

ATTEMPTS AT THE FORMATION OF A EUROPEAN SYSTEM
FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE IN THE SEVENTEENTH,
EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES

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As for the philosophers, they
make imaginary laws for imaginary
commonwealths, and their discourses
are as the stars which give little
light because they are so high.

-----Bacon.

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Since the beginning of written history, the ideal condition for the progress and development of the human race has been that status which we call peace. In spite of the fact that the political, economic, cultural, religious and social history of mankind is the story of brute force, of self-interest, of ethnocentricity, of intolerance, and of class struggle, there have been individuals living in the midst of these conditions who came to believe in the possibility of world peace and international order. It was from the horrors of war and the injustices of peace treaties, from deep-seated dynastic plots for revenge, from the Christian inspiration of universality, from the ruthless play of the balance of power, that men of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were motivated in their formulation of peace projects.

These men had as their intellectual heritage the ideas of federation and arbitration practiced by the Greeks in such organizations as the Delphic Amphicytony. World peace had been achieved in the Pax Romana; but this was an enforced national peace, in no sense resulting from a league of independent nations. In the next phase of European history the Church assumed leadership in the political as well as the spiritual realm, effecting, in a very real way, the common unity of Christendom. The papacy afforded Europe a supreme and final arbiter. While world peace was never completely secured either by the universal church or by the revived universal empire, the idea of the unity of civilization was a real force throughout the Middle Ages. The rise of the spirit of

nationality and the birth of the modern national state system were potent factors in the breakdown of this conception. Rulers cast aside the political philosophy of the Middle Ages with its acknowledgement of the natural law and the compact and substituted, instead, a philosophy based on the Roman Law. Their claims to absolutism were supported by a rising group of theorists who recognized no moral obligations and no limitations on the powers of the monarch. Reason gave way to sheer ruthless force, and the claims to absolute power made themselves felt in the international order as well as in the national. Any hopes that might have survived for a world federation through religion were made impossible by the Protestant Revolt, which produced fanatical rivalry and barbarous warfare among Christian groups. Europe lost a common international authority, and in its stead was raised the sovereign national state, which alone was the judge of its own conduct and obligations.

It was the original intent that this paper should discuss the active attempts at the formations of a concert or a confederation of Europe in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, with equal emphasis on the theoretical plans of philosophers and statesmen, and the diplomatic actualities, in short, the peace treaties concluded during this period bearing on the formation of such an international order. The peace plans, none of them with the possible exception of the Holy Alliance ever put into practice, offer no difficulty to the preconceived purpose of this study. The peace treaties, the cold-blooded results of nationalism, power, dynastic feud, and the heartless reality of politics, do not fit into the original acheme of this paper. The agreements involved are the various settlements commonly called the

treaties of Westphalia, Utrecht, and Vienna. Each of these European settlements ended long periods of nationalistic wars and attempted in their provisions the elimination of the cause of wars. Each of them had a definite function in the evolution of Modern Europe--the recognition and establishment of the European States System by the Treaty of Westphalia, the acceptance of the balance of power of the instrument of the states system by the Treaty of Utrecht, and the acknowledgement of the concert approach by the Congress of Vienna. Nevertheless, the active formation of a confederation of Europe was not considered or attempted by the treaties of Westphalia or Utrecht. They remain as necessary stepping stones to the partial realization of the concert principle at the Congress of Vienna. Without Westphalia and Utrecht, the policies of Vienna would have been impossible, would have been without foundation and necessity. Thus the first two European settlements are significant in this study as the founders and adjustors of the states system which could produce, in the nineteenth century, an active realization of the Concert of Europe.

Grand Design of Henry IV of France published after his death in 1610

It is to Henry IV, king of France, and to his minister of finance, Maximilien de Bethune, duc de Sully, that we attribute the most famous of the many projects advocating a federation of states in order to secure and maintain peace among nations.¹ Historians have long debated the authenticity of the Grand Design, presented as the idea conceived by King Henry with the sanction of Queen Elizabeth, in the Memoires of the duc de Sully. Nevertheless, the scheme shall be discussed here from the viewpoint which Sully chose to create for it. Sully is careful to explain the need of a revised European order and he stresses the thought that to admit the existing political organization of Europe meant to renounce every hope for a lasting peace. His supporting reasons are three: a glance at the map of Europe, he asserted, is sufficient to make one realize that the territories which were in the possession of different states were so unequal in size and natural resources that there could not be any question about the balance of power--the corner-stone of a society aiming to maintain peace; another cause of unrest lay in the fact that the peace treaties, in allowing a territory to become an integral part of a state, did not take into consideration the principle of nationality; and finally, one could hardly hope for lasting peace before freedom of religious thought and worship had been granted.²

The Grand Design would have Europe divided in such a way that the balance of power and the principle of nationality be maintained;

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1. Sylvester John Hemleben, Plans for World Peace Through Six Centuries, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1943), 31.
 2. Elizabeth V. Souleyman, The Vision of World Peace In Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century France, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1941), 20.

small states should receive some parts of the large ones with a population homogeneous to that of the former's main territory. Thus Europe would be divided into fifteen dominions of about the same size as follows: Six hereditary monarchies--France, Spain, Great Britain, Sweden and Norway, Denmark, and Lombardy (consisting of Piedmont and Milan); five elective states--The Holy Roman Empire, the States of the Pope, Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland; and four republics--Venice, the Netherlands, the Helvetian Republic and the Italian Republic (consisting of Florence, Genoa, Parma, Modena, Mantua and Iucca).¹ The plan is to have the borders of the Europeans states so placed that powerful and ambitious princes would realize the vanity of any effort toward expansion and thus spare other monarchs the torments of suspicion, jealousy, and fear.²

The main idea of this rearrangement was the altering of the map of Europe at the expense of the Hapsburgs, the other participant in the dynastic feud of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The House of Austria was to be divested of the empire and of all of its possessions in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. Spain, all that would remain of Hapsburg power, would be given the following possessions in order to have equality with the other European nations: Sardinia, Majorca, Minorca, and the other islands on its coast; the Canaries, the Azores, Cape Verde, and the possessions in Africa; Mexico and the American islands which belonged to it; the Philippines, Goa, the Moluccas, and its other possessions in Asia.³

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1. Sully, Maximilien de Bethune, Memoirs of the Duke of Sully, (London: George Bell and Sons, 1865), IV, 241-244.
 2. Souleyman, op. cit., p. 21.
 3. Sully, op. cit., p. 238.

This severity was just and necessary, Sully maintained, because of the ambition of the House of Austria to achieve universal monarchy, an ambition made evident by the conduct of Charles V and his son in the latter part of the sixteenth century. Naturally the House of Austria would never subscribe to a plan that was designed to assure the predominance of its rival, the Bourbons; therefore a last European war seemed unavoidable, and Sully praises the foresight of Henry in the treaties of assistance signed with England, Sweden and the Protestant princes of Germany. One notes with interest and alarm that the basis of European peace was to be established on the foundations of war.

Speaking of this Christian Republic, Sully becomes quite a dreamer: he anticipated the brotherhood that would prevail among its members; one would be inclined to cherish ambitious plans in a society where ambition was not likely to lead anywhere. All matters of general interest, especially those that might lead to conflicts, would be under the jurisdiction of the General Council.¹ Consisting of the plenipotentiaries from all Christian governments, it would be a permanent organization; the delegates, some sixty-six of them, constantly assembled, would deliberate on the political, civil and religious affairs of Europe, and above all they would try to pacify the disputes. France, England, Spain, Germany and the Holy See would send more delegates and have more votes than any other powers.² The General Council would be assisted by six Local Councils whose functions would be to regulate matters of secondary importance in different regions. In all cases, the award of the General Council was to be irrevocable.

1. Ibid., pp. 239-240.

2. Ibid., 239.

A Court of Arbitration, composed of elected senators from all members states, constituted the judicial body. In case of non-submission to the sentence of the Court of Arbitration, international armed force would be used. The command of this international army with men and expenses apportioned to each member country according to its population and prosperity, was to be in the hands of the General Council; its mere existence was to be a major factor in the preservation of peace.¹

The settlement of the religious question had a prominent place in the Grand Design. In the Christian Republic three Churches were to be admitted on equal footing: the Catholic, the Lutheran, and the Calvinist. It may be that the religious wars of the sixteenth century and the horrors of the Inquisition had taught Sully and Henry IV the advisability of tolerance. It is most interesting to note that the religious settlement advocated in the Grand Design is quite similar to the actual solution that was reached in the Peace of Westphalia some forty years later. Sully's clear insight into the religious problem is expressed best in his own words:

Each of these three religions being now established in Europe in such a manner that there is not the least appearance that any of them can be destroyed, and experience having sufficiently demonstrated the inutility and danger of such an enterprise, the best therefore that can be done, is to preserve and even strengthen all of them, in such a manner, nevertheless, that this indulgence may not become an encouragement to the production of new sects or opinions, which should carefully be suppressed on their first appearance. . . . All therefore, that remains now to be done, is to strengthen the nations, who have made choice of one of these religions, in the principles they profess, as there is nothing in all respects so pernicious as a liberty in belief; and those nations, whose inhabitants profess several, or all these religions, should be careful to observe these rules which they find necessary to remedy the ordinary inconveniences of toleration, which, in other respects, they probably experience to be beneficial.²

1. Ibid., 252.

2. Ibid., 235.

A certain order and a definite procedure were to be established to secure the peaceful coexistence of these three religions. In case of disputes among them, they would be obliged to submit to arbitration. In states like France where the population is divided between two Churches one of them would be considered as governing so long as the ruler neither changed his denomination nor was succeeded by a ruler of a different denomination. Subjects who disliked this type of regulation could leave the country. "Sully's view on toleration is simply the orthodox cujus regio, eius religio".¹

In this system for a federation of Europe, France would neither play the part of the aggressor nor declare war. Her ambition was to assume the role of mediator and peacemaker on the continent of Europe without aiming at any prerogatives or territorial acquisitions:

Besides, what is it that France wants? Will she not always be the richest and most powerful kingdom in Europe? It must be granted. All, therefore, which the French have to wish or desire is, that Heaven may grant them pious, good and wise kings; and that these kings may employ their power in preserving the peace of Europe; for no other enterprise can, truly, be to them either profitable or successful.²

Thus, the Christian Republic, the pragmatic federation, the arrangement of the states of Europe in such a way as to obliterate forever the possibility of the rise of Hapsburg domination, was to be formed by Henry IV. Sully ends his discussion of the proposed Design with the statement that only under the vigorous leadership of a Henry IV could such a scheme be employed.³

In conclusion, it is evident that the Grand Design broke away definitely from the early and medieval idea of a world state. It was

1. Souleyman, op. cit., p. 26.

2. Sully, op. cit., p. 225.

3. Ibid., p. 259

an attempt to reconcile the two opposing demands of early seventeenth century Europe--national independence and world organization.¹ Quite apart from the question of authenticity, the Grand Design is worthy of independent consideration as an important contribution to irenist theories and as the real starting-point of many later schemes for perpetual peace. It is not difficult to distinguish between its elements of permanent and temporary value. On the one hand, it might be considered as merely an ideal sketch of what Richelieu nearly achieved and what Henry IV may have dreamt of doing, with the added attraction of a League of Nations scheme; and on the other hand, it must be remembered that Sully enunciated an important principle, not rediscovered until the twentieth century, that in the complications of modern warfare the plight of the victor may, economically, be at least as bad as that of the vanquished.² In its details the Grand Design shows some historic sense. Considerable insight is shown in the classification of the participating states according to the types of constitution for which they are best adapted; room is left for the old international organizations of Empire and Papacy; and, while there is no violent breach with the past, there is a recognition of the importance of the new republicanism.³

The Grand Design of Henry IV as explained by Sully has a peculiarly modern flavor. Apart from its immediate purpose of subduing the Hapsburg power, the Design evidences an acute political insight. While it was never utilized by the generation for whom it was intended, it is the opinion of this writer that

1. Hemleben, op. cit., p. 40.

2. David Ogg, Europe in the Seventeenth Century, (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1943), 79.

3. Ibid., p. 80.

that this plan, formulated amid doubtful circumstances in the very early years of the seventeenth century, had a marked, if unconscious, effect on the political history of the European states system.

The Grand Design of Henry IV was the most influential of all similar plans. The Abbé Saint-Pierre, William Penn, Rousseau, and others took it for their model. For instance, William Penn was thinking of Henry's suggestions when he wrote in justification of his own scheme: "I will not then fear to be censured for proposing an expedient for the present and future peace of Europe, when it was not only the design but glory of one of the greatest princes that ever reigned in it."¹ Henry's plan was perhaps the basis of Alexander's Holy Alliance. Walter Allison Phillips speculates that its influence may have extended to Napoleon I at St. Helena in the formulation of his plan. Whether the Grand Design actually influenced Napoleon may be left to speculation. Its actual effect, however, upon successive plans is demonstrable, and no project of a league to enforce peace has carried more prestige with later builders of similar projects.²

One has only to consider the foreign policy of Louis XIV and his ministers to see the practical effect of the scheme envisioned by Henry IV and Sully. The alliance against the House of Hapsburg, the extension of the natural frontiers, and the placing of France at the head of the table in the family of European states were certainly similar in the theoretical musings of Henry and the diplomatic actualities of Louis.

1. Hemleben, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

Seventeenth Century Background

The significance of the Thirty Years War and the document that it produced in the Treaty of Westphalia must be prefaced by some understanding of the European political scene early in the seventeenth century. It was an era of critical transition. If the church had occupied the central stage during the religious revolutions of the sixteenth century, the national state, representative of the secular emphasis, became the focal point of seventeenth century activities. These activities of the national territorial state were in the main directed to military and economic enterprises. In this century the Empire and the Papacy were definitely relegated to positions of little more than academic interest, the religious motive was over-shadowed by the economic, the first practical proposals for religious toleration and international arbitration were formulated, and the main conceptions of the system known as the Ancien Regime were defined and applied.¹

France, in 1615, was potentially the most powerful nation in Europe. The balance of power was in her favor and fortunately there were ministers like Richelieu and Mazarin who were able to manipulate royalty and peasants to make of France a united and powerful country. The Dutch had taken their place by the beginning of the century as a prosperous commercial nation, their extraordinary prosperity creating deep envy and prompting attacks by the French on land and by the English on the sea.²

Scotland joined with England in 1603, and during the century

1. Ogg, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

2. Geoffrey Bruun, Europe in Evolution, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1945), 242.

the English Parliament became more arrogant than any previous representative body. The struggle between the king and the commoners led to civil war (1642-1649) and was finally resolved after a second rebellion in 1688-1689 by the establishment of a limited, constitutional monarchy.

In Northeastern Europe the notable development of the century was the aggressive ascendancy of the Swedes who made the Baltic Sea a Swedish lake, interfered in the Germanies, in Poland, and in Russia, and overawed the neighboring states of Denmark-Norway and Finland. The Protestant Revolt had increased the wealth and autocratic power of the Swedish rulers; the development of mining made Swedish foundries the foremost in Europe; and the combination of royal power, artillery, superbly trained infantry, and commercial prosperity raised Sweden temporarily above her weaker and less warlike neighbors.

For the Holy Roman Empire and the German states the seventeenth century was an epoch of agony and disaster. The division of power between Protestants and Catholics established by the Peace of Augsburg (1555) proved unstable. By 1615 all the factors were present which could precipitate a religious war; hostilities commenced in Bohemia in 1618, and for over a generation the Thirty Years War laid waste the richest and most populous regions of central Europe.¹

1. Ibid., pp. 242-243.

The Treaty of Westphalia, 1648

The rebellion in Bohemia, punished two years later by the hanging of twenty-six rebels in Prague, led to a European war unique in its length, its constant shifting of scene and motive, its dreariness and ferocity. There were but few great personalities involved; the generation ending the war had long since outlived the intrigues that began it. Gathering momentum as it proceeded, considered interminable by those who suffered from its ravages, it was ended only by the exhaustion of the combatants and the perpetuation of injustices and resentments breeding future wars. This melancholy struggle gave birth to the first modern peace congresses which, in attempting to stabilize the frontiers of Europe, brought into prominence a great cause of unrest in modern times--the Rhine frontier. The Thirty Years war retarded the civilization of Germany by more than a century and the destinies of Europe and of peace have been profoundly influenced by that fact.¹

The Thirty Years War was the last of the religious wars to which the Reformation had given rise in Europe. It began in 1618 with the attempt of the Protestant nobles of Bohemia to substitute the Calvinist Elector of the Palatinate for their Catholic Hapsburg king. The war spread throughout Germany, and became a contest between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. Foreign powers intervened: Spain came in from the beginning because she was a great Catholic power, allied by family ties to Austria; the Dutch joined in the struggle, because they were fighting their War of Independence against Spain, Gustavus of Sweden came in during 1630, in order to aid his fellow

1. Ogg, op. cit., p. 118.

Protestants, and to keep the Hapsburg Empire from extending itself into the Baltic at the expense of Swedish ambition; in 1634 France under Richelieu, joined the Swedish side in the war, not indeed with the object of helping protestantism, but in order to check the power of the Empire and the establish the Rhine frontier.¹ Thus, French ambition transformed the Thirty Years War from a territorial-religious struggle into a dynastic war.² In 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia, the Thirty Years war came to an end.

The religious and territorial settlements reached in these three treaties were necessarily prefaced by a declaration of the restored peace of Europe:

Article 1. That there shall be a Christian and Universal Peace, and a perpetual, true, and sincere Amity, between his Sacred Imperial Majesty, and His most Christian Majesty; as also, between all and each of the Allies, and Adherents of his said Imperial Majesty, the House of Austria, and its Heirs and Successors; but chiefly between the Electors, Princes, and States of the Empire on the one side; and all and each of the Allies of his said Christian Majesty, and all their Heirs and Successors, chiefly between the most Serene Queen and the Kingdom of Swedeland, the Electors respectively, the Princes and States of the Empire, on the other part. That this Peace and Amity be observ'd and cultivated with such a Sincerity and Zeal, that each Party shall endeavour to procure the Benefit, Honor and Advantage of the other; that thus on all sides they may see this Peace and Friendship in the Roman Empire, and the Kingdom of France flourish, by entertaining a good and faithful neighborhood.³

This declaration of peace is followed by a unique statement of forgiveness and amnesty, far reaching in its intended scope and indicative of the many future statements of similar intent and impracticality:

II. That there shall be on the one side and the other a perpetual Oblivion, Amnesty, or Pardon of all that has been committed since the beginning of these Troubles, in what place, or what manner soever the Hostilities have been practiced, in

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1. R. B. Mowat, The European States System, (London: Oxford University Press. 1929), III.
 2. Ogg, *op. cit.*, p. 119.
 3. A General Collection of Treaties, Declarations of War, Manifestos, and other Publick Papers, relating to Peace and War, (2nd. ed.; London: J. Darby Publisher, 1732), I, 3.

such a manner, that no body, under any pretext whatsoever, shall practice any Acts of Hostilities, entertain any Enmity, or cause any Trouble to each other; neither as to Persons, Effects and Securitics, neither of themselves or by others, neither privately nor openly, neither directly nor indirectly, neither under the colour of Right, nor by the way of Deed, either within or without the extent of the Empire, notwithstanding all Covenants made before to the contrary: That they shall not act or permit to be acted, any wrong or injury to any whatsoever; but that all that has pass'd on the one side, and the other, as well before as during the War, in Words, Writings, and Outrageous Actions, in Violences, Hostilities, Damages and Expenses, without any respect to Persons or Things, shall be entirely abolished in such a manner, that all that might be demanded of, or pretended to, by each other on that behalf, shall be bury'd in eternal Oblivion.¹

Since the original cause of the Thirty Years War was called religious in nature, the solution of the problem as offered by Westphalia would determine in large part the future of militant religiosity. The year 1624 was chosen as the normal year in reference to which the two religious parties were to hold or surrender church lands—a measure favorable to Catholics, because in 1624 the Protestant cause in Germany was at its lowest ebb.² The main effect of this was to confirm the Protestantism of north Germany and the Catholicism of southern Germany.

The treaty guaranteed mutual toleration of Calvinism, Lutheranism and Catholicism.³ The same principle that Sully would have utilized in his Christian Republic was used in the religious settlement of Westphalia—cujus regio, eius religio. Similarly, dissatisfied subjects were allowed, under the terms of the treaty, five years in which to settle their affairs and leave. When the Imperial Diet had to handle religious matters involving Catholics and Protestants, it was accorded the jus eundi in partes, whereby it automatically divided into two sections representing each religion, and as such matters were

1. Ibid., p. 4.

2. Ogg, op. cit., p. 179.

3. Mowat, op. cit., p. 15.

of frequent occurrence, the division of the Diet into two unconnected parts made it more helpless than ever.¹ Though German princes were given the right to enforce conformity by the threat of expulsion, the right was not always exercised, because so sparse was the German population in 1648 that rulers were anxious to see an increase rather than a decrease of their taxable subjects. It is therefore, interesting to note that toleration entered not by the enlightenment of rulers of diplomats, but by economic pressure. Soon Brandenburg and Holland were to prove that toleration and prosperity combine easily.² And as mutual toleration became the law of the Empire (for the treaty concerned only the States of Germany), the principle which it contained became the pattern for all northern and ultimately, for all western Europe.³ In short, man ceased to fight over sacraments, because a new idol, indeed a new god in the shape of the modern national state had risen before him; now it would be to the state that fanatical devotion was owed.

And the Treaty of Westphalia serves as the midwife of the modern national state. The territorial provisions of the Peace of Westphalia sanction and establish this new states system in Europe. France received by the treaties the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul and Verdun, with Moyenvic, Breiasch, the fortress of Pinerolo and the right to garrison Philippsburg, and full sovereignty of Alsace.⁴ This transfer of Alsace in 1648 from Germany to France initiated the establishment of an irredenta for both nations, the cause of deep-seated resentment among common people, the symbol of militant nationalism in the nineteenth century. But France emerged from the conferences of

1. Ogg, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

2. C. V. Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years War*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), 510.

3. Mowat, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

4. Ogg, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

Westphalia with the territorial acquisitions of her choice and the prestige of the most powerful nation in Europe.¹

For her part in the last ten years of the war, Sweden received Western Pomerania, the bishoprics of Bremen and Verden, the towns of Wismar and Stettin, the island of Wollin, the territory at the mouth of the Oder River, and an indemnity on the condition that Swedish troops leave all other German territory.² Thus Sweden became an important German power with the right to be represented in the Diet, and with the first of the many footholds that she was to acquire in the Baltic Sea.

The independence of the Dutch nation, in force since the beginning of the century, was recognized by the Treaty of Westphalia. Belgium, then known as the Spanish Netherlands, was not granted independence and remained under the Crown of Spain. Consequential to the establishing of Dutch independence was the fixing of the frontier between the United Netherlands and the Dutch Netherlands.

Brandenburg received Eastern Pomerania, and the bishoprics of Minden, Halberstadt and Cammin, in addition to the right of succession to the Archbishopric of Magdeburg. Brandenburg obtained these secularized lands mainly through the influence of France, which acted as "Benevolent god-mother to the infant Hohenzollern state."³ Among the miscellaneous clauses was included provision for the full independence of Switzerland.⁴

Of course Germany was the paramount problem. It was agreed that each of the German Imperial states should be free to make alliances

1. Anton Gindley, The History of the Thirty Years War, (New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons., 1884), II, 231.

2. Ogg, op. cit., p. 178.

3. Ibid., p. 178.

4. Ibid., p. 178.

with foreigners, provided such alliances were not directed against the Empire. No question of making or interpreting law, declaring war, imposing taxes, levying soldiers, raising fortifications or concluding peace were to be decided unless with "the consent of the Free Assembly of all the States of the Empire."¹ The question of reform of the imperial administrative machinery was proposed but postponed. The treaty confirmed this territorial independence of the German princes and so completed a process which had long been manifest. It amounted practically to the resignation of the Emperor from all control over German politics, for the feeble bonds which still held the German states to the Empire could easily be dissolved. As there were about three hundred and fifty separate political entities in Germany, the possibilities of diplomatic intrigue were immensely increased.

The treaty of Westphalia came to be considered as a great instrument of public law, standardizing that state system of Europe and providing authoritative guidance in any dispute threatening to upset the equilibrium which it established. This policy of equilibrium continued to be the sole guarantee of right between states.² If the Peace of Westphalia established the main principles of the state system for pre-Revolutionary Europe, it then has definite bearing on the problem of this paper, for without the foundation which it afforded, the evolution of the states system to the Concert level would have been impossible.

The assembling of a general conference was the first acknowledgement that the results of a war were of concern to powers that had

1. Ibid., p. 180.

2. Wyndham A. Bewes, Gathered Notes on the Peace of Westphalia, (London: Grotius Society, 1934), 71.

taken no active part.¹ This conference attempted a task which still engrosses European diplomacy. It confirmed the sixteenth century conception of a secular state, linked commercially with its neighbors, but always potentially antagonistic to them.² It discredited two old institutions--the Empire and the Papacy--both of which had at least claimed to base authority on something more than brute force. The Papacy had monopolized the right of deciding among combatants which side had divine sanction; from this time on it would be difficult for any combatant to assert exclusive partnership with divinity. The medieval Holy Roman Empire had united men of diverse race and language in a confederation claiming to be the sole repository of the imperial traditions of ancient Rome and a bulwark of Western civilization against the encroachment of the barbarians; the future would see in the intensification of linguistic and racial distinctions and the establishment of power not on tradition but on battalions. For the imperial is substituted the national; medieval universality gives way to racial self-consciousness; religious bigotry is succeeded by territorial greed.³ And the practice of states being represented at all capitals, the acceptance of the profession of diplomat, would facilitate international relations of a peaceful nature.⁴

With the problems that it raised, political, social and economic in nature, the Peace of Westphalia remains as the first effort to reconstruct the European states system. Few treaties had such

1. Ibid., p. 66.

2. Ibid., p. 64.

3. Ogg., op. cit., p. 180.

4. Bewes, op. cit., p. 65.

influence, and Europe is said for the first time to have formed a kind of "commonwealth watching with anxiety over the preservation of the general peace."¹

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1. Author MacDonalld, Fundamental Peace Ideas, Including the Westphalian Peace Treaty (1648) and the League of Nations, Reprinted from the Congressional Record, July 1, 1919. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), 5.

Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, 1625

The Peace of Westphalia has an epilogue that is of the utmost importance in the hopes of European peace. De Jure Belli ac Pacis published in 1625 by Hugo Grotius, was inspired by an earnest desire to moderate the suffering and devastation brought about by the Thirty Years War. Amid the general wreck of institutions Grotius sought substitutes for the lost authority of Europe. Looking around him at the general havoc which war had made---the nations hostile, the faith of ages shattered, the passions of men destroying the commonwealths which had nourished them---Grotius decided that Europe possessed a single common bond, the vestige of its former unity, the human mind. To this he made his appeal and upon its deepest convictions he sought to plant the Law of Nations.¹

Beginning with the idea that there is a kinship among men established by nature, Grotius sees in this bond a community of rights. In these rights which men hold in common because of their status as men, Grotius finds a common denominator. The society of nations, including as it does, the whole human race, needs the recognition of rights as much as mere local communities do. As nations are but larger aggregations of individuals, each with its own corporate coherence, the accidents of geographical boundary do not obliterate that human demand for justice which springs from the nature of man as a moral being. There is, therefore, as a fundamental bond of human societies, a Natural Law, which, when properly apprehended, is perceived to be the expression and dictate of right reason.²

1. Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Including the Law of Nature and Nations, trans. A. C. Campbell. (New York: M. Walter Dunne, 1902), 2.

2. Ibid., p. 8.

The inspiration of De Jure Belli ac Pacis was the love of peace, yet Grotius was not one of those visionaries who totally condemn the use of armed force and proscribe all war as wrong and unnecessary. On the contrary, he seeks to discover when, how, and by whom war may be justly conducted.

In the interest of peace, Grotius maintains that there are "Three methods by which independent nations may settle their disputed rights without coming to the decision of the sword."¹

VII The first method is that of conference. For, in the words of Cirero, 'there being two methods of deciding quarrels, the one by discussion and the other by force, the former a peculiar characteristic of man, and the latter, of the brute creation: when the first of these methods fails, men are obliged to have recourse to the latter.'

VIII The other method is that of compromise, which takes place between those, who have no common judge....Surely then it is a mode of terminating their disputes, balancing their powers, and settling their pretensions worthy to be adopted by Christian Kings and States....These and many other reasons of no less importance might be advanced for recommending to Christian powers, general congresses for the adjustment of their various interests, and for compelling the refractory to submit to equitable terms of peace.

IX A third method of terminating disputes, without hostilities, was by lot, a practice commended by Dion Chrysostom in his speech on the interposition of fortune in directing his affairs, and it was commended long before him by Solomon in the xviii chapter of his Proverbs.²

An acceptance of Grotius' theories would considerably limit the number of wars, because he excludes from the category of just war all wars of conquest or revenge. A just war is fought for only one reason—to escape extermination; it would be waged solely by men with whose lives the State could easily dispense; peaceful occupations would be interfered with as little as possible and the convenience of non-

1. Ibid., p. 276.

2. Ibid., pp. 276-277.

combatants would be consulted. Although many of Grotius' proposals for international conduct have been embodied in Hague conventions, his schemes are in reality as idealistic as those of Sully; Grotius allows war, but at the same time robs it of its essential elements—its misery, waste and cruelty.¹

Thus the three instruments--the Grand Design of Henry IV, the Peace of Westphalia, the Rights of War and Peace by Grotius--diverse as their purposes and results may be, were significant in the European peace movement of the first half of the seventeenth century. The Grand Design has inspired like proposals in men of all generations; the Peace of Westphalia brought all Europe together as nations for the first time and there set the stage for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; Hugo Grotius, because of his acute political insight and high ethical standard, both qualities incorporated in his book, has come to be considered as the father of modern international law.

The first instrument provided for a theoretical federation among European nations for the preservation of peace; the second was the result of war and the diplomatic negotiation of the newly risen national state; the third called for recognition of the common bond between men, the settlement of disputes by methods other than warfare, and a high moral and ethical standard adhered to by all men, making unity something more than a federation--rather instead, a brotherhood of men.

1. Ogg, op. cit. p. 550.

Projet de Paix Perpetuelle of the Abbe' Saint-Pierre

The Abbe' Saint-Pierre had by 1707 sketched out his ideas for securing everlasting peace and he published the complete work at Utrecht in 1713 under the title of Projet pour rendre la paix perpetuelle en Europe. The Grand Design is the foundation of the work of the Abbe' Saint-Pierre, who had the shrewdness to shelter himself under the popular name of Henry IV, and presented his scheme as a mere elucidation of the work attributed to the king. But in reality the Projet did better than elucidate the Grand Design. That offered, in opposition to the pretensions of the House of Austria to universal monarchy, a republic of Christian States. The Abbe' carried the idea further, developed it, and transformed it by his method of formal proof. Instead of confining himself like some of his predecessors, to generalities, he had the merit of drawing up practical regulations for the establishment of a European Diet.¹

To secure a permanent peace the twenty-four Christian nations of Europe, maintained within the frontiers assigned to them by the Treaty of Utrecht, are to form among themselves a Grand Alliance or European Union. The twenty-four States are each to nominate a delegate, two substitutes, and two agents to take the place of the substitutes; large and small States are to have equal representation. The twenty-four delegates are to constitute the Senate of Peace which is to sit permanently at Utrecht. The President of the Senate is to be called the Prince of Peace. To secure the independence of the Senate he is to change each week.²

1. Charles Francois Irenee Castel de Saint-Pierre, Abbot of Tiron. Scheme for Lasting Peace, Selections from the Second Edition of the Abrege du Project de Paix Perpetuelle, Trans. by H. H. Ballot, (London: Peace Book Co., 1939), 3.

2. Ibid., p. 4.

In case of dispute between two States, the States in disagreement must first seek reconciliation through the obligatory mediation of the rest of the members of the European Union. In the event of failure of mediation, an award or arbitration becomes necessary. It is rendered by the Senate of Peace, which becomes above all a tribunal, a permanent and compulsory Court of Arbitration. The award is to be made first, provisionally, by a plurality of votes. The definitive award is only to be made five years later and must be adopted by a majority of three-fourths.¹ To be sure, the Abbe did not wish to encourage hasty action! Such an award will be guaranteed by armed force. This army will be composed of a special contingent of troops furnished by each State under the command of a generalissimo, appointed by the Senate of Peace.

Three reasons induced Saint-Pierre to build his plan on the status quo; first, he sees in it a good starting point; second, he finds that history justifies the principle (he uses as an example the German Confederation which, built on the basis of the validity of the last treaties, could boast of centuries of lasting peace); and third, he thinks that a Union of Peace should start with peace and not with war. Obviously, he does not share Sully's opinion that a last great war must precede the establishment of a peaceful federation. He cites the advantages to be gained by the recognition of the status quo as real advantages to each member. There would be no hope for enlarging the territory of a state, but there would be no risk of losing even the smallest part of it.

Saint-Pierre takes great pains in his "first discourse" to stress the futility of the efforts to secure a lasting peace either by treaties

1. Ibid., p. 6.

or the system of the balance of power. Treaties are promises not backed by any kind of guarantee. As for political equilibrium, he compared it to good scales: the slightest weight put on one of the scales turns it. A similar thing takes place in the relations between political bodies: the rulers of nations differ so much in mental ability, force of ambition, and intensity of warlike spirit that the balance of power is indeed a very unsteady balance.¹ The condemnation of the system of the balance of power published at the exact time of the sanction of this system by the Treaty of Utrecht is perhaps indicative of the lag between possibility and actuality, between theoretical reason and the brute force political occurrence. The Abbé described it: "The order of Europe today is determined more largely by passion than by reason. We are in civil relations with our fellow citizens;² but with the rest of the world, we are in a state of nature".³

Saint-Pierre has definite arguments in favor of twenty-four nations represented by the same number of delegates; he regards this number as high enough to prevent plots and petty intrigues, and low enough to secure the efficient and speedy work of the Congress.⁴ The twenty-four nations that Saint-Pierre intended should join the Union are France, Spain, England, Holland, Savoy, Portugal, Bavaria and Associates, Venice, Genoa and Associates, Florence and Associates, Switzerland and Associates, Lorraine and Associates, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, The States of the Pope, Muscovy, Austria, Courland and Associates (Danzig, Hamburg, Lübeck, Rostock), Prussia, Saxony, Palatine and

1. Souleyman, op. cit., pp. 79-81.

2. "Fellow citizens" refers to Frenchmen.

3. Walter A. Philips, The Confederation of Europe, 1813-1823, (London: Longmans, Greene & Co., 1914), 20.

4. Souleyman, op. cit., p. 85.

Associates, Hanover and Associates, Ecclesiastical Electors and Associates.¹

This was, for the Abbé Saint-Pierre, a practical and unfailing means to secure the realization of a great idea, the establishment of perpetual peace among nations. He did not consider this idea from the Christian point of view; that had been the approach of Pascal,² for example. He did not consider it from the point of view of a pure philosopher; this was to be, towards the end of the century, the approach of Kant. The Abbé took for the foundation of his structure the golden rule: "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you". This golden rule, if adopted, cannot fail to lead man, in spite of his potential wickedness, toward a better understanding and a closer co-operation with his fellowmen, and this co-operation in its turn, will hasten man's steps along the road of progress.³ Progress was a God in the eighteenth century.

Presenting his project as a treaty ready for immediate acceptance by the nations of Europe, the Abbé Saint-Pierre sums up the reasons for such an organization in his General Conclusion:

First. Without the signature of the five articles establishing a European Diet, there is no hope of a general defensive league, and partial leagues may always lead to war.

Second. Without a general league there can be no sufficient number of arbiters and no permanent system of arbitration.

Third. Without a permanent system of arbitration to settle the differences which have arisen and will arise between two members of the league there can be no lasting alliance.

Fourth. Without a general and lasting league, and without a permanent system of arbitration, there can be no security for the fulfillment of any promise, no lasting Peace.

1. Ibid., p. 85.
 2. Ibid., p. 87.
 3. Ibid., p. 92.

Fifth. Without a permanent and general congress there can be no facilities for agreeing upon the articles necessary to reinforce and perfect the general defensive League, no decision upon any difference, no ruling in unforeseen cases.

Sixth. Without a general and lasting defensive league there can be no hope of the cessation of the evils and crimes of wars civil and foreign, no hope of concord and tolerance between Christian Nations divided by Schism and Dogmas.¹

1. Saint-Pierre, op. cit., p. 52.

The Treaty of Utrecht, 1713.

The States System of Europe depends upon an equipoise, a balance of power, so adjusted that each State can keep what it already possesses, and that no one State or group of States shall be able to coerce and despoil the rest. In the absence of any super-state, of any international League or Society of Nations, this balance of power has necessarily been attended to and maintained by the members themselves who make up the States System. Normally each one can look after its own interests, and preserve its independence and its territory.

This sensitive balance is always unstable; it is forever liable to be broken up by some state that takes upon itself to assault the system. This assault comes about either because a whole people waxes fat and arrogant, or because one or more persons within it become ambitious of conquest, and form designs to extend their state by force. Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 the states of Europe have enjoyed periods of equilibrium and therefore periods of peace, or relative peacefulness, which, however, have been threatened or even destroyed by a Disturber. The appearance of such a Disturber (or of a Disturbing State) has, in turn always provoked the other states of Europe to band together to defend the system and check the aggressor. The end of each struggle has usually been that the aggressor has been overcome, and that the European system has been re-established by some general peace settlement, some treaty on the grand scale, continuing with the modifications which the struggle made necessary, the settlement of Westphalia.¹ Looked at in this light, Louis XIV was a Disturber of the European System, sending his armies like battering rams against the structure reared by the

1. Mowat, op. cit., p. 18.

treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees. The assaults of Louis XIV provoked coalitions of the assaulted states and of others who showed an interest in the System. After a long series of wars, Louis was finally defeated, and the European States System was re-established at the Peace of Utrecht in 1713.¹

The background of the Peace of Utrecht lies in the activities of Louis XIV from 1660 until his death. The temptation to extend his authority, an impulse which grew stronger with the exercise of absolute power, lured him into a succession of costly wars which disturbed and alarmed all the European princes. The prestige and prosperity of France had awakened once more the fear of a dominant dynasty or nation, and the diplomats of the lesser European states were soon knitting alliances to check the ambitions of the Grand Monarch.

Throughout Europe absolute monarchs followed the example set by Louis, regulating the political, economic, social, and cultural activities of the subjects, increasing their own power, prestige, and revenue as greatly as they could, aping the etiquette of Versailles, and imitating the Grand Monarch in his arbitrary temper and aggressive policies. The result, inevitably, was a series of conflicts, as the toughened and expanding states crowded one another for living room, raised tariffs against one another's trade, and incited the minority groups in neighboring countries to rebel, thereby confusing a rival's policies and depleting his power.

The most costly campaigns in the series of seventeenth century wars arose from this ancient Bourbon-Hapsburg feud. Eager to extend his territory, Louis XIV adopted the doctrine of the "Natural frontiers"

1. Ibid., p. 24.

of France, affirming that Nature had provided, in the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, the natural geographical limits of the French kingdom. To realize these frontiers, Louis needed to annex Franche-Comté, Lorraine, the Spanish Netherlands, and a portion of the Dutch Netherlands, all but the last being territory nominally subject to the Austrian or Spanish Hapsburgs.¹

In 1665 when Charles II assumed the Spanish throne, Louis claimed the Spanish Netherlands on behalf of his wife, an elder half-sister of the Spanish monarch. Louis based this claim on the droit de dévolution under which his wife Marie Theresa as the child of the first marriage of the king of Spain had preference over children of the second marriage in the territorial settlement. Also, Maria Theresa was the proper heir to such fiefs of Philip IV as were subject to the Jus dévolutionis, for the condition attached to her renunciation, namely the payment of 500,000 crowns dowry, had never been fulfilled.²

Louis received a disagreeable rebuff when England, Holland and Sweden formed a Triple Alliance in 1668 to check his advances. He made peace by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle signed on May 2, 1668 by the four countries involved. France retained twelve fortified towns on the border of the Spanish Netherlands, but not the whole portion which it coveted. The towns included Charleroi, Binch, Ath, Douai, Fort de Scarpe, Tournai, Oudenarde, Lille, Armentières, Courtrai, Bergues, and Furnes.³

Angered at the Dutch who had thwarted his projects by their hardy diplomacy, and envious of their commercial prosperity, Louis bribed the venal English King Charles II to remain neutral (secret treaty of Dover,

1. Bruun, *op. cit.*, pp. 300-302.

2. R. B. Mowat, A History of European Diplomacy 1451-1789, (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1928), 126-127.

3. Ibid., p. 129.

1670),¹ paid Sweden likewise to desert the Dutch, and then marched his troops into Lorraine and invaded Holland. Once again he was checked by the formation of an alliance. The Emperor Leopold I, the Elector of Brandenburg, Charles II of Spain and several German princes united to oppose French aggression. Finally England, too, despite the efforts of Charles to keep the nation pro-French went over to the coalition.

After six years of war (1672-1678), Louis accepted the Peace of Nimwegen, whereby Franche-Comte and some more fortified towns in what is now Belgium, passed under French control. Not Holland but Spain had paid for the war in lost territory. France however, had paid also, in treasure, in blood, in lost trade, and in general unpopularity.²

Louis XIV remained the Disturber of the European States System. His troops continued to occupy Lorraine and he manufactured pretexts for seizing Strassburg in 1681 and Luxemburg in 1684 as well as several lesser localities from the feeble control of the Emperor Leopold, who was threatened in these years by a Turkish advance on Vienna. Louis' nibbling tactics, which constituted war without a declaration, precipitated a third conflict, the War of the League of Augsburg, lasting from 1689 to 1697. A coalition of the Emperor, Spain, Holland, Sweden, Bavaria, and England outfought France on land and sea, forcing Louis to abandon Lorraine and his claim to the Palantinate, and to restore all the territories seized since 1687 with the exception of Strassburg. All this was accomplished by the Treaty of Ryswick, signed in 1697.³

1. Bruun, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 302.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 303.

By this time it should have been clear to Louis that preponderant power, exercised aggressively in Europe by one state or dynasty, automatically called into existence an equal and opposite bloc to restore the international equilibrium, the necessary balance of power. But the Grand Monarch would not contain himself. In 1698 a secret treaty for the partition of the dominions of Charles II, the dying and childless King of Spain, was signed by France, England and Holland, by which the Electoral Prince of Bavaria was to have Spain, the Indies, the Low Countries and Sardinia; the Dauphin was to have the two Sicilies, the Tuscan outposts, Finale and Guiposcoa, while the Archduke Charles was to have Milan.¹ News of the treaty leaked out and Charles II so disliked the idea of partition that he signed a will appointing the young Electoral Prince of Bavaria his universal heir. This arrangement pleased none of the states anxious to benefit by partition; the sudden death of the Electoral Prince three months later removed a source of diplomatic embarrassment. Charles II who believed that the only hope for Catholicism and European peace lay in keeping together the Spanish Empire, was indignant that heretic nations, intent solely on trade, should profit by the proposed breaking up of a Catholic empire. It was this sense of the dangers that might follow dismemberment and a desire to retain the Spanish possessions as a great bulwark for Catholicism that induced Charles and the Spanish national party to consider the advisability of devising the whole inheritance to a Catholic prince who, while a member of a ruling house, would not be likely to succeed either to the Empire or to the throne of France. The choice ultimately fell on Philip, Duke of Anjou, second grandson of

1. Ogg, op. cit., p. 261

Louis XIV, who was separated from the succession by the Dauphin and the Duke of Burgundy. Before finally deciding, Charles consulted the Pope and obtained his approval in July of 1700¹. On October 2, 1700 Charles II signed the famous will by which he bequeathed the Spanish Empire to Philip of Anjou. It was stipulated that the Spanish inheritance should never be joined with the crown of France. Translated, the will read:

And my intention being for the good of my subjects, of Christianity, and of all of Europe, this Monarchy be always separated from the crown of France,.....etc.²

The publication of the will after the death of Charles II produced profound sensation throughout Europe. In France opinion was at first divided whether to accept it or put into force the most recent partition, but Louis decided to seize the great heritage now within his grasp. The Duke of Anjou was proclaimed king throughout the Spanish possessions as Philip V. As the young man set out for his new realm Louis embraced him with the significant words: "Adieu, mon fils; il n'y a plus de Pyrenees."³

Although it is difficult to see how Louis could have avoided accepting the Spanish dominions, it is possible to present one possible exit from this situation: he might have appealed to a conference of western Europe, and have made a concerted arrangement with all the states for a settlement of the Spanish succession. When Louis accepted the will for his grandson, the resources of European diplomacy were exhausted. If the French king really meant politically to abolish the Pyrenees, he was a grave disturber of the European States System. The balance of power would now be upset beyond repair. The response

1. Ibid., pp. 262-263.

2. Charles Joseph Barthelemy Giraud, Le Traité d'Utrecht, (Paris: Plon frères, 1847), 32.

3. Ibid., p. 15.

was a new coalition, the Grand Alliance of the Hague, formed by Austria, Holland, Brandenburg, England, and some smaller states, including the Duchy of Savoy, in 1701.¹

The main terms of the treaties that were signed at Utrecht in March 1713 between France and Great Britain, Holland, Portugal, Savoy and Prussia, all grouped together under the name of the Peace of Utrecht were as follows: First, Philip V was recognized as King of Spain and the Indies on the condition that the crowns of France and Spain should never be united. Second, Naples, Milan, Sardinia, and the Netherlands were given to the Emperor, subject to the right of the Dutch to the military government of Furnes, Yprès, Menin, Ghent, Tournai, Mons, Charleroi, and Namur as their barrier against France. Holland was given control over the closing of the Scheldt in order that the trade of Antwerp might not interfere with that of Amsterdam. Third, France was permitted to retain Alsace, including Strasburg as she had by the treaty of Ryswich, but she had to surrender the fortress of Kehl, Freisach and Freiburg, which she had seized on the right bank of the Rhine. Fourth, the electors of Köln and Bavaria were restored, the succession of the House of Hanover in England acknowledged, and the Chevalier banished from France. Fifth, England received Gibraltar, Minorca, Newfoundland (subject to certain rights of fishing on the banks), Hudson Bay, Acadia, and St. Kitts, and she acquired by an *asiento*, or agreement with Spain the right to trade under strict limitations with certain towns in Spanish waters. Sixth, the kingdom of Prussia was recognized and received upper Guelderland. Seventh, Sicily and part of the Milanese were given to

1. Bruun. op. cit., p. 303.

the duke of Savoy and the fortifications of Dunkirk were abolished.¹

By this peace the rule of the Hapsburgs in Spain, which dated from the beginning of the sixteenth century, came to an end. Louis XIV had gained his end and the will of Charles II was confirmed. The sole interest of France was in converting Spain from an enemy territory into a friendly one; the sole interest of Europe was to prevent forever the union of the crowns of France and Spain.² The interests of Spain and France having already been determined, the treaty of Utrecht was in respect to the house of France what the treaty of Westphalia was for the house of Austria: a limit. But at the same time that it imposed on France a limit, the treaty gave her a right; that was to have a friendly dynasty on the throne of Spain.³

The old monarchy of Spain, though it retained its possessions in the New World had to acquiesce in the French occupation of Franche-Comté, and to surrender its Italian dominions and the Netherlands to the Hapsburgs in Austria. Whether these acquisitions by Austria were a fair equivalent for the loss of Alsace and for having had to relinquish Bavaria which she had held since the Battle of Blenheim in 1704, is questionable. For their inhabitants did not speak her language; they lay at some distance from her true center of gravity, and served only to unfit her for the leadership of the Empire, and to distract her from the pursuit of German interests. The Dutch Republic, or the United Netherlands, secured the trade and control of the Scheldt, and obtained barrier fortresses against French aggression. But she made no more fresh conquests from this time, and as her resources were

1. W. O. Wakeman, Europe, 1598-1715, (New York: The MacMillan Co. 1919), p. 364.

2. Giraud, op. cit., p. 31.

3. Ibid., p. 119.

being badly strained, she ceased to be a first-rate power. England was, no doubt, the chief gainer. She had finally thrown off her Stuart kings, who had made her the paid adherent of France. Gibraltar and Minorca, with its harbour of Port Mahon, formed a basis for her future naval supremacy in the Mediterranean; Newfoundland and her conquests on the mainland of North America for a future attack on Canada. Although she had not won any very conspicuous successes at sea, yet she came out of the war with valuable commercial privileges. The Duke of Savoy had gained Sicily and was left in the possession of Piedmont, which gave him a position of great importance in any future struggle between Hapsburg and Bourbon.¹

France herself, chiefly owing to the dissensions of her enemies, escaped from the war on much better terms than she had any reason to expect. Although repeated military defeats had so reduced her power that all chance of her dominating Europe was over, she lost nothing on the Continent which she had gained in the previous wars of Louis' reign except a few towns on the east frontier. She retained Artois and most of Flanders, Valenciennes and Cambrai, Alsace and Franche-Comté, as well as Cerdagne and Roussillon on the Spanish frontier. There are very important. Her position in the New World was potentially magnificent. She held Canada and the island of Cape Breton in the north, Louisiana and many West Indian islands in the south, and if her military prestige had suffered in the War of the Spanish Succession, it had been partially restored by the last campaign of Villars. Looking at the external results, the warlike policy of Louis XIV had met with brilliant results.²

1. A. H. Johnson, The Age of the Enlightened Despot, 1660-1789,
(London: Methuen & Co., 1909), 56-58.

2. Ibid., p. 59.

The War of the Spanish Succession was fought, say the critics of the Peace of Utrecht, to prevent the House of Bourbon from ascending the throne of Spain, and after eleven years of terrible bloodshed the Peace of Utrecht sanctioned the very connection between the crowns of France and Spain. The weak point in the peace--the danger from family compacts--has been much exaggerated. But the cause was one over which the negotiators had little control. The reestablishment of the balance of power made the strengthening of the House of Austria necessary. It was, then, the inherent weakness of the Hapsburgs which made the balance established a tottering one.¹

Since the last great settlement of European affairs, the Peace of Westphalia, three great changes had occurred in European politics. France had acquired beyond all question the position of the leading nation of Europe. A settlement which ignored this fact could not stand for ten years, and the allies showed their wisdom in permitting France to retain the position which she had legitimately won, and guarding her against the abuse of it by forming states on her frontiers, powerful enough to keep her in check. Events proved that they were right. Austria and the Dutch in combination on the dangerous northern frontier, Prussia and the Empire on the east, Savoy to the southeast, with Austria in reserve in Italy, were as a matter of fact, found strong enough to contain the ambition of France in the eighteenth century. It was not until the balance of power and the European states system alike were swept away by the militant democracy of the Revolution, that France became once more a menace to the liberties of Europe.²

1. Wakeman, *op. cit.*, p. 368.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 366.

During the intervening period England had launched herself on that career of colonial and commercial ascendancy which made her the most prosperous country in the world. She was learning to found her colonial empire upon the settlement of colonies. Her acknowledged superiority at sea might be questioned from time to time by France and Spain; however, it could never be overthrown and it brought with it the acquisition of French colonies and Spanish trading privileges. The *asiento* was the thin end of the wedge by which England soon obtained the lion's share of the lucrative slave trade. The cessions in North America were the beginning of her hold over the vast stretches of land to the north of her plantations, which were to be reduced wholly under her rule during the eighteenth century, and are known as the Dominion of Canada and the Colony of British Columbia. In securing to England power and privileges which she alone, owing to her maritime supremacy, could use properly, the Peace of Utrecht not only helped her forward on her true line of national development, but contributed in no slight degree to the resources and prosperity of the world at large.¹

And finally, the dismemberment of the Empire, which had been recognized and made permanent by the peace of Westphalia, had finally removed the last vestiges of national feeling and national policy in Germany. The smaller German states grouped themselves for purposes of offense and defense naturally around the larger powers of the north and south--Prussia and Austria. The barriers to French aggression on the Rhine had to be sought, not in bolstering up an effete institution like the Empire, out of which the vitality had long ago departed, but

1. Ibid., p. 366.

in strengthening and utilizing the leading national forces in these two powers. The Peace of Utrecht adopted this policy as far as was at that time possible. It planted Prussia as a sentinel over against France on the lower Rhine, and added to her possessions in that quarter as well as to her general dignity, in order to make her discharge her duties with the greater zeal. The subsequent history of Europe is one long commentary on the wisdom of this policy. This, then, is the inherent weakness of the balance of power system. One state is artificially increased to combat the strength of another country; it is entirely possible that the former will live to become the threat to the general welfare. There is no guarantee that a strengthened state will serve its purpose and not aspire to a position of dominance.

Austria required no incentive to fulfil a similar task in the upper Rhine and in Italy, but she was deficient in the necessary resources. In the War of the Spanish Succession, the gold and armies of England alone had saved Austria. By giving to her the richest part of Italy, and defending her from French attack by the buffer state of Savoy, the peace did all that was possible to strengthen the defenses of Europe against a renewal of French tyranny, while ministering to the dynastic ambition of the house of Hapsburg.

In its main lines, the treaty of Utrecht was a modification of Westphalia, and like the earlier treaty mainly registered and sanctioned accomplished facts.¹ Both treaties gave concrete expression to the doctrine that states can be transferred like chattels without reference to the opinion of the inhabitants. The negotiators were untroubled by the fact that Italy, Germany, and Belgium still remained geographical

1. Ibid., p. 365-367.

expressions, and seem to have assumed that by partition of the Spanish empire between the claimants the balance of power was restored and the peace of Europe was once more established.

Though based on nothing higher than the conventional diplomatic traditions, the balance of power of the Ancien Regime, the treaty of Utrecht was not without its advantages. It averted the menace of a Bourbon Empire. Indirectly it benefited Spain, because it removed from her control European territories that had involved commitments far beyond her military or financial resources, and when the Pyrenees became the real frontier of Spain, she was able to devote her revenues to national needs rather than to European ambition.

The treaty of Utrecht looked to the future rather than to the past. Savoy benefits materially and becomes the strongest independent power in Italy, while the destinies of Germany are placed in the eager hands of Prussia. The decline of Holland as a European and colonial power is foreshadowed, and Great Britain stands out as the great maritime power of the future. The acquisition of Newfoundland and Acadia was to be the beginning of the struggle for supremacy in North America; while the possession of Gibraltar was one of the most important links of the future British Empire. Colonial rivalry now displaces dynastic ambition in the chancellories of Europe, and the young, vigorous states such as Prussia break down the old monopoly which had confined hegemony to a few families.¹

Even in the middle of the nineteenth century the dependence of the states system on the treaty of Utrecht was recognized by Giraud:

1. Ogg, op. cit., pp. 277-279.

Since 1713 the increase of the power of Britain, the weakening of the power of Holland, the enlargement of Prussia, the extension of Russian domination, the diminishing of the power of Sweden, the emancipation of the large American colonies, and the establishment of representative monarchies, have changed the elements of the balance, but the principles have kept the same, and one is able to say that the law of nations of middle Europe rests yet on the foundations laid at Utrecht.¹

1. Giraud, op. cit., p. 12.

Eighteenth Century Background

From the Peace of Utrecht to the French Revolution, a quieter and more settled era stretched its lengthening spell over the strife-racked continent. Fanaticism was discredited. A more tolerant, judicious, and even skeptical attitude developed, and religious issues no longer provoked men to violence and bloodshed. If not genuine tolerance, at least a live-and-let-live spirit replaced the lust to silence all dissident opinion. Eighteenth century society, especially in France, Holland, and England was distinguished by its moderation and civility, by elegance and amiability, by a dislike of all extravagant appeals to passion, prejudice, irrationality, or violence. Not since the Roman peace of the first century of the Christian era had Europe known so long a period of relative freedom from major disorders or disasters.¹

The French writer, Sorel, gives quite a different picture as he speaks of eighteenth century politics and methods:

To sum up, there is no other guarantee except self-interest, of course, and no other principle of order except the opposition of these interests. Custom reverts to these maxims of empire: What is good to take is good to keep, says passion, and everyone gives heed. Prudence replies, there is good in taking only what is good to keep, and very few follow her counsel. Ambition says, we must extend ourselves; let us calculate with the strong, and let us divide if they demand it; the important thing is to regulate the conditions of bargain. It is better, answers Wisdom, to rule in the midst of divided inferiors than to dispute the empire with powerful rivals. You do well, concludes Experience, to undertake only what you are capable of finishing. This calculation is the only safeguard of states against their own ambitions and against the excesses of others.²

Spain, Portugal, Austria, and the Italian states made but slow progress during the eighteenth century. In the Germanies, Prussia doubled in size and population, while farther east Russia continued to

1. Bruun, op. cit., p. 369.

2. Albert Sorel, L'Europe et la Révolution Française, Les Mœurs Politiques et les Traditions, (Paris: Librairie Plon, Les Petits-Fils de Plon et Nourrit, 1885), I, 35.

expand in area and to increase in population despite backward social and economic institutions. The most important single event in Eastern Europe in the eighteenth century was the disappearance of Poland, partitioned among Prussia, Russia and Austria between 1772 and 1795.¹

Throughout this period the fact that Louis XIV's ambition to extend the boundaries of France beyond reasonable limits, and to dominate Spain by linking it to France in a dynastic alliance, had been seriously thwarted, was evidence in itself that the states system of Europe possessed a rectifying quality; a preponderant assumption of power by one state had once again called forth the united efforts of the remaining states and the attempt at domination had been defeated.² This international balance of power, though it shifted and oscillated, was to vindicate itself as the dominant principle of European politics.

1. Braun, *op. cit.*, p. 365.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 370.

Zum ewigen Frieden by Immanuel Kant 1795

In 1793 England began her great war with France, which was already involved with Austria and Prussia. In 1795 the Peace of Basel terminated for a time the struggle between Prussia and France. The philosopher Immanuel Kant was doubtless influenced by the treaty concluded at Basel, just as the Abbé Saint-Pierre was moved by the Congress of Utrecht to formulate his peace project. The plans of Kant and Saint-Pierre were both in the form of treaties, ready for the signatures of the nations. "In fact, from a bibliographical standpoint, Kant's little work holds place along with Sully's *Memoires* and Saint-Pierre's *Project*,"¹ as interest in the philosopher and his work has grown through the years.

The plan proposed by the philosopher was based on the same idea as that held successively by Saint-Pierre, Penn, Rousseau, and Bentham--a general confederation of European states. The preliminary articles provided: first, that no secret reservations were to be included in treaties; second, that no independent state was to be acquired by another; third, that standing armies were to be abolished; fourth, that no national debts were to be contracted for the external affairs of the state; fifth, that no state was to interfere with another state; sixth, that no state at war was to commit such acts of hostility as would render future confidence impossible.²

The second section of Kant's essay contains the three definite articles of a perpetual peace with a running commentary for each:

1. Hemleben, op. cit., p. 88.

First, the civil constitution of each state was to be republican.¹ Kant believed that perpetual peace was to be achieved only under a republican constitution since under such a constitution the consent of the subjects was needed to go to war. Otherwise, the decision of war would be left to the whim of the ruler. Republicanism is defined as the "Political principle of severing the executive power of the government from the Legislature",² despotism is that "Principle in pursuance of which the state arbitrarily puts into effect laws which it has itself made",³ and democracy "In the proper sense of the word, is of necessity despotism, because it establishes an executive power.. ..Therefore the whole people, so-called, who carry their measures are really not all, but only a majority: so that the universal will is in contradiction with itself and with the principle of freedom..."⁴

The second definite article of perpetual peace says that the law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states.⁵ Kant believed that peace was to be achieved only if states resolved to give up their lawless freedom and yield to the coercion of public laws. He proposed that the states "Can form a State of Nation, one, too, which will be ever-increasing and would finally embrace all the peoples of the earth..."⁶ He realized the impossibility of establishing a world republic and proposed a negative substitute for it, a federation averting war, maintaining its ground and ever extending all over the world.

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1. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, a Philosophical Essay, trans M. Campbell Smith, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1917), 120.
 2. Ibid., p. 125.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid., p. 128.
 6. Ibid., p. 128-137.

The third article said that the rights of men, as citizens of the world, were to be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality.¹ Here Kant shows that the relation of the federated states to one another and to the whole was to be determined by cosmopolitan law.

Kant did not think that immediate peace was possible. That is why he analyzed the causes of war, for he was convinced that permanent peace was not attainable without sufficient preparation. This was then the construction of an international system on a philosophical basis. The basis he finds in the development of enlightened self-interest among the people and the growth of the moral idea, which had already made men open to the influence of the mere conception of law, as though this is itself possessed physical power.² Perpetual peace will thus ultimately be guaranteed by nature itself through the mechanism inherent in human inclination.

Kant's plan was less detailed than Henry's or Saint-Pierre's. The German philosopher failed to work out in detail the idea of a congress applying the principles of international law, and he failed to suggest an international court to administer the law of nations. His union of states was not an indissoluble one; and he guarded himself, as if by anticipation, against the imputations of desiring to establish a universal state. Kant explicitly said:

This alliance does not tend to any dominion over a state, but solely to the certain maintenance of the liberty of each particular state, partaking of this association, without being therefore obliged to submit, like men in a state of nature to the legal constraint of public force.³

Kant demanded the abolition of standing armies; but he did not discuss conscription, a development at that time yet unforeseen. He

1. Ibid., p. 138.

2. Phillips, op. cit., pp. 28-29.

3. Ibid., p. 94.

insisted that no national debts were to be contracted for the external affairs of the state. It is surprising to find Kant emphasizing national indebtedness at a time when the international credit system was still in its infancy.¹ The essay by Kant was particularly unusual in that it was a direct attack on the imperialism that was to develop in the next century. Kant held that the rights of men in foreign countries should be limited to the privileges accorded by hospitality. The proposal that all states have republican government appeared quite radical at the time, for, with the exception of England and France after the Revolution, every European country was ruled by a despot. Kant was anxious to have constitutional government established in all states, for, he assumed, the consent of the people would be necessary to go to war. He was convinced that the people would not decide on war so lightly as princes would.²

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., p. 95.

Nineteenth Century Background

The rampart of republics erected beyond the French borders as a consequence of the victories of 1794 to 1800, and the expansion of French influence in Europe, upset the balance of power, but Napoleon as the Great Disturber of the European states system was not prepared to renounce the advantage that he had won. The French pride demanded that the regimes set up in Belgium, Switzerland, and Italy should be kept under French protection. At last the "natural frontiers," the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, had been not merely reached but transcended, and French revolutionists, happy at this "natural" solution to an ancient problem, hailed this aggrandizement. To other European governments, however, this revival of French aggression recalled the ambitions of Louis XIV. France once more threatened the system of equilibrium. And, as in the time of Louis XIV, the preponderance of France called into existence successive coalitions to counteract it, and all Napoleon's interval of power was an effort to maintain by new campaigns, an artificial and unstable ascendancy.¹

While the remaining monarchs of Europe leagued themselves together against the "regicide republic", the French repelled the invading armies and took the offensive in a war against all kings. Victory and the spread of revolutionary influences enabled the French to erect this rampart of republics around the frontiers of France. But the French bourgeoisie, alarmed at the egalitarian demands of the people, called on the republican army to repress popular disorders, and after 1795 the French Revolution retrograded. Judged by its ideal program the Revolution had been called a supreme assault of the human spirit against

1. Bruun, op. cit., pp. 436-437.

the forces of indestructible brute fact.

The efficient and highly centralized administration erected by Napoleon after 1799 resembled much more closely the unified despotism of the Ancien Regime than it did the ideal republic prophesied by the reformers. Napoleon's attempts to hold and extend gains achieved in Italy, in the Rhineland, and in Belgium involved him in wars against successive European coalitions. The First Coalition was formed in 1792 and lasted until 1797; it included Prussia, Austria, Spain, Holland and Britain. The Second Coalition, 1798-1800, was a triple affair involving Britain, Austria and Russia. The Third Coalition, composed of Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia lasted from 1805 to 1807. And the Fourth Coalition formed in 1812 and lasting until the abdication of Napoleon in 1814, included Britain, Spain, Russia, Prussia, Austria and Sweden.¹ Thus most of Europe concerned itself with the balance of power and the preservation of the equilibrium enough to take up arms against the Disturber State and its dictator during some part of this twenty-year period.

1. Ibid., pp. 421-422.

Instructions to Novosiltzov 1804

In 1804 Tsar Alexander was still in the first flush of his liberalism. He wished to apply the ideas he had learnt from his Swiss tutor, La Harpe, to a new crusade on behalf of Europe, to whose assistance his father, the "mad" Paul, had already sent Russian troops as far as Italy and Switzerland, a new phenomenon in the balance of European power. The young Pole, Adam Czartoryski, full of ambition and love of country, and anxious to use his new position to serve both, was now in charge of foreign affairs, and he and a group of young Russians encouraged the Tsar in these schemes.¹ An understanding for common defense had already been made with Austria. But British gold was needed to bring a coalition into being, and at the end of October 1804, the young Count Novosiltzov was sent by the Tsar and Czartoryski to London on a special mission.

Novosiltzov's Instructions breathed a spirit of lofty idealism in which, however, the objects of the Tsar and his Foreign Minister found an appropriate expression. The old Europe was gone forever and in its place a new structure must rise. The new Europe must take into account the spirit of the times. Nationality, constitutionalism, and federation were the main features of the Instructions.² The old feudalism must be replaced by liberal governments, founded on the sacred right of humanity. All monarchs must endow their subjects with modern constitutions. Even the Ottoman Empire must be encouraged to reform itself, if by joining France it did not lay itself open to more drastic

1. C. K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815; Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe, (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1931), 54.

2. Hans George Schenk, The Aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 27.

treatment.¹ France herself must not be made an exception for it was not the French people but Napoleon who was responsible for the difficulties of Europe. In fact, the foundation on which the Novosiltzov Instructions were based was the conviction that the main ideas of the French Revolution were sound.²

The system which should bind together the various member states of the European league was to be a new, clearly defined, codified international law, to which the national law of the member states would be subjected.³ In this way the European league was to interfere in constitutional questions affecting its members; for it is highly probable that the "tranquility and safety" that this organization would guarantee did not mean external peace alone.⁴ Like Saint-Pierre, the solution for war was to be mediation. Any state that defied the new Europe might be expected to bring upon itself immediately a coalition of all the others, but the privileges of neutrality should also be assured, and this point led naturally to the hope that Britain's conception of maritime rights was to be modified.⁵

There is the proposal that Great Britain join Russia in the establishment of a new European order which amounted to a recognition of the principle of self-determination of nations: "The character of the national desires must be considered before deciding upon the form of the government to be established."⁶ In the same vein the

1. Webster, op. cit., p. 54.

2. Schenk, op. cit., p. 28.

3. Ibid., p. 30.

4. Ibid., p. 31.

5. Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna; A Study In Allied Unity, 1812-1822, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946), 54.

6. Andrei A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe 1789-1825, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1947), 80.

Allies were to fight, not the French people, but "a government as tyrannical towards France as towards the rest of Europe."¹

As for a durable and final peace, it would be possible only if Europe were organized into a confederacy by a pact to which the nations would voluntarily adhere and which would become "the basis of the reciprocal relations between the states of Europe."² This league would have to establish natural frontiers as boundaries and guarantee a homogeneous population to each of the states. As for the small states, in the name of the balance of power they should either unite with the larger states or group themselves into small federative unions, for the "disturbances which have shaken Europe....have only taken place because so little attention has been paid to the system of equilibrium."³

Finally, Britain and Russia must take the new Europe under their special protection as the only Powers "Who by their position are invariably interested in the reign there of order and justice, the only ones who by their position can maintain it, and being free from conflicting desires and interests will never trouble this happy tranquility."⁴

Some concrete suggestions were included. The King of Sardinia should be restored to Piedmont, if he would grant a constitution to his subjects. The Italian republics should be rescued from French control. Switzerland's independence should be re-established, and she should be enlarged and endowed with a democratic constitution. Holland should also be rescued from French influence and placed under a Stadtholder, who, of course, must be a constitutional ruler. As for the German states, they would be united into a federation from which Prussia and Austria were excluded,

1. *Ibid.*, p. 81.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

4. Webster, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

thus making a balance between the two.¹ One of the features of the Novosiltzov Instructions was the neglect of Prussia and Austria.

The Instructions illustrate the mingling of sentimentality and statecraft, of opinion and ambition, which accounts for the strange oscillations of Russian policy between altruistic philosophy and brutal self-seeking.² Alexander insisted on the need of tearing from France the mask of liberty which she had so long worn so profitably. Against the naturalism of Rousseau, which supplied Napoleon with excellent reasons for every annexation, Alexander resolved to appeal to historical rights and the balance of power. Yet he also resolved to uphold the claims of legitimacy and liberty.³ The Novosiltzov Instructions owed everything to Western Enlightenment, and interestingly enough they laid no stress on the Christian character of the federation.⁴

And so the Muscovite who had been excluded from membership in the proposed federations of Sully and Abbé Saint-Pierre on the grounds of religion, now presented to the western nations his own plan for a European federation. This has its own significance in the history of modern times.

With the aims of the Novosiltzov Instructions, Pitt declared his entire concurrence; a just and lasting peace being the first of British interests. He developed these notions in a remarkable document of the 19th of January 1805. He agreed entirely with the Tsar that it would be necessary to reduce France to her former limits, to liberate conquered

1. Ibid.

2. John Holland Rose, *The Life of William Pitt*, (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1934), II, 522.

3. Ibid., 523.

4. Schenk, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

territory, to create future barriers against French aggression, to form some system of collective security, and to re-establish the public law of Europe.¹ However, Pitt did not agree with the Tsar in thinking that the rights and interests of Prussia or Austria could be ignored; without their assistance the total defeat of Napoleon would have been impossible. Thus, while Pitt felt that in any case Holland should be liberated and enlarged, so as to include Antwerp and to form the necessary barrier to France, he was not of the opinion that the Italian Republics could, after so long a period of subjugation, be usefully accorded independence. Such areas, together with Belgian and Luxemburg territory, should preferably be used as compensations and rewards to make Austria and Prussia join the proposed Coalition. Prussia, in other words, should be encouraged to expand north and west, provided only that she did not encroach on Hanover, whereas Austria should be encouraged to seek compensations in the south. The elimination of Bonaparte should not be the avowed purpose of the new Coalition, but would be welcomed if the French themselves desired it. In return for agreement on these points, Great Britain would be ready to place into the common pool many of the colonial conquests which she had made at the expense of France and her satellites. And finally a general guarantee of their European possessions should be accorded to all the partners of the new Coalition.²

At the time these proposals, both the Russian and the British, were rendered inoperative owing to the battle of Austerlitz and the new course adopted by Alexander after Tilsit.³ Pitt also assented to

1. Nicolson, op. cit., p. 55

2. Ibid.

3. Schenk, op. cit., p. 29.

the Tsar's proposal that the final settlement should be guaranteed by international agreements forming a basis for the new European polity, a suggestion in which lies the germ of the Holy Alliance.¹

1. Rose, op. cit., p. 523.

Congress of Vienna 1815

The Congress of Vienna had to restore order and stability to Europe after a quarter of a century of revolution and war. The solutions adopted disappointed almost all classes, but the settlement did bequeath to Europe a period of forty years without an armed clash among any of the great powers. If the function of a peace conference is to prepare an enduring peace, the Congress of Vienna was one of the most successful in history.¹

Vienna was chosen as the meeting place of the Congress in 1814, by virtue of its position as the capital of one of the successful belligerents, and a seat of a government which in a special sense represented law, order, and established tradition. There are two outstanding points of the Congress of Vienna. In the first place, it was not a "Peace Conference", because peace had already been made at Paris, and all the questions at issue between France and the Allies had been definitely settled. The state of war had ceased both in fact and in law, and France, when the Congress of Vienna met, could claim to associate with the other powers as a regular member of the European states system.² The second outstanding point is that the Congress of Vienna did not meet to make a new world out of the old; they believed that the old European system had satisfied the needs of mankind, both for law and for liberty; and so they meant not to reconstruct a new system, but to restore the old.³

Terms were formulated to meet four aims in particular: First, to restore the balance of power in Europe; second, to "contain" France so that she should not overwhelm her weaker neighbors again; third, to

1. Ibid., p. 500.

2. Mowat, History of European Diplomacy, p. 4.

3. Ibid., p. 5.

organize stable and legitimate governments in regions liberated from revolutionary, provisory or military regimes; and fourth, to compensate the victor powers for the sacrifices which they had made.¹

The solution was similar to the one made at Utrecht a century previous.² The Quadruple Alliance was considered the instrument of correction in regard to the balance of power in Europe. This alliance was to arrange conferences from time to time to resolve new difficulties as they arose. At the Congress of Vienna, Belgium and Holland were united as the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This was the creation of a potential buffer state against any future French designs in the north. Prussia was strengthened and given territory in Western Germany so that she might maintain the necessary "watch on the Rhine." The Austrian Empire--not to be confused with the Holy Roman Empire--was rehabilitated after Napoleon's crushing blows and given control of Lombardy and the territory of the Venetian Republic. As republics were no longer in fashion, Genoa passed out of separate existence and was incorporated into the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia under the House of Savoy, thus creating a stronger state in Northern Italy to guard the mountain passes from France.³

Great Britain retained Malta, Helgoland, and Capetown, and the islands of Tobago and Saint Lucia in the West Indies, and Mauritius in the Indian Ocean. Denmark lost Norway, which was annexed to Sweden. Russia retained Finland which she had conquered in 1809. Poland was once more divided among the three eastern powers, Prussia, Austria, and Russia; the latter power received the largest share which it erected into a kingdom with Tsar Alexander I as king.⁴

1. Braun, *op. cit.*, p. 500.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 504.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 505.

4. *Ibid.*

France, the defeated nation, came off lightly, preserving the boundaries of 1791. But the Bourbons were substituted for the Bonapartes, and Louis XVIII, brother of the guillotined Louis XVI, was restored as the legitimate monarch. France had partially forgotten its grievances against Bourbonism because of the greater hardships inflicted by Bonapartism. Louis XVIII promised to reign as a constitutional monarch and, to fulfil his pledge, he issued the charter of 1814. This constitution reflected somewhat the changes that had transpired in France since 1789.¹ It was prefaced by a declaration of the rights of man and the citizen, closely modeled upon the historic platform of 1789. Full executive authority including the appointment of the ministry was reserved to the king. A legislature of two houses was to be so selected that control would largely rest in the hands of the plutocratic landed gentry. While the deputies were to be chosen by men who paid at least three hundred francs in direct taxes, the upper house was to be appointed by the monarch. By its assertion of the inviolability of property, the Charter confirmed the land settlements effected during the Revolution.²

After a year French dissatisfaction over these terms, and hostility to the returning exiles, enabled Napoleon to make one more bid for power. But his dramatic escape from his island kingdom of Elba, where he had been exiled, was accompanied by only a hundred day reign. Liberal decrees issued by Napoleon, assured the people of rights denied them under the Empire, supplemented by masterly

1. Authur May, The Age of Metternich, 1814-1848, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1933), 6-7.

2. Ibid., p. 8.

patriotic appeals, captured the imagination of nearly all of France.¹ His brief second reign ended in irretrievable defeat at Waterloo in June, 1815. This time he was exiled to distant Saint Helena for the last six years of his life, and Europe settled down to sullen peace and economic distress of the sort that follows all great wars.²

Maddened by the response France had made to Napoleon's appeals, the Allies imposed upon France a Second Treaty of Paris whose terms were far more drastic than those of its predecessor. It was the whole French nation, not the army alone, that had rallied to the Emperor in the Hundred Days; hence there was justification for a harsher policy and for the exaction of solid guarantees for the future.³ The French frontier was pushed back to the limits of 1790, involving a loss of a half million people in the Saar Valley. Metternich and Alexander stood firm with Castlereagh in preventing Prussia from taking Alsace-Lorraine in the Second Peace of Paris.⁴ France was obliged to pay an indemnity of 700,000,000 francs within five years, and to maintain an Allied army of occupation in the principal frontier fortresses until the debt was paid. All of the stolen works of art were ordered returned to their rightful owners.⁵

A week before Waterloo, the powers had completed their negotiations at Vienna and signed the "Final Act." Compromises had of necessity been made. In arriving at decisions regarding territory, the diplomats had been guided mainly by the war-time secret treaties, partly by the

1. Ibid., p. 13.

2. Bruun, op. cit., p. 505.

3. May, op. cit., p. 13.

4. Webster, op. cit., p. 464.

5. May, op. cit., p. 14.

determination to erect a strong barrier system around France, and partly by the principles of legitimacy and compensation.¹

Among the principal territorial and dynastic changes, aside from France, were the following: Some of the loyal German princes recovered their titles and possessions, but the claims of several hundred petty ecclesiastical and city states were ignored. No effort was made to revive the Holy Roman Empire which had been dissolved by Napoleon. A new Germanic confederation of 38 states was created under a constitution which provided for a diet of delegates or representatives of the rulers and gave Austria the presidency. The extent of the territorial enlargement of Prussia and Austria has been noted earlier.

The Bourbons were restored in Naples; the Papal States were returned to the Pope; and the king of Piedmont recovered his throne. As compensation for the loss of Belgium, the rest of Italy was left under either direct or indirect rule of Austria.

Sweden was forced to cede Finland formally to Russia and western Pomerania to Germany, but as compensation, she received Norway from Denmark, because of the latter's friendship for Napoleon.

The shameful dismemberment of Poland was legalized on the ground of legitimacy. The lion's share, including Warsaw, went to Russia; Posen, Thorn and Danzig went to Prussia; Austria received Galicia; and Cracow became a free state.²

Of course the Bourbon House was restored in Spain. The slave trade was abolished, but the enforcement of the act was left to each state. A code of International Law to regulate the navigation of European

1. Ibid., p. 15.

2. Alexander Clarence Flick, Modern World History, 1776-1926, (New York: F. S. Crofts Company, 1926), 132-134.

rivers and the methods of international diplomacy was drawn up.¹

Thus, the aristocratic Congress ignored the new forces of liberalism and nationalism, which had been born in Europe. A few rulers and their ministers had remade the map of Europe, trading off people as if they were still serfs. The patriotic feelings of the Belgians, Norwegians, Finns, Poles, Germans, and Italians were outraged by the enforcement of the practices of the eighteenth century despots. Even the doctrine of legitimacy was not rigidly adhered to, for Bernadotte, the Napoleonic marshal, heir to the throne of Sweden, was not desposed because he had deserted his master and been faithful to the cause of the Allies.²

It is said that every ruler left Vienna dissatisfied. All over Europe people were grumbling at the short-sighted settlements. Even the old general, Blucher, denounced the Congress as "An annual cattle fair."³ Excepting Holland, only the great powers gained in population and land. Europe was filled with sore spots for the future. The doctrine of legitimacy was to be applied to religion, education, science, philosophy and literature.⁴

Against these blunders of the Congress, must be placed some positive gains. In the first place, Europe was given some years of badly needed peace. Secondly, the settlement of the affairs of the continent in one document, signed by all the states, meant progress in international relations.⁵ Diplomats now realized that they could meet together and arrive at a solution of their common problems. This

1. Ibid.

2. Brunn, op. cit., p. 506.

3. Flick, op. cit., p. 134.

4. Ibid., p. 135.

5. Ibid.

was then the material realization of the progress of the evolution of the European states system from its crude beginnings at the Congress of Westphalia, through the intermediary step of the Congress of Utrecht, and finally to the acceptance of the Concert principle by the Congress of Vienna. Finally, it was some positive gain to have people imbued with the hope of an all embracing reform of the political system of Europe. "The ground has been prepared," wrote the official secretary Gentz, "for building up a better social structure."¹

Such was the most important international settlement between that of 1648 at Westphalia and that of 1919 at Paris. It was the fashion of the nineteenth century liberal historians to denounce the discisions of the Congress of Vienna.² Since 1919, however, and especially since the hectic days after 1945, it has become clear that the diplomats called together at the close of a general European war are so bound by earlier agreements and by the exigencies of the moment that they cannot build the Utopia. They are fortunate if they are able even to reconstruct an old order. In 1815 neither the statesmen nor the peoples of Europe had any thorough understanding of the vague principles of nationality and democracy. Moreover, there was, at the time of the Vienna Congress, a widespread distrust of these revolutionary concepts. It is as incredible that the statesmen of 1815 would have made them the basis of a reconstructed Europe as the delegates at the conferences of 1919 or 1945 should have revamped Europe in accordance with the precepts of Communism. After the overthrow of Napoleon the diplomats quite naturally resorted to the familiar ideas of the balance of power and to the notions of legitimacy,

1. Ibid.

2. Artz, op. cit., p. 116.

and tried to fuse them into some sort of compromise that would guarantee Europe a period of peace. Whatever may be said against the diplomats, they were, most of them, reasonable, fair-minded, and well-intentioned. These qualities were most strikingly revealed in their treatment of France and in the general absence of rancor in their decisions.¹

1. Ibid., pp. 115-116

Holy Alliance proposed by Tsar Alexander I of Russia

The Holy Alliance with its background of pietism and mysticism, with its debatable authorship--some attributing it to Alexander, others to the Baroness von Krudener--had its acknowledged origin, so the Tsar said, in the scheme of guarantee which Castlereagh had proposed at Vienna.¹ Castlereagh had seen the idea of diplomacy by conference, which he took with him on his first journey to the Continent, justified again and again in the course of the following years.² But the Holy Alliance, translated into the mystical terms of Tsar Alexander's current attitude, had assumed a shape as different from Castlereagh's conception as possible. To the Tsar must be attributed the tone of mystic pietism in which the document was drafted; to him above all must be attributed the fatal error of concluding the Holy Alliance in the name of the sovereigns personally, and not in the name of their governments or peoples.³

Now at this propitious time Alexander perhaps felt called by Providence to carry out the great plan of King Henry IV, whose Grand Design, as well as the Peace Project of the Abbé Saint-Pierre, was familiar to him.⁴ The Tsar felt that the great Christian principles of peace and mutual good will, solemnly avowed by all the European monarchs, would provide the basis for the administration of their respective states.⁵ The reciprocal relations of the powers were henceforth to be based "Upon the sublime truths which the holy religion of our Savior teaches."⁶ The Holy Alliance stipulated that "The precepts of Justice, Christian Charity and peace...must have an

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1. Webster, *op. cit.*, p. 480.
 2. *Ibid.*, p. 481.
 3. Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 249.
 4. Hamleben, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
 5. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
 6. Phillips, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

immediate influence on the councils of Princes, and guide all their steps", and that monarchs would, accordingly, "Remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity and considering each other as fellow countrymen, they will on all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and assistance, while regarding themselves towards their subjects and armies as fathers of families."¹ Governments and their subjects should consider themselves as "Members of one and the same Christian nation."² Thus peace was to be found in a society in which all sovereigns and their people were to act as true Christians. The mere enunciation of so sublime a truth was sufficient in the Tsar's opinion to secure its enforcement.³

The Emperor of Austria did not dare refuse the Tsar when offered so sacred a treaty by a man whom he thought mad, but better occupied with schemes of peace and goodwill than with more dangerous things. He accordingly signed, after altering only a few phrases in the document which seemed especially ridiculous or blasphemous. The King of Prussia, whose simple nature was more easily satisfied, immediately followed suit. Meanwhile the Tsar himself had approached Castlereagh, who irreverently called Alexander's plan, "This piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense."⁴ Castlereagh found a loophole of escape in the constitutional objection that the Prince-Regent, ruling in the place of his insane father, had no authority to sign.⁵ None the less, the Prince Regent addressed a letter to the Tsar assuring him

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., p. 306.

3. Wedster, op. cit., p. 481

4. Ibid., p. 482.

5. Fredrick B. Artz, Reaction and Revolution, 1814-1832, The Rise of Modern Europe, ed. W.L. Langer, (New York and London: Harper Brothers, 1945), 118.

of his "entire concurrence with the principles laid down by the august sovereigns", and "promising that it would always be his endeavour to conform his policy to their "Sacred Maxims."¹

Even Metternich appears at first not to have realized how valuable an instrument the Holy Alliance would prove for his purposes. He called it a "loud sounding nothing",² and a "monument vide et sonore."³

As the Holy Alliance was to be a union of Christian states, the Sultan of Turkey was not invited to join. The Pope presumably felt that he did not need the Tsar of Russia to explain to him the Christian principles of peace, brotherhood or government, and he doubtless would have refused the invitation for membership if it had been proffered. Alexander did not think that such a league would be invalid if the Pope, as a temporal sovereign and as head of the Roman Church was excluded from it.

Progressive opinion throughout Europe was from the outset, alive to the potential dangers of the Holy Alliance. The fact that it had been concluded between Russia, Austria and Prussia, and only adhered to by the other powers, suggested that in some manner it represented an attempt on the part of the three to dominate the continent.⁴ The fact, above all, that it had been concluded as a personal pact between sovereigns and princes created extreme prejudice and alarm. For against what or whom could these potentates be allying themselves unless it were against the liberal movement of the age? It may well be true that Alexander did not at first intend

1. Ibid.

2. Nicolson, op. cit., p. 250.

3. Helen du Coudray, Metternich, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936), 166.

4. Nicolson, op. cit., p. 251.

that his Holy Alliance should become a formula of repression; it only became so when Metternich, playing adroitly upon the Tsar's increasing repudiation of his former liberal sentiments, used it as an organ of reaction.¹

Though criticized as a hypocritical gesture, the Holy Alliance did reflect in some measure the genuine mood of reverence and piety which prevailed in 1815. The magnitude of the military losses, especially from Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 until his final overthrow at Waterloo in 1815, induced a conviction in many minds that the world was approaching a crisis.² A horror of such insensate bloodshed, and the urge to prevent future wars, by diplomatic accords, but even more by perpetuating among princes and peoples a genuine love of peace, stirred many sincere humanitarians. In its mood and purpose the Holy Alliance was an expression of this sentiment.³ Pious in its intention, autocratic in its practice, the Holy Alliance itself is a curious mixture of the ingredients of the early nineteenth century.

Several months after the proclamation of the Holy Alliance, the American charge d'affaires at the Court of St. Petersburg wrote to the Secretary of State:

The treaty of triple alliance concluded at Paris well before this comes to hand, is already known to you. This treaty, a portion of which originated with the Emperor Alexander, and which does equal honor to his head and heart, I fear will not answer the magnanimous purposes for which it was designed. If such were the case we should behold Europe ready to embrace the arts of peace, and see dissolving at once those monstrous combinations which have already lifted the world from its axis and now threaten to consummate the work of human woe.⁴

1. Ibid.

2. Artz, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

3. Bruun, *op. cit.*, p. 512.

4. W. P. Cresson, *The Holy Alliance*, (New York: Oxford University 1922), 48.

But the weaknesses of the Holy Alliance rendered it politically ineffectual. It had no executive and no legislative body, it contained no specific organization. It was merely a loose league of kings, even failing to provide means for the settlement of international disputes. The Holy Alliance was a league of sovereigns and not a league of nations.¹ Beneath its defects, however, was the idea of a unified Europe, in which justice and good will would take the place of suspicion and intrigue.

1. Hemleben, op. cit., p. 101

The Quadruple Alliance

The Holy Alliance did not do the practical work of maintaining the peace. That was left to the Quadruple Alliance. The Quadruple Alliance was formulated at Chaumont in March 1814 by Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and received its final shape at the Second Treaty of Paris, November 20, 1815. The Alliance was to be not merely defensive but a genuine league of nations, bound not "By the vague confession of Legitimist faith, but by specific agreements."¹ By this Act the contracting parties promised to maintain the Second Peace of Paris, to support any party which should in the future be attacked by France, and "To renew their meetings at fixed periods, either under the immediate auspices of the sovereigns themselves, or by their respective ministers, for the purpose of consulting upon their common interests, and for the consideration of those measures which at each of those periods shall be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of Nations, and for the maintenance of the Peace of Europe."²

Herein is the difference between the often confused Holy Alliance and the Quadruple Alliance. The Holy Alliance was an expression of Christian sentiment, coupled with a vague promise on the part of the monarchs that they would in all places and on all occasions lend aid one to another. This agreement had no binding force on any of its members.³ The Quadruple Alliance of November 1815, was quite different from this. It was a definite contract with a specific condition, a casus foederis⁴ according to which, if a certain eventuality occurred,

1. Hemleben, op. cit., p. 102.

2. R. B. Mowat, A History of European Diplomacy, 1815-1914, (London: Edward Arnold Company, 1922), 25.

3. Cresson, op. cit., p. 32.

4. Mowat, European Diplomacy, p. 26.

any of the contracting parties could claim the support of 60,000 troops from each of the others. Secondly it contained a guarantee, not of all the multifarious provisions of the Congress of Vienna, but of one particular and limited Act, namely the Treaty of Peace with France, signed the previous November in Paris. The Powers certainly thought it desirable that the execution of the Treaty of Vienna should be guaranteed too, but that would have been an endless task. But this treaty with France was to be the basic rule of the European system and must at all cost be maintained. And Thirdly, the Quadruple Alliance pledged its members to meet together from time to time, and so began the salutary system known as the Concert of Europe.¹

Castlereagh believed sincerely that the conference device sanctioned by the Quadruple Alliance would transform the methods of the old diplomacy and create a new and useful system of intercourse between sovereign states. Castlereagh had found it necessary to abandon and repudiate his original conception of a general guarantee, and he finally became reconciled to the fact that only through direct intercourse, using the conference machinery, could the Concert of Europe be maintained.²

In the opinion of Metternich the peace of Europe rested on the treaties about which his diplomacy was to revolve for the next thirty years.³ His own reflections on the essence of politics are indicative of the role he was to play:

Politics is the science of the vital interests of States in its widest meaning. Since, however, an isolated state no longer exists, and is found only in the annals of the heathen world, we must always view the society of states as the essential condition

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

2. *Nicolson, op. cit.*, p. 244.

3. *du Coudray, op. cit.*, p. 167.

of the modern world...The great axioms of political science proceed from the knowledge of the true political interests of all states; it is upon these general interests that rests the guarantee of their existence...What characterizes the modern world and distinguishes it from the ancient is the tendency of states to draw near each other and to form a kind of social body based on the same principle as human society... In the ancient world isolation and the practice of the most absolute selfishness without other restraint than that of prudence was the sum of politics...Modern society on the other hand exhibits the application of the principle of solidarity and of the balance of power between states...The establishment of international relations, on the basis of reciprocity under the guarantee of respect for acquired rights,...constitutes in our time the essence of politics of which diplomacy is merely the daily application. Between the two there is, in my opinion, the same difference as between science and art.¹

After 1815 Metternich found a positive use for what was in the days of Chaumont the Quadruple Alliance directed against Napoleon; he constructed a system of European government based on the settlement of 1814-1815. This system of government was not given to Europe in accordance with any set of principles. Each factor was governed by a different series of problems, a different set of partisans, of enmities and ambitions. Metternich co-ordinated them. Where Alexander thought in terms of Christian brotherhood and Castlereagh in terms of British integrity to be preserved in the face of a restless, violent France and an armed Russia, Metternich thought in terms of international security. He built up his political edifice on the foundations of his policies at Vienna. He saw not nations, but states. He saw Europe governed by Europe.² His work consisted simply in quashing subversive activity and thwarting liberal movements wherever they appeared; thus, he succeeded in maintaining the status quo, and a period of peace, no matter on what terms it is achieved, is sure to have some benefits.

1. Ibid., p. 168.

2. Ibid., pp. 172-174.

Europe governed by Europe meant to Metternich a restored, legitimate, compensated regime, respectful of authority, despising change.

... of Europe. The idea was the restoration of Europe as it was in 1815. ... of Europe. ... of Europe.

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The Concert of Europe

During the four years after the Congress of Vienna there was a real Concert of Europe. The idea that the states of Europe were, or might become, a brotherhood for the maintenance of peace was in the minds of many people:

The problem of a universal Alliance for the peace and happiness of the world has always been one of speculation and of hope, but it has never yet been reduced to practice, and if an opinion may be hazarded from its difficulty, it never can; but you may in practice approach toward it, and perhaps the design has never been so far realized as in the last four years.¹

This was the opinion of the British Foreign Office at the time of the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818.

This Concert of Europe was planned to extend the strong hand of international conservatism to every corner of the continent. All threats of discontent on the part of the people were to be watched and every threatened outbreak was to be put down with celerity. The Concert arranged to hold a series of international conferences to provide for the "Repose and prosperity of nations."² The first congress held to adjust European problems was that of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, in which only the states of Austria, Prussia, Russia and Britain had a vote. Since repentant France was ready to pay her indemnity in full, the foreign troops were withdrawn and she was rather reluctantly admitted to the Concert which then became the Big Five rather than merely the Quadruple Alliance.³

The second congress was that of Troppau, called in 1820 to deal with the revolutions in Spain and Naples. Austria, Prussia and Russia drew up the famous doctrine of intervention asserting their right to interfere in cases where governments were changed by revolutions. With

1. Mowat, The European States System, p. 55.

2. Flick, op. cit., p. 136.

3. Ibid.

England dissenting, and France assenting only with certain reservations, these three powers claimed to have the right and duty to employ

peaceful or coercive measures which, in cases where important effects of a salutary influence could be obtained, might recall those States within the bosom of the Alliance... The exercise of this right became still more urgent when those who had placed themselves in that position (i.e. Revolution) sought to communicate to neighbouring States the misfortune in which they had themselves plunged, and to propagate revolution and confusion around them.¹

Acting on this assertion, an Austrian army suppressed the Neapolitan revolution.

The third international conference held at Laibach in 1821 authorized Austria's activities in Naples, while the Tsar of Russia notified the revolutionists in Greece of his disapproval of their uprising against Turkey. The Congress of Verona, convening in 1822, was confronted by a revolution in Spain and in her American colonies. Austria was left free to deal with a revolutionary outbreak in piedmont; Austria and Russia with the revolution in Greece; and France with that in Spain.²

The purpose of the Concert to preserve peace was unquestionably sincere, but the determination of the three autocratic members to use armed force to prevent peoples from disturbing the established order revealed the menace of the system to political progress. The Concert turned out to be a league of reactionary rulers and not of nations. The four congresses clearly revealed its purposes and methods. When it changed from a high court of justice to an alliance to perpetuate absolutism in the name of security, forces both within and without

1. Mowat, The European States System, p. 58.

2. Flick, op. cit., p. 136.

the Concert began to destroy its power.¹ The stand taken by Great Britain in refusing to accept the doctrine of Troppau, the American Monroe Doctrine, and liberal revolutions on the continent of Europe brought about its defeat. As early as 1827 Metternich wrote: "The union known by the name of the Alliance has been for some time little more than a pretense."²

Summing up the attitude of the autocratic powers, is this statement of Alexander I addressed in 1820 to the other members of the Concert of Europe:

During this memorable epoch, a united Europe has been able to smother the spirit of revolution and to create a new order of things safeguarding the general interest, under the aegis of Universal Justice. The means by which this end has been accomplished are: a) the alliance of the Powers unalterable in its principles, yet conformable to the progress of events, so that it may develop into a great confederation of all the states; b) the restoration of the legitimate governments in France fortified by institutions which unite indissolubly the rights of the Bourbons with those of the people; c) the declarations following the Congress of Vienna; and d) the subsequent declarations made in Paris in 1815.³

This association of states has assured the inestimable advantages of civil order and the inviolability of persons and institutions. It has consecrated and guaranteed everywhere legitimacy, and recognized by the treaties now in force, the territorial possessions of every state. In order to maintain this end, the principle of a General Coalition must be established and developed by further eventual action.⁴

With the Congress of Verona of 1822, the Congress Period came to an end. The sovereigns and high ministers of State no longer met, as it were automatically, to discuss any new matter in connection with the settlement of 1815. Nevertheless, the fruitful idea of the Concert went onward. The western, central, and eastern states of Europe now regarded themselves as a society of nations, as

1. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Cresson, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

guardians of European peace and civilization. In spite of their natural jealousies and conflicting aims, they recognized a common responsibility.¹

It would be wrong to assume that the Concert of Europe broke down over ideological causes, say nationalism and democracy. The conflict over interest, over power, over commercial advantage, over trade privilege had its share in the eventual triumph of national interest and economic nationalism. The Concert, because of its very nature, failed for the time to cope satisfactorily with any of these problems.

1. Mowat, The European States System, pp. 59-60.

Young Europe, Joseph Mazzini, 1834.

A decade later, a young Italian romanticist Joseph Mazzini conceived still another plan for a European union. Young Italy, the society that he had organized to secure the independence and unification of Italy, would be reproduced in similiar national groups throughout Europe, and these branches would be federated into a union called Young Europe.¹ Through this means he hoped to furnish Europe with a college of intellects, a sort of intellectual clearing-house for all the problems of democracy and nationality in Europe.²

His idea for the solution of the problems of the nations is suggested in his plans for Switzerland. Mazzini's ideal for Switzerland was to include it with the Tyrol and Savoy in a federation of republics, and substitute for the settlement of 1815 a true federal authority, representing the whole people and responsible to them rather than to the separate cantons. This idea was embodied in the Swiss constitution of 1848.³

The famed Act of Fraternization was signed on April 15, 1834, between Young Italy, Young Germany and Young Poland. Young Europe had become, at least on paper, a reality. Young Germany sent out its propagators. Young Russia and Young Poland, an unusual pair to say the least, were in conference over the possibilities of union. There was a committee of Young Europe in Gibraltar, and an Italian agent at Seville was working toward a Young Spain. Young France was being born at Lyons. Mazzini even had reason to hope that an English Committee would form in London. It appeared that the oppressed of all

1. Bolton King, The Life of Mazzini, (London: J. M. Bent & Sons, 1902), 63.

2. Stringfellow Barr, Mazzini, Portrait of an Exile, (New York: Henry Holt & Co.), 78.

3. King, op. cit., p. 65.

countried were combining.¹ It had also become evident that democracy and interests are international.²

In writing about the efforts of Young Europe, Mazzini said that the "rights" for which men strove in 1789 no longer suffice as the basis for action. Those rights were merely the negation of the outworn feudal organization. It is the affirmation of something more positive and more social than individual rights that Europe is in need of in 1834. Now it is not rights, but duty.³ A sense of man's duties will spring only out of religion. "As a political party we fell. Let us rise again as a religious party."⁴ The Holy Alliance of Peoples must challenge the Holy Alliance of the conservative monarchs. "With faith and action, the future is ours".⁵

Three years later when the future had seemingly failed him and his vision of a revolution of the common people, Mazzini wrote in defense of his Young Europe:

In Switzerland they are shouting that I have deserted Young Europe. Well, I say and shall say that Young Europe has deserted me: is there among the signatories one single person who shares my ideas on Young Europe? I say among the signatories, and so much the worse for those signatories if they did not understand it or made mental reservations... And because no one shares this faith of mine, am I responsible? Am I abandoning, am I deserting, Young Europe, when my Young Europe is not yours?⁶

But it was in the light of high endeavor that Young Europe, even Young Switzerland, Germany, Poland, Russia and France and the rest of the idealistic associations were formed and then expired.

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1. Barr, op. cit., p. 79.
 2. King, op. cit., p. 64.
 3. Barr, op. cit., p. 84.
 4. Ibid., p. 85.
 5. Ibid., p. 86.
 6. Ibid., p. 149.

In spite of the failure of his dreams, Mazzini believed that enormous latent forces in Europe awaited the forms that would allow them expression. On that premise, there was method in his madness.¹

Mazzini said that Young Europe would create a new philosophy, a new literature, a new political economy. He felt that the absolute governments would surely try to take advantage of every opportunity to stamp out the Swiss form of government, the republican state, and that only one thing could prevent this catastrophe--a league of freemen of all countries, an organization like his Young Europe.

In the "General Instruction for the Initiators", Mazzini defined terms of international organization and association as this:

Young Europe is an association of men believing in a future of liberty, equality, and fraternity, for all mankind; and desirous of consecrating their thoughts and actions to the realization of that future.

No true association is possible save among free men and equals.

By the law of God, given by Him to humanity, all men are free, are brothers, and are equals.

Liberty is the right of every man to exercise his facilities without impediment or restraint, in the accomplishment of his special mission, and in the choice of the means most conducive to its accomplishment.

Equality implies the recognition of uniform rights and duties for all men--for none may escape the action of the law by which they are defined --and every man should participate in proportion to his labour, in the enjoyment of the produce resulting from the activity of all the social forces.

Fraternity is the reciprocal affection, the sentiment which inclines man to do unto others as he would that others should do unto him.

1. Ibid., p. 88.

All privilege is a violation of Equality.
 All arbitrary rule is a violation of Liberty
 All acts of egoism are violations of Fraternity.¹

These are the ideas that thrived in an age dominated by Metternich. These are the revolutionary concepts that were feared by the autocrats of the nineteenth century. The romantic, nationalistic movement, ignored by the status quo statesmen, contained the pulse and feeling of the peoples of subjected countries. The idea of the national mission, and the association of all freemen of all countries could find expression only in riot and revolution in this age.

The Europe of Mazzini's day, like the Europe of the time of Henry IV, of Louis XIV, of Napoleon I, and of Metternich, was not politically and philosophically mature enough to accept the idealistic principles of Young Europe. But the fact that the democratic, equalitarian aspect of European confederation had been realized, even by a romantic visionary, is a significant point in the history of peace and international relations. The European states system had evolved to the place where nationality and democracy, the contrasting twins of the French Revolution, were recognized and accepted as factors for consideration.

1. Ignazio Silone, The Living Thoughts of Mazzini, (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1939), 117-121.

Conclusion

The problem of the formation of a system for the preservation of European peace was not solved either by the schemes of the philosophers and visionaries, or by the actual settlements of diplomatic events in the seventeenth, eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. The solution of the same problem has been attempted twice in the twentieth century with no apparant guarantee of permanent results. Thus, in this evolutionary process of the development of human relations along social, economic, religious, cultural and political lines, the present day historian must not condemn past failures when his own generation with its added advantage of hind sight has given no better answer to the problem of peace.

The diplomatic settlements, the treaties of Westphalia, Utrecht, Vienna, that this paper has considered in some detail, are the result of the realistic actualities of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth century European politics. The rise of the modern national state, indelible results of the balance of power, the false hope of peace by the concert method, all these trends were legalized by the various congresses of Europe during the three centuries. Often treaties simply acknowledge existing conditions, merely echo the temper of the times--the ideas of thinkers, the ambition of rulers, the aims of the classes, the schemes of diplomats. To a certain extent, this analysis holds true of the treaties of Westphalia, Utrecht and Vienna. But over and above this, each of these settlements, in addition to restoring peace with the end of a major European war, contributed materially toward the building of the modern states system. Westphalia, the

first of the great European conferences, recognized and established the States System. It came to be considered as a great instrument of public law, standardizing that system and providing authoritative guidance in any dispute threatening to upset the equilibrium which it had established.

The Peace of Utrecht, restoring once more the equilibrium that had been threatened by Louis XIV, sanctioned the principle of balance of power as the accepted instrument of the European States System. The increased power of Savoy in Italy and of Prussia in the Germanies, is a typical example of the results of the balance of power.

With the Congress of Vienna and its reorganization of the States System on the basis of compensation and legitimacy, the prospect of European peace brightened. The concert principle as advocated by the rulers of Europe, as evidenced by the conferences following the Vienna settlement, was considered adequate to cope with future international problems. These three treaties were necessary in the evolution of Modern Europe. The nineteenth century, the product of these diplomatic settlements, happened to be without major wars; the same period could have been the realization of the dreams of the philosophers had not the principle of federative polity fallen in the face of nationalistic ambition.¹

1. "This is the concept of 'federative polity' applied herein to problems of federalism within a state, confederation among states, and quasi-confederal relations of states generally. It...is the polity that emphasizes the political relations of adjustment among equals rather than the political relationships of inferiority and superiority, and of methods of law rather than methods of force.." Robert Binkley, Realism and Nationalism, 1852-1871, The Rise of Modern Europe, ed. W.L. Langer, (New York: Harper Brothers 1935), xix.

On the theoretical side of the peace question, this paper has considered the schemes of men on the European scene in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. None of these plans, from the Grand Design to the Association of Young Europe, were ever put into practice, per se. However, the contributions of these men have not remained in the realm of ideas alone. Some of the concepts which they put into circulation, have had definite effect on the history of peace.

The religious solution affected by the Grand Design was adopted in the settlement of Westphalia; the political organism of federation has been advocated since, even in our time, as a medium through which European peace might be achieved. From the foundation established by Hugo Grotius, international law has evolved into a very real force in the activities of nations. The ideal of universal disarmament as voiced by the Abbe Saint-Pierre is still considered one of the most logical methods for the preservation of the general peace. From Immanuel Kant the nineteenth century was inspired toward the goal of republicanism, that form of government being the most conducive to membership in an effective league of peace-seeking nations. The political ideas of Alexander I, as evidenced in his Instructions to Novosiltzov and in his Holy Alliance, are typical of the dualistic thought of the century. On the one hand is the pragmatic plan for European union under the guidance of Great Britain and Russia and on the other hand is the paternalistic impractical plan of Christian idealism; realism and romanticism in the thought of one man in the nineteenth century is echoed in the activities of nations in the same period. The Association of Young Europe as envisioned by the

romantic Mazzini had a short-lived existence but one of its aims was fulfilled when Europe as a whole took cognizance of the principles of nationalism and democracy; these were the offsprings of the French Revolution, the ideas that had been ignored by the Congress of Vienna. Thus, to say that the efforts of these thinkers had been fruitless, would be to maintain that such concepts had not played a very important role in the drama of Modern Europe.

The ideal of European peace, or of world peace for that matter, remains a hope and a dream for those men who see in the light of all history a constant progress in the attitude of human loyalties. From fanatical loyalty to the family, the tribe, the clan, the city-state, the nation, man may develop into a creature whose devotion to the world cause is supreme. In this slow and tedious process, the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, consciously or unconsciously, made no mean contribution.

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