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AESTHETICS OF SPORT: A METACRITICAL ANALYSIS

by

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APPROVAL PAGE

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WULK, NANCY GAYLE. Aesthetics of Sport: A Metacritical Analysis. (1977) Directed by: Dr. Celeste Ulrich. Pp. 144.

This study attempted to analyze and synthesize the concepts of sport and metacritical aesthetics and to utilize that philosophical base from which to speculate on the nature of a metacritical aesthetic of sport. Two complementary tools of philosophical research were utilized: "theory building" as described by Fraleigh (1970), and "analysis of the structure of knowledge" as developed by Gowin (1969). Fraleigh's design outlined steps or elements with which general and particular phenomena of interest are examined for consistency with and derivation from an existing philosophic statement. Gowin's methodology, which suggested the positing of a series of telling and connecting questions to explore a philosophical concept, was utilized to identify the germinal issues. The philosophical and experimental literature of aesthetics and sport was examined to identify the major ideas and concepts associated with the general phenomenon of interest, sport; the source philosophy, metacriticism; and with the particular phenomenon of interest, an aesthetic of sport.

Beardsley's (1958) metacritical aesthetic theory was selected as the source philosophy. Critical reasoning about aesthetic experiences presupposes general principals upon which judgments about particular experiences deductively depend. Beardsley proposed the three elements of unity, intensity and complexity as the aesthetic-designating factors on which judgments about particular aesthetic experiences and works of art rely. The exhibition in sport of the aesthetic-designating factors comprises the conventional matrix which defines a metacritical aesthetic of sport.

The findings of the study disclosed that sport exhibited the aesthetic-designating factors of unity, intensity and complexity as defined by the metacritical aesthetic theory. Sport, by the nature of the literature, was found to be properly designated as aesthetic activity. This investigation has provided a germinal foundation for the concept, aesthetics of sport. From this base, additional study into philosophical, empirical and experimental concerns can be postulated with the assurance that the fundamental issue of the existence of an aesthetics of sport has been explored.

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The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful supportive role of her committee, friends and family. The conception, formulation and actualization of this study would not have been possible without the emotional support, technical assistance and critical guidance of a great many people.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

> The next area of development in physical education will, I believe, be in the aesthetic field (McCloy, 1940, p. 301).

Thirty-five years is a long time to wait if you are supposed to be "next," but ultimately McCloy's prognosis regarding the future association of physical education and aesthetics is coming to pass. The late 1960's saw a surge of sport/art interest. Aestheticians and sports theorists alike began to explore the mutuality of their previously considered diverse fields.

Thomas (1974), Lowe (1971, 1977), Fisher (1972), Anthony (1968), Keenan (1972), and Kovich (1971) are among the physical educators who have begun recently to explore the association of sport and the aesthetic. From the aestheticians come Saw (1971), Reid (1970), Hein (1969) and Kuntz (1974), who have looked at man's sport and play activities as a part of the aesthetic concern. Aesthetic awareness and evaluation in relation to sport <u>is</u> being considered with encouraging frequency in current professional and popular literature.

These considerations are usually two-pronged and may be oriented either toward the performers' or audiences' viewpoint. Most of the literature deals with an examination of the feeling/aesthetic aspects of the performers' awareness. Authors explore "the perfect moment," "the peak experience" and the ". . . feeling of perfect rhythm, of timing, of perfection of technique that leads to intense joy of expression" (McCloy,

1940, p. 32). The performance or audience-oriented point of view is generally represented by discussions of empathic responses to sport situations and by critical descriptions of the movements in sport using the terminology of art and aesthetics: grace, beauty, power and mastery are words used in the appraisal of art and in the appraisal of sport. Maheu (1965) commenting on the correlation of art and sport, suggested, "In the action and rhythm which testify to mastery of space and time, sport becomes akin to the arts which create beauty" (p. 32). But the theoretical relationship between aesthetics and sport is assumed rather than explored in current literature. To date, the concept, "aesthetic of sport," has never been studied with the intent of justifying the existence of the assumption. As Lowe (1971) stated, "the question of what is the 'sport aesthetic' has been left unanswered far too long" (p. 16).

The philosophical justification for an acceptance of the concept of a sport-aesthetic can be found in the literature of both aesthetics and sport. Each area of knowledge has led up to a conceptual merger of ideas but neither has crossed the border. This paper attempts to cross the boundary by relating the conceptual framework of metacritical aesthetic theory to the sport-philosophy literature dealing with the aesthetic/art aspects of sport.

Play/Art/Aesthetic Concepts

The historical precedent for the consideration of a sport-aesthetic can be found in the play/art/aesthetic concepts literature. Seward's (1944) projection of play as art was proposed as a refutation to a consideration of the close relationship between play and art. He indicated

that many of the justifications for play such as preparation for life, surplus energy, catharsis, and imitation have been utilized also to justify art. He concluded that both are engaged in for the enjoyment of the activity.

Seward contended that the form of play is important to the child and, therefore, the interest in play is esthetic rather than kinesthetic. He did admit a very close relationship between esthetic and kinesthetic interests and satisfactions but subscribed to the viewpoint that the form elements of play (boundaries, rules, etc.) made the esthetic more important. Seward understood play and art as clarifying experience. The form elements of both promote order.

> It is true that in so far as play is recreation, it is escape. It is an escape from the relative chaos of ordinary experience to a world where there is a rational and moral order, plainly visible and not simply the object of faith. The play experience is, then, like art, a clarification of experience (Seward, 1944, p. 184).

Schiller's (1968) classical play theory of art is germinal to this discussion. Schiller's doctrine of play indicated that aesthetic activity (referring to contemplation rather than creation) is the highest form of play. Man possesses a primary "play impulse" which synthesizes his sensuous (animal/material) nature and his formal (rational) nature. "In the play experience man's dual nature is harmonized and humanized" (Hein, 1968, p. 67). Play is an inborn desire to create form out of impressions.

> Perhaps, as Schiller has said, man plays and engages in sport to give satisfaction to his creative imagination. He plays and moves and strives somehow in some way to build and create beauty (Parker, 1965, p. 80).

To Schiller, the relationship between art and play was essentially genetic. Both are manifestations of the play impulse but art is a more mature or complex ("higher") form of play.

Hein's (1969) play aesthetic theory was similar to Schiller's. She saw the relationship between play and aesthetics but felt that Schiller's analysis was deficient in that it valued play, which was defined as spontaneous and intrinsically motivated, for the extrinsic value of aesthetic satisfactions. Hein indicated that this confusion of intrinsic and extrinsic valuation weakened Schiller's position but that the premise of a basic relationship between the aesthetic and play was a sound one.

> Play is not exhaustively described as unreal, nor does the characterization apply to it alone. It is just the fact that it has this quality in common with aesthetic activity and, perhaps, with a number of other activities, that makes the project of exploring the one in terms of the other worthwhile (Hein, 1969, p. 28).

Hein (1969) indicated that Schiller became too involved with the moral equivalency of play and aesthetic activity. This tended to obscure all other relationships which might be found. For this reason, Huizinga's (1972) non-instrumental definition of play was utilized by Hein in her analysis.

The quality of unreality in play which Hein preferred to label "detachment from reality," is "the true bond between the playful and the aesthetic" (Hein, 1969, p. 70). Aesthetic contemplation may or may not be spontaneous or immediately pleasurable (all qualities found in play), but it does require an artificial distinction between the aesthetic activity and an individual's ordinary sense of reality. This suspension of reality has been called "assuming the aesthetic attitude," but that is just a label. The important concept, according to Hein (1969), is that both play and aesthetic activity share the quality of unreality and that the long tradition of association between the two is well-founded.

Groos (1972) was also influenced by Schiller's analysis of play from the aesthetic standpoint. He believed that both play and aesthetic pleasure are connected with sense perception and are genuine sources of enjoyment. There are points of similarity between sense play and aesthetic enjoyment according to Groos. Both are perceptually oriented; they require the total absorption of the creator; technical skill is needed (here Groos extended his discussion to mention the technical side of sport); and both involve the seeking of recognition and appreciation (display). Groos saw art as being rooted in playful experimentation and imitation.

Sadler (1969) saw play as a basic form of creativity and as a mode of forming one's personal world. He argued for a play theory which treats play as a basic form of human behavior rather than a behavior pattern outgrown by adults.

> Certainly art and play interpenetrate in the struggle of imagination to become free; and both aid man in his search to rediscover the originality of his own existence and to see his world with a fresh new vision (Sadler, 1969, p. 67).

Sport in Art

Another justification for the consideration of a sport-aesthetic can be found in the utilization of sport activity as the subject matter of art.

> Sports writer Allison Danzig eloquently describes the bond between sport and art. "The alliance of art and sports is a natural one. The disciplined, rhythmic movements of the athlete--the flow of power in running a race, pulling an oar, throwing the discus, a baseball, or a football, swinging a tennis racquet or a golf club, jabbing and feinting in the ring--are expressions in a different form of the beauty and enchantment of a fine painting or piece of sculpture" (Ingram, 1973, p. 24).

Artists have utilized sport as the subject matter of their art for thousands of years. According to Lipman (1957), the role of the human body in creative and appreciative experience has three aspects: as qualitative presence (body-image); as favored instrument of creative accomplishment; and as subject matter of the arts.

> From a mere thing, the body thus becomes an instrument, and from an instrument it becomes a medium and a primary subject-matter of the arts (Lipman, 1957, p. 432).

Ancient artists depicted athletic feats and events in their cave murals and in the decorations on practical, everyday objects. The Greeks and Romans glorified sport and its participants in their art. Myron's Discus Thrower and Appotenios' The Seated Boxer are two famous examples of ancient attempts to capture and record the instant of peak action and the essence of excitement attendant to sport performances.

Modern artists such as Thomas Eakins, Winslow Homer, R. Tait McKenzie, Joseph Brown, Pablo Picasso and Alexander Calder have turned their attention to sport. These artists have utilized a myriad of styles, techniques and art mediums to deal with sport subjects.

> Paintings, drawings, and sculptures can idealize or particularize the event that occurred, and while some artists tend to portray rigor and realism with photographic exactness, others present an abstraction of moving forms and figures. Descriptive artists can be categorized as social historians because their paintings depict life as it was in the past. Impressionistic artists suggest the quality of the movement: weightlessness, strength, beauty of motion, or mood of the action (Ingram, 1973, p. 26).

Toynbee (1972) indicated that there are several reasons why sports activities are "a particularly sympathetic and stimulating source of inspiration to artists" (p. 305). The sport elements of balance, control and interrelated/interdependant patterns of action are qualities of

design which are valued by artists. The competitive themes of sport, by fostering intensity and complexity, provide the artist with unique and often unexpected patterns and designs. Toynbee described sport art as an opportunity to depict "the oldest and possibly most universally interesting of all subject matter . . ." (1972, p. 306)--the human body. The aesthetic possibilities of the human figure in action have absorbed artists for ages. Sport, with its emphasis on the body, offers almost unlimited possibilities and themes.

The extent of the relationship between sport and art can further be demonstrated by the establishment in 1968 of the National Art Museum of Sport in New York City (Ingram, 1973). The museum has a permanent collection of sculpture, drawings and paintings and has even commissioned artists to create new works for the collection.

The American Alliance for Health, Physical Education and Recreation and the National Art Education Association have recognized the art and sport commonalities through the preparation in 1969 of the filmstrip, Art and Sport. The more than fifty color slides of art works covers ancient to modern times and is accompanied by an audiotape which was designed to enhance the perception of the viewer. The purpose of Art and Sport was to bring attention to the bond between art and sport and to demonstrate "just how moving is beauty and how beautiful is movement" (AAHPER and NAEA, 1968).

Statement of the Problem

This study was designed to analyze and synthesize the instrumental and institutional concepts of metacritical aesthetics and to utilize this as a basis for speculation on the nature of a metacritical aesthetic of

sport. The delineation of philosophical theory concerning the nature of an aesthetic of sport was examined for concepts consistent with current metacritical theory.

Method and Design

This study has utilized two complementary types of philosophical research: "theory building" as described by Fraleigh (1970), and "analysis of the structure of knowledge" as developed by Gowin (1969a). The procedural design followed Fraleigh's format and the method of inquiry utilized Gowin's telling and connecting questions.

Fraleigh's (1970) design for theory building is an "examination of a particular phenomenon in terms and structures consistent with and derived from an existing philosophic statement" (p. 30). The steps or elements of theory building are flexible enough to permit their application to widely differing research problems. For the purposes of this study, those described by Fraleigh (1970) were used.

The elements which were used are as follows:

1. choosing the general phenomenon of interest. In the case of this study, the general phenomenon is sport.

2. selection of a facet of the phenomenon for extensive study. The particular phenomenon of interest is the aesthetic of sport.

3. selection, description and explanation of the source philosophy. The researcher chose the interrelated instrumental and institutional theories of Beardsley (1958) and Dickie (1971, 1974).

4. relating the philosophy to the specific phenomenon of interest. Sport was examined to see if any characteristics were consistent with the aesthetic-designating factors of the source theories.

Gowin's (1969a) method for the analysis of the structure of knowledge was used to collate the phenomenon of sport and the philosophical positions of Beardsley (1958) and Dickie (1971, 1974).

Gowin's (1969a) method for the analysis of structure of knowledge employs the use of a series of telling and connecting questions to explore a philosophical concept. The telling questions lie at the crux of the inquiry and, by their nature, prompt the formation of other questions. These other connecting questions, of a secondary nature, are important to the answering of the telling questions. "That there are a number of connected or secondary questions with answers indicates that there is a structure of knowledge consisting of these interrelationships" (Gowin, 1969a, p. 3).

Telling and connecting questions were identified to define the statement of the problem. These questions focused on the central concerns of aesthetics, sport and their interrelationship(s).

Telling Question: Is there an aesthetic of sport?

Connecting Questions: A. What is aesthetics?

B. What factors designate an object as a candidate for appreciation?

1. What examples can be found which demonstrate the utilization of these factors?

C. What is sport?

D. What factors designate an activity as sport?

1. What examples can be found which demonstrate the utilization of these factors?

Telling Question: Can an aesthetic of sport be defined?

Connecting Questions: A. What aesthetic-designating factors are exhibited by sport?

1. What examples can be found which demonstrate the utilization of these factors?

B. Is the exhibition of these factors central or peripheral to sport?

1. What examples can be shown to demonstrate the central or peripheral nature of these factors?

Telling Question: Can sport be classified relative to the aesthetic?

Connecting Questions: A. Is there variability in the exhibition of aesthetic-designating factors?

1. What examples can be shown to demonstrate this variability?

B. Is there variability in the visibility of these factors?

1. What examples can be shown to demonstrate this variability?

Telling Question: Can a paradigm be formulated for an aesthetic of sport?

The philosophical and experimental literature of aesthetics and sport was examined to identify the major ideas and concepts associated with the general phenomenon of interest, sport; the source philosophy, metacriticism; and with the particular phenomenon of interest, an aesthetic of sport.

Definition of Terms

For the purpose of this study, the set of definitions prepared by Gowin (1969b) for use in philosophical inquiry were utilized.

Assumption	"statement or proposition upon which other statements may depend. Something taken for granted, a supposition. Not tested although it could be converted into a hypothesis for testing" (p. 1).
Presupposition	"assumption made in advance, a necessary antecedent condition in logic or fact" (p. 1).
Concept	"sign of an invariance in a situation, . . . a theoretical construct, an abstract idea" (p. 1).
Conceptual System	"set of concepts logically related" (p. 1).
Philosophical Theory	"cluster of problems with family resemblances" (p. 3).
Principle	"statement which points out the key features of given phenomena which, if known correctly, is a guide to the action of the thing or phenomena" (p. 3).
Telling Questions	"question which when asked seems to suggest other questions: it tells one what to ask next. It is a leading question . . ." (p. 3).
Connecting Questions	"secondary questions with answers indicating that there is a structure of knowledge consisting of these interrelationships" (p. 3).

Assumptions

The underlying assumptions of this study were basically those for theory-building research defined by Fraleigh (1970). They were particularized for this inquiry.

1. That the particular aesthetic theories utilized are valid;

2. That instrumental and institutional aesthetic theories are appropriate philosophical positions from which to interpret sport;

3. That the researcher has an adequate background in the areas of

aesthetics and sport theory and an accurate and adequate grasp of the basic tenets of the aesthetic and sport concepts under consideration.

Limitations of the Study

This study was limited to an analysis of sport interpreted in relation to metacritical aesthetic theory.

The language of aesthetics is often highly specific and obscure. The "sense" of words is seldom identified and, therefore, confusion in the use of terminology is often found. "Art" and "aesthetics" are two terms which exchange descriptive and evaluative senses almost as often as they are used. This study was limited to the author's ability to discern the correct sense of aesthetic terminology.

An additional delimitation is characteristic of all philosophical research and involves availability of literature, selection and interpretation of that literature and the writer's capacity to demonstrate logically derived relationships within the problem.

Significance of the Study

Philosophy and theory building have enjoyed both significance and meaning throughout recorded history. Aesthetics, as a recognized branch of philosophy, is relatively new. Sport theory can also be considered a noviate in the theoretical conjectures regarding activity patterns. An initial investigation into the possible interrelationships between aesthetics and sport could be significant if it provided a foundation from which other studies could proceed. Without a philosophical base or theoretical assurance, the concept of an aesthetic of sport is irrational and, therefore, virtually unjustified.

This study has provided a germinal foundation for a concept which has become increasingly significant and meaningful to many sport theorists and aestheticians. From this base, additional study into philosophical, empirical and experimental concerns can be postulated with the assurance that the fundamental issue of the existence of an aesthetic of sport has been explored.

CHAPTER II

WHAT IS SPORT?

The purpose of a definition is to identify, to explain the nature of, to specify the essential qualities of something. When the question "What is . . . ?" is asked, the questioner is generally seeking an essential definition. The purpose of such a definition is to describe the necessary and sufficient conditions of the thing to be defined. Allowance must be made to include all members of the class to be defined and care must be taken to exclude all which is not a member. An essential definition implies that there is that point at which can be drawn the line which says: That belongs and that does not. This can happen, according to Weitz (1970), only in logic, mathematics or in the sciences in which the concepts are constructed and are completely defined. In the fields which deal with empirically descriptive and normative concepts, the necessary and sufficient conditions cannot be stipulated unless the range of use of the concept being defined is arbitrarily closed. This arbitrary closing of the range of use of a concept is called, in empirical research, an operational definition. The definition is then specific to the situation and the use to which it is applied.

Historically, when philosophers (in whatever field) proposed a definition, their fellow theorists would examine the definition critically for loopholes and fallacious or circular thinking. Semantic analysis "proved" the worth or worthlessness of the definition. Rigorous

inspection followed by an essay denouncing the definition as somehow inadequate was the general pattern until Wittgenstein proposed his doctrine of family resemblances. This theory circumvents the traditional objections to a proposed definition by indicating that there are no clear-cut necessary and sufficient conditions to define concepts. All those entities to which are applied a common name (like sport or art) do not necessarily possess any one or two features in common. They may be related through the crisscrossing and overlapping of resembling features. A problem arises with the doctrine of family resemblances when one tries to limit the application of a given word.

Some balance must be established between the strictness of essential definitions and the looseness of open-textured, family resemblance-type explanations or definitions. This balance is sought with the demonstration of relationships among operationally defined subconcepts. This balance is partially found in contextual definitions. The definitions of "What is art?" and "What is sport?" are derived from what they are (structurally and organizationally) and by what they "do" (to the creator/participant and to the audience/critic/spectator).

Both art and sport are extremely complex and abstract concepts. Attempts to define them date back to their inceptions. Both are known to practically everyone but neither have been defined to anyone's complete satisfaction. Each succumbs to Kennick's (1968) "warehouse theory." Ask a friend to go into a warehouse and bring out all the art or sport objects and he will do so. Then ask him to get all the objects which display "significant form," "organic unity," "competition," or "alea" and he will return empty-handed and baffled. He knows what a

sport or art object looks like, but does not know what to look for when told to retrieve objects which possess "symbolic transformation" or which display "agon."

It can be contended that if the obtuse terms were defined or if the context of their usage were explained, then our friend would have the same success regardless of the wording of the task directions. This paper will attempt to define the terms "sport" and "aesthetics" with such clarity.

Numerous authors, when writing about sport, play, games and athletics, do not define the context of their terminological usage. The word, "sport," is applied to a variety of situations. Each application is specific to a context of usage and that context is often understood only after careful reading and interpretation. Suits' (1973) sport is Kent's (1975) game; Weiss' (1969) sport is Kent's (1975) athletics; and Loy's (1968) multiple definition of sport encompasses most of the current usages. It is up to the individual reader to discern the particular "meaning" of an author's terminology. Only by careful inspection can the various sport theorists and theories be differentiated and defined.

Few would deny that the experiencing of sport has effects on both the performers and the spectators involved. In fact, involvement is the key to the affective response to sport. Some authors, in their definitional efforts, choose to look at what they consider to be the basic nature of sport: its organizational and structural pattern. By describing the readily apparent aspects of sports, they indicate that it is the structure and organization which allow sport activities to be identified as different from other patterns of behavior. Other theorists see the

"center" or definitive issue of what is or is not sport in relation to the responses and involvement of the performers and spectators. They do not deny structure and organization, but they indicate by their extension of the concept of sport, that the interactional patterns of behavior are germinal to the meaning of sport. A third group of sport definitions can also be identified. These more complex definitional efforts attempt to combine the previously described emphases, structure and involvement, with varying degrees of success.

Structural/Organizational Definitions

The structural/organizational definitions can be introduced with the anthropologist's answer to the "What is sport?" question (Leonard, 1975). Sport is designated as organized play which involves competition among two or more sides. There are criteria to determine a winner and the pattern of play must follow agreed-upon (by the participants) rules.

Metheny (1969) posed the problem to her students to differentiate between those activities called sport and those which are called something else. They tried to identify a set of characteristics common to all types of sport activities (an essential definition). Metheny's definition of sport, then, refers to a diverse set of activities or organizations of human behavior which involve at least one performer who moves within a specific environment with the objective being to bring about overt changes in the locations or appearance of specified animals, objects and/or other persons. These actions are governed by concocted rules or agreements which specify the allowable procedures. A stasis, chaos, stasis rhythm is developed with the contest whereby after each attempt to achieve the objective, the performers return to their initial

positions. Some typical patterns involve solo, side-by-side, parallel and face-to-face performances. The values a person might find in experiencing sport are not considered in this definitional effort.

Suits' (1973) definition of sport is a game which involves physical skill and which has a fairly stable, wide following. A game has a goal, the means for achieving the goal, both constitutive and skill rules and an acceptance of the rules by the participants. "Playing a game is the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles" (Suits, 1973, p. 55). Sport, to Suits might best be expressed as "popular sport."

Loy (1968) defined sport in relation to the various planes of discourse utilized in the reference to the concept. Consideration of sport as an institutionalized game and as a social institution are essentially structural definitions. The institutionalized game plan treats sport in relation to its degree of organization. Teams, sponsorship, norms and sanctions set sport apart from other concepts. Sport requires technology: the intrinsic elements involving equipment, physical skills of players, knowledge of the rules; and the extrinsic elements associated with facilities, and the skills and knowledges of support and coaching personnel. Sport also has a symbolic sphere including elements of secrecy, ritual and display. Lastly, the physical skills of sport are transmitted through formal instruction. Sport is institutionalized; games are not.

Loy (1968) extended the notion of sport as an institutional pattern to a consideration of sport as a social situation. Sport is so pervasive that its magnitude qualifies it for designation as an institution. Sport as a social institution refers to the sport order. All organizations in society, whether primary, technical, managerial or corporate,

which organize, assist or regulate human action in sport situations comprise the sport order. This view of sport is broader than the view of sport as an institutional game.

Summary. The organizational/structural definitions see sport as involving skilled human patterns of play occurring within spatial, temporal and organizational limits. Each has different aspects of sport on which it focuses, but all include the definitive factors of space and time use and organizational patterns. (See Appendix A.)

Interactional Definitions

The interactional or psychologically-centered definitions focus on what happens to the performers or the audience. They generally begin with the common factors from the structural definitions but they go much farther and center their emphasis on the affective behavior patterns. For this reason, it is somewhat harder to discern commonalities among these definitions.

Huizinga's (1972) play theory is germinal to many of the interactional definitions. He postulated that play is free and voluntary; it is outside ordinary life into the intense and absorbing "only pretending" life; it has rules and spatial and temporal boundaries and is ordered within its sphere of influence. Play has tension brought on by uncertainty of outcome and promotes the formation of cohesive groups who cloak themselves with secrecy to highlight their "difference" to those not in the group. Huizinga saw play as being on the opposite end of a long continuum from work.

Caillois (1972) looked at games in an effort to satisfactorily classify them. He despaired of other classification systems which

designated differences in relation to who played or where play was held or what implements were used. Caillois felt that many game activities may employ several of these classifications and several very different games can be played in the same spatial boundaries or by the same players or with the same implements. Caillois concluded that the attitudes of the players should be the classifying factor.

He proposed four original principles, each of which dominates yet interacts with the others. Competition (agon), chance (alea), simulation (mimicry) and vertigo (ilinx) are designated as the four main rubrics. Within these divisions, game behavior occurs on a continuum from free improvisation (paida) to total discipline (ludus).

Luschen (1967) indicated that sport is interactional activity which is both rational and playful. The rewards earned through participation are extrinsic and, as the rewards become greater, the more the players "work" at the sport. He obviously saw sport involvement on a continuum somewhere between work and play.

Loy's (1968) consideration of sport as a social situation involves the social context within which individuals interact. The distinctions among sport situations are decided on the basis of the degree and kind of interactional involvement. Two kinds of involvement (producers and consumers) and three degrees of involvement (primary, secondary and tertiary) allow all sport interactions to be classified. The players are primary producers and the coaches and officials occupy a secondary role. The primary consumers are those who see the contest "live"; the secondary consumer is involved through mass media; and the person who reads about the outcome is a tertiary or vicarious consumer.

Loy does not mention it, but an individual could, within the temporal confines of one contest, take several roles. A cheering bench-warmer who periodically dons the spotter's earphones would cross from primary consumer to secondary producer. When he gets into the game, he then becomes a primary producer and acts out his real reason for being there.

Another view of sport is offered by Dunning (1967) in a paper intended to demonstrate that sport is not "unreal" or "irreal" but is real because the sporting behavior is overt and clearly observable. He sought his definition in a sociological analysis and saw the function of sport being to provide a pleasurable tension-excitement. This is accomplished by a group configuration characterized by the level of involvement of the players and spectators and the degree of equality among opposing players in terms of skills and strengths. The rules of the contest are designed to reduce arbitrary advantages caused by environmental conditions and the outcome must be uncertain. The rules or organization of a sport situation are often changed to maintain or restore the dynamic tension-balance. Official rule changes which point this out are the designated hitter in baseball, the tie-break procedure in tennis and the 30-second clock in basketball. Organizational changes are generally less formal and are clearly shown when players are "swapped" from one team to another to make the competition more equal and when the rules are "bent" to allow for the skill level or the number of participants.

McIntosh (1968) classified sport in relation to the motives and satisfactions which sport gives. He did not look at the activity itself. McIntosh utilized the three concepts of competition, combat and conquest

to differentiate among the various sport situations. Physical activity which does not involve one of these three concepts is placed in a rather nebulous expressive/communicative area. He expressed succinctly the dilemma of the theorists who look at sport from a sociological or interactional point of view:

> Sport, then, touches human life at many points--so many that it is difficult to define the concept or set limits to sporting activity (p. 10).

Jeu (1972) asked the question "What is sport?" and followed with an interesting, if rambling, discussion of the various "things" sport is. He utilized a tri-level theory to define sport. His initial assumption was that sport is both physically and emotionally exertive. On the first level of his theory, sport is a free (in the Huizinga sense), open-air activity involving competition and requiring a systematic effort to discipline the body. The second level explains that sport allows community with nature and it allows man to overcome his natural heaviness and to free himself from any felt alienation from his body. Competitive sport, according to Jeu, adds the confrontation with the other both within the self and with others.

The third stage of the definition deals specifically with the competitive aspect of sport. Sport is tragedy, mastery of self before mastery of an opponent, self-determination in relation to freely choosing the sport and adopting its rules, and cooperation before competition. Jeu indicated that, "The principle which brings individuals together in sport is the will to fight." There must be an agreement to compete or there is no contest.

Jeu made an interesting point in differentiating between sport and game:

> Thus sport favours science and law; the game, by contrast, remains in the domain of instability and fantasy: it finishes as it begins, to the delight of everyone. Lastly, sport differs from the game in so far as it takes the game seriously (p. 155).

Additionally, game depends on chance and external forces and sport is anti-chance. In sport, the outcome is predicted because of the performers, not because of external causes. Within the discussion of sport, Jeu designated the heart of sport to be the feature of tragedy. "Tragedy in sport opposes two finite selves each of which wants to impose its infinite will upon the other" (p. 162). The outcome is uncertain and dynamic tension and intensity are built by the opposition of will.

Slusher's (1967) existential sport is serious, centered around the physical body and communal. Being is both the object and goal in his explanation of the individual's involvement in sport. In a sport situation, man is both the mover and the moved. Sport has rules and regulations, it has ritual, and it is a social institution. The center or spirit of the concept, to Slusher, lies with four factors: contention of interest which involves commitment and rules-determined outcomes, consistency of role carrying a need for individual and group decision-making, utilization-actualization involving ". . . maximization of individual effort toward utilitarian ends" (p. 47), and variable predictability which indicates that the controlling variables in sport cannot be predicted but those in games can. This last factor provides the differentiation between sport and game.

Summary. All of these interactional definitions discuss the involvement and competitive aspects of sport. They begin with an acceptance of the physical, bodily nature of the activities and center their theories in the degree and/or kind of involvement among the individuals in the sport situations. (See Appendix A.)

Complex/Combinational Definitions

Several sport theorists have utilized complex, combinational definitions to "explain" sport. They describe the structural/organizational features and then go on to concern themselves with the interactional affects. This straddling of the structure vs. affect fence could be construed as a theoretical weakness but the author does not see it as such in the theories described below. Rather than shifting the focus between two "centers," which would weaken the arguments, most of these theorists have broadened central concepts to include both structural/organizational and interactional features.

Weiss' (1969) structural description indicated that sport is a rule-governed bodily adventure which has boundaries, strategies and tactics. The other aspect of his explanation postulated that man engages in sport to seek excellence and completion of self. This striving for perfection and selfhood explains why people train and compete when to do so often involves pain, deprivation, discouragement and failure. His theory is somewhat unique in that he applied it directly to athlete and spectator alike. Most theorists discuss the spectator's involvement only in an incidental way.

According to Kenyon (1974), sport is "institutionalized, competitive, gross physical activity. Its major elements are its form, its

participants, its facilitators, and the situation in which it occurs" (p. 20). The form of sport includes its goals and rules (explicit form) and its acquired characteristics and rituals (implicit form). The participants are the players and spectators. The sport situation possesses both physical and social aspects. Leadership, arbitration and commerce are the outside facilitation factors which are necessary for the sport activity to be operational. Like Loy (1968), Kenyon allowed for differing degrees and kinds of involvement with the sport situation. For instance, participation or facilitation could be either primary/direct or it could be secondary/peripheral.

Loy's (1968) explanation of sport as a game occurrence was both involved and analytical. He began with the basic elements of Huizinga and Caillois. Sport is playful, free, uncertain, unproductive, rule-governed and "only pretend." The elements of competition and physical prowess imply the dynamic tension and ascetic factors present in sport. The final element involved the presence and interaction among physical skill, strategy and chance. The outcome of most sports is determined by a combination of at least two of these factors. Often the factor of chance is utilized through the rules to assure equal opportunities concerning temporal and environmental features. Loy differentiated between games and sport on the basis of the skill demands of the activities. Sports require practice and learning to attain the necessary proficiency; games generally utilize a minimum of physical skill. A borderline area is described by Loy; he suggested, in such peripheral instances, that a difference be defined in terms of the degree of organization or the institutionalization of the activity. Sport is more highly organized and

has a tradition and a past and has guidelines for the future.

Torkildsen (1967) saw sport as a complexity. It has, like art, diverse meanings. "Sport, like art, is viewed differently by different people; it has many sides to its nature" (p. 65). Sport is associated with the related concepts of play, games, physical activity, leisure and recreation. Sports are structured, organized and rule-governed activities involving gross human movement. They are characterized by competition and are manifest in games, both physically active and relatively passive; in contests (athletic, conquest and transportation); and in active and organized recreation. Sport, according to Torkildsen, can be viewed both as an institution in society and as a domain of human activity. It is non-utilitarian, competitive and ordered.

Vanderzwaag (1972) related sport to three other concepts: play, games and athletics. Sport is an extension of play which is marked by spatial and temporal boundaries. It is ruled, competitive activity which includes the demonstration of physical prowess. Athletics is a more highly structured and organized extension of sport. Most of Vanderzwaag's concept of sport can be pictured on a continuum:

play ◄----------sport----------► athletics

◄----------games----------►

> Games are a variety of play; they are found in sport; and they are an essential ingredient in athletics. . . . This [continuum] conveys the idea that games are found in play, sport, and athletics. The nature of games changes as one moves from play to sport to athletics (p. 72).

According to Vanderzwaag (1970), many key concepts have been associated with sport. Some of the more prominent include sportsmanship, sports appreciation, creativity in sport, competition, play, games,

exercise, physical education, culture and the human movement phenomenon. Most of these have been, at one time or another, the most important phenomenon either associated with or subsumed under sport. Vanderzwaag allied sport with play, games and athletics.

Kent (1975) examined the conceptual framework of all of the above definitions and sought to identify their commonalities. In this way, she arrived at a succession of definitions relating play, game, sport and athletics. Each concept is separately constructed in relation to the common features found in older definitions. Each is predicated on the framework of the preceeding concepts and a continuum from play to athletics is apparent. Her definitions have utilized reduction reasoning.

> Play is a voluntary behavior, regulated by orderly and separate temporal and spatial designs, which is indifferent to material interest.
> Game is a pattern of play, dictated by a prescribed, goal-oriented, system of action, which may use material compensation to encourage future involvement.
> Sport is a pattern of game, governed by a history and a prescribed system of physical, goal-oriented, action which may offer material compensation to reward excellence and/or to encourage future involvement.
> Athletics is a pattern of sport which is rigid in governance and offers material compensation to reward excellence (Kent, 1975, p. 1).

Sport, being a pattern of game, includes the elements of play and game. The presence of history and the potential for material gain differentiate sport from game. Athletics, then, becomes a more rigidly governed and more amply rewarded pattern of sport. In much of the literature utilized in this study, the authors selected used the term "sport" when they were referring to the activities that Kent would call "game," "sport" or "athletics."

Kent's definition does not forbid the application of all three terms to particular activities. Volleyball is a game when "infinity volleyball" is played. This game involves everyone who wants to participate cooperating to keep the ball in play. The official rules are followed with one major exception: the "score" is the number of consecutive contacts by both teams and is shared by all players. Volleyball is sport in most physical education class situations and it is definitely athletics at the national and international levels of competition.

Singer (1976), in a discussion of sport and sport science, like Kent, utilized a family resemblances-type of definition. Play, games, physical recreation, physical education and sport are terms which define a "conceptual family." Sport is the center of the concept and games are the predominant form of sport.

> Sport is a human activity that involves specific administrative organization and a historical background of rules which define the objective and limit the pattern of human behavior; it involves competition or challenge and a definite outcome primarily determined by physical skill (p. 28).

The various levels of organization which are seen in sport can be differentiated by the modifier which precedes them: intercollegiate, professional, natural, intramural. Game, as the major form of sport, is seen by Singer, as:

> activities with an agreed-upon organization of time, space and terrain, and rules that define the objective and limit the pattern of human behavior; the outcome, which is to determine a winner and a loser, is achieved by totaling or accumulating objectively scored points or successes (p. 31).

This definition of game excludes gymnastics, figure skating, ski jumping, diving and synchronized swimming as games due to the subjective aspects of their scoring. Games and sports may overlap but some sports

cannot be games (gymnastics) and some games may not be sports (checkers).

Singer proposed a set of five interlocking circles as the model for his "family of concepts" definitions. Sport is at the center.



Singer's family concept definition of sport, by its development and organization, is "essential" enough to exclude nonsport and is flexible enough to allow, as sport, most of the newer, nontraditional physical activities which are currently being played in the name of sport.

Summary. The combinational and continuum-oriented definitions of sport are more effective in pinpointing "What is Sport?" than are the single-centered structural or interactional explanations. They utilize the common features of each center and, thereby, expand the application of the definitions to include many differing sport activities. The commonalities among these more complex definitions begin with structure and expand to include relational/involvement concepts (see Appendix A).

The definition of sport which is utilized for this paper is a synthesis of the previous group of sport definitions. The germinal aspects of all the definitions were considered and the following definition of sport broadens the concept to allow for the inclusion of the widely differing manifestations of the thing called sport.

Sport is physical, playful, bounded, rule-governed and competitive/challenging activity. It offers opportunities for social interaction and

for the pursuit of personal and group excellence. It is dynamic, tense, absorbing and potentially fulfilling. Sport is related to play, games and athletics. Differentiation among these four concepts is not readily apparent but the degree and institutionalization of organization offers a means of discrimination.

CHAPTER III

WHAT IS AESTHETICS?

> Aesthetics is variously conceived as the philosophy or science of beauty (as by Santayana, 1896), as the philosophy or science of art (as by Parker, 1920), and as the philosophy of criticism (as by Beardsley, 1958) (Sparshott, 1963, p. 57).

The term "aesthetics" was coined by Baumgarten, a German philosopher, in the eighteenth century. The original meaning referred to a theory of sensuous knowledge formulated as a counterpart to logic as a theory of intellectual knowledge.

The field of aesthetics is characteristically diffuse and unsystematic. It has no clearly delineated boundaries or directions and, therefore, there is no history of consistent organization of the theoretical approaches or ventures in this area. The variety of methods utilized in aesthetic inquiry reflect the complexity of analytical approaches.

Experimental psychologists have used rank ordering, paired comparisons and absolute judgments to determine the aesthetic preferences of individual subjects. The work of Barron and Welsh (1952) and Eisenman (1964; 1966), dealing with preferences for visual complexity, and that of Child (1962; 1964), concerned with preferencing as an expression of aesthetic sensitivity, are notable. The work of Beardsley (1958), Santayana (1896), Ziff (1959) and Weitz (1970) in analytical philosophy have sought to clarify the language used in art criticism.

Published dialogues, discussions and disagreements among aestheticians constitute the major work in analytical aesthetics. As soon as a theory is proposed, it is critically examined for circularity or fallacious reasoning. Few, if any, theories completely survive the dissection. Kaelin's (1962) research in existential psychology and phenomenological aesthetics has contributed to aesthetic education by utilizing the epoche technique of Husserl to "bracket out" all the non-phenomenal characteristics of the appearance of any object (its species, the causes of its existence, etc.) to get at the essence of the object itself. This qualitative evaluation seeks to distinquish relevant from irrelevant statements about the nature of aesthetic objects. Experimental psychology, analytical philosophy and existential psychology are widely diverse areas which have applied their various research methods to examine the field of aesthetics.

The definition and usage of the terms "art" and "aesthetics" has changed consistently from period to period and from theory to theory. The study of art in the classical period of Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus was the study of life. The narrow sense of art as "fine art" was then unknown. Science and art were not clearly differentiated until art was divorced from science in the eighteenth century and the science of artistic perception was "created." Aesthetics has been separated gradually from other philosophic disciplines and it has become more isolated from everyday life.

As an axiologic subdiscipline of philosophy, aesthetics concerns itself with the nature and significance of art, with the evaluation and value assessment of art objects and with the concept of "the beautiful."

This concern with "the beautiful," in terms of written material, at least dates back to Plato and Aristotle. Art as manufacture and craft gave way to the classical themes of art as beauty, art as appearance and art as imitation. These ideas lacked systematic and elaborate conceptual development but were (and are) used as the building blocks to formulate modern aesthetic theories (Kristeller, 1970).

Some major philosophical issues in aesthetics concern beauty, taste and the nature of the aesthetic experience. Osterhoudt (1973) expanded these concerns to include:

> the metaphysical status of the arts; the form, content, and subject matter of the arts; the criteria of aesthetic judgement (criticism); . . . the role of intellectuality (contemplation) and emotionality (feeling) in the arts; the nature of aesthetic experience and pleasure; the relation of the art product (work of art) to the process by which it is created; . . . the role of the artist, performer and the audience in the arts . . . (p. 303).

The ultimate issue which encompasses all of the above concerns is to define the range of expression in the arts. In aesthetics, attempts are made to clarify the basic concepts employed in thinking and talking about the objects of aesthetic experience and to answer certain questions within which these concepts are embedded. Four central questions are germane to analysis:

1. What is art?
2. What is the nature of a work of art?

   — definitive concerns

3. What is (are) the purpose(s) of art?
4. What is good art?

   — valuational concerns

All aesthetic theories, with varying degrees of success, ultimately address themselves to these questions.

A work of art or aesthetic experience involves three entities: a creator (artist), an object (event) and a perceiver (audience/critic). Hein (1970) indicated that the aesthetic situation has three essential components: the artist, the work of art and the appreciator. To facilitate the presentation of representative theories, Hein's (1970) organization of categories into which basic issues of aesthetics are placed will be used.

Various theories can be categorized relative to where they place the central focus of their concern.

> Before the eighteenth century, beauty was a central concept; during the century, it was replaced by the concept of taste; by the end of the century, the concept of taste had been exhausted and the way was open for the concept of the aesthetic (Dickie, 1971, p. 32).

A consideration of the "aesthetic" generally subdivides modern theories into four categories:

> formalism theories represented by Bell's (1958) significant form and Osborne's (1955) organic unity;
>
> expression theories of which Croce's (1970) intuition, Collingwood's (1970) imaginative expression and Langer's (1970) symbolic transformation are notable;
>
> aesthetic attitude theories represented by Bullough's (1970) psychical distance, Stolnitz's (1969) disinterested attention and Aldrich's (Dickie, 1971) "seeing as";
>
> metacriticism theories of Beardsley's (1958) instrumentalism and Dickie's (1974) institutionalism.

Utilizing Hein's essential components to categorize modern aesthetic theories leads to the following basic scheme and allows a graphic presentation to differentiate among these various theories.

Central Focus	Theory	Proponent
In the object	Significant form	Bell
	Organic unity	Osborne
In the artist	Intuition	Croce
	Imaginative expression	Collingwood
In the perceiver	Symbolic transformation	Langer
	Psychical distance	Bullough
	Disinterested attention	Stolnitz
	"Seeing as"	Aldrich
	Instrumentalism	Beardsley
	Institutionalism	Dickie

Central Focus--In the Object

When the central focus of the theory is found in the object (or event), the concept is known as formalism. Aesthetic formalism can also be called aesthetic objectivism. It claims that the artist communicates in and through forms and that the audience enjoys the formal arrangement which combines formal elements into a unity. Formalism finds distinguishing features in the object, not in the artist or in the attitude of the audience. The essential object of aesthetic analysis is the concrete work of art, but the starting point is the individual experience of aesthetic emotion.

Formalism, contrary to some interpretations, does not deny emotion. What it does deny is that a work of art is a means of expressing or communicating experience from one person to another. It states that a work of art is an autotelic thing, separate and newly created, which exists to be experienced for what it is in and of itself. Formalism, believing in beauty in configuration, does not deny that a work of art may and does serve several purposes but does indicate that purposes other than authenticity are not relevant in judging artistic excellence. Formalism is a theory about one quality of a work of art; the quality that allows objects to be classified and assessed as works of art. This property/

element which is claimed to be the essence of artistic excellence is variously called form, structure and configuration.

Significant form. The formalism of autonomous creation proposes the existence of the concept of significant form which focuses attention on the work of art itself. Bell (1958), who originated the theory, defined significant form as "lines and colours combined in a particular way, certain forms and relations of forms, [which] stir our aesthetic emotions" (p. 17). The function of the artist and, consequently, the purpose of art, is to create, combine and arrange forms in order to move an audience to "rapture and ecstasy" (Weitz, 1964, p. 3).

> Bell finds in the true appreciation of art an exalted, rapturous, nonpractical, disinterested, pleasurable, contemplative experience, the essence of which is that it is a response to significant form. By the "unique aesthetic emotion" he means the totality of these characteristics (Weitz, 1964, p. 7).

The artist sees reality as significant form, therefore, to see significant form is a function of seeing reality in a certain way--as pure form. Likewise, the true spectator's view of art implies, and requires, rapturous, nonutilitarian and disinterested attention. Bell proposed that spectators are aesthetically moved by certain combinations of line and color because they share in the artist's unique vision of reality as significant form.

Any representational elements in a work of art must be interpreted as combinations of line and color rather than as anything else. Representation is always either harmless or very harmful--never beneficial. If ordinary (nonaesthetic) emotions are evoked by an art object, then the object itself is designated as "descriptive art" and has given up significant form for the representation. Bell proposed two kinds of art

objects and two kinds of appreciation. Their relationship is diagrammed as:



The essential purpose and value of this pure appreciation of the formally significant is escapist. The aesthetic experience/emotion is outside ordinary experience/life. The aesthetic experience is extra-ordinary and allows the artist and the appreciator to escape the mundane cares, concerns and responsibilities of ordinary life through the aesthetic emotion. The appreciation of significant form in art allows the artist and audience to move from everyday existence into a world of "rapture and ecstasy" (Weitz, 1964, p. 3).

Organic unity. The formalism of organic unity is as configurationally-oriented as that of significant form. Organic unity is:

> a configuration such that the configuration itself is prior in awareness to its component parts and their relations according to discursive and additive principles (Osborne, 1955, p. 228).

The difference between these two theory-aspects lies in two areas: in the manner in which the parts of a work of art are apprehended and in the form/content distinction. Significant form-formalism concentrates on the form (the medium of presentation) of a work of art, generally to the exclusion of the content (the theme) of the work. Organic unity-formalism makes no distinction between form and content. They are the same coordination of elements, characteristics and relations.

Osborne (1955) suggested that any construct which displays organic unity is apprehended synoptically, as a complex whole of related parts,

not discursively, as a summation of parts. He implied that significant form is apprehended discursively. When attention is isolated on a part of a work of art, the structural qualities of the object are seen differently from when attention is distributed over the whole work.

Osborne's (1955) discussion of synoptic/discursive perception is in relation to vision, but it may be equally applicable to the other sensual mediums. He defined discursive seeing as switching attention rapidly from one section of the field to another and, therefore, the field is apprehended by comparing and putting together the parts which are attended to separately. In synoptic seeing, the field enters into awareness in a single act of evenly distributed attention. This requires organic unity and compactness. According to Osborne (1955), only works of art can be seen synoptically and the degree to which a work can be looked at in this manner is the degree of its beauty. Organic wholes, like Humpty-Dumpty, cannot be broken down and put back together. When broken down, the parts change and become something else. An organic whole is known only by intuitive apprehension of it as a whole through direct acquisition. Synoptic perception is both immediate and primary. The formal patterns/configurations directly and immediately "leap to awareness . . ." (Osborne, 1955, p. 249).

Synoptic apprehension requires a heightened sensual awareness which is much greater than that required for the normal needs of life. Only works of art demand or provide enough material for such heightened awareness. This apprehension in appreciation causes heightened consciousness and enhanced mental vitality. Enhanced awareness and vitality are why the experiencing of beauty, through organic unity, is valued. It makes one more alive.

Weitz (1964) combined the terminology of both theory-aspects in his discussion of organic unity. He defined art as significant form insofar as it is an organic complex of elements, expressive in character and embodied in a sensuous medium. "Organic" means that the elements form an internally constituted complex and "expressive" refers to an association with some emotion or emotional activity. Osborne (1970) indicated that modern formalism or modern concern with formal/perceptual qualities of artworks emphasized the "emotional-expressive" significance of pictorial elements (line, color, shape, mass, etc.) of a work of art. Every element means some emotion or emotional quality to every spectator; but quite possibly means different ones to different spectators.

Both significant form- and organic unity-formalism suggest that response to the formal elements of a work of art may be different for different people. Sparshott (1963) asked a very interesting question in reference to this:

> Do tendencies to respond to form and representation respectively not perhaps depend on innate psychological determinants and correspond to types of personality? (p. 344).

No significant attempts have been made to answer this question.

Summary. Formalism, in its insistence that a work of art be analyzed in terms of formal relations alone, is attractive for three reasons: 1) it assures one will look at the work of art alone; 2) it offers refuge from subjectivity; and 3) it is equally applicable to the arts dependent on sight and sound. Formalism, though, is very vulnerable on three fronts: 1) it tends toward ambiguity when applied to the visual arts; 2) it assumes you can discriminate form without cognizance of the referent of the form; and 3) it has little application to the literary arts. (See Appendix B.)

Central Focus--In the Artist

When the central focus of the theory is found in the artist (the creator), the concept is generally grouped under the name of Expressionism. Expression theory arose in the nineteenth century as a relation to Romanticism. Its theorists claimed that a work of art expresses the qualitative character of felt emotion. In a simplistic form, the underlying premise of expression theory is that the artist lives through (actually or imaginally) an experience. Other people, through appreciative contemplation, can duplicate in their own minds the artist's experience. Anything (object/artifact) which successfully communicates such an experience is a work of art. Art is excellent to the extent that it communicates experience.

One use or "sense" of the word "expression" in relation to art theory sees art as the self-expression of the artist--as a process which begins in the artist's mind. Self-expression theories center their concern in the artist.

Intuition. Croce's (1970) art as intuition proposal is a modern self-expression theory. Knowledge has two forms, intuitive or logical; it is obtained through either imagination or intellect; and it is of the individual or universal, of individual things or of relations of things. The formula expressed by Croce's theory, "art=intuition=expression," indicates that art is essentially expressive of the artist's intuitive interpretation of reality and human life.

> Croce points out that all art is a kind of language; it expresses and so fixes and makes recognizable what before was vague, fleeting, and merely felt (Garritt, 1969, p. 130).

The artist expresses the "inner feel, the subjunctive experienced quality, of emotional situations actual, recollected, or imagined, which cannot be conveyed by ordinary language" (Osborne, 1970, p. 231). An artist comes to terms with his feelings by experiencing those feelings in art form. The art form actualizes it for apprehension. Therefore, the purpose of art is not so much to communicate as it is to comprehend intuitive, personal feelings. Artistic creation is a mental process and the work of art is initially in the mind of the artist. The physical embodiment is only secondarily important. Good art is the successful expression of emotion. Expression consists of finding images to articulate an emotion and to make it determinate for apprehension. In "art as intuition" theory, the process is vastly more important than the product.

Imaginative expression. Collingwood's (1970) "art as imaginative expression" theory was influenced by and is very similar to Croce's "art as imitation" theory. To Collingwood, art expressed emotion rather than evoking it. He made an original assumption that art has something to do with emotion. Emotion can be either evoked or expressed. Craft arouses emotion and, since art is not craft, art must express something. By this line of reasoning, Collingwood concluded that art is the expression of emotion. The imagination aspect of his theory refers to the acquisition of knowledge dichotomy of Croce (1970). Knowledge is obtained through either imagination or intellect. Art is imaginative in that it involves the formation of mental images "in the head."

> He claims that the only real works of art are the mental images formed in the mind of the artist or as he creates a public object or the mental images formed in the mind of the spectator as the result of experiencing a public object (Dickie, 1971, p. 91).

The expressive process begins with the presence of chaos and confusion in the artist's mind. As the emotions are expressed, clarity and order replace the chaos and confusion. The emotions are channeled in the exercise of the art medium. The artist does not know ahead of time what he will create because the art of expressing emotions is, in itself, an exploration of the nature of the emotions. Good art is art which expresses emotions which were formerly unclear. Bad art is non-art (craft) which attempts to arouse or evoke emotion.

Summary. Expression theory basically attempts to do three things: 1) to show that art can do something important for people; 2) to relate art to the lives of people; and 3) to account for the emotional quality of art and for the way art moves people. As a viable theory, it fails to the extent that: 1) it fails to provide adequate criteria to differentiate good and bad art; 2) it is subject to an intentional fallacy (the confusion of the intent of the artist with the properties of the work itself); and 3) it is subject to an affective fallacy (the confusion of the reactions of the spectator with the properties of the work itself). (See Appendix B.)

Central Focus--In the Perceiver

When the central focus of a theory is found in the perceiver, the germinal concepts of the theories are found in several theory-aspects. Each of the two previous sections involved theorists who belonged to the same "camps." The Formalists centered in the object and the two Expressionists focused on the artist. When the perceiver/critic/audience becomes the core of a theory, the theoretical neatness of the other sections gives way to a potpourri of philosophical positions. In this

section, one can find expressionism, attitude theory and metacriticism theorists all centering their proposals in the perceiver.

Symbolic transformation. Langer (1969) was a major Expression theorist who dealt with the communication aspects of the art experience. Her theory of symbolic transformation saw art as the perceptual analogue of inner experience; as the symbolic expression of the artist's knowledge of emotion, not his actual emotion. Langer's symbol is not an iconic model. It is expressive in that it allows us (the audience) to make an abstraction.

Dickie (1971) called Langer a modern imitation theorist because she asserted that a work of art imitates or reproduces in itself not a concrete, discrete, actual emotion or situation but the form, pattern--the gestalt--of emotional situations.

> Thus a work of art is a symbol which does not symbolize anything other than itself but which reproduces in its own structural form the structure or pattern of feeling (Osborne, 1970, p. 246).

The artist attempts to communicate direct awareness of the ebb and flow of emotional life through his work of art. These are not merely the personal and private emotions held or experienced by the artist but are the basic forms of feelings which are common to most people. Reid (1968) further interpreted Langer's theory and asserted that:

> If art reveals human feeling it is neither (as we know) just the artists' feelings before making; nor is it even anything so general (if indeed there is anything so general) as "the form" of human feeling; what is experienced is the particular individual affective import of that work (p. 355).

Attitude theory. The attitude theorists define an aesthetic object in terms of the perceiver's approach to it or attitude toward it. The

concept of attitude is polarized, placing the practical in opposition to the aesthetic. If you look at an apple and take note of its economic value or the fact that it has bruises, then you are taking a "practical" interest in it. On the other hand, if you are cognizant of its color, texture and taste, then you are considering the apple, for the time being, as an aesthetic object. This attitudinal way of defining "aesthetic object" has been found valuable by subsequent theorists because it offers a broad scope for critical statements.

There are three prominent versions of attitude theory and all claim that there is something that a person can do which makes any perceived object into an aesthetic object. They differ in what it is that the person does: achieve distance, perceive disinterestedly or "see as."

Psychical distance. Bullough (1970) proposed "psychical distance" as the distinguishing feature of an aesthetic attitude. This "distance" is not actual spatial or temporal distance but a "psychical" distance from which an object is not examined from a practical point of view in relation to means and ends.

> Distance is produced . . . by putting the phenomenon, so to speak, out of gear with our practical, actual self; by allowing it to stand outside the context of our personal needs and ends--in short, by looking at it "objectively," as it has often been called, by permitting only such reactions on our part as emphasize the "objective" features of the experience, and by interpreting even our "subjective" affections not as modes of our being rather than characteristics of the phenomenon (Bullough, 1970, pp. 783-784).

According to Bullough, distance is a factor in all art and, therefore, is an aesthetic principle. It is accomplished by separating the perceived object and its appeal from the perceiver's self by an inhibitory aspect of "putting it [the phenomenon] out of gear with practical

needs and ends" (Bullough, 1970, p. 785). This inhibition, which is necessary for aesthetic appreciation, can either be an action on the part of the perceiver or a psychological state into which the perceiver is induced. Distance is a psychological or psychical state and, as such, it can be both achieved and lost. "Under-" and "over-distancing" occur when the perceiver is out-of-synchronization with the phenomenon of interest. An example of under-distancing occurs when a jealous husband thinks of his wife's suspicious behavior while viewing a performance of Othello. Another person in that same audience could be guilty of over-distancing if he is at the performance to observe the technical aspects of the play. The distancing perceiver has to walk a fine line between being "in" the experience but detached enought to really "see" what is aesthetically there.

Disinterested attention. "Psychical distance" has been defined as a special action or psychological state. Another attitude theorist, Stolnitz (1969), argued that such a special state is not needed. He indicated that the ordinary act of attending can be done in a special way. This special way of attending is called "disinterested attention." Disinterested attention, as opposed to practical or interested attention, has no ulterior purpose. It is divorced from any actual or intimate involvement on the part of the perceiver. The object of interest is not being used or manipulated for practical purposes. "There is no purpose governing the experience other than the purpose of just having the experience" (Stolnitz, 1969, p. 20).

Nonaesthetic or practical interests view an object or experience with a concern for origins and consequences, for any interrelationships with other things.

> By contrast, the aesthetic attitude "isolates" the object and focuses upon it--the "look" of the rocks, the sound of the ocean, the colors in the painting. Hence the object is not seen in a fragmentary or passing manner. . . . Its whole nature and character are dwelt upon. One who begins a painting merely to cover a stain on the wallpaper does not see the painting as a delightful pattern of colors and forms (Stolnitz, 1969, p. 20).

Classifying, studying and judging are not part of the aesthetic attitude. An object which is disinterestedly perceived and appreciated is aesthetically accepted "on its own terms." The aesthetic attitude can be taken toward any object of awareness and "a work of art or a natural object may or may not be an aesthetic object, depending on whether or not it is attended to disinterestedly" (Dickie, 1971, p. 53).

"Seeing as." Bullough proposed the aesthetic attitude as a special psychological state. Stolnitz wrote about a special kind of attention. Aldrich (Dickie, 1971) posited an aesthetic mode of perception. He indicated that there is a specific way of perceiving aesthetically which will show what aspects of a work of art or nature are aesthetic and which are not. He maintained that the aesthetic characteristics are objectively there to be experienced. The perceiver just has to look in a certain way to see them. This "seeing as" theory was suggested to Aldrich by Wittgenstein's work dealing with ambiguous figures. A good example of perceptual ambiguity, a square within a square drawing, can be found in Dickie, 1974, p. 137. What is seen is conditioned by the background of the perceiver (by what one has in mind at the time) and what is seen is an object of perception and is not just a thought or subjective image. This phenomenon of ambiguous figures, according to Aldrich, does not "prove," but it does prepare the reader for his theory.

Perception, to Aldrich, involves what he called "the phenomenon of categorical aspection." He postulated two kinds of perception: the ordinary, nonaesthetic kind of scientific inquiry and everyday life; and the aesthetic kind. He called the nonaesthetic perception "observation" and the perception characteristic of aesthetic experience is called "prehension." The entity being perceived is designated "material thing."

> According to Aldrich, when a material thing is observed, it is realized in physical space as a physical object, but when it is prehended, it is realized in aesthetic space as an aesthetic object (Dickie, 1974, p. 138).

These different "ways" of seeing objects are based on the fact that the same things do look different under differing conditions of viewing. Aldrich felt that his theory, by "explaining" the reason why different things are "seen," gives an objective rather than subjective account of aesthetic theory. Additionally, his theory does state that aesthetic objects are the proper objects for appreciation and criticism. Bullough's and Stolnitz's theories do not allow these appreciative and critical functions.

Summary. The attitude theorists, by proposing a specific state of mind for the experiencing of the aesthetic, present a broad theory which designates as works of art all those things which are the object of the aesthetic attitude. This broadness allows the inclusion of many things as aesthetic which would certainly be excluded by the narrower theories. These theories do take the psychological aspects concerning art appreciation and criticism into account. Additionally, they make the audience an important participant in the aesthetic experience. Their weaknesses lie in the realization that: 1) by making the perceiver so important, they undermine the importance of the artist and the object in the

aesthetic process; 2) they propose a difference between the aesthetic and nonaesthetic features of an object, but fail to adequately distinguish that difference; and 3) they fail to provide sufficient evidence that there is an individual, perceptually-oriented power which has the specific function of changing nonaesthetic features into aesthetic ones or which makes aesthetic characteristics accessible. (See Appendix B.)

CHAPTER IV

METACRITICAL AESTHETIC THEORY

All of the formalistic, expressionistic and attitudinal theories propose philosophical positions which do not appear to "work" in actual practice. They have not been primarily concerned with the appreciation and criticism of art, and yet, they arbitrarily make valuational decisions concerning particular objects. Their evaluation phases are universally weak and unproven. The metacritical theories to be considered next are more current than formal, expression and attitude theories and reflect attempts to both compensate for shortcomings in the evaluation phases of the older theories and "to take account of the actual practice of critics" (Dickie, 1971, p. 147).

Instrumentalism

In the late 1950's, Beardsley (1958) proposed that aesthetics be conceived of as the philosophy of criticism. His meta- ("along with") critical theory in Instrumentalism was centered in the perceiver/audience as the focus in the valuational process. He saw aesthetics as consisting of the principles which clarify and confirm critical statements.

> I take as central the situation in which someone is confronted with a finished work, and is trying to understand it and to decide how good it is (Beardsley, 1958, p. 6).

Beardsley was concerned with practical criticism.

The function of criticism is to make statements and judgments concerning works of art, aesthetic objects and aesthetic experiences.

According to Beardsley (1958), these critical statements are either normative or non-normative. The normative statements are critical evaluations. "Critical evaluations are those that apply to works of art the words 'good' or 'beautiful,' their negatives, or other predicates definable in terms of them" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 9). Non-normative statements either interpret or describe works of art. A critical interpretation concerns discovering the "meaning" of a work. Words such as "represents," "signifies," "symbolizes" or "expresses" appear in critical interpretations. The central focus of critical descriptions is the concept of form. Statements that inform about color and shape, summarize plot or theme or classify compositional form are critical descriptions.

Beardsley's Instrumentalism is a theory of evaluation based on a "general criterion theory." Critical reasoning about the arts presupposes general principles upon which judgments about particular works of art deductively depend. Beardsley maintained that a distinctive kind of experience can be isolated and described as an aesthetic experience. An aesthetic experience is seen as valuable in itself; therefore, the aesthetic object which promotes this experience is seen as valuable as a means to an end. This line of reasoning produced the "Instrumentalist" designation. Some things, like love, truth and privacy, have been proven, over time, to be valuable means to ends and are, therefore, given privileged and protected positions among the values of life. Beardsley believed that the arts and the experiences they provide belong in this company. His theory of Instrumentalism included the following concerns: the aesthetic object, the aesthetic experience, aesthetic value and the values of art.

> To analyze an aesthetic object is precisely to get acquainted with its finer details and subtler qualities, to discover, in short, what is there to be enjoyed--to be responded to emotionally (Beardsley, 1958, p. 76).

The term, "object," refers to any entity which can be named, talked about and to which characteristics can be attributed. Critical statements, to Beardsley, are about an "aesthetic object."

Beardsley's development of his aesthetic object concept occurred in two stages. In the first stage, he sought to exclude some aspects of works of art from consideration as part of the aesthetic object. The second stage asked the question: "what distinguishes aesthetic objects from other perceptual objects?" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 59).

In the initial stage, Beardsley utilized two principles: the "principle of distinctness" and the "principle of direct perceptibility." The principle of distinctness sought to refute intentionalist criticism which indicates that the intention of the artist in producing the work of art is an aesthetic object of that work. To Beardsley, the aesthetic object is distinct from the intention of the artist. "The objective critic's first question, when he is confronted with a new aesthetic object, is not, What is this supposed to be? but, What have we got here?" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 29). The second principle, of direct perceptibility, concerned the perceptual object and was utilized to avoid confusing the merely physical basis of a work from its aesthetic aspects. A perceptual object is one which has qualities which are open to direct sensory awareness. The physical basis of that perceptual object consists of what can be described in the language of physics. The physical properties of something are not discovered by direct sensation but by such procedures

as measuring, weighing, cutting and burning. Beardsley concluded his first stage by observing that all aesthetic objects are physical objects but that not all perceptual objects are aesthetic objects.

Beardsley's second stage in the development of his concept of the aesthetic object attempted to differentiate between aesthetic objects and other perceptual objects. "Aesthetic object" has been historically defined in a myriad of ways. Beardsley felt that the best and most objective way to define and distinguish aesthetic objects from other perceptual objects is by their own characteristics, as opposed to their causes or effects or relations to other things. He offered a pluralistic answer to the question in proposing that each sensory (perceptual) field and art form be looked at separately. A consensus of usage for each particular art would then be formulated as the definition of what would be accepted and rejected as an aesthetic object in that medium.

> Once we have considered the basic properties of the visual field, we can distinguish visual aesthetic objects from other visible objects. . . . And once we have considered the basic elements of language and meaning, we can distinguish literary works from other discourses, philosophical, scientific, and practical. . . . The point of breaking the question up this way is that each of these distinctions raises its own problems. . . . Some of the distinctions will be more difficult than others, and all of them will, of course, be somewhat vague, since general usage draws no sharp lines (Beardsley, 1958, p. 64).

Beardsley also relied on a consensus of usage or compilation of generalizations to describe his "aesthetic experience." He defined aesthetic experience as the "immediate effect of aesthetic objects" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 559), and proposed five characteristics of the experience.

1. In an aesthetic experience, attention is fixed on heterogeneous yet interrelated parts of a phenomenally objective field. It is composed of some sensory pattern. There is a <u>central focus</u>, as opposed to the

looseness of daydreaming, and the aesthetic object controls the experience.

2. The experience is marked with intensity and a concentration of experience. It marshalls "the attention for a time into free and unobstructed channels of experience" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 528).

3. The experience is coherent. It "hangs together" with one thing leading to another; with continuity of development and with an overall sense of pattern and coherence. Even if the experience is interrupted, such as occurs with intermissions, etc., a re-connection is quickly made with what went before and the audience is back in the same experience again.

4. The experience is complete in itself. All expectations and impulses which are aroused are counterbalanced or resolved by other elements within the experience.

> Because of the highly concentrated, or localized, attention characteristic of aesthetic experience, it tends to mark itself out from the general stream of experience, and stand in memory as a single experience (Beardsley, 1958, p. 528).

5. The aesthetic experience is "not real." It is "make-believe" in the sense that the question of reality never arises. It has the capacity to elicit admiration and contemplation with no need for commitment to practical action. "The music is movement without anything solid that moves; the object in the painting is not a material object, but only the appearance of one" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 529).

Beardsley condensed his five characteristics into three elements: unity, intensity and complexity. These are the three principles on which judgments about particular aesthetic experiences and works of art depend.

Both the work of art and the experience of it involve some degree of unity, complexity and/or intensity. These elements are connected but independent and aesthetic experiences differ in magnitude as a function of these three variables.

Magnitude is the general term which describes all three and which is applied to the whole experience, including the phenomenally objective, affective and cognitive elements. Further clarification of Instrumentalism's three general principles can be shown by examples of the critical comments which are regularly employed when criticising objects. Table 1 shows these comments as well as the distillation of the five characteristics into the three principles.

The Instrumentalist's definition of value involves an object's utility or instrumentality to a certain kind of experience. "The test of whether an object has aesthetic value is just that some of its presentations actually cause, and enter into, aesthetic experience" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 532). The definition makes the original assumption that having an aesthetic experience is itself valuable. The concise definition offered by Beardsley is:

> "X has aesthetic value" means "X has the capacity to produce an aesthetic experience of a fairly great magnitude (such an experience having value)" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 531).

Note that the definition only deals with the possibility of an aesthetic experience. There is no stipulation that it will occur. "Capacity" is used in a dispositional sense of describing what effects the object is capable of producing.

It should be readily apparent that Beardsley's Instrumentalist position follows and fits in quite well with practical criticism. A

Table 1

Instrumentalism: Basic Concepts

Magnitude	Unity: coherence; completeness	Examples of Critical Comments well-organized/disorganized formally perfect/imperfect has/lacks inner logic of structure and style
	Intensity and concentration of experience	full of vitality/insipid forceful and vivid/weak and pale beautiful/ugly tender, tragic, ironic, graceful, delicate, richly comic
	Complexity: range of elements; diversity	developed on a large scale rich in contrasts/lacks variety and repetitive subtle and imaginative/crude

critic says an aesthetic object is a good one. When asked "why?" the answer points out the features which contribute to its having a high degree of unity, complexity and/or intensity. The categorizing of these three elements objectifies the explanation of the aesthetic experience.

If this Instrumentalist theory is accepted, then it follows that the preferring of one aesthetic object over another can be rationally justified. But this is not always the case and, therefore, Beardsley included in his theoretical position a unique feature. He allowed for the occurrence of preferences with no real reason for rational choice.

> In short, there will be preferences, choices among aesthetic objects, that fall through the wide mesh of critical argument; preferences that cannot be rationally justified. Let us say that such preferences belong to an Area of Undecidability in the realm of critical evaluation--an area where rational argument does not reach, and where choice, if choice occurs, cannot be guided by reasons (Beardsley, 1958, p. 536).

This "Area of Undecidability" consists of all pairs of aesthetic objects, X and Y, such that it cannot be proven that X is better than Y or even that they are equal in aesthetic value. This area is created by two factors: 1) critical judgments utilize multiple criteria of value and 2) there are a variety of qualities in aesthetic objects.

The first factor notes that critical judgments are based on Beardsley's three critical principles (unity, intensity and complexity) which contribute to the aesthetic value of objects. These critical judgments utilize many differing criteria of aesthetic value. "And there is no set of rules that says that one of the three [principles] . . . is to be weighted higher than the others" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 538). The relative weight of each standard is an individual matter, Critic A might judge a

work as lacking order and Critic B might say that the work was acceptable because it had enough vividness to overbalance its lack of order. One person might be configurationally oriented and would weigh unity very high. Another person might place his emphasis on the intensity factor. These two people would probably never agree on the relative worth of many aesthetic objects.

The second factor creating the area of undecidability is the variety of regional qualities in aesthetic objects. A sensory field is a complex of parts. Any object which has several parts is a complex. If a part cannot be further subdivided, then it is designated as an element. Elements have qualities to be perceived. These qualities, such as color and shape, are called an object's local qualities. But some complexes (objects) have qualities which are not qualities of their individual elements. A characteristic of a complex which belongs to the complex but not to its parts is a regional quality of the complex. A person's weight is a regional quality; having weight is not. All body parts have weight and, therefore, the fact of weight cannot be a regional quality. Weighing 130 pounds is a regional quality because none of the parts that make up that weight weigh that much.

An additional example originally offered by Beardsley (1958) to explain this concept follows. Regional qualities have novelty in that they are not discernible in the parts when separated, but these qualities depend on the parts and their relations for their existence. The following design has several qualities:



The elements can be described: A, B, C and D are circles on a white background. The relations between the elements can be described by utilizing a geographic coordinate system. A is one-half inch west of B, C is one-half inch west of D, A is one-half inch north of C and B is one-half inch north of D. Once these relations are given, the figure is determined and all other relations (C to B and A to D) are established. The regional quality of the figure as a whole is that this figure has a "squarish" character. Its "squarishness" is a regional quality because it is a feature of the complex but not of any part. A complete description of the figure would have to include the statement that this squarish quality is present. Other, more detailed, descriptions could be offered but no new kind of description is possible.

> No matter how complicated we made the figure, the true statements describing it would fall into the same basic categories. There are statements about the number and local qualities of elements, about complexes and their regional qualities, about relations between elements or between complexes (Beardsley, 1958, p. 85).

Because regional qualities are uniquely created by the combinations of their elements, the sheer number of possible regional qualities is infinite. Although regional qualities depend on complex perceptual conditions, they are themselves relatively simple and may be just liked or disliked. The work of individual artists reveal unique and characteristic recurrent regional qualities. These are the very qualities which

will make one person like the artist's work a great deal while another person dislikes it intensely. The work is simply liked or disliked on the basis of its regional qualities and no other justification for the decision is available. A "better than/worse than" distinction does not have to be made but a choice is implicit in any preferencing. This non-rational choosing falls within the "Area of Rational Undecidability."

Instrumentalism can be criticized for attempting to deal with this gray area of aesthetic preferencing because the explanation is somewhat undefinitive and confusing. Beardsley has contributed to the field of aesthetics with his unique area of undecidability. Some aesthetic objects are valued more highly than others and yet there are definite limitations to the rating of diverse objects on the same scale. Preferences can be presented but often cannot be rationally justified. Instrumentalism does allow for the occurrence of preferences with no reasons for rational choice.

The Instrumentalist theory of aesthetics and aesthetic value is carefully composed to reveal that to accept the theory is to take for granted that the aesthetic experience itself is valuable. Acceptance of this proposition makes the value of the aesthetic object a means to an end. Stated differently, the capacity of an object to evoke aesthetic experience is not a value unless the experience itself is seen to have value. If it is contended that the arts deserve a place among the "goods" of culture, then this position must be justified with evidence that the experiences they provide are, in some real way, "good" for us. According to Beardsley's Instrumentalism, there is no such thing as intrinsic value. "You can never judge the value of anything except in relation

to other things that are at that time taken to be valuable" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 541).

Historically, many assertions have been made about the inherent and desirable values of art. Beardsley has examined these claims for any cross-claim consistency and has prepared a list of "predictions" of the effects of aesthetic value. He formulated his listing as predictions rather than assertions for two reasons: 1) aesthetic value, by his definition, is dispositional to the extent that it means that something has the capacity to produce an aesthetic experience and 2) the case is not totally in for the "proving" of inherent value for aesthetic objects. Much work is yet to be done in this area. Beardsley's listing occurs on two planes. The first four "predictions" concern fairly well-recognized claims for inherent value. The next three effects listed are more remote and indirect but could be, nevertheless, construed as part of the inherent values of art.

1. "That aesthetic experience relieves tensions and quiets destructive impulses" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 574). This is the Aristotelian catharsis claim which would make art the moral equivalent for violence.

2. "That aesthetic experience resolves lesser conflicts within the self, and helps to create an integration, or harmony" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 574). This value involves a clarification and personal integration effect. Having an art experience, the viewer may find himself in a clearer and more decisive frame of mind. This is the exhilaration, the "high," the tonic effect of art.

3. "That aesthetic experience refines perception and discrimination" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 574). Having aesthetic experiences makes an

individual better at having aesthetic experiences and, further, promotes increased sensitivity and perception in all phases of life. This sharpening of attention would be potentially helpful in increasing the emotional relations of people, for example.

4. "That aesthetic experience develops the imagination, and along with it the ability to put oneself in the place of others" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 574). This prediction deals with the fostering of empathic responses as well as with increasing the creative flexibility of and adjustibility of the experiencing individual. The aesthetic experience leads to the expansion of imaginative response and creativity.

5. "That aesthetic experience is, to put it in medical terms, an aid to mental health, but perhaps more as a preventative measure than as a cure" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 575). Aesthetic experience, in a pre-cathartic sense, would promote mental health and forestall the formation of many common neuroses and psychoses in a society which has adequte artistic outlets for high aesthetic value.

6. "That aesthetic experience fosters mutual sympathy and understanding" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 575). Art can draw people together in friendship and mutual respect through the sharing of aesthetic experience. This shared experience builds a bond between people who have participated in these experiences together.

7. "That aesthetic experience offers an ideal for human life" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 575). This is a social role of the arts. The aesthetic experience is potentially a microcosm of what is (and can be) fulfilling in life. The close interrelationship between means and ends in art can help bring the means/end separation found in much of life closer together and, thereby, increase the richness and joy of life.

Beardsley developed his Instrumental aesthetic theory from a basis in critical practice. He indicated that there would be no problems in aesthetics if no one talked about works of art. But people do talk and the problems arise in relation to the communicative clarity and effectiveness of the discussions. The older theories previously discussed often looked good in print but failed in actual practice. Instrumentalism, being metacritical, attempts to isolate and describe the features of experience which are pecularily characteristic of intercourse with aesthetic objects. Works of art are instrumentally good because they produce aesthetic experiences which are themselves good things. Since all works of art have some degree of unity (by the fact of their very presence) but not necessarily any intensity of complexity, all works of art have some aesthetic value. By this line of reasoning, Beardsley's theory accommodates the full range of negative and positive aesthetic evaluations. (See Appendix B.)

Institutionalism

By his own admission, Dickie (1971) followed the lead of Beardsley in developing his metacritical theory of Institutionalism. Some phases of the original theory were questioned and additional interpretations were formulated. The major criticism of Instrumentalism involved Beardsley's definition of aesthetic objects. Dickie argued that in order to be able to:

> see that an artist's intentions and an aesthetic object are distinct, that person must already have a clear idea of what the contents of the objects of criticism and appreciation are for works of art of that particular kind (Dickie, 1974, p. 171).

He indicated that Beardsley is basically correct but that the background

that is necessary to have before distinguishing between intentions and aesthetic objects is implicit rather than explicit in Instrumentalism. Dickie's Institutionalism proposed that:

> In order to verify statements about aesthetic objects we must already know what in general to look for and at, what to listen for and to, and so on (Dickie, 1974, p. 173).
>
> The aspects of a work of art which belong to the aesthetic object of that work of art are determined by the conventions governing the presentation of the work (Dickie, 1974, p. 149).

The conventions mentioned deal with the spatial/temporal cues/ factors which serve to locate the aesthetic object for the spectator.

> In general, the ability to make the locations and distinctions in a given case depend upon an understanding of the type of art of which the given case is an instance. This means that the distinguishing of aesthetic objects is a piecemeal affair, since it depends upon experience and understanding of specific art forms. Each art form has a primary convention or practice for presenting works of that type, together with a variety of secondary conventions of greater and lesser importance (Dickie, 1974, pp. 178-179).

The primary convention of presentation is the understanding shared by the artist(s) and the audience that they are involved in a particular kind of formal activity. The fact that a painting is displayed is the primary convention of painting. The manner of display, with the design visible and the back to the wall, is one of the secondary conventions. These secondary conventions are constantly being challenged, expanded and changed by innovative artists in the particular art forms. Knowledge of the conventions is learned in a variety of ways: by direct teaching; by observations of others who know; and by transfer from one art form to another.

Dickie's Institutionalism stressed the conventional matrix within which works of art are embedded and which define the characteristics of

art. His classificatory definition of a work of art included the conditions of artifactuality and conferred status. The assumption that a work of art is an artifact is historically accepted by both philosophers and non-philosophers. The aspect of conferred status indicates the institutional nature of Dickie's theory.

The second necessary condition required that an object or event "has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld)" (Dickie, 1974, p. 34). The artworld, consisting of the loosely organized association of artists, producers, audiences, reporters, critics, historians, theorists, etc., carries on its business at the level of customary practice. The minimum core of the artworld, the presentation group, includes the artists, the presenters and the goers. All of these roles are institutionalized and must be learned. It is not simply an "I christen this work a work of art" designation. The artworld, as do all institutions, has a background of accepted and acceptable practices.

> The Artworld as I conceive of it consists of a bundle of sub-systems--theatre, painting, sculpture, music, and so on --each of which furnishes background for the conferring of the status of objects within its domain (Dickie, 1973, p. 29).

The status of being art can be acquired by just one person's acting as a representative of the artworld and treating the artifact as a candidate for appreciation. This conferring of status is usually done by the artist who created the artifact. If the artist has accomplished the "things" that are generally accepted as being part of the customary practice of that art form, then the artifact will be accepted by others as a

work of art. If however, the artifact does not conform to the institutional/accepted frame-of-reference, then there are two courses which can be pursued. A new frame-of-reference can be developed and promoted by its proponents. If the time is right, the new frame-of-reference will be accepted. "The world has to be ready for certain things, the art world no less than the real one" (Danto, 1964, p. 581). Or the artifact can be rejected as a work of art by the rest of the artworld.

> In conferring the status of art on an object one assumes a certain kind of responsibility for the object in its new status--presenting a candidate for appreciation always allows the possibility that no one will appreciate it and that the person who did the conferring will thereby lose face. One can make a work of art out of a sow's ear, but that does not necessarily make it a silk purse (Dickie, 1974, p. 50).

Dickie's Institutional concept of art is broad enough to include, as art, all that is historically considered art. It takes the actual practice of the past and present art world into account. The theory is not particularily complicated and, unlike the formal, expressive and attitude theories, it does not try to imply "good art" when defining "art."

Summary. No single aesthetic theory investigated is satisfactory in all its aspects. The best that can be hoped for is general consonance with current critical practice. Metacriticism meets this criterion. The combining of Instrumentalism and Institutionalism brings complementary theories together to form an objectively-oriented theory-base from which to examine as an aesthetic activity. Beardsley's Instrumentalism gives the basic general standards which can be utilized to critically analyze sport performance as aesthetic experience. Dickie's Institutionalism provides the framework (frame-of-reference) from which the institutional nature and conventional presentational matrix of sport can be examined as

aesthetic activity. Sport, in current literature, has sometimes been designated as aesthetic and as art. These postulates will be examined in relation to the theory-base formed by the interrelated Instrumentalism and Institutionalism.

CHAPTER V

A METACRITICAL AESTHETIC OF SPORT

> A partial survey of several movement "systems" shows that symmetry and assymmetry, rhythm, balance, harmony and economy of effort, are among the most-mentioned qualities used in assessing what is a "good" movement (Anthony, 1960, p. 3).

> Sport has aesthetic and thematic compulsion because expressive modes of performing and contesting are significant and valued (Felshin, 1975, p. 31).

> Those eclectic lovers of sport who hold that all sport is beautiful may find such beauty in the spectator appeal, in a player's imagination for the game, in the intensity and steadiness of a champion, in the perfectionist's zeal, or perhaps even in the briefest shorts on some coordinated gamin (Miller and Russell, 1971, p. 104).

The word "sport" symbolizes a complexity that regularly reveals new facets. It is used to describe game activities which are very diverse and which occur on an almost unlimited number of skill and organizational levels. The word is also used, with modifiers, as a descriptor to accurately pinpoint areas of scholarly inquiry.

Sport theorists, representing many differing interests, examine sport from the perspectives of psychology, sociology, philosophy, biodynamics and exercise science. These areas are then often fragmented further to concentrate on more specific aspects of sport.

Sport, as reported by Baitsch (1972), has been viewed, for example, as a medium of self- and life-fulfillment; as play; as ethical training; as a socialization process; as a sign-world of reality; as a safety valve for aggression; and as an aesthetic phenomenon. This last area of

inquiry, aesthetics of sport, has become increasingly significant and meaningful to many sport theorists and aestheticians as evidenced by publications in the area. This study seeks to provide a germinal foundation, based in metacritical aesthetic theory and in sport theory, for the concept "aesthetic of sport."

Beardsley (1958) defined aesthetic experience as the "immediate effect of aesthetic objects" (p. 559), and proposed five characteristics of the experience.

1. The aesthetic experience has a central focus wherein attention is fixed on heterogeneous yet interrelated parts of a phenomenally objective field. The aesthetic object (performance) controls the experience.

2. The experience is intense and involves a concentration of experience. It marshalls "the attention for a time into free and unobstructed channels of experience" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 528).

3. The experience is coherent. One thing leads to another. There is continuity of development and an overall sense of pattern and coherence. The experience "hangs together" and even if it is interrupted, with an intermission, etc., a re-connection is quickly made and the audience is back in the same experience again.

4. All expectations and impulses aroused are counter-balanced or resolved by other elements within the experience, making the experience complete in itself.

> . . . because of the highly concentrated, or localized, attention characteristic of aesthetic experience; it tends to mark itself out from the general stream of experience, and stand in memory as a single experience (Beardsley, 1958, p. 528).

5. The aesthetic experience is "not real"; in fact, the question of reality never arises. The experience has the capacity to elicit admiration and contemplation with no need for any commitment to practical action.

These five characteristics were condensed by Beardsley into three elements: unity, intensity and complexity. These are the three aesthetic-designating factors on which judgments about particular aesthetic experiences and works of art depend.

The characteristics of coherence and completeness form the factor of unity. Critical comments dealing with form, organization and the logic of structure and style are recognized as statements dealing with the unity of an aesthetic experience.

The intensity factor and its attendant concentration of experience aspect are characterized by critical interpretations dealing with the forcefulness, vividness, beauty and vitality of an experience. Comments indicating tragedy, irony, grace, delicacy, tenderness and comedy are descriptive of the intensity of an experience.

The complexity factor deals with the range and diversity of elements within the aesthetic experience. Descriptors of the scale, richness and variety, subtlety and imaginativeness of the experience are common critical statements related to this factor.

Both the work of art and the experience of it involve some degree of unity, complexity and/or intensity. These factors are connected yet independent and aesthetic experiences differ in magnitude as a function of the three variables. Magnitude is the general term which describes all three and which is applied to the whole experience, including the phenomenally objective, affective and cognitive elements.

Beardsley's Instrumentalist position follows and fits in very well with current critical practices in both art and sport. The critic makes an assessment and when asked to justify, points out the features which contribute to the experience or object having a high degree of unity, complexity and/or intensity. The categorizing of these three elements objectifies the explanation of the aesthetic experience.

The authors' contention that the literature dealing with sport reveals consistent usage of aesthetic-designating factors in discussing the beauty of sport is supported by Smith (1968). She posited that the general formal/structural principles of aesthetics can be employed to evaluate any object or activity. Such concepts as line, space, rhythm, contrast, repetition, balance, color can be used to assess the human body in motion.

> Since aesthetics is based on perception, to appreciate the beauty of the human body in motion one must make an effort to "see" the <u>form</u> as well as the <u>function</u> of movement patterns (Smith, 1968, p. 62).

The presence of all three aesthetic-designating factors is evidenced in a classic discussion by Browne (1917). His book, <u>The Esthetics of Motion</u>, dealt primarily with what he called "the psychology of grace and the expression of movement." In this work which is germinal to a consideration of an aesthetic of sport, Browne discussed the factors in sport that contribute to beautiful movement.

> Grace is more than mechanical beauty. To create the impression of physical ease, movements should conform to our individual habits, be made without visible effort, without noise, with apparent lightness, with a maximum of stability, and a minimum of apparent resistence; in addition, there ought to be some obvious variety in rhythm, obvious freedom in the purpose, and a certain prodigality of effort--too obvious economy robs movements of their grace (Browne, 1917, p. 32).

Most of Browne's comments can be directly categorized to the three aesthetic-designating factors.

Unity	Intensity	Complexity
conform to individual habits (i.e., normal movement patterns)	prodigality of effort minimum apparent resistance apparent lightness maximum stability no visible effort no noise	variety in rhythm freedom in purpose

The comments requiring "no visible effort" and a "prodigality of effort" are not really contradictory, although, without elucidation, they may seem so. Browne's requirement of "absence of visible effort" dealt with eliminating as many as possible of the physical manifestations of effort; the swelling neck veins, red face and facial contortions particularly. He felt that such signs of muscular effort negated the impression of perfect ease. "Prodigality of effort" is an adjunct of effortlessness. The performer must demonstrate, with small shows of force or little bravado flourishes of difficulty overcome, that economy of effort is not parsimony. Too obvious economy of effort robs movement of its intensity and prodigality "will by an actual intensification of effort dispel the impression of effort" (Browne, 1917, p. 23).

Browne's comments have been used as an introduction and as a model for the material which follows. Each aesthetic-designating factor and the sport literature which complements the factor is dealt with separately.

Unity

> The beauty of human form with its proportions, its balance, its symmetry, rhythm and power to express was recognized as art itself. Man became aware of movement, design, line, rhythm --these, the very substance of art (Pendergast, 1937, p. 68).

The most obvious manifestation of unity involves spatial and temporal boundaries of performance. Both aesthetic and sport experiences are characterized by time and place structuring (Felshin, 1975; Kitchin, 1966; Thomas, 1973). Sport contests are definitely organized and "Athletic contests, like dramatic tragedy, are divided into time periods of varying lengths" (Keenan, 1972, p. 13). Both sport and art have rules of performance, unities of space and time and unique/special ways of using time and space (Kuntz, 1974). More specifically, sport provides unity by being spatially immediate and temporally recurring. For instance, Kostelanetz (1973) has proposed that the spatial and temporal rhythm of football has a definite form. The action can be traced through the stages of stasis, purpose, passionate pursuit, chaos and a return to stasis. Such "plotting" of the rhythm of a sport shows the formal unity which can be identified. "The most beautiful sporting events are those both formally beautiful and enhanced by the expression of practical fitness" (Roberts, 1975, p. 98).

Performance skill is also an aspect of formal unity. Aesthetic response to sport movement is, according to Lowe (1971), derived from two sources: from an empathic response to the action itself or from individual interpretation of the form, technique and composition of the movement. The art which is to be found in sport is expressed through "skill in movement expressing beauty" (Kovich, 1971, p. 42).

White (1975) indicated that the great moments in sport, discussed from an aesthetic point of view, are germinally dependent on the skill or technical excellence of the performer. This excellence is, of course, relative to the level at which the performance occurred.

Well-executed movement, which displays balance, rhythm, economy of effort, yields greater pleasure for the spectator than random, undisciplined, arhythmic movement patterns. The competitive rules and purposes drive the competitors toward their sport goal. If this goal is reached through well-executed movements, then an appreciation of the aesthetics of the situation widens the perceptual field and heightens discernment (Smith, 1968; Best, 1975).

> A specific movement is aesthetically satisfying only if, in the context of the action as a whole, it is seen as forming a unified structure which is regarded as the most economical and efficient method of achieving the required end (Best, 1975, p. 44).

The smoothness and flow of a sport performer's movements reflect the economy and efficiency of effort, the skill, of the performance (Kupfer, 1975). There should be no wasted energy and no superfluous movement. The total coordination of body and movement parts are fundamental to skilled execution and are basic to aesthetic appreciation. Sport goals can be achieved through random or accidental movement patterns but "A smooth, flowing style is more highly regarded aesthetically because it appears to require less effort for the same result than a jerky one" (Best, 1975, p. 46).

Form is another aspect of unity which is important to both sport and art. Form, of human bodies moving and interacting, is displayed in all sport performances. It is evaluated only in some sports. Ziff (1974), although denying the aesthetic as a viable concern of sport, admitted that some sports do display aesthetically appealing form and even that some sports are definitely aesthetic in that form was an evaluating factor in judging them.

Sandle's (1972) discussion of form in sport indicated that "form can exist as a relationship among several moving elements, among moving and static elements, or among different phenomenal sequences of movement (such as tempo)" (p. 132). Form in both sport and art is perceived as a sense of pattern and is described in both formal and expressive terms (Reid, 1970). Formal properties such as balance, symmetry, continuity are often linked with the more expressive descriptors such as dynamic, strong, and graceful.

Toynbee (1972) felt that team sports particularly exhibited flowing, continuous patterns and designs of movement through their positional play. He believed there is a real sense of design in sport. It is both spatial and temporal and exists both with and among teams and individual players. Kupfer (1975) even contended that the form of a sport was an essential reason governing the choice of watching or playing one sport rather than another.

According to Fisher (1972), sport has unity or wholeness in the action of one contest. Every movement within the contest is an integral part of the whole and harmony is displayed.

> Harmony may be discerned in the creative use of space and rhythm in both individual movements and in the action as a whole, in the patterns of the game (pp. 320-321).

The aesthetic in movement occurs when the feel, whether actual or empathic, and the sport goal of the movement are in harmony in action.

> The sweet shock of impact of a perfectly timed stroke in any striking skill; the total harnessing of applied effort when the rhythm of a crawl stroke is just right; the feel of a back-somersault which fits the sequence of rebound on a trampoline; a mohawk on skates without a trace of snatch; these are the kinds of experiences in action when mind and body sing in tune (Munrow, 1972, p. 104).

Sport performances display a unity of purpose which is akin to that found in art (Keenan, 1972). Everything is focused toward the achievement of the sport goal and useless motions, which do not contribute to the completion of movement skills, detract from the unity, wholeness and grace of the sport performance (Browne, 1917).

There is also a unity or wholeness in sport which is formed in the context of the opposition necessary for the sport to take place. Kupfer (1975) suggested that in the tensions between opponents and the coordinations among teammates, individual players come together to form a whole. "Concepts such as timing, jelling, flowing, harmonizing, and executing attest to this aesthetic ideal in competitive sport" (p. 88). In terms of the spectator:

> The wholeness and finality possible in competitive sporting events, paradigmatic in the artistic, answers the human desire for completeness and unity, if only in symbol (Kupfer, 1975, pp. 88-89).

Summary/Unity. Unity in sport performances, then, is displayed through spatial and temporal considerations; through technical skill in performance standards concerned with the efficiency and economy of effort; through the display and evaluation of formal design and expressive qualities; and through the twin concepts of harmony and wholeness. The coordination and interdependence among these various unity aspects is most pointedly shown in a discussion by Ames (1956). He chose to introduce his aesthetic discussion of "What is form?" with an explanation of how form functions in athletics. Ames felt that unity and coherence are products of aesthetic form.

> In athletics we are familiar with form as the difference between what is done and how it is done. Whether a runner

> is a winner or not, we may admire how he has been trained to swing his arms close to his ribs, not too high and not too low, balancing a smooth gait that all goes ahead, without chopping and without wobbling or flying out. Form enables a man to clear the hurdles without rising or changing his stride; and takes a jumper or vaulter over the bar with minimum effort. Form is all the fancy diver has to offer, from the moment he steps on the board until he disappears without a splash. A football player, in grace of movement, in the pattern of his posture, shift and charge, coordinates with teammates and goes through signals like a dancer doing steps with the rest of the troupe. Lovers of the game, much as they care about having their side win, enjoy following each play's intricacies which are missed by the uninitiated. In boxing the How of play and plot is shown and masked by footwork, tip of head and ripple of the body, as well as by the logic of the gloves, and is what fans pay to see along with punishment and blood. So a cowboy in the saddle is a music of balance and motion. Any man at his own work or fun, if it is fit for a man and he is good at it, will show the economy of effort and lack of strain that makes for form (Ames, 1956, p. 85).

Intensity

> . . . if one watches the sometimes extended and elaborate preparation of an athlete on his mark for a sprint or a long jump, it certainly looks as though something very intense were going on, and a tension released in the action (Reid, 1970, p. 270).

> Sport contains experiences which for participant and spectator alike are frequently unique in their intensity (White, 1975, p. 124).

Sport is perceptually complex and intense (Roberts, 1975). It involves what Kostelantz (1973) referred to as "stunning kinetic images" (p. 54). Power and beauty, which are aspects of Beardsley's intensity factor, are found, in varying degrees, in sport performances (Bannester, 1964). The intensity factor involves a concentration of experience which is clearly shown in sport through intense moments of emotional unification and climax (Kuntz, 1974).

The intensity of sport is most commonly discussed in relation to two focuses: the aesthetic value of the human form in motion and the dynamic tensions created by the competition and conflict, the interactions, of sport (Gebelwicz, 1965). Additionally, according to Reid (1970), the spectacle of sport which includes the more peripheral aspects of pregame introductions and postgame rituals, organized cheering, team nicknames, mascots and colors, etc., are other intensity-producing parts of sport. He felt that the spectacle of sport forms a very rich aesthetic experience for the spectator. The spectators become the frame and their cheering the accompaniment to the spectacle of sport.

Authors, writing for centuries, have described the intensity, beauty and formal perfection of the human body moving in sport activities (Fisher, 1972; Renshaw, 1975; Sandle, 1972; Thomas, 1974). Many descriptions utilized in relating sport performances highlight the aesthetic concept of intensity: ". . . supple stretch . . . , . . . fluid thrusts . . . , . . . harmonious control . . . , . . . rhythmic burst . . . , . . . crescendo coil . . ." (Miller and Russell, 1971, p. 103).

In an aesthetic consideration of sport, the focus is on the beauty of the human form in motion. The efficiency, grace, ease of skilled movement, rhythm, tension, flow, suppleness, of the sport performer are critically examined in the aesthetic assessment (Fisher, 1972; Renshaw, 1975; Thomas, 1974). Sandle (1972) further indicated that the dynamic flow of movement, the tensions, the spatial and temporal interrelationships among bodies and body parts, contribute to the aesthetic quality of sport.

Kovich (1971) suggested that the performer and spectator can share the intensity of the sport experience by becoming sensitive to the movement elements of space, force and time. The feel of freedom in flight; the rhythm of skilled performance; the precarious balance produced by strength, concentration and control all contribute to the shared intensity of sport performances. As the athlete experiences the movement in relation to a harmony of sensation, the spectator sees the movement in relation to its rhythm, force and space aspects (Baitsch, 1972; Laban, 1947).

Lowe (1977) proposed that the intensity of the sport experience is heightened by the amount of risk, originality and virtuosity displayed by the performer. The flawless execution of a difficult skill intensifies the aesthetic experience both visually and experientially. Skilled performances in sport heighten the essence of the experience, enabling the spectator to "see" "the poise of balance, the smoothness of rhythm, the power of a leg leaping, the effort of a muscle taut with strain" (Pavlich, 1966, p. 9).

In a discussion of responses to visual form, Arnheim (1951) proposed that visual forms contain directed tensions. His essay repeatedly mentioned the intensity and strong dynamic effort of the aesthetic response to pictures depicting movement as well as the response to movement itself.

> In particular, it is characteristic of artistic vision that, for instance, the gesture of an arm is not noticed simply as a displacement in space but felt as being soft or abrupt, graceful or jerky. But such experiences are not limited to artists. The dynamic component is a part of the everyday experience of movement. Strictly speaking, there is probably no such thing as a perception of movement devoid of dynamics, even though there may be great individual differences in the strength and awareness of it (p. 276).

The previous discussions have pointed out that the movement in sport can be creative, beautiful and dramatically tense. Sport performances, to be aesthetic events, according to Kaelin (1968), become "a unique context of dramatically significant tensional wholes" (p. 26). Sport builds up, sustains, compounds and releases tensions (Kaelin, 1968).

The drama of sport, according to Kitchin (1963), comes from the display of conflict and controlled aggression. In an article dealing specifically with tennis, soccer and rugby, Kitchin (1966) contended that the conflict of sport is "a duel in the kind of tension aimed at by Strindberg and comparably ruthless" (p. 607). Through conflicts, collisions of intent, climactic moments, bizarre happenings and Dionysiac rituals, sport reveals itself as an extremely intense experience for both the performer and spectator.

Kupfer (1975), in a discussion of the purpose and beauty of sport, indicated that sport involves tension between opponents and coordination within teams. Aesthetic values related to the intensity of the experience arise from these human interactions.

Kaelin (1968), in a germinal argument for a consideration of sport as aesthetic activity, proposed that dynamic tensions are created through sport performances. He indicated that the conflict produced by opposing wills to win made the game an aesthetic event. The tempo and rhythm of a game are shown through the build-up and release of dynamic tensions. These are tensions created by the competition among equally capable teams or individuals.

> The game itself considered as an aesthetic object is perceived as a tense experience in which pressure is built up from moment to moment, sustained through continuous opposition until the climax of victory or defeat (Kaelin, 1968, p. 25).

Intensity in sport is also related to the dramatic and emotional responses to the action and uncertainty of outcome. Sport has the power to excite (Felshin, 1975). As in art, excitement attracts attention and adds intensity (Keenan, 1972). The movement in sport can be creative, lyrical and dramatically tense (Williams, 1970). Jeu (1975), in his definition of sport, indicated that the aesthetic essence of sport is tragedy. The drama and doubt over the final outcome provides a dynamic tension even beyond that found in theatre. Sport, by requiring the total involvement of both spectator and participant, encompasses the whole range of emotions. Emotional responses to sport display the full spectrum from joy and excitement to sadness and despair (Pavlich, 1966).

Summary/Intensity. Intensity in sport performances is shown through the power, beauty and formal aesthetic factors displayed by the skilled human form in sport motion; through the dynamic tensions formed by the flow of movement and the rhythmic, force and spatial/temporal interrelationships of bodies and body parts; through the risk, virtuosity and originality displayed by the participants; through the dynamic tension produced by the conflict and the opposition of wills to win; and through the dramatic and emotional responses to the action and the uncertainty of outcome.

> The athlete in action is a perfect embodiment of all that is beautiful in art; not only beauty of movement, but beauty of intense vital movement--vigorous art. The struggle portrayed in the movement of the athlete's body, the working musculature, the captured action portrayed successfully in split seconds of "arrested movement," surpasses any art creation produced by man (Pendergast, 1937, p. 70).

Complexity

Any consideration of sport must reveal that the concept itself is complex. Sport is a complex whole which is formed from many different levels (Jeu, 1972). Besides the obvious complexity derived from the myriad of activities functioning within the rubric of sport, there is also a complexity which is formed by the many "viewpoints" one can take in an examination of sport. Sport has been examined from the perspectives and modes of inquiry of sociology, philosophy, psychology, history, biodynamics, etc.

Jeu (1972) has suggested that one can contemplate sport movement and form, the moral elements of fair play and sportsmanship, as well as, the appreciation by the knowledgeable observer of the abilities of the players. The very fact that at least twenty definitions of sport exist (see Appendix A) argues for the complexity of the concept.

The dramatic aspects of sport offer diversity within the experience. Athletic contests often contain the dramatic element of reversal, a sudden change of advantage during the contest. Sport is rich in these moments which vividly contrast victory and defeat in a sudden reversal of action (Keenan, 1972; Kitchen, 1966). The concept of personal style of moving also adds drama and complexity to sport performances. "Sport translates simple themes into complex dimensions of style and, in so doing, provides dramatic satisfaction" (Felshin, 1975, p. 31). Maheu (1963) stated in his discussion of sport and culture that the beauty of sport can be found in the "performance of an action that is unique" (p. 52).

Functional perfection, the mastery of bodily movements, allows the performer to move smoothly and fluidly with appropriate rhythms of tension and relaxation. Once this is achieved, then the performer can "give the movement expressive form which is his own creation, and which is meaning-embodied" (Reid, 1970, p. 250). This is what is meant by style. No two people do the same task in the same way. Sport participants display their own assertion of personality in the style quality of their performance. "Thus individuality asserts itself even, seemingly, at that highest pitch of perfection which characterizes both art and sport" (Maheu, 1963, p. 32).

Lowe (1977), in a discussion of modern Olympic gymnastics, has indicated that the style of performance is increasingly important. The gymnast is challenged to utilize "provocative, personal, free-flowing movements in which the illusion of ease and flight are valued" (p. 118). He further stated that complexity, a judged component of composition, is an artistic quality of performance.

> The creative gymnast who modifies the usual or expected into the novel or unexpected approaches his performance with the psychological set of an artist (p. 121).

Another complexity-producing aspect of sport is created by sports rules, boundaries and regulations. The rule-imposed confines and precise, geometric spatio-temporal boundaries of sport require invention and improvisation on the part of the participants. "Sport instantiates man's capacity to improvise in the midst of structured stress" (Kupfer, 1975, p. 89). Keenan (1972) has suggested that:

> Perhaps it is the ability to cope with the novel immediately and skillfully which provides us [the spectator] with an aesthetic quality in the athletic contest (p. 5).

Brown and Gaynor (1967) proposed an action theory of creativity which indicated that creativity will occur during athletic action and that it operates in movement like it acts in other processes. They stated that the competitive sport situation is an arena where confusion and chaos are rampant. Invention, improvisation and experimentation by the participants are necessary for adaptation to the ever-changing vista of a sport situation. Brown and Gaynor also indicated that "The creative person can fulfill his search for complexity by participating on a team or playing in a competitive game" (p. 160).

Several authors have discussed the novelty, the uniqueness, the chaos of sport. Kostelanetz (1973) saw football as displaying complex and precise ensemble movements within and among groups revealing patterns of evolution and resolution. To Toynbee (1972), no two sports or sport actions were alike. The design and pattern to be found in a particular contest was unique and specific to that sport situation. The spontaneity revealed in game patterns prompted Fisher (1972) to propose that within sport "there is the presentation of pure possibility" (p. 319).

Browne (1917), in a consideration of the beautiful in movement, discussed the unity factors of regularity, adaptation to desired end and economy of effort. But then he proposed that:

> to produce expression of grace, the rhythm must not be too monotonous, the object not too apparent, and the economy not too strict (p. 21).

Graceful lines are those which are created through free, easy, supple movement. The movement must have a purpose but should show a certain potential and actual variety in the achievement of that purpose.

Summary/Complexity. Complexity in sport performances is displayed through the range and diversity among the kinds of sport activities available to participants and spectators; through the dramatic concepts of reversal and style; through the many "viewpoints" from which sport can be examined (sociology, psychology, philosophy, biomechanics, aesthetics); and through the uniqueness, novelty and spontaneity found in sport actions.

Variability in the Exhibition of Aesthetic-Designating Factors

The above discussions have sought to describe the presence of the aesthetic-designating factors of unity, intensity and complexity in sport performances. The proof of presence, however, has not indicated any variability in the exhibition or visibility of these factors.

There are three viewpoints concerning the exhibition and visibility of the aesthetic in sport. Some sport theorists propose that all sports have aesthetic features; some believe that the variability to be found occurs among contests or events; and then there are those writers who see variability from sport to sport.

All sport is aesthetic. Kuntz (1974) and Miller and Russell (1971) have indicated that lovers of sport would argue that all sport is beautiful and that all sports have aesthetic elements.

Keenan (1972), in his discussion of the Aristotelian model of tragedy in relation to sport, indicated that beauty is found in all sports. The aesthetic in sport is found in the drama of sport. Drama is seen in every athletic contest in which the outcome is uncertain. Keenan suggested that beauty can be seen in the grace and skill in gymnastics;

in the coordination and style in synchronized swimming; in the acrobatic mastery of diving; and in the skill, precisioned movement, coordination of effort and unity of purpose in team sports.

Kupfer (1975) has proposed that all sports have aesthetic features. They all display economy and efficiency of effort; the tensions and intensity of human interactions; rhythm; and the drama of opposition of wills to win. Kupfer further suggested that the aesthetic in sport is concerned with the excellence of play of a sport. The aesthetic cannot be seen as secondary to the main purpose of the sport since excellence and, therefore, the aesthetic, is central to all sport.

Variability contest to contest. Browne's (1917) discussion of the aesthetic in sport was generalized across sport and examples of each of his points were taken from a variety of sports. He found the aesthetic to be specific to particular performances rather than to particular sports. Variability in grace, use of force and rhythm occurs from performer to performer, from contest to contest rather than being identified with specific sports.

Gaskin and Masterson (1974) saw the aesthetic in sport in relation to formal aesthetic qualities and indicated variability not from sport to sport but from contest to contest. The elements of composition and structure (unity), rhythm and harmony (unity and complexity), empathy (intensity) and color and tension (intensity) are different for each performance of every sport.

Jeu (1972) saw the essence of the aesthetic in sport as tragedy, the staging of violence and death. He indicated that there must be doubt over the final outcome and there must be the opposition of wills to win.

Sporting performances which highlight and emphasize these qualities are "more aesthetic" than those which do not. Contests in which the teams or individuals are not evenly matched; contests in which one side admits defeat before the final action; and contests which are "fixed" are all examples of "less aesthetic" sport performances according to Jeu's standards.

Kaelin's (1968) view of what makes sport aesthetic is very similar to Jeu's (1972). He proposed that sport is made aesthetic by the competition. The opposition of wills to win creates dynamic tensions. Those contests which build-up, sustain, complicate and release dynamic tensions are aesthetic. Playing for a tie is never aesthetic. Some contests, because of the evenness of skill levels, preparation, desire to win, etc., create more tension and intensity than other performances. This factor of dynamic tension and intensity varies in relation to the individual contest and is not defined particularly by the structure of the particular sport.

Kostelanetz (1973), in a discussion of the aesthetic to be found in football, proposed that professional games were more aesthetic than any other level of sport because the performance skill and proficiency was higher. He saw grace and beauty in relation to the skill of the performers and concluded that the aesthetic in sport varies from contest to contest depending on the skill and organizational levels of performance.

Toynbee (1972) defined the aesthetic in sport in relation to the design elements of balance, controlled movement and interrelated and interdependent patterns of action. Each contest is unique and different in the exhibition of these elements.

> Each match played to the same rules by different teams, or the same team at different times, or even between the same teams on the same ground on different days, contains the same timeless elements and yet the human beings playing it create an intense individuality, sometimes of greatness, sometimes of bathos [pathos], but whether memorable and stirring or not, each match is different from every other, each pattern and design is unique (Toynbee, 1972, p. 306).

Variability sport to sport. Brown and Gaynor (1967) saw differences in the creativity potential among sports. Some sports present many opportunities for improvisation and spontaneity. These sports provide more potential action-alternatives for the participants. Brown and Gaynor proposed a "calisthetic-noncalistetic continuum" in which the calisthetic activity, such as a fifty-yard dash, offers fewer action-alternatives than a noncalistetic activity, like intercepting a football and making a return run.

> The potential operational use of the creative process is directly related to the point on the continuum at which the action situation falls. The more variables the action situation offers, the more the individual can use his creative resources (p. 159).

Team sports, because of the opportunity for individual action and group interaction, offer more chances for creativity than do individual sports. Group creativity in team sports is influenced by three factors: the combining of individual creativity; team interaction; and game structure. Some sports, like baseball, have very set and confined patterns of action.

Variability in creativity can be seen from contest to contest as well as from sport to sport when using Brown and Gaynor's action-alternative proposal. Some teams and individuals in all sports display a very set, methodical style of play which does not offer much complexity or

intensity. Differing game plans do exhibit variability across contests as well as across sports.

Geblewicz (1965) indicated that the spectacle of sport contributes to the aesthetic considerations. In this respect, sports do differ in relation to the exhibition of aesthetic factors. The rules, history and traditions of some sports dictate the presence of the more spectacular elements of rituals and ceremonies, parades of participants, elaborate costuming, and fanfares.

Geblewicz proposed a continuum which classified the aesthetic in sport according to the appearance and importance of both the form and beauty of the movements displayed and the spectacular elements present.

> For instance, in tennis the beauty of the movements plays a greater part than in football. In general, sports might be divided into a series in accordance with their spectacular values, the first place being occupied by certain forms of gymnastics, while in the last place archery and shooting would be classed (p. 56).

Best (1975) classified physical activity in relation to means/end relationships. Those activities in which the aim can be specified independently of the manner of achieving it are designated as purposive activities. Some examples of purposive sports are football, golf, tennis and track and field. In some activities the aim and means of achievement cannot be considered apart from one another and these are labeled as aesthetic activities. Examples of aesthetic sports are gymnastics, diving, figure skating and skiing. The third category defines those artistic activities, like dance and mime, in which it would be illogical to try to distinguish means from ends.

Best, therefore, differentiated among sports in relation to sport goals. In most sports the end is more important than the manner of

achieving it and the aesthetic is incidental. He did not propose a spectrum to fix various sports on a continuum because he indicated that he could not find many mid-spectrum sports. The only sport Best could identify for a mid-position which mixes purposive and aesthetic evaluation was ski-jumping and the identification of only one sport in the middle does not justify a continuum.

Renshaw (1975) utilized Best's (1975) means/end classification system to also discuss the exhibition and variability of aesthetic features among sports. Those sports in which there is a very close connection between function and form were designated as aesthetic sports. Olympic gymnastics, diving, figure-skating and skiing were so designated. The aesthetic sports are evaluated all or in part with aesthetic criteria: form, style, balance, grace, rhythm, line and economy of effort. The way the movement is performed is important and, therefore, the aim cannot be seen in isolation from the means.

The majority of authors indicating variability among sports in the exhibition of aesthetic-designating factors did so on the basis of evaluation procedures.

Gaskin and Masterson (1974) and Lowe (1977) suggested that in some sports, such as diving, skating, gymnastics and ski jumping, the aesthetic component is fundamental to their judgment. Variability is demonstrated, therefore, when an aesthetic quality of execution is seen as part of the definition of a successful performance in some sports and not in others.

Reid (1970) proposed a purpose-oriented continuum to classify sport. Some sports, like gymnastics, diving and skating, have as central to

their games purpose an aesthetic element in which the grace and manner of moving is important. In these sports, the way the movement is performed is evaluated by a judge and is counted in the scoring. All spectator sports have an aesthetic element which is associated with the spectacle (the cheering, color and intensity of the spectator experience) of their being played but Reid concluded that variability can be found primarily in the relation of aesthetic factors to games purpose.

Ziff (1974), even in contending that there is nothing to be gained from considering sport from an aesthetic view, declared that some sports have distinct aesthetic aspects which are present in that form is a factor in evaluation. His "aesthetic" sports were gymnastics, ski-jumping, figure-skating, high-diving and bull fighting.

Munrow (1972) indicated that some sports, like skating, Olympic gymnastics, diving and trampolining, are hardly distinguishable from art forms. They form one end of a spectrum which reflects differences in evaluation procedures. At one end, aesthetic standards prevail and, at the other end of the spectrum of sports, objective scores, distances or speeds mark achievement.

In most sports, according to Anthony (1968), any aesthetic element is incidental to the main aim of scoring goals or points. There are some sports, however, in which one major aim of the sport is aesthetic: to move artistically or gracefully. Variability among sports is found in differing sport purposes and some sports are more aesthetic than others if the aesthetic elements related to formal unity, intensity and complexity are an integral part of their evaluation.

Conclusion. Variability in the exhibition of the aesthetic-designating factors of unity, intensity and complexity seems to be a function of: the structure and aims of particular sports; the "game plan" and style and level of play of a particular contest; and the integration of the aesthetic factors into the evaluation procedures of particular sports. Variability is found from contest to contest and from sport to sport.

Variability in the Visibility of Aesthetic-Designating Factors

Variability in the visibility of aesthetic-designating factors is more a function of the selective perception of the spectator than of any other factor (Fisher, 1972; Best, 1975). Best indicated that while those sports which allow smooth and flowing movement in the achievement of their purpose seem to be generally considered and preferred as more aesthetic, the devotee of all sports can "see" beauty and grace in their sport.

Renshaw (1975) posited that the sport activity can be perceived independent of the reason for its performance. For instance, a tennis serve can be regarded in terms of its functional aspects of power, speed and accuracy or in terms of the pure form of the movement. He then concluded that "only the aesthetically aware spectator will perceive aesthetic quality in the player's performance" (p. 9).

Similarily, Smith (1968) pointed out that perception is an integral ingredient of aesthetics and that "all human movement, for whatever purpose it is performed, is intimately related to aesthetics" (p. 60).

> Since aesthetics is based on perception, to appreciate the beauty of the human body in motion one must make an effort

> to "see" the form as well as the function of movement patterns. By practice, however, the eye may be educated to take in more details of the patterns observed, and thus one's perceptual field is widened and one's discernment heightened (Smith, 1968, p. 62).
>
> The fact that the traditional measures of the quality of these events [sports] are minutes, seconds, feet, inches, and points should not distract us from an appreciation of the beauty of the movements themselves (Smith, 1968, p. 63).

Keenan's (1972) viewpoint of variability of aesthetic-designating factors also, like Best (1975), Fisher (1972), Renshaw (1975) and Smith (1968), hinges on the selective perception of the spectator. He proposed that the spectator must have some understanding of aesthetic qualities to properly evaluate the artistry in a sporting performance. Prior movement experiences enable a spectator to fully perceive the artistry and "only the skilled recognize the extreme difficulty and fully appreciate the artistry of another's performance" (Keenan, 1972, p. 5).

Conclusion. It can be concluded from these discussions that variability in the visibility of the aesthetic-designating factors is a function of the knowledge and background of the spectator in both aesthetics and in sport. The more one knows about the factors which contribute to the aesthetic in sport, the more one "sees" in sport performances.

Central/Peripheral Nature of Aesthetic Qualities of Sport

After considering the specific aesthetic-designating factors exhibited by sport, the centrality or peripherality of the aesthetic qualities of sport should be considered. Few authors have dealt with this issue and those who have done so devote very little time to the discussion.

The philosopher, Reid (1970), categorically stated that:

> The aesthetic qualities of games and sport are by-products --for the participants and even for the most aesthetically -minded observer, if he is really interested in sports or games as such. They can be an important and precious by-product, but by-product they are none the less (p. 252).

He proposed that sport is played to achieve the practical end or purpose of the sport and not generally to produce movement for aesthetic contemplation.

According to Reid (1970), aesthetic purposes are parasitic to most sports. However, in a discussion of the so-called "aesthetic" sports of gymnastics, skating and diving, Reid entertained the questions of "whether the production of aesthetic value is intrinsically part of the purpose of these sports" (1970, p. 258).

Munrow (1972) argued for the teaching of aesthetic awareness of sports and games. Aesthetic awareness is a by-product, not end-product, of physical skill but such awareness is generally learned by practice rather than precept. His expressed concern was that aesthetic awareness, as a by-product of sport and game performances, is caught rather than taught.

Anthony (1968) stated that "Most sports have the straightforward, uncomplicated objective of scoring goals or points; any esthetic element is incidental to the main aim" (p. 2). He did, however, mention that some sports, such as gymnastics, diving and skating, have one major aim which is aesthetic: the creation of "artistic" or "graceful" movement. The majority of sports are scored on what happens (points, goals, touches, etc.) rather than on how the actions are performed (rhythm, harmony and economy of effort).

Another author who offered a similar distinction between "aesthetic" and "non-aesthetic" sports is Best (1975). He analyzed sports relative to the importance of the aesthetic. The importance of aesthetic considerations of sport are, to Best, specific to the category of sport being examined. Those sports where the aesthetic is relatively unimportant and, therefore, incidental, are designated as "purposive" sports.

> In each of these sports the aim, purpose, or end can be specified independently of the manner of achieving it as long as it conforms to the limits set by the rules or norms (Best, 1975, p. 43).

The other category of sports include those activities in which the goal cannot be isolated from the aesthetic. In these sports, the how of performance is central rather than incidental.

> they are similar to the arts in that the purpose cannot be considered apart from the manner of achieving it. There is an intrinsic end, one which cannot be independent of the means (Best, 1975, p. 43).

Best further proposed that the gap between these two categories of sport can be closed. The purpose and structure of the aesthetic sports can be examined and aesthetic considerations can be applied to sports of the purposive kind.

Aesthetic sports have externally identifiable aims or purposes. There are rules and structures in all sports and "it is significant that there is no analogy in aesthetic sports with poetic justice" (Best, 1975, p. 44). Any deviation from the basic rule-specified requirements of a sport detract from the scoring and from the standards of the performance. However, in the aesthetic sports, the separation between the goal to be achieved and the manner of achievement is minimal. How the performer reached the goal is almost as important as the fact that the goal was reached.

Performances in purposive sports can be aesthetically viewed. The economy and efficiency of effort, the rhythm, balance and harmony of movement can be examined. A purposive point of view would reward any way of winning, within the rules; aesthetic acclaim would be reserved for the sportsperson who achieved his purpose in an aesthetically pleasing way.

> The aesthetic pleasure which we derive from sporting events of the purposive kind, such as hurdling and putting the shot, is, then, derived from looking at, or performing, actions which we take to be approaching the ideal of totally concise direction towards the required end of the particular activity (Best, 1975, pp. 45-46).

It must be noted that successful achievement in both aesthetic and purposive sports presuppose attainment of the goal of the particular sport.

> Maximum aesthetic success still requires the attainment of the end, and the aesthetic in any degree requires direction to that end, but the number of ways of achieving such success is reduced in comparison with the purely purposive interest of simply accomplishing the end in an externally specifiable sense (Best, 1975, p. 44).

Two authors, Kupfer (1975) and Kaelin (1968), are opposed to placing the aesthetic as peripheral to the nature of sport. Kupfer (1975) suggested that the aesthetic is not external to the nature of the game but rather is the full realization of the sport.

> It seems to me that in no sport is the aesthetic subordinate to the "main purpose" since the purpose alluded to is part of the whole game, a reflection of excellence in the play of that game, and the aesthetic concerns the excellence of the whole (p. 86).

Kaelin (1968) contended that the sport goals of conflict and opposition of teams and/or individuals is central to the aesthetic aspects of sport. He indicated that the winning or losing of a game is aesthetically irrelevant, but that the desire to win is always aesthetically relevant.

> Controlled violence in which the opponent is not destroyed, but only defeated, and yet somehow morally edified--such is the essence of competitive sport. It reaches its aesthetic heights when the victor narrowly surpasses the worthy opponent. . . . Sudden death play-offs--and perhaps extra-inning games--are as close as a sport may come to achieving this aesthetic ideal (pp. 24-25).

Kaelin, therefore, saw the aesthetic as being central to the "well-played game." If the opponents are not well-matched in skill or if one team plays for a tie, the aesthetic and sport purposes are not met. The desire to win is an integral and necessary part of competitive sport. This opposition of strength in the will to win builds, sustains and releases dynamic tensions among both participants and observers. To Kaelin, the sport and aesthetic purposes of a contest do not have centra/peripheral relationship. If one is actualized, the other is realized also. They are interrelated and the failing to achieve one, negates the attainment of the other.

Conclusion. The aesthetic is peripheral to the nature of sport if one defines the goal of sport as being independent of the manner of achieving that end. When the "what" is seen as divorced from the "how" of achievement, the aesthetic is seen as an ancillary consideration. However, if one defines the sport purpose or goal in relation to the manner of achieving that end, then the aesthetic is a concommitant purpose. The central/peripheral question is, therefore, answerable only in relation to how one defines both sport and the aesthetic.

The definitions utilized in this paper lead to the conclusion that the aesthetic is central to the games-purpose of sport. The goals of sport and the manner of their achievement have been interpreted in relation to the aesthetic-designating factors of unity, intensity and

complexity. As Kaelin (1968) has indicated, the sport and aesthetic purposes of a contest are interrelated and the achievement of one brings about the achievement of the other.

Conferred Status of Sport as Aesthetic Activity

The next step in the establishment of the concept "aesthetic of sport" lies in an examination of the feasibility of conferring on sport the status of aesthetic activity. Sport has been found to display the aesthetic-designating factors of unity, intensity and complexity developed by Beardsley (1958) in his metacritical theory of Instrumentalism.

The related Institutional aesthetic theory of Dickie (1974), because it was developed out of the basic precepts of Beardsley's Instrumentalism, offers the most logically consistent guidelines for designating sport as aesthetic activity.

Dickie's aesthetic theory stressed the conventional matrix in which aesthetic objects and works of art are embedded and which define the essential characteristics of art.

> In order to verify statements about aesthetic objects we must already know what in general to look for and at, what to listen for and to, and so on (Dickie, 1974, p. 173).

Dickie proposed that the aspects of an object or activity which designate the aesthetic aspects are determined by the conventions which govern presentation. Much of Dickie's explanation was concerned with identifying art objects rather than aesthetic objects or activity but the conventions described will help to define sport as aesthetic activity.

The conventions of presentation which delineate aesthetic activity are intended to locate the aesthetic object for the spectator. The conventions are specific to the activity and are characterized by the

essential properties and acceptable practices of that area. The conventional matrix of a sport aesthetic, then, is determined by the display in sport of the aesthetic-designating factors which define aesthetic activity for this study.

The aesthetic-designating factors have been identified as unity, intensity and complexity and the display in sport of these factors was discussed in detail earlier in this chapter. The exhibition in sport of the selected aesthetic-designating factors comprises the conventional matrix which defines an aesthetic of sport (see Table 2).

Once the conventional matrix has been identified, the final step requires that an object or event "has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution" (Dickie, 1974, p. 34). Dickie's designation of an art aesthetic was conferred on behalf of the "artworld" (Dickie, 1974; Danto, 1964). The artworld consists of a loosely organized association of artists, producers, audiences, reporters, critics, historians, theorists, etc. The minimum core of the artworld, the presentation group, includes the artists, the presenters and the goers.

The application to sport is apparent. The conferring on sport of the status of aesthetic activity is done on behalf of the "sportworld." The sport situation or sportworld has been defined by Loy (1968) as being composed of: the primary (athletes), secondary (coaches, officials, trainers, managers) and tertiary (service personnel) producers; and the primary (active/"live" spectators), secondary (media spectators) and tertiary (those who talk or read about sport) consumers. Other personnel, not mentioned by Loy, are also important to the sportworld and should be

Table 2

A Metacritical Aesthetic of Sport

Aesthetic-designating Factor	Display in Sport
Unity	spatial and temporal boundaries technical skill in performance--efficiency and economy of effort display and evaluation of formal design and expressive qualities harmony wholeness
Intensity	power, beauty and formal aesthetic factors displayed by the skilled human form in sport motion dynamic tensions formed by the flow of movement and the spatial/temporal interrelationships of bodies and body parts risk, virtuosity and originality displayed by the participants dynamic tension produced by the conflict and the opposition of wills to win dramatic and emotional responses to the action and the uncertainty of outcome
Complexity	range and diversity of sport activities dramatic aspects of sport many "viewpoints" from which sport can be examined ever-changing vista of sport situations uniqueness, novelty and spontaneity found in sport

added to its realm. This group would include the sport theorists, reporters, critics and historians. The minimum core of the sportworld would include the athletes, the coaches and officials and the spectators. Without these individuals, the sportworld would not exist.

Having defined the social institution, the sportworld, it remains to demonstrate how status is conferred by this institution. Dickie (1971, 1974) indicated that status may be acquired by a single person treating the activity as a candidate for appreciation. Therefore, a discussion of sport as aesthetic activity would be sufficient to designate it as such. Such discussions, once made public, carry a particular kind of responsibility: presenting sport as aesthetic activity always includes the possibility that no one else sees it as such and the person who did the conferring would thereby be seen in a less than favorable light.

This has not happened with the sport aesthetic concept, though, for many sport theorists, who can be conceived of as acting on behalf of the sportworld, have designated sport as aesthetic activity. Some of the more succinct pronouncements are presented below as evidence of the conferring on sport the status of aesthetic activity.

> Sport has aesthetic and thematic compulsion because expressive modes of performing and contesting are significant and valued (Felshin, 1975, p. 31).

> The athlete in action is a perfect embodiment of all that is beautiful in art; not only beauty of movement, but beauty of intense vital movement--vigorous art. The struggle portrayed in the movement of the athlete's body, the working musculature, the captured action portrayed successfully in split seconds of "arrested movement," surpass any art creation produced by man (Pendergast, 1937, p. 70).

> In the action and rhythm which testify to mastery of space and time, sport becomes akin to the arts which create beauty (Maheu, 1963, p. 32).

> The spectator, as well as the performer, will primarily respond to and acknowledge "the straight forward uncomplicated objective of scoring goals or points" but his appreciation and enjoyment of the performance can be enhanced by his awareness of the aesthetics of the activity. In fact, because of the essentially different functions of performer and audience, it may well be that the onlooker sees more of the game in the aesthetic sense too (Munrow, 1972, p. 100).

> The game itself considered as an aesthetic object is perceived as a tense experience in which pressure is built up from moment to moment, sustained through continuous opposition, until the climax of victory or defeat (Kaelin, 1968, p. 25).

> The most arresting aesthetic feature of sport <u>is</u> the grace of the human form. Economy and efficiency of effort is accomplished in movement which is continuous and fluid: sport provides us distinct balletic values. . . . Aesthetic values also emerge from human interaction (Kupfer, 1975, p. 87).

> From the spectator's point of view, the aesthetic experience may come from any of three sources in sport--from the human form in action, from a single action, or from the action of the whole game at one moment (Fisher, 1972, p. 318).

> To discover the aesthetic in athletics is to be concerned with the action and movement of the medium, for athletics is necessarily process oriented (Keenan, 1972, p. 4).

In this study, sport has been shown to exhibit the aesthetic-designating factors which were defined by the selected metacritical aesthetic theories. The exhibition, visibility and centrality of these factors has also been examined and sport has, by the nature of the literature, been found to be properly designated as aesthetic activity (see Appendix C).

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study attempted to analyze and synthesize the concepts of metacritical aesthetics and sport and to utilize that philosophical base from which to speculate on the nature of a metacritical aesthetic of sport.

Gowin's method for the analysis of the structure of knowledge was used to identify the germinal issues in question form. The existence of a metacritical aesthetic of sport was explored and was found to be a viable concern. The answering of primary/telling questions and secondary/connecting subquestions supported the existence of the concept.

Telling and Connecting Questions

Telling Question: Is there an aesthetic of sport?

Connecting Questions: What is aesthetics?

What factors designate an object as a candidate for appreciation?

Aesthetics is an axiologic subdiscipline of philosophy which concerns itself with the nature and significance of art, with the evaluation and value assessment of art objects and with the concept of "the beautiful." Aesthetic discourse attempts to clarify the basic concepts utilized in thinking and talking about the objects of aesthetic experience.

A work of art or aesthetic experience involves three entities: a creator (artist), an object (event) and a perceiver (audience/critic)

(Hein, 1970). Various concepts of "What is aesthetics?" can be categorized relative to where they place the central focus of their concern: in the object, in the artist or in the perceiver.

Formalism locates its central focus in the object. It proposes that the artist communicates in and through forms and contends that the audience enjoys the arrangements which combine formal elements into a unity. Formalism finds distinguishing features in the object itself rather than in the artist or in the attitudes of the audience. The essential object of the aesthetic analysis is the concrete work of art.

Formalism, although it offers refuge from subjectivity and assures centrality of the object itself, tends toward ambiguity in the appraisal of the visual arts and makes the assumption that form can be discriminated without awareness of the referent of the form.

Those theories which focus on the artist are generally grouped within the rubric of Expressionism. One connotation of the term "expression" in relation to aesthetics sees art as the self-expression of the artist. Proponents claim that a work of art expresses the qualitative character of felt emotion. Expression consists of finding images to articulate an emotion and to make it determinate for apprehension. Art is excellent to the extent that it communicates experience.

The artist-centered Expressionism theories do account for the emotional quality of art and for the way art moves people but they are subject to the serious faults of confusing the intent of the artist and the reactions of the spectators with the properties of the work itself.

When the central focus of aesthetic concern is found in the perceiver, several theory-camps can be identified. Some Expression

theorists, dealing with the communication aspects of the art experience, contend that the artist attempts to communicate the basic forms of feelings through the work of art. Attitude theorists define the aesthetic object in relation to the perceiver's attitude toward it or approach to it. These theorists claim that there is some attitudinal position which the perceiver can assume which makes any perceived object into an aesthetic object.

Perceiver-centered Expression and Attitude theorists make the audience an important participant in the aesthetic experience and highlight the psychological aspects of art appreciation and criticism. But these theorists, by making the perceiver so important, undermine the importance of the artist in the aesthetic process.

All of the above-mentioned aesthetic theories are not particularly concerned with the evaluation and criticism of art, and yet, they arbitrarily make evaluative decisions about art and aesthetic objects. Metacriticism, which places its central focus in the perceiver, is more current than formal, expression and attitude theories. It was developed from the actual practices of critics and, as such, sees aesthetics as consisting of the principles which clarify and confirm critical statements.

Metacritical Instrumentalism, which is the basic philosophical aesthetic position utilized in this paper, attempts to isolate and describe the features of experience which are peculiarly characteristic of intercourse with aesthetic objects (Beardsley, 1958). Critical reasoning about the arts presupposes general principles upon which judgments about particular works of art deductively depend.

Aesthetic experience is defined as the "immediate effect of aesthetic objects" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 559), and the primary principles or aesthetic-designating factors of metacriticism are unity, intensity and complexity. These factors are connected but independent and aesthetic experiences differ in magnitude as a function of these three variables.

The aesthetic experience is coherent and complete (unity). It has continuity of development and an overall sense of pattern and coherence. All expectations and impulses which are aroused are counter-balanced or resolved by other elements within the experience. The experience is marked with intensity and a concentration of experience. The experience is composed of a sensory pattern of heterogeneous yet interrelated parts of a phenomenally objective field (complexity). Attention is totally focused, freely and without obstruction, on the experience itself.

Metacritical Instrumentalism maintains that aesthetic experiences are distinctive and can be described utilizing the three aesthetic-designating factors of unity, intensity and complexity as a basis for explanation. The categorizing of these three factors objectifies the explanation of the aesthetic experience.

Connecting Questions: What is sport?

What factors designate an activity as sport?

The literature which attempts to define the nature of sport approaches the concept from three viewpoints: the organization and structure; the responses and involvement of the participants and spectators; and a combination of both structure and involvement.

Some authors indicate that it is the structural and organizational aspects which allow sport activities to be identified as different from

other patterns of behavior. These definitional efforts see sport as involving skilled human patterns of play occurring within spatial, temporal and organizational limits.

Other theorists focus attention on the responses and involvement of the performers and spectators. Structure and organization are not ignored, but these definitions contend that the interactional patterns of behavior are germinal to the meaning of sport. The physical, bodily nature of sport activities are assumed and these theorists then center their definitional efforts in the degree and kind of involvement among the individuals in the sport situations.

The third focus or viewpoint attempts to combine the previously described emphasis, structure and involvement, to form more complex and encompassing definitions. These definitions, rather than splitting the focus between the two "centers," have broadened the central concepts to include both structural/organizational and interactional/involvement features. The complex and combinational definitions tend to be more effective in pinpointing "What is sport?" than the single-centered structural or interactional explanations. The common features of each single-centered focus are combined and expanded to allow the application of a composite definition to many differing sport activities.

A consideration of the germinal aspects of the myriad of sport definitions explored in this paper produced the following definition of sport.

> Sport is physical, playful, bounded, rule-governed and competitive/challenging activity. It offers opportunities for social interaction and for the pursuit of personal and group excellence. It is dynamic, tense, absorbing and potentially fulfilling. Sport is related to play, games and athletics.

This definition, hopefully, is narrow enough to exclude nonsport and broad enough to allow for the inclusion of the widely differing manifestations of the thing called sport. The word "sport" symbolizes a complexity which is regularly used to describe diverse game activities occurring on an almost unlimited number of skill and organizational levels.

Telling Question: Can an aesthetic of sport be defined?

Connecting Question: What aesthetic-designating factors are exhibited by sport?

Metacritical Instrumentalism, the central aesthetic theory of this paper, defines aesthetic experience as the "immediate effect of aesthetic objects" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 559), and proposes three aesthetic-designating factors to identify the experience and the object: unity, intensity and complexity.

Unity. Coherence and completeness comprise the unity factor. Critical comments dealing with form, organization and the logic of structure and style are recognized as statements dealing with the unity of an aesthetic experience (Beardsley, 1958).

The aesthetic-designating factor of unity is displayed in sport through spatial and temporal boundaries of performance; through technical skill in performance standards concerned with the efficiency and economy of effort; through the display and evaluation of formal design and expressive qualities; and through the twin concepts of harmony and wholeness.

Sport provides unity by being spatially immediate and temporally recurring. The total coordination of body and movement parts are fundamental to skilled execution and are basic to aesthetic appreciation

(Best, 1975). Well-executed movements, which display balance, rhythm, and economy of effort, yield great pleasure for the spectator (Smith, 1968).

Form in sport is perceived as a sense of pattern and is described in both formal and expressive terms. Formal properties such as balance, symmetry and continuity are often linked with the more expressive descriptors such as dynamic, strong and graceful (Reid, 1970). Every aspect of a sport contest is an integral part of the whole and harmony is displayed (Fisher, 1972). The aesthetic in movement occurs when the actual or empathic feel and the sport goal of the movement are in harmony (Munrow, 1972). Everything is focused on the achievement of the sport goal and useless motions, which do not contribute to the completion of movement skills, detract from the unity, wholeness and grace of the sport performance (Browne, 1917).

Intensity. The intensity factor and its attendant concentration of experience are characterized by critical comments dealing with the forcefulness, vividness, beauty and vitality of an experience.

Sport is perceptually complex and intense (Roberts, 1975). When the focus is on the beauty of the human form in motion, the efficiency, grace, ease of skilled movement, rhythm, tension, flow and suppleness of the sport performance are critically examined (Fisher, 1972; Renshaw, 1975; Thomas, 1974). Also contributing to the intensity factor of sport are the dynamic flow of movement, the tensions, the spatial and temporal interrelationships among the bodies and body parts (Sandle, 1972).

Risk, originality and virtuosity intensify the aesthetic experience both visually and experientially (Lowe, 1976). Sport builds up, sustains, compounds and releases tension (Kaelin, 1968). Through conflicts,

collisions of intent, climaxes and Dionysian rituals, sport reveals itself as an extremely intense experience for both the performer and the spectator (Kitchin, 1966).

Sport requires the total involvement of both spectators and participants, thereby encompassing the whole range of human emotions. The drama and doubt over the final outcome provides dynamic tensions and emotional responses to sport display the full spectrum from joy and excitement to sadness and despair (Pavlich, 1966).

Complexity. The range and diversity of activities which are called sport contribute to the complexity of the concept. The dramatic aspects of sport, such as reversal or sudden changes of advantage during a contest and climaxes and personal styles of moving, offer diversity within the experience. "Sport translates simple themes into complex dimensions of style and, in so doing, provides dramatic satisfaction" (Felshin, 1975, p. 31).

The novelty, uniqueness and chaos of sport contribute to its perceived complexity (Kostelanetz, 1973; Toynbee, 1972; Fisher, 1972). The sport situation, by its nature, is constantly shifting and changing and this necessitates invention, improvisation and experimentation on the part of the participants (Brown and Gaynor, 1967).

Connecting Question: Is the exhibition of these factors central or peripheral to sport?

The central/peripheral issue is concerned with the relative importance of the aesthetic to the nature of sport and is answerable only in relation to how sport and the aesthetic are defined. The relationship among sport and aesthetic means and ends must be examined to make a decision on this issue.

The aesthetic qualities of sport have been interpreted as peripheral or parasitic to the practical end or purpose of sport (Reid, 1970; Munrow, 1972). This viewpoint contends that the majority of sport activities are scored on what happens rather than on how the actions are performed (Anthony, 1968) and, therefore, the aesthetic is seen as ancillary.

Best (1975) modified this viewpoint to offer that the central/peripheral issue was specific to the nature of the sport being considered. In some activities, the achievement of the sport goal can be considered independently from the manner in which the goal was reached. In these sports, the aesthetic is peripheral and of only secondary importance. When the "how" of performance is intrinsic to the achievement of the sport goal, the aesthetic is primary and central.

The position offered by Kaelin (1968) and Kupfer (1975) is consistent with the definitions of sport and aesthetics utilized in this paper. These authors suggested that the aesthetic is not external to the nature of sport but, instead, is the full realization of the sport goal. The aesthetic is seen as concommitant if one defines the sport purpose/goal in relation to the manner of achieving it.

The goals of sport and the manner of achieving those goals have been interpreted in this paper in relation to the aesthetic-designating factors of unity, intensity and complexity. The sport and aesthetic purposes of a contest are interrelated and interdependent and the failing to achieve one, negates the attainment of the other.

Telling Question: Can sport be classified relative to the aesthetic?

Connecting Questions: Is there variability in the exhibition of

aesthetic-designating factors?

Is there variability in the visibility of these factors?

The issue of variability in the exhibition of the aesthetic-designating factors of unity, intensity and complexity is discussed in the literature examined from three points of view: all sport is aesthetic; variability is found from sport to sport; variability is seen from contest to contest among all sports.

Kupfer (1975) and Keenan (1972) argued that all sport is beautiful and that all sports have aesthetic elements. The display of economy and efficiency of effort, the tensions and intensity of human interactions, the rhythm and the drama of opposition of wills to win which occurs in all sport is indicative of the centrality of the aesthetic to the nature of sport.

Browne (1917), Gaskin and Masterson (1974), Jeu (1972), Kaelin (1968) and Toynbee (1972) proposed that the variability to be found occurs from contest to contest. The aesthetic is seen as specific to particular performances rather than to particular sports. The elements of composition and structure (unity), rhythm and harmony (unity and complexity), empathy (intensity) and tension and color (intensity) are unique and different for each sport performance. Since opposition and tension are factors related to the aesthetic in sport, any variability in these elements would produce aesthetic variability. Contests in which teams or individuals are mismatched and contests in which one side "gives up" before the final action are examples of "less aesthetic" performances when compared to those contests in which the tension and doubt over the

final outcome are sustained to the final second of play.

Aesthetic variability has also been proposed to be a function of the structure, history and ritual and evaluation phases of sport. Brown and Gaynor (1967) saw differences among sports in the potential for spontaneous improvisation and creativity. The structure of some sports offers few action-alternatives for the participants. The opportunities for individual action and group interaction are generally greatest in team sports with group creativity being influenced by three factors: the combining of individual creativity; team interaction; and game structure.

If one agrees with Geblewicz (1965) that the spectacle of sport contributes to the aesthetic considerations, then variability sport to sport is assumed. The rules, history and traditions of sports vary and some sports dictate the presence of the more spectacular elements of rituals and ceremonies, parades of participants, fanfares and elaborate costuming.

Variability was found by Best (1975) and Renshaw (1975) to be a function of the means/end relationship found among sports. Those sports in which there is a very close relationship between the sport goal and the means of achieving it are designated aesthetic. In most sports the end is more important than the manner of reaching it and, therefore, the aesthetic is incidental.

Variability within sport is found in differing sport purposes. Some sports are more aesthetic than others because the aesthetic-designating elements of unity, intensity and complexity are an integral part of their evaluation phases (Lowe, 1977; Munrow, 1972; Reid, 1970; Anthony, 1968). If objective scores, distances or speeds mark achievement, then the

aesthetic is not as important as in those sports in which aesthetic standards prevail.

The visibility of the aesthetic-designating factors also produces variability among sports and among contests. The selective perception of the spectator seems to be the major factor here. Smith (1968), Keenan (1972), Fisher (1972), Renshaw (1975) and Best (1975) agree that variability in the visibility of the aesthetic-designating factors is a function of the knowledge and background of the spectator in both aesthetics and in sport.

Variability in the exhibition and visibility of the aesthetic-designating factors of unity, intensity and complexity is found from sport to sport and from contest to contest. Variability seems to be a function of the structure and aims of particular sports, the style and level of play of particular contests and the integration of the aesthetic factors into the evaluation procedures of particular sports. The more understanding a spectator or participant has concerning the nature of aesthetic qualities and how they contribute to the aesthetic in sport, the more one is able to "see" and properly evaluate in sport performances.

Telling Question: Can a paradigm be formulated for an aesthetic of sport?

In an attempt to clarify and symbolize the interaction of sport and the metacritical aesthetic-designating factors of unity, intensity and complexity, a model was designed. This paradigm should help to conceptualize and better visualize the metacritical aesthetic. Pictures of the model are presented as Figures 1, 2 and 3.



Figure 1

Model, view 1



Figure 2

Model, view 2



Figure 3

Model, view 3

Wood was chosen as the medium for the model for several reasons. The author had been recently working in wood and, therefore, was able to clearly visualize a design solution in that medium. The supplies, tools and technical assistance were readily available. Most importantly, the texture, grain design and natural color tones of wood seemed to be proper for the development of the model. Wood tones, being somewhat neutral, eliminated the potential problem of connotations associated with color.

Basswood, which is also called Linden Wood (Tilia heterophylla), was chosen as the type of wood because it is soft and easily worked and because it exhibits a distinct grain pattern. The size of the model was dictated by the size of available material. A larger model might show the inner designs more clearly.

The ultimate design of the model was actualized through sketching and clay modeling. Design ideas were initially sketched and then worked in clay. This preliminary work saved valuable carving material and allowed the design ideas to be tried out to see if they had potential. Once a satisfactory sketch and clay figure were designed, the wood model was created.

The model was conceived and is designed to be viewed synoptically, not discursively. Osborne (1955) defined discursive seeing as switching attention rapidly from one section of the field to another and, therefore, the field is apprehended by comparing and putting together the parts which are attended to separately. In synoptic seeing, the field enters into awareness in a single act of evenly distributed attention. The discussion will, by necessity, isolate various design features in a discursive fashion but does so only to justify the symbolizations. The

whole model should be viewed as an entirety to fully realize its intended meaning.

The explanation of design symbolization related formal design features (line and shape) to the three metacritical aesthetic-designating factors. Curvilinear paths, rather than rectilinear designs, were chosen to suggest the flow and flexibility of the interactions of unity, intensity and complexity within sport. The potential complexity and variety of the interactional possibilities among the three factors necessitated suggesting these relationships rather than trying to depict them as they might occur.

Sport is symbolized as an ellipsoid. The curved shape seemed consistent with the overall intent to show flow, flexibility and energy in the model.

The aesthetic-designating factors of unity, intensity and complexity are presented as curved channels within the ellipsoidal model of sport. Each of these tubular passages intersects with the other channels at a variety of angles. The intersection of the factor paths was designed to reflect the unpredictable interactional effects of the elements. Were these interactions mathematically predictable and precise, a more traditional geometic design might have been utilized. The variability in channel length, size and intersecting angles is intended to suggest the range and diversity in the possible interactions of the factors.

Each hole in the ellipsoid of sport was created to represent the threefold metacritical aesthetic of sport and to allow carving access to the aesthetic pathways. They are shaped to suggest the flow of energy within sport. No attempt is made to specifically identify each entrance

as being unity, complexity or intensity. Variations in the shapes was intended to show the potential variability in the exhibition and visibility among the three factors rather than to depict each factor as it occurs within sport. Critical aesthetic judgments utilize many differing criteria of value and "there is no set of rules that says that one of the three . . . is to be weighted higher than the others" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 538). These aesthetic-designating factors are interconnected yet independent and aesthetic experiences differ in magnitude as a function of the three variables.

The interactions among the factor pathways occur towards the center of the model to indicate the centrality of aesthetics to sport. The sport and aesthetic purposes of a contest are integrated and the achievement of one brings about the attainment of the other.

The decision to cut the design loose from its base was made to allow the model to be turned and examined from many different viewpoints and perspectives. This was done to give the viewer an awareness of the complexity and variability to be found in the metacritical aesthetic of sport. A different wood, mahogany, was utilized for the base to assure that the model would be seen as independent from its display pedestal.

Recommendations for Further Study

1. Inspection of the concept, aesthetic of sport, should be attempted from other philosophical aesthetic positions such as formalism, expressionism and attitude theory.

2. A more definitive analysis of variability among and within sports in the exhibition and visibility of the metacritical aesthetic-designating factors should be attempted.

3. A semantic analysis of the metacritical aesthetic of sport should be devised experimentally. The utilization of bi-polar adjectives associated with the aesthetic-designating factors identified should be utilized to locate the concept in semantic space.

4. Analysis of specific sport forms such as football, baseball, tennis and gymnastics should be made utilizing the metacritical aesthetic-designating factors of unity, intensity and complexity.

5. The metacritical aesthetic of sport should be examined and analyzed more specifically from the performer's point of view.

6. A pedagogical model should be developed to assist in the presentation of metacritical aesthetic of sport appreciation.

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APPENDIX A

Synopsis of Selected Sport Definitions

Structural/Organizational Definitions

Anthropological	sport is organized play involving two plus sides which has rules, patterns of play and criteria to determine a winner.
Metheny	sport is a diverse set of activities or organizations of human behavior.
Suits	sport is a game which involves skill and which has a fairly stable, wide following.
Loy (institutional game)	sport is defined in relation to its degree of organization.
Loy (social institution)	the sport order is comprised of all organizations which assist or regulate human action in sport situations.

Interactional Definitions

Huizinga (play)	play is free, voluntary, intense and absorbing; it has rules, order and boundaries.
Caillois (game)	game is defined in relation to the attitudes of the players with competition, chance, simulation and vertigo being designed as the four main rubrics.
Luschen	sport is interactional activity which is both rational and playful.
Loy (social situation)	sport in a social context is defined in relation to the degree and kind of interactional involvement among the individuals in the sport situation.
Dunning	the function of sport is to provide a pleasurable tension-excitement through a group configuration.
McIntosh	sport is classified in relation to the motives and satisfactions which sport gives.
Jeu	sport is both physically and emotionally exertive; it is free, competitive and fulfilling.
Slusher	sport is serious and is centered around the physical body and is communal; Being is both the object and goal of man's involvement in sport.

Complex/Combinational Definitions

Weiss	sport is a rule-governed bodily adventure which has boundaries, strategies and tactics; man engages in sport to seek excellence and completion of self.
Kenyon	sport is gross physical activity which is both institutionalized and competitive.
Loy (game occurrence)	sport is playful, free, uncertain, unproductive and rule-governed; it is highly organized with traditions, a past and guidelines for the future.
Torkildsen	sport is both an institution in society and a domain of human activity.
Vanderzwaag	sport is an extension of play which is ruled, competitive and includes the demonstration of physical prowess.
Kent	sport is a pattern of game which includes the elements of play and games; it has a history and a prescribed system of physical, goal-oriented actions.
Singer	sport is activity with administrative organization and rules to define and limit human behavior; it involves competition or challenge and physical skill primarily determines the outcome.
Wulk	sport is physical, playful, bounded, rule-governed, competitive activity offering opportunities for social interaction and the pursuit of excellence; it is dynamic, tense, absorbing and potentially fulfilling.

APPENDIX B

Synopsis of Selected Aesthetic Theories

Formalism

Theory	Significant form	Organic unity
Proponent(s)	Clive Bell	Harold Osborne
Essence of art	significant form	organic unity
Apprehended	discursively	synoptically
Purpose of art	escapist--to go beyond or out of real life	vitality and enhanced awareness--to become more alive
Value of art	intrinsic value resides in aesthetic appreciation as a self-rewarding activity--an individual work of art is said to have aesthetic value insofar as it evokes and sustains aesthetic contemplation and the aesthetic experience.	
Criteria of good art	that which displays significant form through relational configurations of line and color thereby, evoking the aesthetic emotion	that which displays organic unity through relational configurations of complex elements, expressive in character and embodied in a sensuous medium

Expressionism

Theory	Intuition and Imaginative expression	Symbolic Transformation
Proponent(s)	Benedetto Croce R. G. Collingwood	Suzanne Langer
Essence of art	self-expression of the artist--as process	embodiment of emotion in an art object--as communication
Apprehended	synoptically	synoptically
Purpose of art	to express felt emotion of the artist	creates specific forms which are symbolic of specific human feelings
Value of art	clarifies feeling	expands and enriches experience
Criteria of good art	successfully expresses emotion intended by the artist	successfully expresses the desired human feeling(s) through the symbolic transformation of its structural properties

Attitude Theory

Theory	Psychical distance	Disinterested attention	"Seeing as"
Proponent(s)	Edward Bullough	M. J. Stolnitz	Virgil Aldrich
Essence of art	experiencing of a special aesthetic attitude to the presence of an object		
Apprehended	synoptically	synoptically	synoptically
Purpose of art	promote the experiencing of an aesthetic attitude		
Value of art	expands and enriches experience		
Criteria of good art	that which is successfully perceived in a special aesthetic attitude way:		
	psychical distance	disinterested attention	"seeing as"

Metacriticism

Theory	Instrumentalism	Institutionalism
Proponent(s)	Monroe Beardsley	George Dickie
Essence of art	causation of aesthetic experience of fairly great magnitude--having unity, intensity and complexity	artifacts with conferred status are experienced within a conventional matrix defined in behalf of the art world
Apprehended	discursively	discursively
Purpose of art	as a means to produce aesthetic experiences which are valuable in themselves	
Value of art	contact with works of art potentially causes aesthetic experiences aesthetic experiences have the capacity to: relieve tension and quiet destructive impulses; promote personal integration; increase sensitivity and perception; and expand imaginative responses and creativity	
Criteria of good art	successfully causes and enters into aesthetic experience	has an "inner life" by being embedded in an institutional/ conventional matrix

APPENDIX C

Synopsis of a Metacritical Aesthetic of Sport

General term	Aesthetic-designating factors	Examples of critical comments	Display in sport
Magnitude	Unity coherence completeness	well-organized or disorganized formally perfect or imperfect has or lacks inner logic of structure and style	spatial and temporal boundaries technical skill in performance--efficiency and economy of effort display and evaluation of formal design and expressive qualities harmony and wholeness
	Intensity and concentration of experience	full of vitality or insipid forceful and vivid or weak and pale beautiful or ugly tender, tragic, ironic graceful, delicate richly comic	power, beauty and formal aesthetic factors displayed by the skilled human form in sport motion dynamic tensions formed by the flow of movement and the spatial/temporal interrelationships of bodies and body parts risk, virtuosity and originality displayed by the participants dynamic tension produced by the conflict and the opposition of wills to win dramatic and emotional responses to the action and the uncertainty of outcome
	Complexity range diversity of elements	developed on a large scale rich in contrasts or lacks variety and repetitive subtle and imaginative or crude	range and diversity of sport activities dramatic aspects of sport many "viewpoints" from which sport can be examined ever-changing vista of sport situations uniqueness, novelty and spontaneity found in sport