

The University of North Carolina
at Greensboro

JACKSON LIBRARY



CQ

no. 753

Gift of
Ronald A. Goodbread
COLLEGE COLLECTION

GOODBREAD, RONALD A. The Heart Attack of President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Its Political Implications for His Candidacy for Re-election. (1967) Directed by: Dr. Richard Bardolph. pp. 145.

Seldom has the nation been so preoccupied with an individual's personal decision as it was in late 1955 and early 1956 with the personal dilemma of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. In September, 1955, he had suffered a "moderate coronary thrombosis" which almost everyone took to signify his exclusion from the next year's race for the Presidency. Then with his rapid recovery, the President seemed to take on an intense interest in what was going on around him and his candidacy became more and more of a monopolizing possibility.

President Eisenhower's decision to run in 1956 involved more than just his own well-being. He was dealing with the fate of his country, his party and in great measure the entire world. While recuperating in an imposed inertia at his Gettysburg farm in the last two months of 1955, he experienced a political renaissance. He had almost lost his life and now he had it back again. He had a second chance at the Presidency and he suddenly recognized that he could not let it pass. For politics was now synonymous with life itself.

Even if the heart attack had not occurred Eisenhower might have been persuaded to run for a second term merely for the reason that there simply was no other Republican who could win. But he would have been an unwilling candidate. With the experience of the heart attack he realized that he had not done all he had set out to do - nor had he done it in the manner he should have. Now he had a zeal

to try it again. In short, the "New Eisenhower" of 1956-1961 can be dated from the heart attack crisis of 1955-1956.

Eisenhower's failure to bring results to his fervent desire to rebuild the Republican Party into one of moderation and youth was dramatically emphasized to him during the coronary crisis. The party had had only him in 1952 and now - when at first he felt he should retire - they again came to him saying he was all they had. They had not learned; they had depended on only one man, in spite of his repeated warnings. And he, too, was partly to blame. All during his first term he had been "above politics" and had expected to accomplish this goal. With the Second Chance he was offered after the illness, he set about his tasks with renewed determination and exhibited the qualities and accomplishments that embody the entire case for his present-day defenders. The heart attack, then, rather than excluding a second term, almost necessitated one.

Yet there were also other failures - failures to which even the cardiac accident did not give perspective. And these passed without notice. They were ignored not by Eisenhower - but by those thousands of Americans who felt that they had almost lost him and now they had him back. He had not blundered - the fault was with others. This, too, is attributable to the heart attack which is the single dramatic event that goes a very long way in explaining many of the other enigmas of the Eisenhower Interlude.

APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis has been approved by the following
committee of the Faculty of the Graduate School at The
University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

Thesis
Director

Richard Barndt

Oral Examination
Committee Members

Richard N. Dement

J. B. Bryant

Betty Carol Collette

9-29-67
Date of Examination

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Responsibility for the composition of the factual content of this thesis and for the conclusions herein is entirely that of the author. Other factors, however, were vital to the completion of this work. The time and effort of the members of the Examination Committee entitles its members to a note of special merit for undertaking a prodigious effort. The most important factor, though, has been supplied by Dr. Richard Hardapt. His contribution has been not only that of timely advice on content and style but also in providing the highest example for which every aspiring teacher should strive.

Credit in the inspiration department also goes in great measure to Miss Dorothy Smith.

R. Goodbread -

28 July 1967
133 North Spencer Annex
University of North Carolina
at Greensboro

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Responsibility for the compilation of the factual content of this thesis and for the conclusions herein is entirely that of the author. Other factors, however, were vital to the composition of this work. The time and effort of the members of the Examination Committee entitles its members to a note of special merit for undertaking a prodigious effort. The most important factor, though, has been supplied by Dr. Richard Bardolph. His contribution has been not only that of timely advice on content and style but also in providing the highest example for which every aspiring teacher should strive.

Credit in the inspiration department also goes in great measure to Miss Dorothy Smith.

R. Goodbread -

20 July 1967
135 North Spencer Annex
University of North Carolina
at Greensboro

INTRODUCTION

A well-respected historian once told this writer that there were "two Eisenhowers." One was the public figure who carefully maintained an image of "wholesome Americanism," who measured his words and actions in public - who was in short content to preserve the status quo. The other was the private man who was just as apt to use blistering profanity in describing General Douglas McArthur as he was when he missed a golf ball. To a large extent, the professor was correct. But what made the Eisenhower ambivalence significant is that the private self was just the opposite of the public self. This duality goes deeper than just a matter of images; it is a contrast of Presidents. There were two Presidents Eisenhower. The first was the First Term Eisenhower; the second was President Eisenhower the Cardiac Victim. This work is an attempt to provide some insight into the origins of what political analysts termed the "New Eisenhower" (i.e., the second Eisenhower) of 1956-61.

While many question that there was any such thing as a "New Eisenhower" their position is dubious. The very facts of the heart attack, the death of Dulles, the advent of Nixon and the entrance into the age of intercontinental ballistic missiles, could not allow even a man as static as the so-called political scientists claim Eisenhower to have been, to remain unchanged.

More than anything else, however, it was Dwight Eisenhower's attack that changed him. It provided, in short, the difference between

a particular President's views of political power and his purpose. This was the second (or "new") Eisenhower. Had he not suffered the attack it is highly possible that Eisenhower would have retired after one term. Had he died during the crisis it is interesting to speculate as to what kind of President might have been revealed by accounts similar to those in Emmett John Hughes' kiss-and-tell Ordeal of Power or in at-the-elbow accounts of a dead President like Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s Thousand Days.

Had President Eisenhower's life been taken by the coronary, it would have rendered unlikely, if not utterly improbable John F. Kennedy's election in 1960 and death in 1963, the rise to the Presidency of the United States of Richard M. Nixon, the probable ascendancy of the center of the Republican Party, and the maintenance of the theretofore persistent bar between Lyndon B. Johnson and the White House. After that, who can say?

An attempt has been made to reconstruct what has heretofore not been comprehensively reported, with attention to detail, yet without being overly microscopic in the manner of Jim Bishop or William Manchester. One of the difficulties in compiling this work has been the source material. It has almost all been Republican-oriented and distinctly favorable to the Eisenhower performance. The national press of the 1950's was overwhelmingly Republican and the liberals and/or Democrats believed, as Rexford G. Tugwell was contending as late as June 1967, that Eisenhower "had not wanted very much of anything done; but anyone who says that now is attacked furiously by

his partisans."¹ Believing that Eisenhower's were years of "do-nothingism" they wrote little of a constructive nature on them insofar as source material goes. The problem is compounded seriously by difficulties in interpretation of memoirs. The accounts of a certain highly important luncheon meeting by Sherman Adams and Richard Nixon, for instance, will vary widely. An example, in translation, of Adams is witnessed by the following:

WHAT ADAMS SAID

Eisenhower's conscientious sense of duty and his deep personal pride made it impossible for him to leave his work until he could do so with a feeling of satisfaction that he had it finished or that he had given all he had to give it.

WHAT ADAMS MEANT

Eisenhower's consciousness that there was no other Republican who could lead the party to victory in 1956 and vindicate and continue his policies, made it impossible for him to retire in spite of his heart attack.

After the heart attack, virtually everyone counted the President out of the 1956 race. Then with his rapid recovery his candidacy seemed to be more and more a probability. It was at that press conference that the theme of this paper was discussed

1 Rexford G. Tugwell, "The President and His Helpers," POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, LXXXII (June 1967), 255.

2 Sherman Adams, FIRSTHAND REPORT (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 220.

when the following exchanges took place summing up the major concerns of this paper:

Q. MERRIMAN SMITH, UPI: Mr. President, could you tell us, sir, when you arrived at a positive decision?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I have tried so - I will say this one thing: ... I will say that I was arguing about it yesterday morning. [Laughter]

* * *

Q. WILLIAM S. WHITE, NEW YORK TIMES: Mr. President can you tell us, sir, what the most decisive consideration was for you in the decision you have reached?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is very difficult ... But it's - when you come down to comparisons, I am not certain what influences a man most in this world.

Q. HAZEL MARKER, NBC: Mr. President, can you tell us had you made up your mind previous to your heart attack that you would run for a second term?

THE PRESIDENT: You know, Miss Marker, that is one secret I don't think I will ever tell anybody. Possibly, in my papers, that can be opened 25 years after I have passed on, why, it will be told.³

Thus, as was typical of most Eisenhower replies at press conferences, the President did not answer any of these important questions directly. The author has therefore attempted to do so. Briefly stated, he has concerned himself with seeking answers to the following problem areas:

- 1) What were the circumstances surrounding President Eisenhower's heart attack?

³ PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1956 (Washington: Federal Register Division, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 267 and 271-72.

- 2) What was the nation's reaction to it?
- 3) To what extent was the country subsequently governed by a White House clique during the crisis?
- 4) Was Vice President Nixon systematically excluded from the inner workings of the government by any combination of high-ranking Administration officials?
- 5) To what extent did Eisenhower's associates play politics with the heart attack crisis?
- 6) What were the most important factors in persuading President Eisenhower to seek re-election?
- 7) What effect did the heart attack have on his decision and on his conception of the Presidency?

The time period herein covered is a range from September 1955, when the heart attack occurred, to February 1956, when the President announced for re-election. This paper is concerned only with the President's heart attack and its effects and does not consider any of the President's subsequent illnesses, such as his ileitis attack of 9 June 1956. Neither does it attempt - because of the material researched - to present a national consensus of the problems herein discussed, except insofar as it is reflected by the national news magazines and the New York Times.

Believing that the Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower had some creditable and valuable contributions, that these were more than eight years of "stale, dank air of normalcy" as John F. Kennedy charged in 1960, and that the failures of the Eisenhower Administration were at least not cardinal ones, the present author has sought to find the origins of those contributions that were made. Those origins cannot be found in the first term. Only after the experience of the

heart attack - when Eisenhower got a second chance, as it were - did there emerge a "New Eisenhower." For there was something more than unique about the Eisenhower interlude. While it was true that Dwight D. Eisenhower was unique, so were the times. Something bade the people to trust a priori - even in the awareness of the perils inherent in a policy of returning to normalcy. They did not want to slow down - but to continue at a steady postwar pace. They were somehow persuaded to let the Times be handled by those in whom greatness was assumed, even if not proven altogether. The failures of the Eisenhower Era were therefore covered up - not by those in the Administration as much as by those in the country who had wanted so much for him to succeed in everything. And this too is attributable to the heart attack. Somehow they knew that they had nearly lost him and that things would have been worse if they had. What follows here is an account of why the people believed this and how they came to be convinced of it.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
INTRODUCTION	v
CHAPTER 1: MYOCARDIAL BRINKSMANSHIP	1
CHAPTER 2: GOD WAS TOO HIGH AND THE CZAR WAS TOO FAR AWAY	22
CHAPTER 3: THE HAUNTED HOUSE OF DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER	72
CHAPTER 4: THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG	110
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	

1. "He was 'The Doc's Thinking Boy,'" *MEMORIES*, XLVI (13 Aug. 1955), 14-17; and Samuel Barber, "President Begins Denver Vacation; Plans Work, Too," *THE NEW YORKER*, 14 Aug. 1955, pp. 1 and 3.

2. John W. Ward, *RICHARD NIXON: A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL PORTRAIT* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp. 162-67.

CHAPTER 1: MYOCARDIAL BRINKSMANSHIP

Since July and the meeting of the Big Four chiefs of state, the warmth of the "Spirit of Geneva" had permeated the political atmosphere of the globe. That aura was augmented in the United States by the peace and plenty of the late summer and autumn of 1955. President Dwight D. Eisenhower was at the height of his popularity just before an election year and the Republican National Committee was inspired to proclaim that "Everything is booming but the guns." The President was entering his sixty-fifth autumn and was taking care of himself as well as a man possibly could with his responsibilities and burdens. As soon as he finished up his work in Washington, he planned to fly to Denver, Colorado, for one of his many "working vacations." Press Secretary James C. Hagerty announced prophetically that the vacation was for complete rest and would last "longer than several weeks."¹ Vice President Richard M. Nixon was due to join the President on 26 September in Denver for a conference of education, sports figures, government officials and civic leaders, to launch a national physical-fitness crusade. And in the late fall Nixon would take advantage of the "era of good feelings" to embark on a good-will tour of the Near East.² All in all, it was a good time for

1 "66 and '56: Ike's Thinking Now," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (15 Aug. 1955), 17-18 and Russel Baker, "President Begins Denver Vacation; Plans Work, Too," NEW YORK TIMES, 14 Aug. 1955, pp. 1 and 8.

2 Earl Mazo, RICHARD NIXON: A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL PORTRAIT (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), pp. 188-89.

the Administration. It was at its peak popularity, there were no elections to face that year, Congress was not in session, there were no immediate great decisions to make, and the President himself appeared in a prosperous state of health to match that of the national economy.

Eisenhower arrived in Denver on 14 August and by late September the first snow of the year was sparkling on the 12,000-foot mountain slopes of the "mile-high city." The air was crisp and cold and the temperature dipped as low as 13 degrees above zero. The Eisenhowers enjoyed Denver perhaps more than any other place save Gettysburg where their 496-acre farm was located. Denver was a second home to them. Mrs. Eisenhower had been born there and grew up there and when they visited the city they always stayed with her mother, Mrs. John S. Doud. There on the front porch of the unpretentious eight-room gray brick house at 750 Lafayette, Eisenhower had courted Mamie Doud when he was a young officer. After their arrival, the President gradually settled down to the kind of life he most enjoyed and he regained in the modest home of his mother-in-law, some of the privacy and naturalness that he had reluctantly surrendered to the Presidency.³

A "Summer White House" office was conveniently at hand at nearby Lowery Air Force Base and Cherry Hills Country Club afforded

3 Marquis Childs, EISENHOWER: CAPTIVE HERO (New York: Hartcourt, Brace and Company, 1958), p. 214 and Russel Baker, "Eisenhower in Hospital with 'Mild' Heart Attack; His Condition Called 'Good,'" NEW YORK TIMES, 25 Sept. 1955, pp. 1 and 41. See also Dorothy Branon, MAMIE DOUD EISENHOWER: A PORTRAIT OF A FIRST LADY (New York: Scribner, 1954), p. 33.

ready opportunity for the President to take exercise in his favorite sport of golf. In addition there were mountain fishing streams in the vicinity. Eisenhower particularly enjoyed trout fishing, for, as President Hoover said, "All men are equal before fish."

Also in Denver, in early September, a national conference of the forty-eight state Republican Chairmen was to meet. On 10 September they were unanimous in asking the President to run for the second term for which he had not yet declared himself a candidate. They were hoping that when he motored into town from his fishing retreat to address them ~~that~~ he would announce or give some indication of his candidacy. Eisenhower spoke to the group at a breakfast meeting on the 10th and among other things he warned them against complacency concerning their plans for the coming presidential election. "... [H]umans are frail - and they are mortal," he said. "Never pin your flag so tightly to one mast that, if a ship sinks, you cannot rip it off and nail it to another. It is sometimes good to remember that." While this message brought about a "noticeable letdown" it was at least in part good news for the state chairmen. If Ike's health held up, they reasoned (or rationalized), he would run. And they had never seen him looking healthier.⁴

⁴ See the NEW YORK TIMES, Russell Baker, "48 G.O.P. Chairman to Fly to Parley with President," 1 Sept. 1955, pp. 1 and 6; Alan Drury, "G.O.P. Unanimous In Asking President To Run," 10 Sept. 1955, pp. 1 and 9 and Russell Baker, "President Warns His Party To Shun One-Man Outlook," 11 Sept. 1955, pp. 1 and 10. See also "Happiness Through Health," TIME, LXVI (19 Sept. 1955), 19-20 and PUBLIC PAPERS, op. cit., p. 16.

Except for occasional bouts with bursitis and the tensions of high office, the President's general health picture at mid-term seemed satisfactory. He always looked healthy and those who knew and worked with him testified that he retained an amazing ability to recuperate rapidly from fatigue. During his first term he had suffered from nothing more serious than a mild case of food poisoning, a sore elbow, and occasional colds. His heart - the most important heart in the world - was pronounced "sound" after a comparison by the White House physician with electrocardiograph reports dating as far back as 1945. There was "no diversion" in them whatever.⁵

The rest of the month in Denver went much like the usual routine. By the third week of that month the President was spending most of his time high up in the thin air of the Rocky Mountains at the Byers Peak Ranch owned by his friend Aksel Nielson. There he passed the time angling in his favorite fishing streams. On the morning of Friday, 23 September, the President was up before dawn and by 5:00 a.m. had cooked his own breakfast of hot cakes, fried mush, pork sausage and beef bacon. He headed for his office at 6:45. By 8:40 he had arrived at Lowery where he spent the next couple of hours working on correspondence (including a recently-received communique' from Soviet Premier Bulganin), and departed shortly after 11:00 for the golf course at Cherry Hills.⁶

5 "Eisenhower Stays Healthy," U. S. NEWS, XXXVIII (19 Mar. 1955), 36. See also Merriman Smith, MEET MISTER EISENHOWER (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), p. 232.

6 Robert J. Donovan, EISENHOWER: THE INSIDE STORY (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), p. 359 and Dwight D. Eisenhower, MANDATE FOR CHANGE (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), p. 536. See also "Before the Heart Attack - What the President Did," U. S. NEWS, XXXIX (7 Oct. 1955), 67.

On the golf links the President was always surrounded by a crowd. In addition to his usual foursome, there were eight to twelve other "golfers" around him. His usual average in the low eighties is impressive when one considers that he was always the center of attention. If most of the group seemed distracted, that was why they were there. They were in actuality members of the White House Detail of the Secret Service and the game they played had a par of zero and did not allow for bogies. Although outwardly appearing as golfers they carried only one "club" in their bags: a high calibre (.351) rifle with the best long-range telescopic sight available. Ahead of the Presidential party there were six to eight other agents, all observing the rough, high places, bunkers and other "traps" on the golf course which might hazard the President more than the sand or water - the potential assassin. The Chief Executive was trailed by two other agents, one on a golf cart and the other on foot. Each carried a high-power machine gun in his golf bag in order to deal with several possible assassins at one time. All agents carried a walkie-talkie apparatus to call back to the control in the clubhouse, revealing the President's exact position at all times. All of this was logged into a permanent record. In addition, the local police constantly patrolled the roads surrounding the unfenced-in course to dispel any lingering or suspicious individuals.⁷ All this so the President of the United States could shoot a round of golf:

7 U. E. Baughman, with Leonard Wallace Robinson, SECRET SERVICE CHIEF (New York: Popular Library, 1962), pp. 132-35. The superb competency of the Secret Service in this unobtrusive patrol is evidence by the fact that they never interfered with or bothered the President, obviously, since he made no mention of these precautions whatsoever in his memoirs.

The President's party had hardly finished the first hole before word was relayed to the President that Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was on the Washington line and wished to speak to him. The President went back to the clubhouse only to be told that there was trouble with the lines and he would have to return later on in the match to talk to Dulles. On the second trip the President was told that Dulles had left for an engagement and would call back. He finally talked with Dulles on a third return to the clubhouse.

By 2:30 the Presidential party had concluded the first eighteen holes of golf, with the President having shot an eighty-four. But because the morning's golf had been so badly interrupted the President decided to play a few more holes in the afternoon. His choice for lunch, as he later recalled, "was probably not too wise." It consisted of a huge hamburger with generous slices of Bermuda onion and coffee.

Once again on the course the President was recalled for another communication from Dulles only to find that it was a false alarm because the operator had not learned that their business had been concluded. The President's disposition thereupon "deteriorated rapidly." After an interrupted twenty-seven holes of golf, his attitude was not improved by the ensuing effects of lunch and he was developing an uneasiness in his stomach. On the eighth hole the President was heard to remark, "I guess I can't eat these onions anymore. They seem to be backing up on me." His score on the last nine holes, however was a

low forty.⁸ For Eisenhower, the exercise of the day, including the successive trips back to the clubhouse, had not been particularly strenuous.

By 5:10 p.m. the President, accompanied by his friend George Allen, had arrived back at the Doud home. They did not eat dinner, as they were still feeling the after effects of lunch. Instead Eisenhower and Allen played billiards for a while in the basement. Both declined a drink explaining that they were tired and expected to go to bed early.⁹ After dinnertime Allen complained of being slightly ill. The President gave him some milk of magnesia and Allen soon left for his room at the Brown Palace Hotel.

The President went to bed about 10:00 and fell asleep immediately.¹⁰ Shortly after 2:00 a.m. on the morning of 24 September, Mrs. Eisenhower, from her room across the hall, heard the President thrashing around in his bed. She went immediately to see what was the trouble. She found the President asleep but restless and awakened him.

8 Eisenhower, op. cit., pp. 536-37 and "Before the Heart Attack - What President Eisenhower Did," op. cit., p. 67. One or two doctors later guessed that the President was at this point undergoing the thrombosis, mistaking it for an upset stomach. Id. See also "President Played 27 Holes of Golf," NEW YORK TIMES, 25 Sept. 1955, p. 45.

9 Another ex post facto medical opinion suggested that had the President accepted the drink he might not have had the attack at all. One doctor told him that people over sixty should take one drink - no more - each evening before dinner. Such a small amount of alcohol tends to dilate the arteries and aid circulation, preventing blood clots which result in thrombosis. Id. See also W. H. Lawrence, "President Set Exhaustive Pace During His Colorado Vacation," NEW YORK TIMES, 27 Sept. 1955, p. 27.

10 "Before the Heart Attack - What President Eisenhower Did," op. cit., p. 67.

"What's the matter, Ike?" she asked. "Are you having a nightmare or something?"

The President explained that he was all right and Mrs. Eisenhower went back to her room. Shortly thereafter the President experienced an intense piercing pain in his chest. He arose and walked with his hand over his heart to Mrs. Eisenhower's room and asked for the milk of magnesia he had given Allen earlier, thinking that he was suffering again from indigestion. Mrs. Eisenhower was not satisfied with this cursory remedy and called the President's physician, Major General Howard McC. Snyder, who was staying at the BOQ at Lowery, four miles away. It was 2:30 a.m.

"Ike has a pain in his chest," she told the Doctor. "You'd better come right over." It is possible that Mrs. Eisenhower had just saved the life of the President of the United States.

Dr. Snyder immediately called the airbase dispatcher for a car and instructed the driver to pick up a medical kit at his office on the second floor of the administration building. Hurriedly the physician - nearly ten years Eisenhower's senior - slipped on his clothes over his pajamas and rushed out to the waiting car, driven by Airman 2 c. Jacob Judis.

"Seven hundred fifty Lafayette Street and step on it," Snyder ordered. Judis, disregarding traffic lights, sped through the overcast morning streets of Denver on the most important mission of his career.¹¹

¹¹ Donovan, op. cit., pp. 362-64.

Dr. Snyder was not only the President's official physician, but was also his intimate friend. He had received his M. D. degree from Jefferson Medical College in Philadelphia and served his internship in Presbyterian Hospital in that city. Commissioned in the Medical Corps in 1908, he had met General Eisenhower when the latter was commanding the invasion of Northern Africa in 1943. He became fast friends with the man who was to become Supreme Allied Commander, and was called from retirement to follow him as he became Commander-in-Chief in 1953.¹² As the official White House Physician, he, of course, accompanied the President at all times wherever he went. His concern, therefore, was for more than a patient, or a patient who was President of the United States. It was most for his friend Ike. His later actions would indicate this emphasis.

Judis wheeled Snyder up to the Doud house at 3:11 a.m. and the General went immediately to the President's room. He found Eisenhower perspiring and flushed and tossing in bed with a severe pain in his chest. Snyder listened to Eisenhower's heart with a stethoscope and took his blood pressure and pulse: high and rapid. The President's face was rapidly becoming palid.

Dr. Snyder was seized with the terrifying realization that the President of the United States was suffering from a heart attack of unknown causes and proportions.

12 "Ike's Decision Depends on Word From Old Friend," U. S. NEWS, XL (20 Jan. 1956), 61-3 and "President's Doctor Long An Aide to Him; Was Recalled From Retirement to Post," NEW YORK TIMES, 25 Sept. 1955, p. 46.

With lightning-quick instinct and professional sagacity, Dr. Snyder broke out an ampoule of amyl nitrate and had the President sniff it. Following this he gave him several injections at intervals from 3:45 a.m.: one for dilation of the arteries in the heart, one to ease the pain and shock, and one to increase the liquidity of the blood to prevent clotting. He did not tell the President of his grave diagnosis and Mrs. Eisenhower was sent back to bed under the impression that her husband was suffering from nothing more serious than indigestion.

As the medicine pried loose the grip of pain the President sank slowly into a deep sleep induced by a shot of morphine. Dr. Snyder looked at his watch: 4:30 a.m. The President was passing now through an intense physical crisis. So was Howard Snyder. He sat professionally calm but personally panicked as he watched the President of the United States - just twenty days short of his sixty-fifth birthday - beginning the struggle at the brink of death.¹³

Howard McC. Snyder was facing the crisis of his career. Before him lay a man for whom he had unbounded affection and respect. Yet not only was he the President of the United States - he was the President in a nuclear age. Even in those days before intercontinental ballistic missiles it was unthinkable that the Commander-in-Chief

¹³ Donovan, *op. cit.*, pp. 362-64. See also Richard M. Nixon, *SIX CRISES* (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961), p. 136.

should be secretly under sedation and totally incommunicado for eight to ten hours. Dr. Snyder grappled with the problem: Should he spread the word of the President's heart attack or keep it to himself? Should his concern be primarily for his patient and friend or for his Chief and nation? It was shortly after three in the morning in Denver; it was just after six a.m. in Washington. A communication with the White House might result in the diffusion of the crisis all over the world, Snyder reasoned. This might seriously shock Mrs. Eisenhower - who suffered herself from a valvular heart condition - and her seventy-seven-year-old mother. The excitement could even endanger the President's chances for recovery - whatever they might be.¹⁴ "It was difficult for me to assume the responsibility of refraining from making public immediately the diagnosis of coronary thrombosis," Dr. Snyder wrote later in his report to the White House.¹⁵ Yet he pre-emptorily assumed that responsibility. He would let the rest of the world wait while he did his best. As Saturday dawned, Dr. Snyder sat at the bedside, his fingers on the Administration's pulse, and waited.

The President had slept peacefully for seven hours with General Snyder constantly checking his blood pressure and pulse. No word of her husband's illness had yet been given Mrs. Eisenhower.

¹⁴ Nixon, op. cit., p. 137 and Donovan, op. cit., p. 364.

¹⁵ Nixon, op. cit., pp. 137-38. See also Adams, op. cit., pp. 183-84.

Snyder was sustained in his decision as he noted with satisfaction that the pulse was slowing and the pressure coming down. A premature announcement of a Presidential heart attack - of whatever proportions - could have very undesirable national and political results. More importantly it was imperative that the President be prepared for a calm and unhurried transfer to nearby Fitzsimmons Army Hospital.¹⁶ An announcement of any sort of serious Presidential illness would turn the area into what might be fatal bedlam.

After 7:00 a.m., noting that no complications were arising, Dr. Snyder called the Summer White House and in accordance with his set decision, left word for Assistant Press Secretary Murray Snyder (who was not related to the Doctor) that the President had "indigestion" and would not keep his morning appointments. This would allay press suspicion. Dr. Snyder's role as White House Physician was taking on expanding proportions. Not only was the public to be kept entirely in ignorance for fear of the President's condition, but also were to be his wife, mother-in-law, assistant press secretary and his entire Administration - including the Vice President of the United States.

At Lowery Air Force Base the press was routinely gathered near the President's office to get a story on his activities and appointments for the day. At 8:00 a.m. Murray Snyder appeared and made the relatively unexciting announcement that "The President suffered a digestive upset in the night, and, if he comes in, it will

¹⁶ Id., and Ezra Taft Benson, CROSSFIRE: THE EIGHT YEARS WITH EISENHOWER (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962), p. 66.

not be until considerably later. Dr. Snyder was summoned in the night. He is there now." He told the press that the President had suffered his illness before he had retired. When asked if it was his impression that the President was in "serious condition, or fair condition, or poor" Snyder quite truthfully related, "I haven't anything on which to base an impression beyond what I gave out."¹⁷ The reporters were only slightly aroused. Dr. Snyder's security strategy was working.

The President began to stir from his drugged sleep at about 11:45 a.m. When he awoke he was still very weak and numbed from the morphine. Shortly after noon Dr. Snyder secretly summoned General Bryon E. Pollock from Fitzsimmons with an electrocardiogram machine. Dr. Pollock arrived at 12:30 with Major General Martin E. Griffin, commanding general of the hospital. Mrs. Eisenhower was then told for the first time of the seriousness of her husband's condition. Snyder also telephoned another deliberately false report to Murray Snyder with which he could stave off the enquiring reporters. Dr. Snyder's control of the situation was meticulous.

At 1:00 precise tracings of the President's heart impulses were taken as he lay in bed.¹⁸ The reading of the electrocardiogram was taken downstairs and laid out on the dining room table as the

17 "When Ike's Heart Faltered," U. S. NEWS, XXXIX (7 Oct. 1955), 66.

18 "Chronology of Illness," NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Sept. 1955, p. 15.

doctors pored over it. It confirmed Dr. Snyder's initial diagnosis: a blood clot had caused a lesion blocking an artery in the front wall of the President's heart, cutting off the supply of blood from that part of the heart muscle and causing it to collapse - a myocardial infarction or coronary thrombosis, in medical terms. Snyder and Pollock returned to the President's bedroom and told the Chief Executive that his heart had "suffered an injury."

"We would like to take you to Fitzsimmons," Snyder told him.

The President made no response to the diagnosis. "All right, Howard," he replied to the request for removal to the hospital, "call Jim and get my car and let's go out."

Snyder agreed that the President should go to the hospital in his own car rather than in an ambulance since the latter method would certainly be noticed and the commotion might further endanger the President. Sergeant John Moaney, the President's valet, helped the President into a bathrobe and the three doctors supported him as he walked down the stairs. Again the doctors felt that the walk would be less of a strain on the President than if he had been strapped to a stretcher and carried at a steep angle down the narrow stairs. The Presidential limousine had been backed into the driveway by the indefatigable Secret Service. On the porch two agents, Jim Rowley¹⁹ and Deeter B. Flohr, the President's chauffeur, took over from the doctors. They aided with the short walk from the porch to the limousine and helped

¹⁹ Rowley is at the time of this writing now Chief of the Secret Service, having succeeded U. E. Baughman in 1961.

the President into the back seat. General Griffin and General Snyder slipped in on either side of the President - to be at hand on the nine mile drive to the hospital in case of a relapse in which seconds would matter - while Rowley rode shotgun and Flohr drove at a moderate speed. History might have been changed drastically at any moment on that short drive and only seven people in the entire world were aware of it.²⁰

At Lowery, Press Secretary Murray Snyder reappeared at 12:15 - still in total ignorance of the fate of his Chief - and told the press that he had just received a second call from Dr. Snyder at the Doud home saying that the President was resting. The President's "indigestion", he was told, was "not serious" since it was "the same type of indigestion that many people have had." Repeating, he said "It is not serious ... He [the President] won't be out here today."²¹ It looked like another dull day for the White House press corps.

The Presidential limousine arrived at Fitzsimmons shortly before 1:30 and drove past the guardhouse, through the gate and up to the front of the massive eight-story concrete building. The car rolled up underneath a portico where a wheel chair was waiting to carry the President to the uppermost floor. Eisenhower smiled at the

20 Donovan, op. cit., pp. 365-66; Adams, op. cit., pp. 184-85 and Baughman, p. 154.

21 "When Ike's Heart Faltered," op. cit., p. 68.

attendants in the corridor and had a friendly greeting for Charles Adams, the elevator operator who brought him up to the eighth floor to room 8002. The special suite had been prepared in advance for the President. It had cream-colored walls, light green furniture and green drapes. It was a typical hospital suite for a most atypical patient. Army guards from Fort Carson, Colorado, were on their way to throw up a security net around the 640 acres of the hospital's grounds while four G. I.'s and a secret service agent secured the main elevator to the eighth floor. From now on, only authorized persons could go past the seventh floor. As the President slipped into bed an oxygen tent was immediately placed over the upper portion of his body.

Dr. Snyder informed Agent Rowley of the details of the night drama and called Murray Snyder at Lowery, finally to inform him of the true situation. Secretary Snyder immediately called his boss, James C. Hagerty, who was vacationing in Washington where it was past three o'clock in the afternoon. What should he do? Hagerty ordered that the news should be "played straight, with no details held back." Hagerty would fly immediately to Denver to take charge of the situation.²²

At 2:08 p.m. - more than twelve hours after the initial phases of the President's heart attack - Murray Snyder grimly announced

22 "Benson, op. cit., p. 269; Donovan, op. cit., pp. 365-66; Baughman, op. cit., p. 154 and Adams, op. cit., pp. 184-85. See also "Hospital Called World's Largest," NEW YORK TIMES, 25 Sept. 1955, p. 45 and "4 G. I.'s Man Elevator," NEW YORK TIMES, 27 Sept. 1955, p. 20.

at the Summer White House, that "The President has just had a mild ... coronary thrombosis. He has just been driven to the hospital in his own car and walked from the house to the car." The result was pandemonium. Snyder was battered with a torrent of questions that were a mixture of dismay and irritation. Snyder calmly told them that he knew no more about it than what he had just announced. Not until after 2:30 was the full report broken to the world with thoroughness and candor. After examination of the President at the hospital the next day, "mild" was changed to "moderate ... without complications."²³

"Tell Jim to take over ... " the President had said on his brink-of-deathbed. Dr. Snyder later quoted the President as having added, "and handle the story." Previously the conclusion was that it was Chief of the White House Detail of the Secret Service, Jim Rowley to whom the President was referring. Others thought he meant for his indispensable press secretary Jim Hagerty - who would not arrive until Sunday - to take over and run the Executive Branch. This was also inaccurate. Although for several days Hagerty was the only official Administration spokesman on the scene and his authority was indisputably greater than is customarily exercised by a press

23 "When Ike's Heart Faltered," op. cit., p. 68. Emphasis added. See also Donovan, op. cit., p. 366. When the news hit the New York Stock Exchange the ensuing panic grossed a loss of some \$14 billion on the market. See "Stock Prices Decline Sharply," NEW YORK TIMES, 27 Sept. 1955, pp. 1 and 49.

secretary, certainly any such statement of the President's if taken literally (which would have been highly unrealistic) would have been much more reasonably applicable to Hagerty's public relations duties in the Administration. Hagerty has since insisted that this was all the President meant: that the Press Secretary should do his job - "handle the story" - with accuracy and candor. In short, he was to be truthful with the American people.²⁴ This Hagerty insisted was typical of the President. Everyone on his staff was expected to do his job - and especially in a situation of this gravity that job must be done with complete honesty toward the public. One need only remember the secrecy of the Wilson illness, the suspense of the Garfield lingering, and the mystery of the Harding death to see that this must have been the case. Yet Eisenhower's penchant for honesty would cost him later on. By being open and above board about his condition the President made his physical health readily available for exploitation as a partisan issue in later months.

The reporters at Lowery were in bedlam. And they were irritated at Murray Snyder for what they thought was deliberate deception in announcing a Presidential coronary thrombosis, already twelve hours old, as "indigestion." Snyder, however, like any good subordinate official, acquiesced in the decision of his superiors - even though that

24 Adams, op. cit., p. 216. See also Donovan, op. cit., p. 367. In relation to this matter of Hagerty's authority, Donovan noted that "... it is difficult to think of anyone whose authority in those first couple of days exceeded that of Hagerty, a very sure-footed official with a large capacity and a readiness to make decisions." Id.

decision caused his own "deception" which was nothing more than innocent ignorance and even though it opened him up to this barrage of criticism.

One exchange between Snyder and the press went:

Q. We are getting some queries about why, if this attack occurred at that early hour - first of all why it was called digestive upset, and, secondly, why the announcement of the heart attack or coronary thrombosis was held up so long? Can you say anything on that?

A. No.²⁵

Murray Snyder was, then, one of the unmerited and unthanked victims of the coronary crisis of 1955.

The reporters, however, had a point and it is probable that Murray Snyder -handling the most important story of his life as a stand-in - knew it. Dr. Snyder's concern for his patient was of course commendable. But there is room for criticism of his analysis of the situation. The distinction he drew between Eisenhower the Friend and Eisenhower the President was lopsided. Certainly rousing the Secret Service and Washington officialdom during the first few hours after the attack at one and four o'clock in the morning would have produced little beneficial result. First of all there were very few prominent officials in Washington during this period of lull in international activity since the Geneva conference. Secondly the excitement would certainly have permeated the Doud home and, as Dr. Snyder correctly deduced, probably would have endangered all its occupants. Yet Mrs. Eisenhower was informed of the President's true condition sometime close

25 "When Ike's Heart Faltered," op. cit., p. 74.

to noon Saturday and Murray Snyder was informed shortly after noon. By that time ten hours had elapsed since the President had been stricken. Still no one in a policy-making post had been informed. Vice President Nixon was not informed until late Saturday afternoon. Jim Hagerty, who received the news before Nixon did, did not find out until after three o'clock Washington time. Meanwhile during the first stages, the President of the United States was under sedation, completely unable to have received any communication. And forcing a major decision upon him would have been unthinkable. Yet had one arisen who would have made it? Who would have decided even at the least that no decision had to be made? The Vice President was not in the position to have been confronted with the President's heart attack and a decision of major proportions in immediate sequence. And the fact that most of the Cabinet were out of the capital made the situation worse.

The conclusion emerges that Dr. Snyder overplayed his hand. True, his initial actions probably saved the President's life. Yet more was involved in his decision than merely not wanting to "spread the word" for fear of the President's health whether Dr. Snyder realized it or not. In answer to that important question as to who would have made the decision - who, in fact, did make the decision - the answer by default was Howard McC. Snyder. Dr. Snyder had for all practical purposes - out of comprehension dulled by the imminent death of this dear friend - assumed the entire breadth of the prerogatives of the President of the United States. National security might have been at stake and there is no way of telling what might have been the consequences had other factors entered the picture. The world was fortunate that they did not.

After the official announcement of the "mild" or "moderate" heart attack the word spread all over the globe within hours. What follows is an account of the political and personal reactions to that news. Meanwhile Doctors Snyder, Pollock and Griffin and a score of hospital personnel launched into action around the form of a sixty-five-year-old man under an oxygen tent on the eighth floor in Fitzsimmons Army Hospital. The Administration and the nation was in a state of total paralysis, completely cut off from its isolated Chief. And Dwight D. Eisenhower, a man already destined for immortality, was almost there.

procedure for transfer of power - is it temporary or permanent -
from one who lingered in a white-and-go contest with the Grim
Demerol. Certainly there was no policy established for decision-making
during the complete physical incapacitation of the President, with
less when the insistence on any major decision might result in
his death. The response to Dr. Snyder's policy of secrecy and
deception concerning the incapacitated president, although filled
with intrigue, was swift and decisive. The Constitution prescribed
that that policy be fulfilled by the Vice President of the United
States, Richard Milhous Nixon.

Hardly anyone of any major prominence was in the nation's
capital city. In addition to the President and Congress, the
Secretary of State had meanwhile left to go to New York to

CHAPTER 2: GOD WAS TOO HIGH AND THE CZAR
WAS TOO FAR AWAY

As the lights dimmed in Denver, the intense beam of international attention focused on Washington, D. C. It was a unique situation in American history. Never before had an incumbent American President suffered a heart attack. While a specific method had been prescribed and followed in the event of the instant death of the Chief Executive, there was no set procedure for transfer of power - be it temporary or permanent - from one who lingered in a touch-and-go contest with the Grim Reaper. Certainly there was no policy established for decision-making during the complete physical incapacitation of the President, much less when the insistance on any major decision might result in his death. The response to Dr. Snyder's policy of secrecy and deception concerning the incapacitated presidency, although filled with intrigue, was swift and immediate. The Constitution prescribed that that policy be fulfilled by the Vice President of the United States, Richard Milhous Nixon.

I

Hardly anyone of any major prominence was in the nation's capital city. In addition to the President and Congress, the Secretary of State had meanwhile left to go to New York to

address the United Nations on further U. S. disarmament proposals. The nation's chief legal officer, Attorney General Herbert Brownell was taking a holiday in Spain, the Assistant to the President, Governor Sherman Adams was on a rare vacation fishing in Scotland, and Press Secretary Hagerty was at that moment absent from the city. Vice President Nixon seems to have been the only member of the President's policy-making "Team" in Washington. Whether this was by prearrangement or coincidence has not been determined.

Saturday, 24 September, started out as a usual day for the Vice President. Except for the fact that he was at home rather than working in his office, catching up on the week's accumulated correspondence, his normal activities during the day had been interrupted only by his attendance at the wedding of one of his secretaries to the son of a Senator from Idaho. This event had been the high point of the day.

By the time the Vice President and Mrs. Nixon returned home it was after three in the afternoon. In Denver it was past 12:30 and the press had not yet been informed of the extent of the President's illness. Mr. Nixon picked up the afternoon newspaper as he walked into his living room and began to scan the uneventful headlines. It was Vice President Charles G. Dawes who once remarked that he had only two duties: one was to sit in front of the Senate chamber and listen to Senators talk and the other was to check the newspaper every day to see if the president was still healthy. Nixon dutifully noted a small item on the front page that reported that President Eisenhower

was suffering from a slight case of indigestion in Denver. He hardly gave the article a second thought. He was checking the baseball scores when the telephone rang.

"Dick," said the familiar voice of Jim Hagerty, " ... I've got some bad news for you. I've had a call from Murray Snyder in Denver. The President has had a coronary."

"Oh, my God!" gasped Nixon. The Vice President went dead inside. The news and the shock were so unexpected that he could think of nothing to say for several seconds and Hagerty thought they had been disconnected.

"Are they sure?" Nixon insisted. "There are many times when people have indigestion," he said remembering the news article he had just read, " and it is erroneously diagnosed as a heart attack. Doctors can make mistakes. I don't think we should announce it as a heart attack until we are absolutely sure." The extent of Nixon's shock was evidenced by his unusual lack of grasp of the intensity of the situation. His subconscious made him insist quite contrary to what he knew to be untrue, that it was possible for the White House Physician to be mistaken on a matter of such grave import as a presidential coronary thrombosis.

"No," replied Hagerty slowly, "we are absolutely sure." He went on to tell Nixon that the press would be informed shortly and that he was flying to Denver immediately. His final warning was for Nixon to expect anything and that the Vice President should let him "know where you can be reached at all times." He would not follow Dr. Snyder's policy of keeping out of touch where the matters of administrative continuity and national security were concerned.

"I don't see how I could describe those first few minutes except as a complete shock," Nixon later recalled. He went into the living room and sat down on the edge of a chair "without saying anything or really thinking for at least five or ten minutes. For quite a while I didn't even think to tell Pat [his wife] who was upstairs." During the past three years he had lived with the stereotyped status of being the proverbial "heartbeat away" from the office for which he so earnestly yearned. But not this way.

Presently Nixon returned to the telephone and called his intimate personal friend and fellow Californian, Deputy and now acting Attorney General William P. Rogers, who had already heard the news. The Vice President asked Rogers to come to his house. Rogers arrived in time for dinner. Soon the telephone began to ring constantly and reporters began invading the Spring Valley section of Washington and massing outside the modest Nixon home. With television floodlights bathing the house, Nixon was intent not only on being totally unavailable to reporters but also on not being photographed. The clamoring did not allow for Nixon and Rogers to grapple with history with the energy and attention that they deserved. The Vice President suggested that they go to Rogers' house in nearby Bethesda, Maryland. Mrs. Rogers was called and directed to drive over and pick them up at a side street. While one of Nixon's little daughters drew the attention of the reporters at the front door, Rogers stealthily accompanied the man who might at any moment become President

of the United States, as they stole out of the house and down a back alley to the waiting car. Now the capital was officially deserted.¹

On the drive to Rogers' house Nixon faced eternity. His plight was lonely and uncertain, and, like the Russian peasants of the previous century, for him too, "God was too high and the Czar was too far away." With the exception of Andrew Johnson, probably no other American Vice President was faced with a greater certainty of succession than was Nixon. With Eisenhower gravely ill, the eyes of the entire world would be focused on him. Nixon faced the most serious crisis of his life as these realizations began to materialize in his mind. During what many later described as his "finest hour" he would have to act with caution. Like the man who occupied the office to whose threshold he suddenly found himself being pushed, every action, every word would be more important now than anything he had ever said or done previously. For Richard Nixon was the immediate concern not only of the members of the Administration in his plight between God and the Czar, but also of the people of the United States, its allies, and its enemies. As he later recalled, "... even the slightest misstep could be interpreted as an attempt to assume power." Such an impression had to be avoided at almost any cost. For years now the political pundits had been stressing Nixon's youth, questioning his ability to assume

¹ Nixon, op. cit., pp. 131-32; Mazo, op. cit., p. 189; and Donovan, op. cit., pp. 367-68. See also "Nixon Gets News Ahead of Public," NEW YORK TIMES, 25 Sept. 1955, pp. 1 and 49 and William M. Blair, "Team to Continue President's Plans," NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Sept. 1955, p. 17.

the duties and responsibilities of the Presidency should he be required to do so, and throwing at him the barbs which partisans had been hesitant to fling at Dwight D. Eisenhower. With all eyes concentrated on the sickbed in Denver, Richard Nixon was undergoing a brutal re-examination in the back of the nation's mind.² As the London Economist noted later, Nixon would "be given many opportunities of proving that he is a statesman. He long ago proved himself a politician, although not always a tactful one."³

2 For a description of Nixon's feelings see Nixon, op. cit., pp. 133-35. The controversy over Nixon's character continues to this day. For favorable opinions contemporary to the coronary crisis see: "Nixon is Making Sense and Friends," LIFE, XLI (16 July 1956), 32; "What Ike Says About Nixon Now," U. S. NEWS, XL (23 Mar. 1956), 36; "Nixon Story," U. S. NEWS XL (11 May 1956), 68-72; "Salute to Dick Nixon," LIFE, XL (19 Mar. 1956), 41 and "A Gain for Nixon," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (18 Nov. 1955), 34. For negative and highly critical opinions see: William Lee Miller, "The Debating Career of Richard M. Nixon," REPORTER, XIV (19 April 1956), 11-17; "Nixon: The Old Guard's Young Pretender," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXV (20 Aug. 1956), 9-16; Irving Howe, "Poor Richard Nixon," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXIV (7 May 1956), 7-9; Gene Marine, "What's Wrong With Nixon? Public Life of a Cardboard Hero," NATION, CLXXXIII (18 Aug. 1956), 131-34; R. T. McKenzie, "Ike: Stuck With Dick," NATION, CLXXXIII (1 Sept. 1956), 170-72; "Some Quotations from Nixon's 1954 Campaign," REPORTER, XIV (19 April 1956), 16; "The Young Pretender," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXV (17 Sept. 1956), 4; William Lee Miller, "Some Selected Footprints of Richard M. Nixon," REPORTER, XIV (16 May 1956), 48, and the more recent comments by Arthur M. Schlesinger in his partisan campaign document, KENNEDY OR NIXON? DOES IT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE? (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960). For objective accounts see: R. Coughian, "Debate, Pro and Con. Subject: Richard M. Nixon," LIFE XLI (16 July 1956), 92-3; "Man Who Might Be President," U.S. NEWS, XXXIX (7 October 1955), 30-2; "Why the Vice Presidency is In the Spotlight," U.S. NEWS, XXXIX (9 Sept. 1955), 48; and "Nixon in '60?" NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXVI (27 Jan. 1957), 2. For Nixon's own views on major issues see his THE CHALLENGES WE FACE (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960).

3 Quoted in "Ike's Illness: Europe Was Stunned, Confused, the Prayerful," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (10 Oct. 1955), 55.

A resolution of tact in a situation of this nature was a major burden for Nixon. He did not sleep that night.⁴

II

Jim Hagerty arrived in Denver at ten minutes past noon on Sunday, 25 September. Dr. T. W. Mattingly, heart specialist at Walter Reed Army Hospital in Washington, had arrived twelve hours earlier. They immediately went into consultation with Doctors Snyder and Pollock. The three army leaders then went in to examine the Commander-in-Chief.

With each successive medical bulletin the President's condition seemed to worsen. After "mild" became "moderate" it was all too clear that the President was not yet out of danger. Mrs. Eisenhower moved into the room next to her husband's after being told that a recurrence within the next few days would be fatal to him. Cots were set up in the corridors adjoining the press room where reporters could keep a death watch.¹

In the meantime a delicate decision was in the process of being made by Administration officials. In Washington it was felt that a civilian should be added to the team of army doctors ministering to the President, to improve the "public relations aspects of the President's illness." As with so many other factors in the President's condition, this policy had to be implemented with thoughtfulness and tact. An arbitrary

4 Even had Nixon been in a disposition to sleep, Brownell's teenage son, with a callous disregard for a possible future President of the United States, kept Nixon awake all night with his short wave radio in the room above Nixon's.

1 Baughman, op. cit., p. 155 and Childs, op. cit., pp. 217-18.

addition of a civilian might reflect upon Dr. Snyder and Dr. Mattingly's competence. General Wilton B. Persons, the President's Congressional liaison, was chosen to make Administration views known to the doctors since he had long been a friend of General Snyder. This understandably touchy subject - the mishandling of which might have endangered the President - was competently facilitated by General Persons, due in no small part to the wisdom of the broad-minded White House Physician. Later on Sunday a special Air Force plane brought to Denver from Boston Dr. Paul Dudley White, a pioneer in cardiology and founder of the National Heart Association. He was one of the most eminent cardiologists in the nation and although he assured the country that the medical staff attending the President was "among the very best" of heart specialists in the United States, it was Dr. White, rather than the military insiders, who became identified in the public mind as the major factor in the President's case.²

At 4:15 p.m. the four doctors released a statement saying that the President "has had a moderate attack of coronary thrombosis without complications. His present condition is satisfactory." Dr. White immediately took the lead in explaining that "moderate" meant neither "mild" nor "serious" and that the words to be stressed were "without complications."³

The President was kept under an oxygen tent for three days, visited only by his wife and his son, Major John Eisenhower, who had been flown

2 Nixon, op. cit., pp. 138-39 and page 144.

3 John D. Feerick, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION (New York: Fordham University Press, 19). See also W. H. Lawrence, "President's Attack Found 'Neither Mild Nor Serious'; Condition 'Satisfactory'," NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Sept. 1955, pp. 1 and 15.

out to Denver from Fort Belvoir, Georgia, on receiving the news. When John first visited his father, the President asked for his wallet and took some money out of it in order that John might buy the President's daughter-in-law a birthday present for him, since her father-in-law had been otherwise occupied on her birthday.⁴

As the days wore on it became apparent that the heart attack had run its course and that the President at least would live. It was not yet apparent however, to what extent his life would have to be altered because of it, although practically everyone felt this would preclude his seeking re-election. In the meantime a saga of political intrigue and highly subdued struggle for suddenly liberated power was under way in Washington.⁵

A tight security net was kept around the President and a regular schedule adhered to. Each morning, the moment he awakened, usually about six or six-thirty, the nurse in the room set in motion a daily routine that involved thirty people, including, in addition to the Secret Service, five doctors, nine nurses, four dieticians, two medical corpsmen, and three cooks. For the first few weeks the President's day was short. After breakfast he was to have complete rest. He was not even allowed to read. His dinner was taken to him at about six-thirty in the evening and he was ready to sleep by eight-thirty.⁶

4 Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 537 and Baker, op. cit., p. 41.

5 Vide infra, pp. 72-145.

6 "Ike's Life as a Patient," U. S. NEWS, XXXIX (14 Oct. 1955),

From the beginning newspapers were kept from the President and he did not insist that he should have them since he "did not want to worry over speculation about me, my work, and my future." Recorded albums of five books were brought to him from a nearby library for the blind, and John brought tapes of some of his father's favorite musical selections.⁷ As time passed he was allowed to work crossword puzzles and cryptograms in a book purchased at the hospital newsstand. While he was not permitted to read or write them, a nurse would read the directions aloud and the President would guess at the words which she would write down. "Sometimes he guessed the words even before I told him how many letters there were," said one of the nurses. He followed the World Series eagerly, although because of the excitement it would engender, he was not allowed to watch it on television or listen to it on radio.⁸ It was apparent that the heart attack had produced no permanent physical or mental impairments. Not so politically, as will be seen.

Meanwhile hundreds of thousands of letters and telegrams poured in. The effect of the President's stroke was world-wide. Significant was the message from Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev: "Remembering our personal meeting in Geneva, I have

7 Political cynics might have sneered at the fact that one of those musical pieces was "The Funeral March of a Marionette." Donovan, op. cit., p. 337n.

8 As the New York Yankees went down in defeat in seven games to the Brooklyn Dodgers, it was reported that the President was disappointed since he was an American League fan. Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 539 and "The President: Our Hopes Rose," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (10 Oct. 1955), 32-3.

learned with grief of your illness. I wholeheartedly wish you a speedy recovery."⁹

On 30 September - six days after the attack - an amazing occurrence took place. The President resumed partially his official duties by signing several papers. Bringing them into his patient, Dr. Snyder said, "Mr. President, you only have to initial these ... "

The President looked up and smiled. "Well, Howard," he said, "I think I know more about it than you do," and signed his name in full. Although this action wrought headlines, the papers were relatively unimportant, except for the 177 Foreign Service Officers for whom they meant a raise in pay. Their major significance was twofold. First they demonstrated Eisenhower's incredible resilience in the face of cardiac illness. Second his action helped to demonstrate that the nation was not going to remain in a state of paralysis and that the President was capable of performing in a clutch situation if the need arose. His action also, as will be seen later, staved off

9 "Russians Sympathetic," NEW YORK TIMES, 27 Sept. 1955, p. 27. Eisenhower's old friend and military colleague Marshal Zhukov of the Soviet Union wired a similar message. See "Waiting," TIME, LXVI (10 Oct. 1955), 28. For messages from other world leaders see "World Leaders Express Concern," NEW YORK TIMES, p. 15; "Queen Elizabeth Cables President," p. 43 of 26 Sept. 1955. At home former President Herbert Hoover said that "the whole country was praying" for the President's recovery. Former President Harry Truman said he was "terribly sorry" about his successor's condition and Adlai Stevenson was similarly "terribly distressed" [A decade later a heart attack was to take Stevenson's life.] Then Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson, recuperating from a similar attack which had stricken him on 2 July 1955, wired the President to "take care of yourself." See "Hoover, Truman Express Concern," NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Sept. 1955, p. 42.

any legal decision as to whether constitutional powers should have been delegated. Two days later the President was reported as feeling "a little tired" and the news shook the stock market, resulting in a drop from one to five points, or the loss of four billion dollars on the New York Exchange. But the President bounced back and so did the market, and as days passed he began to devote more and more of his time to his governmental duties. By this time the Cabinet and the National Security Council had met and Sherman Adams had joined Hagerty in Denver.¹⁰

The first time the doctors had been available to the press was on the Tuesday after the attack when Dr. White, now spokesman for the physicians, held a news conference. As Secretary Hagerty read the medical reports, Dr. White would interpret and explain their meaning. It was the first time that the entire story was told in detail. One analysis went as follows:

Hagerty (reading): [The President] had a good bowel movement.

Dr. White: Now I put that in - which I insisted be put in, and I am sure the others agreed to it because it is. I said the country will be very pleased - the country is so bowel-minded anyway - to know that the President had a good movement this

¹⁰ "Waiting," op. cit., 28; "The President: Our Hopes Rose," op. cit., pp. 32-3; Donovan, op. cit., p. 377. See also Russell Baker, "President Better But Doctors See a 'Long Way To Go'," NEW YORK TIMES, 9 Oct. 1955, p. 1 and "Eisenhower Takes Back the Reins," U. S. NEWS, XXXIX (28 Oct. 1955), 25. For an account of the Cabinet meetings see below, pp. 55-62.

morning and it is important. It is good for the morale of the people for one thing.¹¹

It would take three weeks for the scar on Eisenhower's heart to heal and two or three months for the President to recover, said White.¹²

With the close of Dr. White's comments, the first question was already spilling forth: Did the Doctor think the President would recover enough to run for a second term? White said it was "quite conceivable" that he would but that having seen the strain, he would not recommend it. Later he was pressed on the matter. Did he mean to say that he would recommend to the President that he should

11 "The Doctor's Report," TIME, LXVI (10 Oct. 1955), 28. If Dr. White's syntax was that typical of one in the sciences, his analysis was effective. As to precisely how much of a boost the President's bowel movement gave to the country's morale, we do not have accurate indications, but as Dr. White later explained to Eisenhower himself, when the President wryly remarked that he and Hagerty were carrying the "realism" possibly a little too far, "That may not mean much to the general public, but to doctors everywhere it will tell a revealing story." Eisenhower had, after all, instructed them to "Tell the truth, the whole truth; don't try to conceal anything." This, the President said, was because he "had been one of those who during President Wilson's long illness wondered why the public was kept so much in the dark about his real condition and thought that the nation had a right to know exactly the status of the President's health." Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 538.

12 "Noted Heart Specialist Is Flown From Boston to Denver by U. S. Air Force Plane," NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Sept. 1955, p. 15.

not run again? Advised by Hagerty to clarify this statement, White explained,

I indicated that I, personally, as Paul D. White would have no great desire to undertake such a strain as that imposed upon a President of the U.S.A. This remark would be interpreted as meaning that I would give such advice to the President. Far from it. If the President has a good recovery, as he seems to be on the way to establishing, and if he desires to continue in his present career - which could be, of course, to the great benefit of this country and the world at large - I would have no objection whatsoever to his running again. But that remains for the future to decide.¹³

White called the President's chances "reasonably good" for recovery sufficient to allow for a second campaign and said it was probable that the President would be ready to confer fully with his associates in two weeks.¹⁴ The question of a second term was still in doubt. While it was Eisenhower's decision to make, though, there was little doubt of the outcome of the convalescent's decision.

Meanwhile the President's psychological condition presented more of a problem to the doctors than did his physical condition. The major setback of a heart attack is not the initial effects but the depression of the aftermath. More often than not this depression is what incurs another attack. It was soon apparent that Eisenhower was lying in bed worrying about the government. After visits by officials later on, this became more and more obvious. It was vital, therefore, that the

13 Id., and "The Doctors' Report," op. cit., p. 29.

14 Russell Baker, "Eisenhower Is Improving; Chance of Full Recovery Called 'Reasonably Good'," NEW YORK TIMES, 27 Sept. 1955, p. 1.

President's morale be kept up. After a slow start, the President's work schedule, under Dr. White's suggestion and direction, was gradually but steadily increased. The President spent most of his time in bed mulling over Administration business and decisions and was given as much official work as possible. The goal was to make him feel less of an invalid.

This psychology was made effective by the visits of Cabinet and Administration officials. Brief conferences were set up in order of seniority in the Cabinet, starting with the Vice President on down. Press Secretary Hagerty and the Assistant to the President Sherman Adams were to be there at all times.¹⁵ The doctors impressed upon each visiting dignitary that the President must not be treated as an invalid and that the conversations should be as normal as possible. In the early phases their talks were confined to problems of a less exacting nature but as time passed, visiting officials were buttonholed by doctors and told to speak to the President straight from the shoulder and "not to act as if they were addressing someone on his deathbed."¹⁶

15 For an account of Adams' conduct see below.

16 Adams, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-89 and Donovan, p. 377. So concerned with Eisenhower's morale were the physicians that they constantly put such things as children's letters and particularly letters from the President's grandchildren into the official papers brought him in later weeks. One such letter from John's daughters, Susan (age 3) and Barbara (age 6½) and his son David (7½) include some samples of their art work on get well cards and some bubblegum. See "To Grandfather With Love: Some Bubblegum," *NEW YORK TIMES*, 6 Oct. 1955, p. 1.

Vice President Nixon's visit was the first time a Vice President had been at the bedside of a conscious and seriously stricken President.¹⁷ Dulles spent twenty-five minutes with Eisenhower and "found the President's mind fresh and vigorous." He was satisfied that the President "was ready to apply himself to any problem that might become acute."¹⁸ Ezra Taft Benson, the Secretary of Agriculture, visited the President with Sherman Adams and Milton Eisenhower, the President's younger brother. Though he was not in any official position in the Administration, Dr. Eisenhower (who was at that time President of Pennsylvania State University and later President of the John Hopkins University) was one of the President's foremost advisers.¹⁹ The President gave them a "cheerful and hearty greeting." As he looked Benson over, he said, "Ezra, you look tired.

17 Mazo, op. cit., p. 193. Andrew Johnson had visited his stricken Chief, but Lincoln never regained consciousness from the time of his attack. Arthur never visited the lingering Garfield, and McKinley died within hours before Roosevelt, who was half a continent away on a hunting trip, could be contacted. Lyndon Johnson, while in the same building wherein Kennedy died, was not allowed by the Secret Service to be in the open near him. For the results of Nixon's conversation with the President see pp. 46-51.

18 Donovan, op. cit., pp. 381-82.

19 The initial assumption before the doctors' report of the full extent of the President's injury was understandably that the President would not run for a second term in 1956. Persistent rumors had it that his brother Milton would therefore run for the nomination. Milton became so sensitive to these stories that he stayed away from Denver during the early weeks and he did not see his brother until the Vice President and the Secretary of State had visited and conferred with the President, and then not until he specifically asked that he should be allowed to see Milton. Adams, op. cit., p. 187. See "Humphrey to See President; Milton Eisenhower a Caller," NEW YORK TIMES, 13 Oct. 1955, pp. 1 and 20.

Don't let these Doctors fool you. They told me I was in perfect health before this heart attack came."²⁰ He was not, however, concerned about his own health and had said earlier to Sherman Adams, "Funny thing, if the doctors here didn't tell me differently, I would think this heart attack belonged to some other guy." Dr. White told the press that he expected the President back in the White House by New Years' day.²¹

At any rate it was apparent that the crisis had passed and that the President was out of danger. This much was indicated by Eisenhower's directives, which came incessantly from Room 8002, the temporary capital of the nation. One of the things the President had been insistent upon all along was that "all regularly scheduled meetings of the Cabinet and National Security Council should be held under the chairmanship of the Vice President."²²

III

On the drizzily and gusty flight back from Scotland Sherman Adams began to think of how the President would want the "Team" to carry on. Although Adams had never been given any orders for such an eventuality by Eisenhower, this was not atypical. Eisenhower never gave Adams orders. Adams came to the conclusion - as did several other members of the official family - that the President's illness, if it had to happen, occurred at a

20 Benson, op. cit., p. 274.

21 Adams, op. cit., p. 188 and Russell Baker, "Physician Sees President Back in Capital by Jan. 1," NEW YORK TIMES, 6 Oct. 1955, p. 1 For a pictorial account see "Flock of Visitors as Patient Gains," LIFE, (14 Nov. 1955), 70-4.

22 Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 538.

fortunate time. Congress was not in session, there was a minimum of problems, no imminent Communist threat was poised on the international front, the Administration's program for the coming year was in the early stages of preparation, there was no pending legislation and while several long-range programs such as the State of the Union Message and the Budget were in preparation, they did not demand immediate attention. Everyone was hurrying back to Washington anticipating the problems that would arise and how they could be handled or staved off during the crisis.¹

On his way home the next morning Vice President Nixon noticed for the first time that an enlarged detail of Secret Service agents was guarding him. This was but a vanguard of the increased and intensive public attention that would follow him in the weeks and months ahead. His every word and action were doggedly given a beady-eyed examination by reporters, politicians, average citizens - and Administration officials. In addition to the increased guard, a bevy of reporters followed him wherever he went and camped on the street in front of his house until he had his basement fixed up for their use. Even the ventures outside the house of his famous dog "Checkers" were faithfully recorded.

After church that Sunday Nixon invited about ten of the reporters to his house. Saturday night he had predetermined the exact strategy of

¹ Adams, op. cit., p. 181 and Nixon, op. cit., pp. 141-43. See also Joseph A. Loftus, "Adams, 'No' Man of the Administration Returns," NEW YORK TIMES, 27 Sept. 1955, p. 21.

such a meeting with the press. He did not want to give the impression that he was holding a news conference or taking advantage of his new artifice position. The keynote of his meeting with the reporters was informality. Otherwise the whole Washington press and television corps would have been attracted and it would seem as though Nixon were making a move toward center stage. On the other hand Nixon did not want to avoid the press altogether, lest he give the impression of a lack of confidence in himself and the members of the entire Administration. He was, with the President, the only other man elected by all the people and they had a right to expect leadership. Yet an upsetting of the delicate balance would cause national dissention, a rift in the Administration, and perhaps even a danger to the President. A feeling of drift had to be avoided, leadership established and the vacuum filled without any of these motions being apparent.² It seemed an impossible dilemma. Nixon had to lead in order to fulfill his duty, yet remain static in order to demonstrate his loyalty. Letters and advice poured down upon him. Senator Styles Bridges, the senior senator from New Hampshire, wired him, "You are the constitutional second-in-command and you ought to assume leadership. Don't let the White House clique take command."³ There was no doubt that they would try to do so.

² "Acting Captain," TIME, LXVI (10 Oct. 1955), 25; Ferrick, op. cit., p. 222. See Also Nixon, op. cit., pp. 143-44 and 139.

³ Ferrick, op. cit., p. 222 and Nixon, op. cit., p. 149.

Nixon told the reporters gathered in his living room, "The business of the government will go on without delay ... Under the President's Administration a team has been set up in Washington which will carry out his well-defined plans."⁴

After the meeting with the Press Sunday afternoon, Nixon met again that night with Deputy Attorney General Rogers. This time they were joined at Rogers' home by the President's Congressional aide, General "Jerry" Persons. Nixon took the lead in urging that the Administration should follow "a business-as-usual" policy, with the members of the Cabinet and Staff going on with their daily routines. Yet it would not do to act as if it didn't make any difference whether the President were there or not.⁵ In order that this impression be averted Nixon suggested that a Cabinet meeting be called to dramatize the President's absence and also to demonstrate that the government and the Team could carry on in the framework of the policies already established by President Eisenhower. After checking with Hagerty and other officials via telephone, the three agreed on this course of action.⁶

4 Quoted in Donovan, op. cit., p. 368.

5 Indeed, some years later a witticism was bantered about to the effect that FDR proved that you could be President as long as you wanted to; Harry Truman proved that anybody could be President, and Eisenhower proved we didn't really need one.

6 Feerick, op. cit., p. 217 and Donovan, op. cit., pp. 368-69. Although a NSC meeting had been scheduled for the following Thursday, a Cabinet meeting was not on the week's agenda.

But even though the Administration might carry on, it was confronted with a rather obvious problem: who was to be boss in Washington? Only two men presented the logical choice for the exercise of authority. The Constitution suggested in a round-about way that Nixon was the man; the set policies of the Administration called upon Adams. Nixon's dilemma has already been explored. As for Adams, he later wrote that, "If I knew Nixon, he would be wary of appearing to assume presidential prerogatives before he became constitutionally eligible for them." Adams systematically excluded Secretary of State Dulles as senior member of the Cabinet, because "Dulles had enough problems in the foreign field without taking on domestic ones, too." That left Sherman Adams foremost on the dim horizon.

The Assistant to the President arrived in Washington Monday morning as the New York Times was postulating that "the Eisenhower Republicans will make every effort to keep power in the hands of Sherman Adams and away from Vice President Nixon."⁷ Immediately Adams met with Nixon, Persons and Rogers for three hours over lunch at the conspicuously empty White House. The subject of delegation of powers was not approached and Adams agreed that the Cabinet should meet. He was equally insistent, however, that if any decisions had to be made, the Cabinet as a group should make them. Nixon's reply to this is unknown. He was not yet, however, in a position to disagree very strongly. Adams on the other hand had nothing to lose - or everything to lose, depending upon how one viewed the situation.

⁷ William S. White, "Johnson, Rayburn to Give Support," NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Sept. 1955, pp. 1 and 17.

If Eisenhower died he would be out of a job anyway, but while the President was still alive he would not risk his own personal unprecedented power being diminished in the slightest. After lunch Adams and Nixon communicated with several Cabinet members and it was agreed that the Cabinet should meet on Friday, 30 September. Not since the Administration of Woodrow Wilson had a President's Cabinet taken it upon itself to meet of its own accord when the President was incapacitated. Word from Denver the next day that Dr. White had announced that the President was capable of making decisions and would be able to take part in conferences in two weeks effectively killed any concrete plans for going ahead with actual delegation of powers to Nixon.

Nixon's account of the Monday White House Luncheon differs only slightly from that of Adams. He described his relationship with Governor Adams as "somewhat formal rather than friendly." They worked well together, though, he pointed out, with a mutual respect for their authority and abilities. Of the meeting, Nixon stated that "Adams said little ... but for him that was not unusual or surprising." Nixon's main concern was that the Cabinet members should be kept in harmony and kept up-to-date on the President's progress and decisions in the government. This was an important point. Adams was notorious in Washington for being, as Lincoln was described, "the most shut-mouthed man" in government. In a situation such as this it would not have been unusual for Adams to have kept others deliberately in the dark. Nixon insisted that the impression should be avoided "that any one clique of Cabinet officers was running the government." He said he "wanted to make sure that no jealousies arose within the Cabinet" as a result of his having conferred with some and not with

others.⁸ What he meant was that he did not want Sherman Adams to become Acting President of the United States.

Yet another meeting was arranged for Monday night, again at Rogers' home. This time the subject was politics. It must be remembered that at this time the President was still in grave danger and it was naturally assumed that he would not run again even if he recovered fully. For men whose business was politics it was not improper for them to meet and discuss the political implications and possible eventualities of the President's heart attack and what would be the official reaction to them.

Nixon met for four hours that night with Adams, Leonard Hall, the Republican National Chairman, and his press aide, Lou Guylay, along with Rogers and Persons. Thus there were two Eisenhower men, two Nixon men and two representatives of the Party. While the rest of them talked politics Nixon remembers that Adams "volunteered nothing." Leonard Hall later described Adams' attitude: "Every time we asked, 'Sherm, what do you think?' he would talk about fishing in Scotland." After receiving such evasive and noncommittal piscatorial replies to three or four more questions, the Republicans realized that Adams was not going to discuss any political future that did not include his boss. It thus becomes apparent that Adams' actions were not based solely on jealous guarding of his own position. As Nixon explained, "Adams' sole loyalty was to

⁸ Adams, op. cit., pp. 185 and 192; Feerick, op. cit., p. 217, and Nixon, op. cit., p. 147. See also William M. Blair, "Nixon Meets with Top Officials; Ruling on Powers Deferred," NEW YORK TIMES, 28 Sept. 1955, p. 1.

Eisenhower and ... he did not want to take part in any action before he knew his chief's inclinations."⁹

One of the most admirable and remarkable facets of the American Constitutional System is that it precludes a struggle for power in the case of a fallen or stricken chief of state. But it cannot provide for steps to be taken against party jealousies, personal antipathies, individual ambition and blind, intensive loyalty. Although Eisenhower was proud and confident that his "Team" could carry on under the "chairmanship" (but not "direction") of his Vice President, friction in the face of this impending crisis was inevitable.¹⁰

It would be unrealistic to suggest that neither Adams nor Nixon realized the potentialities of this situation. By Tuesday it was tentatively assumed that Eisenhower was out of imminent danger and so it was not a game of morbid politics or ambition. James Reston lost no time in concluding two days after the attack that "Vice President Nixon today fell heir to one of the greatest responsibilities and political opportunities ever presented to so young a man in the history of the Republic." Reston further observed that it would be difficult to oppose Nixon openly, since he might at any time become President.¹¹ It did not take an astute politician like Adams to realize this much. For Adams it was a

9 Nixon, op. cit., p. 147.

10 See James Reston, "Problems of the G.O.P. 'Team'," NEW YORK TIMES, 27 Sept. 1955, p. 24.

11 James Reston, "Nixon Is Considered in Forefront For '56," NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Sept. 1955, p. 1.

matter of preserving the status quo. For Nixon, who had been under fire since 1952, it was more than that. First, and foremost it was a time of perilous trial. He could ruin his own future or add immeasurably to his opportunities for a promotion. Second, it was a time of proving himself. If he could handle an almost impossibly delicate task, assert himself, provide leadership, allay suspicion, maintain harmony and exhibit loyalty, his credentials for that promotion would be established. So the angling for authority and power boiled down to an invisible contest between the Assistant President and the Assistant to the President.

Soon after Adams left for Denver the appointments with the recovering President were arranged and Nixon's was first. When he arrived he visited the President in Adams' presence and the President told him of the decision they had come to on the delegation of powers. It did not surprise Nixon.

Before Attorney General Herbert Brownell was on the ground from his flight from Spain, the decision he was called upon to make was already made. Almost every prominent Republican and Administration spokesman had issued a statement to the general effect that the Eisenhower Team, now back together, would be able to carry on almost exactly as before. Accordingly, on Tuesday, 27 September, after the White House luncheon, while Rogers ordered a study of the problem of delegating presidential non-constitutional functions by executive order, Brownell announced that there were "sufficient legal arrangements to carry on 'the day-to-day operations of the government ...' I don't know that it will be

necessary to deliver a legal opinion" on the subject of immediate delegation. None was ever rendered.¹² Meanwhile the government was run by a committee consisting of the Vice President, Dulles, Brownell, Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, Persons - and Sherman Adams. "As I expected." Adams wrote later, "Nixon leaned over backward to avoid any appearance of assuming presidential authority."¹³ Nixon himself said that he had "leaned with the wind"¹⁴ but if he were pushed over backwards it was from the gusts provoked by the high pressure area, Sherman Adams.

None of these actions were, of course, publicized. As far as the general public knew, Nixon might still become President in fact by succession or by temporary appointment. The whirlwind of attention therefore continued around him. The Democrats were frantic over any possibility of Nixon's ascent to the highest office in the land by any means whatever. The Democrats voiced the thoughts of Harry Truman. "No President can delegate his powers to others," snapped Truman. He had contended this with the "do-nothing" Eisenhower all along. The only precedent for such a case, he said, had been when President Wilson fired his Secretary of State Robert Lansing (who, incidentally, had been John Foster Dulles'

12 See "U. S. Ruling Asked on Shifting Tasks," NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Sept. 1955, p. 1. See also, William M. Blair, "Cabinet Meeting Called by Nixon," NEW YORK TIMES, 17 Sept. 1955, pp. 1 and 26 and "No Pressing Business Facing President; Doubts Need to Delegate Powers," NEW YORK TIMES, 27 Sept. 1955, p. 21.

13 Richard H. Rovere, THE EISENHOWER YEARS (New York: Farrar, Strau, and Cudhay, 1956), p. 321; Feerick, op. cit., p. 217; and Adams, op. cit., pp. 155-56.

14 Nixon, op. cit., p. 143.

great-uncle) for calling Cabinet meetings during the Wilson illness. "President Wilson fired Lansing and he should have," observed Truman.¹⁵ The Russians, lulled temporarily into a harmonious attitude by Eisenhower's efforts at Geneva, distrusted everyone in the American government except the President. Pravda thus saw Nixon as a spokesman for "reactionary circles" which were trying to replace the "spirit of Geneva" with one of "intolerance."¹⁶ The most noticeable effect of the sudden emphasis upon the Vice President was the tendency of the politicians in Washington to "play the winner." Lobbyists and men who had hardly tried to conceal their antipathy for him before the President's attack now paid him courtesy calls or sought to give him advice, expounding upon his brilliant future. But as the President's health improved, and as the trial balloon of delegation of powers was slowly but deliberately deflated, the "Nixon band wagon" chugged to a conspicuous halt.¹⁷

Nixon was still intent on playing his role to the fullest extent possible and in maintaining harmony in the Administration. He called upon Cabinet members in their own offices to avoid the impression that he was summoning them upon the basis of new found authority. Even here the change was noticeable as the conventional address of "Dick" gave way to "Mr. Vice President." Nixon's initiative, there can be little doubt,

¹⁵ "President Can't Delegate Powers, Truman Says," NEW YORK TIMES, 28 Sept. 1955, p. 1.

¹⁶ Quoted in Leon Volkov, "Men in the Kremlin: Suspicious of Most Except the President," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (10 Oct. 1955), 55.

¹⁷ Nixon, op. cit., p. 150.

made it possible for the small group of the Eisenhower Team - himself, Adams, Persons, Dulles and Humphrey - effectively to continue to carry on the Eisenhower policies, in spite of his ostensive and initial reaction that no group of Cabinet members should form a clique to run the government. As Adams later recalled, however, this was made possible also because "There was never a move on the part of any of us to 'seize power' or to take an unwarranted action that Eisenhower would have disapproved." Also the group, of course, was never recognized as any official governing agency.¹⁸

Yet Adams' reasoning here leaves part of the story unsaid. Actually he did not have to move to 'seize power'; power fell into his lap. He inherited it by default. His actions were motivated by a determination not to let anyone else (i. e., Nixon) in on the inheritance. It must be pointed out, however, that the actions of Adams and the Inner Circle may not necessarily have been motivated by any personal dislike or distrust for the Vice President. They would have taken place in much the same manner no matter who was constitutionally second in command. As had been noted, Governor Adams had nothing to lose by insisting that the status quo be rigidly maintained, a good deal to lose if it were altered in favor of Nixon, and everything to lose if Nixon succeeded to the Presidency. In a Nixon Administration there would have been no room for an Assistant to the President, for General Persons, and perhaps several more Cabinet members. Most obviously Brownell's days would have

18 Feerick, op. cit., p. 222 and Adams, op. cit., pp. 185-86.

been numbered by his Deputy, Bill Rogers - Nixon's long time confident. The handling of the situation of delegating powers was, then, motivated by a desire to serve the nation and the Administration only insofar as those in policy-making positions felt that the nation and the Administration could best be served under the present circumstances by themselves. But as Richard Rovere pointed out on the matter of a delegation of powers,

The most elementary kind of prudence would appear to call for the establishment, though not of course the immediate application of a policy, and the unwillingness of Mr. Brownell and his colleagues to go through with his can only suggest that all of the men around Mr. Eisenhower do not wish to take any step that could result in giving Mr. Nixon greater authority or even in giving Mr. Nixon the impression that greater authority was soon to be his.¹⁹

As had been pointed out, however, the target was not Nixon, per se; the target was the uncertain fear that a reshuffling or even a diffusion of power would result inevitably in a diminishing of their own status on the part of the men in question. It was this uncertainty that prevented these men from acting in complete good faith either with the President or the Vice President. It was still entirely possible that the President might pass away or suffer a relapse. This being the case, the situation might not be so fortunate now as it had been earlier when there were no pressing demands and when the principles of the Administration were scattered around the world. There simply was no active spokesman - either for it or the nation.

Then, too, there was the factor of the political reality of the situation. Cabinet members and other Administration officials were faced with a choice between Adams who was in fact the inside man and Nixon who was in a position of tremendous potential but questionable authority.

¹⁹ Rovere, op. cit., pp. 322-23.

If Nixon lost the contest and showed up poorly then those who had showed an allegiance to him would be in dire trouble with the "no" man of the Administration. If on the other hand Nixon succeeded they could not be blamed for showing a degree of loyalty which a President Nixon might quite properly expect of his own subordinates. And if Eisenhower survived then nothing would be changed at all.

The actions of the Inner Circle were, then, based upon a series of possible hypothetical situations, and the short-sightedness of Governor Adams and his colleagues in this situation is explained only by the stark realization that their jobs were on the line and unless they were jealously guarded they would be lost.

Thus when Nixon arrived in Denver for his conference with Eisenhower (and Adams) it was not news to him that the President had long since come to the conclusion that it was "neither necessary nor desirable to surrender temporarily any of the President's powers."²⁰ Yet Nixon was to be "chairman", the ringmaster, the playing captain (but not the manager) of the Team in Washington.

IV

Those who accused Nixon of being overambitious were still watching to see if he would make any attempt to climb over Eisenhower's

²⁰ Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 541. In all fairness it should be pointed out that arguing in terms of "what might have been" is a very thin basis on which to found such a severe criticism of the Adams clique. Yet the very fact that the President had suffered a heart attack, the causes of which could not be traced and had suffered it after being pronounced in "excellent health" serves to sustain it. Nixon's conduct was, in short impeccable, and was not matched by that of his colleagues for the most part.

stricken body and "move in." Nixon disclaimed later that "... I had no desire or intention to seize an iota of presidential power. I was the Vice President and could be nothing more."¹ Precisely how much of this attitude was by reason of loyalty and how much was by reason of impossibility cannot be determined. For by now Sherman Adams and other prominent Administrators had made it virtually impossible for Nixon to receive any such power. He was to "preside" and "co-ordinate" - vaguely appear to lead with token authority and no power.

In gauging the actions of Adams and the Insiders it must be noted that at this time (and for many months afterward) Nixon was the heir apparent. They acted out of ignorance. Would Eisenhower run again? Could they persuade him to do so? If such was their plan, how was the time to start to convince the President that he should attempt another term. Thus began a long campaign to make Eisenhower believe that the country and the world needed him - a campaign, as it turned out, that was both highly successful and equally unnecessary. Whatever Nixon intended to do, it would have been unlike his usual political astuteness to attempt any political coup or inclination toward self-aggrandizement. If Eisenhower refused to run, Nixon would be the man to beat and the Vice President knew it. If the President eventually determined to seek another term, it would be foolish to duel with Sherman Adams or to give any reason for

1 Nixon, op. cit., pp. 143-44.

the President to ask Nixon to step down. Accordingly Nixon sat tight and flatly refused to do anything "that could possibly be construed as political so long as we had a President who conceivably could run for a second term"² It is entirely possible that even at this early date Nixon - who had just witnessed firsthand the high-pressure tactics of the President's official advisors - had already guessed that Eisenhower would be persuaded to run again, if for no other reason than to defend his record against defeat with another Republican candidate who ostensibly wore the "can't win" label.

It would be inaccurate to leave the impression that Nixon was preempted from the picture by the awesome power of the Adams Clique. That Nixon was pushed aside by Adams is true enough, but it is also true that the Vice President offered little personal resistance. As has been seen, there was little to gain by a duel with Adams. His efforts were concentrated not on gaining power for himself - that would come anyway if worse came to worst - but rather in keeping Sherman Adams from becoming Acting President. This was the intent Behind Nixon's insistence that the Cabinet (including him) should be kept fully informed of the President's progress and his decisions. Adams' actions, on the other hand, reflected less upon the Governor's confidence in Nixon and more upon his confidence in himself. It was not Adams' immediate or intended goal to keep Nixon from becoming President - he simply did not want anyone but Eisenhower to be in the White House prior to 21 January 1961.

2 Id., p. 147.

Thus, as has been ascertained, his actions would have been the same toward anyone who might have been the Vice President. His immediate concern was Eisenhower's running for a second term in 1956. If the President ran, Adams would remain; if Eisenhower retired, Nixon would be the probable candidate anyway. So Adams' goal was not to stop Nixon but to boost Eisenhower thereby assuring in the meantime (and for the next four years) his own place of preeminent power in the government. Nixon fought the tendency of Adams' power to fill the vacuum while Adams fought the tendency of his power to drain away and become a vacuum. It must be remembered, however, that all of Nixon's subsequent actions were made with the nearby universal premise in mind that Eisenhower could not under any circumstances be persuaded to run again, yet balanced by his personal experience with Adams and his comprehension of the Governor's influence with the President. At any rate, he could put up with Adams until after the National Convention.

With the Nixon policy of "normalcy" instituted, some of the Cabinet expressed reservations about carrying on the business of the government at too usual a fashion. Treasury Secretary Humphrey was concerned about his leaving the country for economic talks in Ottawa, and Dulles and Benson, along with Commerce Secretary Sinclair Weeks were scheduled to discuss trade and economic problems with their Canadian counterparts. Nixon urged Humphrey that they should all go to Canada as scheduled to "avoid any impression that the business of the government was grinding to a standstill while the President was ill" or that the government was withdrawing into a shell of timidity.³

3 Id., p. 141.

Once again Nixon had exhibited profound political sagacity for a man of forty-two years. This time he served a twofold purpose. It was extremely fortunate for the Administration that any impression such as Nixon described was avoided. Much political hay was later made of Eisenhower's disability (and Nixon's "running" of the government) anyway. Second, Nixon at least got most of the inner circle away from Washington, as it had been in the beginning. Again, whether this was so that he could occupy the limelight or whether he was actually concerned with the public's opinion of the Administration is hazy. A good guess would be that the Vice President was concerned with both. If the Administration looked bad, he looked bad. And if he were to run for President when and if Eisenhower bowed out, his record would have to sparkle during this period of crisis. And the best setting for that performance was in Washington. He cancelled his proposed goodwill tour of the Near East. It was a logical move.

Presiding over the Cabinet and the National Security Council was not new to Nixon. He had done it several times previously when Eisenhower had been away from Washington. In fact he was the first Vice President in history to have done so. As the special meeting of 30 September 1955 approached, however, the situation was electric with tension. The Cabinet was meeting on its own. Its chief lay in a hospital 1,150 miles away, still in danger from a heart attack not yet a week old. The White House was bustling with official activity for the first time since the President had left in August. The Cabinet room was crowded

with thirty-four officials in addition to the Cabinet members. All were in a serious mood. The Vice President made no attempt at an "entrance," sat in his own chair, leaving the President's, directly across from his, empty. There was no agenda and the large mahogany table was uncluttered with papers.

The Vice President called the meeting to order at 9:30 a.m. and asked for silent prayer. After a minute he read the morning medical bulletin from Denver. The President was improving and had spent an "excellent" night. It was his first night out of the oxygen tent.

Nixon followed the usual procedure and turned to the Secretary of State for a report on the foreign problems which faced the Administration while the President was ill. The most critical situation was in the Middle East and Dulles explained in his accustomed manner (though probably holding back since Eisenhower, was not there to hear) about the difficulties with the Arabs.⁴

Immediately thereafter the Cabinet moved into a discussion of what Administration policy should be during the President's illness. Although Nixon had been in communication with each Cabinet member individually during the week, this was the first time that they had had an opportunity to exchange views as a policy-making body. The situation was largely resolved in advance.

The gathering now turned from a Cabinet meeting into a Republican Caucus. First, Nixon reminded them that questions about the outlook

⁴ Id., p. 148; Adams, op. cit., p. 222; "Acting Captain," op. cit., p. 25; Donovan, op. cit., pp. 370-71.

for the party would be inevitable. He suggested that they should be fended off with as little comment as possible and with expressions of concern for the President's recovery. He also suggested that they might make comments about Eisenhower's skill and wisdom on selecting such an effective administrative organization.⁵

At this point Dulles volunteered, without mentioning any names, that while the President was absent from Washington "there might be certain people outside the government who would try to set themselves up as authoritative spokesman for the President on various public issues." He suggested that the best way to avoid this situation was to set up only one official channel from Denver. That channel: Sherman Adams. His reasoning, as Adams himself reports, was that the Assistant to the President "had become recognized nationally as a public figure closely identified with the President." Nixon hesitantly seconded this idea - there being little else under the circumstances he could do.⁶ With Adams in Denver the senior member of the White House Staff in Washington would be Jerry Persons and it was resolved that all communications should be handled through him.

If politics were on Governor Adams' side in this case so was logic. Any communication of the Adams-Eisenhower type handled through the Vice President would immediately have upset the power structure in the

5 Donovan., op. cit., p. 374.

6 Adams reports (p. 186) that Nixon questioned this arrangement and wanted Adams to stay in Washington as head of the White House Staff.

capital causing more difficulty than benefit. It is to be pointed out, however, as Adams does point out, that Dulles had ulterior motives. There was no one in the Cabinet who had a higher opinion of Nixon than did Dulles. It was almost a father-son relationship and the respect was mutual. Yet Dulles suggested a communications system that completely by-passed "his boy." This was simply a matter of self-preservation on Dulles' part - as was the quick vote of confidence on the part of the entire Cabinet. Dulles wanted his own position as the maker of foreign policy completely insulated from any outside interference. As Adams pointed out, "He wanted to make sure that nobody would get between the President and himself with suggestions for changing the foreign program or with some troublesome public statement that the President would be unable to disavow."⁷

The Cabinet subsequently agreed upon a statement to be issued after the meeting to the effect that "there are no obstacles to the orderly and uninterrupted conduct of foreign and domestic affairs of the nation during the period of rest ordered by the President's physicians." The statement went on to say that the President's policies were "well established along definite lines and are well known." Actions taken during the President's absence would be within the framework set up by the President himself and new policies would be postponed until his return.⁸

⁷ Id., pp. 186-87. When Adams was in Denver he implemented his policies by exercising his unique prerogative as the sole spokesman for the President, buttonholing officials and saying, "It is the President's wish that you do this," or "The President hopes you will do thus and so." Donovan, op. cit., p. 378.

⁸ Benson, op. cit., pp. 271-72 and Donovan, op. cit., p. 373.

After the discussion of several other minor matters the following procedure was agreed upon:

- 1) Actions that were usually decided upon by members of the Cabinet themselves, without consultation of the President or their colleagues, would be carried out as usual.
- 2) Questions normally brought before the Cabinet for consideration would continue to be discussed there.
- 3) Questions on which the President usually had the ultimate decision would first go to the Cabinet or the NSC for thorough discussion and then to Denver via Governor Adams for the President's consideration.
- 4) The proper channel to the President would always be first through General Persons at the White House and then through Governor Adams in Denver.⁹

It is conspicuous - albeit logical and politically apropos - that the Vice President was bypassed altogether.

With the usual incidentals, the meeting ended at noon. In closing however, Dulles, noting the intense strain under which the Vice President had so admirably operated during the week, said as the Senior Member on behalf of the Cabinet,

Mr. Vice President, I realize that you have been under a heavy burden during these past few days and I know I express the opinion of everybody here that you have conducted yourself superbly. We want to express our appreciation for the way you have carried out your responsibilities during the past week. You have ... given the country the assurance it needed. And I want you to know we are proud to be on this team and proud to be serving this Cabinet under your leadership.¹⁰

9 Feerick, op. cit., pp. 218-19.

10 Donovan, op. cit., p. 376; Nixon, op. cit., p. 149; and Benson, op. cit., p. 272.

Nixon thanked him and adjourned the meeting with the first kind word he had received since the attack.

By way of summary, the official press statement released after the Cabinet meeting is worth reproduction here:

After full discussion of pending matters, it was concluded that there are no obstacles to the orderly and uninterrupted conduct of the foreign and domestic affairs of the nation during the period of rest ordered by the President's physician.

Governor Sherman Adams, the Assistant to the President, will leave for Denver today and will be available there, in consultation with the President's physicians, whenever it may later become appropriate to present any matters to the President.

The policies and programs of the administration as determined and approved by the President are well established along definite lines and are well known. Coordination of the activities of the several departments of the government within the framework of these policies will be continued by the full co-operation among the responsible officers of these departments so that the functions of the government will be carried forward in an effective manner during the absence of the President.¹¹

The release was made not by the "Acting Captain" but by the Attorney General and no references at all was made to the Vice President of the United States.¹²

Nixon presided over subsequent Cabinet meetings with much the same results. Emmet John Hughes, an occasional speechwriter for Eisenhower, noted that Nixon was "articulate and forceful" at the

¹¹ Feerick, op. cit., p. 219; Adams, op. cit., p. 186; and Donovan, op. cit., p. 373.

¹² The statement had been drawn up by Rogers at the request of the NSC for its meeting the day before and was to be approved by the Cabinet.

meetings "as he almost always appeared at Cabinet" and did not play the role of a meek moderator.¹³ In a subsequent Cabinet meeting, however, when a heated discussion arose over the budget, Arthur Flemming, then the Defense Mobilizer, recalls that Nixon made no effort to quell the participants. When some Cabinet members spoke longer than they would have if Eisenhower (who disliked wordiness) had been there, Nixon told him that "it isn't my Cabinet; it is the President's Cabinet. I am just the presiding officer."¹⁴

Despite all of Nixon's efforts, however, it was impossible to maintain complete harmony within such a situation when men were motivated, almost obsessively, to maintaining the status quo. For instance it was virtually impossible for Nixon to venture outside his house or office without running into reporters. They had the responsibility to cover him and he had a responsibility to be as noncommittal as possible. Still, after the NSC meeting the day before the Cabinet meeting (Thursday) two Cabinet officials called Nixon, very upset, because they thought he had sought out the press in violation of an agreement at the meeting not to have press conferences during this period.¹⁵

All in all, however, most of the "Palace Guard" were completely satisfied with Nixon's conduct. This was probably motivated by the fact that he did not attempt to change the status quo in any direct way. One of the most ironic notes, it turned out later, came from Nelson Rockefeller,

13 Emmet John Hughes, *THE ORDEAL OF POWER: A POLITICAL MEMOIR OF THE EISENHOWER YEARS* (New York) Atheneum, 1963), p. 117.

14 Mazo, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

15 Nixon, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-49.

then a special assistant to the President. "All of us in the administration," he wrote Nixon, "are proud indeed to be associated with you as the leader who is carrying on in the President's absence."¹⁶ The extent of Nixon's static success was noted later by Emmet John Hughes:

At his intellectual best in offering tactical counsel, he came to appear more and more the kind of politician who, but for some accident of partisan affiliation, could have rendered such service just as healthily to the Democratic party. Significantly and logically, then, the most effective period of his vice presidency had come with the awkward political suspense following Eisenhower's heart attack ... Then, poised and restrained, he had given an exemplary performance as a man close to great power not being presumptuously or prematurely asserive. This descreetly empty time was surely his finest political hour.¹⁷

Nixon spent the rest of the intensive week following a schedule that stretched from twelve to sixteen hours a day. It entailed several hours with the White House Staff. While in the White House, Nixon used a conference room and steered clear entirely of the President's empty office. For the first time since the President was stricken, he signed some non-legal, ceremonial papers with his own name but always "in behalf of the President."¹⁸ Having at least displayed his competency to be Chief of State, it was the closest Richard M. Nixon would come to the Presidency of the United States.

16 Quoted in Mazo, op. cit., p. 188.

17 Hughes, op. cit., p. 317.

18 Feerick, op. cit., p.222 and Nixon, op. cit., p. 148. In addition to advice such as the telegram from Senator Bridges, Nixon was urged to demonstrate token assertion of authority by moving in and working in the Blair House, Washington's official guest house, across the street from the Executive Mansion. Nixon did not even consider making such a move. See Blair, "Cabinet Meeting Called By Nixon," op. cit., p. 26.

V

A month and a day after he had entered the hospital, President Eisenhower made his first appearance to reporters. Wearing loud maroon pajamas with the response "Much Better Thanks" embroidered on the shirt pocket, sent to him by the White House press corps, and a wild western tie bearing the five stars of his rank (plus one the doctors had given him for "good behavior"), he was wheeled out on the sundeck of Fitzsimmons Hospital. This meeting with the press was carefully planned by Jim Hagerty - probably the coolest head during the entire crisis. Only ten photographers were admitted. They were instructed to work quickly, to give no "shouted orders," and to come no closer than twelve feet to the President. Only one correspondent was allowed to view the occasion.¹ The President was very genial but made no conversation of any importance during the brief meeting with the press.

Eisenhower could have left the hospital in October but decided to wait until he could walk out rather than being carried out a month sooner. He began to make plans to depart in early November and was assured by his

¹ James E. Pollard, THE PRESIDENTS AND THE PRESS, TRUMAN TO JOHNSON (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964), p. 82. When the President went outside on the sundeck the security was tightened and the entire grounds were closed. Security officials and Jim Hagerty were incensed when in early October CBS photographers in a helicopter and an unidentified plane flew over the sundeck when the President made his inaugural visit there. Hagerty was described as "livid" at this disturbance to the President and to the other patients in the hospital. The Secret Service confiscated the film and CBS apologized. Hence the measures described above for photographing the President. See Russell Baker, "President Spends 30 Minutes in Sun on Hospital Deck," NEW YORK TIMES, 11 Oct. 1955, pp. 1 and 29.

doctors that after a period of recuperation he would be ready to attend regular meetings of the Cabinet and the NSC by January. His plans were to go from Denver to Washington, where he would make a brief stop at the White House, and then to his farm in Gettysburg, where he would remain until he was strong enough to resume his duties. His doctors would have preferred a warmer climate - winter was coming to Pennsylvania - such as Florida or Arizona, but Eisenhower was becoming impatient. He was ready to get back into the harness and those locales were too far removed from Washington. He would establish a temporary office in Gettysburg so that his staff and Cabinet members and other officials could consult with him.

Significantly enough, General Eisenhower walked out of Fitzsimmons Army Hospital on Veterans Day, 11 November 1955, nearly two months in advance of the time Dr. White had predicted he would be ready to leave. He made a few remarks, saying that the hospital staff had earned his "eternal gratitude", thanking the people of the nation for their "prayers for a sick person" and said thank you and goodbye to the people of Denver. He flew to Washington where he was greeted at the airport by Vice President Nixon, former President Hoover and Major and Mrs. John Eisenhower with their children. The President remarked to the airport crowd that he had taken "a little longer than we had planned" to return and that he was happy that the doctors had given him "a parole if not a pardon." He was dandid

about his condition. "I expect to be back at my accustomed duties," he informed them, but the doctors said, "I must ease my way into 'em and not bulldoze my way into them." He was under intense scrutinization the entire time, as the nation watched on television. Every word, every movement was closely examined. His loss of weight was readily observable and the New York Times even observed that his wave to the crowd was "not a typical Eisenhower wave" since he did not raise his hands over his head. After the speech at the airport the President and Mrs. Eisenhower were spontaneously received by crowds all along Pennsylvania Avenue on the ride back to the White House. All governmental employees were off for Armistice Day and 200,000 people lined the streets with placards proclaiming "Welcome Home Ike," "Glad You're Back," "I Like Ike - Back Home."² Now ended the partial moratorium on his health; now began in earnest the political speculation; now the Lame Duck was recuperated and fair game.

² Russell Baker, "Waves and Says, 'Good-By Folks'," NEW YORK TIMES, 12 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 8. In the same edition see Joseph A. Loftus, "President Flies Back to Capital; Shows No Fatigue," and Alvin Shuster, "Happy Crowd Greet's President On Flag-Draped Capital Route," on pages 1 and 9. See also Adams, op. cit., pp. 189-90 and Nixon, op. cit., p. 151.

The Monday after his return to the White House the President left Washington for Gettysburg and his farm for convalescence from what back in August had started out to be a summer vacation. Contrary to many reports the farm at Gettysburg was not given to Eisenhower by businessmen or governmental associate after he became President. It was bought in sections during the time span from December 1950 (189 acres at \$24,000) to July 1955 (one acre at \$4,200) and its present 496 acres represented a total investment in excess of \$267,500 (which included the complete renovation of the old farmhouse). It was paid for mostly from the proceeds from his best-selling account of his World War II years, Crusade in Europe.³

The brook that meandered through the President's farm was almost frozen over upon his arrival in Gettysburg. The big rebuilt rambling old brick, wood and stone farmhouse stood amidst craggy trees that had long since dropped their last auburn leaves. On 14 October

3 "When Washington Moves to Gettysburg," U.S. NEWS, XXXIX (14 Oct. 1955), 22-3 and "When the White House Moves to Gettysburg," U.S. NEWS, XXXIX (25 Nov. 1955), 58-61.

in Lincoln Square in Gettysburg the local populace of 7200 welcomed the Eisenhowers from their eighty-eight mile motor trip from Washington with a tremendous reception. It was not only the President's homecoming but it was also the First Lady's fifty-ninth birthday. President and Mrs. Eisenhower thanked them, said it was good to be back, and went immediately to their farm on Emmitsburg Road.

The President was not at home for more than two weeks before Dr. Snyder, who moved in with the Eisenhowers, remarked that "he's beginning to fret a little at not having enough to do." Eisenhower would walk around the house using a putter as a walking stick and worry about the government. The doctors would not let him wander around the farm too much and his putting green in back was not only incomplete but was also likely to be frozen over.

By prearrangement, in Gettysburg the local postmaster, Lawrence Oyler, was voluntarily moved out of his office and the General Services Administration went to work on a temporary office for the President. The small room (11 x 18 feet) was completely renovated. The glass door was replaced by a solid one made of wood bearing the initials "D. D. E." in small letters. Inside, the walls were repainted a "federal light green," and the floor covered by a wall-to-wall gray carpeting. New venetian blinds

shaded windows in which the panes had been replaced with two-inch thick bullet-proof glass that looked directly onto the street eight steps away. Two phones were installed: one for local calls (Gettysburg, 1505, Ext. 35) and the other marked with a bright red tape, was a direct line to the White House. The President's chair was flanked by the American and Presidential flags and between them on the wall hung the Presidential seal. The President said he thought it was "nearly as nice as the one in Washington." A guard stood at the door at all times while the President was in the office. In the rear of the huge concrete Post Office Building a "White House Communications Room" was set up by the Signal Corps. Pilots were instructed not to fly within a two-mile radius, photographers were asked to pack away their long-range lenses and at the farm nearby sightseeing tours through the adjoining Gettysburg Park Battlefield were closed as was a park observation tower which afforded a view of the Eisenhower home. At night floodlights bathed the acres in light and the Secret Service constantly patrolled the area. An electric-eye circuit had been linked up around the perimeter of the farm so that any intruders could be detected immediately. When the hunting season opened the Gettysburg Times, as usual, carried a legal notice: "All persons are warned not to trespass on the premises of the undersigned with dog, gun or trap..."

Among the 126 signatories: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Route 2.⁴

Although the restless President had been told that he could take part in regular Cabinet meetings by January, he was anxious to see his official family again and to give the impression that he was officially taking back the reins of government. Accordingly a Cabinet meeting was called for 21 November to be held at Camp David, the official Presidential retreat in the Maryland Mountains. There was no official business but the doctors allowed it because the President would improve his psychological disposition and get some rest at the camp retreat.

The meeting at Laurel Lodge at Camp David was a moving scene for all concerned. As the Cabinet officials arrived by plane, car and helicopter and went into the lodge, each studied the President carefully, looking for a change in his attitude or appearance. Although he was somewhat thinner, and not as glowing as usual, he was sharp and energetic in his comments and opinions. Many were astonished by his fast recovery and his quick, decisive and keen manner. The President thanked the Cabinet for their "perfect" performance of their extraordinary responsibilities during his absence, but as far as anyone has reported he made

4 "At Gettysburg ... the President 'Frets a Little,' Wants to Do More," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (28 Nov. 1955), 32-3; "Quickening Pace," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (12 Dec. 1955), 34 and "Big Day at Gettysburg," NEWSWEEK, XLVII (13 Feb. 1956), 27. See also Charles E. Eagan, "President Picks Gettysburg Site for Office Work," NEW YORK TIMES, 13 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 70; Alan Drury, "Gettysburg: 'Temporary Capitol' of the U.S.," NEW YORK TIMES, 14 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 8 and his "Gettysburg Gives Eisenhowers Joyous Welcome," NEW YORK TIMES, 15 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 18. A pictorial account is "Eyes on Gettysburg," NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, (20 Nov. 1955), 10-11.

no individual thank-you's. He felt that they all had done what was expected of them. Vice President Nixon had flown back from a vacation from the strain of the previous weeks. It was his first visit to the Presidential retreat. For him, though he had walked the delicate line of tension during this entire crisis, there was no acknowledgment. He had, after all, done only what a Vice President was supposed to do. The President suggested with a smile that the Cabinet actually had worked better without him. "The only thing that surprised me," he said, "was that [some commentators] should have been surprised that this Cabinet could continue to work harmoniously and successfully in pursuing a practical middle course between too little and too much government. I knew you could do it because all of you are dedicated to this policy at home and abroad."⁵

Richard Nixon sat silent - and so did the others.

⁵ Indeed, on Nixon's visit to Denver, the President expressed his pride and satisfaction with the Cabinet's performance saying that "he was sure that in the whole of American history there had never been another Cabinet like this one." Donovan, op. cit., p. 382. A comprehensive picture of the Camp David Cabinet meeting is "At Ike's Cabinet Meeting: Camp David," U.S. NEWS, XXXIX (2 Dec. 1956), 42-3. An NSC meeting had been held the previous day, Eisenhower drove the twenty-five miles from Gettysburg to Thurmond, Maryland, near the camp, renamed after his grandson. Four helicopters and two small aircraft flew in the dignitaries, many of whom grumbled about the trip over the mountains. The President spent the two nights at the Presidential Lodge at the camp. See Alan Drury's articles in the NEW YORK TIMES, "Eisenhower Maps Talks This Week With Top Leaders," 16 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 16; "Top Aides Brief President; 'Copters Fly Some to Camp," 22 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 18, and "President Meets Cabinet at Camp," 23 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 13.

Back in Gettysburg after the Camp David Meeting, the President began to receive visitors in his temporary office in the Post Office Building. His attitude was changed somewhat but his spirits rose only slightly. The visitors only provided momentary relief from the depression of the post-attack period that was beginning to set in by early December. As Christmas approached he was cheered by the gift of a tractor-cultivator ("Gee, that's nice.") from the townspeople of Gettysburg. The year 1955 was ending. Next year was an election year and it would be the most tumultuous of Eisenhower's presidential career ..Far-reaching decisions - political decisions, the kind Eisenhower up to this point did not relish - lay ahead and the President became even more despondent. Although no one, including Eisenhower himself, yet knew it, a tremendous and profound change was coming over Eisenhower the President that would be evidenced only in degrees during the coming months.

On the 17th of December Dr. White came to give the President his Christmas present early. It was one he appreciated most of all and reflected a doctor's wisdom. The present: a golf ball.⁶

⁶ "The President: A Gift," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (26 Dec. 1955), 13-14.

CHAPTER 3: THE HAUNTED HOUSE OF
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

After it was all over and the President was safely out of danger, there were two kinds of uneasiness about the uncomfortable ramifications of his illness. One was medical, the other political. Other illnesses were traceable. This one was not. Just before the attack, Eisenhower's heart had been pronounced "sound." He had looked and acted the picture of health and then suddenly he was courting death. The underlying question was "What caused it?" He had not been overactive and did not have a high cholesterol count. The mystery of the origins of the thrombosis led to a bigger question: "Could it happen again?" Not even the doctors knew. When asked whether the Presidency would have a negative effect on Eisenhower's recovery, Dr. White pointedly replied, "I haven't seen any Presidents with coronary thrombosis."¹

I

The primary concern, of course, was whether the President would be able to run again. It could be subsequently debated and decided whether he would run again. The doctors could answer only the first question. Dwight D. Eisenhower could answer only the second.

1 "Ike's Convalescence," TIME, LXVI (10 Oct. 1955), 90.

"Many things are possible that may not be advisable," said Dr. White only a week after the attack. "He may or may not have complete recovery ... If I were in his shoes I wouldn't want to run again having seen the strain." The Doctor's statements threw a damper on the hopes of those who were envisioning that Eisenhower might be well enough to be persuaded to run again in 1956, and reinforced the opinions of those who assumed that he would not run in any case.² In addition it was learned that Dr. Snyder didn't think the President should deliver his State of the Union Message in person after Congress convened on 3 January. Snyder was in favor of the President's waiting until at least the middle of February before making a decision as to whether his recovery was complete enough to warrant a campaign for re-election.³

2 "The Doctors and Mr. Eisenhower's Decision," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXIV (2 Jan. 1956), 3. This in spite of Dr. White's subsequent comment at the press conference that "such questions are inanswerable" and that "If the President has a good recovery as he seems to be establishing, and if he desires to continue his career, which would of course be to the benefit of this country and the world at large, I would have no objections whatever to his running again. But that remains for the future to decide," he added. Id.

3 "Ike: Precautions Only," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (19 Dec. 1955), 19. As it turned out, Eisenhower was convalescing in Key West, Florida, when Congress convened and did not deliver his State of the Union Message to Congress in person. The clerk of each house routinely read the message to his respective chamber. By not delivering the message in person, Eisenhower had gone back to the precedent broken by Woodrow Wilson who was the first President to appear before Congress regularly to deliver special messages to that body. The President did make a short (7½ minutes) address to the nation on television about the message, however. See below, pp.81-4. See W. H. Lawrence, "Eisenhower Calls Upon Congress To Strengthen U. S. And Its Allies; Opposes any Tax Reduction Now," NEW YORK TIMES, 6 Jan. 1956, pp. 1, 10 and 11.

Meanwhile, Dr. White's reports became more encouraging. It is probable that their glowing outlook was partially prompted by Eisenhower's associates as well as the medical findings and other factors. In December, after visiting the President for Christmas, White philosophized about his illustrious patient's future. It rested, he said, "in the lap of the gods, as it more or less does with all of us ..." With "average good luck, and common sense care," however, it would be possible for the President "to live for years and be fully active, as have many others among my own patients who have recovered similarly at this stage of their convalescence."⁴

At this point it becomes apparent that Dr. White's role extended beyond the bounds of any ordinary consulting physician's. First of all he was motivated politically. He was a Republican. And more than that, he was pressured by the Inner Circle not to allow the press to back him into saying that the President ought not to run. If he were not fit to run, he was not fit to remain President. Common sense argued that it was not the Doctor's place to throw a roadblock in front of any potential plans the President might have or make. Continually, therefore, Dr. White urged a professional opinion coupled always with a statement to the effect that the ultimate decision would be Eisenhower's. He would not, medically or politically, turn Eisenhower into a "lame duck" before his time. In another vein, White

4 "The President: A Gift," op. cit., p. 14.

had a personal and professional motivation that inspired his pronouncements about Eisenhower. A leading heart specialist, he was a proponent of methods for convalescing from coronaries that were not completely consonant with those of established medical procedures. He was of the belief that heart attack victims could be restored almost to full usefulness by techniques which encouraged their gradual warming up to their pre-coronary thrombosis activities. White was eager to make an example of Eisenhower. If his methods worked on the President of the United States, they would certainly be valid practice for the average citizen. Yet it would be unfair to imply that Dr. White took unnecessary risks with Eisenhower's health. While to many it appeared as if he ignored the fantastic demands of the Presidency, at no time is it apparent that White risked either Eisenhower's life or the initiative of the Presidency. Almost certainly he would not have been able to do so. It was, after all, Eisenhower himself who was the ultimate judge of what he could or should do. At all times the doctors were insistent upon Eisenhower's resting in proportion to the amount of work he did. Only when they observed the gradual increase of his "vital capacity" did they allow him to increase his work load almost to normal by the end of December, 1955. And only to the extent that the President continued to prove the accuracy of White's theories did White allow his activities to continue in that vein. To suggest otherwise would be grossly inaccurate and unfair. For in addition to Dr. White, at one time or another, Dr. Byron E. Pollock, who commanded Fitzsimmons, Maj. General Leonard D. Heaton, commanding officer of

Walter Reed Army Hospital and Colonel Thomas W. Mattingly, heart specialist at Walter Reed, all ministered to the President. And of course Dr. Snyder was always there. So under their watchful eyes and those of Mrs. Eisenhower, the Secret Service and the President's staff, did the President continue successfully along the road to recovery.⁵

In late December the President went to Key West, Florida, to conclude the vacation that had started in August.⁶ On 8 January he held his first "on the record" news conference since 4 August and the first news conference he had ever held outside of Washington. He announced that he felt completely recovered after "a very splendid period of just sheer recreation" and that he was going back to the White House the next day "as ready to go to work as a person could be after the physical experience I have been through." He refused to comment at that time about his decision or the process of his decision on a second term.⁷ It was almost certain that he could run, but would he? When the representatives of the press continued to insist upon trying to draw him out in the open, he told them calmly, "I have no desire whatsoever to confuse the American people or to escape anything you are putting in front of me.

5 PUBLIC PAPERS, op. cit., p. 32. See Childs, op. cit., p. 221 for a note on Dr. White's role in the President's convalescence.

6 W. H. Lawrence, in the NEW YORK TIMES, "Eisenhower Flies to Florida Today for 2-Week Rest," 28 Dec. 1955, pp. 1 and 12 and "Eisenhower's Tour the Florida Keys on Quiet Holiday," 2 Jan. 1956, pp. 1 and 15.

7 See W. H. Lawrence's articles in the NEW YORK TIMES, "President To Discuss Health At News Conference Today," 8 Jan. 1956, pp. 1 and 78 and "President Hints He Has Decided Whether To Run," 9 Jan. 1956, pp. 1 and 12.

But you can well imagine the pressures that are brought to bear upon me every day [here the work of Adams and company was beginning to show] and I have to isolate myself from them at times as much as I can." Significantly he told them later that he would "make the announcement as quickly as a decision is firmly fixed in my own mind." He would not be pressured by the Knowland candidacy or anything else - but he did not indicate as to what exactly that decision pertained to, whether deciding to run or deciding when to announce that he would (or would not) run.⁸

On 20 January the President, speaking from Washington, told thousands of Republicans via closed circuit television at a \$100-a-plate "Salute to Eisenhower" dinner that "it appears that this is a question that first I alone must answer."⁹ That answer involved a great deal of politics and persuasion - and a great deal of soul-searching, not only on the part of Dwight D. Eisenhower and his family but also on the part of the leaders of the Republican Party. There is, however, evidence to indicate that by this time that ordeal had already been weathered. But while it was in progress not the least uncomfortable of principals in it was Leonard Hall.

8 W. H. Lawrence, "Eisenhower Warns G.O.P.P Not To Pin All On One Man; States His Faith in Dulles, NEW YORK TIMES, 20 Jan. 1956, pp. 1 and 10. Emphasis added.

9 W. H. Lawrence, "Eisenhower Says 2D Term Decision Must Be His Own," NEW YORK TIMES, 21 Jan. 1956, pp. 1 and 10. In the same edition see Richard Amper, "President Hailed At Garden Rally," pp. 1 and 12. See also Donovan, op. cit., p. 398.

II

Although he loved his job as National Republican Chairman Len Hall was in the quandary of his career. An astute politician, he admitted in the confidence of his associates that he did not know what to do. The Monday after the heart attack, even as the President fought for survival under an oxygen tent, Hall astounded the country in an address to the Union League Club by stating that there was no change in the party's plans for 1956 so far as he was concerned. Not only would Eisenhower be the candidate for the Presidency, Nixon would also be the candidate for the Vice Presidency. It was incredible! If Eisenhower by some miracle did decide to run, reasoned Hall, then so much the better. If not, he would, as he said, "jump off that bridge when I come to it." In either case there would be no profitable purpose served by his pressing the issue on the President. Any decision should be put off as long as possible both for the President's and the party's health. Plans were too well-laid in any event for 1956 to junk them categorically so long as there was the barest possibility of Eisenhower's candidacy. But this did not stop the press from pressing Hall.¹

1 Richard Amper, "Hall Says Illness of President Has Not Changed 1956 Strategy," NEW YORK TIMES, 21 Sept. 1955, p. 1. See also Nixon, op. cit., p. 147; Mazo, op. cit., p. 191 and "Consternation Within," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXIII (3 Oct. 1955), 7. In Denver previous to the heart attack, Hall had visited Eisenhower to talk about the subject of a second term and had not found the President altogether receptive to the idea, see below, pp. 79-81.

Some journals were already suggesting that it would be "callous and reckless to press upon Mr. Eisenhower the heaviest of human burdens for another five years." The partisans, after first dutifully expressing their admiration for the aging President, were deductively suggesting that a second term would be out of the question. One suggested in a roundabout way that the President ought to resign!²

The first time Hall saw Eisenhower after the heart attack was on 28 November when he met with the President in his temporary office in the Post Office in Gettysburg. His was the major in a series of political meets scheduled for November and December. Before Hall saw Eisenhower, Jim Hagerty told the press he "wouldn't think" they would discuss the possibility of the President's running again. But the reporters knew better.

Hall found the President in one of his post-attack moods of depression such as he was still experiencing at Gettysburg before he left for Key West. Hagerty and Adams had drawn the Chairman aside and told him despondently, "This man isn't going to go." Hall mustered all his political finesse and delicately approached the President. In their forty-five minute private conversation, Hall expressed hopes for the party and the nation that the President might yet see fit to serve another term, reinforcing his plea with polls that showed that Eisenhower could

² "The President From Today to January, 1956," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXII (3 Oct. 1955), 3-4.

re-elected without a strenuous campaign. The President, referring to himself as "'an old dodo'" for whom "the years had caught up" did not give Hall the hint of any affirmative response for which he had hoped. Their discussion was gloomy.

"Okay," said Hall, "let's talk about what I'm going to say to the Press when I walk out of here. Everyone else who visits you can say that they did not talk politics, but if I said that they'd call me a liar."

"Go out and say what you think you should say," replied Eisenhower, "I don't want to know what you are going to say." Eisenhower, while at Gettysburg, was in no mood to make any decision about a second term. He sought to avoid it, for he was caught in an awful moral dilemma. He had an obligation to the party he had sought so earnestly to rebuild. He also felt a similar obligation to the country at large. Yet he had an equal obligation not to serve if he did not think he could do so with the necessary vitality and initiative for which he suddenly realized the job called. He also had a moral obligation to his wife and family not to push himself with any more deliberate speed towards the end of his life.

Hall left the Post Office Conference feeling that Eisenhower's candidacy was all but a dead letter. He told the truth to the reporters, that the President had not made any decision and had not in any way affirmatively indicated to him that he would run again. "I can only give you my opinion," he said, "I did not get anything directly or indirectly.

He did not say 'yes' and he did not say 'no.' I feel encouraged," he remarked cryptically.³

But Leonard Hall was a political realist. While the hopes for an Eisenhower candidacy were dim, he did not count them out altogether. And neither did the professionals and the expert political commentators. Millions of words and hours of editorial cliff-hanging continued over the prospects of Eisenhower and the Republicans. And as Eric Sevareid was later to remark, reporters had long since "learned the hard way to pay more attention to Mr. Hall than to Mr. Eisenhower in discovering political realities ..." The record, he said, "indicates Mr. Hall and his group always get their way with the President whenever the chips go down."⁴

The chips began to go up after Eisenhower left for Key West on 27ⁿDecember. After getting away from work and the gloomy atmosphere and reinforced reaction to Gettysburg, the President's spirits rose mightily. It was, however, a personal, rather than a political phenomenon. At that news conference on 8 January 1956, the day before he returned "full time" to the White House, the President answered a question as to whether

3 See Alan Drury's articles in the NEW YORK TIMES, "Eisenhower Acts To Resume Role as Party Leader," 24 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 34; "President Sees Hall Today In First Political Parlays," 28 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 8 and "Eisenhower To Run If He Feels 'Able' G. O. P. Head Thinks," 29^mNov. 1955, pp. 1 and 20. See also Nixon, op. cit., p. 155 and "If He Feels He's Able," TIME, LXVI (12 Dec. 1955), 19. For a detailed discussion of Eisenhower at Gettysburg, see below, pp. 110-145.

4 Eric Sevareid, "The Coming Campaign," REPORTER, XIV, (22 Mar. 1956), 17.

or not he considered the Presidency "the most physically taxing" job he had ever had. In typical Eisenhowerese he said:

Well, I don't know whether you can give a straight yes or no answer to that, and I'm sorry - but you do have this situation: every problem that you take up has inevitably a terrific meaning for many millions of people, so there is no problem that comes up in the Presidency - even some that appear trivial that is handled as easily as you would handle your own daily living, or even something in the military, or in other activities in which I have been engaged.

I would say that the Presidency is probably the most taxing job, as far as tiring of the mind and spirit; but it also has, as I have said before, its inspirations which tend to counteract each other.

So I really can't say. There have been times in war where I thought nothing could be quite as wearing and tearing as that with lives directly involved. But I would say, on the whole, this is the most wearing, although not necessarily, as I say, the most tiring.⁵

Eisenhower was, then, not tired with the Presidency. But he admitted that it was wearing him down. If he were planning another term at this point, such a statement was not as politically astute as he might otherwise have made it. The press there at Key West polled themselves and concluded (12-2) that these were the words of a retiring elder statesman.

The President said he was "going back into the full duties of the Presidency tomorrow morning" but that those duties would not be what might have been considered "normal" previously. Herefore, he said, he "didn't have that sense of fatigue, or have any

5 PUBLIC PAPERS, op. cit., p. 34.

feeling at all I had to care for myself" and consequently he had "done many things that were unnecessary." Both he and his staff, he said, would "scrutinize the problems, but as far as the duties of the Presidency are concerned, I will be in full swing."⁶

The day after the Key West news conference, the President left to return to a capital wrapped in sub-freezing weather. On 14 February his doctors announced that his health continued to be "satisfactory." Dr. White said that his present condition was that his heart had a "well-healed scar" and his general health "favorable." He said also that "the chances are" that the President "should ... be able to carry on his present active life satisfactorily ... for five to ten years, knowing full well ... the hazards and uncertainties of the future." Again, it was not for the White House physicians to close the door on politics. Eisenhower could run and whether or not he would was up to him. Asked if he would vote for Eisenhower if he should decide to seek another term, White said he would.⁷

If there were no doubts (officially at least) in the doctors' minds about the President's fitness there was still doubt in his own mind. Characteristic of most heart attack victims, he was hesitant about exerting himself. He had not done so at Gettysburg or at Key West.

6 Id., pp. 36-6; Donovan, op. cit., p. 398 and Lawrence, "President Hints He Has Decided Whether To Run," op. cit., p. 12.

7 W. H. Lawrence, "Eisenhower Is Fit To Run Doctors Say After Tests; Strees That 'Choice Is His,'" NEW YORK TIMES, 15 Feb. 1956, pp. 1 and 21. Emphasis added.

While he had swung a golf club at Key West he had not played a full round of golf since the day before the attack and he was anxious to do so. On the day before the Doctors' 14 February news conference in Washington, Eisenhower left for Thomasville, Georgia, with his Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey, to shoot quail on the latter's sixty-acre plantation and also to use the golf ball Dr. White had given him for Christmas. There in Georgia he tested his strength at somewhere near full capacity for the first time in five months. "He plunged into it with what you might call a 'I'll-show-'em attitude,' "one of his companions later recalled. Although previous to his first round of golf the President admitted he was "a little scared" (now instead of just the immediate party watching him tee off the entire world was so doing) he finished his first round just a little (11 strokes) above his usual score. While hunting he plunged through the waist-high grass as the Secret Service stood by horrified of the rattlesnakes therein. After bagging the legal limit of quail he returned to the house saying proudly, "Well, I'm feeling pretty good. I didn't get tired out. It didn't bother me." Polls showed Eisenhower could beat Stevenson by a ratio of 5-3.⁸ No doubt about it - he was back in form. Leonard Hall's hopes soared.

⁸ The polls also showed Nixon would lose 59-41%. See James Reston, "President Goes South This Week to Make Up Mind In 'Seclusion,'" NEW YORK TIMES, 13 Feb. 1956, pp. 1 and 19. See also in the TIMES, W. H. Lawrence, "President Flies South to Determine Whether To Run," 16 Feb. 1956; "Eisenhower Golfs In Georgia Drizzle; Does 9 Holes in 47," 18 Feb. 1956, pp. 1 and 7, and W. H. Lawrence, "President Tests Endurance Again," 24 Feb. 1956, pp. 1 and 13. In the news magazines see, "Big Decision After A Rest in Georgia," U.S. NEWS, XL (17 Feb. 1956), 16 and "Ike: Now the Answer: Style and Time to Decide," NEWSWEEK, XLVII (27 Feb. 1956), 21-2, along with Donovan, op. cit., pp. 402-03.

A fortnight before the President's heart attack, Vice President Nixon was asked whether or not he thought Eisenhower, who had not yet announced, would run again. Was he "the indispensable man?" Nixon said it was his opinion that the President would be the last to say he was "indispensable," I don't believe those of us in the Administration would say that the President or anybody else is indispensable," he said. He was the "best man" for the country, however. But would he run? "I would say that ... people who know the President and who desire very much that he runs again ... are more optimistic today than they have been at any time since he has been inaugurated ..." Nixon said. Eisenhower, he pointed out, was a man with "a very high sense of duty" and would see that the nation and the world needed him for another four years.⁹ Then came the heart attack and that very same "high sense of duty" seemed to be the factor that would keep Eisenhower out of the 1956 race.

Yet the plain political truth was that for the Republicans Eisenhower was the "indispensable man." They had impressed that upon the public's mind in two partisan political campaigns in 1952 and 1954. Leonard Hall was not truthful in mid-February when he said that "not one iota of pressure" was being put on Eisenhower to run.¹⁰ As early as

9 "Nixon Sizes Up '56," U.S. NEWS, XXXIX (16 Sept. 1955), 119 and Eric Sevareid, "Is Any Man Indispensable?" REPORTER, XIII (20 Oct. 1955), 26.

10 Reston, "President Goes South This Week To Make Up Mind In 'Seclusion.," op. cit., p. 19.

5 September there was still doubt in the minds of Nixon and others - with the heart attack crisis still ahead of them - as to whether or not Eisenhower would seek another term. The pressure had been actually increased since the thrombosis. To find why this was necessary, one need only to look back to Eisenhower's political origins.

III

"I'm a soldier and I'm positive no one thinks of me as a politician," said the Commander of SHAPE. He would under no circumstances be a candidate for the Presidency in 1948.¹ Four years later when he was President of Columbia University his office issued a statement from then President Eisenhower saying in part, "I have no desire to go anywhere else if I can help to do what I want here in Columbia. This is the place for me. I don't know why people are always nagging me to run for President. I think I've gotten too old."² Richard H. Rovere contemporaneously supported Mr. Eisenhower, but with a different outlook:

Why on earth [he asked] should anyone think Eisenhower would make a good President? What does he know about the United States? What does he know about anything

1 John Gunther, EISENHOWER; MAN AND THE SYMBOL (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951), p. 133. Indeed, Marquis Childs wonders seriously why General Eisenhower didn't attempt to capture the nominations of both major parties and unify the nation politically. Childs, op. cit., p.128.

2 Id., 129.

that is related to the presidency except the running of the military establishment? Why should so many Americans think that this man, untrained and untested in politics and until recently quite uninterested in the subject, could make a suitable chief magistrate? Is the presidency a demanding job or isn't it? Does it require special knowledge and special abilities, or is it an office that any literate and halfway conscientious American can handle? If it is as demanding as we generally believe it to be, then clearly Eisenhower has no qualifications worth discussing and those who are so eager to have him for President are either contemptuous of the office or themselves ridiculously ignorant. That, at any rate, must be the verdict of simple logic.

Yet simple logic will not do.³

Indeed it would not. The same arguments could have been made against every military candidate from Washington and Jackson and civilian candidates such as James Buchanan, Woodrow Wilson and even Harry Truman. Eisenhower was a man fantastically suited to the times. He represented prosperity, status quo, moralism, standard Americanism. His personality was structured, distrustful of fine distinctions, accentuated, impatient with theory, ever-ready to translate ideas into action. He was in short the ideal candidate to bewitch and bewilder the mobs.⁴ For this reason the liberal Republicans wanted him in 1952. They realized that the future of their party was at stake and felt the same about the nation as a whole. Abroad Europeans were confident that "General Ike" would not drop atomic bombs

3 Rovere, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

4 During the campaign the General was cognizant of this effect on the people. One day as he was scrutinizing the draft of a speech written by Emmet John Hughes, he remarked sardonically to Hughes, "We need maybe a few more "cheer lines" in this speech ... a mob like this doesn't want to think - they just want to yowl," Quoted in Hughes, op. cit., p. 193.

on them. The old Warrior represented peace to the whole world.⁵

Eisenhower's tenure at Columbia was aborted by the Republicans in 1952. Precisely what made him decide to become a candidate is unclear. Years later it was reported that had he known Adlai Stevenson would have been the Democratic standard-bearer he would not have opposed him. He is said to have believed Stevenson would have made a good President.⁶ What had in fact goaded Eisenhower into the political arena, it was said, was the prospect of another four years of Harry Truman.

Although in later years, when political animosities colored his thinking, Eisenhower remarked that he would have liked to have had the opportunity of beating Truman, it is much more likely that in 1952 the state of the Republican Party was his impetus for running. True, he was concerned with the belief that the left-leaning Democratic Party was passing irretrievably under the control of those politicians who advocated strong centralized power and inflation. But more than that Eisenhower was concerned that the Republicans as a consequence of their twenty years out

5 See T. R. B., "Washington Wire," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXIII (3 Oct. 1955), 2 and Rovere, op. cit., p. 17 along with Gunther, op. cit., pp. 143 and 42.

6 If this were indeed true - and it is doubtful - Eisenhower's attitude toward Governor Stevenson changed in subsequent months. Almost from the beginning of the campaign he developed a manifest dislike and personal antipathy toward him. He would dismiss Stevenson's charges, saying coldly, "It's not going to do me any good to study what that monkey's saying, since I have no intention of answering him anyway." Cited and quoted in Hughes, op. cit., p. 195. Later on his attitude acquired more vigor and he admitted bluntly, "I'm not one who finds it difficult to hate my enemies," Quoted in Gunther, op. cit., p. 19.

of power were degenerating into a negative party of opposition. The baffled, sterile extreme right wing was about to take control of the party which would even further widen the gulf between them and the moderates and independents. In short, he was convinced that only a moderate could save the party from such a fate. So more than Harry Truman, it was Robert Taft who drew Eisenhower into the presidential contest in 1952.⁷

His goal, then, was to remove the "curse" which the Republican Party had been enduring for two decades and reform it from a negative to a positive attitude. Party leaders assured him that one smashing victory in 1952 would accomplish this goal. For Eisenhower was even at that time an old man. He was tired of public life and quite justly so; he felt that he had served his country as much as he should have. He made the race for the Presidency confident that by 1956 there would be a younger man of moderate stance to whom he could turn over the reigns.

After the election, as he was drafting his inaugural address he was wondering, and wanting to put into it the idea that he would not seek a second term. Horrified Republicans were quick to point out that if he did so party warfare would be continued and encouraged rather than stifled. And besides that he would be a lame duck on the day he went to work. He yielded to their persuasion then - but reluctantly. In the years that followed, as he chafed under the burdens of the Presidency, he expressed his wish many times in private that he should have ignored the politicians.

7 Rovere, op. cit., pp. 342-43 and C. J. V. Murphey. "The Eisenhower Shift," FORTUNE, LIII (Apr. 1956), 114, Part IV.

But Eisenhower the political amateur had been unrealistic. He thought that in four years he could unify the party that had taken five times that long to become splintered, balance the national budget, institute what he called a "free economy" and halt the drift to what he considered a "welfare state."⁸ Now after the heart attack he was faced with the same problems with which he entered the White House. Two weeks previous to the attack in Denver he impatiently told Leonard Hall when the National Chairman had come to encourage his candidacy, "What more do they want from me ... I've given all of my adult life to the country... What more must I do?" He listed five or six names of men he said were younger and just as capable to run on his record and carry on his mode of government.⁹ But they couldn't win. And Eisenhower deep in his heart had to admit it: he had failed in that respect; there was no younger man who could be counted on to lead the party to victory again. At the Cabinet as late as 13 February 1956 he renewed his desire to serve only one term. He had, he said, done his share of the work. Those who had talked him out of preemptorily refusing a second term were hard put to refute his argument now that the Twenty-Second Amendment had turned any second term into the same thing they had argued against: he could not run for a third term

8 George Johnson, EISENHOWER: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF A GREAT GENERAL, PRESIDENT AND STATESMAN, (Derby, Connecticut: Monarch Books, Inc., 1962), p. 123; Donovan, op. cit., p. 396; and Nixon, op. cit., p. 152.

9 Id., p. 153.

and he would be a lame duck the day he went to work on 21 January 1957. It irked him now that the people who were beseeching him to run again were the same ones with the same reasons who had assured him in 1952 that a single tremendous victory would be sufficient for a re-establishment of the Republican Party.¹⁰

Eisenhower's frustration was beginning to show. He had failed and the party had failed. They had rested on his popularity and continued party bickering during his term in office. And he knew he was partially to blame. For four years now he had prided himself on being "above politics." He was slowly coming to the realization that he had erred if he wished the party to be remoulded in his own image. Popularity was not enough and he had no taste for getting down into the "fry." Now it appeared an impossible task and the heart attack made it seem even more frustrating and out of reach. The party chiefs came at him with the same argument they had used in 1952; he was needed by the party, the nation and the world; only he could win. For the President it suddenly seemed as if it had all been to no avail. Dwight Eisenhower's political house was haunted by the spectre of failure. At Normandy in 1944 he had written out a communique before the invasion landed accepting sole responsibility for its failure. He was just as ready to admit failure now. It was time to quit.

¹⁰ Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 228 and Murphy, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

To those not acquainted with the fluctuating Presidential state of mind it seemed as though recovery had been so rapid and complete that his candidacy for a second term became less of an absurdity and more of a monopolizing possibility. As time passed and as he was constantly subjected to persuasions from one side and the other, the President began to give serious consideration to the counterweights to his desire to leave office in 1957. Sometimes he would be completely resolved to return and partisans who talked with him then came away discouraged. Other times he was seriously considering dropping his categorical decision and devote himself anew to his task which was so obviously incomplete. With the convention in August the time when he would have to announce, however, was still sufficiently far away so that a final decision would not have to be reached until as late as February or March.¹¹ If he were going to run then nothing would be changed. If not, a cutthroat fight for the nomination could be averted until the last minute. His frustration was always there and throughout it all he maintained the attitude, "Hell, if the people were to decide not to re-elect me, I sure couldn't feel desperately unhappy about it."¹² Yet there was more involved than his own personal feeling.

Here was the awe-inspiring spectacle of Dwight D. Eisenhower grappling not only with the prospects of his own continued life and the future of his family, but also with the immediate destinies of 150

11 Donovan, op. cit., pp. 387 and 397.

12 Hughes, op. cit., p. 192.

million Americans, the attitudes of even more millions of America's allies and the possible future of one of the nation's two great political parties. Eisenhower's modesty was not so broad that it would allow him to overlook or to ignore the fact that he was ipso facto all these things to all these people. The issue was heavily weighted by his health and at times the burden added to his other extraordinary responsibilities discouraged his even trying to lift it. He could have bowed out before this. Now the politics of paradox took hold. Instead of retirement, the heart attack demanded that he go on. The nation had almost lost him - and he it. Now he was back and grateful to have back what was almost gone - the must of the time - they would not let him leave again lest things change somehow for the worse. How could he say no?

As long as his health held up the possibilities for a second term were strong indeed. But he would not hold back. They wanted the truth and he would give it to them. He told the press he would "be just as truthful as I can be" about his health. He went on to say, "... I believe this: I think even people who would classify themselves probably as my political enemies do believe I am honest - they may call me stupid - but I think they think I am honest."¹³ He would level with them. He knew what he wanted. Perhaps the truth might give him an honorable way to achieve it. Perhaps they would realize that the risk was too great - that maybe he should quit - that, really, they had no right to ask more of him, even if he were healthy. Perhaps ... and yet he was loathe

¹³ PUBLIC PAPERS, op. cit., pp. 268-69 and "How the President Answered the Big Question," U. S. NEWS, XL (9 Mar. 1956), 66.

to leave the center of power and action. If he could be a part-time President - but that would not do. Now he was back, berated by the same ghosts that haunted him in 1952.

Thus, if Eisenhower was to be completely honest about his health he would open the door on the exploitation of the health issue. But he did not care. Meanwhile it was no secret that the President was dismayed over his own post-recovery condition. His depression was accentuated by the memory of his friend General Brehon B. Somervell who had died suddenly of a heart attack, and when heart attacks struck some of the businessmen and friends who had been guests of his White House get-togethers. His pre-attack reluctance to run for a second term was strengthened.¹⁴ The see-saw tipped the other way and virtually everyone counted him out. The political pundits seemed to be equally divided among the possibilities of his candidacy, a "wide-open battle" for the nomination, and Nixon's sure role as "heir apparent." But the political professionals - Adams, Hall, Brownell, Summerfield, and other men of this type - conceded nothing. Their persuasiveness for his second candidacy, of course, was inevitable. Their jobs depended upon it. But now they knew that the same old straight "the-country-needs-you" line would not work by itself. While Hall was audaciously proclaiming in public that there was no change in the Republicans' plans and that Eisenhower was still to be the candidate even though no pressure was being put on him to do so, Adams and the Palace Guard went to work

¹⁴ "Will Ike's Brother Stop Nixon," U.S. NEWS, XXXIX (28 Oct. 1955), 21-2 and Nixon, op. cit., p. 145.

behind the scenes with a psychological campaign to capture the President's mind. They knew they had him at a moral disadvantage. But if they could persuade the doctors to postpone a final verdict, and if they could demonstrate to him that many of the distasteful chores of the Presidency could be lessened or delegated then he would go. They knew their man. And they knew he quickly suffered from claustrophobia and confinement. They had until March to exploit that.¹⁵ They would not succeed - and yet they would win.

IV

Eisenhower himself had opened the health issue from the minute he directed that Haggerty and Snyder should be open and frank about his condition. He added to his burden when he continually told the press that he would be honest to the public about his health. "I will tell you people very frankly," he said after being pressed on the issue at a news conference, "I have nothing to hide here. I am certainly not trying to be coy." This of course made it an inevitably partisan issue. Democrats renewed their charges with new and dramatic fervor that Eisenhower was a part-time President. They took his Crusade in Europe down from the shelves and quoted it to its author:

The doctors took charge [he wrote in an account of a serious illness which struck him while he was the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe].

¹⁵ Id.; Donovan, *op. cit.*, p. 397 and Eric Servareid, "Preliminary Bouts," *REPORTER*, XIII (15 Dec. 1955), 4.

For four days they would not let me move and during that time I not only recovered my health, I learned a lesson I did not thereafter violate: A full measure of health is basic to successful command.²

Now with Eisenhower in a condition that would not allow him medically to enter OCS he was barraged by much of the press imploring him not to run again.

Walter Lippmann called the discussion of the President's health a "horrid duty." If it were not openly discussed, he contended, "The result would be to make the election turn on a vast whispering campaign."³

As early as March, 1955, H. L. Varney had written in the American Mercury as a consequence of the recent off-year elections, "No fact is more undeniable in the political situation than that the Eisenhower spell is broken."⁴ If that were the case, the heart attack ended it. For if the Eisenhower spell was broken temporarily the prospects of losing Ike renewed it. People liked Ike and the immediate outpouring of sympathy after his heart attack renewed their hope and his recovery reinforced their faith. Still, many really did not think that he would (or should) be a candidate for another term. They liked him too much to see him kill himself. And as late as November 1956, in the final stages of the campaign, David Lawrence wrote, "If Ike wins this campaign,

2 Quoted in John J. Sparkman, "Do We Desire A Part-Time President?" VITAL SPEECHES, XXII (15 Mar. 1956), 349. See also "The Presidency," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXIV (15 Mar. 1956), 4.

3 Quoted in "The President's Health," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXV (3 Sept. 1956), 9.

4 H. L. Varney, "Eisenhower Midway," AMERICAN MERCURY, LXXX (Mar. 1955), 9.

it will be a close vote. If he loses, it may be that the Democratic tide will be of landslide proportions. There is no chance of landslide for Eisenhower."⁵ There was an unspoken feeling (fully exploited by the Democrats) among many that had its roots in the beginning of the Eisenhower Era. For four years now there had been in the public mind no direct tie between Eisenhower and the Republican Party. Now there was. The Republican politicians, many felt, were exploiting Ike for their own benefit. Many would not allow them to ride his hearse to power. Thus there was even at that late a strong feeling that a vote for the Democrats was a vote for Eisenhower.

The strongly anti-Eisenhower New Republic was noting by the second week in October, 1955, that it was "no longer assumed that Eisenhower will run again and win again and remain President for five years."⁶ "The unavailability of candidate Eisenhower puts Democratic hopes in new prospective," it noted the following week,⁷ and by the end of the month was predicting that "the Democrats have a 50-50 chance of winning the next year's election."⁸ With the turn of the year it had launched on its

5 Robert Bendiner, "What Happened to the Sure Thing?" REPORTER, XV (1 Nov. 1956), 9.

6 "Who Makes the Fateful Decisions for Peace?" NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXII (10 Oct. 1955), 8. Indeed the bitter partisan yellow journal ran Adlai Stevenson for president twelve months a year by offering each week a full page advertisement bearing the availability of a 24-page booklet entitled STEVENSON SPEAKS: THE MAN WHO MAY BE PRESIDENT. It allowed readers to order them by the thousand and offered them at bulk rates at Christmastime.

7 "1956 - Return ..." NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXIII (17 Oct. 1955), 11. The New Republic seldom referred to him as President Eisenhower.

8 T. R. B., "Washington Wite," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXIV (31 Oct. 1955), 2.

incessant theme, insisting that the people would not stand for allowing the Republicans "to tailor the Presidency to the man." It pointed out that "The Republicans next year would nominate a man of 66 who has suffered a heart attack for one of the world's toughest jobs knowing that no insurance company would give him a policy. They are not afraid of Presidential insignificance - they seek it."⁹ It was content to rest upon its original observation that "the victory of the Democrats in 1956 [is] about as certain as anything political can be."¹⁰

Commonweal came to the conclusion that a second term for Eisenhower would be less successful than the first. "The problems they now see crowding the horizon," it found, "cannot be stalled off for another four years ... and yet, they are problems which a President on a limited work schedule may be able to contend with but not to surmount."¹¹ During Eisenhower's convalescence at Gettysburg, Richard H. Rovere found it "doubtful in the extreme that Vice-President Nixon or Leonard Hall has advised Mr. Eisenhower that his presence is sorely missing in Washington.. .." Rovere noted that a "growing number" of the President's subordinate officials were "grumbling quite openly about the difficulties of leading

9 T.R.B., "Washington Wire," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXIV (2 Jan. 1956), 2.

10 "Consternation Within," op. cit., p. 7.

11 William V. Shannon, "The Eisenhower Paradox," COMMONWEAL, LXIII (23 Mar. 1956). 641.

a great republic... with no President on hand"¹² Newsweek shortly after the attack was ready to admit that "it's now almost certain he won't run for re-election regardless of how good a recovery he makes."¹³ And C.J.V. Murphy wrote later in Fortune that Eisenhower's ineligibility for a third term made the President believe his candidacy ineffective.¹⁴

Nation magazine, which had been for him in 1952, now called upon Eisenhower not to run again because the Presidency, it said, could not be "cut and tailored to fit the personal limitations which have resulted from his heart attack"¹⁵ With "deep regret" it had reached the conclusion that "The time has come for President Eisenhower to evidence the full measure of his respect for the office of the Presidency and announce his retirement from public life."¹⁶ The Washington Press Corps was polled and 88% said that Eisenhower would not run again.¹⁷

12 Rovere, op. cit., p. 313.

13 "The President:..A Difficult Time." NEWSWEEK, XLVI (3 Oct. 1955) 21.

14 Murphy, op. cit., p. 115.

15 Quoted in Johnson, op. cit., p. 145.

16 "The Office and the Man," NATION, CLXXXII (30 June 1956), 541.

17 Nixon, op. cit., p. 154. 47% of the reporters thought the G.O.P. could not win without Eisenhower while 46% thought it could. 7% did not hazard a guess. They picked the 1956 ticket as Nixon and Governor Christian Herter of Massachusetts and said that Adlai Stevenson and Estes Kefauver would lead the Democrats. "Capital Reporters Doubt Eisenhower Will Run," NEW YORK TIMES, 12 Nov. 1955. p. 8.

Harry Truman said that the Democrats were "going to give the American people a chance to vote for a President and not a regency or a part-time chairman of the board."¹⁸ Sherman Adams was reported to have "said repeatedly that he doesn't believe Mr. Eisenhower will be available for re-election."¹⁹ Mrs. Eisenhower was against a second term; John opposed it; Milton did not like the idea at all. If re-elected Ike would be seventy years old at the end of his second term. No other American President had ever lived to be that age while in office. Why hurry toward the end of the road burdened by the obligations and responsibilities of the most important job in the world? Yes, he had told himself at first. He was only mortal; he had done his share. Perhaps, if this heart attack thing had come but not now. He wanted to live - and yet not as a quitter, not as an invalid.

For on the positive side of the ledger there were some good points. Perhaps, the major one was voiced by Newsweek magazine when it pointed out that "This gruesome suggestion [of President Eisenhower's imminent demise] is not regarded by sophisticated people as a real bid for voters"²⁰ The people trusted Eisenhower. If he said he was

18 Quoted in "Eisenhower As A Candidate, What They Say," NEWSWEEK, XLVII (13 Feb. 1956), 27. Senator Margaret Chase Smith was quoted in the same article predicting a Nixon-Claire Booth Luce ticket if President Eisenhower did not choose to run.

19 Smith, op. cit., pp. 291-92.

20 "Knowland, Nixon and Knight," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (19 Sept. 1956), 128.

capable then they would believe him.

Other factors had good indications. Eisenhower was and had been an enormously popular President. He had a record to which he could point with justifiable pride: a foreign policy that had thus far averted war, tremendous strides in prosperity which included traditional sympathy to business while at the same time blunting Democratic charges by continuing many of their welfare programs. On the issue of civil rights the Republicans felt they had done more than the Democrats ever had (indeed, most opposition came from within the Democratic Party). On a partisan level, Eisenhower's dream of a reorganized "moderate" Republican Party was at least partially fulfilled. Some thirty-nine new state chairmen had been elected. They were "positive" rather than "negative" Republicans, and they were young. Nevertheless, the extent of the reformation was disappointing to Eisenhower. But, since this much had been done in four years, it stood to reason that more could be done in eight.²¹

A significant factor was Eisenhower's temper and low threshold of arousal. One partisan reasoned.

Sure, Ike doesn't want to run now and probably won't want to run in 1956. But, just wait until they put his feet to the fire. Wait until they feed him lines like 'You can;t turn your back on America now' and 'Adlai Stevenson says you're afraid to stand on your own record.' They'll bring him around, and I don't care if his friends try to stop it with fifty Black

²¹ "The President - A Shoo-In, But -," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (25 Aug. 1955), 34.

Angus bulls and a private golf course for the Gettysburg farm. He'll run.²²

Governor Dewey agreed, saying, "I don't think Mr. Eisenhower wants to run, but I'm sure he will I don't blame him for wanting to retire, but he can't."²³ It was well known that Sherman Adams could persuade Eisenhower in just such a manner and that Dewey swung much weight with the President. Ambassador Lodge had elaborated in June of 1955, explaining:

I would say this, that the guiding rule of President Eisenhower's life has been duty. I believe that in 1956, he will think it is his duty to accept the nomination.

Under his Administration, we have achieved two unique things which have seldom if ever been achieved by any President in modern times. The first is that we have kept ourselves at peace. The second factor is that we have done this with prosperity and have not only retained but expanded our prosperity.

²² Smith, op. cit., p. 293. The inside-the-White House Eisenhower was astonishingly different from the public-Eisenhower. In public, his words were nursed and almost too carefully weighed to the point where his syntax often defied analysis. In private the old soldier was not above using barracks-room language. When a job was neglected or poorly done or when he encountered what he considered baseless criticism, his face would flame and his temper would explode in a violent burst of language and activity. One of his closest associates, after witnessing such a scene, gasped, "My God, how do you compute the amount of adrenalin expended in those thirty seconds? I don't know why long since he hasn't had a killer of a heart attack." Cited and quoted in Hughes, op. cit., p. 149. As will be seen later, the President's volcanic energy would play a large role in his decision on a second term.

²³ Quoted in "The President and Politics," NEWSWEEK, XLV (25 Aug. 1955), 34.

I believe that these facts will become more and more impressed on the public mind and on his mind, and I think that he will, therefore, feel it to be his duty to make himself available for future service as President.²⁴

A great factor in influencing the President was Mrs. Eisenhower's feelings. Ever since the doctors told her that a second attack would be fatal to her husband she had opposed a second term. But now that his recovery had been so rapid and so complete and she had seen the passing of his depression as he returned to work, she became less and less adamant about the idea of re-election. Indeed, the President himself reported that "Mamie, above all others, never accepted the assumption that I had incurred a disabling illness.... She perhaps more than any other, retained the conviction that my job as President was not yet finished."²⁵ Her health, too had improved and she did not press her husband; she did not, in the final analysis, want her own feelings to be involved in her husband's decision.²⁶

In the long run Eisenhower's partisans viewed it this way: his health was good and continuing to improve as he took care of himself. The state of the world was sufficiently foreboding and the prospects of the party without him sufficiently dim, so that Eisenhower could be persuaded to shoulder the burden for another four years. With this in mind his close advisors set about the work they had begun in earnest soon

²⁴ Quoted in "What Eisenhower's Friends Say," U.S. NEWS, XXXVIII (17 June 1955), 22.

²⁵ Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 542.

²⁶ Eric Sevareid, "Will the President Run Again?" REPORTER, XII (10 Mar. 1956), 30.

after the gloom-dispelling vacation to Key West.

General Lucius Clay, a close friend and political advisor to the President, was telling any gathering around the country that would listen that the President would run again if he believed it his duty to do so. Few believed that Eisenhower would find it outside his realm of service to do so if he were called upon by a sufficient number of people. The President did not ask General Clay to stop what he was saying.²⁷

Meanwhile, the frustrating partisan aspect loomed ever-present in Eisenhower's mind. This was the issue to which his obstinacy was most vulnerable. The plain fact was that the Republicans would lose and the "old crowd" would be back in power if he did not run again. Around Washington the assumption was that if Eisenhower did not run again, his forty-year-old Vice President would be the man to beat at the Cow Palace Convention in San Francisco in August. In the months after the President was stricken few believe this could be done if Nixon had Eisenhower's blessing. The first Gallup Poll taken after the President was stricken asked Republicans whom they favored in the event Eisenhower did not run. The results showed 33% for Nixon, 15% for Dewey and 13% for Dulles. No other potential candidate received more than 5%.²⁸ A poll of 53 Republican

²⁷ Id., and Donovan, op. cit., pp. 400-01.

²⁸ "Broken Glass and Tacks on Nixon's Path," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXVIII (17 Oct. 1956), 3. See also "Those Who Could or Would Be President," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXIV (2 Jan. 1956), 4-5.

state chairmen in December 1955, showed that Nixon was clearly the preference if Eisenhower didn't run.²⁹

The Nixon boom was, no doubt, inspired by the Vice President's conduct during Eisenhower's absence from Washington. It capped a rising wave of support for Chief Justice Earl Warren for the nomination. Warren led Nixon 25% to 19% in April of 1955,³⁰ but the Chief Justice took the tide out when he completely and absolutely withdrew in the post-coronary speculation of October. Warren had not been interested in the Presidency, he said, since he had gone to the High Court. The fact that his name was being used in connection with the Republican nomination for President was "a matter of embarrassment" to him as Chief Justice. "When I accepted that position, it was with the fixed purpose of leaving politics permanently for service on the court," he insisted. "That is still my purpose. It is irrevocable. I will not change it under any circumstances...."³¹

29 See "Ike in '56? A Poll of GOP Chairmen," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (12 Dec. 1955), 33-4.

30 See "The President and Politics," *op. cit.*, p. 34.

31 "What Warren Said," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (10 Oct. 1955), 38. Warren had been a candidate for the Vice Presidency on the unsuccessful 1948 Republican Ticket headed by Thomas E. Dewey. In 1952, after the resignation of Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, President Eisenhower appointed former Governor Warren Chief Justice. He had not been involved in politics since that time. See also James Reston, "Profound Effect on 1956 Is Expected in Capital," NEW YORK TIMES, 25 Sept. 1955, p. 8.

Although in public President Eisenhower had warned against "too great a confusion between politics and the Supreme Court" Nixon tells us that he was irritated at Warren for renouncing any political involvements. Perhaps, the President was envious of the Chief Justice's ability and position to do so. "I don't see why he couldn't just have said nothing," Eisenhower complained. The party had been good to Warren, he thought, and Warren owed it as much as to keep the door open and respond if he were called upon. Eisenhower was, no doubt, influenced by the previous polls showing Warren to be favored over Nixon and by the most recent ones showing the Chief Justice with 14% to 11% for the Vice President. He mentioned to Nixon that he had seen another poll where the Vice President had run substantially behind Stevenson.³²

Eisenhower's frank discussion with Nixon about the apparent inadvisability of the latter's candidacy at this point is revealing. Nixon was young and able, but old wounds inflicted by Nixon for both of them during the time when Eisenhower had been loathe to indulge in partisanship were still aching. Nixon's "rock 'em, sock 'em" campaign tactics irritated many people. Some called it "repressed McCarthyism."³³ The President's suggestion to Nixon that Warren would make a better candidate demonstrates his fixation on one goal: Republican victory.

³² W. H. Lawrence, "Eisenhower Lauds Nixon And Opposed Draft of Warren," NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Jan. 1956, pp. 1 and 12, and Nixon, op. cit., p. 159.

³³ See Irving Howe, "Poor Richard Nixon," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXIV (7 May 1956), 7-9.

Eisenhower was for whoever could win. For if Warren ran, the party's chances would be much improved and victory a relative certainty. If this were the case, Eisenhower had an out. Warren's candidacy would allow him to quit the race, retire honorably to Gettysburg, secure in his record and in the prospects of a Republican victory as a vindication of that record. Then Nixon would have his time. When Warren cut off Eisenhower's most desirable avenue of escape, the President was greatly agitated.

With Warren's withdrawal political pressure soon came to bear more intensely from all directions. As a result of the potential Nixon candidacy, the Vice President's intra-party adversary, Senate Minority Leader William Knowland of Nixon's home state of California (which had seventy convention votes and where an erstwhile anti-Nixon alliance had sprung up between Senator Knowland and Governor Goodwin Knight)³⁴ was

34 See Gladwin Hill, "Nixon Can't Win. Knight Maintains." NEW YORK TIMES, 14 Oct. 1955, pp. 1 and 20. Also see "Nixon-Knowland-Eisenhower Triangle." NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXII (13 June 1955), 2; "Three Cornered Chess," NATION, CLXXXIV (19 Jan 1956), 50-1; Raymond Moley, "Knowland, Nixon and Knight," op. cit., p. 128 and H.H. Miller, "Three-Handed Checkers," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXVI (28 Jan. 1956), 8-11. In addition Nixon had serious opposition from the Eastern Establishment. This led to a growing apprehension over Eisenhower's candidacy. See "After Eisenhower Bows Out - An Eastern Bloc Will Try to Stop Nixon," U.S. NEWS, XXXIX (21 Oct. 1955), 24-5 and James Reston, "Nixon Is Opposed By Some In G.O.P.," NEW YORK TIMES, 15 Feb. 1956, p. 21. See also Alvin Shuster, "Knowland Says He'll Wait Until Feb. 15 On Candidacy," NEW YORK TIMES, 16 Jan. 1956, pp. 1 and 9. Knowland was going ahead with his plans to run even when the President was vacationing with Secretary Humphrey in Georgia, "Knowland Feels Rising Pressure," NEW YORK TIMES, 16 Feb. 1956, p. 23.

reported on 1 November to have decided that he would announce his own candidacy by early March if the still-hospitalized Eisenhower decided not to run. On 8 December he moved the date up to 31 January and later he put it at 15 February. Meanwhile, the President's physicians had urged him to put off any decision until the middle of February at the earliest. On 30 December it was announced that a poll taken of 134 Republican governors, state chairmen and national committeemen now showed that over half of them believed that Eisenhower would lead the ticket if physically able.³⁵ The much-dreaded strife in the party was imminent in the higher echelons.

Knowland was telling Republicans as early as October 1955 that he didn't consider "a Pepsodent smile, a ready quip, an actor's perfection with lines, nor an ability to avoid issues as qualifications for high office." Whether Knowland was talking about Nixon, Knight or Stevenson, he didn't say.³⁶

On 15 November (the day after the Eisenhowers arrived at Gettysburg from Fitzsimmons) Adlai Stevenson announced his candidacy.³⁷

In the meantime the situation stood like this: Republicans wanted

35 Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 570. See also "'56 Could Center on Californians," NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Sept. 1955. p. 16.

36 "Nixon's The Target," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (24 Oct. 1955), 26. See also "Consternation Within." op. cit., p. 7.

37 Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 570 and W. H. Lawrence, "Stevenson Seeks Nomination in '56' Hits G.O.P. Record," NEW YORK TIMES, 16 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 24.

Eisenhower to run if he were able. If he were not able, since Chief Justice Warren had taken himself out of the picture, Nixon was their man. But Knowland and Knight controlled California's seventy convention votes and that was a powerful threat to Eisenhower's erstwhile united party. The threat that his own Vice President would be repudiated by the National Convention made Eisenhower maintain a detached attitude toward Nixon. The Vice President himself, knowing firsthand the tactics that would come to bear on the President, later said, "If I had bet at that time, I would have wagered that he would seek a second term."³⁸

The Inner Circle - Adams Hall, Snyder, Brownell, et al - who at first were urging the President to announce for a second term, now took on a different line of persuasion. Fearful that his announcement would be a flat refusal they now were urging him to put off a final decision for at least two more months, until February or March. And for a long while there was heard only silence and equivocation from The Man. And for once Eisenhower's fervid advocates agreed with his bitter critics: no news from Eisenhower was good news.³⁹

³⁸ Nixon, op. cit., p. 154 and "70 Convention Votes and a Feud With Nixon." U.S. NEWS, (28 Oct. 1955), 60-3.

³⁹ See Alan Drury, "The Enigma of Gettysburg," REPORTER, XII (29 Dec. 1955), 20-1.

CHAPTER 4: THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

I

When Leonard Hall was asked, after the Post Office Conference in Gettysburg back in November, when he thought the President would announce and whether or not they had discussed the timing of the announcement (whatever it might be), he said, "I did not. I never felt that is important."¹ That, of course, was not true. Timing was the most important aspect of the President's announcement outside of its content. In the first place, if the President was going to run, too early an announcement would allow partisans to launch their campaign of "part-time President" sooner. If, however, the President decided not to seek another term, the later he postponed his announcement the longer the party could be kept intact.

Now, the Warren balloon burst, the Knowland candidacy was in the embryonic stages and the Nixon inheritance was shakily but steadily filling the vacuum. Eisenhower was wrestling with his fate and the press was clamoring for some kind of decision. If the President were going to step aside, other candidates would have to know as early as 23 January, in time to file for the Illinois primary, or at least by 5 February, with the deadline for filing in New Hampshire, West Virginia,

¹ "Party Chairman's Views of President's Plans," U.S. NEWS, XXXIX (9 Dec. 1955), 26.

and Alaska. By mid-February, filing dates for the primaries in Ohio and Minnesota would have passed. Within a week after the Key West news conference of 8 January, the President's friends and advisors made the move and one by one intently urged him to run for a second term.²

The President was gravitating toward making an ultimate decision on his own initiative, however. It appears that at this early date, he was definitely but reluctantly considering an affirmative answer. It would not be all that he wanted, but at least a second term could be made bearable. His wish had been summed up in what he had told the Madison Square Garden Rally in late January: "I could devoutly wish," he said, "that there were some method by which the American people could, under the circumstances point out the path of my true duty."³ Then he got a letter from a former governmental official - among hundreds of thousands of other pieces of advice he received - suggesting that he let Republican voters decide for him whether or not he should run for re-election. At least three purposes would be therein served. First, he would not have to decide a priori, that is, on his own. If the voters in the primaries supported him, the decision would be that much easier and more plausible. If they voted him down, he would have

2 "When Ike Must Decide," U. S. NEWS, XXXIX (30 Dec. 1955), 19.

3 W. H. Lawrence, "Eisenhower Says 2D Term Decision Must Be His Own," op, cit., p. 10. Emphasis added.

a good albeit a disappointing, reason for not running again. Of course, the fact that he would be unopposed indicated not only the overwhelming probability of his "election" but also the gist of his affirmative decision even at this early date. Second, the announcement of the decision could be postponed until after the primaries instead of being forced prior to them and a possible intra-party battle thereby averted. Third, if he won he would have done so on his own and without the support of the party professionals that had been necessary for his nomination and victory in 1952. It would, in short, mean that their roles would be reversed. While he could not lose he would be giving the "people" the opportunity of voting him up or down. Here was a painless way out of saying "yes" or "no" to a second term on the spot.⁴

Yet, how this was to be manipulated without appearing to enter the primary on his own initiative, which would have been tantamount to announcing his candidacy, was a difficult problem. Any appearance that a final decision had been reached had to be avoided, lest he risk the appearance of repudiation if he lost. This, in fact, had been the problem underlying the entire issue of a decision on a second term.

⁴ "Ike's Health and the Voters," NEWSWEEK, XLVII (30 Jan. 1956), 23. For James Reston's views of the considerations that weighed upon the President's mind, see his three consecutive articles, "The Big Question," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 10, 11 and 12 Jan. 1956, pp. 14, 12 and 14, respectively. See also Arthur Krock, "' Will He Or Won't He'" Keeps G.O.P. On Edge," NEW YORK TIMES, 15 Jan. 1956, p. B3.

That same week, the third week in January, the President received a telegram from the Deputy Secretary of State for New Hampshire, Henry E. Jackson, saying that unless the President objected, his name would be entered on the ballot for the primary on 13 March. Here was the opportunity that Eisenhower had awaited. At his news conference on 19 January he announced the receipt of the Jackson telegram and issued the text of his reply. He had written Jackson on 14 February, thanking him for his courteous interest, but interposing no objections to his name being entered on the ballot. The section of the President's telegram to Mr. Jackson that excited the most interest read as follows:

It would be idle to pretend that my health can be wholly restored to the excellent state in which the doctors believed it to be in mid-September. At the same time, my doctors report to me that the progress I am making toward a reasonable level of strength is normal and satisfactory. My future life must be carefully regulated to avoid excessive fatigue. My reasons for obedience to the medical authorities are not solely personal; I must obey them out of respect for the responsibilities I carry.

He emphasized, however, that his lack of objections did not constitute a final decision in favor of seeking re-election. "I hope that all who vote in your Republican primaries will carefully weigh all the possibilities and personalities that may be involved," he added. He was explicit in emphasizing

that the "accident of my illness" should not stand in the way of a free choice.⁵

As he had been along with the question of his health, the President was being completely honest with the people. But he was also being politically astute. For they were one and the same. His honesty on the health issue would preserve and strengthen the kind of position he wanted to retain. If he could not have a second term of his own terms, he did not want it. His honesty was what made him politically. As he said to Emmet John Hughes after reading a tribute to himself in an editorial:

This is what I mean to people - sense and honesty and fairness and a decent amount of progress. I don't think the people want to be listening to a Roosevelt sounding as if he were one of the Apostles, or the partisan yipping of a Truman. This business of rolling the drums to rally your own party troops has its place, but - damn it - everyone that comes

5 PUBLIC PAPERS, op. cit., p. 56; "Ike Discusses His Health, His Job, His Secretary of State," U.S. NEWS, XL (27 Jan. 1956), 94; and Adams, op. cit., p. 227. Of course, the President was unopposed in the New Hampshire Primary. The surprising results were in the write-in votes for Nixon for Vice President. Nixon had recently been through an agonizing decision as to whether or not to seek another term himself and had also been the object of a "Dump Nixon" movement led by Harold Stassen, who contended that Eisenhower would run stronger with someone else other than Nixon on the ticket, preferably Governor Christian Herter of Massachusetts. Nixon received a spontaneous 9,436 write-ins. Other candidates whose names were written in for the Vice Presidency were Governor Herter (1,111), Senator Styles Bridges (813), Senator William Knowland (219), and Chief Justice Earl Warren (185). See John Fenton, "Nixon, Kefauver Score Victories In New Hampshire Primary," NEW YORK TIMES, 14 Mar. 1956, pp. 1 and 26.

into this office tells me that I am the only thing that can pull this party through. So there's no use my making any compromises with the truth, supposedly for the party, because if I were caught in one falsehood, and what I stand for in the people's eyes got tarnished, then not just me but the whole Republic an gang would be finished.⁶

So Eisenhower was also trying to save the party from itself. The constant urgings of the Palace Guard had their effect on Eisenhower, but not in the same way as they had perhaps intended. They had educated him; they had produced a politician. He would now realize what he could do and crystalize his kind of leadership. It was a new dawning on the Eisenhower Administration and all of a sudden the President experienced a fervent desire to exercise it. But, first he had to keep the door open so as to produce a draft.

Just before the news of the Jackson Telegram was made public the President's heart was again in the throat of the nation. The New Republic on the liberal side published a "Five Year Recovery of Patients Who Survived Initial Coronary Occlusion," by comparing studies of various cardiologists and life insurance companies. The results seemed to indicate that the chances were somewhat less than

6 Quoted in Hughes, op. cit., pp. 194-95.

50% that the President would live another five years.⁷

The ardently conservative U.S. NEWS released the results of a controversial poll of heart specialists it had conducted⁸ showing evidence to the contrary. When asked if they thought a heart attack victim could be regarded as physically able to serve as President, 64.4% (152) said yes while 35.6% (84) said no. In response to a question about President Eisenhower's particular illness, 60.3% (141) said they thought he was physically able to serve a second term, while 39.7% (93) said they did not think so.⁹

7 "Five Year Recovery of Patients Who Survive Initial Coronary Occlusion," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXIII (3 Jan. 1956), 3. Results in the various comparisons ranged from as low as 15.2% to 76%. The implications seemed to be that if this were the case with groups of ordinary citizens, the pressures of the Presidency on a 66-year-old man who had suffered a coronary occlusion less than a year previously reduced his chances to somewhere near the bottom of the scale. As late as the week before the election the NEW REPUBLIC published an article showing that the average age of the Presidents was only 65. Eisenhower was at best living on borrowed time. Louis H. Bean, "How Long Do Presidents Live?" NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXV (29 Oct. 1956), 12-13.

8 U.S. NEWS did not conduct the poll in its own name but had a private firm do so. Questionnaires were sent to the 444 doctors certified as heart specialists by the American Board of Medical Specialists, published by A.N. Marquis Company of Chicago. Answers were received from 275 respondents or 61.9%. Of these, 236 answered the first question and 234, the second. "What Heart Specialists Say," U.S. NEWS, XL (13 Jan. 1956), 21.

9 Some did not answer either yes or no, but made comments. Many protested that they could not answer without having examined the patient and suggested that the poll was therefore ineffective, inconclusive and useless. One doctor reasoned that in his opinion the "meddlesome project should be abandoned." Another considered the poll "a travesty on Lincoln" while yet another answered the questions and returned the questionnaire with the comment "My fee for this service will be \$100.00." Alternate suggestions were made such as "He should run for Vice President and his brother Milton should run for President." *Id.*, pp. 28, 29, 28, and 24 respectively. The American Medical Association blasted the poll as "politically slanted" and declared that "consultation without examination is absurd." See William S. White, "Capital Doubts That Eisenhower Will Be Candidate for 2d Term," NEW YORK TIMES, 20 Jan. 1956, pp. 1 and 15.

In the latter poll, Eisenhower's greatest "support" came from doctors in the traditionally Republican Middle Atlantic States and the East North Central States. No conclusions can be drawn from this, however, since questionnaires were not sent out or returned in proportion to population nor were there any distinctions made in the results as to the correlation between received ballots and area population.

Neither poll, of course, really proved anything. The New Republic survey was a conglomeration of studies on individuals and groups of individuals from 1941-54 and in no way applied to Eisenhower personally. The U.S. News poll, while specifically mentioning the President, could not be deemed conclusive since, of course, it could not give the doctors questioned the opportunity to examine the President and since there was no uniformity in what evidence the individual doctors considered. The New Republic survey was totally apolitical while the U.S. News study did not allow for personal political preferences and aversions. Indeed, the Washington Post and Times Herald noted with some pointed conclusiveness that "heart specialists tend to be Republicans by a preponderance of about 3 to 2."¹⁰ Although both studies caused great controversy, neither, then, was strictly pertinent to the subject at hand except for suggestive propaganda purposes for the political factions.

¹⁰ Quoted in "The Press and the President," TIME LXVII (23 Jan. 1956), 69.

Of more significance as a factor on the President's decision about seeking re-election were the results of a study conducted by his own doctors. On 11 February, after he arrived back in Washington from Key West, the President was examined at Walter Reed Hospital. The physicians took x-rays of his heart and compared them with x-rays taken of the heart before the attack. The key to the entire situation was the relative size of the hearts. If the post-attack heart had enlarged significantly then the President's condition remained dangerous. If, however, the heart was relatively the same size after the President had resumed an almost normal schedule of activity, then his chances of running and surviving were vastly improved. As the doctors bent forward to examine the two superimposed x-rays they found the outlines of the two hearts almost precisely contiguous with one another. At that news conference on 14 February when they announced that the President was good for another five to ten years, they were frank to admit, "We don't know that he won't have another cardiac accident." Nevertheless, it was a decisive factor in the President's medical as well as political outlook.¹¹

¹¹ See the NEW YORK TIMES for "Eisenhower Gets Check-Up To Guide Decision On Race," 12 Feb. 1956, pp. 1 and 59; and W.H. Lawrence's articles, "Doctors Report To President Today," 14 Feb. 1956, pp. 1 and 25 and "Eisenhower Is Fit To Run Doctors Say After Tests; Stress That 'Choice Is His'," op. cit., pp. 1 and 21. See also James Reston, "Open Door On 2d Term," 15 Feb. 1956, p. 21.

How much it eased the heart conditions of Leonard Hall and Sherman Adams, et al, has not been recorded.

The next day the President left for Georgia.

The comparison of the x-rays coupled with Eisenhower's plan to allow his name to be entered in the New Hampshire primary were two major factors in determining his inclination to run for a second term. While the honesty of the reply to the Jackson Telegram was typically Eisenhower, the Political strategy was not. Heretofore, political angling had been left to Nixon, Adams and Hall. Now the President - entirely of his own accord - made the first of a series of incidents which mark the advent of the "new Eisenhower," a politically astute Eisenhower, an Eisenhower who was beginning to enjoy his job and to realize what it called for. The prospects for a second term not only were looking good to his partisans, they were also brightening for him. The reply to the Jackson Telegram and the timely publication of the results of the x-ray comparisons were political strokes of the first magnitude. Eisenhower had been constantly barraged by his advisors and friends and associates with appeals for his candidacy. Now, he responded, although not in the manner in which many of them thought he would. Eisenhower was beginning to realize that he could institute his kind of leadership in a manner that could not have been possible had his heart attack not occurred. For the health situation gave him an opportunity to project further his most potent political asset: his honesty. Even his enemies, he had said, who regarded him as "stupid"

did not think he was dishonest. But those enemies failed to recognize the possibilities of this Eisenhower image as they continued to try to exploit the health issue. Now Eisenhower had the opportunity to make it backfire on them. The honesty with which he treated the people of New Hampshire, for instance, was to give him the opening he wanted to go before the nation with the same candor and have them clamor for his candidacy. The health issue could be made to backfire on the Democrats with the results of increasing Eisenhower's popularity and influence and giving him a running start on any lame duck status he would accrue on 21 January 1957. The question was no longer one of putting off the decision on the people but of maneuvering them into the position of endorsing him in spite of his admitted disability. For on the one hand he was disabled and would have to have his schedule reduced, but on the other, he was recovering and the x-rays demonstrated that he was "normal." If they could be maneuvered into wanting him - even on a part-time basis, as the Democrats charged - his presidential power would be vastly increased for the application in those areas he was learning it should be applied. But making the Democratic charges seem untrue was dependent entirely upon his being 100% honest about his health - in short, upon his admitting that they were true insofar as he was not the same man as he had been in September 1955, but also in proving that he was the same President. His goal was to make widespread the opinion of a partisan that "Half an Eisenhower is better than two Democrats any day."¹²

¹² Quoted in "Candidate Eisenhower," COMMONWEAL, LXIII (16 Mar. 1956), 607.

And the more the Democrats pointed out the shortcomings of half an Eisenhower the bigger his abilities to handle the nation's problems as President seemed to become.

But before the people were convinced, the politicians had to be convinced - on Dwight Eisenhower's grounds.

II

At Key West the President had said in re consideration of a second term, "Naturally I will want to confer with some of my trusted advisers, and this particular thing has not been greatly talked about by me with my own people."¹ What he meant was that his advisers had been doing all the talking. For mutual conversation he resorted to an established White House practice that had been in use since he had become President.

Part of the President's policy of attempting to bring new ideas and unified, young, aggressive leadership of the moderate outlook into the Republican Party was to institute a series of "stag dinners" in the White House. He wanted to agitate Republicans thinking by bringing together businessmen, editors, politicians, educators, labor leaders and other varied personalities. Oftentimes these gatherings were no more than get-togethers of old cronies but more often they were to provide a setting for which leaders of different philosophies could rally around the banner of Eisenhower's own belief in middle-of-the-road philosophy.

¹ W.H. Lawrence, "President Hints He has Decided Whether To Run," op. cit., p.12.

By the time January came, the President realized that he had much more of a responsibility than he had heretofore conceived, both to the party and to the nation. By allowing his name to be entered in the New Hampshire and other primaries, he was well on the road to having the people convince themselves of the desirability of his candidacy. To convince his associates - and himself - that the second candidacy must be different from the first, he scheduled a special stag dinner for Tuesday, 10 January. He was irritated when word of it leaked out and with the greatest secrecy he rescheduled it for that following Friday night - the thirteenth. He went to such pains to keep it secret that he personally brought the place cards over to the Mansion from his office in the West Wing.

Although what transpired at that historic dinner has never been recorded, it is known that this was the first time the President got down to a personal brass tacks discussion with his associates and advisors about his candidacy for a second term. There were thirteen men present at the Friday the Thirteenth Dinner. In addition to the President, the list included Secretary of State Dulles, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Sherman Adams, Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, Defense Co-Ordinator Arthur Summerfield, Press Secretary Jim Hagerty, Howard Pyle and Tom Stephens, two of the President's aides, Major General Wilton B. ("Slick" or "Jerry") Persons, National Chairman Leonard Hall, Attorney General Herb Brownell, and Dr. Milton Eisenhower.²

² C.J.V. Murphy, *op. cit.*, p. 115; Donovan, *op. cit.*, p. 394; Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 225; Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 141; and Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, p. 571.

Vice President Nixon was not invited. The President had told him that during this critical period during which he was pondering over the possibilities of a second term, it would be necessary to hold conferences on the political situation without Nixon's being present. This was necessary, he told Nixon, because the Vice President would, of course, be one of those whom they would discuss.³

Mrs. Eisenhower joined the distinguished group of gentlemen for a very pleasant dinner, after which the men retired upstairs to the President's study - what he called his "trophy room" because he kept his World War II mementoes there. On the east and west walls hung full-length portraits of both the President's parents. The President sat down with his back to the fireplace and the mood changed to a very serious one. Usually, when the President got a group such as this one together he had no agenda and encouraged free expression. This time, however, he had a very definite program. With the men sitting around in a circle, the President said that soon he would have to make a very serious decision. Still awaiting the results of decisive medical tests (the ones with the x-rays scheduled for 11 February) and the final word from his doctors, he wanted in the meantime to discuss with these men present the possible eventuality that those tests would allow him to run for a second term. From them he wanted, freely and off the record, their individual arguments for or against running again.⁴

3 Johnson, op. cit., p. 141 and Nixon, op. cit., p. 157.

4 Donovan, op. cit., pp. 393-94; Johnson, op. cit., p. 141 and Adams, op. cit., pp. 225-26.

One by one each had his say. Dulles told the President in his own inimitable Presbyterian style that Eisenhower had a God-given ability to reconcile differences among nations and he should remain in a position to exercise it fully. He emphasized the deterioration of international relations which would result without Eisenhower in the White House and stressed the possibilities of nuclear war which would threaten the very existence of mankind. Adams, Hall and others said that the President had provided the party with a new, appealing identity and that only he among all Republicans could hope to continue it to another victory. Lodge stressed the national unity and prosperity that had characterized Eisenhower's years in office and urged that he remain there to sustain it.

When everyone had given his arguments in favor of the President's running again, the would-be candidate asked his brother Milton to sum up the arguments for and against a second term. He did not ask Milton to give his own opinion. As the other "President" Eisenhower related it, the negative side was unconvincing. If the President retired his influence on world peace would be correspondingly reduced. As it had been presented, the President had a position to exert a great influence on international peace - so long as he was in the White House. The incentive of public responsibility enabled him to unify the nation and the party. Only he could win in the 1956 election for the Republican Party and if he did not run the Democrats would return to power and reverse all his efforts. The choice he faced, therefore, was either run for a second term or lose everything he had worked for during his term

in office. Finally, it was agreed that it was entirely the President's own decision to make and that all those present would abide by it whether it was yes or no.

"I didn't know you all would be against me," the President rejoined. He remarked that only Milton seemed to be on his side. As the gathering broke up, the President left the members with no hint as to what his decision was or might be.⁵

It is highly improbable that the President expected any negative persuasion from the members of such a group as he brought together at the White House on Friday the Thirteenth of January 1956. Cabinet Members administration aides, and party officials would have been the last people in the world to play the devil's advocate and discourage a second term. The one member of the group who might have been expected to present cogent reasons for his brother's retirement that might have swayed the President was not asked by him to elucidate. If the President were looking for serious reasons for retiring he would not have consulted his own appointees. What the President evidently wanted to do was to reinforce his own thinking and to convince them and himself that he should run again.

⁵ Donovan, op. cit., pp. 394-95; Adams, op. cit., pp. 226-27; and Eisenhower, op. cit., pp. 571-72.

The crux of the matter was this: Eisenhower had seen that he was once again in a position to provide what he called "dynamic conservative" leadership. Yet he was unsure whether or not the nation would be ready to accept leadership from an alleged invalid. He, therefore, contrived the New Hampshire primary coup. Second, he was only too aware of the gnawing failure to provide new moderate and young leadership for the party. The hard political facts were that only he could win the 1956 election on the Republican ticket. That being the case he was not ready under any circumstances to let all he had worked for go down the drain with a Democratic victory in 1956 - especially when it looked as if Adlai Stevenson would be the candidate and otherwise President-designate. When the doctors reported on that 14 February that he would "be able to carry on an active life satisfactorily for another five to ten years"⁶ Eisenhower was medically taken off borrowed time.

III

President Eisenhower wrote to his brother Milton in December 1953, on the topic of a second term, "If ever I should show any signs of yielding to persuasion, please call in the psychiatrist - or even better, the sheriff I feel there can be no showing made that my

⁶ D.D. Rutstein, "Doctors and Politics," ATLANTIC, CXCVIII (Aug. 1956), 32; "What Doctors Say About Ike, 'Active Life For 5 to 10 Years'," U.S. NEWS, XL (24 Feb. 1956), 107-08 and "Doctors Say He's Able; Is He Willing?" LIFE, XL (27 Feb. 1956) 38-9. See above, pp. 74-75.

'duty' extends beyond a one time performance." Even then, two years before the heart attack, he regarded himself as "too old" (62) and "this almost precluded any thought of my occupying the Presidency for eight years." But anyone trying to lead the nation into the new era of the sixties would need to have at least two terms in the White House to make a significant start.¹ As already noted, this determination to limit his political career on his own behalf to four years was to have been a part of his first inaugural. But he had yielded to the political persuasion and had left the door open for a second term. Then he was Eisenhower the novice politician; Eisenhower the healthy conquering warrior, man of peace. Now he was Eisenhower the professional, the cardiac case - but still the man of peace.

In 1955-56, the politicians went to work again, but this time on a different Eisenhower. Now they faced a man who had undergone an intense, albeit brief, political baptism of fire. He had faced a Democratic Congress for three years and he had also faced death. If it were possible, even more of the lessons of life had been crammed into his sixty-five years. The nation had reached unprecedented peaks of prosperity. The Korean conflict had been brought to a close and a postwar recession successfully dealt with. Red China was still in check in the Far East while the tense relations with Russia were temporarily eased by the disarmament proposal at Geneva in 1955. At the present time there were only faint forebodings of the impending

¹ Cited and quoted in Eisenhower, op. cit., pp. 556-57.

trouble in the Middle East and the prospects for the Republican Party were good - if Eisenhower stayed at the helm. The President could have left office at that time with the grateful thanks of millions of world citizens but with the feeling that more might have been accomplished if he had remained at the forefront. The time of complete satisfaction had not yet come to Eisenhower as it never comes to any President. Now more seriously than ever before he weighed these considerations in his mind: Was it true that the tense world situation could better be handled by him than by anyone else on the American political scene? Were his domestic policies serving the best interests of America as a whole? Could he continue in office without seriously impairing his health and consequently his effectiveness, both medically and politically in spite of the heart attack and the Twenty-Second Amendment? The answer to all three questions seemed in his mind to be yes. But the main question was this: Would the Republicans lose and the return of the Democrats reverse everything he had thus far done? Here was the decisive affirmative answer. "He hated the thought of turning over his moderate and conservative policies to a Democratic administration," Adams tells us. "For that reason alone, whether he had had the heart attack or not, I believe he could have been persuaded to become the Republican Candidate in 1956"² And who should know but Sherman Adams?

² Adams, op. cit., pp. 220-21

On the home front Mrs. Eisenhower, John and Milton became reconciled to the fact that the President's recovery did not make his prospects for a second term as ominous as originally they appeared to be. General Snyder began to advance the suggestion to them that the President's restless energy and aversion to inertia might do his health more harm in retirement than would another active term in the White House.³

For Eisenhower's own part, the decision had resolved itself. His main concern now was for the nation and the office. For if the nation could not be convinced that it was to its best interest to continue him in office, or if they came to believe that a heart attack victim in the White House would diminish the Presidency, then he risked defeat. One of his greatest strengths lay in the fact that his kind of leadership had brought back a certain element of respect to that office which had been lost during the latter Truman years. Now if he threatened its effectiveness as well, then he certainly could not run again. "The problem," he told a news conference a month before his announcement, "is what will be the effect on the Presidency"⁴ Yet the issue remained: if he were the only Republican who could win - and he lost then the party would be out of contention for an incalculable period of

3 Id., p. 222.

4 "Eisenhower Gets Check-Up To Guide Decision on Race," op. cit. p. 59, and "Ike Talks About - The Big Decision, His Health, Warren, the Coming Campaign," U.S. NEWS, XL (17 Feb. 1956), 81.

time. His vision, therefore, had to extend beyond the primaries and into the general election when the voters would be subject to the full onslaught of the Democratic propaganda machine.

Evidence exists to show that Eisenhower had come to the conclusion at a very early date that the heart attack, the position of the party, the state of the nation and of the world, and the position of his associates called for another term in the White House. He made the significant admission that "I think I will probably trust my own feelings more than I will the doctors' reports." Even at this late date (mid-February) the President was still observing the disparity between medical and political practicalities, between the could and the should of his candidacy. "Now a doctor's sole care is with his patient," he explained. "He doesn't have to think about the things I do in trying to solve this problem." He said he had always tried to be on the "cautionary side rather than on the optimistic side" hoping, as he said, that if he ultimately decided "that I don't believe I should try to do this" that there would be no national "shock."⁵

5 PUBLIC PAPERS, op. cit. pp. 33-4. Emphasis added. When asked at this point if this statement meant that he had not yet made up his mind about seeking re-election, the President drew laughter when he replied, "It means as of this moment I have not made up my mind to make any announcement as of this moment." Id. Cf. Eisenhower's statement of 29 February at his final announcement (quoted in Introduction, p.viii) that he was "arguing about" the decision until the previous morning. He meant he was arguing - not discussing.

At a news conference on 8 February, the President said that he would like to make his announcement at a press conference. Although one may question his motives were as he stated them to be, the later events proved to be exactly in line with his apparently set decision when he said, "... here is where I would like to make it. For ... I have had relations with this group that I have treasured, and this would be the logical place to make it." He went on to say, however, that "it will probably need some explanation, and the longer explanation will not be here ... if it can work out that way."⁶ That is precisely how it happened.

Outside of Nixon, Hagerty, Adams, Persons, Hall and Milton Eisenhower, only a few persons knew of the President's decision. On 29 February the President "leaped" into the political arena - the two months (to the day) that his advisors had asked for. He scheduled a press conference for that day and word went out that this was it since he had previously promised an answer "within the month." Before leaving his office he held a thirty-five minute briefing with Hagerty and Murray Snyder. Snyder prepared a cue card with inch-high words reading:

Red Cross
Italian
Farm Bill
Upper Colorado
Personal

6 Id.

Picking it up, the President left his office shortly after 10:00 a.m. to walk to the Executive Office Building across the street from the West Wing of the White House. Since early that morning reporters had been lining up for the press conference outside the Indian Treaty Room on the fourth floor where the President always conducted his news conferences from behind a large desk in front of the room. Three hundred and eleven reporters and cameramen jammed into the ornate room. At 10:31 the President walked in, dressed in a tan suit and vest with his head slightly bowed in thought. As the assemblage rose, great suspense filled the teeming room.

Eisenhower yielded to an irresistible temptation to tantalize the reporters. For six suspense-filled minutes he routinely discussed his hope that the people would support the Red Cross Drive, announced his pleasure over the arrival of President Giovanni Gronchi of Italy for a state visit, voiced his opposition to the rigid price supports which had been written into the farm bill pending in the Senate, and dragged his impatient listeners into the Upper Colorado River Basin project, which was then up for consideration in the House. He was for it. He unbuttoned his coat and thrust his left hand into his trousers pocket. It was 10:37.

"Now my next announcement will be of interest to you, as so many questions have been asked about it."

He said he had promised that body that when he had reached a decision as to his "own personal future," he would let them know.

Now he had reached that decision, he said, but "there were so many factors and considerations involved, that I saw the answer could not be expressed just in simple terms of yes and no." Some explanation to the nation was necessary, he said, and he would ask for time on national radio and television to explain to them those factors so that they understood them fully. The reporters were panicky with anticipation.

Just as he would not go before the nation without this explanation clear to them, he continued, neither would he go before the Republican National Convention unless all Republicans "understood, so that they would not be nominating some individual other than they thought they were nominating." It might be, after their having heard what he had to say that neither the Republicans or the nation wanted him, he hinted. But if they called upon him, he said, "My answer will be positive; that is, affirmative."⁷

The President broke into a wide grin as a horde of reporters broke for the exits and jammed the telephone booths to get the scoop on the wires. The news hit the New York Stock Exchange at 10:52 a.m.

⁷ Adams, op. cit., p. 229; Donovan, op. cit., p. 404; "Something Personal," NEWSWEEK, XLVII (12 Mar. 1956), 28-9; PUBLIC PAPERS, op. cit., p. 265; and "Here's How Ike Broke the News," U.S. NEWS, XL (9 Mar. 1956), 46-9; W.H. Lawrence, "Eisenhower Word on Second Term Expected Today," NEW YORK TIMES, 29 Feb. 1956, pp. 1 and 14 and James Reston, "Eisenhower Says He Will See A 2D Term; Confident of Health; Bars 'Barnstorming'; Praises Nixon But Does Not Endorse Him," NEW YORK TIMES, 1 Mar. 1956, pp. 1, 15 and 35. An interesting pictorial account of the announcement is "Drama of the President's Yes," LIFE, XL (12 Mar. 1956), 18-25.

The air was tense and the galleries were jammed. Somebody shouted, "He's going to run!" A roar went up and people on the floor and in the galleries cheered, whooped and slapped each other on the back. Orders to buy came in so incredibly fast that the tape fell an hour behind as prices surged.⁸ A good Democrat would have expected as much from Wall Street.

His immediate staff and family along with the Vice President were invited to the White House that evening to hear the President's televised address to the nation. Eisenhower was a natural for television. He came across on the screen like no other modern political figure save John F. Kennedy. He learned his style with help from actor Robert Montgomery and his ruddy face and contagious grin projected the very image of clean, wholesome, serious American statesmanship.

At 10:00 p.m. Eisenhower went on the air from his office in the White House. He explained the goals he had sought in his first term: international peace and national security; harmonious federal-state relationships; a dynamic economy; co-operation of the Executive and Legislative branches; solving the problems of the nation's farmers; building highways, schools, and other needed public works and extending

⁸ "When the News of Ike's Decision Hit the Stock Market," U.S. NEWS, XL (Mar. 1956), 37.

social welfare along with many other factors of similar importance. "To this clarification of issues," he said, "I devoted much time and effort. In many cases these things can now be done equally well by my close associates, but in others I shall continue to perform these important tasks." As President Kennedy did with the religious question when he was a candidate in 1960, President Eisenhower met the health question head on:

So far as my own personal sense of well-being is concerned, I am as well as before the attack occurred. It is, however, true that the opinions and conclusions of the doctors that I can continue to carry the burdens of the Presidency contemplate for me a regime of ordered work activity, interspersed with regular amounts of exercise, recreation and rest. A further word about this prescribed regime. I must keep my weight at a proper level. I must take a short midday breather. I must normally retire at a reasonable hour, and I must eliminate many of the less-important social and ceremonial activities.

But the President wanted to make one thing clear: "As of this moment there is not the slightest doubt that I can now perform, as well as I ever have, all of the important duties of the Presidency. This I say because I am actually doing so and have been doing so for many weeks."⁹

To his partisans and to the independents for the most part Eisenhower's speech was balm in Gilead. There he was, smiling, radiating health and confidence and implicit trust. He could do his job, he

⁹ "The President Tells the Nation," U.S. NEWS, XL (9 Mar. 1956), 67-8 and PUBLIC PAPERS, op. cit., pp. 274-75 and 276-77.

said, and if they wanted him for another term he would consent to it. If they wanted him! What humility! thought the masses as they sat on the edge of their seats in front of the television screens. Ike had won again and was a hero anew. He had beaten the Nazis, the Communists, the politicians, the Democrats, the corruptors, and now he had beaten Death itself. They had almost lost him and now they had him back. Of course they would have him!

What rubbish! thought the Democrats. "As it happens with most fine print, the public didn't read it" in Eisenhower's speech, noted Marquis Childs. "A regime of ordered work activity, interspersed with regular amounts of exercise, recreation and rest" meant even more golfing holidays, and less time on the job. If he had not been considered as "taking it easy" before the heart attack, what could be expected of him now? And as for his being able to "perform, as well as he ever had, all of the important duties of the Presidency," that was hardly any consolation to those who had never believed he was doing those duties well in the first place. But he had announced, had so much as asked for the Presidency again and the people would well up in a surge of sympathy and send get-well notes to him in the form of Republican ballots.

The professionals were hard-put to decide which fact was more remarkable: the President's steadfast post-attack resolve to retire or his present consuming zeal to seek another term. He had made his decision to run again in the affirmative thanks to the favorable doctors'

reports, the favorable effects of the Key West and Thomasville outings, his new conception of his office and duties, the retreat of his family's objections, and the persuasion of his associates. True, he would have been persuaded with the lack of another candidate anyway. But now he seemed eager to run - something he had not been in 1952 or anytime since. All except the closest associates were baffled as to why. But now his "personal political Rubicon was crossed," as he said later.¹⁰ And those who knew why looked for the reason back across the dreary plains of Gettysburg.

IV

In later years President Eisenhower once remarked to Sherman Adams, "You know, if it hadn't been for that heart attack, I doubt if I would have been a candidate again."¹ It was undoubtedly true. In the weeks and months following his announcement for a second term, the Democrats continually pictured him as a weak, spent, used-up man, swindled out of his needed and coveted retirement by the heartless professional Republicans. They had too much "sympathy" for him to believe that he really wanted to undergo another - perhaps fatal - ordeal in the White House. Not only was this characterization more

¹⁰ William S. White, "Eisenhower Says He May Announce Plans By March 1," NEW YORK TIMES, 9 Feb. 1956, pp. 1 and 18.

¹ Quoted in Adams, op. cit., p. 220.

a benefit to the Eisenhower candidacy than it was a debit because it enabled people to believe that Ike could do his job well even while disabled, but it was also untrue.

To those who stood in the sheer impact of his physical presence during the post-Gettysburg days, Eisenhower seemed to show unimagined zest for a second term. While it was true that perhaps the most decisive factor in his decision was the lack of another Republican candidate, Eisenhower did not need the Republicans to persuade him that that was true. The decision became completely personal as the Democrats continued to picture him as a tired, sickly, spent, useless old man for whom the burden of office had proved too much. As Adams tells us, the President had always taken pride in his health and stamina. Thus, when such charges were made it became a personal goal to accept a second term. Not to do so was to accept personal defeat, along with party defeat. Now they became one and the same. "To let it be said that such duties had worn him out, that the burden of leadership had become too much for him, seemed more and more repugnant," relates the Assistant to the President. He would wait until the doctors gave the final word, but barring their flat no, he had made up his mind in the last weeks at Gettysburg that he would stay in the White House.²

This frame of mind on Eisenhower's part was a direct result of the convalescence at the farm. "Far from longing for

2 Id., p. 221.

retirement," contends Hughes, "his taste of it, through the gray winter weeks of convalescence at Gettysburg, had decisively sharpened his desire for continued office."³ His premature departure from the hospital and the Camp David meeting had at first staved off the post-attack depression. Then came the winter and he was corralled in the house, unable to walk around, constantly worried over governmental problems, yet unable to take an active part in solving them. By that time "even the worst days in the White House looked rather appealing by contrast."⁴

It was during the second half of the stay at Gettysburg that the President's advisors set out on the campaign to convince him to run again. This was their most propitious moment and they had reasons other than political in nature. "I don't care what happens to the Republican Party," said General Lucius Clay, Eisenhower's long-time friend and advisor, "but if he quits, it'll kill him." Even Mrs. Eisenhower had decided that her husband "was not ready for

3 Hughes, op. cit., p. 176

4 Donovan, op. cit., p. 397. Eisenhower's claustrophobia was evidenced by the fact that because he was unable to walk a great deal, "he was sometimes forced to ride in a jeep for something to do." See also "Not Ready to Retire," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXV (9 July 1956), 2.

retirement, and several of the doctors felt that "retirement could bring him frustration that would be a greater strain on his heart than the burdens of the Presidency."⁵

It is therefore the irony of history that the heart attack, rather than precluding it, came to necessitate Eisenhower's candidacy for a second term. It is equally ironic that the burdens and responsibilities of the Presidency rather than being the looming reasons against running again became the major persuasion used on Eisenhower to convince him that he should run. Vice President Nixon later contended that "The basic considerations which went into this decision were the same before and after September 1955 - with the exception of the heart attack - and I believe it was the heart attack itself which, more than anything else, helped convince him to become a candidate for re-election."⁶ After five weeks of convalescence when golf was forbidden, weather bad, and boredom rampant, Eisenhower got tired of painting, reading his favorite western novels, and his tortured morale slumped. The battle

5 Nixon, op. cit., p. 162 and "Not Ready to Retire," Id. The effect of this line of argument on the President is evidenced by his statement in his address to the nation on his announcement for a second term: "Incidentally, some of my medical advisors believe that adverse effects on my health will be less in the Presidency than in any other position I might hold." See "The President Tells the Nation," op. cit., p. 68 and PUBLIC PAPERS, op. cit., p. 216.

6 Nixon, op. cit., p. 152.

that his associates thought they would have to wage against adamant retirement was turned into a patient seige upon Eisenhower's restlessness. "I really don't know the exact moment when he decided to run again," said Jim Hagerty, "but I do know that history was made sometime in those weeks at Gettysburg."⁷ Eisenhower was, in short, bored into becoming a candidate.⁸

7 Quoted in Hughes, op. cit., p. 176. See also "Persuading the President," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXIV (18 June 1956), 2.

8 In a news conference on 25 January 1956, Eisenhower denied that this was the major reason for his seeking re-election. When asked if he missed the bustle of the Presidency when he was at Gettysburg, the President replied:

Well, it seems to me to be a fair question, although I don't know if it is terrifically important.

Anybody who has been busy, when he doesn't have immediately something at hand, has a little bit of a strange feeling. But to say that I was bored to death at Gettysburg - there are so many things that I have to do. I have piled up stacks of books I never have had a chance to read, and I am trying to get through. I, as you know, daub with paints. I like the actual roaming around on a farm. I love animals. I like to get out and see them. I have got a thousand things to do in this world, so I don't think I would be bored, no matter what it was.

But the fact is that the President, as noted, got tired of reading, painting, was restricted in his "roaming around" and was constantly subjected to the boredom of inactivity and pressured by his associates about a second term. After he got back to the White House it was a tremendous relief to him and it was not politic to suggest to the public that he was running only because he had nothing else to do. PUBLIC PAPERS, op. cit., p. 191.

This, coupled with the lack of a candidate, the plight of the party, the retreat of his family's objections, the Key West experience, the support of his associates at the Friday the Thirteenth Dinner, the New Hampshire coup, the vacation with George Humphrey⁹ at Thomasville, and the decisive reports of the doctors left little doubt in Eisenhower's mind that he could not quit now.

Evidence tends to demonstrate, therefore, that Eisenhower's decision to run again was unobtrusively made during the latter party of the Gettysburg convalescence. It can be narrowed down between the two points of the 11 February x-rays and the 28 November meeting with Len Hall. It was obviously made prior to the x-rays, since they only substantiated his decision, as he admitted he would trust his own feelings more than the reports. On 8 February he said he had already received "as much information as I am going to get," promised an answer "before the month is out" (it was made on 29 February) and described the exact method in which it would be made.¹⁰ It was therefore made before early February. On 8 January at Key West he said that he merely had not made up his mind to announce the decision there. Since he left for Key West on 27 December, the decision was probably made sometime during the last

9 It was reported by NEWSWEEK that before his 29 February announcement Eisenhower tried to persuade George Humphrey to run for the GOP nomination. The Secretary of the Treasury refused firmly on the grounds of his age (66, seven months Eisenhower's senior) and his lack of a political background. Eisenhower, with the same problems, was then decisively persuaded to run, says NEWSWEEK. No corroborating evidence has been found by the author to substantiate this contention. See "White House Whispers," NEWSWEEK, XLVII (25 June 1956), 15.

week in December - around Christmastime - at Gettysburg. All subsequent events merely reinforced his desire to seek another term. He had determined since that point that he would like to run again. He had not determined that he could or should. His associates convinced him that he should and the doctors told him he could. Shortly after learning that he could run, the President set about determining whether he could win. Thus he entered the New Hampshire primary. Polls sustained his popularity. But most decisive in these areas were the charges of the partisans that he should not run - that he had failed and should step aside. Unlike the Republicans, they did not know this man. If they had praised his record, commended him with whatever reservation, and demonstrated genuine sympathy, then perhaps Eisenhower would have been more vulnerable to being eased out of the picture.

Gettysburg was once again a turning point in history. Throughout the post-convalescence weeks it crops up again and again. It was a heart attack that encouraged Eisenhower to run again; it was partisan criticism that tempered his mettle; it was a bitter recovery that convinced him that he could last; and it was a genuine concern for his party and his country that convinced him that he should try. As was traditional with Eisenhower, when the decision was made, there was no turning back. In August 1956, William McGaffin of the Chicago Daily News asked the President the following question at a news conference:

Mr. President, this, again, is one of those personal questions about your health, sir, but I think perhaps you don't realize the impact it's had on the people of the country ... and when we were all in Gettysburg, for instance, I went around and talked to a number of your friends and neighbors to ask them how they felt about your running again.

Well, they all love you, as you know, and they said they are going to vote for you; but really they wished that you wouldn't run because they feel you have done enough for the nation, you have made so many sacrifices, and sir, they are afraid that you won't last out, they are afraid you won't live for another four years.

The resolution and zest Eisenhower had for a second term was summed up in his answer, along with an insight into his philosophy of life:

Well, sir, I would tell you frankly, I don't think it is too important to the individual how his end comes, and certainly he can;t dictate the time.

What we are talking about here is the importance to the country, and it happens that at this moment the Republican Party apparently thinks I am still important to them and to the country. And, since I believe so much in the Republican Party, and I believe that it needed rebuilding so badly, an effort which I have been making, as you well know, I said I would continue to try.

But this is a decision that the American people are going to have to face. I am flattered by what you tell me about my friends and neighbors at Gettysburg, but I have made up my mind this is the thing I should try, and we will see what the American people have to say about it.¹¹

¹¹ Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 575.

It was therefore, as early as Christmas 1955 that Eisenhower, staring out across the fields of history and death at Gettysburg, decided entirely on his own not to forsake the responsibility he had - the responsibility that had been preserved ninety-two years earlier on that very spot. Here he took new determination and new vision. Here he came to realize that he had a second chance and that he could not let it go to waste, that he must try. Here emerged the "New Eisenhower." And if the struggle endured by General Eisenhower in December 1955 was not as dramatic or costly as that of July 1863, it was still significant enough to speak of in history as a second Battle of Gettysburg.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. BOOKS

- Adams, Sherman, FILSHAW REPORT, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961.
- Bughman, W. M., With Leonard Wallace Robinson, SECRET SERVICE CHIEF, New York: Popular Library, 1961.
- Burton, Kara Velt, CROSSFIRE: THE EIGHT YEARS WITH EISENHOWER, Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962.
- Childs, Margulis, EISENHOWER: CAPTIVE HERO, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1958.
- Greene, Edward S., THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1797-1957, New York: New York University Press, 1957.
- Hobson, Robert J., EISENHOWER: THE INSIDE STORY, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956.
- Holmes, Dwight Davis, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1956, CONTAINING THE PUBLIC MESSAGES, SPEECHES, AND STATEMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT, JANUARY 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 1956, Washington, D. C.: Federal Register Division, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, Government Printing Office, 1958.
- _____, THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS: MARCHES FOR CHANGE, 1953-1956, Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963.
- _____, THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS: WAGING PEACE, 1956-1961, Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964.
- Frederick, John D., FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION, New York: Fordham University Press, 1957.
- Gunter, John, EISENHOWER: MAN AND SWAGE, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951.
- Hughes, Ernst John, THE ORDEAL OF POWER: A POLITICAL MEMOIR OF THE EISENHOWER YEARS, New York: Atheneum, 1963.
- Johnson, George, EISENHOWER: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF A GREAT GENERAL, PRESIDENT AND STATESMAN, Derby, Conn: Monarch Books, Inc., 1962.
- _____, RICHARD NIXON, Derby, Conn.: Monarch Books, Inc., 1961.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. BOOKS

- Adams, Sherman, *FIRSTHAND REPORT*, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961.
- Baughman, U. E., With Leonard Wallace Robinson, *SECRET SERVICE CHIEF*.
New York: Popular Library, 1961.
- Benson, Ezra Taft, *CROSSFIRE: THE EIGHT YEARS WITH EISENHOWER*,
Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962.
- Childs, Marquis, *EISENHOWER: CAPTIVE HERO*, New York: Hartcourt,
Brace and Company, 1958.
- Corwin, Edward S., *THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1797-1957*,
New York: New York University Press, 19 .
- Donovan, Robert J., *EISENHOWER: THE INSIDE STORY*, New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1956.
- Eisenhower, Dwight David, *PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1956, CONTAINING THE PUBLIC
MESSAGES, SPEECHES, AND STATEMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT, JANUARY 1 TO
DECEMBER 31, 1956*, Washington, D. C.: Federal Register Division,
National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration,
Government Printing Office, 1958.
- _____, *THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS: MANDATE FOR CHANGE, 1953-1956*, Garden
City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963.
- _____, *THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS: WAGING PEACE, 1956-1961*, Garden City:
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964.
- Feerick, John D., *FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION*,
New York: Fordham University Press, 19 .
- Gunther, John, *EISENHOWER: MAN AND SYMBOL*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951.
- Hughes, Emmet John, *THE ORDEAL OF POWER: A POLITICAL MEMOIR OF THE
EISENHOWER YEARS*, New York: Atheneum, 1963.
- Johnson, George, *EISENHOWER: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF A GREAT GENERAL,
PRESIDENT AND STATESMAN*, Derby, Conn: Monarch Books, Inc., 1962.
- _____, *RICHARD NIXON*, Derby, Conn.: Monarch Books, Inc., 1961.

- Mazo, Earl, RICHARD NIXON: A POLITICAL AND PERSONAL PORTRAIT, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959.
- Neustadt, Richard E., PRESIDENTIAL POWER, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962.
- Nixon, Richard M., SIX CRISES, Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962.
- _____, THE CHALLENGES WE FACE, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960.
- Pollard, James E., THE PRESIDENTS AND THE PRESS, TRUMAN TO JOHNSON, Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964.
- Pusy, Merlo J., EISENHOWER THE PRESIDENT, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956.
- Rovere, Richard H., THE EISENHOWER YEARS, New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1956.
- Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., KENNEDY OR NIXON? DOES IT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE? New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960.
- Smith, Merriman, MEET MISTER EISENHOWER, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955.
- Sorenson, Theodore, DECISION-MAKING IN THE WHITE HOUSE, THE OLIVE BRANCH OR THE ARROWS, New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.
- Tourtellot, Arthur Bernon, THE PRESIDENTS ON THE PRESIDENCY, Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964.

II. ARTICLES AND ESSAYS

Journals included in the following listing are as follows:

AMERICAN MERCURY	REPORTER
ATLANTIC	TIME
COMMONWEAL	U. S. NEWS
ESQUIRE	VITAL SPEECHES
FORTUNE	
LIFE	
NATION	
NEW REPUBLIC	
NEWSWEEK	
NEW YORK TIMES	
NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE	
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY	

"Acting Captain," TIME, LXVI (10 Oct. 1955), 23-6.

"A Gain for Nixon," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (28 Nov. 1955), 34.

"After Eisenhower Bows Out - An Eastern Bloc Will Try To Stop Nixon," U. S. NEWS, XXXIX (21 Oct. 1955), 24-5.

Amper, Richard, "Hall Says Illness of President Has Not Changed 1956 Strategy," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 27 Sept. 1955, p. 1.

_____, "President Hailed At Garden Rally," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 21 Jan. 1956, pp. 1 and 12.

Ascoli, Max, "The President and His Party," REPORTER, XIV (12 Jan. 1956), 10.

_____, "The Turning Point," REPORTER, XII (20 Oct. 1955), 10.

"At Gettysburg ... the President 'Frets a Little,' Wants to Do More," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (28 Nov. 1955), 32-3.

"At Ik's Cabinet Meeting; Camp David," U. S. NEWS, XXXIX (2 Dec. 1955), 42-3.

Baker, Russell, "Eisenhower is Improving; Chance of Full Recovery Called 'Reasonably Good'," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 27 Sept. 1955, p. 1.

_____, "Eisenhower is in Hospital with 'Mild' Heart Attack; His Condition Called 'Good,'" in the NEW YORK TIMES, 25 Sept. 1955, p. 1 and 41.

_____, "48 G.O.P. Chairmen TO Fly to Parley with President," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 1 Sept. 1955, pp. 1 and 6.

_____, "Physician Sees President Back in Capital by Jan. 1." in the NEW YORK TIMES, 6 Oct. 1955, p. 1.

_____, "President Begins Denver Vacation; Plans Work, Too," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 14 August 1955, pp. 1 and 8.

_____, "President Better But Doctors See a 'Long Way to Go'," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 9 Oct. 1955, p. 1.

_____, "President Spends 30 Minutes in Sun on Hospital Deck," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 11 Oct. 1955, pp. 1 and 29.

_____, "President Warns His Party To Shun One-Man Outlook," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 11 Sept. 1955, pp. 1 and 80.

_____, "Waves and Says, 'Good-Bye Folks'," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 12 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 8.

- Bean, Louis H., "How Long Do Presidents Live?" NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXV (29 Oct. 1956), 12-13.
- "Before the Heart Attack - What President Eisenhower Did," U. S. NEWS, XXXIX (7 Oct. 1955), 67.
- Bendiner, Robert, "What Happened to the Sure Thing?" REPORTER, XV (1 Nov. 1956), 9.
- Berle, Adolf A. and Malcolm Moos, "The Need To Know and the Right to Tell: Emmet John Hughes, THE ORDEAL OF POWER - A DISCUSSION," POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, LXXXIX (June 1964), 161-83.
- "Big Day At Gettysburg," NEWSWEEK, XLVII (13 Feb. 1956), 27.
- "Big Decision After A Rest in Georgia," U.S. NEWS, XL (17 Feb. 1956), 16.
- Blair, William M., "Cabinet Meeting Called by Nixon," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 27 Sept. 1955, p. 1.
- _____, "Nixon Meets Top Officials; Ruling on Powers Deferred," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 28 Sept. 1955, p. 1.
- _____, "Team to Continue President's Plans," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Sept. 1955, pp. 1 and 17.
- "Broken Glass and Tacks on Nixon's Path," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXVIII (17 Oct. 1956), 3-5.
- "Candidate Eisenhower," COMMONWEAL, LXII (16 Mar. 1956), 607-08.
- "Capital Reporters Doubt Eisenhower Will Run," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 12 Nov. 1955, p. 8.
- "Chronology of Eisenhower's Illness," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 27 Sept. 1955, p. 21.
- "Chronology of Events of President's Illness Since Heart Attack," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 1 Mar. 1956, p. 14.
- "Chronology of Illness," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Sept. 1955, p. 15.
- "Consternation Within," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXVIII (3 Oct. 1955), 7.
- Coughian, Robert, "Debate Pro and Con, Subject: Richard M. Nixon," LIFE, XLI (16 July 1956), 92-3.

Culter, Robert, "I Shall Vote for Eisenhower," ATLANTIC, CXCVIII (Oct. 1956), 46-50.

Dangerfield, George, "Cult of Ike, Threat to the Presidency," NATION, CLXXXII (16 June 1956), 504-05.

"The Doctors and Mr. Eisenhower's Decision," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXIV (2 Jan. 1956), 3-4.

"The Doctor's Report," TIME, LXVI (10 Oct. 1955), 28-9.

"Doctors Say He's Able; Is He Willing?" LIFE, XL (27 Feb. 1956), 38-9.

"Drama of the President's Yes," LIFE, XL (12 Mar. 1956), 18-25.

Drury, Alan, "Eisenhower Acts to Resume Role as Party Leader," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 24 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 34.

_____, "Eisenhower Maps Talks This Week With Top Leaders," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 16 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 26.

_____, "Eisenhower to Run if He Feels 'Able', G.O.P. Head Thinks," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 29 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 20.

_____, "The Enigma of Gettysburg," REPORTER, XII (28 Dec. 1955), 20-1.

_____, "Gettysburg Gives Eisenhower's Joyous Welcome," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 15 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 18.

_____, "Gettysburg: 'Temporary Capital' of the U.S.," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 14 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 8.

_____, "G.O.P., Unanimous In Asking President To Run," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 10 Sept. 1955, 1 and 9.

_____, "President Meets Cabinet at Camp," in the NEW YORK TIMES. 23 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 13.

_____, "President Sees Hall Today In First Political Parleys," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 28 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 18.

_____, "Top Aides Brief President; 'Copters Fly Some to Camp," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 22 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 18.

"Dwight D. Eisenhower, Politician," TIME, LXV (28 Feb. 1955), 12-13.

Egan, Charles E., "President Picks Gettysburg Cite for Office Work" in the NEW YORK TIMES, 13 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 70.

- "The Eisenhower Candidacy," NATION, CLXXXIII (21 July 1956), 49.
- "The Eisenhower Era," NEWSWEEK, XLVII (23 Jan. 1956), 25-35.
- "The Eisenhower Story," U. S. NEWS, XLI (2 Nov. 1956), 62+.
- "Eisenhower Takes Back the Reigns," U. S. NEWS, XXXIX (28 Oct. 1955), 25.
- "Eisenhower As A Candidate, What They Say," NEWSWEEK, XLVII (13 Feb. 1956), 27.
- "Eisenhower Gets Check-Up To Guide Decision On Race," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 12 Feb. 1956, pp. 1 and 49.
- "Eisenhower Golfs In Georgia Drizzle; Does 9 Holes in 47," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 18 Feb 1956 pp. 1 and 7.
- "Eisenhower's Contribution; What He Did and Did Not Do," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXV (10 Sept. 1956), 304.
- "Eisenhower Stays Healty," U. S. NEWS, XXXVIII (18 Mar. 1955), 36.
- "Every Man A Doctor," REPORTER, XV (12 July 1956), 1.
- Evjue, William T., "I'll Vote for Stevenson," NATION, CLXXXIII (20 Oct. 1956), 321-22.
- "Eyes on Gettysburg," NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE. (20 Nov. 1955), 10-11.
- Fenton, John H., "Nixon, Kefauver, Score Victories in New Hampshire," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 14 Mar. 1956, pp. 1 and 26.
- Field, M. D., "Eisenhower: Constitutional Monarch," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXIV (26 Mar. 1956), 8-9.
- "'56 Could Center on California," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Sept. 1955, p. 16.
- "Flock of Visitors as Patient Gains," LIFE, XXXIX (14 Nov. 1955), 70-4.
- "4 G.I.'s Man Elevator," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 27 Sept. 1955, p. 20.
- "Global Leaders Express Concern," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Sept. 1955, p. 15.
- "Happiness Through Health," TIMES, LXVI (19 Sept. 1955), 19420.

- "Has Eisenhower Changed?" U. S. NEWS, XL (1 June 1956), 38-9+.
- "Heart Specialist Comments After Seeing the President," U. S. NEWS, XXXIX (7 Oct. 1955), 80+.
- "Here Are Answers That Heart Specialists Gave to Poll on Ike," U. S. NEWS, XL (13 Jan. 1956), 22-6.
- "Here's How Ike Broke the News," U. S. NEWS, XL (9 Mar. 1956), 46-9.
- Hill, Gladwin, "Nixon Can't Win, Knight Maintains," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 14 Oct. 1955, p. 12.
- "Hoover, Truman Express Concern," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 25 Sept. 1955, p. 42.
- "Hospital Called Army's Largest," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 25 Sept. 1955, p. 45.
- "How and When Ike Will Decide About Running Again," U. S. NEWS, XXXIX (9 Dec. 1955), 22-4.
- Howe, Irving, "Poor Richard Nixon," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXIV (7 May 1956), 7-9.
- "How the President Answered the Big Question," U. S. NEWS, XL (9 Mar. 1956), 64-8+.
- "Humphry to See President; Milton Eisenhower A Caller," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 13 Oct. 1955, pp. 1 and 20.
- Hyman, Sidney, "Eisenhower's Presidency - the Known and the Foreseeable," REPORTER, XIV (22 Mar. 1956), 13-16.
- "If He Feels He's Able," TIME, XLVI (12 Dec. 1955), 19.
- "If Ike Doesn't Run," U. S. NEWS, XL (24 Feb. 1956), 23-8.
- "If Ike Runs Again -," U. S. NEWS, XL (24 Feb. 1956), 23-6.
- "If It's O.K. With Adams, It's O.K. With Eisenhower," U. S. NEWS, XXXIX (14 Oct. 1955), 56-8.
- "Ike Discusses His Health, His Job, His Secretary of State," U. S. NEWS, XL (27 Jan. 1956), 94-8.
- "Ike in '56? A Poll of GOP Chairmen," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (12 Dec. 1955), 33-4.

- "Ike: Now the Answer," NEWSWEEK, XLVII (27 Feb. 1956), 21-2.
- "Ike: Precautions Only," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (19 Dec. 1955), 19-20.
- "Ike Talks About - The Big Decision, His Health, Warren, the Coming Campaign," U. S. NEWS, XL (17 Feb 1956), 81-6.
- "Ike's Close Friend Says: It Was A Flat 'No' Until Mid-January," U. S. NEWS, XL (9 Mar. 1956), 28-9.
- "Ike's Convalescence," TIME, LXVI (10 Oct. 1955), 87-8+.
- "Ike's Decision Depends on Word From Old Friend," U. S. NEWS, XL (20 Jan. 1956), 61-3.
- "Ike's Health and Voters," NEWSWEEK, XLVII (30 Jan. 1956), 23.
- "Ike's Illness: Europe Was Stunned, Confused, then Prayerful," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (10 Oct. 1955), 54-5.
- "Ike's Life as a Patient," U. S. NEWS, XXXIX (14 Oct. 1955), 39.
- Kempton, Murray, "The Underestimation of Dwight D. Eisenhower," ESQUIRE, LXVIII (Sept. 1967), 108 and 156.
- "Key to '56: Ike's Yes or No," U. S. NEWS, XL (6 Jan. 1956), 33-6.
- "Knowland Feels Rising Pressure," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 16 Feb. 1956), p. 23.
- Krock, Arthur, "' Will He Or Won't He?' Keeps the G.O.P. On Edge," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 15 Jan. 1956, p. B3.
- Lawrence, David, "Ikes' Quandry - An Answer," U. S. NEWS, XL (17 Feb 1956), 176.
- Lawrence, W. H., "Doctors To Report To President Today," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 14 Feb. 1956, pp. 1 and 20.
- _____, "Eisenhower Calls Upon Congress To Strengthen U. S. And Its Allies: Opposes Any Tax Reduction Now," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 6 Jan. 1956, pp. 1, 10 and 11.
- _____, "Eisenhower Flies To Florida Today For 2-Week Rest," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 28 Dec. 1955, pp. 1 and 2.
- _____, "Eisenhower Is Fit To Run Doctors Say After Tests; Stress That 'Choice Is His'," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 15 Feb. 1956, pp. 1 and 21.
- _____, "Eisenhower Lauds Nixon and Opposes Draft of Warren," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Jan. 1956, pp. 1 and 12.

- _____, "Eisenhower Says 2D Term Decision Must Be His Own," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 21 Jan. 1956, pp. 1 and 10.
- _____, "Eisenhower Tour the Florida Keys on Quiet Holiday," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 2 Jan. 1956, pp. 1 and 15.
- _____, "Eisenhower Warns G.O.P. Not To Pin All On One Man; States His Faith In Dulles," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 20 Jan. 1956, pp. 1 and 10.
- _____, "Eisenhower Word on Second Term Expected Today," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 29 Feb 1956, pp. 1 and 14.
- _____, "President Flies South To Decide Whether To Run," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 16 Feb 1956, pp. 1 and 23.
- _____, "President Hints He Has Decided Whether To Run," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 9 Jan. 1956, pp. 1 and 12.
- _____, "President Tests Endurance Again," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 24 Feb. 1956, pp. 1 and 13.
- _____, "President to Discuss Health at News Conference Today," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 8 Jan. 1956, pp. 1 and 78.
- _____, "President's Attack Found 'Neither Mild Nor Serious'; Condition 'Satisfactory'," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Sept. 1955, pp. 1 and 15.
- _____, "President Set Exhausting Pace During His Colorado Vacation," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 27 Sept. 1955, p. 27.
- _____, "Second Spot in Doubt," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 1 Mar. 1956, pp. 1 and 16.
- _____, "Stevenson Seeks Nomination in '56; Hits G.O.P. Record," 16 Nov. 1955, p. 1 and 24.
- Lewis, Anthony, "President Asks Disability Rule," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 1 Mar. 1956, p. 21.
- "Little White House," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (21 Nov. 1955), 28.
- Loftus, Joseph A., "Adams, 'No' Man of the Administration, Returns," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 27 Sept. 1955, p. 21.
- _____, "President Flies Back to Capital; Shows No Fatigue," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 12 Nov. 1955, p. 1 and 9.
- "Man in Command," NEWSWEEK, XLV (28 Feb. 1955), 21.
- "Man Who Might Be President," U. S. NEWS, XXXIX (7 Oct. 1955), 30-2.
- Marine, Gene, "What's Wrong With Nixon? Public Life of A Cardboard Hero," NATION, CLXXXIII (18 Aug. 1956), 131-34.

- McKenzie, R. T., "Ike: Stuck With Dick," NATION, CLXXXIII (1 Sept. 1956), 170-72.
- "Memo from Denver: On With the Job," U. S. NEWS, (7 Oct. 1955), 104.
- Miller, H. H. "Three-Handed Checkers," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXVI (28 Jan. 1956), 8-11.
- Miller, William Lee, "The Debating Career of Richard M. Nixon," REPORTER, XIV (19 April 1956), 11-17.
- _____, "Some Selected Footprints of Richard M. Nixon," REPORTER, XIV (17 May 1956), 48.
- Moley, Raymond, "Knowland, Nixon, and Knight," NEWSWEEK, XLVI 19 Sept. 1955), 128.
- "More Answers From Ike on Health, Political Plans," U. S. NEWS, XL (3 Feb 1956), 80-1.
- Murphy, C. J. V. "The Eisenhower Shift," FORTUNE, LIII (Jan. 1956) 82-7+; (Feb. 1956), 110-13+; (Mar. 1956), 110-12+; (Apr. 1956), 112-16+.
- "New Eisenhower in Command," LIFE, XXXVIII (28 Feb. 1955), 31.
- "Nixon Gets News Ahead of Public," In the NEW YORK TIMES, 25 Sept. 1955, pp. 1 and 49.
- "Nixon in '60?" NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXVI (27 Jan. 1957), 2.
- "Nixon is Making Sense and Friends," LIFE, XLI (16 July 1956), 32.
- "Nixon-Knowland-Eisenhower Triangle," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXII (13 June 1955), 2.
- "Nixon Sizes Up '56" U. S. NEWS, XXXIX (16 Sept. 1955), 119-20+.
- "Nixon's the Target," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (24 Oct. 1955), 26.
- "The Nixon Story," U. S. NEWS, LX (11 May 1956), 68-72+.
- "Nixon: The Old Guard's Young Pretender," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXV (20 Aug. 1956), 9-16.
- "No Pressing Business Facing President; Aide Doubts Need to Delegate Powers," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 27 Sept. 1955, p. 21.
- "Noted Heart Specialist Is Flown From Boston to Denver By U. S. Air Force Plane," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Sept. 1955, p. 15.
- "Not Ready to Retire," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXV (9 July 1956), 2.

- "The Office and the Man," NATION, CLXXXII (30 June 1956), 541.
- "O.K., S.A.," TIME, LXVI (9 Jan. 1956), 18-22
- "Party Chairman's Views of President's Plans," U.S. NEWS, XXXIX (9 Dec. 1955), 26-8.
- "Persuading the President," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXIV (18 June 1956), 2.
- "The Presidency," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXIV (15 Mar. 1956), 3-4
- "The President: A Difficult Time," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (3 Oct. 1955), 19-22.
- "The President and Politics, Worried Backers Ask: Who, If Not Ike, in '56?" NEWSWEEK, XLV (25 Apr. 1955), 34-5.
- "The President: A Shoo-In, But -" NEWSWEEK, XLVII (12 Mar. 1956), 27-8.
- "President Can't Share Powers, Truman Says," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 28 Sept. 1955, p. 1.
- "The President From Today to January, 1957," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXIII (3 Oct. 1955), 3-5.
- "The President: Our Hopes Rose," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (10 Oct. 1955), 31-8+.
- "President Played 27 Holes of Golf," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 25 Sept. 1955, p. 45.
- "President's Doctor Long an Aide to Him; Was Recalled From Retirement to Post," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 25 Sept. 1955, p. 46.
- "The President Tells the Nation," U.S. NEWS, XL (9 Mar. 1956), 67-8+
- "The President's Health," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXV (3 Sept. 1956), 9-16.
- "President's Progress: Denver to Washington to Gettysburg," U.S. NEWS, XXXIX (18 Nov. 1955), 14.
- "The Press and the President," TIME, LXVII (23 Jan. 1956), 69.
- "Progress Report on a Famous Patient," U.S. NEWS, XXXIX (23 Dec. 1955), 92-5.

"The Prospects of a Part-Time President," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXIV
12 Mar. 1956), 3-5.

"Quail Hunting, George Style - and Time to Decide," NEWSWEEK,
XLVII (27 Feb. 1956), 22.

"Queen Elizabeth Cables President," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 25
Sept. 1955, pp. 1 and 46.

"Quickening Pace," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (12 Dec. 1955), 34.

Reston, James, "The Big Question," Parts I-III, in the NEW
YORK TIMES, 10 Jan. 1956, p. 14; 11 January, p. 12 and
12 Jan., p. 14.

_____, "Eisenhower Says He Will Seek A 2D Term; Confident of
Health; Bars 'Barnstorming'; Praises Nixon But Does Not
Endorse Him," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 1 Mar. 1956, pp. 1
and 15.

_____, "Nixon Is Considered In Forefront For '56," in the
NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Sept. 1955, pp. 1 and 16.

_____, "Nixon Is Opposed By Some In G.O.P.," in the NEW YORK
TIMES, 17 Feb. 1956, pp. 1 and 11.

_____, "Open Door on 2d Term," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 15 Feb.
1956, p. 21.

_____, "President Goes South This Week To Make Up Mind In Se-
clusion," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 13 Feb. 1956, pp. 1 and 19.

_____, "Problems of the G.O.P. 'Team'," in the NEW YORK TIMES,
27 Sept. 1955, p. 24.

_____, "Profound Effect on 1956 Is Expected in Capitol,"
in the NEW YORK TIMES, 25 Sept. 1955, pp. 1 and 46.

Rutstein, D.D., "Doctors and Politics," ATLANTIC, CXCVIII
(Aug. 1956), 32-5.

"Russians Sympathetic," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 27 Sept. 1955,
p. 27.

- "Salute to Dick Nixon," LIFE, XL (19 Mar. 1956), 41.
- Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., "Why I Am For Stevenson," NEW
republic, cxxxv 929 Oct. 1956), 11.
- Sevareid, Eric, "The Coming Campaign," REPORTER, XIV (22 Mar.
1956), 17.
- _____, "Is Any Man Indispensable?" REPORTER, XIII (20 Oct.
1955), 26.
- _____, "Preliminary Bouts," REPORTER, XIII (15 Dec. 1955), 4.
- _____, "Will the President Run Again?" REPORTER, XII (10 Mar.
1955), 30.
- "Seventy Convention Votes - And a Feud With Nixon," U.S. NEWS,
LXXIX (28 Oct. 1955), 60-3.
- Shannon, W. V., "The Eisenhower Paradox," COMMONWEAL, LXIII
(23 Mar. 1956), 639-41.
- Shuster, Alvin, "Happy Crowd Greet's President on Flag-Draped
Capitol Route," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 12 Nov. 1955, pp.
1 and 9.
- _____, "Knowland Says He'll Wait Until Feb. 15 on Candidacy,"
in the NEW YORK TIMES, 16 Jan. 1956, pp. 1 and 9.
- "'66 and '56: Ike's Thinking Now," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (15
Aug. 1955), 17.
- "Some Quotations from Nixon's 1954 Campaign," REPORTER, XIV (19
Apr. 1956), 16.
- "Something Personal," NEWSWEEK, XLVII (12 Mar. 1956), 28-9.
- Sparkman, John J., "Do We Desire a Part-Time President?" VITAL
SPEECHES, XXII (15 Mar. 1956), 347-48.
- "Stock Prices Decline Sharply; Loss is Estimated at 14 Billion"
in the NEW YORK TIMES, 27 Sept. 1955, - p. 1 and 49.

- "Those Who Could Or Would Be President," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXIV (2 Jan. 1956), 4-5.
- "Three-Cornered Chess," NATION, CLXXXIV (19 Jan. 1956), 50-1.
- "Three Out of Five Heart Specialists Say Ike Could Serve A Second Term," U.S. NEWS, XL (13 Jan. 1956), 19-26+.
- "To Grandfather With Love: Some Bubblegum," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 6 Oct. 1955, p. 1.
- T.R.B., "Washington Wire," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXIII (3 Oct. 1955), 2.
- Tugwell, Rexford G., "The President and His Helpers," POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, LXXXII (June 1967), 253-67
- "U.S. Ruling Asked on Shifting Tasks," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Sept. 1955, p. 1.
- Varney, H.L., "Eisenhower Midway," AMERICAN MERCURY, LXXX (Mar. 1955), 9-16.
- Volkov, Leon, "Men in the Kremlin: Suspicious of Most Except the President," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (10 Oct. 1955), 55.
- "Waiting," TIME, LXVI (10 Oct. 1955), 27-8.
- "What Doctors Say About Ike; 'Active Life For 5 to 10 Years'," U.S. NEWS, XL (24 Feb. 1956), 107-08+.
- "What Eisenhower's Friends Say," U.S. NEWS XXXVIII (17 June 1955), 22-3.
- "What Ike Says About Nixon Now," U.S. NEWS, XL (23 Mar. 1956), 36.
- "What Warren Said," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (10 Oct. 1955), 38.
- "When Ike Must Decide," U.S. NEWS, XXXIX (30 Dec. 1955), 19-21.
- "When Ike's Heart Faltered," U.S. NEWS, XXXIX (7 Oct. 1955), 66-8+.
- "When the News of Ike's Decision Hit the Stock Market," U.S. NEWS, XL (9 Mar. 1956), 37.

- "When Washington Moves to Gettysburg," U.S. NEWS, XXXIX (14 Oct. 1955), 22-4.
- "When the White House Moves to Gettysburg," U.S. NEWS, XXXIX (25 Nov. 1955), 58-61.
- "White House Whispers," NEWSWEEK, XLVII (25 June 1956), 15.
- White, William S., "Capitol Doubts That Eisenhower Will Be Candidate for 2d Term," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 10 Jan. 1956, pp. 1 and 15.
- , "Eisenhower Says He May Announce Plans Bt March 1," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 9 Feb. 1956, pp. 1 and 18.
- , "Johnson, Rayburn to Give Support," in the NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Sept. 1955, pp. 1 and 17.
- , "Evolution of Eisenhower as a Politician," NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (23 Sept. 1956), 11+.
- , "Has Eisenhower Changed the G.O.P.?" NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (18 Mar. 1956), 11+.
- "Who Makes the Fateful Decisions for Peace?" NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXVIII (10 Oct. 1955), 6-8.
- "Who's Running the Country Now? The 'Big Four' With Nixon as Co-Ordinator," U.S. NEWS, XXXIX (7 Oct. 1955), 26-9.
- "Why Ike Will Run Again," U.S. NEWS, XXXVIII (17 June 1955), 19-21.
- "Why the Vice Presidency Is In the Spotlight," U.S. NEWS, XXXIX (9 Sept. 1955), 48+.
- "Will Ike's Brother Stop Nixon?" U.S. NEWS, XXXIX (28 Oct. 1955), 21-4.
- "The Young Pretender," NEW REPUBLIC, CXXXV (17 Sept. 1956), 4.