forms of the interview were devised by dividing the interview into two forms, A and B, with three stories in each form and two issues defined for each story. The two forms contained parallel stories each of which dealt with the same issues so that only one form was necessary to assess moral stage. The standard interview format is considered semi-structured. The same questions are asked to each subject and probes are intiated only to clarify or elaborate ideas expressed by the subject.

The unit of analysis is again the issue, however, the orientation is to each point elaborated about the issue on a single story rather than to the subject's entire discussion of an issue over several stories (structural issue rating method). Six issue scores are derived (two per story) for the entire interview and a form score computed by converting points for all issues to percentages. As was stated previously, only five issues were scored in the present study.

Certain concepts called "criterion concepts" which best depict perspective and role-taking of each stage are presented in the scoring manual along with the descriptions of structural orientation by stage for each issue. The basic procedure in standard scoring is to match reasoning in the protocol with the "criterion concepts" in the manual. For example, one of the criterion concepts listed under stage 3 in the Heinz story is as follows:

> A.1 It is right to steal the drug because the husband is doing it out of love or the good intentions of saving a life, his wife's life, etc., and this is his only choice in a life and death situation. (Kohlberg, 1975, Manual A, p. 16)

The above criterion concept typifies a personal, affective level of perspective. In standard scoring any reasoning which makes this point for a justification for stealing the drug would be scored 1 point at stage 3 on the Life issue. The procedure set forth in the scoring manual was adhered to as closely as possible in the scoring of the protocols of the present study.

The following is a description of the procedure used in scoring the protocols:

1. The subject's entire response on one issue was read.
2. The scorer then matched criterion points listed in the manual with points of reasoning given in the protocol. For each distinct stage idea elaborated by the subject one point was entered at that stage on the scoring sheet. For example, an idea which fits a stage 2 criterion concept for the issue of punishment will be scored as 1 point at stage 2. If the subject made the same point twice even in response to different questions it was still counted only once. On the other hand, if the subject made 2 or more distinct points

in response to a single question all points were counted at their appropriate stages. A response idea was scored only when it corresponded to a point in the manual. Thus, some points made by the subject were left unscored.

3. The goal of standard scoring was to find those places in a subject's discussion of an issue where he gave two solid pieces of reasoning at a particular stage. When the necessary evidence for one stage was found, reasoning at the next higher stage was investigated.

4. For a given issue, no more than 2 points for each stage were scored, however, oftentimes only 1 point for a stage was found.

5. Ambiguous points were given when 2 specific points could not be found. Ambiguous points (e.g. 3-A; ambiguous stage 3) indicated that the response was basically at a given stage but which contained some elements of a lower stage.

6. Scoring of the issue ended when no reasoning at the next higher stage could be found.

7. After all issues were scored individual issue scores as well as an overall score was determined.

Issue scores were determined by looking at all the points awarded for the given issue. If only one stage received points then a pure stage score was given the subject. If more than one stage was used the stage that received the most number of points was designated the major stage for the issue. In cases where only two stages were used the remaining stage was considered the minor stage and was enclosed in parentheses e.g., 3(2). If the two stages received an equal number of points they were both considered major stages and were written with a hyphen between them, e.g., 2-3. To clarify the assignment of issue scores all possible combinations of scores that could have been obtained from protocols that use only two scores is listed:

Patterns of Issue Scores

$\begin{array}{r|l}2 & 1,1\\3 & 1,1\end{array}$ is scored 2-3

$\begin{array}{r|l}2 & 1,1\\3 & 1\end{array}$ is scored 2(3)

$\begin{array}{r|l}2 & 1,1\\3 & A,A\end{array}$ is scored 2(3)

$\begin{array}{r|l}2 & 1,1\\3 & A,1\end{array}$ is scored 2(3)

$\begin{array}{r|l}2 & 1\\3 & A,1\end{array}$ is scored 3(2)

$\begin{array}{r|l}2 & 1\\3 & A,A\end{array}$ is scored 2-3

$\begin{array}{r|l}2 & \\3 & A\end{array}$ is scored 3

$\begin{array}{r|l}2 & \\3 & 1\end{array}$ is scored 3

(Kohlberg, 1975, p. 8)

Finding the use of three stages on individual issues was not common. In such cases all stages receiving only 1 or ½ points were eliminated. Then the issue was scored in the same manner as the two-stage protocols. For example, with a score of $\begin{array}{r|l}1 & 1\\2 & 1,1\\3 & 1\end{array}$ the first step was to eliminate stages 1 and 3 since each only received 1 point. Stage 2 is the only remaining stage; the issue is scored stage 2.

After having completed all five issues an overall score was calculated. The basic purpose was to determine if the protocol was a pure stage or a mixture of two stages or in rare cases three stages. The percentage of usage by stage was determined by adding up the total number of points over all issues for each stage. Protocols where 76% or more of the total number of points awarded were at the same stage were judged to be purely at that stage. Stages representing less than 25% of the total were treated as non-existent, even in mixed scores. The stages receiving less than 76% but more than 25% of the total points were designated the major or minor stage, e.g. $\frac{2}{3}\left|\begin{array}{l}40\%\\60\%\end{array}\right.$ would be scored 3(2). Stages receiving 50% of the total points were designated major stages, e.g., 2-3.

In the analysis of the data form scores were used in the computation of mean stage and for the correlation coefficients. The number of points received for each stage across issues was used for the stage by stage analysis of the data. Issue scores were used for the computation of inter-rater reliability.

Excerpts from protocol #31 are presented to illustrate how a protocol was scored on the Life issue (taken from the Heinz dilemma):

Q. Is there a good reason for a husband to steal if he doesn't love his wife?

I think yes, because he would be saving a life.

Q. Would it be as right to steal it for a stranger as for his wife?

No.

Q. Why?

Well, I think he would be less likely to steal for a stranger as for his wife. It would still be as legitimate to steal for a stranger to save his life, but he would be more likely to steal for his wife, even if he didn't love her, than for a stranger.

The above protocol is a clear example of stage 3 reasoning which matches criterion concept B-9 in the scoring manual. The criterion concept is stated as follows:

> B 9. It would be right to steal for a stranger, but he would feel less obligation or motivation to do so. (Obligation and affection are somewhat confused). Kohlberg, 1975, p. 23)

In this particular case only one clear point for the Life issue was elaborated. The protocol was scored stage 3 for the issue of life.

As is pointed out in the scoring manual there will often be as much as 50% of an interview that is unscorable. Unscorable responses are primarily of two types. One is where a subject does not provide enough information or fails to answer the "why" of a question. Such is the case in the following excerpt from protocol #31:

> Q. Which is worse letting someone die or stealing?
>
> Letting someone die.
>
> Q. Why?
>
> Letting someone die would be worse than stealing.

Further probes did not elicit any additional information. A second type of response that is considered unscorable are responses that do not discriminate between stages. Such responses are given as frequently at one stage as at another. For example the following responses appear with equal frequency on stage 2 and stage 3 protocols:

> Q. What is the most important thing a good father should recognize in his relation to his son?
>
> Trust. A father should learn to trust his son and to be honest with him. (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 19)

While the issue of trust is clearly addressed, it is not clear whether a stage 2 or stage 3 perspective is intended. Either trust for the sake of relationship (stage 3) or trust for the benefit of oneself (stage 2) could have been the implication. The important task of scoring is to recognize and match scorable responses with criterion concepts presented in the manual.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

The primary objective of the study was to develop a valid and reliable objective measure of preference for moral stage which would approximate the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview in stage scores.

Two objective instruments were designed; one a paired comparison instrument pitting paired stages 2, 3, 4, and 5 statements against each other and a Likert instrument which elicited one of five degrees of preference for statements representing stages 2, 3, 4, and 5. The Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview, form A, (1975), was administered to all subjects to validate the objective instruments. Subjects were 21 undergraduate students and 20 seventh grade students.

The following hypotheses were proposed for each of the three instruments:

1. College subjects show significantly higher scores on stages 3 and 4 than on stages 2 and 5.

2. Seventh grade subjects show significantly higher scores on stages 2 and 3 than on stages 4 and 5.

3. College subjects have a significantly higher moral stage preference than seventh grade subjects.

Inter-rater reliability for the interview responses will be presented first, followed by the analysis of the data from the interview, the analysis of the data from the Likert instrument, and the analysis of the data from the forced-choice instrument. Reliability of the objective instruments will then be presented followed by a final section presenting an analysis of the validity of the objective instruments.

Inter-rater Reliability for the Interview Responses

Three tests for scorer reliability were obtained. For all three tests the form scores of the two raters were compared for extent of agreement.

The first was obtained by having a scorer from Kohlberg's staff (who had been trained by and who had worked closely with Kohlberg) to score blindly 10 randomly selected protocols including five college and five seventh grade interviews. The reliability coefficient between the present researcher's scores and the Kohlberg scorer's scores was .78. (This and all future reports of correlation coefficients were computed as Pearson Product Moment values.) Actual scores on the protocols differed on three comparisons (researcher stage 4 vs. scorer stage 3(4); stage 2 vs. stage 2-3; and stage 3(2) vs. stage 2(3)). (See Chapter III for a complete description of scoring.) The Kohlberg scorer noted that on two of the discrepant interviews, statements were at least a certain stage, but if more fully developed responses had been given, the subject could have been scored a higher stage for certain issues. The researcher, however, gave the "benefit of the doubt" when statements indicated a more structurally advanced state; hence, the two interviews were scored at slightly higher stages.

The researcher also scored 10 interviews secured from the Kohlberg staff and correlated these scores with the scores given by the Kohlberg staff. These protocols were generally not as lengthy as the protocols from the present study, however, the format used for both groups of protocols was form A of the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview (1975). Inter-rater reliability was .97 which indicated a strong degree of consensus with the Kohlberg staff on scoring.

Three independent scorers were trained by the researcher for the purposes of obtaining a third reliability score. This third score would indicate the adequacy of a minimal amount of scorer training. Scorers met with the researcher for approximately four hours in two sessions. In addition, the scorers read selected parts of the scoring manual and familiarized themselves with the scoring guide. Ten interviews not included in the study were scored by each of the scorers during the practice period. The protocols were divided into three groups according to moral judgment situation. Due to the length of the protocols and the time-consuming scoring procedure, it was decided that each scorer would score only one of the dilemma situations for all 41 protocols. Scorer 1 scored blindly all the protocols for situation 1, scorer 2 scored blindly all the protocols for situation 2, and scorer 3 scored blindly all protocols for situation 3. Reliability coefficients were obtained by correlating the stage score given for each issue with the score given by the researcher for each issue.

Reliability coefficients for the five moral issues scored by the three scorers and the researcher were as follows: .40, .37, .45, .41, and .36. These results tend to support Kohlberg's contention that learning to score is learning the theory. It takes several months of practice to become a proficient scorer.

Results of the Interview

The protocols were scored by assigning a stage of 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5, or a mixed stage score (e.g. 4(5), 2-3) for each of the five moral issues discussed during the interview (see Chapter III for a complete description of scoring). Thus each protocol received five issue scores (e.g. 3, 2-3, 2, 3, and 3). These issue scores were converted to points per stage for all issues. In order to insure the equal contribution of each issue to the total tally, each issue was counted as 3 points. Therefore all subjects had a total of 15 points distributed among the stages. A protocol with the following five issue scores: 3, 2-3, 2, 3, and 3 was converted to 10.5 points at stage 3 and 4.5 points at stage 2 (an issue score of 2-3 was interpreted as 1.5 points for both stage 2 and stage 3). The number of points received for each stage was used for the stage by stage analysis of the data.

The data were analyzed with t tests to determine salient differences between responses for each stage. An analysis of variance could not be used due to the unequal distribution of interview scores. The seventh grade subjects yielded no stage 4 or stage 5 points and college subjects yielded no stage 1 or stage 5 points. Thus, variability could not be measured on stages lacking scores.

It was hypothesized that college subjects would score significantly more points on stages 3 and 4 than on stages 2 and 5, and that seventh grade subjects would score significantly higher on stages 2 and 3 than on stages 4 and 5. The t-tests reported in Table 1 indicated that statistically significant differences existed between the stages with the exception of stage 2 vs. 4 on the college sample. The nonsignificance of the college 2 vs. 4 comparison can be explained by the fact that the greatest percentage of points on the interview for college subjects was 66% at stage 3 with stages 2 and 4 receiving 12% and 22% respectively of the total response as shown in Figure 1. In similar fashion, seventh grade subjects scored the largest percentage of responses at stage 2. However, differences between the means of the two adjacent stages (stages 1 and 3) were significant ($p < .05$). It appears that college subjects did score significantly higher on stages 3 and 4 than on stages 2 and 5. Stages 3 and 4 received 88% of the total response on the interview, while stages 2 and 5 received 12% of the total response. This evidence serves to support the first hypothesis.

Table 1

_t_-tests for Differences between the Means of each Stage on the Interview for College and Seventh Grade Subjects

Group	Comparisons	_t_
College	stage 2 vs. 3	9.33**
	stage 3 vs. 4	7.24**
	stage 2 vs. 4	1.66 n.s.
Seventh grade	stage 1 vs. 2	6.53**
	stage 2 vs. 3	4.61**
	stage 1 vs. 3	2.32*

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$.



Figure 1. **Percentage of total response for each stage on the interview for college and seventh grade subjects.**

	Stage				
Group	1	2	3	4	5
Seventh	14	58	28	0	0
College	-	12	66	22	0

There is also adequate evidence to retain the hypothesis that seventh grade subjects score significantly more points on stages 2 and 3 than on stages 4 and 5. Stages 4 and 5 received no points for seventh grade subjects while stages 2 and 3 received 86% of the total response on the interview.

Seventh grade response on stage 1 was 14% of the total interview points. Had this high a percentage been anticipated, a more satisfactory analysis of the data could have been made if stage 1 had been added to the Likert and forced choice instruments. In comparing the instruments stage 1 was eliminated from the analysis since there was no comparable score on the Likert and forced-choice instruments.

It was hypothesized that college subjects have a significantly higher moral stage preference than seventh grade subjects. Mean stage scores for the two groups were college, 3.33; and seventh grade, 2.23. The mean stage score was determined from each subject's overall form score. These stage levels appear consistent with moral developmental theory in that the invariant and sequential nature of moral stage is reflected.

A 2 x 2 repeated measures analysis of variance was used to determine significant differences between college and seventh grade subjects on stages 2 and 3 (see Table 2). A significant interaction effect as well as a significant effect for Stage was found. The total number of points

Table 2

Analysis of Variance for Stages 2 and 3 on Interview

Source of Variation	df	MS	F
Between groups			
A (age)	1	6.8571	1.8113 n.s.
Subjects within groups	40	3.7857	
Within subjects			
B (stage)	1	66.9643	5.0213*
AB	1	817.1905	61.2766**
B x subjects within groups	42	13.3361	

*p <.05.

**p <.01.

Newman-Keuls Tests of Differences Between Means for Stages 2 and 3 in the College and Seventh Grade Samples.

	c$\bar{X}_2$	7$\bar{X}_3$	7$\bar{X}_2$	c$\bar{X}_3$
c$\bar{X}_2$ = 2.8095	-	2.3572	6.8095*	8.0238*
7$\bar{X}_3$ = 5.1667	-	-	4.4523*	5.6666*
7$\bar{X}_2$ = 9.6190	-	-	-	1.2143
c$\bar{X}_3$ = 10.8333	-	-	-	-

Note. c = college sample, 7 = seventh grade sample, subscripts denote stage.

*p <.01.

received on the interview was held constant for all subjects so that there was no effect for Age. A Newman-Keuls test (Kirk, 1968) indicated that the difference between college stage 3 and seventh grade stage 3 was significant ($p < .01$) as were the differences between stage 2 means (see Table 2). Hypothesis 3 can be accepted in view of the significant difference between mean stages of the two groups.

Results of the Likert Instrument

The Likert data were analyzed in the form of points awarded on the basis of the degree of preference for each of the 24 statements. The stronger the degree of preference the higher the number of points awarded. Points for each statement were added to the points of the other statements representing the same stage. A total of 30 points was the highest possible score for any one stage.

The data were analyzed using procedures of analysis of variance and a Newman-Keuls test to determine significant differences between responses for each stage. A 2 x 4 analysis of variance with repeated measures was performed to determine significant mean differences for responses by stage. A significant difference was indicated for Stage and for the interaction of Age x Stage (see Table 3). A Newman-Keuls test (Kirk, 1968), a multiple comparison test, was used to determine significant differences between the means for each group of subjects (see Table 3).

Table 3

Analysis of Variance for Likert Instrument

Source of variation	df	MS	F
Between groups			
A (age)	1	79.8062	2.8037n.s.
Subjects within groups	38	28.4655	
Within subjects			
B (stage)	3	215.2729	15.7768*
AB	3	55.9230	4.0982*
B x subjects within groups	80	13.6458	

*p <.01.

Newman-Keuls Tests of Differences Between Means for Likert Instrument-College Subjects

	$\overline{X}_2$	$\overline{X}_5$	$\overline{X}_4$	$\overline{X}_3$
$\overline{X}_2 = 17.50$	-	2.45	6.10*	6.15*
$\overline{X}_5 = 19.95$	-	-	3.65*	3.70*
$\overline{X}_4 = 23.60$	-	-	-	.05
$\overline{X}_3 = 23.65$	-	-	-	-

*p <.01.

Newman-Keuls Tests of Differences Between Means for Likert Instrument-Seventh Subjects

	$\overline{X}_5$	$\overline{X}_2$	$\overline{X}_4$	$\overline{X}_3$
$\overline{X}_5 = 20.25$	-	1.80	2.40	5.15*
$\overline{X}_2 = 22.05$	-	-	.60	3.35
$\overline{X}_4 = 22.65$	-	-	-	2.75
$\overline{X}_3 = 25.40$	-	-	-	-

*p <.01.

It was hypothesized that the college subjects would score significantly higher on stages 3 and 4 than on stages 2 and 5. For the college group significant differences were found for four of the six comparisons ($\bar{X}_2$ vs. $\bar{X}_4 = 6.10^*$, $\bar{X}_2$ vs. $\bar{X}_3 = 6.15^*$, $\bar{X}_5$ vs. $\bar{X}_4 = 3.65^*$, $\bar{X}_5$ vs. $\bar{X}_3 = 3.70^*$; $p < .01$). The difference between means for $\bar{X}_2$ vs. $\bar{X}_5$ and for $\bar{X}_4$ vs. $\bar{X}_3$ was not significant. Means for stages 2 and 5 were the lowest of the four stages with means for stages 3 and 4 being the highest. In view of the evidence that the college subjects did score significantly higher on stages 3 and 4 than on stages 2 and 5, the hypothesis can be retained.

It was hypothesized that the seventh grade subjects would show significantly higher scores on stages 2 and 3 than on stages 4 and 5. For the seventh grade subjects only one significant difference was found on the Newman-Keuls test. The means of stages 5 and 3 differed significantly ($p < .01$). The results of the analyses shown in Table 3 indicate that the Likert instrument did not differentiate responses on the other stage comparisons. The data for the Likert instrument do not lend support for the second hypothesis.

It was hypothesized that the college subjects would score significantly higher than the seventh grade subjects. The means for each stage for both college and seventh grade groups on the Likert instrument are presented in Figure 2. A Newman-Keuls test was used to determine mean differences



Figure 2. Means for Likert instrument by stage for seventh grade and college subjects.

between the college and seventh grade groups. A significant difference ($p < .01$) between the means of seventh grade and college groups at stage 2 was found but differences between stages 3, 4, and 5 were not significant (see Table 4). The third hypothesis cannot be accepted since the Likert instrument did not distinguish means between the higher stages for the two groups. This is more clearly seen by looking at the mean stage scores for the two groups. The college subjects' average score was 3.62 while the seventh grade mean was 3.25. Mean stage scores were calculated from each subject's overall dominant score.

Seventh grade subjects appeared to have preferred stage 5 statements as being most characteristic of themselves to a greater degree than the college subjects. This could have been due to the tendency of seventh graders to mark statements they did not understand with an "undecided" or "strongly characteristic" rather than to cross the statement out as the directions stated. While it is believed that stage 2 subjects theoretically cannot truly comprehend reasoning at stage 5, only 8 out of 20 subjects crossed out at least one stage 5 statement. Only one subject crossed out as many as three of the possible six statements representing reasoning at stage 5. In contrast, 24 out of 25 seventh graders in a pilot group crossed out at least one stage 5 statement. However, only 5 of the 24 subjects crossed out at least three stage 5 statements. The major difference

Table 4

Newman-Keuls Tests of Differences Between Means on the Likert Instrument for College and Seventh Grade Subjects

	$c\overline{X}_2$	$c\overline{X}_5$	$7\overline{X}_5$	$7\overline{X}_2$	$7\overline{X}_4$	$c\overline{X}_4$	$c\overline{X}_3$	$7\overline{X}_3$
$c\overline{X}_2$ = 17.50	-	2.45	2.75	4.55*	5.15*	6.10*	6.15*	7.90*
$c\overline{X}_5$ = 19.95	-	-	.30	2.10	2.70	3.65	3.70	5.45*
$7\overline{X}_5$ = 20.25	-	-	-	1.80	2.40	3.35	3.40	5.15*
$7\overline{X}_2$ = 22.05	-	-	-	-	.60	1.55	1.60	3.35
$7\overline{X}_4$ - 22.65	-	-	-	-	-	.95	1.00	2.75
$c\overline{X}_4$ - 23.60	-	-	-	-	-	-	.05	1.80
$c\overline{X}_3$ = 23.65	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.75
$7\overline{X}_3$ = 25.40	-	-	-	--	-	-	-	-

*$p < .01$.

between the pilot and the experimental groups was that the pilot group represented a cross section of seventh graders in terms of reading achievement scores while the experimental group was randomly chosen from those subjects reading at grade level. The greater frequency of crossed out statements for the pilot group may have resulted from a confounding of reading comprehension level with moral stage comprehension. The general low frequency of crossing out stage 5 statements in both groups may be due to certain test taking behaviors of the seventh grade age group or to possible efforts to understand stage 5 statements in terms of a lower stage structure. Further research is needed to clarify the issue.

The Likert instrument was rescored by awarding zero points to stage 5 statements marked as "undecided." The rationale for rescoring was the conjecture that seventh grade subjects may have been confused between not understanding a statement and being undecided about it, resulting in a higher number of undecided responses. If this was the case subjects would have received more points for not understanding a statement and marking "undecided" than for understanding the statement and marking "not characteristic." Adjusted means for stage 5 on the Likert instrument were 17.00 points for the college sample and 16.05 points for the seventh grade group out of a possible 30.00 points for each score. While the college mean was higher the difference was still not statistically significant. Thus it appeared unlikely that the seventh graders were marking the "undecided" response for stage 5 statements that were not understood.

Results of the Forced-choice Instrument

The data were analyzed by procedures of analysis of variance and a Newman-Keuls test (Kirk, 1968) to determine salient differences between responses for each stage. The data were analyzed in the form of total points awarded for each stage.

A 2 x 4 analysis of variance with repeated measures was performed to determine significant mean differences for responses of the seventh grade and college groups. The analyses presented in Table 5 indicate that the effects of Stage and the interaction of Stage x Age were significant at the .01 and .05 levels respectively. No effect for Age was found since all subjects scored a constant total number of points on the instrument.

It was hypothesized that the college subjects would score significantly higher on stages 3 and 4 than on stages 2 and 5. The results of the Newman-Keuls test for the college sample are presented in Table 5. Significant differences were found between all means except stages 3 and 4, ($p > .05$). Stages 3 and 4 were the highest means while stages 2 and 5 were the lowest. Thus adequate support is given for the acceptance of the first hypothesis.

It was hypothesized that seventh graders would score significantly higher on stages 2 and 3 than on stages 4 and 5.

Table 5

Analysis of Variance for Forced-choice Instrument

Source of variation	df	MS	F
Between subjects			
A (age)	1	.0562	.9983n.s.
Subjects within groups	38	.0563	
Within subjects			
B (stage)	3	152.3729	38.1514**
AB	3	15.0396	3.7657*
B x subjects within groups	80	3.9939	

*$p < .05$.

**$p < .01$.

Newman-Keuls Tests for Differences Between Means for Forced-choice Instrument College Sample

	$\bar{X}_2$	$\bar{X}_5$	$\bar{X}_4$	$\bar{X}_3$
$\bar{X}_2$ - 1.60	-	2.25*	4.25*	4.95*
$\bar{X}_5$ = 3.85	-	-	2.00*	2.70*
$\bar{X}_4$ = 5.85	-	-	-	.70
$\bar{X}_3$ = 6.55	-	-	-	-

*$p < .01$.

Newman-Keuls Tests for Differences Between Means for Forced-choice Instrument Seventh Grade Sample

	$\bar{X}_5$	$\bar{X}_2$	$\bar{X}_4$	$\bar{X}_3$
X_5 = 2.60	-	.70	3.00*	3.90*
X_2 = 3.30	-	-	2.30*	3.20*
X_4 = 5.60	-	-	-	.90
X^3 = 6.50	-	-	-	-

*$p < .01$.

The results of the Newman-Keuls test for the seventh grade sample indicated that significant differences were found for all but two mean comparisons (see Table 5). Mean differences for stages 2 and 5 and for stages 3 and 4 were not significant ($\underline{p} < .05$). Mean scores were highest for stages 3 and 4 and lowest for stages 2 and 5, thus, the hypothesis that seventh graders would score significantly higher on stages 2 and 3 than on stages 4 and 5 cannot be supported.

It was hypothesized that college subjects would score significantly higher than the seventh grade subjects. The means by stage for both the college and seventh grade groups on the forced-choice instrument are shown in Figure 3. The similarity of the seventh grade and college curves indicates that the forced-choice instrument did not appear to distinguish between scores for the college and the seventh grade subjects. A Newman-Keuls test was used to determine significant mean differences between the college and seventh grade groups (see Table 6). No significant differences between stage 2, stage 3, stage 4, or stage 5 for the two groups was found. Mean stage scores, calculated from the subjects' overall dominant score on the forced-choice instrument were college, 3.45; and seventh grade, 3.33. The hypothesis that the college subjects would score significantly higher in terms of stage preference than the seventh grade subjects cannot be accepted.



Figure 3. Means for forced-choice instrument by stage for seventh grade and college subjects.

Table 6

Newman-Keuls Tests for Differences Between Means on the Forced-choice Instrument for College and Seventh Grade Subjects

	$c\bar{X}_2$	$7\bar{X}_5$	$7\bar{X}_2$	$c\bar{X}_5$	$7\bar{X}_4$	$c\bar{X}_4$	$7\bar{X}_3$	$c\bar{X}_3$
$c\bar{X}_2 = 1.60$	-	1.00	1.70	2.25*	4.00*	4.25*	4.90*	4.95*
$7\bar{X}_5 = 2.60$	-	-	.70	1.25	3.00*	3.25*	3.90*	3.95*
$7\bar{X}_2 = 3.30$	-	-	-	.55	2.30*	2.55*	3.20*	3.25*
$c\bar{X}_5 = 3.85$	-	-	-	-	1.75*	2.00*	2.65*	2.70*
$7\bar{X}_4 = 5.60$	-	-	-	-	-	.25	.90	.95
$c\bar{X}_4 = 5.85$	-	-	-	-	-	-	.65	.70
$7\bar{X}_3 = 6.50$	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.05
$c\bar{X}_3 = 6.55$	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

*$p < .01$.

Reliability of Objective Instruments

The reliability of the Likert and the forced-choice instruments was measured by the procedure of test-retest reliability. Thirty-two college undergraduates were administered the Likert test and were retested two weeks later under similar conditions. A reliability coefficient of .75 was obtained for the Likert instrument. Reliability coefficients obtained for each stage were as follows: stage 2, *r*=.75; stage 3, *r*=.77; stage 4, *r*=.81; and stage 5, *r*=.66.

Two reliability coefficients were obtained for the forced-choice instrument. A sample of 18 seventh graders was administered the forced-choice instrument and was retested two weeks later. The average correlation across stages was *r*=.31. The following correlation coefficients were obtained for each stage: stage 2, *r*=.31; stage 3, *r*=.28; stage 4, *r*=.49; and stage 5, *r*=.17.

Twenty-three college undergraduates were administered identical forms of the forced-choice test one week apart. The following reliability coefficients were obtained: stage 2, *r*=.26; stage 3, *r*=.63; stage 4, *r*=.66; and stage 5, *r*=.74. The low reliability coefficient for stage 2 is misleading since zero scores for stage 2 were included in the computation. The average reliability coefficient across stages was .57.

The low reliability of the forced-choice instrument for the seventh grade subjects can be accounted for, in part, by the inability of some subjects to read the instrument. The teacher who administered the instrument noted that students often asked to have sentences or words read.

Suggestive of the lower reliability of the forced-choice instrument was the frequent comment made by subjects that the forced-choice instrument was more "confusing"; meaning that it was difficult to select one response over another.

Validation of Objective Instruments

Table 7 summarizes the results obtained by correlating each objective instrument with the interview. Coefficients for the first two columns were obtained separately for each age group by stage. A combined correlation coefficient was obtained by combining age groups for each stage. A single correlation coefficient was obtained by combining both age groups and correlating the dominant stage score of the objective instrument with the form score from the interview for each subject. This overall coefficient was expected to be the most meaningful indicator of validity since it compared a dominant stage score rather than points received for each stage. For educational purposes predominance of stage is most meaningful in assessing moral growth rather than fluctuations in points awarded to stages on the objective instruments.

Although none of the reported correlations was high enough to consider either test instrument a valid test for the kinds of thinking presumably elicited in the interview,

Table 7

Validity Coefficients for all Instruments by Group

	College[a]	Seventh[b]	Combined Groups[c]
L2I2[d]	-.01	-.40	.30
L3I3	.43	.27	.03
L4I4	.23	-	-
L vs. I	correlation coefficient computed by dominant stage = .41		
F2I2	.33	-.24	.42
F3I3	.31	.01	.13
F4I4	.25	-	-
F vs. I	correlation coefficient computed by dominant stage = .68		

[a] *n* = 21.

[b] *N* = 20.

[c] *n* = 41.

[d] L = Likert instrument, I = interview, F = forced-choice instrument, numerals denote stage.

the results were encouraging. The correlation coefficient for the interview and forced-choice instrument was .68, but the correlation coefficient for the interview and the Likert instrument was .41. The greater tendency of the seventh grade group to score a higher predominant stage on the Likert than on the forced-choice measure may have resulted in the lower correlation coefficient for the Likert vs. the interview.

It is of interest to note that on the Likert and forced-choice instruments 95% and 90%,respectively, of the college subjects scored within one stage of that attained on the interview (see Table 8). The percentage of seventh grade subjects scoring either the same stage, a one-half stage higher or a full stage higher was 75% on the Likert and 70% on the forced-choice measure. The most striking comparisons were between the percentage of subjects scoring the identical stage on the interview and objective instrument. While 43% and 48% of the college subjects scored the same stage (as the interview score) on the Likert and forced-choice instruments respectively, only 20% of the seventh grade subjects scored the same stage on the Likert and only 10% of the seventh grade group scored the same stage on the forced-choice in comparison to the interview scores (see Table 8).

Comparison with Schwarz (1974)

A comparison of the difference scores reported here with those reported by Schwarz (1974, p. 85) for a multiple choice

Table 8

Distribution of Difference Scores between Form Score on the Interview and the Dominant Stage on Forced-choice, and Likert Instruments for College and Seventh Grade

Likert			Forced-Choice		
College			College		
Degree of difference	f	%	Degree of difference	f	%
+1½ stages	1	.05	+1½ stages	1	05
+1 stage	8	.38	+1 stage	6	28
+½ stage	3	14	½ stage	3	14
same stage	9	43	same stage	10	48
			-1 stage	1	05
Seventh Grade			Seventh Grade		
Degree of difference	f	%	Degree of difference	f	%
+3 stages	2	.10			
+2 stages	3	15	+2 stages	4	20
+1 stage	6	30	+1½ stages	2	10
+½ stage	5	25	+1 stage	11	55
same stage	4	20	+½ stage	1	05
			same stage	2	10

Note. Degrees of difference indicate difference from the interview score.

instrument administered to a similar college sample indicated that some gains had been made in more closely approximating the interview scores. Schwarz's difference score was obtained by subtracting the highest twice-attained scores on the open-end instrument from the dominant stage scores on the objective test. The highest twice-attained score would tend to be higher than the form score calculated in the present study which would result in larger difference scores for the present study. Despite this discrepancy, both the Likert and forced-choice instruments appeared to be more accurate instruments than the objective instrument first attempted in the Schwarz study (1974). While 50% of the Schwarz college subjects scored at least two stages higher on the objective instrument than their twice highest reached stage on the open-end instrument, only 5% of the college subjects in the present study scored one and a half stages higher than their score on the interview. Eight percent of the college subjects in the Schwarz study made the same score on both instruments. The percentage of college subjects attaining the same score as the interview on the Likert and forced-choice instruments was 43% and 48% respectively.

Comparison with Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg (1969)

In contrast to Rest, Kohlberg, and Turiel (1969) who found that subjects preferred +1 and +2 statements to an equal degree, the results of the present study indicate that not all subjects preferred +1 and +2 statements to the same degree. Ninety to ninety-five percent of the college subjects preferred either their own stage of usage or the next stage higher.[1] The Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg (1969) subjects were fifth and eighth graders and would be expected to compare more closely with the seventh graders of the present study. Seventh grade subjects in this study showed a greater tendency to select +1 and +2 statements in similar fashion to Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg's subjects. None of the college subjects showed a predominant preference for +2 statements whereas 20 to 25% of the seventh graders preferred a stage at least 2 stages higher than their own (see Table 8). This might suggest a number of possible explanations; one being a possible test-taking behavior peculiar to elementary and junior high subjects. Level of comprehension of higher stage statements may explain the age difference for preference of moral stage. The present study was not designed to ascertain comprehension of statements on the objective instruments.

While the Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg study (1969) data is inconclusive and is not directly comparable with the data presented here, it does pose some interesting questions about the nature of preference and assimilation of moral structures.

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[1] One difficulty in comparing the results is that Rest et al. (1969) did not include the subjects' own stage in the sets of advice from which the subjects made their choice of best advice. Only in the case of stage 1 was an exception made; stage 1 subjects were given their own stage of advice in place of -1 stage advice. These subjects rejected their own stage advice in preference for +1 and +2 stage advice.

Two alternative theories of preference and assimilation are suggested (Rest, Turiel, & Kohlberg, 1969). Piaget has presented an equilibrium view of stage development (Turiel, 1969) which suggests that an individual prefers and assimilates new material to his own equilibrated stage structure. An individual's next preference would be the +1 stage which he gradually would attempt to use. This equilibrium theory does not fully explain preference and assimilation of statements made by others, however, the results of the college sample would tend to support this notion.

A "Platonic level" view is supported by the Rest, Turiel, Kohlberg (1969) findings. The individual is believed to possess an innate appreciation for more mature stages and, therefore, will prefer the highest level he can comprehend to some degree rather than preferring his own level or the one above it.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS

Kohlberg's cognitive developmental approach to moral development has revolutionized conceptualizations about what moral education in the public schools should be. Traditional moral education programs were concerned with the internalization of societal rules and norms and success was measured in terms of virtuous behavior. Kohlberg has put forth a moral education program designed to help students progress through a sequence of moral stages which parallel movement through cognitive stage structures and social cognitive stages. The program is based upon empirical research demonstrating that individuals pass through as many as six invariant and sequential stages that are universal structures for viewing moral issues. Students engage in discussion on moral issues with their peers who are not all at the same moral stage. Research has shown that students progress most easily to a higher stage through exposure to one stage higher than their own. Dissonance is created within students during the discussion process when they realize they cannot adequately solve the moral issue based upon their own reasoning. If they are cognitively capable, reasoning at a next higher stage is then considered.

In order to assess moral stage transition, to match students' reasoning with a stage higher than their own level, and to select appropriate dilemmas for discussions, educators must have a practical means of assessing moral stage. At the outset of this study, Kohlberg's interview and the open-end instrument devised by Schwarz (1974), both of which require a complicated scoring procedure, were the only instruments which were found to be available. A previous attempt to devise a multiple choice instrument with six choices, one for each stage, was unsuccessful because subjects selected the highest stage statements presented regardless of their own stage of moral reasoning (Schwarz, 1974). Recently Rest (1975) has devised a multiple choice instrument, suitable for high school and adult subjects which has a correlation coefficient of .60 or better with Kohlberg's interview.

The purpose of the study was to design a reliable objective instrument that would correlate highly with the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview (1975). Two instruments were devised after a series of revisions and pilot tests. The two instruments, one a Likert scale and the other a forced-choice format, were administered along with the Kohlberg interview to a group of 20 seventh graders and to a group of 21 college undergraduate students. A time period of one week was interposed between the administration of the interview and the objective instruments.

As hypothesized the college sample gave the highest percentage of responses at stages 3 and 4 rather than at stages 2 and 5 on all three instruments. It was hypothesized that seventh graders would show significantly higher scores on stages 2 and 3 than on stages 4 and 5. Seventh grade data supported the hypothesis only for the interview. Seventh grade scores on the two objective instruments were not significantly differentiated from the scores of the college sample.

Test-retest reliability coefficients for the Likert instrument and the forced-choice instrument were .75 and .57, respectively. Correlation coefficients computed to assess concurrent validity were .41 for the Likert instrument with the interview and .68 for the forced-choice instrument with the interview. The two instruments in their present form appear to yield considerably closer approximations to the interview when compared with previous attempts to devise an objective instrument. While the present instruments are not valid substitutes for the interview, it is optimistic that 90-95% of the college subjects preferred the same stage or the stage higher than the subjects' own stage of usage (the comparable result for the seventh grade sample was 70-75%). Even with this kind of result, teachers could obtain an approximation of either what stage students were actually using or what stage they preferred. The preferred stage was usually one stage higher than their usual stage and this is the stage that teachers would want to expose to students in a moral discussion.

Based upon the encouraging results of this study the researcher concludes that a valid and reliable objective instrument is indeed possible. It appears that either format--a Likert scale or a forced-choice scheme--will yield similar results. It may be that test-taking behaviors of age groups make one format more suitable than another for different age subjects. Much more work will be needed before an instrument suitable for adolescents can be validated.

Recommendations

The tendency for seventh graders to prefer higher stages than the college subjects as compared to their own stage of usage indicated a possible test-taking behavior peculiar to this younger age group. Additional examination of the relationship between preference, comprehension, and assimilation of higher stages would provide insight for those interested in constructing and using objective tools to assess moral stage. It would be valuable to answer questions such as these: What is the relationship between comprehension and preference for moral statements made by others? Does preference for higher stages indicate readiness to assimilate higher stages? Does the nature of stage preference change with increased moral maturity? The research of Rest (1968) and Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg (1969) has not provided definitive answers to these questions. It might also be recommended that sophisticated, nonsensical statements resembling stage 5 statements be added to the instruments. The addition of these statements might provide a measure of true comprehension of higher stage statements.

Perhaps an instrument more suited for adolescents would be one composed of statements from stages 1, 2, 3, and 4. The present instruments could be altered to include stage 1 and to omit stage 5.

It is recommended that a revision of the objective instruments be attempted after the final revision of the Kohlberg interview. Provided that a high correlation with the interview is desired and that statements from the interview are incorporated into the test format, the ability of the objective instruments to distinguish stages is only as good as the measurement it is based upon. The interview and scoring procedure are only considered in a formative phase at present. The Kohlberg staff is well aware of the weaknesses of the scoring procedure and are presently working to find a final, precise version (Kohlberg summer workshop, 1975).

The data from this study provide a most compelling argument for the need for moral education programs in the college environment as well as the public school milieu. The data from the study showed that only 6 college subjects out of 21 were using stage 4 reasoning to any considerable degree. While this finding would probably not be unusually different from other college samples it points out the need for increased moral stimulation. The college population should be most capable of moving to some principled level of reasoning and certainly to stage 4 reasoning when provided with opportunities to engage in discussion about moral conflict. Family life courses provide an ideal context in which to consider issues of human rights and contract. Mature moral reasoning is essential to a more adequate understanding of human relationships and, therefore, should have some consideration in a course which deals with a variety of human relationships--familial, marital, societal, and interpersonal relationships.

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Appendix A

Likert Instrument

Age______Class__________Grade Point Average______Sex________

The following statements refer to responses people might give to the question: "Why should promises be kept?" Please read each statement and circle the letter on the left indicating the degree to which the statement is characteristic of you or most like a response you would give. (SC strongly characteristic, C characteristic, U undecided, N not characteristic, SN strongly not characteristic.) Some statements may contain words which you do not understand. Draw a line through all the letters (example: ~~SC C U N SN~~) if you do not understand the statement. There are no right or wrong answers. Answer as honestly as you can.

SC C U N SN 1. Friendships are built in learning to trust others. Breaking promises tears down trust.

SC C U N SN 2. Making and keeping promises allows people to have an informal and personal method of obligating themselves to undertake certain actions. The conventions of mutual trust and fidelity are invoked when promises are made.

SC C U N SN 3. It's important to keep promises with everyone. There are times when we need friends to trust.

SC C U N SN 4. If you break a promise to someone, you cannot count on him any longer to keep promises to you.

SC C U N SN 5. Everyone wants others to have a good impression of them from the very beginning. Keeping promises helps others build a better image of a person and gives them a clue to a person's character.

SC C U N SN 6. If you do not keep a promise, then you will not get to be good friends with that person.

SC C U N SN 7. An obligation is a definite duty. If a person commits himself to a promise, he should have the integrity and character to carry it out.

SC C U N SN 8. The bond of trust is broken if promises are not kept. This causes a loss of faith in the promiser and often a disappointment of expectations.

SC C U N SN 9. Keeping promises is one way a person can help build a more just world which is not based on force or authority.

SC C U N SN 10. Keeping promises is a part of the general social contract between men which defines membership in society.

SC C U N SN 11. There will not be any trust in one another without a person first proving that he can be trusted, therefore, people should live up to their promises.

SC C U N SN 12. A person sometimes feels a friend cannot be trusted when a promise is not kept.

SC C U N SN 13. Promises involve a special commitment that should not be broken.

SC C U N SN 14. Promises should be kept to maintain self-respect and integrity.

SC C U N SN 15. Keeping promises helps build a trustful world where everyone enjoys optimum freedom to live the way they want to while not having to worry about others hurting their freedom.

SC C U N SN 16. If a promise is broken a person might not be your friend anymore.

SC C U N SN 17. Promises should be kept because when human trust is violated that tears down any possible goodness that can come out of human interaction. The real core of personal interaction is based on trust.

SC C U N SN 18. When a person keeps a promise, it establishes a good impression about that person and a mutual trust.

SC C U N SN 19. A promise should be kept to avoid the disappointment of the person who will not get what was promised.

SC C U N SN 20. Social relationships depend on people keeping their word to prevent conflict and to maintain order.

SC C U N SN 21. Promises have a sacred character; they represent a commitment. If the circumstances of the promise don't change, neither should the promise.

SC C U N SN 22. A promise should be kept because if you keep your promise you can be believed in. More people will believe in you.

SC C U N SN 23. Social actions are based to some extent on a sense of trust or obligation even between strangers. If everyone broke promises, we would have no basis for our actions.

SC C U N SN 24. Keeping promises is basic to the notion of trust. Trust is basic to human relationships, which is essential to meaningful existence.

Appendix B

Forced-Choice Instrument

Age______Class_______Grade Point Average______Sex________

Read the question and the sets of statements which follow. Each set contains two statements, a and b. Circle the letter of the statement (a or b) which is most characteristic of a response you would give.

Example: Why should a promise be kept?

1. [✓ a] Keeping promises promotes goodwill.
   b Keeping promises encourages faith in people.

There are no right or wrong answers. Answer as honestly as you can.

Why should a promise be kept?

1. a) The bond of trust is broken if promises are not kept. This causes a loss of faith in the promiser and often a disappointment of expectations.
   b) Keeping promises is part of the general social contract between men which defines membership in society.
2. a) The bond of trust is broken if promises are not kept. This causes a loss of faith in the promiser and often a disappointment of expectations.
   b) An obligation is a definite duty. If a person commits himself to a promise, he should have the integrity and character to carry it out.
3. a) Promises involve a special commitment that should not be broken.
   b) Keeping promises is a part of the general social contract between men which defines membership in society.

4. a) Keeping promises is a part of the general social contract between men which defines membership in society.

   b) A promise should be kept to avoid the disappointment of the person who will not get what was promised.

5. a) Promises have a sacred character; they represent a commitment. If the circumstances of the promise don't change, neither should the promise.

   b) It's important to keep promises with everyone. There are times when we need friends to trust.

6. a) If you break a promise to someone, you cannot count on him any longer to keep promises to you.

   b) When a person keeps a promise, it establishes a good impression about that person and a mutual trust.

7. a) Keeping promises helps build a trustful world where everyone enjoys optimum freedom to live the way they want to while not having to worry about others hurting their freedom.

   b) Everyone wants others to have a good impression of them from the very beginning. Keeping promises helps others build a better image of a person and gives them a clue to a person's character.

8. a) Promises should be kept because when human trust is violated that tears down any possible goodness that can come out of human interaction. The real core of personal interaction is based on trust.

   b) There will not be any trust in one another without a person first proving that he can be trusted, therefore, people should live up to their promises.

9. a) Keeping promises helps build a trustful world where everyone enjoys optimum freedom to live the way they want to while not having to worry about others hurting their freedom.

   b) An obligation is a definite duty. If a person commits himself to a promise, he should have the integrity and character to carry it out.

10. a) Keeping promises is one way a person can help build a more just world which is not based on force or authority.

    b) If you break a promise to someone, you cannot count on him any longer to keep promises to you.

11. a) Promises have a sacred character; they represent a commitment. If the circumstances of the promise don't change, neither should the promise.

    b) Keeping promises is the way a person can help build a more just world which is not based on force or authority.

12. a) Friendships are built in learning to trust others. Breaking promises tears down trust.

    b) Social relationships depend on people keeping their word to prevent conflict and to maintain order.

13. a) A person sometimes feels a friend cannot be trusted when a promise is not kept.

    b) A promise should be kept because if you keep your promise you can be believed in. More people will believe in you.

14. a) If you do not keep a promise, then you will not get to be good friends with that person.

    b) Promises involve a special commitment that should not be broken.

15. a) Friendships are built in learning to trust others. Breaking promises tears down trust.

    b) If you do not keep a promise, then you will not get to be good friends with that person.

16. a) Promises should be kept to maintain self-respect and integrity.

    b) If you break a promise to someone, you cannot count on him any longer to keep promises to you.

17. a) There will not be any trust in one another without a person first proving that he can be trusted, therefore, people should live up to their promises.

    b) Social actions are based to some extent on a sense of trust or obligation even between strangers. If everyone broke promises we would have no basis for our actions.

18. a) Keeping promises is basic to the notion of trust. Trust is basic to human relationships, which is essential to meaningful existence.

    b) It's important to keep promises with everyone. There are times when we need friends to trust.

Appendix C

The Research Instruments

Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview (Taken from Kohlberg, 1975)

Form A

Story I. In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

1. Should Heinz steal the drug? Why?
2. Which is worse, letting someone die or stealing? Why?

2a. What does the value of life mean to you, anyway?

3. Is there a good reason for a husband to steal if he doesn't love his wife?

4. Would it be as right to steal it for a stranger as his wife? Why?
5. Suppose he was stealing it for a pet he loved dearly. Would it be right to steal for the pet? Why?
6. Heinz steals the drug and is caught. Should the judge sentence him or should he let him go free? Why?
7. The judge thinks of letting him go free. What would be his reasons for doing so?
8. Thinking in terms of society, what would be the best reasons for the judge to give him some sentence?
9. Thinking in terms of society, what would be the best reasons for the judge to not give him some sentence?

Story II. Joe is a fourteen-year-old boy who wanted to go to camp very much. His father promised him he could go if he saved up the money for it himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper route and saved up the $40 it cost to go to camp and a little more besides. But just before camp was going to start, his father changed his mind. Some of his friends decided to go on a special fishing trip, and Joe's father was short of the money it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money he had saved from the paper route. Joe didn't want to give up going to camp, so he thought of refusing to give his father the money.

1. Should Joe refuse to give his father the money? Why?
2. Is there any way in which the father has a right to tell the son to give him the money? Why?
3. What is the most important thing a good father should recognize in his relation to his son? Why that?
4. What is the most important thing a good son should recognize in his relation to his father? Why that?

Story III. Two young men, brothers, had gotten into serious trouble. They were secretly leaving town in a hurry and needed money. Karl, the older one, broke into a store and stole $500. Bob, the younger one, went to a retired old man who was known to help people in town. Bob told the man that he was very sick and he needed $500 to pay for the operation. Really he wasn't sick at all and he had no intention of paying the man back. Although the man didn't know Bob very well, he loaned him the money. So Bob and Karl skipped town, each with $500.

1. Which would be worse, stealing like Karl or cheating like Bob? Why?
2. Suppose Bob had gotten the loan from a bank with no intention of paying it back. Is borrowing from the bank or the old man worse? Why?
3. What do you feel is the worst thing about cheating the old man?

4. Why shouldn't someone steal from a store?
5. What is the value or importance of property rights?
6. Which would be worse in terms of society's welfare, cheating like Bob or stealing like Karl? Why?
7. Would your conscience feel worse if you cheated like Bob or stole like Karl? Why?
8. What do people mean by conscience? What do you think of as your conscience and what does it do?

8a. What or who tells you what is right or wrong?

9. Is there anything about your sense of conscience which is special or different from that of most people? What?
10. How do people get their consciences? (How did you get or develop a conscience?)