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SPORTS AS FINITE PROVINCES OF MEANING: AN APPLICATION OF THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ALFRED SCHUTZ

The University of North Carolina at Greensboro

ED.D. 1980

SPORTS AS FINITE PROVINCES OF MEANING: AN APPLICATION OF THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ALFRED SCHUTZ

by

K. Gail Whitaker

A Dissertation Submitted to
the Faculty of the Graduate School at
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Education

Greensboro
1980

Approved by

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Dissertation Adviser

APPROVAL PAGE

This dissertation has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

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Committee Members

February 13, 1980
Date of Acceptance by Committee

February 13, 1980
Date of Final Oral Examination

WHITAKER, K. GAIL. Sports as Finite Provinces of Meaning: An Application of the Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz. (1980) Directed by: Dr. Gail Hennis. Pp. 104

Schutz's phenomenological theory of internal time consciousness was reviewed. According to the theory, a phase of the individual's flow of conscious experience can be constituted as a discrete object of attention. The meaning of such an isolated experience is defined as the individual's reflective attitude when attending to the experience.

A finite province of meaning is, according to Schutz, a set of the individual's experiences which exhibit a characteristic cognitive style and whose meanings are mutually compatible with respect to that style. It was argued that the set of the individual's participatory experiences in any sport displays a unique cognitive style and thus constitutes a finite province of meaning. As an example, the cognitive style of the sport of singles tennis was discussed.

Reflective acts within a finite province of meaning result in meanings which have the cognitive style of the province in common. Therefore, when the individual enters into participation in a sport, a significant aspect of the meanings of the sport experiences is predetermined. Further, the meanings of sport experiences are fundamentally different when the experiences are reflected upon within different finite provinces of meaning.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Sincere thanks go to the members of my doctoral committee, for their help and encouragement throughout the completion of my program. I am especially appreciative of Fritz Mengert for his insight and attention, of Gail Hennis for her guidance and flexibility, of Betsy Umstead for her perception and thoughtfulness, and of Gay Cheney for her perspective and support.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Questions of meaning commonly arise in a variety of contexts. Things which have meaning include words, sentences, objects, persons, lives, and events or experiences. Further, the meaning of a thing may be its definition ("'Father' means 'male parent'"), its cause ("His hangover means he drank too much last night"), its effect or consequences ("This snow means no school tomorrow"), or its signification ("That ring means she's married"). A meaning may also be a specific reference ("Stay out--this means you"), an intention ("I mean to lose weight this month"), a purpose ("The meaning of my life lies in achieving freedom for my people"), or a significance ("I can't tell you how much this means to me").

Experiential meaning, or meaning in the sense of the significance of lived experiences, is to be investigated in this paper. Specifically, the study will address the topic of the meaning of sport experiences for the participant in sport.

Sport is often discussed as a meaningful human experience, and athletes are frequently questioned as to the meaning of their participation. The wide variety of answers offered by those athletes attests to the broad range of interpretations of the concept of meaning (19:94). Their interpretations

also indicate the need for more disciplined inquiry into meaning as manifested in sport experiences. The purpose of this study is to initiate such an inquiry.

As will be discussed in Chapter II, the literature to date contains numerous references to the meaning of sport experiences. Only a few works, however, include comprehensive treatments of the concept. More commonly, existing works lack either an identifiable theoretical context or a thorough analysis of experiential meaning within that context, or both. The two conceptual contexts which have been applied are Cassirer's theory of symbolic forms and existential-phenomenological theory.

The theoretical basis for this paper is existential phenomenology. Specifically, the phenomenology of Alfred Schutz will form the conceptual framework for the examination of the meaning of lived experiences within the province of sport.

There are two reasons for the selection of Schutz's work as a theoretical base. First, his theory is both extensive enough and comprehensive enough to encompass all aspects of the concept of meaning which are of concern in this investigation. Second, Schutz's analysis employs a unique combination of concepts extracted from other authors. The resultant framework shows considerable potential for application to, and illumination of, lived experiences within the context of sport. Therefore, the works of Alfred

Schutz have been chosen as the foundation of the study, and all explanations and arguments are based on that foundation.

The Schutzian Framework

Essential to an understanding of Alfred Schutz's treatment of the concept of meaning is his phenomenological conceptualization of time consciousness. As the foundation of this conceptualization, Schutz accepted the Bergsonian notion of durée, also referred to by Schutz as duration or personal time. The individual's consciousness of experiences occurs within duration. In their most elemental form, i.e., as the raw data of perception, experiences unfold as a uni-directional stream of qualities, or here-and-nows, one after another within the individual's personal time (24:47). This flow of experiences in duration was referred to by Bergson, and acknowledged by Schutz, as the stream of consciousness.

Personal time, within which the stream of consciousness, or flow of conscious experiences, unfolds, is an example of a time frame, or frame of reference for time. Another time frame is biological time, in which physiological events such as healing, aging, and the prenatal development of a baby occur (25:181). Still another is cosmic time, the time frame of everyday, public life (25:181). Cosmic time, then, is external to the individual, as contrasted with internal personal time.

Conscious actions which involve movements by the individual in the outer world take place both in external, cosmic time (as bodily movements in space) and in internal, personal time (as conscious events related to the experienced action). This intersection, or co-experiencing, of cosmic time and duration produces a unified flow of experience called the vivid present (21:216). Sport participation, for example, involves both physical activity in the outer world (cosmic time frame) and internal conscious events (personal time frame). Thus, it is experienced in the vivid present, a fact which will prove useful in the characterization of sports.

One further Bergsonian concept contributed to Schutz's framework of time consciousness. It is the idea of the tension of consciousness. Conscious experiences occur on various levels or planes, depending on the individual's attention to, and interest in, life (26:25). These planes represent corresponding tensions of consciousness, the highest tension represented by the plane of action and the lowest by the plane of dream (21:212). The concept of tension of consciousness will be used to help characterize finite provinces of meaning.

Schutz accepted the foregoing concepts of Henri Bergson, and added to them a set of ideas derived from Edmund Husserl in order to complete his framework of time consciousness.

Within the completed framework, the meaning of lived experiences will be examined.

The central concept borrowed from Husserl is that of reflection. Although the stream of consciousness is unidirectional and continuous, the individual can attend to, or reflect upon, experiences within the stream (24:47). By constituting a phase of the stream as a discrete object of attention, the individual can consider that phase in a new light, that is from the perspective of the current phase of the stream (the here-and-now) (21:210).

By means of reflection, the content of consciousness (i.e., the experiences in the stream of consciousness) can be attended to independently of originally being undergone (21:210). As they are originally occurring, as the stream of consciousness is unfolding, experiences are said to be pre-reflective, or pre-phenomenal (24:56). By the act of reflection, they are changed to reflective or phenomenal status (24:75). By Schutz's definition, this process is necessary in order for experiences to be meaningful (24:52).

The four types of reflection are recollection, retention, anticipation, and protention. Many past experiences must be recalled, i.e., reconstructed as objects of attention, in order to be reflected upon. Reflection which involves such reconstruction of the experience is called recollection (24:48-49).

In order to reflect upon future experiences (those not yet within the stream of consciousness), the individual first attends to them "in the future perfect tense," that is, imagines them to have already happened (21:215). This type of reflection is called anticipation. Since it involves a conscious structuring of the experience as in recollection, anticipation is described as the "future-directed counterpart of recollection" (24:58).

As the individual performs an intentional action, the immediate future within that action is the ongoing object of reflection. This attentive grasping of the imminent future in order to bring it about is the type of reflection known as protention (24:57).

The variations of reflection described above are based on Edmund Husserl's writings. Along with the Bergsonian concepts previously explained, they form the essential structure of Schutz's theory of time consciousness, within which his concept of meaning is to be understood.

According to Schutz (24), experiences in their pre-reflective status (or as original phases of the individual's stream of consciousness) are without meaning. The individual is pre-reflectively conscious only of a continuous flow of undifferentiated events. By the act of reflection, however, the individual attentively considers an objectified phase of the stream of consciousness. It is by this act of reflection (and only by such an act) that the experience attended to

(reflected upon) becomes meaningful. Specifically, the meaning of the lived experience for the individual lies in the attitude, or conscious stance, of the individual in reflecting upon the experience.

If the meaning of a lived experience lies in the individual's reflective attitude toward that experience, then variations in the individual's reflective attitude can affect the meaning of an experience for the individual. Based on Husserl, Schutz (24:73) described attentional modifications, or alterations in the reflective attitude. As the interests, relevances, motivations, etc. which characterize the individual's here-and-now vary, the individual's corresponding point of view toward an experience changes. As a result, the reflective attitude, and thus the meaning of the experience, is subject to change as attention to the experience is modified.

Although individual meanings of lived experiences are subject to change as described above, Schutz (24:75) also discussed unifying influences on such meanings. Separate experiences can be viewed in a polythetic manner, that is, with a separate act of attention and thus a separate meaning for each. Alternatively, several separate experiences may be viewed as related, and unified into a single object of attention. Polythetic reflective acts are thus synthesized into a single, monothetic reflection upon the unified object of attention. As a result, separate meanings are interrelated

by the encompassing meaning of the unified whole. The relationship among such experiences is called a configuration of meaning, or meaning context.

The concept of finite province of meaning completed Schutz's conceptualization of meaningful lived experience. A finite province of meaning is a set of the individual's experiences whose meanings are mutually compatible and which share a particular style called cognitive style (26:23). Examples given of finite provinces of meaning include, among others, the world of everyday life, the world of dreams, the world of madness, and the child's play world (21:230-232). It will be shown that a finite province of meaning constitutes a high-order meaning context.

Statement of the Problem

In terms of the theory outlined above, answers to the following questions will be sought:

1. Do sports constitute finite provinces of meaning? An attempt will be made to definitively characterize a finite province of meaning. If the attempt proves to be successful, then a definition of a sport will also be offered. Based on that definition, an argument will be presented for the constitution of sports as finite provinces of meaning.

2. How, if at all, do finite provinces of meaning affect the meaning configurations of intra-province lived experiences? Schutz's framework reflects the view that

individual meanings form elements of larger and still larger configurations of meaning, among the largest of which are finite provinces of meaning. In this study, the relationship between participation in a particular finite province of meaning and the meanings of lived experiences within that province will be investigated.

3. If sports constitute finite provinces of meaning, then what implications can be drawn for the effect of participation in a sport on the meanings of sport experiences for the participant? If sports constitute finite provinces of meaning, and if finite provinces of meaning have certain effects on the meanings of intra-province lived experiences, then, syllogistically, participation in a particular sport has specifiable effects on the meanings of participatory experiences. The nature of these effects will be suggested.

Underlying Assumptions

Three primary assumptions underlie this investigation. First, Alfred Schutz's phenomenological conceptualization of the meaning of lived experiences is accepted as the foundation for the study. Treatment of all concepts related to time consciousness, meaning contexts, and finite provinces of meaning is in accord with those concepts as put forth by Schutz.

Second, Schutz's comprehensive framework is the basis of this study; individual elements of the framework are useful

only as adapted to that context. Therefore, concepts originally contributed by Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl, and William James are accepted only as interpreted by Schutz.

Third, the literature contains arguments for numerous definitions of the term "sport." For the purposes of this study, the description of sport given by Ellen Gerber is accepted as definitive (see Glossary of Terms).

Scope of the Study

As stated above, the investigation is restricted to the phenomenological framework of Alfred Schutz. In addition to this qualification, there are three major limitations to the scope of the study. First, the concept of meaning is addressed only as it applies to lived experiences. Other uses of the term, such as the meaning of words or sentences, are not dealt with.

Second, only meanings for the individual who undergoes the experiences are under investigation. Hence, the study is concerned only with sport experiences of the participant in sport rather than those of the observer or student of sport.

Third, outcomes of the investigation apply only to those activities which constitute sports as defined in the study. Therefore, it would be incorrect to extrapolate findings beyond the boundaries of that definition.

Glossary of Terms

The following concepts are essential to the understanding of Schutz's theory of time consciousness and meaning. Discussed more fully in Chapter III, they will be used to explain additional concepts which are developed in later chapters. Therefore, they are presented here, with Gerber's definition of sport, as a condensed glossary of terms for the convenience of the reader.

Anticipation. Reflection upon future experiences, i.e., experiences which do not yet fall within the stream of consciousness, by attention to them "in the future perfect tense," as if they had already occurred (21:215). It is "the future directed counterpart of recollection" (24:58).

Attentional Modification. Alteration of the individual's reflective attitude toward an experience, concomitant with a change in the individual's point of view in the here-and-now. It results in alteration of the meaning of the experience being reflected upon (24:73).

Configuration of Meaning, or Meaning Context. A relationship among separate experiences resulting when, by a shift in the individual's attention, polythetic reflective glances at distinct events are synthesized into a monothetic glance at now unified objects of attention (24:75). Meanings already created are thereby synthesized into a constitution of a higher order (24:75).

Duration or Personal Time. The individual's inner time frame, in which the stream of consciousness unfolds (25:181). The foundational component of time consciousness, it is a uni-directional stream in which experience flows continuously from one here-and-now to the next. It binds together the experiences of the individual (by the fact that they are all experiences of this individual) (24:75), and it intersects with external, cosmic time as the individual acts in the outer world (21:216).

Finite Province of Meaning. A set of experiences all of which demonstrate "a specific cognitive style and are--with respect to this style--not only consistent in themselves but also compatible with one another" (21:230). It is a high-order configuration of meaning, consisting of mutually compatible lower-order meaning contexts. No one finite province of meaning can be reduced or translated into another, and the transition from one to another involves a "leap" or "shock" (26:24). In the absence of incompatible experiences, the "accent of reality" is bestowed on the current finite province of meaning (21:231).

Meaning Context. See Configuration of Meaning.

Meaning of a Lived Experience. The attitude, or conscious stance, of the individual in reflecting upon a past part of the stream of consciousness (24:69-70). It is subject to change with modifications of the individual's attention to experiences (24:73). It constitutes reality for the

individual within the current finite province of meaning (21:341).

Personal Time. See Duration.

Protention. Reflection upon the immediate future within an intentional action. The individual attentively grasps the immediate future in order to bring it about (24:57).

Recollection. Reflection upon a past experience, i.e., an elapsed phase of the stream of consciousness, by reconstructing it as an object of attention (24:49). The attitude of the individual during such reflection is the meaning of the experience for the individual (24:69-70).

Reflection. Attentive consideration of a phase of the stream of consciousness, either already elapsed (as in recollection) or envisioned as already elapsed (as in anticipation). It is a "turning-back against the stream, a special kind of attitude toward that stream" (24:47). By the act of reflection, the content of consciousness is changed from pre-phenomenal to phenomenal status (24:75), and meaning is bestowed upon an experience.

Retention. The after-consciousness, or still-consciousness, of an experience just preceding in the stream of consciousness (24:48). It is the form of reflection which, occurring closest within duration to the original experience, involves the least amount of reconstruction of the experience. It is primary remembrance, which eventually fades or runs off, necessitating secondary remembrance, or recollection (24:48).

Sport. "A human activity which involves specific administrative organization, a historical background of rules or customs which define the objective and limit the pattern of human behavior; it involves challenge and a definite outcome determined by physical skill" (8:vii).

Stream of Consciousness. The flow of heterogeneous qualities experienced by an individual within duration (24:45). It consists of those experiences which are immediately and continuously perceived by the individual.

Tension of Consciousness. A function of the individual's attention to, and interest in, life, ranging from the plane of action (highest tension) to the plane of dream (lowest tension) (21:212). Each finite province of meaning has, among other characteristics, a specific tension of consciousness.

Vivid Present. A unified flow of experience originating in the intersection of internal time, or duration, and external, or cosmic, time (21:216). All working action, whereby the individual interacts intentionally and physically in the outer world, is experienced in the vivid present (21:216).

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Several authors have addressed the topic of meaning in sport experiences. These authors represent a variety of approaches to the concept. Their observations illuminate a number of factors which comprise and which influence experiential meaning in sport.

Each of the authors to be cited contributed to the task of analyzing experiential meaning in sport. Most, however, failed to provide a comprehensive treatment of the concept. Their insights are of limited value because they were offered without reference to any underlying theoretical framework. Consequently, they constitute isolated distinctions or individual interpretations, with no sound conceptual basis. Only a few authors have escaped this difficulty by providing a theoretical background for their comments. Even fewer of these have offered extensive insights on experiential meaning within such a theoretical framework.

Roger Bannister was the first athlete to run the mile in less than four minutes. In 1964, Bannister (2) addressed himself to "The Meaning of Athletic Performance." He discussed several examples of character-building, such as maturity, which he felt can result from sport participation. He also cited examples of self-trial, e.g., struggling to do

one's best, which he considered to be satisfying aspects of sport. He used other examples to illustrate social benefits of sport participation, such as acquiring the companionship of kindred people.

Despite these attempts at delineating meaning in sport, Bannister concluded that he had failed to describe it after all. He maintained that the meaning of sport is specific to each individual. Further, he found himself unable to describe the meaning of sport experiences even for himself, and suggested that no athlete can explain it. Thus, Bannister demonstrated the difficulty of analyzing the meaning of sport experiences for the sport participant.

A physical educator at Brevard College in 1972, Patsy Neal (17) discussed the concept of "meaning through wholeness" in sport. Neal stated that, in order for sport to be meaningful, the individual must confront it in a personal way. This is possible when the athlete participates in sport with total involvement, acknowledging that the world of sport and the world outside of sport are the same. When the athlete participates in this manner, then both the sport experience and the athlete have meaning.

Neal's discussion of meaning in sport is rambling and disjointed. In addition, it is without an identifiable theoretical basis. As such, its contribution to the understanding of meaning in sport is minimal.

Jan Felshin (6), a professor of physical education at East Stroudsburg State College, identified in 1969 two modes of experiential meaning in sport--the social mode and the personal mode. Focusing on the social mode of meaning, Felshin stated that it is linked to the structure of sport as a social institution, and to the social interactions, roles, statuses, socializing agents and models, i.e., the pervasive social context, of sport experiences. She pointed out the difficulty of ascertaining whether the meaning in sport determines its structure or whether the structure determines its meaning.

In the book, More Than Movement (1972), Felshin emphasized the importance of the personal mode of meaning in experience. She maintained that any meaning found in experience must include the basic element of personal meaning. Further, she associated personal meaning with the idea of relevance. Those things which one finds to be meaningful, she stated, are things which are personally relevant, or somehow within the scope of one's own concern or attention.

Felshin's distinction between the social and personal modes of experiential meaning contributed to the understanding of the concept of meaning in sport. Her association of personal meaning with personal relevance also added to the characterization of experiential meaning. These observations, however, did not constitute a thorough analysis of the concept, nor did they fall within an identifiable theoretical

context. Thus, the scope of Felshin's contributions to the study of experiential meaning in sport was limited.

In 1975, Christopher Stevenson (28) was a physical educator at the University of New Brunswick. In an article entitled "The Meaning of Movement," Stevenson made some distinctions with regard to the study of meaning in movement (and specifically in athletics), but declined to suggest an analysis of meaning itself. Stevenson maintained that the meaning of athletics is involved with larger social meanings because athletics as a human movement phenomenon is an example, or category, of human endeavor in general.

Stevenson distinguished two approaches, or orientations, to the study of meaning in movement. The kinesics orientation, involving detailed analysis of the structural elements of various movement forms, is of limited use in discovering meaning. A more promising approach, Stevenson claimed, is the sociology of knowledge orientation. He supported the view that meaning is determined, or created and specified, by society. The sociology of knowledge, while not providing specific tools for analyzing meaning, is concerned with the sources of meaning. Therefore, Stevenson advocated this approach to the discovery of meaning in athletics.

Although the observations above are directly concerned with the pursuit of meaning in sport, Stevenson stated that it was not his intention to definitively analyze the meaning

of movement himself. His description of meanings in athletics as dependent upon larger, social meanings is a step toward analyzing the source and operation of such meanings. Further, his support of the sociology of knowledge orientation over the kinesics orientation helped to clarify the task of discovering meanings in sport experiences. However, the lack of suggestions as to either a proper theoretical framework or specific analytical instruments left his treatment far from comprehensive.

Patricia Phillips (19), a physical educator at Bridgewater State College, claimed in a 1975 article that descriptions of sport experiences commonly given by athletes in response to questions of its meaning for them actually have little to do with the meaning of sport. Phillips maintained that what gives rise to the meaning of a thing, for example sport, is its form. She described form as a unity, or an ordering, of the experience. In sport, Phillips stated, the elements of form include the skills, means of expression, and rules of the game. When an individual can view each of the elements of a sport in relation to the whole, then the individual makes sense of the form of the sport, and confronts its meaning. Further, Phillips suggested that this is only possible if the individual not only masters the skills, means of expression, and rules of the sport, but also becomes totally involved, or immersed, in the experience.

Phillips pointed out that the form of expression in sport is different from the forms of expression in other experiences, such as music and dance. She concluded that the meaning of sport, then, is unique. In addition, Phillips observed that the elements of form in sport can only be understood in the context of the persons who engage in sport, their place, time, and culture. Therefore, she argued, the meaning of sport is culturally dependent.

Phillips' emphasis on the form of sport as the key to its meaning, and her insistence on the uniqueness and culture-relatedness of that meaning, contributed to the characterization of experiential meaning in sport. Her suggestion of the importance of involvement in the experience as a prerequisite to meaning was also revealing of the concept. The theoretical basis of her arguments, however, was unclear. Thus, her work was limited in background as well as in scope.

Shirl Hoffman (10), a physical educator at the University of Pittsburgh in 1976, equated the meaning of sport with its purpose and nature. In an article presented in the Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, he addressed the concept of athletae Dei, or spiritual athletes, and offered an interpretation of the meaning of sport for such athletes. Hoffman suggested that the meaning of sport for spiritual athletes is predetermined by the nature of their religious (identified as Christian) convictions. However, he argued,

many athletae Dei miss, or at least misrepresent, the religious meaning of their sport participation. Hoffman contended that athletes who describe their performance as a glorification of God, justify their emphasis on winning as a striving for God-like perfection, and explain their rigorous training as the development of spiritual discipline, are inconsistent with the real theological stakes or true purpose and nature of their sport. Specifically, sport for such athletes should be viewed as a celebration of serious but happy people, joyous in the security as well as the responsibility of Christian faith. At the same time, sport should be appreciated for its demonstration of the insufficiencies and transitory qualities of life.

Hoffman's suggestion that convictions and purposes which characterize one's life in general influence the meaning of specific life experiences was a significant idea. Although his treatment of this idea was limited to spiritual athletes and to strictly religious convictions and purposes, it represented a contribution to the understanding of experiential meaning in general. Nevertheless, Hoffman offered an analysis of only one aspect, i.e., the religious aspect, of the meaning of sport for the athletae Dei. Further, his arguments were presented without reference to a general theory of experiential meaning. As such, they fell short of a thorough explanation of the meaning of sport experiences.

Eleanor Metheny, a prominent physical educator, has written extensively on the concept of meaning in movement. In the 1965 book entitled Connotations of Movement in Sport and Dance, Metheny discussed the topic of experiential meaning within a pre-established conceptual framework. She identified her theoretical point of departure as the philosophy of symbolic forms developed by Ernst Cassirer. A twentieth-century philosopher known for his work in semantics, Cassirer conducted an extensive analysis of the process by which an individual undergoing a direct sensory experience transforms the experience into symbols, or abstract representations. Subsequently, the use of symbols evokes certain responses, either intended or unintended, in each person who perceives them.

Cassirer emphasized the symbolic forms of spoken and written language; Metheny applied the theory to movement forms, including those in sport. She noted that movement experiences constitute symbolic forms; that is, an individual who experiences a movement tends to transform it into symbols. The individual may then recognize relationships between those and other symbols, or between those symbols and other direct sensory experiences. Consistent with Cassirer's theory, Metheny stated that the meaning of the experience for the individual lies in the recognition of relationships elicited in the individual by the symbolized experience.

In the 1968 publication, Movement and Meaning, Metheny distinguished between two aspects, or properties, of a symbol--namely, its denotation and its connotation. The actual constitution of a symbol (e.g., words, paint and canvas, movement), the particular form or pattern of organization of the symbol (e.g., a proper name, a painting, a dance), and any idea which the symbol specifically represents (e.g., Napoleon Bonaparte, an oak tree, a dying swan) are elements of its denotation. The denotation of a symbol, and thus one aspect of its meaning, may be agreed upon by more than one individual. By contrast, the unspecified, individual relationships, feelings, and emotions evoked by the symbol (e.g., tyranny, permanence, sadness) constitute its connotation. Because of the individual nature of connotations, Metheny argued, they are unique to each person and valid for that person only. In this respect, then, an experience is uniquely meaningful to each person who undergoes, symbolizes, and interprets it.

Roselyn Stone (29), a student and supporter of Metheny's work, offered in 1975 some clarification and extension of Metheny's theory of experiential meaning. Stone pointed out that an analysis of meaning reveals three elements--namely, that which is meaningful, the perceiver of the meaning, and the meaning referent, or perceiver's point of comparison. Given these elements, Stone defined meaning as recognized relatedness, or "a relationship, or pattern of relationships,

found by the perceiver between the stimulus pattern (object/event situation) and some idea, feeling, or action (referent) either within the perceiver's experience or which is now created by the perceiver" (29:10). The pattern, or configuration, of meanings found by a perceiver with respect to an activity is called the meaning-structure of the activity.

The first element of meaning-structure is the object or event which is meaningful. Metheny, after Cassirer, had termed this element the symbolic form; Stone called it the meaning-bearer. The perceiver may be aware of the meaning-bearer in the form of a perception or sensation, or as a thought or idea. The meaning-bearer may originate outside the perceiver, for example the sound of a surfboard on waves or the feel of a basketball in one's hands. Alternatively, the source of the meaning-bearer may be internal, for example a pounding heartbeat or a feeling of pain.

In sport, Stone observed, meaning-bearers may arise with regard to the actual sport performance, such as the call of a play in a huddle or the spectator's thrill at the flight of a javelin. Other sport-related meaning-bearers concern the planning or organizing of the sport event, such as a change in rules or the hiring of a new coach. Further, Stone pointed out that some meaning-bearers are of greater or more immediate concern to the perceiver than others. The identification of such meaning-bearers, called especial

bearers of meaning, aids the task of delineating the pattern of meaning, or meaning-structure, which a sport experience holds for the individual perceiver.

The second element of meaning-structure is the perceiver of the meaning, or the meaning-formulator. Stone distinguished between two groups of perceivers in sport. The first group consists of persons who are present at the sport event, including performers, substitutes, coaches, officials, news reporters, and other spectators. The second group includes persons who are peripherally involved in the event, such as rule makers, promoters, league officials, and equipment manufacturers. Stone argued that the various types and degrees of involvement of each of these perceivers determine in part the pattern of meanings which each of them formulates with regard to the sport event.

The third element of meaning-structure is the meaning referent. This element is an idea (e.g., conflict), a feeling (e.g., antagonism), or an event (e.g., a turmoil) to which the perceiver relates a meaning-bearer. The relatedness which is recognized, and the perceiver's response to that relatedness, constitute the meaning of the meaning-bearer for the perceiver.

Stone pointed out the highly individual nature of meaning-structures, citing the wide variety of background experiences, perceptual sets, cognitive and expressive styles, and affective bases of individuals. This variety,

she observed, makes the understanding of human movement forms as meaning-bearers difficult. She did, however, suggest a distinction between two categories of meanings which support or enhance the meaningful event itself. First, those meanings which give rise to personal insight or feelings of satisfaction or pleasure are termed meanings within the act. Such meanings serve to support, encourage, and enhance the event itself. Second, meanings which are extrinsic in that they justify the event as a means to other ends (e.g., economic gain) are called meanings for or about the act. In both categories of meaning, the relatednesses recognized by the perceiver, whether they remain covert or are expressed overtly, become new meaning-bearers in more complex and comprehensive meaning-structures.

The theory of experiential meaning developed by Metheny and expanded by Stone is admittedly incomplete but potentially comprehensive. One notable characteristic of the theory is its emphasis on the function of the meaning-bearer. Relatively little attention is given to the conscious processes of the perceiver of meaning. This characteristic constitutes a major limitation of the theory as developed to date.

In 1969, sport philosopher Warren Fraleigh (7) adopted the theoretical framework developed by Metheny. Within this framework, Fraleigh supported the concept of self-meaning, or personal meaning, in the form of direct self-awareness

arising from movement experiences. He discussed three perspectives on such meaning acquired in physical activity. First, the natural science perspective focuses on the human body as an object which is subject to identifiable laws of physics and chemistry. Certain activities, e.g., gymnastics, body conditioning, and swimming, tend to give the performer this perspective on self-awareness. Second, the social and behavioral science perspective concentrates on the social structure and interactions of performers in movement activities. Activities such as social dance, tennis, volleyball, and soccer lend themselves well to this perspective on the self-awareness which develops during participation. Finally, the humanities and arts perspective emphasizes individual uniqueness and personal expression in physical performance. Activities which encourage this perspective on self-awareness include modern dance and square and folk dance.

Fraleigh observed that meanings perceived from the natural science perspective and the social and behavioral science perspective have a source of reference (i.e., scientific principles) which is external to the performer. Meaning from these perspectives lies in insights regarding the human body as an object and human social nature, respectively. By contrast, the reference source for the humanities and arts perspective is internal. Thus, meaning

viewed from this perspective is more personal than meaning perceived from the other two perspectives.

Instances of meaningful self-awareness constitute a kind of knowing which, at the point of direct experience, is nonverbal and accepted by Fraleigh as valid. This kind of knowing, called pure fact, is viewed as essential to the larger task of increasing human knowledge of the meaning of the human being as a moving being. The larger task, however, is served only by verbalizing about the experience. Verbalization of self-meaning derived from movement experiences yields concepts whose meaning can be identified as universal (as in applications of physics to the body object) or as individual (as in expressions of personal emotions in dance). Thus, Fraleigh viewed the understanding of the meaning of the human being as a moving being as the result of a process involving direct individual insights gained through movement experiences, followed by verbal conceptualization and generalization using those insights as the basis for discussion.

Besides the theoretical school of thought fostered by Metheny, the other major approach to the meaning of sport experiences is that of the existential-phenomenological school. Representatives of this approach have included Patricia Thomson, Simon Wenkart, Seymour Kleinman, and Howard Slusher.

In her 1967 doctoral dissertation, Patricia Thomson (31) reviewed the mid-twentieth century phenomenological theory of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Employing a method derived from the writings of Merleau-Ponty, she conducted an experiment which was designed to reveal ontological truth in a sport context. Thomson defined ontological truth as "that knowing of reality which reveals itself to man as he exists in time and space" (31:10). Although she did not directly investigate the concept of experiential meaning in sport, she pointed out that, in phenomenological theory, human consciousness is viewed as the means of discovering meaning about one's self and one's world. Further, she suggested that, in a phenomenological sense, ontological truth and meaning imply each other. Moreover, while noting the lack of such studies at the time of her own investigation, she indicated that the application of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological concepts is a potentially fruitful avenue of study in the area of meaning. Thus, Thomson pointed the way to a productive approach to the understanding of experiential meaning in sport.

Simon Wenkart, M.D., discussed "The Meaning of Sport for Contemporary Man" in the Journal of Existential Psychiatry in 1963. Wenkart took an existentialist perspective on the meaning of sport. He defined an existential act as a "human activity which calls on the integration of thought, will, decision and the act" (32:399).

Pointing out the necessity for a synthesis and balance of mental and physical processes in sport, he argued that physical activity (including sport) may be viewed as "an existential act of a person stepping out of . . . isolation into existence" (32:401). This, Wenkart suggested, reveals the existential meaning of sport. "When the body is in action, as in sports," he stated, "we can look at it as a human existence open towards the world" (32:401).

Wenkart grounded his argument in existential theory, but he failed to define such key terms as thought, will, decision, and act within the theory. Further, his discussion of meaning in connection with individual relation to the world was consistent with existential theory, but it lacked further analysis in that context.

In a 1972 article, Seymour Kleinman (12), a sport philosopher at Ohio State University, aligned himself with phenomenological theory and made some brief, general references to meaning from this perspective. Kleinman maintained that, in most contemporary physical education, the sport itself is emphasized rather than the participant. The body is treated as an obstacle or as a means to the end of winning, rather than as a mode of being. This approach, he claimed, neglects the significance and meaning of human movement in sport. Kleinman contended that the goal of physical education should be the uncovering of meaning and significance. He suggested that this goal is impossible if

physical education continues to be equated with sport and games. Rather, physical education should, above all, "develop, encourage, and nurture" self-awareness, openness to self, and consequent self-understanding in individuals (12:177). As a result, Kleinman claimed, the individual will discover "the deeper meaning of one's being" (12:177).

Kleinman's approach to physical education was indeed phenomenological, as was his association of self-knowledge with existential meaning. He did not, however, define "the deeper meaning of one's being," nor did he explain the role of this concept within existential-phenomenological theory. Hence, his treatment of the concept was sketchy at best.

In the 1967 book entitled Man, Sport and Existence, Howard Slusher analyzed sport from the perspective of existential theory. Slusher stated that, in existential terms, the time frames of past, present, and future cannot be separated from each other. For example, meaning in the future, and meaning on the whole, are dependent on meaning in the present. Slusher termed this relationship time-meaning, and claimed that it is well illustrated in sport. The time sequence involved in a finite sport experience is linked with continuity to previous and subsequent time sequences. Thus, the meanings experienced in sport events are intimately and necessarily related to the individual's total pattern of experiential meaning.

Slusher also viewed sport as a source of affirmation of individual existence. By providing a concrete here-and-now, sport lends to the individual a locus in the world. It places the individual "out of 'that which is' to 'that which is for now'" (27:91). In such a setting, Slusher claimed, one faces one's own potential--one is on the edge of being. Sport is a good situation, then, for the discovery of personal meaning.

In order for meaning to be activated, or experienced in the sport situation, the individual must be personally involved in the experience beyond the mere mechanics of manipulating the body. Self must be viewed as subject rather than as object. Further, Slusher maintained, there must be an attitude of inquiry into self, a merger of human desires with the dynamics of the experience. An essential element of this involvement is conscious, active, goal-related thinking. The individual must constantly be aware of the demands and possibilities of an ever-changing situation, and transform the input of information into patterns of action.

Slusher allowed that both animals and humans can think to some extent. However, inasmuch as humans, seeking to be authentic, personally relate to their thoughts, they experience sport as meaningful. As humans are aware of the implications of their thoughts and actions for the meeting

of their own potential, they feel the meaning of the experience for them.

Sport, then, provides for the existential individual the setting and the raw material for meaning. Meaning is actually sensed as the individual relates the demands of the situation to the greater goal of personal fulfillment.

Slusher argued that meaning is never activated where the individual divorces self from others. It is one's ability to relate, Slusher maintained, that makes meaning possible. As one must relate the activity to self, one must also experience one's own relationship to others. In the process, one's own meanings become correlated with those of the others who share the experience. Thus, in sport there exists a mutual operation of individual meanings. Further, Slusher claimed, in team sports there may be operating a group meaning. This meaning goes beyond, and may differ greatly from, the meanings held by each participant in the group. Slusher suggested, then, that there exists a collective character of meaning.

Slusher's discussion of sport and meaning was at times ambiguous, and some of his arguments were weakly supported. However, his observations were firmly grounded in existential theory, and his analysis of meaning in that context was extensive. Therefore, Slusher's contribution to the study of experiential meaning was significant.

As revealed in the foregoing review of literature, the authors who have addressed the topic of experiential meaning in sport represent a wide variety of approaches to the concept. Bannister offered general observations regarding inquiry into the subject, without providing specific insights into the concept of meaning. Neal, Felshin, Stevenson, Phillips, and Hoffman contributed partial analyses of the concept. However, their arguments lacked an identifiable conceptual framework. Fraleigh, Thomson, Wenkart, and Kleinman each identified a theoretical context. However, they each extracted and applied elements of theory without explanation of those elements within the theoretical context. Only Metheny, Stone, and Slusher both presented a theoretical framework and began to investigate the concept of experiential meaning in sport within the context of that framework.

CHAPTER III

THE SCHUTZIAN THEORY OF MEANING

Alfred Schutz was born (in 1899) and grew up in Vienna, Austria. He attended the University of Vienna, where his studies included law, economics, and the social sciences. He was especially influenced by the work of Henri Bergson and Max Weber, and later by Edmund Husserl and William James. After twelve years of preparation, during which he was also occupied in both banking and law, he published his first book, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (The Phenomenology of the Social World), in 1932. This book was dedicated to Husserl, who was most complimentary of Schutz and his work.

In 1938, before the Nazi occupation of Austria, Schutz went to Paris. After a year, he and his wife emigrated to the United States, arriving there in July, 1939. Soon thereafter, he accepted an appointment as lecturer on the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science at the New School for Social Research, in New York. In addition, he re-established his career in law and business. He also took part in the establishment of the International Phenomenological Society, and served on the editorial board of that society's journal, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. In 1952 he became a professor at the New School for Social Research. He died in the spring of 1959.

In his first major work, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (The Phenomenology of the Social World), Schutz addressed himself directly to the concept of meaning. His delineation of the concept was grounded in his phenomenological theory of internal time consciousness. The theory will first be reviewed, then the concept of meaning will be defined and discussed in that context.

Schutz's Theory of Internal Time Consciousness

Schutz's theory of internal time consciousness was based heavily on the work of Henri Bergson and Edmund Husserl. "Only in the work of these two thinkers," he stated, " . . . has a sufficiently deep foundation been laid on the basis of which one could aspire to solve the problem of meaning" (24:xxxii). Specifically, Schutz credited Bergson's Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience (Time and Free Will) and Husserl's Vorlesungen über die Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness) as the primary sources of his theory (24:43).

In developing his theory of internal time consciousness, Schutz employed three concepts derived from the work of Bergson. Those concepts are the stream of consciousness, durée, and tensions of consciousness.

In its most elemental form, Schutz (24) explained, consciousness of the world as experienced by the individual

is "a continuous coming-to-be and passing-away of heterogeneous qualities" (24:45). The individual experiences a flow of sensory events which are the raw data of perception. These events are experienced continuously and sequentially, in a uni-directional stream. The heterogeneous qualities, or perceptual events, are termed the stream of consciousness. The coming-to-be and passing-away, i.e., the uni-directional flow itself, is called durée. (Schutz refers to this as duration, personal time, or inner time, terms which will be used interchangeably in this paper as well.) Thus, the stream of consciousness unfolds, or takes place, in the internal frame of reference (or time frame) of durée.

Durée, or personal time, is one of various frames of reference for time which the individual experiences. Another time frame, for example, would be biological time, or the time of physiological events such as healing, aging, and the prenatal development of a baby (25:181). Still another is cosmic time, the time of nature and everyday, public life. Cosmic time is spatialized, homogeneous, and quantified. It is commonly visualized (via time lines, clocks, etc.) and standardized into equal parts such as minutes, hours, or days. By contrast, personal time is marked only with the passing of heterogeneous perceptual events, the "transition from a now-thus to a new now-thus" (24:45).

Many human activities involve operations in more than one time frame simultaneously. Such activities take place in intersections of time frames (25:181). For example, the birth of a baby occurs in an intersection of biological time and cosmic time. Another example is conscious action involving physical movement; this takes place in the intersection of cosmic time (the time frame of the movement) and personal time (the time frame of the conscious processes.) As Schutz explained,

> We experience our bodily movements simultaneously on two different planes: inasmuch as they are movements in the outer world we look at them as events happening in space and spatial time, measurable in terms of the path run through; inasmuch as they are experienced together from within as happening changes, as manifestations of our spontaneity pertaining to our stream of consciousness, they partake of our inner time or durée (21:215).

The result of the particular intersection explained above by Schutz (that of cosmic time with inner, personal time) is a unification of movement and consciousness into a flow of experience which Schutz called the vivid present (21:216). Any human activity which involves both physical movement and internal conscious events takes place in the vivid present. Sport, involving skilled movement directed by conscious thought, is a clear example of such activity. This characteristic of sport will prove useful in supporting the constitution of sports as finite provinces of meaning, in Chapter V.

One further Bergsonian concept contributed to Schutz's (21) theory of time consciousness. It is the idea of tensions of consciousness. Activities in the conscious life of the individual occur on various planes, or levels. The factor which distinguishes each plane of conscious activity is its degree of tension, or intensity. This degree of tension of the individual's consciousness at a given time is determined by the individual's attention to, and interest in, life and its demands at that time.

The individual's conscious life displays a range of planes of activity, each plane corresponding to the degree of intensity which characterizes it. A low plane of conscious activity, for example, is marked by a low degree of intensity or tension. The plane of consciousness displaying the lowest tension is the plane of dreams, in which the individual gives the least attention to the demands of life. By contrast, the plane of highest tension is the plane of action. Action is self-initiated, planned activity such as mental problem solving (thinking) or physical movement which is designed to accomplish a preconceived purpose (working). Since the plane of action is characterized by the highest degree of attention to life, it is called the plane of wide-awakeness.

The concept of tensions of consciousness will be drawn upon to delineate finite provinces of meaning. It will be illustrated that each finite province of meaning has, among

other characteristics, a specific tension of consciousness. Thus, this and the other Bergsonian concepts explained above each contributed to Schutz's treatment of the concept of meaning.

In addition to the concepts derived from Bergson's work, Schutz borrowed several ideas developed by Edmund Husserl, and incorporated them into his own theory of internal time consciousness. The central concept which is based on Husserl's work is that of reflection.

Schutz (24) described the stream of consciousness in duration as a flow of experiences with no clear contours, boundaries, or differentiations.

> Indeed, when I immerse myself in my stream of consciousness, in my duration, I do not find any clearly differentiated experiences at all. At one moment an experience waxes, then it wanes. Meanwhile something new grows out of what was something old and then gives place to something still newer. I cannot distinguish between the Now and the Earlier, between the later Now and the Now that has just been, except that I know that what has just been is different from what now is (24:47).

Thus, there is no awareness or recognition of discrete, identifiable events while the individual's consciousness is unfolding in duration. In fact, Schutz (24) stated, the individual is not even aware of the stream of consciousness itself while still immersed in it. Awareness of the stream, or of discrete experiences within the stream, necessitates a conscious "turning-back against the stream," the taking of a particular attitude or conscious stance toward the stream

(24:47). This attention to discrete experiences is called reflection.

Reflection involves a conscious shift, a modification of the individual's awareness of experience. Within duration, experiences are in the form of primal impressions, the state in which they originally unfold. In reflection, the individual lifts experience out of duration, constituting it as discrete events which are remembrances of primal impressions rather than the primal impressions themselves. Thus, in order to reflect upon an experience which originally took place within duration, the individual lifts the experience out of duration, making it a discrete object of attention, and attends to it as a remembrance.

By means of reflection, the individual can consider an experience beyond its actuality, that is, independent of undergoing it. As it originally occurs, i.e., as the stream of consciousness is unfolding, the experience is pre-reflective, or pre-phenomenal. By the act of reflection, it is transformed to reflective or phenomenal status.

Pre-reflective experiences exist as primal impressions, which are simply phases of the stream of consciousness. As an elapsed phase of the stream falls farther and farther from the presently unfolding phase of the stream, its constituent experiences fade farther into the past. They become less clear or fresh in the memory. This fading phenomenon is called running off, and it ultimately results

in a total loss of memory, thus an unavailability of the experiences for reflection.

Schutz discussed four variations or types of reflection identified by Husserl. They are recollection, retention, anticipation, and protention.

Often a past experience falls within an elapsed phase of duration but is still available for reflection. Such an experience must be recalled, i.e., reconstructed as an object of attention, in order to be reflected upon. (In general, the more running off has occurred, the more reconstruction of the experience is necessary.) Reflection which involves such reconstruction of the experience is called secondary remembrance, or recollection.

An experience which took place in the immediate past occupies a phase of duration which is very close to the presently unfolding phase. Very little running off has occurred, and to an extent the individual is still conscious of the experience. Therefore, little or no reconstruction of the primal impression is necessary in order to reflect upon it. Reflection of this type, involving an after-consciousness or still-consciousness of the experience, is called primary remembrance, or retention.

Future experiences do not yet fall within the stream of consciousness. Therefore, they cannot be lifted out of the stream. The individual can and does, however, reflect upon future experiences. This is accomplished by imagining the

experience as something which "will have been," thus attending to it "in the future perfect tense" (21:215). This conscious process allows the individual to constitute the future experience as an object of reflection, even though the experience has not yet occurred and may not occur as imagined. Such reflection on future experiences is called foreseeing expectation, or anticipation. Since both recollection and anticipation involve a structuring of experience (as it is remembered or foreseen, respectively), Schutz described anticipation as "the future-directed counterpart of recollection" (24:58).

As the individual performs an intentional, planned action, experiences in the immediate future of the action are reflected upon, or attended to, in order to bring them about. This conscious grasping of the immediately foreseen future is the type of reflection called protention. As in anticipation, protention involves experiences which do not yet fall within the stream of consciousness. As in retention, however, it is reflection upon experiences which are very close to the presently unfolding stream. Its experiences link the present stream with the future stream as those of retention link it with the elapsed stream. Hence, protention is described as the future-directed counterpart of retention (21:172).

One further concept derived from Husserl's work was employed by Schutz (24) in his delineation of the concept of

meaning. It is attentional modification, or alteration of the reflective attitude. The act of reflection itself is a phase of experience. It occurs in the now, or the current phase of duration. This fact actually characterizes the act itself, lending to the individual's attention the perspective, or point of view, of the present. Thus, each act of reflection carries an attitude, a subjective conscious stance which is determined by the perspective of the present now in which the act occurs.

Each different time the individual reflects upon a given experience, the act of reflection occurs at a unique now, i.e., in a distinct current phase of duration. Since each phase of duration has its own point of view, each separate act of attention to the experience is characterized by a different, or modified, reflective attitude. Thus, each time an experience is reflected upon, the individual's attention to the experience is modified by the perspective of the present.

The concepts described above are based on the work of Edmund Husserl. Along with the Bergsonian concepts previously explained, they form the basic structure of Schutz's theory of internal time consciousness. It is within this framework that Schutz's treatment of the concept of meaning is to be understood.

The Meaning of Lived Experiences

Schutz (24) delineated the meaning of lived experiences in terms of the concepts of duration, the stream of consciousness, reflection, and attentional modification. According to Schutz, experiences in their pre-reflective status, in the form of primal impressions within the stream of consciousness in duration, are without meaning. In duration, the individual is conscious only of a continuous flow of undifferentiated perceptual events. By the act of reflection, however, the individual attends to a bounded, objectified phase of the stream of consciousness. It is by this act of reflection, and only by such an act, that the experience becomes meaningful. "Meaning does not lie in the experience. Rather, those experiences are meaningful which are grasped reflectively" (24:69). Specifically, Schutz stated, the meaning of the lived experience for the individual lies in the attitude, the subjective conscious stance, of the individual in reflecting upon experience. "The meaning is the way in which the Ego regards its experience. The meaning lies in the attitude of the Ego toward that part of its stream of consciousness which has already flowed by . . ." (24:69).

By Schutz's definition of meaning, not all lived experiences are necessarily meaningful. "It is . . . incorrect to say that my lived experiences are meaningful merely in virtue of their being experienced or lived through"

(24:70). Rather, Schutz stated, only those experiences which are made the objects of reflective attention become meaningful to the individual. The primal impressions of other experiences (e.g., eye blinks, facial expressions, passing moods) may be consciously imperceptible, or may be lost to the memory due to rapid running off, or may simply not be relevant enough to the individual to merit reflective attention. Such experiences have occurred in the individual's duration; therefore, they are part of the individual's total set of lived experiences. They remain, however, pre-reflective and consequently non-meaningful.

The meaning of an experience for the individual lies in the individual's reflective attitude, or conscious stance toward the experience. This reflective attitude, it was shown, is subject to attentional modification as the individual's point of view changes from one present moment to another. For example, the factor of temporal distance, or remoteness of the experience from the presently unfolding phase of duration, modifies the individual's attentive attitude toward the experience. Another influential factor is the individual's tension of consciousness, determined by the degree of attention to life at the moment of reflection. Such factors result in variations of the reflective attitude of the individual from one reflective act to another, with regard to a given lived experience.

Since the meaning of a reflected-upon experience for the individual lies in the individual's reflective attitude, and the reflective attitude is subject to attentional modification, then the meaning itself is modified by the circumstances of the moment of reflection. As Schutz stated,

> . . . the meaning of a lived experience undergoes modifications depending on the particular kind of attention the Ego gives to that lived experience. This . . . implies that the meaning of a lived experience is different depending on the moment from which the Ego is observing it (24:73-74).

The reflective attitude, and thus the meaning of the experience for the individual, is subject to change as attention to the experience is modified.

The attentional modification of the meaning of an experience from one reflective act to another illustrates the changeability of meaning. However, Schutz (24) also discussed a unifying influence on meaning. It involves the phenomenon of configurations of meaning.

Upon reflection, separate lived experiences may be attended to polythetically, that is, with a separate reflective act and thus a separate meaning for each. For example, a student may reflect upon each of the teacher's statements separately. The student's reflective attitude toward each statement is the meaning of that statement for the student. At times, however, the individual views a number of separate experiences (e.g., teacher's statements) as related in some way. In such cases, the experiences are

gathered and synthesized into a single, unified object of attention (e.g., a lecture). Then the polythetic reflective acts become synthesized into an encompassing, monothetic reflection upon the unified object of attention. In addition to their separate meanings, the experiences (e.g., statements) gain a combined meaning (e.g., the meaning of the lecture) which corresponds to the reflective attitude of the individual in reflecting upon all of them at once. At this point, the experiences belong to a configuration of meaning, or meaning-context. "We say that our lived experiences E_1, E_2, . . . , E_n stand in a meaning-context if and only if, once they have been lived through in separate steps, they are then constituted into a synthesis of a higher order, becoming thereby unified objects of monothetic attention" (24:75).

Separate experiences stand in a configuration of meaning, or meaning context, when they are viewed as a combined whole with an encompassing meaning. The more encompassing a meaning configuration is of separate meanings, the higher is its complexity, and thus the higher is its order. For the student, the meaning of the teacher's lecture is of a higher order than the meaning of each statement in the lecture.

Just as separate meanings are synthesized into configurations of meaning, separate configurations of meaning can be synthesized into still higher-order configurations of meaning. For the student, the meaning

configurations of several lectures may be synthesized into the higher-order meaning configuration of an entire course. Higher-order configurations, it will be shown, include finite provinces of meaning.

A finite province of meaning is a set of experiences whose separate meanings are consistent with the combined meaning of the configuration, and are mutually compatible with respect to that meaning. "A finite province of meaning thus consists of meaning-compatible experiences" (26:23).

Schutz (21) gave several examples of finite provinces of meaning. They include, among others, the province of everyday work, the province of dreams, the world of madness, and the child's play world. In Chapter IV, the characteristics of finite provinces of meaning will be examined more closely.

CHAPTER IV

FINITE PROVINCES OF MEANING

Alfred Schutz (21) credited the work of William James as the source of his conception of finite provinces of meaning. In Principles of Psychology (1890), James discussed the human sense of reality in terms of theories of belief and disbelief. Schutz expanded this psychological treatment of the topic of reality into the philosophical conceptualization of finite provinces of meaning.

Meaning and Reality

Philosophically, Schutz (21) maintained, reality for the individual is determined by the meaning of experiences for the individual (rather than, for example, by the ontological structure of objects). An experience to which the individual attends is accepted as real by the individual as long as the meaning of that experience is not contradicted by the meanings of other experiences to which the individual attends. Sets of experiences whose meanings are compatible in this way are called finite provinces of meaning. Examples of finite provinces of meaning include the world of everyday life, the world of dreams, the world of the stageplay, the child's play world, the world of art, the world of jokes, the world of religious experience, the world of scientific contemplation, and the world of insanity.

In the absence of inconsistent or incompatible experiences, the accent of reality is bestowed by the individual upon each finite province of meaning as a whole. While the individual is dreaming, for example, the world of the dream is accepted as real. When the dreamer awakens, however, the reality of the dream world is exchanged for the reality of the world of everyday life. Thus, reality for the individual is determined by the finite province of meaning in which experiences are being lived.

Meaning and Cognitive Style

The key to the meaning-compatibility of the experiences in a finite province of meaning is their cognitive style. Schutz (21) stated,

> . . . we call a certain set of our experiences a finite province of meaning if all of them show a specific cognitive style and are--with respect to this style--not only consistent in themselves but also compatible with one another (21:230).

The meaning-compatibility (and thus the reality) of experiences depends upon the consistency of their style of existence, or cognitive style (26:24). All of the individual's experiences in each finite province of meaning reflect a particular, shared cognitive style.

With respect to the cognitive style which they each display, the constituent experiences of a finite province of meaning are mutually compatible. Although a particular experience may contradict the others and thus be logically

invalidated within the finite province of meaning, unless it violates the cognitive style it need not cast the individual out of the finite province of meaning. For example, the individual may be dreaming about driving a car which suddenly takes flight, and realize that this experience is inconsistent with the nature of a car. Despite this inconsistency, the experience need not disrupt the dream, which may continue. The sudden intrusion of the sound of an alarm clock, however, drastically alters the dream's characteristic cognitive style, and the individual is cast out of the dream world into the world of everyday life.

Schutz (21) established that the cognitive style of each finite province of meaning is unique. Experiences which are consistent and compatible in cognitive style within their own finite province of meaning are inconsistent and incompatible from the perspective of the cognitive style of any other finite province of meaning. Thus, no finite province of meaning can be reduced or translated by means of a formula into any other finite province of meaning. Further, the transition from one finite province of meaning to another is accomplished only by a cognitive leap, experienced as a shock which reflects the corresponding change in cognitive style. Such shock experiences are common because transitions from one finite province of meaning to another occur frequently.

> Some instances are: the inner transformation we endure if the curtain in the theatre rises as a transition to the world of the stage play; the radical change in our attitude if, before a painting, we permit our visual field to be limited by what is within the frame as a passage into the pictorial world; or falling asleep as a leap into the world of dreams (21:344).

As a set of meaning-compatible experiences, a finite province of meaning is an example of a configuration of meaning, or meaning context. It consists of a set of experiences which can be reflected upon individually but may also be attended to collectively, as a synthesized combination of experiences. Further, it cannot be reduced or translated into any other finite province of meaning, nor can any other finite province of meaning be reduced or translated into it. Therefore, a finite province of meaning usually constitutes a meaning context of a higher order.

Characteristics of Cognitive Style

Schutz (21) listed six features of cognitive style which can be identified in a finite province of meaning. They are as follows:

1. A specific tension of consciousness
2. A specific epoché
3. A prevalent form of spontaneity
4. A specific form of experiencing one's self
5. A specific form of sociality
6. A specific time perspective

In addition to the six features of cognitive style specifically isolated, Schutz's descriptions of various finite provinces of meaning include clear references to the following two additional characteristics of cognitive style:

7. A specific space perspective
8. A specific pattern of causality

Schutz acknowledged that there may be other features as well. Further, other writers have cautioned that, since the list of features may be incomplete, it would be incorrect to treat Schutz's description of cognitive style as definitive (9:6). The description is, however, comprehensive enough to make understandable Schutz's definition of finite provinces of meaning. Hence, that definition can be used to accurately distinguish between sets of experiences which do constitute finite provinces of meaning and those which do not.

The world of everyday life is considered the paramount reality because of its prominent cognitive style. Schutz described the characteristics of cognitive style in terms of their manifestations in the world of everyday life. That finite province of meaning will be used as a point of comparison for the description of those characteristics in this chapter as well.

Tension of consciousness

Schutz's conceptualization of the tensions of consciousness was explained in Chapter III. The greater the

individual's attention to the demands of life, the higher is the individual's tension of consciousness. The world of everyday life is marked by the highest tension of consciousness, which is called wide-awakeness. Other finite provinces of meaning feature lower tensions of consciousness, corresponding to less attention to life and its demands. The finite province of meaning with the lowest tension of consciousness described by Schutz is the world of dreams.

The tension of consciousness is the foundational element of the cognitive style of a finite province of meaning (26:25). It can direct the individual towards or away from the present demands of life, thus largely determining the individual's attention to a particular finite province of meaning. For example, as the individual's tension of consciousness diminishes, interest in the demands of the life situation wanes, and the individual may drift from the world of everyday life into the world of daydreams.

The transition from one finite province of meaning to another involves a corresponding change from one tension of consciousness to another. This is accomplished in the form of a conscious leap (in the Kierkegaardian sense), as described in the previous section. The individual, Schutz (26) observed, experiences this abrupt change as a shock. The shock experience is attributed specifically to the change in the individual's tension of consciousness.

Epoché

Closely related to the tension of consciousness is the epoché of a finite province of meaning. Schutz (21) explained this concept in terms of the natural attitude, the prevailing attitude of the individual toward the world of everyday life. The natural attitude is characterized by a high tension of consciousness and an eminently practical interest in meeting the requirements of life. Given this objective, the individual in the natural attitude accepts the world and everything in it, experiencing no doubt as to its reality. Schutz stated,

> . . . it is characteristic of the natural attitude that it takes the world and its objects for granted until counterproof imposes itself. . . . We are not interested in finding out whether this world really does exist or whether it is merely a coherent system of consistent appearances. We have no reason to cast any doubt upon our warranted experiences which, so we believe, give us things as they really are (21:228).

Schutz (21) referred to the commonly employed phenomenological method of epoché, which is a bracketing or suspension of belief in the reality of the world as we experience it in the natural attitude. Schutz noted that the epoché of the world of everyday life includes no suspension of belief, but rather a full acceptance, or suspension of doubt, in the reality of existence as experienced in the natural attitude. Other finite provinces of meaning, however, are characterized by less acceptance of

the world as experienced in the natural attitude. Each of these finite provinces of meaning features an epoché which is the suspension of belief in certain realities of the world of daily life. Examples of such realities include those of physical existence and the inevitability of death, the individual's system of relevances, the individual's control over the fulfilling of anticipations, and the prescription for success and lines of responsibility.

The individual's experiences in the everyday world are marked by what Schutz called the fundamental anxiety. This is the individual's underlying knowledge of the finitude of physical existence, the inevitability of death. It is accomplished by the awareness of other limitations--the need for nourishment and rest, for example, and the knowledge that certain feats are humanly impossible. In other finite provinces of meaning, however, these realities of the everyday world may be suspended. The world of the stageplay, for instance, may feature persons of superhuman strength, immortal beings, or even ghosts.

Another reality which varies from one finite province of meaning to another is the individual's system of relevances. The individual's interest is selective, organizing the demands and concerns of life into those of relatively major or minor relevance. As a result, certain concerns command a great deal of attention while others are of minor interest or are totally irrelevant to the individual.

This organization, or system, may vary from one finite province of meaning to another. The companionship of others, for example, may be highly relevant to the individual in the everyday world. In the solitary world of scientific contemplation, however, companionship is an irrelevant concern. Thus, the system of relevances is a reality which distinctively characterizes the epoché of each finite province of meaning.

Another feature of the epoché of a finite province of meaning is the extent to which the individual can control the fulfilling of anticipations. As described in Chapter III, reflection is of four types--recollection, retention, protention, and anticipation. Recollection and retention are types of reflection upon distant and recent past experiences, respectively. Both recollection and retention, then, determine the meaning of experiences which have already been manifested as primal impressions in the stream of consciousness. Protention is reflection upon experiences as they are being brought about by the individual's purposive performance. The actual unfolding of such experiences, although as yet uncertain, is controlled to a great extent by the acting individual. Anticipation, however, is reflection upon future experiences, which may not turn out to be as the individual expects them to be. Schutz stated, "anticipations are empty and may or may not be fulfilled by the action once performed" (21:215).

In some finite provinces of meaning, the individual has little or no control over the fulfilling of anticipations. In the world of dreams, for example, the dreamer is carried along by the flow of events, unable to control the future of the dream. By contrast, in the world of everyday life the individual, through planned, intentional performances, can shape the future, bringing it about in accordance with the way in which it is anticipated. That future, though, is rarely fulfilled exactly as anticipated in this finite province of meaning. In the world of daydreams, however, the individual exercises complete control over the fulfilling of anticipations. Experiences in this finite province of meaning unfold precisely as designed and anticipated by the individual.

The prescription for success is a distinct reality in each finite province of meaning. Such factors as family background, wealth, formal education, personal appearance, physical strength, personal effort, and luck each determine to different extents the meeting of the individual's goals. In the everyday world, for example, education and personal effort may be considered to be the road to success. In the world of religious experience, faith and the grace of God may be paramount factors in achieving the goal of salvation.

Related to the prescription for success is the nature of the individual's responsibilities in each finite province of meaning. In order to achieve success in the everyday

world, for example, the individual is responsible to superiors in the bureaucracy of the work force. In the world of religious experience, however, the individual is primarily responsible to the will of God. Thus, the epoché of each finite province of meaning includes particular lines of responsibility for the individual as well as a specific prescription for success.

Schutz pointed out that the epoché which characterizes the cognitive style of a finite province of meaning is closely related to its tension of consciousness. Specifically, in finite provinces of meaning with high tensions of consciousness (e.g., the world of daily life), the individual is highly attentive to the demands of life and thus is highly accepting of the realities of everyday life. Such finite provinces of meaning are characterized by a minimal epoché. By contrast, in finite provinces of meaning with relatively low tensions of consciousness (e.g., the world of daydreams), the individual has turned away from the demands of life. In such finite provinces of meaning, there is consequently a greater epoché, a suspension of belief in more factors of everyday reality. Thus, as a general principle, the lower the tension of consciousness of a finite province of meaning, the more of everyday life is bracketed in its epoché.

Prevalent form of spontaneity

The cognitive style of a finite province of meaning is characterized by a prevalent form of meaningful spontaneity. Spontaneous lived experiences are those which are initiated by the individual (as opposed to those which are merely perceived by the individual). Spontaneous lived experiences are termed behavior. Some behavior is never reflected upon and is therefore non-meaningful (e.g., respirations, eye blinks, passing facial expressions, etc.). It is, however, the individual's meaningful behavior, called conduct, which affects the cognitive style of a finite province of meaning. Conduct is of several forms, some of which are more prevalent than others in a finite province of meaning.

Covert conduct is meaningful behavior which occurs only within duration, or in the individual's inner life. Covert conduct is called thinking, although it is not necessarily intended (remembering one's own dog upon seeing someone else's is unintended thinking). Overt conduct is manifested in the outer world, in cosmic time. It is called doing, and may or may not be intended (yawning is usually unintended doing).

Preconceived, planned conduct, either covert or overt, is called action. Some action (e.g., a day-dream) is not intended to be carried out; there is no intention to realize such action. Action which is intended to be carried out is called performance. A performance may be covert, as in

mentally solving a mathematical problem, or it may be overt, as in picking up a book. Performance which is overt is called working. "Working, then, is action in the outer world, based upon a project and characterized by the intention to bring about the projected state of affairs by bodily movements" (21:212).

The various forms of meaningful spontaneity--covert and overt thinking, doing, action, and performance--characterize to different extents the cognitive style of each finite province of meaning. For example, in the world of everyday life, the dominant form of spontaneity is overt performance, or working. By contrast, the world of scientific contemplation is characterized by covert performance (specifically, the mental solving of theoretical problems) as the prevalent form of spontaneity.

Form of experiencing one's self

For the individual, each finite province of meaning features a specific form of self-experience. This form reflects both the epoché of the finite province of meaning and its prevalent form of spontaneity. In the world of everyday life, for example, the specific epoché is a complete acceptance of the realities of daily life. Correspondingly, self is experienced as subject to the realities of embodiment, mortality, the necessity of food and rest, etc. By contrast, in the epoché of the world of

daydreams, some or all of those realities may be suspended. Thus, self may be experienced as invisible, immortal, able to fly, superhuman in strength, etc.

The prevalent form of spontaneity in the everyday world is that of working; thus, the working self is the dominant form of self-experience in the everyday world. In the world of scientific contemplation, however, thinking performance is the prevalent form of spontaneity. In that finite province of meaning, self is experienced primarily as a thinking self.

Besides the general form of self-experience, a more definite self-role may characterize a finite province of meaning. The individual may identify self specifically with the particular role which is filled in spontaneous experiences within the finite province of meaning. In the everyday world, for example, self may be experienced not simply as a working self, but more precisely as a "mother" working self, a "law-enforcer" working self, etc. In the world of scientific contemplation, the thinking self may be a physicist, chemist, biologist, or mathematician thinking self. In the world of daydreams, self may be experienced as a medieval knight, a space explorer, a ghost, or a superhero.

Form of sociality

In addition to the form of self-experience, the form in which the individual experiences and interacts with others

(and whether such interaction even takes place) is a characteristic feature of each finite province of meaning. In the world of everyday life, the existence of other people is accepted as reality. Further, it is accepted that all people share the same principal means of interpersonal communication, and that such communication takes place under certain universally understood rules and conventions. Thus, language, music, movement, visual art, and other common forms of social communication are characteristic of the everyday world. In other finite provinces of meaning, however, this may not be the case. The play world of a child, for example, permits some sociality in the form of mutual participation and even social interaction, as when several children share the same sandbox activity. Non-players, however, are alien to the sandbox communications. In the world of insanity, the individual may find it impossible to communicate with others, or others may not be recognized at all. In the world of dreams, the individual is totally isolated, unable to share experiences with anyone. Thus, the extent of sociality in finite provinces of meaning ranges from the full, rich interpersonal communications of the everyday world to the total isolation of the world of dreams. The extent and the particular form of such sociality constitutes a definitive characteristic of the cognitive style of a finite province of meaning.

Time perspective

The experiences of each finite province of meaning take place within a prevalent time frame or intersection of time frames. As explained in Chapter III, time frames, or perspectives of time, include the inner time of duration, biological time (the time of physiological events), and external cosmic time, which is quantified in daily life into standard or clock time. The working self, which characterizes the world of daily life, functions in the vivid present, where duration intersects with cosmic time. That intersection, then, is the prevalent time perspective of the world of daily life. By contrast, the time perspective of the world of dreams is exclusively that of duration, or inner time.

Some finite provinces of meaning feature modification of the everyday time perspective. In the world of daydreams, experiences may occur in a prescribed period of standard time--for example, the time of World War II or the twenty-first century. Further, time may be condensed or magnified, as when several weeks pass between acts in a stageplay.

The temporal boundaries of some finite provinces of meaning differ from those of the everyday world. Experiences in the everyday world are limited to the lifetime of the individual. Thus, the individual's birth and death are the temporal boundaries of everyday experiences. In other finite provinces of meaning, however, these boundaries may

be restricted. Involved in the world of a joke, for example, the individual is nevertheless aware that the joke will last only a few minutes at most. Thus, the individual recognizes a much closer horizon of experience in the world of the joke than in the everyday world.

A finite province of meaning is characterized both by the time frame in which lived experiences unfold and by the temporal boundaries of those experiences. In these respects, time perspective is a definitive feature of the cognitive style of each finite province of meaning.

Space perspective

In addition to a time perspective, each finite province of meaning features a particular space perspective. Although not specifically listed by Schutz as a characteristic of cognitive style, space perspective was identified and discussed in Schutz's descriptions of various finite provinces of meaning.

Schutz (26) noted that space in the world of everyday life is centered around the individual.

> The place in which I find myself, my actual "here," is the starting point for my orientation in space. It is the zero-point of the system of coordinates within which the dimensions of orientation, the distances and perspectives of objects, become determined in the field that surrounds me. Relative to my animate organism, I classify the elements of my surroundings under the categories right, left, above, below, in front of, behind, near, far, etc. (26:36-37).

Given self as the spatial center of the individual's everyday world, Schutz (21) distinguished between two major zones, or strata, in the spatial arrangement of this finite province of meaning. These are the world within actual reach and the world within potential reach.

The stratum of the everyday world which is accessible to the immediate experience of the individual is called the world within actual reach. It includes the portion of the world which can be perceived from the reference point of the individual. The world within actual reach is subject to change as this reference point, the location of the individual, changes in the everyday world. Thus, the world within actual reach is a function of the spatial and temporal location of the individual--the here and now.

Beyond the world within actual reach of the individual is the world within potential reach. This stratum of the everyday world has two parts, the world within restorable reach and the world within attainable reach. The world within restorable reach refers to the individual's past, being the spatial location of experiences already lived through by the individual. This sector of the everyday world is potentially accessible by means of the individual returning from the present locus to the one from which this sector was previously within actual reach. The world within attainable reach refers to the individual's future, being the spatial location of anticipated experiences. This

sector of the everyday world is not, and has never been, within actual reach of the individual. It is, however, that sector of the world which the individual expects can be brought into actual reach (although the likelihood of such an eventuality may not be consistent with the individual's expectations).

The world within actual reach and the world within potential reach are spatial concepts which apply to all finite provinces of meaning, characterizing the cognitive style of each. Schutz noted that these strata of reality in other finite provinces of meaning may differ drastically from those in the everyday world. In the world of daydreams, for example, the world within potential reach is limited only by the individual's imagination. In other finite provinces of meaning, however, the world within potential reach may be severely restricted. The world of a stageplay, for example, lies within the setting placed between the audience, the wings, and the curtains of the stage.

In various finite provinces of meaning, the spatial standards of the everyday world may be altered or suspended in a number of ways. In the fantasy world of Don Quixote, Schutz (22) observed, the universe conforms spatially to the Aristotelian arrangement of regions encircling the earth and providing the natural habitats of earth, water, air, and fire. Further, for a knightly inhabitant of Don Quixote's world, distant locations can easily be brought within actual

reach because instantaneous, magical transportation over great distances is commonplace. In the child's play world, a toy truck may assume huge proportions for the child even while it is being held in the child's hand. In the world of art, a formidable mountain may fit easily onto a two-dimensional scrap of canvas. Thus, the space perspective of each finite province of meaning constitutes a characteristic feature of its cognitive style.

Pattern of causality

Experiences are generated in characteristic ways within each finite province of meaning. The emphasis upon particular causal sources is a characteristic feature of the cognitive style of each finite province of meaning. In the world of everyday life, for example, the dominant form of spontaneity is the working performance of the individual. Intentional, planned actions directed toward meeting practical goals of the individual are the prevalent pattern of causality in this world. Other causal sources, such as the forces of nature (e.g., earthquakes, weather, growth, disease) and of physical science (e.g., gravity, electromagnetism, nuclear radiation) are secondary in importance to the practical projects of the individual in the working world. By contrast, in the world of insanity, the individual may feel unable to control the events of life, recognizing instead only the forces of chance or the will of perceived enemies.

In some finite provinces of meaning, causal forces which are not commonly recognized in the practical experiences of the everyday world may play major roles. In the world of religious experience, for example, the will of God dominates the efforts of mortals, prayer is a recognized causal force, and miracles attest to the supreme causal power of God. Another such finite province of meaning, discussed at length by Schutz (22), is the fantasy world of Don Quixote. Experiences in this world, he observed, are controlled by forces of enchantment, which supersede the inferior, spontaneous efforts of humans. Enchanters (e.g., magicians) in this world "can transform all things and change their natural shapes" (22:139). Further, Schutz stated, the activity of such beings "is the basic category of Don Quixote's interpretation of the world" (22:139). Thus, the pattern of causality in this world is clearly dominated by forces of enchantment.

In each finite province of meaning, then, an ordered pattern of causal sources emerges. The individual's acceptance of the pattern of causality is a feature of the cognitive style associated with each finite province of meaning.

Summary

A finite province of meaning is a meaning context of a high order. Its constituent experiences share a common,

characteristic style of existence, called cognitive style. The elements of this cognitive style can be identified as features of the set of experiences. They include for each finite province of meaning the tension of consciousness, the epoché, the form of spontaneity, the form of experiencing one's self, the form of sociality, the time perspective, the space perspective, and the pattern of causality.

With respect to the cognitive style which they display, the experiences in a finite province of meaning are mutually compatible. Since the cognitive style of each finite province of meaning is unique, the experiences in any one province are inconsistent and incompatible with those of any other province. Consequently, finite provinces of meaning are mutually exclusive. The transition from one province to another is accomplished by a cognitive leap. It is accompanied by a shock experience which corresponds to the change in cognitive style.

The accent of reality is bestowed by the individual upon each finite province of meaning as a whole, and is dependent upon the consistency of cognitive style. Thus, reality for the individual is determined by the finite province of meaning in which experiences are being lived.

In Chapter V, a definition of a sport will be offered. According to that definition, the constitution of sport experiences as finite provinces of meaning will be analyzed.

CHAPTER V

SPORTS AS FINITE PROVINCES OF MEANING

In Chapter IV, it was shown that, in order for a given set of the individual's experiences to constitute a finite province of meaning, the experiences must share a consistent cognitive style. All of the dream experiences of the individual, for example, display the same tension of consciousness, epoché, form of spontaneity, form of self-experience, form of sociality, time perspective, space perspective, and pattern of causality. Further, the cognitive style of the set of experiences must be unique. No two distinct finite provinces of meaning share the same cognitive style. (If they did, then one would reduce or translate to the other.) Thus, the cognitive style of the individual's dream experiences, for example, is unlike the cognitive style of the individual's lived experiences in any other finite province of meaning.

The particular sets of experiences which are of interest in this study are those of the individual during participation in each of various sports. In order to conclude that the experiences of participating in each sport (e.g., tennis or basketball) constitute a finite province of meaning, it must be demonstrated that, in each sport, the individual's experiences share a unique cognitive style

(21:341). In the next section, a definition of a sport will be presented. It will then be argued that the set of the individual's participatory experiences in each sport displays a common, unique cognitive style and therefore constitutes a finite province of meaning for the individual.

Definitional Factors and the Cognitive Style of Sport Experiences

For the purpose of this study, a sport is defined as

> a human activity which involves specific administrative organization, a historical background of rules or customs which define the objective and limit the pattern of human behavior; it involves challenge and a definite outcome determined by physical skill (8:vii).

Obvious examples of activities which qualify as sports by this definition include tennis, basketball, football, and gymnastics. The individual's participatory experiences in each of such sports, then, involve the factors designated in the definition (specified, of course, for each sport). In particular, five of the factors are (1) administrative organization, (2) objective of behavior, (3) pattern of behavior, (4) element of challenge, and (5) component of physical skill. It will be demonstrated that each of these factors helps to determine the cognitive style of the set of experiences.

Administrative organization

By the definition given, a sport includes specific administrative organization. Associated with each sport are

identifiable authorities which regulate the formal organization of events. In tennis, for example, the designation of amateurs and professionals, the matching of contestants by age group, the establishment of criteria for open and closed competitions, the selection and seeding of players, the qualification of officials, and other administrative duties are performed by such authorities as the International Lawn Tennis Federation, various tournament committees, and team coaches.

The administrative organization specific to a sport partly determines the epoché which characterizes participatory experiences in the sport. Lines of authority in the everyday world, for instance, are replaced by the authority and decision-making privilege of the administrative organization for the sport. Correspondingly, the experiences of the participant in sport are marked by the suspension of everyday lines of responsibility and the acceptance of authority and responsibility dictated by the regulatory structure for the sport.

The administrative organization of each sport designates criteria for individual participation such as age, sex, experience, win-loss record, geographical location, and amateur or professional status. In this capacity, the administrative organization has a direct influence on both the individual's form of self-experience and the form of sociality characteristic of participatory experiences. By

the criteria established, the individual experiences self not only as a player in the sport, but also, perhaps, as an amateur or professional player, local or international player, "weekend hacker" or top-ranked champion, home-team or visiting player. In addition, the individual is generally matched with teammates and opponents of similar caliber. The persons with whom participatory experiences are shared are commonly limited by the administrative organization to participants with comparable skill, background, amateur/professional status, age, sponsorship, etc. In this way, the administrative structure of a sport is a determining factor of the form of sociality as well as the form of self-experience in the cognitive style of the individual's participatory experiences.

Objective of behavior

According to the given definition of a sport, the rules and customs of each sport specify the objective of participatory behavior. In basketball, for example, the objective is to shoot the ball through the basket so as to score, with one's teammates, more points than do members of the opposing team. The example of basketball illustrates the effect of the stated objective on the cognitive style of participatory experiences. In order to meet the objective of the sport of basketball, the individual must act purposefully in the outer world. Thus, the prevalent form of spontaneity in basketball is that of working

performance. The objective also ensures that experiences take place in both personal and cosmic time, thus establishing the individual's general time perspective as that of the vivid present. Further, by requiring the propulsion of an object from the location of the individual to a more distant point within the world of actual reach, the objective dictates aspects of the individual's spatial perspective. Thus, the form of spontaneity, the time perspective, and the space perspective which characterize experiences in each sport are partly determined by the defined objective of the sport.

Pattern of behavior

The acceptable pattern of behavior is, by the definition given, delimited for each sport by the rules and customs of that sport. Rules and/or customs specify such aspects as space and time boundaries, acceptable and unacceptable movement patterns, appropriate treatment of opponents, and allowable use of external objects (e.g., balls, clubs, protective equipment). Such limits on the pattern of participatory behavior largely characterize the cognitive style of experiences in each sport setting. They specify the epoché, the form of self-experience, the form of sociality, the time and space perspectives, and the pattern of causality.

The rules and customs of a sport identify aspects of everyday reality which are placed in suspension. In some

sports, for example (e.g., men's gymnastics, football), success is closely associated with sheer physical strength. In other sports (e.g., basketball, lacrosse), the importance of speed and agility in achieving success is an additional reality. Other determinants of success (e.g., socio-economic status) which are a part of everyday reality are usually suspended in such settings. Thus, rules and customs are a determinant of the epoché of participatory experiences in each sport.

Limitations on the pattern of behavior in a sport help to create the role or roles played by participants in the sport. Self is experienced by the participant in the form of baseball player or basketball player, for example. The rules, and especially the customs, of a sport further specify the form of self-experience. The baseball player is more specifically a pitcher, shortstop, etc., and the basketball player is a center, forward, or guard. Thus, the rules and customs of a sport help to determine for the individual the form of self-experience which characterizes the cognitive style of participatory experiences.

The rules of each sport specify the number of teammates and opponents with whom experiences may be shared. They also limit the types of communication with others which are proper. In tennis, for example, there is no physical contact between opponents, and deliberate verbal attempts to distract an opponent result in the loss of points. By

contrast, in football both physical contact and verbal distractions are appropriate. In such ways, the limits on the pattern of behavior in each sport determine the forms of sociality which characterize the individual's participatory experiences in the sport.

The requirement of physical skill guarantees that experiences in every sport take place in cosmic time as well as in inner time. The rules and customs of each sport, however, specify more precisely the standardization of cosmic time for participatory experiences in that sport. In women's lacrosse, for example, the exact period of participation (sixty minutes, divided into two equal halves) is specified. Participation ceases during this period only for official time-outs and for the half-time intermission. The rules of basketball, however, add that regulated time ceases whenever the ball leaves the playing area. In baseball, time is measured, not in minutes, but rather in innings of play. In tennis, participation is continuous until one individual or team has secured the necessary number and combination of points. In football, the periods of time for thinking performance (as in the huddle) are limited as well as those for working performance. Thus, the rules and customs of a sport limit the pattern of behavior in terms of time, and so specify the time perspective which characterizes the individual's set of participatory experiences in that sport.

The spatial perspective of participatory experiences is also determined by the rules of each sport. Internal as well as external boundaries are established. In basketball, the dimensions of the court are specified, and the entire area is within every participant's actual reach. In tennis, only one-half of the playing area can be occupied at any one time, but sides are exchanged at prescribed points during play. In football, the line of scrimmage and the external boundaries determine the world within actual reach of each participant; the world within potential reach fluctuates with the location of the ball and the role played by each participant (e.g., certain players are "ineligible" to be "down field"). Thus, by spatially limiting the pattern of behavior, the rules of each sport determine the space perspective of the individual's participatory experiences in the sport.

Limitations on the pattern of behavior in each sport influence the relative potency of various causal sources of the participant's experiences. Although by definition the outcome of a sporting event is ultimately determined by the physical skill of human contestants, the relative importance of chance, natural forces (e.g., wind, heat), animal behavior, and human action vary from one sport to another. In tennis, for example, the luck-of-the-draw is recognized as a partial determinant of success in a tournament. In competitive sailing, wind and water conditions are

influential. In polo, the behavior of one's mount is a causal factor. Thus, the rules and customs which detail the procedures for each sport also establish the pattern of causality which characterizes participatory experiences.

Element of challenge

By the definition given, all sports include the element of challenge. Challenge is "difficulty in a job or undertaking that is stimulating to one engaged in it" (20:244). In a sport, the participant is stimulated by the challenge of the situation to outperform opponents. This places heavy demands upon the individual's attention to the requirements of the situation. Thus, the element of challenge dictates a high tension of consciousness for the participant in a sport. By so doing, it affects the cognitive style of participatory experiences.

Component of physical skill

By the given definition, the outcome of a sport contest is ultimately determined by physical skill. It was noted that this component establishes the prevalent forms of spontaneity and of causality as working performance, i.e., purposeful physical action in the outer world, directed toward the fulfilling of a prescribed goal. It was also pointed out that the component of physical skill ensures that sport experiences take place in outer, cosmic time as well as in inner, personal time. Although rules and

customs specify other aspects of spontaneity, causality, and time perspective for each sport, these general facts regarding cognitive style are determined directly by the requirement of physical skill.

The component of physical skill also influences both the form of self-experience and the form of sociality in a sport. The individual's experiences of self as a basketball player or tennis player, for example, include the concept that such a self is physically skilled in particular patterns of working performance. The individual also experiences others, teammates and opponents, as similarly skilled. Forms of communication with others, then, are focused on making use of teammates' skills and on frustrating those of opponents. Thus, the component of physical skill in each sport helps to determine the cognitive style of the individual's participatory experiences.

In summary, the given definition of a sport designates the five factors of administrative organization, objective of behavior, pattern of behavior, element of challenge, and component of physical skill. The unique specification of these factors for the individual's participatory experiences in each sport establishes the distinct cognitive style of those experiences. It is concluded that the individual's participatory experiences in each sport share a unique cognitive style and therefore constitute a distinct finite province of meaning.

The Cognitive Style of the Sport of Singles Tennis

In order to exemplify the constitution of sport-specific experiences as finite provinces of meaning, the cognitive style of the individual's experiences in the sport of singles tennis will be discussed. Each of the eight designated characteristics of cognitive style--tension of consciousness, epoché, form of spontaneity, form of self-experience, form of sociality, time perspective, space perspective, and pattern of causality--will be considered.

Tension of Consciousness

The element of challenge is, by definition, present in all sports. It was shown in the previous section that this element is responsible for the high tension of consciousness which characterizes the cognitive style of all sports. Singles tennis is no exception to this. The tennis player, stimulated by the difficulty of the objective at hand, is highly attentive to the demands of the situation in striving to outperform the opponent. Consequently, the player's tension of consciousness is high.

Epoché

The epoché which characterizes the cognitive style of experiences in tennis involves the suspension of several realities of everyday life. These realities include aspects of physical existence, the system of relevances, the ability

to fulfill anticipations, the prescription for success, and the nature of responsibilities.

The world of everyday life is characterized by the fundamental anxiety, the underlying sense of one's own finitude and the inevitability of death. This reality, with the related reality of the need for periodic nourishment and rest, characterizes the cognitive style of the individual's experiences in the everyday world. In tennis, however, these realities of physical existence are drastically altered. The fundamental anxiety regarding death is suspended; the prospect of death is not a concern within the province of tennis participation. In place of the finitude of life, however, is the finitude of the sport contest, the fact that each match has a definite, foreseeable end. Every participatory experience is lived in the face of this reality. Nourishment and rest, as well as the actual playing of points, are adjusted to the reality of the finitude of the contest. The player takes refreshment and paces play according to the demands of the situation over the duration of the match, and no further. Thus, the epoché of the sport of tennis includes the replacement of the reality of death with the reality of the finitude of the contest. This reality is a distinct feature of the cognitive style of tennis experiences.

As noted above, the reality of death is of great concern to the individual in the everyday world; in tennis, it is not.

This is an example of the variation in the individual's system or pattern of relevances between the world of everyday life and the sport of tennis. Besides death, other aspects of experience take on different relevance in the province of tennis. For example, the acquisition of worldly goods is irrelevant in tennis, whereas the winning of points (according to the definition of winning put forth in the rules of tennis) is relevant. Financial security is not relevant; physical fitness and emotional fortitude are. Interpersonal relationships are not relevant; anticipation of the opponent's movements is relevant. Plans for the distant future are not relevant; strategy for the immediate future is. In general, then, factors which affect the outcome of the sport contest at hand are highly relevant in the province of tennis. Factors which are of practical importance in everyday life but are relatively inconsequential in the sport setting are minimally relevant, if at all. This unique system of relevances, dictated by the objective and the demands of tennis, is a prominent feature of the epoché which characterizes the cognitive style of tennis experiences.

The extent to which the individual is able to fulfill anticipations is another aspect of reality in each finite province of meaning. In the province of tennis, the individual's freedom of discretion in determining the future is similar to that in the everyday world. In neither

province can future events be brought about completely at the discretion of the individual (as they can, for example, in the world of daydreams). Both in the everyday world and in tennis, however, the individual can often determine the likely outcome of events, and planned, purposive actions can help to bring about the future as it is desired and/or expected to be.

Despite these similarities, there is a notable difference between the everyday world and the sport of tennis with regard to the individual's ability to fulfill anticipations. Plans and projects in tennis are generally focused on meeting the relatively narrow objective of the sport. Anticipations commonly refer to the expected movements of the opponent and to the outcomes of individual points and combinations of points. The tennis player's ability to fulfill such anticipations is largely a function of that player's skill in comparison to the opponent's skill. If the player's skill is superior to that of the opponent, then the player has greater control over future events than when the opponent's skill is equal or superior. Thus, anticipations in the sport of tennis are narrowly focused, and the individual's ability to fulfill such anticipations is largely determined by the relative skill of the two players. This reality in the sport of tennis characterizes the cognitive style of the individual's participatory experiences.

In the sport of tennis, factors which determine success take on a different reality than in the everyday world. Family background, wealth, formal academic education, and personal appearance, for example, are valuable in daily life but ineffective in obtaining the objective of a tennis match. Those realities of the everyday world, then, are suspended in the epoché of the province of tennis. Rather, success in tennis is determined by such factors as physical fitness, speed, and skill in the use of a racket and ball. This distinct formula for success in tennis uniquely characterizes its cognitive style.

Another reality of the everyday world is the nature of responsibilities faced by the individual. Generally, such responsibilities involve family, friends, and various superiors and subordinates in the individual's life situation. Within the province of tennis experiences, however, the reality of those responsibilities is suspended. In tennis, the participant is responsible only to the rules, customs, and administrative organization which regulate the conduct of the sport. The epoché of the province of tennis, therefore, includes the suspension of everyday responsibilities in favor of those specific to the legitimate conduct of participatory experiences.

Form of spontaneity

The objective of the sport of tennis is to win the proper number and combination of points with the use of a

racket and ball in certain prescribed ways. The meeting of this objective is the ultimate purpose of the participant's spontaneous behavior. Since participation in tennis involves such purposive, goal-oriented actions in the outer world, it can be concluded that the prominent form of spontaneity in the sport of tennis is that of working action.

Although working action is the primary source of spontaneous experiences in tennis, other forms of meaningful spontaneity also give rise to participatory experiences. For example, the analysis and correction of problems encountered when one's service is repeatedly unsuccessful or one's volley consistently goes into the net requires mental problem-solving, or thinking performance. In addition, thinking takes place in tennis which is neither planned nor goal-directed. Such non-performance thinking may occur, for example, if the player is annoyed by the bright sun while tracking a lob, and momentarily reflects upon sunglasses which were left at home. Thus, thinking performance is an important, if not predominant, form of spontaneity in the province of tennis, and non-performance thinking is a common occurrence as well.

Form of self-experience

By definition, the outcome of a tennis contest is determined by physical skill. Further, the rules and customs of tennis dictate the specific skills and abilities

which are necessary to participate effectively in the sport. The participant's concept of self as tennis player, then, centers on attributes such as speed, conditioning, and specific skills which are associated with successful tennis performance.

In addition to the general experience of self as a tennis player, the participant's concept of self involves those designations created by the administrative organization of the sport. For example, the participant may experience self as an amateur or professional, local or international, unseeded or top-ranked player. Thus, the form of self-experience which characterizes the individual's participatory experiences in the sport of tennis reflects the status of the individual within the overall structure of the sport as well as the goals and demands of each contest.

Form of sociality

In the everyday world, the individual encounters many others who display the same motivational and behavioral patterns. In addition, the others share with the individual the same principal means of communication. In the sport of tennis, however, only the opponent shares the individual's objective, patterns of behavior, and means of communication.

Both players in tennis are bound by the rules, customs, and administrative organization of the sport. Both, then, are motivated by the same goal and use the same general

skills and actions in order to achieve the goal. In this sense, each is the other's peer, and there are no other peers in the contest. Although the identity of the individual's opponent may vary from one match to another, only one opponent is encountered in any particular tennis experience.

The means of communication in tennis are highly restricted in comparison to those of the everyday world. No physical contact occurs between players, and normally few words are spoken. Music, visual art, and other common forms of communication in the everyday world are of no use in tennis. Physical location and bodily movements are the primary means of communication in the sport. By the receiver's location and stance, for example, the server knows that the receiver is ready and the ball can be put into play. In addition, each player may read the opponent's intentions by interpreting the opponent's movements preparatory to executing a shot. A player may even disguise or fake movements in order to cause the other to misjudge what action will follow. These communicating movements, however, primarily involve tennis skills and thus are unique to the sport of tennis. In this way, the specific communications, as well as the forms of communication, in tennis differ considerably from those of the everyday world.

Although the opponent is the individual's only peer in the province of tennis, other persons occasionally perform

peripheral roles in the pattern of sociality. Umpires, line officials, coaches, and other administrators may regulate the conduct of a match. In this case, some verbal and/or nonverbal communication may take place between a player and such an administrator during the course of the contest. The form of sociality in tennis varies somewhat with the presence or absence of such additional, peripheral participants.

Time perspective

The objective of tennis experiences, as well as the required element of physical skill, establishes the primary time perspective as that of the vivid present. This flow of experiences in the intersection of inner time and cosmic time occurs as the individual both thinks and overtly acts with the purpose of meeting the objective of the sport. Although some participatory experiences occur in inner time alone (as when the player plans a strategy for the next service return), the vivid present is by far the predominant time perspective in tennis.

The time perspective described above is similar to that of the everyday world. In addition, there is no distortion of standard units of time in tennis. Experiences in the province of tennis occur in units of time which are consistent with those in the everyday world. There is no

such thing, for example, as superhuman speed (as in the world of daydreams) or juxtaposition of distant periods (as in the world of a stageplay).

Although these aspects of time perspective are consistent in tennis with those in the everyday world, other aspects of time perspective differ in tennis. The boundaries of time, for example, are different. Experiences in the everyday world are temporally bounded by the events of the individual's birth and death. In tennis, however, these temporal boundaries are considerably restricted. A contest commences with the first service and ends when the objective has been met or the match is interrupted by experiences which cast the players back into the everyday world (as when it rains or a player is incapacitated). The individual, then, is aware of a different, closer horizon of time in tennis than in the everyday world.

In addition to the unique temporal boundaries of tennis experiences, the passage of time in tennis is marked by different events than in the everyday world. The progress of a tennis match is measured in points, games, and sets rather than in seconds, minutes, and hours. Although standard time may be superimposed upon a tennis contest, the course of the match from the perspective of the player is determined by the extent to which the objective of the match has been met. Further, the match is ended by the meeting of the objective and not by the marking of a prescribed number

of standard time units. In this way, the time perspective of the cognitive style of tennis experiences is unique.

Space perspective

As in the everyday world, self is the spatial reference point in the province of tennis experiences. Further, space is perceived as three-dimensional, and there is no distortion of space by which sizes or distances would be perceived as inordinately larger or smaller than in the everyday world. These aspects of space perspective in tennis, then, are consistent with those in the everyday world.

In some ways, the space perspective of the province of tennis differs from that of the everyday world. The spatial boundaries of tennis experiences, for example, are unique. As prescribed by the rules of tennis, the ball must be kept in play within the baseline and sidelines of the court. In order to meet the objective of the sport, the player is spatially restricted to the area within a few yards beyond each boundary line. In addition, the net forms a boundary which restricts the player's area of actual physical reach to only half of the total area at a time. When serving, the player is further restricted physically to the area behind the baseline between the center mark and the prescribed sideline for each point.

Despite these physical restrictions, the tennis player is always able to perceive the entire area in which

participatory experiences may occur during the match. Further, the area which is beyond actual physical reach at a given time can be intruded upon indirectly by sending the ball to any point in that area. Indeed, the spatial focus of the player's attention usually consists of locations which are beyond the player's actual physical reach. Thus, the cognitive style of the tennis player's experiences includes a space perspective which is unique to the province of tennis.

Pattern of causality

The sources of causality in the province of tennis are similar to those which are recognized in the everyday world. Purposive, working actions of the player and the opponent are predominant causal forces in tennis. The opponent, in fact, is a very powerful causal source, generally as influential in generating experiences as is the self. Because of the absence of other peers in tennis, however, causality originating with persons other than the opponent is not a factor.

In addition to the two players, other sources of causality in tennis include change and such related factors as the court surface, the wind, and the sun. The luck-of-the-draw may match the player with a more highly skilled, top-seeded opponent, thus affecting the probable outcome of a contest. The court surface may cause an occasional bad

bounce, an unpredictable breeze may carry an otherwise good shot out-of-bounds, and the sun may suddenly peek from behind clouds and unsight a player. Factors such as these, although recognized as influential on occasion, are of only minor importance compared to the players themselves as causal sources. Thus, the pattern of causality which characterizes the cognitive style of tennis experiences is dominated by the actions of the player and the opponent, with only minor influences in addition to those.

Summary

A set of the individual's experiences, all of which share a unique cognitive style, constitutes a finite province of meaning for the individual. According to the definition of sport given in this chapter, each sport includes specified factors which determine for that sport the unique cognitive style of the individual's participatory experiences. It is concluded that the set of the individual's participatory experiences in each sport constitutes a distinct finite province of meaning for the individual. As an illustration, the cognitive style of the individual's experiences in the sport of tennis was discussed.

CHAPTER VI

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Implications

The following points have been established in the preceding chapters:

1. According to Alfred Schutz's theoretical framework, a lived experience occurs as a primal impression in the stream of consciousness, within the individual's inner time frame. As such, it is non-meaningful. When the experience is lifted from the stream of consciousness and constituted as a discrete object of attention, then it is meaningful to the individual. Specifically, the meaning of the experience for the individual lies in the individual's reflective attitude, or conscious stance, toward the experience.

2. The individual's reflective attitude is a function of the point of view of the present moment, or here-and-now, at which reflection takes place. Therefore, the reflective attitude, and hence the meaning of the experience for the individual, is subject to change from one reflective moment to another.

3. An experience may be reflected upon singularly, with its own meaning for the individual at the moment of reflection. Alternatively, the experience may be reflected

upon together with related experiences. The related set of experiences, or configuration of meaning, then takes on for the individual a collective meaning.

4. A finite province of meaning is a set of meaning-compatible experiences. As such, it constitutes a configuration of meaning. Further, a finite province of meaning features a unique, consistent cognitive style.

5. The set of the individual's participatory experiences in any sport (as defined in this study) constitutes a finite province of meaning. Such a set of experiences, then, composes a configuration of meaning with a unique, consistent cognitive style.

Given these points, some implications can now be drawn regarding the individual's participation in a particular sport, and the effect of that participation on the meanings of participatory experiences for the individual.

The meaning of an experience for the individual, i.e., the individual's reflective attitude in attending to the experience, is dependent on the point of view of the here-and-now at which reflection takes place. According to Schutz, "it is from the point of view of the present moment that the shaft of attention is directed backward. . ." (24:73).

This point of view of the moment of reflection includes such factors as the temporal distance of the present moment from the experience being reflected upon (24:74). (The greater this temporal distance, it was shown, the more

reconstruction of the experience is necessary in order to reflect upon it.) The central aspect of the point of view, however, is cognitive style--the individual's conscious stance toward lived experiences in general at the moment of reflection. Schutz stated, "the attitude of the Ego toward life . . . determines in turn its attitude toward the past" (24:73). Thus, the cognitive style of the individual's experiences at the moment of reflection determines the meaning for the individual of the experience (or set of experiences) which is the object of reflection.

Schutz specifically mentioned the effect of the individual's tension of consciousness on the meaning of experiences (24:73). The other aspects of cognitive style which have been discussed also help to determine the meaning of experiences at the moment of reflection. The epoché, form of spontaneity, form of self-experience, form of sociality, time perspective, space perspective, and pattern of causality all contribute to the point of view of the here-and-now. By so doing, they contribute to the reflective attitude and thus to the meaning of any experience which is the object of attention at the moment of reflection.

The cognitive style of the individual's experiences at the moment of reflection determines the meaning of any experience which is the object of reflection. If the cognitive style of any two reflective moments is the same, then the meanings of the experiences reflected upon at

those two moments will have much in common. In this way, consistency in cognitive style from one moment to another results in a large degree of consistency in the meanings of experiences which are reflected upon.

Such a consistency of cognitive style is found within a finite province of meaning. Every finite province of meaning features a cognitive style which not only is consistent from one experience to another, but also is unique to that province. Consequently, every act of reflection within a given finite province of meaning (i.e., which is itself an experience in the finite province of meaning) results in a meaning which is similar to every other meaning realized within that province. Further, those meanings are different in a fundamental way from the meanings which arise from reflective moments in any other finite province of meaning.

The individual frequently experiences life in a particular finite province of meaning (e.g., by attending a stageplay or by playing tennis). By so doing, the individual assumes the particular cognitive style which characterizes experiences in that finite province of meaning. Any acts of reflection within that province, then, occur at moments whose points of view have the corresponding cognitive style in common. The meanings which result from such acts of reflection also have that cognitive style in common. In addition, that aspect of the meanings is

different from meanings which arise within any other finite province of meaning.

Thus, the individual's experience of life in a particular finite province of meaning has a direct effect on the meanings of experiences which are reflected upon within the finite province of meaning. Notably, the participatory experiences themselves (i.e., those which compose the finite province of meaning) are meaningful in a consistent and distinct way when reflected upon during participation. As the individual plays tennis, participatory experiences become the objects of reflection in the course of play. For instance, the player frequently reflects upon both previous points and subsequent, anticipated points in order to plan a successful strategy. The meanings of such participatory experiences when reflected upon during play are largely determined by the cognitive style of the province of tennis. Thus, reflective acts during play result in meanings which have a distinct cognitive style in common. To this extent, the meanings of participatory experiences are predetermined as the individual enters into participation.

When sport experiences are reflected upon during the individual's participation in other finite provinces of meaning, the resultant meanings include the cognitive style of those other finite provinces of meaning. In the province of everyday life, for example, memories of sport experiences

are meaningful from the perspective of the cognitive style of everyday life. The meanings of sport experiences which arise from reflections in daily life have the cognitive style of daily life in common. In addition, they are distinct in that respect from meanings which arise during sport participation or in any other finite province of meaning. Thus, sport experiences have fundamentally different meanings when reflected upon in different finite provinces of meaning.

Conclusions

Answers to the questions addressed in this study can now be stated. First, the set of the individual's experiences in each sport does constitute a finite province of meaning. The individual's tennis experiences, for example, share a unique cognitive style; they are a finite province of meaning for the individual.

Second, the cognitive style of the individual's experiences at any moment of reflection is a component of the reflective attitude and therefore determines the meaning of the object of attention. Reflective acts within any finite province of meaning have the cognitive style of the province in common. The resultant meanings (which are the individual's reflective attitudes) have that aspect in common as well.

Finally, this is true in the various sport provinces as well as in other finite provinces of meaning. In

particular, as the individual participates in a sport, events of that participation are frequently reflected upon as the contest progresses. The meanings which arise from such acts of reflection have the cognitive style of the sport in common. That aspect of the meanings, then, is predetermined as the individual enters into participation in any sport. Further, the meanings of sport experiences vary from one finite province of meaning to another. Sport experiences have different meanings when reflected upon during daily life, for example, than when attended to during sport participation.

The purpose of this study was to initiate an inquiry into the meaning of sport experiences, based on an established theoretical foundation. The study is only a beginning; certainly Schutz's theory can be expanded more fully and applied in greater detail. In addition, studies are needed which approach the topic of experiential meaning from other theoretical bases. Only then can the ultimate contribution of this study be assessed and a truly comprehensive understanding of experiential meaning in sport be reached.

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