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GENERATING A THEORETICAL BASE FOR RESTRUCTURING CURRICULUM CONTENT

The University of North Carolina at Greensboro ED.D. 1979

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GENERATING A THEORETICAL BASE FOR
RESTRUCTURING CURRICULUM
CONTENT

by

Ira Marc Weingarten

A Dissertation Submitted to
the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Education

Greensboro
1979

Approved by

[Signature]
Dissertation Adviser
This dissertation has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

Dissertation Adviser

Committee Members

March 19, 1979
Date of Acceptance by Committee
The purpose of this study is to contribute to an ongoing effort among a number of contemporary curriculum theorists to generate a theoretical base for restructuring curriculum content. The study is divided into a Prologue, two Chapters, and an Epilogue.

PROLOGUE confronts the significant metatheoretical problems that are raised simply by the articulation of this project. In the course of asking "What kind of research strategies, consonant with this intention, are appropriate for educators in North America?" the study reviews the metatheoretical considerations that have led contemporary curriculum theorists to frame such a question. Two avenues of approach that have emerged from such considerations are identified—a personal change position that involves a restructuring of individual consciousness, and a social change position that is oriented towards a restructuring of the ensemble of social relationships. The potentials of these two strategies are explored, and an argument is made for the development of a way of speaking and acting that honors the significance of both.

Chapter I, LIBERAL DOCTRINE AS CURRICULUM CONTENT, begins by presenting the taken-for-granted conception of curriculum content—as-response to the question
"What do we teach in schools?", and the liberal doctrine as integrating the psychological and political avenues of reflection that have been employed to affect that response. The epistemological categories of liberal psychological theory are played off against the human predicament they disclose in the course of establishing a concrete relationship between liberal psychological theory and the problematic quality of individual existence in our time. In addition, the epistemological categories of liberal political theory are played off against the human predicament they disclose in the course of establishing a concrete relationship between liberal political theory and the problematic quality of social existence in our time. Thus, the two avenues of reflection are seen as signalling a particular world that we come up against in life (particularly life-in-schools): "liberal doctrine as curriculum content."

It is argued that liberal doctrine as curriculum content presents us with a fundamentally interpersonal world which, in turn, leads us to construct environments that limit access to inner spaces, masks the impact of institutional communications and diverts the potentialities of collective effort.

In Chapter II, IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRICULUM THEORIZING, the researcher turns his attention to the vast majority of curricularists for whom such inquiry might seem foreign or remote. Section one, The Institution of Education as the Methodology of Liberal
Doctrine: A Perspective on the Curriculum Theorists Situation, draws upon the frame of reference introduced in Chapter I to develop fresh approaches to many of the topics contemporary curricularists are concerned about. Two interlocking predicaments, "making hay" (a contradiction between our intention and practice that leads us to do more) and "searching for the paddle," (an inability to establish a cause-effect relation between educational theory and school practice that leads us to do less) portray the difficulties that contemporary curricularists face. An analogy between the hypothetical-deductive model of inquiry and the bureaucratic structure of the Institution of Education is constructed. An interpretation of "the reading experience" and "the back to basics" sentiment is offered. These heuristics, in turn, are drawn upon to respond to the twin questions "Why curriculum theorizing?" and "Why is it so difficult"? In effect, if the problems educators face are not transparent, if "we understand that we misunderstand," curriculum theorizing is both difficult and necessary. We must pursue it if we are to develop the insight and communicative competence to challenge the institutional life-form, and overcome the predicaments of "making hay" and "searching for the paddle."

Section two of this chapter undertakes a textual analysis of two traditional avenues of approach to curriculum theorizing. This discussion of the work of the Herbartians and Paul Hirst documents the inability of inquiry that starts from the taken-for-granted
conceptualization of curriculum content to shed light upon either the biographical or socio-political limit situations of everyday life—not even in schools.

Finally, a brief Epilogue reviews the contributions of this study and speculates upon the future directions such efforts may take.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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PROLOGUE

My hope for this study is that it can make a contribution to an ongoing effort among a number of curriculum theorists to generate a theoretical base for restructuring curriculum content. I have chosen to focus upon liberal doctrine because it exists as both an ideology that pervades the institutional life of America (especially schools), and as a substantial limit situation that we encounter in our day-to-day lives, and sometimes transcend. This focus permits me, in Chapter I, to review curriculum content in terms of this complex codification in which it is embedded. In Chapter II, I turn my attention to the vast majority of curricularists for whom such inquiry might be regarded as foreign and remote, as I attempt to sketch the implications of my review for the field.

The Prologue is divided into two sections. In section one, I locate the metatheoretical concerns that prompted me to undertake this study in terms of the methodological context of related theoretical efforts in curriculum. This section begins with the metatheoretical overview provided by Richard Bernstein in his book *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory*. While Bernstein is not...
a curricularist, his work is a valuable point of departure for describing and interpreting these complex and profoundly significant efforts. In section two, I focus directly upon the methodology to be employed in this study, in terms of the dilemmas I faced in its preparation, and how I attempted to respond to these dilemmas. As well, I comment upon each section of the study, in the course of providing a step-by-step summary.

Metatheoretical Concerns

Bernstein's Overview

Richard Bernstein brings a very special maturity to the task of building an argument (in both the older sense of a plot or story, and the conventional sense of a rational argument) for *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory*. He envisions:

...a dialectical movement from the advocacy of empirical theory to the realization of the necessity for interpretation and understanding of social and political reality. And finally, there is growing recognition of the need for a type of critique that has a practical interest in the fate and quality of social and political life. The search for empirical correlations, the task of interpreting social and political reality, and the critique of this "reality" are not three distinct types of inquiry. They are three internal moments of theorizing about social and political life.3

While I do not believe that Bernstein achieves a "Hegalian embrace" of the multifaceted voices of mainstream social scientists, language analysts,
descriptive and constitutive phenomenologists, and critical theorists, his attempt is most significant because it assumes a very fundamental insight. In the late 1970's, what shall count as legitimate inquiry in the social and human studies is very much "up for grabs". Bernstein's problem is no longer the polemical one of shattering a false metatheoretical consensus. Rather, he begins by "recovering and articulating the understanding that mainstream social scientists have of their discipline", and proceeds to work through volumes of seemingly diverse and unrelated critiques "attempting to assess their strengths and weakness and to sort out what is right and wrong".

The review of Merton, Smelsor, Homans, Almond, Truman, Rudner and Nagle locates a set of framework assumptions and catagorical distinctions that Bernstein calls "Mainstream Social Science", without reducing this project to a caricature. Nevertheless, he demonstrates that mainstream social science has failed to redeem its promise to provide meaningful theoretical explanations of human behavior that take a deductive form and can be verified by reference to counter-factual explanations of objectively established correlations between independent and dependent variables. He patiently explains how this naturalistic interpretation of human behavior misrepresents
the ways in which we describe, explain and understand human action, effectively freezes out the possibility of normative theory, and is very much wedded to the social and political reality it is attempting to study. At the same time, a variety of "impossibility arguments" are examined and found inconclusive; Bernstein sees no reason to conclude that the idea of a social science is ultimately impossible. Rather, the issue is moral, psychological, and finally political.

In this connection, striking parallels between the work of analytical philosophers such as Louch and Ryan, and descriptive phenomenologists such as Schutz are explored. While purely descriptive studies of practice, forms of life and intersubjective meaning are becoming increasingly sophisticated, and they enable us to see the interpretative schemes that underlie and are presupposed by mainstream social science, they do not succeed in isolating the problems of interpretation from those involved in causation. In effect, "what we judge to be an adequate interpretation of social action is itself dependent upon our understanding of the causal determinants of social action." Moreover, these considerations bring into sharp relief a problematic conception of the role of the theorist that has its origin in Weber, but is shared by main-
stream empiricists, language analysts, and even the more descriptive phenomenologists. The idea that the theorist can and should adopt an attitude that is disinterested, objective and aloof is powerfully challenged. Even a model which simply reflects the commonsense interpretations of everyday life does not allow us to question whether there are distortions or mystifications in persons' self-understanding, and it allows us to mistake what might be relative to a specific historical context for a permanent feature of the human condition. ¹²

It is the European traditions of phenomenology and critical theory that have anticipated, and attempted to respond to this challenge. Bernstein contrasts the approach outlined by Husserl in the *Crises of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* with the more recent efforts of Habermas to develop a social theory of knowledge which includes technical, practical, and emancipatory interests, and a theory of communicative competence that would clarify the epistemological status of critical theory.

He sees Husserl as attempting to recover and fulfill the guiding ideal of *Theoria*. The act of theorizing, properly understood, involves a "conversion" that "frees" the theorist from the layers of myth in which his life is imbedded. In Husserl's self-understanding:
...This means not only that man should be changed ethically (but that) the whole human surrounding world, the political and social existence must be fashioned anew...13

In response, Bernstein comments:

But while Husserl affirms the absolute self-responsibility of man based on genuine theoretical insight and self-understanding, he never succeeds in showing us concretely the intrinsic connections between the life of pure Thoria and its practical efficacy in transforming mankind.14

In Bernstein's treatment, Habermas, on the other hand, is seen as attempting to recover and fulfill the guiding ideal of Praxis, where the pursuit of the good and just life becomes synonymous with the study of politics. According to Bernstein, the theory of cognitive interests is intended to pave the way for such a study.15 Habermas asserts that all knowledge is generated out of the dimensions of human social existence -- work, interaction, and power.16 For example, work is considered a primary dimension of human social existence that refers to ways in which individuals control and manipulate their environment in order to survive.17 It demands an essentially technical "knowledge constitutive interest" in control. Habermas' use of technical here refers to the Greek sense of Techne--the production of artifacts and the mastery of objectified tasks. As expressed in the empirical-analytic sciences (and in disciplines that seek to copy
its style) the technical interest shapes and determines the categories we use to think about things; what we think about and what we consider valid ways of thinking.\(^{18}\) This is the sense in which we can say with Habermas that scientism, the belief that the empirical analytic sciences are synonomous with knowledge, negates praxis. It aspires to provide a set of techniques for managing men that would make any discussion of how the good and just life is to be attained quite irrelevant. Habermas argues that already such discussion (which "takes place" in the dimension of human interaction, and gives birth to the historical/hermeneutical disciplines such as phenomenology which are guided by the practical interest in understanding) has become so distorted that it is increasingly irrelevant to the use of power.\(^{19}\)

This, in turn, threatens theory itself, because, as Habermas understands, theoretical discourse is essentially an intersubjective linguistic process that requires a community of inquirers that are prepared to bracket the constraints of action;\(^{20}\) they must be able to pursue and follow the best argument.\(^{21}\) To the extent to which the technical interest becomes so pervasive that we can no longer determine, concretely, the ways in which social and political institutions distort that dialogue, the self-corrective inquiry that Pierce and Dewey put their faith in (and Habermas regards as a necessary starting point) cannot occur.
Thus, the need for critical theory guided by an emancipatory intention is seen as evident. Freud's psychoanalysis and Marx's critique of ideology have some usefulness as models, in the sense that both involve developing interpretations that are neither irrelevant to, nor reducible to the common sense interpretations of persons struggling to liberate themselves from psychic or political enslavement.22 These analogies can be pushed too far; Habermas is well aware that Freud saw the therapeutic situation as a one-to-one relationship between two unequals, and that what is clear and specific in Marxism has been falsified by historical events. He is merely situating the guiding spirit of critical theory in the activity of an emancipatory self-reflection.23

Bernstein finds serious problems with Habermas, too. But on the whole, he is sympathetic. He does not think that Habermas succeeds in justifying his claim that there are categorically distinct forms of knowledge and inquiry. For example, invoking the concept of "technical interest" does not solve the problem of developing principles to help mainstream scientists resolve conflicting self-interpretations of their work. And while hermeneutics represents a vital tradition in continental thought that might well operate (on the continent) in a "distinctive methodological framework", Bernstein faults Habermas for failing to specify this framework.24
In effect, Bernstein suggests that it would be better to see a continuity—and not a reduction in all forms of inquiry, especially between Hermeneutics and critical theory. Finally, he reminds us that there are still major questions beyond the scope of critical theory and hermeneutics:

In a new form we have the old problem that has faced every critical theorist: under what conditions will persons that have a clear understanding of their historical circumstances be motivated to overcome distorted communication? What are the concrete dynamics of the process?

Contradistinctions: Two Mappings of the Field of Curriculum Theorizing

We find in Bernstein's overview the tools for grasping the fundamental issue that divides curriculum theorists who no longer claim to be "disinterested, objective and aloof", but are desperately searching for forms of inquiry and activity that honor an emancipatory commitment. Perhaps the sharpest way to pose the problem would be to contrast two mappings of the curriculum field. In their contradistinctions, the two mappings reflect a dissonance, and we will see that this dissonance calls attention to the metatheoretical concerns I bring to this investigation. At the same time, the two maps clarify what I take to be a common ground that indicates the distance that has already been traveled from the obtuse metatheoretical argumentation
that has become standard in many of the established disciplines, towards the development of a distinctive style of inquiry and theoretical activity eventually capable of generating a theoretical base for restructuring curriculum content. It is to this journey that the present study is dedicated.

In the preface to a book of readings entitled *Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists*, William Pinar presents a mapping of the field, which he extended and clarified in a presentation to AERA in 1977. In the preface he writes:

In general terms, this process of reconceptualization has three stages. First, a tradition accumulates, and many initiates accept uncritically the values of that tradition. ...Essentially this work is of a technical sort; it is carrying the load of others. To surpass this tradition, the critic is required. His task is complicated and often thankless. It involves learning the language of the heritage, of the masters, in order to be understood. This learning nearly always occurs because the critic comes of age in the tradition; it is through his own usually painful self-education that he comes to realize the difficulties with accepted tradition. Only then does he begin to criticize in hope of rectifying the situation. While the criticism is consciously aimed at his colleagues, the real target lies within him, placed there by his early acculturation. So the effects of criticism are as discomfiting to the critic as to those who are criticized. Yet this second stage is necessary for the third to begin. ...The final stage has just begun in the curriculum field. Some of us have begun to turn our attention from the past (the Tyler tradition and present-day social science) and begun to look to the present and to the future. This stage has meant introducing phenomenology and existentialism to the field,
in order to provide conceptual tools by which we can understand human experience of education... The intellectual foundations of continental philosophy and the experience of life in the United States (specifically in the schools) in this last third of the twentieth century are the two primary "ingredients" of the curriculum field reconceptualized.27

From Pinar's perspective, the political emphasis of the work of Apple, Mann, Burton, Molnar, and some of the work of Macdonald and Huebner, represents a critique of "the past", but is still somehow "absorbed" in it. These "critical reconceptualists" rightly insist that research is an inherently political act. Their situating of curriculum issues in the broad intellectual/cultural/historical currents of 20th century life is applauded. When they write for "school people", as they did in Schools in Search of Meaning, their intention is not to guide curriculum development in the technical sense in which this is usually conceived, but to "raise consciousness", and this too Pinar sees as a decided virtue. The order of critique distinguishes it from the many reform efforts that accept the deep structure of education and social life, and thinks in terms of isolated problems and "great society" solutions; it aspires to critique which insists upon transformation of extant structures.28

All this is embraced, but seen as providing a bridge (albeit a necessary one) from a critique of the old to the creation of the new. It clears the way for the
"post-critical reconceptualists" (eg., Pinar, Schucat-Shaw, Riorden, Grumet, some works of Macdonald, Greene and Huebner) who are directly concerned with finding their own voice, with transforming themselves and their work "from the static, the oppressive, the deformed, to the fluid free process that is historical and individual movement". In the language of phenomenology, existentialism, and imaginative literature, they find ways to share the transformations they undergo, and their theorizing provides "signposts" for those who undertake the effort to liberate themselves from their enslavement and complicity with contemporary conditions.

In contrast, let us look at the mapping James Macdonald outlined for the Curriculum Theory Conference at Charlottesville, Virginia in October of 1975. The schema was only intended to be used for discussion purposes at the conference, but the discussion that it stimulated still continues, and we must see why this is so.

Drawing upon Habermas' framework, Macdonald found it useful to view the field "in terms of the intentions and interests of curriculum theorists". He develops three categories that correspond to the three "knowledge constitutive interests" we discussed above--control theorists, hermeneutical theorists and critical theorists.
The category of "control theory" refers to precisely the same body of curriculum literature as Pinar's categories of traditionalists and present-day social scientists (conceptual empiricists in his designation). Macdonald, as did Pinar, cites Tyler as the exemplar, and refers to the extension of the Tyler Rationale by Goodlad and Richter. Such theory is clearly intended to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of educational (almost always school) activity "by providing rational conceptualizations of the relevant phenomenon from which purposive-rational (i.e., technical) actions may be generated". Both Pinar and Macdonald agree that the work of Frymier and Duncan exemplifies the so-called "scientific" approach to theory construction, which Macdonald also calls "control theory" in the sense that it involves identifying relevant phenomenon and operationalizing events in terms of cause-effect relationships. In effect, both mappings indicate a need to move beyond these kind of approaches. Macdonald lists three general "critiques" of control theory in curriculum, which parallel the arguments we find in Bernstein's review of social and political theory:

1. Control is only one human interest and is not appropriate when taken in the form of a type of rationality and methodology developed in the sciences in relation to non-human objects and applied to human beings.
2. Both scientific and technical control approaches mistake their efforts as being "value-free" and thus cover up a fundamental aspect of curriculum and instruction - the definition and selection of values translated into goals.

3. The control theories are embedded in a social structure in which they can only operate to facilitate a status quo which may well reduce our understanding of the human condition and facilitate the restriction of human freedom and the development of human potential.\textsuperscript{33}

It is in reference to Macdonald's two other categories that we find a considerable disparity. Recall that in the Pinar schema, the work of the "critical reconceptualists" clear the way for the ground-breaking efforts of the "post-critical reconceptualists". Here, the literature that Pinar called "post-critical", Macdonald calls "hermeneutical". The difference is more than semantic. In the Macdonald outline, the work of Pinar, Greene, Riorden, Klohr, as well as Hubner's work with curriculum language is seen as representing intentional attempts to broaden our understanding of being human through "a constant creative search for conceptual frameworks that will reveal through new interpretations a different perspective on the conditions we are concerned about".\textsuperscript{34} This activity is praised for having "opened up" the field, and "laid to rest clearly for thoughtful people"\textsuperscript{35} the adequacy and integrity of control theory. But, in a magnificent metaphor we learn that, for Macdonald, it is the hermeneutical
theorists that provide the transition, and the critical theorists that break new ground. He likens hermeneutical scholarship to midwifery:

...Curriculum theory... is not the midwife helping or bringing the child into the world, but the pregnant mother grunting and groaning, straining and praying during the issue of the child. Without the child and its eventual drawing of its first breath, it is not complete. 36

Macdonald interprets the significance of hermeneutical theory in much the same terms as Pinar views the critical theorist, as "standing back", offering only "philosophical analysis or criticism". It "fails to integrate its theory with its praxis, either in the origination of its consciousness or in its programatic fulfillment". 37 In critical theory, particularly the work of Apple and Mann, Macdonald finds a more significant future direction, one that embodies a more "total perspective":

A curriculum theory, as a critical theory would be predicated upon examining the basic propositions of curriculum as socially and historically located social conventions. It would examine in detail the constraints placed upon the curriculum by the forming of social relations, rewards, and learning expectations in curriculum by economic and occupational interest structures, social class and power structures; and the use of language as distorted by work and power arrangements, as well as the form of language itself. 38

The Issue, The Common Ground, and The Character of My Metatheoretical Concerns

Having introduced these two mappings, I should like to move towards locating the fundamental issue that they
raise. From there I can go one to clarify the meta-
theoretical concerns I bring to this study.

That Macdonald's challenge to the "hermeneutical
theorists" to make explicit the emancipatory intent that
undergrids their inquiry has been taken up by Pinar,
Riorden, Schucat-Shaw, and Klohr (each in their own special
way to be sure), suggests that the contradistinctions
we find in the two mappings may not stem from categorically
different intentions. The dialogue does not seem to
question whether we should build a discipline in curricu-

lum that is solidly emancipatory in intent. Rather, it
seems the question that remains unresolved is "What kind
of research strategies, consonant with this intention,
are appropriate for educators in North America?"

Let me hasten to add that I do not mean to suggest
either that an explicit consensus must be achieved by
curriculum theorists as a prerequisite for generating
a theoretical base for the restructuring of curriculum
content, or that there is not already a discernable
common ground that informs the consideration of the
question. To articulate a common ground that is both
tacit and abstract is risky at best. Nevertheless, our
discussion thus far does provide us with the intellectual
tools for sketching what I take to be a common ground, and
this will help to locate the issue that remains salient.
Macdonald's critique of "hermeneutical theorists" and Bernstein's criticism of Husserl (for failing to show how the "conversion" that "frees" the theorist from the layers of myth in which his life is imbedded connects concretely to the transformation of mankind) suggests that theorizing guided by an emancipatory intent must have a "strategic element" to it. Strategic here refers to some conception of the relationship between theory and praxis. Bernstein's consideration of Habermas indicates that one clear meaning of praxis is associated with the Greek notion of the pursuit of the good and just life. Such a pursuit proceeds pedagogically. Habermas insists that only the power of self-reflection can free human consciousness from dependence upon reified structures. From my understanding of the work of Pinar, Riorden, Shucat-Shaw, and Klohr, I feel confident that there is no disagreement here. What I am suggesting as a common ground is that a consonant strategy involves, minimally, a reflection that aims at authentic "emancipating" insights which in turn are directed towards, or have some utility for initiating, analogous processes of reflection among persons or groups of persons.

Thus, I am also suggesting that the issue which remains salient has a strategic quality to it. It has something to do with two markedly different senses of what Bernstein called "the concrete dynamics of the
...(emancipatory)... process". As he noted, Germanic scholarship does not specify these dynamics. And of course, to specify them would be to render the process technical, and negate the emancipatory potential. On the other hand, the significance of a particular act of theorizing, indeed what makes it curriculum theory and not Germanic scholarship, has to do with the "practical wisdom" the theorist brings to bear upon his/her reflection at its inception. In effect, the theorist must leave the safety and shelter of Germanic texts and meta-critique if she/he is to do curriculum theory, but now the issues that are raised are no longer scholastic, and the map that was stashed for safekeeping in the proverbial back pocket just does not solve the problem of which way to turn (although the map remains indispensable for curriculum theorists to see clearly their own and their colleagues' work in the context of the growth of knowledge in general).

Is the first step on the road to emancipation personal, and does it involve coming to terms with the ways in which the concrete biographical structure is arrested, or is the first step socio-political, and one which involves coming to terms with the basic ways in which institutions are organized and controlled? By theoretical base do we mean, as Michael Apple does, "the necessary preconditions for a politically and
educationally potent program of analysis"\textsuperscript{41} or do we mean, as William Pinar does, "an attempt to formulate in general terms the broad outline of past, present and future, the nature of our experience, and specially our educational experience, that is the way we can understand our present in the way that allows us to move on, more learned, more evolved than before"?\textsuperscript{42}

This, I submit, is the outstanding issue, and it has some very definite methodological consequences. I would like to indicate here what I take some of these consequences to be. The purpose is to share with you the metatheoretical concerns I bring to this study.

In so doing, I do not mean to suggest that curriculum theorists have been blind to the relationship between biographic and socio-political movement. Quite the contrary, despite the often heated controversy that has permeated the atmosphere of virtually every recent gathering of curriculum theorists, I would like to believe that few would want to argue with Macdonald when he said in June of '76:

I do not believe that there is any fundamental contradiction in the long run between those theorists who advocate a personal change position and those who advocate a social change orientation in terms of changing consciousness towards a liberating praxis. This assumes that the social approach does involve a highly structured set of "new" meanings, nor the personal growth approach being structured to a highly individualistic orientation without meaning for communal living. Neither approach need be exaggerated to the point of exclusion of the other.\textsuperscript{43}
However, "the long run" has just begun, and the problem of speaking simultaneously to the two poles of our concern remains.

For example, Apple would have us begin our theoretical reflection by positing a conceptual whole, which he calls Hegemony:

(Hegemony) is a whole body of practices and expectations; our assignments of energy, our ordinary understanding of man and his world. It is a set of meanings and values which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming..."44

"Analyzing Hegemony" proceeds by "situating" the school as an institution, the knowledge forms, and the educator him or herself as constitutive parts of this whole.45 Such a research program has undeniable value for educators who are concerned with generating a theoretical base for restructuring curriculum content. The scope of phenomenon it can potentially comprehend is enormous. Surely one criterion for an adequate theoretical base must be its scope. Without an adequate appreciation of the scope of the project, efforts to restructure curriculum content run the decided risk of becoming exercises in self-delusion. And this research strategy presupposes that any effort to restructure curriculum content can be authentic only in so far as it is total, embracing all aspects of society and all dimensions of human existence.
Here we locate not only a strength, but also a definite weakness. The kind of totality it requires people to conceive is hopelessly abstract and literally all-encompassing. This makes it extremely difficult to separate the light from the darkness. The concept "hegemony" has no substantial, emotive, viscerally compelling character to it. While it may well be a concept that can name the whole we live through, it requires us in the Apple formulation to disassociate ourselves from this lived experience in order to make it intelligible and politically potent. Moreover, the concept hegemony was not built from the language forms that Americans live through in their everyday lives, but superimposes a foreign, and I fear, a very distant vocabulary, although surely a more conceptually adequate one. I am very much concerned about the potential of this new vocabulary to resonate with people's own meaning structures. Suppose we succeed in situating people in this abstraction, training their analytic capabilities to unpack the dense web of political, economic, and social relations of which it is composed, and to chart these relationships in an intellectually responsible way. Surely we would develop a new tradition of sophisticated and important scholarship, and I do not wish to demean this possibility. But I wonder what these people would find in their own lives, and in the world they have
turned into a monstrous abstraction, to affirm, and yes, to love. How successful would they be in "initiating analogous processes of self-reflection", in entering into other peoples' lives, if the insights they brought with them took on such a foreign structure? How would one say, in this new vocabulary, "I love the world, just the way it is, and this is why I want to change it"? Would one forget?

Pinar, on the other hand, might have us begin by:

Likening ourselves to the situation of campers, sitting around a campfire at night. What is close at hand is reasonably illuminated, though the light by which we see flickers, altering continually our perceptions. We look outwards, attempting to see the broader contexts in which we sit. For some feet we can see clearly, but then our view quickly dims. We see shadows at the edge of the lights sphere, then deepening darkness. We know more is there but given our light, given our perspective, we cannot see it.46

From this frame, the act of theorizing is built out of the attempt of each to find his/her focus, his/her fireplace. The method of Currere is one "re-search" strategy for the cultivation of voice and vision. It involves the use of texts to stimulate biographical movement. The "re-search" cycle is regressive (a "re-view" of the biographic past), progressive (a dwelling in future states), analytical (a description of the biographic present, and an analysis of the three "photographs") and synthetical (a reconceptualization of the present situation). 47 What emerges is a story
to be shared with the other "campers", a story of one individual's reconceptualization of his/her own experience:

I no longer see what it is I see as I saw it, and it is because one I see differently, and two what is seen is different (his underlining).48

For example, Pinar's efforts up to this point amount to a re-conceptualization of "the individual". First, the attempt to recover one's own biography leads to an insight into the necessity of restructuring curriculum content to honor the integrity of biographic meanings. And second, institutions (especially so-called educational ones) are seen through a new light, in terms of the contradiction between the abstract images of reality that people carry around in their heads and use to repress themselves and oppress each other, and the concrete biographic experience of these people as they struggle to live through the dehumanizing structures of their sociality.49 This "re-search" strategy is political in the sense that it involves a new kind of relationship among "the campers" (let us call them university-based curriculum theorists). Truly hearing another's story (or his "case study") requires something more than a tolerant acceptance of "different points of view". It means not only that I accept this storyteller as he is, but that I confirm history; in myself, and then in him. I respond to those moments
wherein the story discloses, no matter how inchoately, what "the other" is meant to become. Pinar calls the political dimension of Currere "cell work", and I think the image is apt. The stories are meant to uncover, in part, our concrete personal participation in the web of present-day political, economic, and cultural structures, and how our maintenance of and complicity with these structures holds us back both biographically, and historically. Thus, Currere gets at the use of the theorist's work, its biographic function, and is oriented towards developing the kind of clarity it takes to resist the pressures to use one's work, however unconsciously, in historically regressive ways.

Once again, it is clear that this re-search strategy also has undeniable value for educators who are concerned with generating a theoretical base for restructuring curriculum content. Surely we must have a body of theory that resonates with personal meanings. The kind of insights that have potential for making a significant difference in other peoples' lives are often the ones that have made a significant difference in our own. Not to acknowledge the biographic context of our work is tantamount to confessing a communicative incompetence that is bound to rub off on our students and colleagues, and can sink the whole project in its contradiction. Liberation signifies not a body of
theory, but an intensely human struggle to which the theory is dedicated. When the voice of such theory no longer resonates with the context of personal struggle and concern it makes a mockery of its intention.

Nevertheless, I have become increasingly concerned about the methodological limitations of the biographical strategy. Biographic distress is but one index of our historical situation; self work is but a partial response.

What strikes me most about the metaphor of the campfire, is that the "fireplace" is both ultimately, and quite concretely, communal. Among those who believe the meaning of existence to be disclosable in the relation of the individual to his self, liberation becomes a liberation from the world and not a liberation of the world. Such a project adds little to the communal fireplace; such a focus is flawed. Pinar, I believe, recognizes this when he writes:

It is unavoidable, given our fasticity, that is given our membership in the species, alive in the present historical era, that to some extent, in some way, this center circle, oneself, is in fact unsatisfactory.\textsuperscript{51}

However, I see this recognition that in the most profoundly concrete sense we share the same fate, the same human condition, as a powerful reminder that, ultimately, it is a mistake to view the "I" that is Ira Weingarten-in-his-uniqueness as the methodological center
of the universe. It would be irresponsible to substitute a focus on the individual in his "running of the course" (Currere) for a focus on "the course to be run" (Curriculum). The latter is most assuredly not reducible to the former. While it would be monstrous if, in our concern for scope, we contributed to the relegation of the individual to an appendage of a social-political order, it would be tragic if, in our concern for resonance, we contributed to an equally powerful historical tendency towards the primacy of individual existence and towards its self-glorification.

On The Methodology to be Employed in This Study

This section presents a guide to the study, from the mind set in which it was framed through the various subsections in which it is cast.

I brought to this study a twin concern: scope and resonance. It was clear to me that to honor both concerns would involve interfacing the ideas and commitments of the "critical theorists" and the "hermeneutical theorists" in some intellectually and pedagogically responsible way. While the metatheoretical investigations of Bernstein and Habermas helped immeasurably, I could find no clear exemplar in the literature. I concluded that the tone that I wanted to establish would have to be of my own making, and that I
would have to begin by setting a number of more or less arbitrary limits.

Scope was uppermost in my mind throughout most of the months of reading, organizing, story telling and listening that proceeded the actual writing. I came across the concept "hegemony" early on in the process, and regarded it as the most fruitful concept to emerge from the critical tradition, as it had begun to impact upon thinking in Curriculum. Yet, for reasons indicated above, I was dissatisfied with this conception. Rather than using the concept as a point of departure for my writing, it became a conscious limit for my reflection. I was prepared, if I had to, to sacrifice some scope for a pattern of explanation that would have, I hoped, more pedagogical integrity to it (i.e., resonance). The limitation I set was both experimental and substantial. The moment my reflections began to take me outside of the pattern of relationships I was living through and trying to grasp, I consciously "cut them off", and struggled to find a more intimate, value-laden way to make sense of how we live together in America.

I turned my attention outward. Through personal connections and various work activities, I sought to make a fresh start in understanding the terms by which other persons were making sense of the world they lived in, in the hope of finding the most meaningful terms
with which I could initiate and contribute to this profoundly significant activity. My decision to, in effect, substitute "liberalism" for "hegemony" as a conceptual focus was the outgrowth of this experience. There were many reasons for this decision, some more conceptually compelling than others, some based almost purely upon intuition and others having to do with many of the meta-theoretical concerns I have already shared, but here I will try to reconstruct my rationale.

First, my experience helped me to recognize that liberalism as an ideology pervades the schools. I also recognized that this may or may not be a conceptually compelling reason to focus upon it. There are undoubtedly other ways of characterizing the world view of teachers and students in school. What began to persuade me of the potential of this approach was that the word "liberal" seemed to have meaning and significance for people. Teachers seemed to understand themselves as more or less "liberal". Students seemed to perceive their teachers as more or less "liberal". While no two persons I met used the word in the same way, and I eventually abandoned the idea of beginning the study with an attempt to define the concept in terms of the multifaceted meanings people seemed to evoke by its expression, it was clear that the term carried with it a host of value-laden associations that when viewed
in their entirety presents a picture of life in America that surely does not lack for scope. However, this line of thought left me with a considerable conceptual problem. The bulk of contemporary political thinkers regard liberalism as an explicit political allegiance, not a form of life. And, it would have been impossible for me to continue had I not come across, quite by accident, a very special book that helped me to overcome this problem—Roberto Unger's *Knowledge and Politics*. Unger's treatment of liberal doctrine provided me with the intellectual categories for fusing the language of liberalism with the deep structure of contemporary social life. Now, finally, I was convinced that my project was viable intellectually.

A second, but related reason for focusing upon liberalism was that the meanings engendered by its usage seemed to conform to the same pattern in every institutional context I investigated. At this point, I had begun work as a labor organizer, and had also begun to deepen my reading on liberalism. I found that as I began to crack this complex codification intellectually, and began to get a sense of what the liberal theorists of the enlightenment were up to, there was an immediate pay-off in my work. As the petition campaign of the union began to move into full swing, it set in motion a very productive relationship between the kind of practical
insight such work can engender, and the theoretical insight that came from my critical reflection upon the history of liberal thought. I found in my union organizing that it was sometimes hard to "break the ice" with workers who were naturally suspicious of my University background. My theoretical understanding of liberalism was of immeasurable value in breaking the ice that seemed to separate me from the workers I was trying to organize.

This brings me to a third reason for focusing upon "liberalism" as opposed to "hegemony". One of the problems of working with critical theory is that it becomes very difficult for theorists to validate their interpretations. As Bernstein recognizes, critical interpretations are not reducible to the common sense interpretations of person's self-understanding of their everyday life, but neither can they be irrelevant to it. In the end, the choice between liberalism and hegemony came down to a choice between the two spheres of validation that are appropriate to two different "levels" of critical theorizing. Habermas, for example, in exploring the epistemological foundations of critical theory, hopes to develop "true statements (critical theorems) that can stand up to rational discourse". Habermas makes a clear distinction between such discourse and action. Indeed he says "discourse
requires the virtualization of constraints upon action". By that he means that the function of critical theory, qua "theory" is to provide "true statements" about social reality. These kinds of statements can only be validated among those who are able to bracket the constraints of action and are free to pursue the best argument possible. In other words, there is a level of critical theorizing whose concrete referent is an enlightened community of scholars. I suspect that working from a relatively established "critical theorem" such as Hegemony in the way in which Apple describes can result in a number of middle-range conceptualizations of this type. However, critical theory also has another function which Habermas calls "the organization of processes of enlightenment" (by enlightenment here, Habermas means emancipation). This second function has both a theoretical and practical dimension to its reflection and its validation. In effect, we can say that here critical theorizing mediates between theory and praxis. The explanations it develops refer to "processes of reflection carried on within certain groups towards which such processes are directed". Bernstein, in discussing Habermas' distinction between these two levels of theorizing, attempts to clarify what "critique" means in this second context:
Critique... (becomes) .. a form of "therapeutic knowledge" -- not in the debased sense so characteristic of contemporary fashions, but in the classical sense of paideia (education) directed to the cultivation, formation, and "turning" of the human psyche.

In other words, critique that is directed to "the organization of processes of enlightenment" is validated partially by rational discourse ("Are the basic concepts historically accurate?"; "Can they have meaning for people outside the situation from which they have emerged?", etc.), and partially by those persons or groups to whom the critique is directed. It seemed to me that what Bernstein called "therapeutic knowledge" was what I was after, and that focusing upon liberalism could provide me with a way of partially validating the interpretations I was beginning to develop at the early stages of this investigation. The focus on Liberalism provided me with a language that did indeed directly contribute to a process of enlightenment that I was attempting to initiate. While most of the concepts of critical theory with which I was familiar from my readings could not be validated in this sense because their mere utterance turned off people in droves, the new interpretations I was developing could be sculptured by this experience. Many of the subsections in Chapter I (that I will describe shortly) are based upon explanations that emerged from this experience. I am convinced that
explanations of the sort I have tried to introduce in this study do have potential for "the organization of the processes of enlightenment".

As I moved towards the writing process, the concern for resonance became more pronounced. Armed with an emancipatory intent, and a set of meta-theoretical concerns for the field of curriculum theorizing, I had immersed to myself in an historical time, which I came to recognize by its liberal "grammar". How was I to reconstruct my reflective and practical experience in a way that was consonant with my intention and concerns? Essentially this involved me in a consideration of the relationship between wholes and parts and the problem of perspective.

My experience formed a biographic/historical "whole". The "grammar" of liberal doctrine had encircled me, as anyone who tried to talk with me once the writing began in earnest can surely attest. However, my concern was not for this whole per se, but for the dialogical process by which it was formed and its potential to build more meaningful wholes in the future. To honor these concerns, I would have to blend a narrative voice with a more insistent theoretical voice. The narrative voice would reconstruct the whole in terms of its related parts, and the theoretical voice would indicate how the parts both enlarged and challenged the whole
and eventually could lead us to a deeper one. I could use the first person point of view and active voice to introduce each major movement (or part), speaking directly to the reader and setting off this sort of communication from the main body of the narrative. As well, this kind of direct communication could be used at the conclusion to get some distance from the narrative, and to help both me and the reader to see some implications that would not otherwise be visible.

Chapter I: Background and Commentary

This became the methodological outline for Chapter I. The introduction begins with a diffuse, abstract whole—the taken-for-granted conception of curriculum content-as-response to the question "What do we teach in school?", and the liberal doctrine as integrating the psychological and political avenues of reflection that have constituted that response. The rest of the introduction is concerned with specifying, in non-technical language, what it is I am trying to achieve in this Chapter, and providing an anticipatory meditation upon the liberal consciousness that is intended to provoke the reader.

In section two, the narrative begins. Here the epistemological categories of liberal psychological theory (the narrative voice) are played off (by the theoretical voice) against the human predicament they
disclose. This part of the narrative is meant to establish a concrete relationship between the categories of liberal thought and the quality of individual existence in our time. Thus, a part of the original, abstract whole (the use of psychological theory as an avenue of reflection that responds to the question "what do we teach in schools?") becomes an enlarged "concrete" whole, which offers a visceral challenge to the original one.

Section two forms the theoretical heart of this study. The discussion of political man (pages 62, 63) is pivotal. Much of the discussion to follow depends upon the interpretation of liberal theory as an abstracted psychology. The distinction between encounter and meeting (pages 63, 64) provides a personal index for locating the limit situations of liberal doctrine. Out of this is developed a paradox that is both personal and political, and is the key to understanding how we can (at least partially) challenge this whole in our every day life. The discussion of contracts (pages 66-67) is useful in understanding how we confuse interpersonal situations with political ones, in a way that dishonors both. The juxtaposition of the theoretical voice, which is attempting here (pages 69-74) to demythologize the intellectual edifice of liberal political theory, with a narrative voice that provides
a series of panoramic images of the American political
and pre-political scene, is meant to move the narrative
deeper and deeper into the relationship between the
categories of liberal political thought and the quality
of social existence in our time. Once again, a part of
the original whole (the part political reflection plays
in responding to the taken for granted conception of
curriculum content) has been enlarged, and serves to
challenge the original whole, but now the "visceral
grounds" for this challenge are at once psychic,
ethical, political, and theological (and along the way a
number of interpretations have been introduced that can
be used to help us make this challenge). On page 74,
the first person usage is employed to break the descent,
and to begin a process of reconstruction that is meant
to point towards a more meaningful whole. The discussion
of institutional communications (pages 74-79) attempts to
integrate many of the themes that have emerged, and
bring them to bear on an interpretation of this life-form
and the threat it poses to "the persistence of the human
presence". The reconstruction begins in earnest on page
79, where the conceptualization of liberal doctrine as
curriculum content, latent all along, begins to be
brought out into the open. The discussion of intention-
ality (pages 80-86) is primitive but insights into the
relationship between private and public world, particular-
ly the insights of Arendt (pages 83, 84), provide perhaps the strongest challenge to liberal doctrine this study presents. Her vision has been an inspiration to me, and her interpretive framework can be quite powerful practically. The interpretation of method (pages 87-93) is significant to the extent that it considers this category in a constitutive way, and perhaps can help us understand why curriculum theorists are so properly concerned with methodological critique. Method becomes both a psycho-social (how we go about doing what we do) and an historical (the historically specific way in which experience translates itself into forms of symbolism and substance) category. Thinking this way about method calls my attention to the fundamental methodological reconstruction that would be necessary to move us beyond the liberal constellation, and the strategic role curriculum theory might be able to play in this process. The interpretation of context brings this chapter to a summation. Three contexts are posited and briefly noted. The first is the brute reality of the buildings we occupy, but never seem to notice. In mentioning this, I try to move the reader outside of these buildings, and I ask that we grasp the panorama of physical structure, humanly constructed, that surrounds us. The second context is meant to take the reader back inside to appreciate the full context of presence. This "full
context" is potentially more than just the curriculum content that is evoked by liberal doctrine, much more than what could have been made present by this narrative. Thus, I employ the first person usage again, to step back from what has been developed here, and draw together the parts in a more meaningful whole. This whole is portrayed in terms of three interrelated, contiguous dimensions of curriculum content. I am suggesting that while we may encounter most situations as interpersonal, there are always at least two other dimensions of curriculum content (intrapersonal and socio/political) for us to draw upon, present as possibility. Each dimension is distorted to some degree, and indeed to some degree this might be a constitutive element of the human condition. While these concepts are not developed in the body, I should like to affirm here my faith that movement is possible to the extent that we conjoin the dimensions in our praxis. Even within the present historical era, the potential is staggering. The old culture must be synthesized, concretized, and miniaturized to become "the curriculum" in the still invisible new age.

Chapter II: Background and Commentary

Having come through the circle, my attention turned towards the curriculum field, towards the 70 or 80% for whom the reconceptualization is perhaps interesting and
quaint, but distant. However, this would mean leaving something very important "up in the air" -- the epistemological status of the dimensions of curriculum content. And I hesitated, not knowing which way to turn. To turn back into the top of the spiral that is Chapter I, and attempt an explicative reconstruction of the dimensions seemed important, though I wasn't quite sure how to do it. On the other hand, with my immersion in the liberal doctrine still fresh in my mind, it seemed a unique opportunity to speak to the questions "Why curriculum theorizing?", and "why is it so difficult?", in terms of the contexts that most curricularists are concerned about: schools as institutions, the back-to-basics sentiment, school reform and so forth. And if my concern for resonance had really paid off, I should be able to generate interesting, insightful and fresh approaches to the topics, I reasoned optimistically. Moreover, the two questions were and are important to me; indeed I have never met a curriculum theorist who is not plagued with them every so often, so it was not a choice between performing a service and undertaking a labor of love.

I will not attempt to rationalize the choice I made in esoteric methodological terms, although I did at the time (at least to myself). I needed to begin to address myself to curricularists who are not "critical theorists"
or "hermeneutical theorists", to try out a number of interpretations that followed from my earlier exploration and might have some potential for communicating with this broader audience, to establish a starting point for engaging in professional communication with this audience some time in the future. As well, I feared that I was not ready to actually construct a "new curriculum theory" (indeed I'm still not sure what form such a theory should take), although I believed I was ready, able, and indeed anxious to distinguish my viewpoint from others.

Faced with this dilemma, I decided to divide Chapter II into two sections, each quite different in tone and approach. In section one I would address the twin questions "Why curriculum theorizing" and "Why so difficult", and experiment with interpretations, drawn from the narrative of Chapter I, that I hoped might have some potential for communicating with a broader context of curricularists. In section two, I would focus on significant texts, and critique them both in terms of each other, the broad body of understandings that Chapter I has generated, and the dimensions of curriculum content (but only to the extent that they had already been articulated).

Section one begins by establishing the change of tone and perspective. Two predicaments are introduced (pages 96,97); "making hay" and "searching for the
paddle". The relationship with Chapter I is established directly thereafter (indeed to emphasize this connection I employ it in the title of this section). In effect, I am suggesting that, with respect to the simple context of raw, man-made physical structuring, the institution of education (all the elementary, secondary, colleges, and universities) can be profitably interpreted through the category of liberal methodology. This point of departure permits me to construct an analogy (pages 99-101) between the hypothetical-deductive model of inquiry (the process of mainstream science as ideal type and the bureaucratic structure of the Institution of Education. This sort of interpretation is obviously not as sophisticated as what could have been achieved by a systematic analysis of the problem, (as for example in the work of Apple and Feinberg in this country, Young in England, and Bourdieu in France). It would be irresponsible to push this analogy too far, but I think it has a great deal of heuristic value. Similarly, while the interpretation of the reading experience (pages 102-104) provides a powerful connection between the concerns of Chapter I and the very concrete concerns of the broad context of our profession, I regard the interpretation as heuristic, nothing more -- but a richly potent one probably worth extending a bit further before it would break down. The point of view I take
on the "back to basics" phenomenon (pages 104-106), and it is no more than a point of view and not an analysis, is valuable and revealing and built directly out of the discussions of the first chapter. On page 106, I employ first person usage again to break this pattern of interpretive experiment, and begin a reconstruction that draws upon these interpretations and attempts to integrate them with the whole body of Chapter I, for the purpose of responding to the twin questions "Why curriculum theorizing?" and "Why so difficult?". Basically I indicate that the problems as they are understood by all parties concerned are not transparent (we understand that we misunderstand), and therefore curriculum theorizing is just as significant as it is difficult. We must pursue it if we are to challenge the institutional life-form, and ever hope to overcome the predicaments of "making hay" and "searching for the paddle".

I feel the body of section 2 is sufficiently clear, and a step-by-step summary would be superfluous. However, some general comments are in order.

In selecting texts, I began with two general considerations. First, I wanted to chose works that had not been categorized by Macdonald or Pinar, or for that matter by myself in a Preliminary Statement I prepared several years ago. The reasoning was simple. In this section I do not, either by implication or design, want
to place texts in one category or the other, or in one schema or the other. I do not want to map the field, I simply want to shed light on the understandings this study has generated. I am presuming that this study enables me to see with more adequate eyes, and I did not want past biases to interfere. This consideration eliminated approximately thirty texts. The other consideration was more qualitative. I wanted to chose works that were of obvious high quality. The reasoning here is also simple. In this section I am concerned with avenues of approach and not intellectual competence.

The search process was informal. I examined scores of books, articles, monographs, but the moment I came across The Proceedings of the National Herbart Society, the first choice was made. In making this choice, there is an implicit statement I ought to clarify. Conventional wisdom has it that the publication of Franklin Bobbits' The Curriculum in 1918 signifies the beginning of the field. This is correct in the sense that before this era, curriculum was not a self-conscious area of professional specialization. However, there is a limit to what we can learn from recognizing men such as Bobbit, Charters, and Snedden as the founders of the field.
In Macdonald's terms, we might just simply say that their work no longer forms a point of departure for thoughtful curricularists. Indeed, from a geneological point of view, I have my doubts as to whether these men are our "Fathers", if you will. Others who have pursued this question far deeper than I have yet to establish this hunch either way. My point is simply that in a time of reconceptualization, it is especially appropriate to review our origins.

I have found much that is unquestionably significant in the early proceedings of the National Herbart Society (1895-1898). While section two critiques this body of theorizing in terms of the understandings that have been developed in this study, I've tried to indicate how delightfully surprised I was to find much in Herbartian thought that does offer a legitimate point of departure for curriculum theorists that do not accept everything I've had to say here. It should be noted that I address myself to the proceedings purely as an intellectual codification, and do not deal with the historical context of the 1890's. As well, I present a consensus view generalized from my readings of the presentations and debates. I do this so that I can treat this work as a body of theory. I believe this is fair, and not just a fabrication of my own mind. I recognize that while all Herbartians seemed to be aware of the language of
correlation and concentration, some believed in correlation, others concentration. I don't treat this as an issue, but simply as two options within a general framework. The same is true for Charles McMurray and Dewey's famous dispute over the pedagogical significance of the "cultural epoch hypothesis."

The second text I chose, Paul Hirst's *Knowledge and the Curriculum*, did not even come from my library search, but was originally suggested by a member of my committee (Dr. James B. Macdonald). I must say that I had never heard of Hirst before that, and I was immediately fascinated and frustrated by his thought. Hirst represents perhaps the most careful, respectable, "traditional" approach to curriculum thinking. What struck me most was the contrast between Hirst and the Herbartians. This contrast helps to clarify the point of view this study advocates, and the four-way conversation (Weingarten on the Herbartians, the Herbartians on Hirst, Weingarten on Hirst, Weingarten on the Herbartians and Hirst) indicates the distance that must yet be traveled to claim the promise of this point of view.

My final comments are confined to conclusions I consider essential. The Epilogue is brief, expressing my conviction that there is much left to be done, for we have only begun to scratch the surface.
CHAPTER I
LIBERAL DOCTRINE AS CURRICULUM CONTENT

Introduction

Until quite recently, it has been widely acknowledged that the decisive question for curriculum workers is "What is to be taught in schools?" and that in responding to this question, we locate what can be called the "content" of the curriculum. In the process, questions of a psychological and political nature have been raised, and although consensus has never been attained when educators try to determine which of these two avenues of reflection deserve priority, their patterns of language usage make clear an otherwise hidden assumption that these avenues are somehow related.

Not surprisingly, the nature of their relationship has seldom been treated as an object of conscious reflection. To do so, it would be necessary to recognize, perhaps as Roberto Unger does in Knowledge and Politics, a stream of accessible, critical understanding that bridges the distance from the study of knowledge to the understanding of separate persons and their conduct, from the understanding of persons to the study of society, and from the study of society to the exercise of political choice. Here in Chapter I, I will suggest that liberalism,
both as a philosophical system that has its roots in Newton and Hobbes, and as a kind of psychological and political agenda that is still very much with us, has provided the field with just this sort of an understanding in the past, an understanding that must be considered by those who would seek revision, reform, reconceptualization or even revolution.

Before we begin, it would help if what is meant by the expression "accessible, critical understanding" could be rendered somewhat more comprehensible. Von Wright (as quoted in Stake) does an excellent job of distinguishing between understanding and explanation. He writes:

understanding is also . . . as empathy . . . connected with intentionality in a way that explanation is not. One understands the aims and purposes of an agent, the meaning of signs and symbols, and the significance of a social institution or a religious rite.2

The meaning of understanding is surely not the same as that of explanation. But to truly get to the heart of the matter, it is essential to distinguish, as well, between understanding and comprehension.

While I was coming of age in Brooklyn, my mother did a most thorough job of informing me of this non-trivial distinction. If I had managed somehow to fail to meet her sense of my responsibilities on a given day, she would waste little time in describing for me what I had
done, or not done, and providing some instruction for the future. Oftentimes, these evaluative moments would conclude as follows:

"Now in the future, you are to ___, ___; verstehen?"

Believe me, before I felt ready to respond "versheten" (the Yiddish form for the German verstehen, which translates as "understand" in English), I would realize that what was required here was not a simple intellectual comprehension. Rather, the demand was for something approaching a "standing-under"; I was being asked to join my mother underneath the verbiage and truly stand with her. More than an agreement to apply for general instructions to upcoming circumstance, "standing-under" transformed my tacit meaning structures. I was left with a markedly different sense of these circumstances when I came up against them.

So my expression of an intention to approach an accessible, critical understanding makes at least three demands. First, an understanding is accessible if it can be made present for another. In this case, my hope is that you will achieve some understandings while experiencing this first chapter that are roughly consistent (though surely not identical) with those that I have achieved while thinking through what I have written.

Second, an understanding becomes critical when it is experienced as somehow important, evaluative, and not
without consequence for one's action in the world. In this case, the interpretation of liberal doctrine is critical in another sense as well. Realizing that the sheer scope of liberalism would place a life-time demand upon anyone who felt competent to attempt an exhaustive interpretation, I have quite consciously selected what I have chosen to focus upon. It is hoped that my critical selection of elements, motifs, and ideas from an almost infinitely dense liberal constellation will, upon your inspection, do more to clarify than to distort. Third, as the title of this chapter suggests, I do see a rather significant relationship between liberal psychological and political theory and the content of our curriculum. Thus, the third demand is that this connection that I see, which will require not only an interpretation of liberal doctrine but also a rather special conceptualization of curriculum content, will become present for you in some way as you experience this first chapter. This is a tall order, but I hope to fill at least some of it.

Finally, some clarification of how I use the expression "liberal doctrine" might facilitate a more integrated experience for those of you who decide to follow this inquiry through until its conclusion. In thinking about liberal doctrine, I found it prudent to ground my critique in the inquiry rules and emotive patterns which
locate themselves in "paradigmatic microcosm" through the work of Newton and Hobbes. To put it another way, if liberalism could be responsibly portrayed as an intellectual framework that has, or has had a certain currency, it would be plausible and perhaps defensible to simply identify the main ideas. Presumably then, curriculum theorists would, could or should pick and choose among the main ideas, and having made some judgement as to their conceptual and pedagogical fitness, they might be called upon in the pages to follow to exercise their scholarly discernment, or perhaps even their sense of civic or spiritual responsibility in preparing these ideas for presentation to the young in school. I assure you, this is not what I intend to say here. The more I have experienced, reflected, read, and worked, the less sense this kind of practice seems to make.

If I may be allowed to make the zealot's mistake of anticipating the afterward in the midst of the forward, I would relate that the "private" fascination which carried me through this work was with the liberal consciousness, as opposed to present-day social policy decisions or second-order reflections upon the esoteric of utilitarianism. If there is to be any meaning in the evocation of a liberal consciousness (and I do not know if there must be), it would seem to lie in the image of a consciousness that denies itself -- epistemologically,
axiologically, viscerally -- actually. One way to approach an understanding might be to comprehend the liberal consciousness in two moments. It seems to present itself as simultaneously affirmative, prescriptive, universalistic, and pessimistic, relativistic and particularistic. The paradox begins to resolve if we take cognizance of liberalism's checkered history. The affirmative moment recalls the early efforts of Newton, Hobbes, Locke, Jefferson, Kant, and a score of others. The spirit that triumphed over feudalism, papism, and irrationalism, established constitutional government and a rich bourgeois culture, has not entirely disappeared. It manifests itself "affirmatively" as a consciousness that comprehends "situations" as a set of dilemmas that reasonable people should struggle to resolve, in the context of preserving for themselves and their posterity a sense of human dignity and a framework of republican procedure. This quality of reasonableness, and faith in the ability of free individuals to fashion a morally enlightened science and technology has provided the liberal with continued, but surely less frequent and more episodic opportunities for affirmation and recognition. However, the original triumph carries with it, as well, the seeds of later distress and present-day anguish. While transparently successful in fashioning a social organization and protestant elan that encouraged a more
generous development of individual thought and action, the basic liberal understandings have by no means formed a set of universal principles that all people freely choose. It is most decisively unclear that this rigorous discipline, the liberal version of enlightenment, has been the path selected by many of those whom the liberals like to take credit for enfranchising. This may, in part, account for the underlying pessimism of a consciousness that, on the one hand, has upon occasion evidenced a capacity for sympathy and tolerance for what it considers its progeny. Often to the point of relativizing its essential commitments, yet at the same time it has evidenced a decided tendency to reject, renege, and submerge itself and its enemies in a sea of marshmallow and arsenic . . . .

But I have already said too much and it's time to let the body speak for itself.

**Liberal Psychological Theory**

Although liberalism has been vitally concerned with "the integrity of the individual", liberal theory does not approach the person directly. Rather, as F. S. C. Northrup has so ably demonstrated, the liberal conception of man emerges from the attempts of Hobbes and Locke to systematically develop the philosophical consequences of modern physical science. Thus, in our attempt to
recover the liberal psychology, we must proceed, as liberalism does both historically and phenomenologically, from a pre-existent, scientifically necessary world to inquire about the status of the observer who lives in it.

We begin by imagining the world as a system of colorless, odorless objects. These objects exist in a single public space that is the same for everyone, regardless of what we might perceive, think, or desire. They are in perpetual motion, bouncing into each other in this way or that, existing in a single public time as a succession of events. The motion is not random, but the laws that govern, or that we suspect govern the relationships between object-events are just as separate from the events themselves, or the objects they represent, as they are from our perception of them.4

Here, in a nutshell, is the frame of reference that liberal psychological theory presupposes. The virtues of the Newtonian system, the release it promised from religious dogmatism and passing fancies, were seized upon and extended into the realms of psychology and politics. Eventually, they settled deeply within the mental and social configuration that we can now comprehend as modern western civilization.

This is not to say that, even within the liberal context, there is or ever has been a single fully agreed
upon conception of man. Philosophers still debate within these boundaries, and the underlying tensions still account for much of the dynamism of our time and place. Essentially, two interpretations of the Newtonian situation are possible. We can consider man as a creature of public time and space, or, to a greater or lesser degree, their creator. In effect, the liberal continuum runs from a view that understands man as a complicated physical mechanism, to one that defines a human being as a composite of a body, that is to say, a collection of the atoms of physics, and a mental substance that becomes conscious of colors, odors, sounds, pains, pleasures, and desires in a private personally relevant time and space when it is bombarded with the colorless, odorless objects of the public space and time of which the body is a part.\(^5\) It is certainly possible to separate out a number of conceptually distinct positions along the continuum, or concentrate upon the disparity between its two poles, especially if one wishes to focus on the very real and significant diversity of viewpoints one finds among contemporary behavioral psychologists. It is also possible to separate out the substantive issues that the "hard psychologies" (i.e., perception, cognition, physio-psyche) raise in areas such as basic brain research, biofeedback, special education and the like. The purposes of the present inquiry are, however, best served
by appealing to the underlying features that seem to
govern the discourse and its implications for the way we
think about ourselves. Thus, what must claim our
immediate attention are the consequences of replacing the
classical inquiry into man's essence, which proceeded
from the question "what is man?", with a modern inquiry
that proceeds from the question "how is man like the
rest of the things in the world?".

The first important consequences are primarily
epistemological. Once the idea of immutable essences is
jettisoned, we're left with a world that, in principle,
at least, can be classified in numerous ways according to
our purposes through particular languages or theories.
The mind is in a peculiar predicament. It knows things
through its senses, and the language or theory with which
it operates. But since these sensations are purely
private, and our language or theory is, at best, tenta-
tively and conditionally appropriate, it cannot be said
that such knowledge is true. On the other hand, the
presumption of a realm of real things independent of the
mind that can at some point be known seems to be a basic
feature of what we call science. Indeed, central to the
belief in the progressive development of science is the
presumption that we can check our observations out
against the facts of this real world. But as we have
shown, this real world exists, not as an essence, but as
theory, a peculiar imagining of the mind that, in turn, grounds the liberal conception of man.⁶

Lest we think this circular puzzle to be of purely antiquarian interest, or perhaps, a problem that can be safely relegated to mainstream scientists intent upon verifying their hypotheses, or even federal bureaucrats attempting to establish the advisability of legalizing Laetrile, we need only to consider how some of the pieces of the puzzle find their way into the most elemental aspects of every day liberal psychology.

Recall that when we speak within the liberal framework of conscious mind, we refer to our ability to perceive sensations — odors, colors, feelings, and desires — and when we speak of theory, we refer to language that is constructed to help us understand the regular relationships between the things of the objective, public world. This is the sense in which the mind knows things through its senses, and the languages or theories with which it operates. Another way of putting this is to say that the self consists of understanding and desire, and the two are separate from one another.⁷ Immediately, a fiendishly complicated and historically rooted conundrum begins to translate itself into a nagging burden that permeates the personal landscape. Desires, it has been felt, act as the moving force of personal activity, while the understanding acts as a guide which directs this force
towards its chosen destination. The story of the liberal psychology revolves around the exploits of these two forces. The predominate motif suggests that these two forces are doomed to do battle in the psyche of man, and the stakes, as Hobbes reminds us in his *Leviathan*, are high. Unchecked desire conjures up the liberal image of disaster. The sordid image of "the state of nature", where life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short", is but one of many vehicles that serve to etch this message of fear in the hearts of modern men.

Moreover, desires, by which we may now refer, in rough historical sequence, to appetites, pleasures and pains, ends, goals, values, conscious interests, and felt needs, are arbitrary from the perspective of the understanding. While the political consequences are perhaps the most obvious -- "preference functions" become the only legitimate index for judging the response-ability of government, while the distribution of knowledge and the quality of that knowledge is considered a "pseudo-issue", the psychological consequences are equally telling. It serves to limit the role of reason to that of an instrumentality. To be sure, reason is still quite
capable of making the desires an object of the understanding. In this sense, desires have the double aspect of psychic events to be explained scientifically by an empirical psychology, and internally experienced forces which are to be monitored and managed by the moralists. However, this bifurcation of the situation into two realms of discourse (ethics and empirical psychology) merely functions to mask the underlying premises to which they both refer.10

Within the liberal framework, reason cannot tell us what ends to choose; it can merely direct our attention to the most efficient and effective means for making the choice, and having made it, for achieving our objectives. The opposition of means and ends presupposes the contrast between objective, public knowledge, and arbitrary, private desire. At best, those who are possessed by the Hobbesian mythology and driven to seek refuge in the temple of reason, (and thus find themselves aligned with a tradition that reaches back to Kant) can argue that there are certain rules we must accept in order to engage in moral criticism. Unless we make the choice to accept the rules, we cannot justify to ourselves or our fellows the satisfaction of any of our desires. The problem is that so long as we maintain the opposition between reason and desire, means and ends, fact and theory, description and evaluation, these rules are condemned to be either
coherent and empty or incoherent and self-defeating. For the rules to be universally acceptable, they must maintain a formal neutrality with respect to the desires of individuals, hence becoming abstract shells. To breathe substance into the formal principles, one has to abandon the pretension of neutrality, yet it was precisely to avoid the need to choose among equally arbitrary desires that the project was pursued in the first place. While this peculiar predicament will be given the more extensive treatment it deserves in the pages to follow -- it is relevant here as examplifying the more general strategy that Michael Polanyi has called pseudosubstitution:

The actual subject matter is restricted to a fragment found suitable for formalization. This formalization, if carried out strictly produces a result that is strictly, in itself, empty of any bearing on the subject matter; but by calling it an "explanation", (or in this case, a universal moral principle with "empirical support") one inbues it with the memory of that informal insightful act of the mind which it was supposed to replace . . . This we may call pseudo-substitution. A pseudo-substitution is a gesture of intellectual self-destruction that is kept within safe bounds by its inconsistency...

In effect, liberal psychological theory substitutes a behavioral technology for the memory of human experiencing -- but, unknowingly, relies upon this tradition of remembrances as the context which allows their technology to "make sense". We substitute job for work and call it "making a living"; we substitute sex for love and passion and call it a "meaningful relationship".
We may still seem to be obscuring the issues when we focus so intently upon the esoterica of liberal thought. But the tensions, convolutions, anomalies, and intellectual sleights of hand which we have evoked in this far too encapsulated treatment are meant to project something of a feel for the fate which falls with such bewildering force upon those to whose moral experience the principles of liberal psychology refer. An epistemological chasm all too effectively isolates a private world of colors, odors, textures, longings, fears, commitments, and as we shall discover, consciousness -- from a public world that is denied the stuff of human experience. This is a world of object-events, mechanical regularities and distorted role relationships, typically unable to meet its responsibility to bring forth an experience of continuity and worldly community, or in Hannah Arendt's terms, "to assure us of the reality of the world and ourselves". Living through the chasm is a treacherous, scary, often empty business.

Up to this point, we have proceeded as if the continuing presence of the categories of the liberal psychology depended exclusively upon a philosophical tradition and a lively imaginative facility. Surely, by now, it should be apparent that these principles draw their power in association with a dominant socio-political organization. Section 2 of this chapter aspires to
clarify this matter, in the course of elucidating liberal political theory as curriculum content.

Liberal Political Theory as Curriculum Content

In section two we introduced ourselves to some of the basic concepts that depict a liberal psychology, and portrayed, in literary vein, that psyche coming up against a deeper memory and projecting, in present-day, a decided tension and melancholia. Here in section three, we will eludicate the predominant themes of the liberal political theory, and inquire into the popular and generic images which sustain them "all of a piece". From there we undertake to connect the theory to contemporary social practices; and analogously, to much of what we come up against in our sociality. We do this by attempting to understand the liberal political theory as an historical intention, a methodology, and finally, a context. In effect, this section will carry the task of showing how liberal doctrine can direct our attention towards the ensemble of relationships we actually live through; that is to say, the "content" of our "curriculum". To understand liberal political theory as curriculum content is not to understand curriculum content per se, but I think/believe it can point towards such an understanding.
Liberal political theory, as we shall understand it here, refers simultaneously to a rich intellectual tradition, a particular institutional apparatus (the system, if you will), and an all-embracing understanding that mediates the two in the course of carrying itself through the vicissitudes of everyday life. Its scope is enormous when viewed this way.

Recalling our discussion in Section 2, it may seem that liberal political theory would have to concern itself explicity, and not merely upon our interpretation, with what we have called the public world. And, apparently, it does. Does not our common parlance suggest that liberalism represents a certain orientation to this public world, perhaps a disposition to vote this way or that on the great issues of the day, or failing that, a commitment to the enduring values of freedom, order, equality, individualism, due process and the like, with the inevitable conflicts or "trade-offs" between and among them? Yet, such a view mistakes itself in that it confuses the focal object of attention with the "content" that it actually captures. Harold Lasswell illustrated the point nicely when he conceptualized modern "political man" as a product of private motives displaced on to public objects and rationalized in terms of the public interest.14

However, once we have recognized the vitality and richness of the world which falls under the rubric of
what liberalism calls "private motives" (Section 2), Lasswell's formulation becomes rather timid. We are ready to comprehend "political man", within the liberal framework, as nothing more than a concept which abstracts out of the personal landscape those qualities, attributes, or patterns of conduct which might occasion public controversy, and posits a pattern of relationship between and among these now abstract categories (e.g., black-white, rich-poor, woman-man, Jew-Moslem, child-adult, or student-teacher, client-professional, worker-manager, etc.) and the state (or, more generally, the institutional apparatus). More importantly, for our purposes here, it follows that this pattern of relationship would be thought of as an irreducible element in the total stream of human interaction, and experienced as such by those for whom the theory holds.

In this sense, we are all "political men and women" when we act upon the intuitive principle that "relationships are a matter of convenience". The element of quid pro quo in human relationship corresponds to the psychological situation to which the liberal political theory both appeals, facilitates, and over time, comes to sponsor. Yet, side by side with the sense that we initiate encounters because they are in our interest and expect others to respond having performed the same calculus, is, I believe, a deeper sense that real human
affection and care is possible. Indeed, it is this deeper sense that was drawn upon to construct the conclusion to Section 2 of this chapter.

When we step out of the encounter mode, and move towards a meeting, we live an experience that intuitively grasps a partial critique of liberal doctrine. As Martin Buber reminds us:

In a living relationship with things, man not only regards them technically and purposively, but turns to them in their essential life... In an essential relationship with man, similarly, one life opens to another so that one experiences the mystery of the other being in the mystery of one's own... In our age, in which the true meaning of every word is encompassed by delusion and falsehood, and the original intention of the human glance is stifled by tenacious mistrust, it is of decisive importance to find again the genuineness of speech and existence as We... Man will not persist in existence if he does not learn anew to persist in it as a genuine We. 15

Indeed, the dominant tradition with culminates in today's liberal constellation has always recognized, however uncomfortably, a world of events and meetings that is characterized by mutuality and directness; Aristotle spoke of phila or fellow feeling. Jesus spoke of love, Aquinas of charity, Hume of sympathy; and even Compte and Durkhein did not deny the existence of altruism. While few have said with Buber "all real living is meeting", all have known a time/space that does not correspond to the Newtonian construction -- an anthropological time in which the future is undetermined because it depends in
part upon our decisions, a phenomenological time that points each of us toward his/her unique presence in the peculiar rhythm of self and other -- all of us know what it means to forget oneself to lose track of time. The self we have upon occasion "forgotten" is the purposefully constructed, socially mediated liberal individuality; the time we lose track of is the abstract signal of a liberal epistemology.

Although the potential for negation inheres within the direct immediacy of the lived moment and the reflective knowledge of thoughtful persons everywhere, on the whole, the world of everyday life has come to fit a form from which the liberal political theory can continue to derive its legitimacy. The everyday life contracts we make with each other do provide an arrangement that we may safely presume to be occurring unless we decide to call it off. Indeed good manners often constrains one from asking for a suspension of the arrangement, and leaves one in a situation where chit-chat is oft-times resorted to in an attempt to mitigate against the aesthetically unpleasing "bottom line", and fill the empty and negative spaces. The contradiction between the clarity of human experience, and the convolution of its expression in forms of symbolism and substance, is the central problem of our time.
While the liberal political theory derives its sense of "contract" from the interpersonal situation, the contract it asks us to accept is one between a given individual and the state, and not the person and his neighbor. This intellectual sleight of hand, what Habermas might call the projective generation of higher order, purely abstract "subjects", retains its polemical power as long as the contract we initiate and suspend in everyday life is not thought of as an arrangement between groups or classes and institutional structures. Thus, we see that the organic nature of the interpersonal contract still holds together enough to make the idea of a contract intuitively appealing, but allows us, in effect, to break our interpersonal contracts (as in say, divorce) or transcend them (in moments of meeting) without directly threatening the political order. Political radicals never seem to tire of making the point that those who believe their new, "free", "communal", "spiritual", and/or hedonistic life style to be "revolutionary", are only kidding themselves, or the victims of a decided naivete. Such a view equates the realm of politics with the personnel, practices and policies of the state and derives its cogency from the perceived absence of connection between individual expressions of justice, mercy, or creativity, and the state apparatus.
However, in those moments when we explicitly acknowledge and act upon the "political contract" that concerns itself with the relationship between individuals and institutional structures, other aspects of the liberal political theory come into play and tend to direct the relationship in a way that confirms the theory and sustains the world that has been built in its image. For example, when we pay our taxes, some of us may feel it to be unreasonable to pay so much for the sewer system, the school system, the welfare system, hospitals, and so forth. But here, we see that the phenomenon of "tax revolt" does not seem to threaten the political regime (although it may threaten a whole generation of its leaders). One explanation is that the arguments of the liberal political theorists, arguments that were skillfully constructed to convince an 18th-century world to move towards secular republican government, have settled so deeply into our present-day thinking that they can still define apparent efforts to suspend the contract in a way that simply does not threaten it. For example, is not John Lockes' argument (that our mere use of the facilities and participation in society constitutes an acceptance of the contract, and that it should remain in force unless we can clearly demonstrate profoundly disturbing consequences on a calamitous scale) still accepted by many of those whose voting behavior situates
them as participants in this so-called "tax revolt"?
After all (and now who is it that is speaking, John Locke, or the voters of California?), we must realize that each generation cannot start afresh and construct its own contract; would then be anarchy -- chaos. How could we determine where to begin, and who would protect us from the threat of outside invasion, epidemic or worse, as we busied ourselves finding out?

John Rawls might amend Locke here, by asking us to hypothesize an "original condition", where free individuals, totally unaware of their particular historical circumstances, negotiate a contract to establish their political relationships, and then he might ask us to judge the fairness of our tax by asking if it could have resulted from such a hypothetical event. Again, though very few persons may know who Rawls is, or the nature of his argument, his ideas and the burden they impose upon those who would seek to challenge the legitimacy of the regime have real currency and power. For example, present-day social policy invariably begins by isolating problems such as inequality from the ensemble of social relations. Structural attempts at solution transpose the now identified problem into abstract quantitative terms that cannot possibly capture the full dimension of the perceived injustice. The planners' solution is no solution at all,
not even in principle, and it is not extraordinary for this to be publically recognized by the planners themselves. But, the injustice is reduced to commonplace. Establishing its presence is no longer a liberative activity, but a complex, banal, bureaucratic procedure. Connections between particular incidents and critically revealing cultural thematics are deflected. The problem has been named, limited, and serviced, and the new services expand the ideological resources of the state. Contracting continues to be experienced as an interpersonal activity, but its logic surely governs our sense of collective responsibility and purpose.

With this in mind, it becomes possible to comprehend contract theory and the potent images to which they appeal. Within the liberal political theory, attempts to focus upon institutions, or the basic structures of society which support them, begin by taking two steps backwards. First, the relevant qualities, attributes and patterns of conduct of the personal landscape are abstracted out and projected across the public screen, the better to reveal the political, calculative quality of the relationships between the now abstract individuals, as their interactions are mediated by historical circumstance. This situation is used quite explicitly as the contemplative frame for contemporary social policy. Secondly, the historical situation itself must be
abstracted out to reveal a primitive "state of nature" (Hobbes) or a hypothetical "original condition" (Rawls) from which political history can be reconstructed theoretically to make the basic structure of society and its institutional apparatus seem intelligible and secure, and to convince us that we need the liberal doctrine.

The formal pattern of this theoretically reconstructed political history is where the fundamental images of the liberal political theory come from. John Rawls expresses the pattern thusly:

A simplified situation is described in which rational individuals with certain ends and related to each other in certain ways are to choose among various courses of action in view of their knowledge of their circumstance.17

The revelations of the Watergate era, following upon the heels of Vietnam, made us all familiar with one sort of language that adheres to this approach. Executive departments prepare options for "the president", which present him with various courses of action. These options are circumscribed, from their inception, by "the certain ends" which are tacitly, and sometimes explicitly accepted, and the political infighting revolves around "the certain ways in which the parties are related". It is possible, once the rich, dense, social and political reality is flattened to conform to the "simplified situation", to construct a political "science" that has as its goal the explanation and prediction of what gets
to be considered an issue and what doesn't, and what the probable outcome of the decision making apparatus will be, given the inputs. Politics, then, becomes an institutionally situated and bounded activity whose "purpose is the management of conflict, ...operationalized through transactional relations between independently situated political actors". That phenomenon such as "tax revolt" and "affirmative action" have contradictory consequences is not considered anomalous, but thoroughly consistent with the Hobbesian inspired pattern. Frank Coleman's description of contemporary American politics captures this dynamic in formal terms:

The states' policing power is organized to channel self interested calculations of rulers and ruled towards identities of interest, and in so doing, reinforce the state's position in the management of social conflict.

Here we locate the more popular images of contemporary political life -- skull sessions in the Oval Office, arm twisting in the Congress, grandpa goes to Washington and finds his fellow senators are not real human beings. These images are something more than media reflections. They are immensely powerful reminders of how we have come to regard that life -- as if it were a movie shot on some faraway location. To realize that the script betrays the characteristics of a venerable though surely tattered British import, and counts us all as actors and not as audience is not enough. The
movie consciousness must be understood and dissolved, if the formal pattern of the liberal political theory is to be altered.

Our analysis of liberal doctrine has stressed its integrated, practical character. It has helped us to illuminate -- in graphic, broad brushstroke -- the America we live through together. Obviously, it is not the logical brilliance of the great liberal philosophical treatises that holds this theme together as a word that is given to us, although we can locate these themes in that logic. Experiencing one's life as if it were a movie is not quite what Newton and Hobbes suggested. As well, it would be a mistake to undertake here an exploration of late-industrial economics, since this aspect of our existence is part of the "consensus" we are attempting to understand. Rather, we need to suggest, however incipiently, the theological intensity of our taken-for-granted commitment to this way of regarding ourselves, our being with others, and the structural context within which these encounters and events occur.

Drawing once again upon John Rawls' theoretical reconstruction, we can conclude that while the formal pattern of the liberal political theory remains fairly constant over time, the generic image which sustains it "varies depending upon how the contracting parties are conceived, upon what beliefs and interests they are said
to hold, and upon which alternatives are available to them". It follows that the languages of legitimation and apparent dispute would change with changing empirical circumstances. And there is surely some significance to be attached to the historical development of these pre-political images from Hobbes' world of mutual hostility and dependence, to Rawls' world of mutual disinterest. It is not that one world has simply replaced the other. The Hobbesian scenario has not lost its power to capture the imagination of 20th Century America, just as surely as the spector of an Id cut loose from its Super Ego, which N. O. Brown tried to evoke in the '60's, left even the likes of a Herbert Marcuse deeply perplexed. Rather, given the underlying motif of fear and chaos (Hobbes), what seems to have occurred is that the growing complexity of the contemporary predicament has occasioned a demand for greater clarity under the guise of a thoroughly antiseptic reenactment of the proverbial rite of passage (Rawls). We'll develop this image further in Chapter II, Section 1, when we discuss "the reading experience". Our point here is merely to emphasize the depths to which these prepolitical images appeal. They serve to sustain the actual argument by erecting a psychic barrier which must be penetrated if one is to escape their grasp. Underneath the verbiage, coloring the whole of the
particular circumstances, liberalism represents an embarrassed struggle with the dynamics of original sin.

In effect, what I've been saying up to this point is that liberal political theory sits in a rather peculiar dialectical relationship with what we have called the public world. On the one hand, the theory has contributed to both the de-energizing of the public world and the development of a bloated and limpid private realm. At the same time, it has served as a vehicle by which individuals speculate about the public world, and finding themselves in some structured relationship with other people, act from and through that interpersonal relationship upon their images of this world. We can liken this dynamic, wherein the boundaries of the public and private worlds begin to lose coherence, to grafting. What once was public becomes private, while the "stuff" of the private realm can no longer be kept with confidence in confidence; the signposts blur -- the human presence begins to disappear.

We see this most clearly in the phenomenon of institutional communications. The language of institutions re-presents the scientism to which we have been referring. Having developed their own language, their own view of time and space, institutions effect communications which necessarily submerge the personal and collective consciousness due to the latter's being
conceived as a pathogenic threat to the former's well
being; to the institution's ability to maintain these
arbitrary definitions. Reality is flattened and made
one-dimensional by a purposive esthetic which seeks to
submerge our subsidiary awareness of what could be
possible. The language of institutions tends to assume
what is manifestly false -- a one-to-one correspondence
between language and reality. (If the memo says it
snowed today, then it snowed today!) Thus, the by now
clichéd analogy with computer language is strong and
positive; efficiency depends foremost upon the lack of
apparent ambiguity of the communication and the absence
of freedom. In effect, a particular kind of distortion
in communication -- the communique -- is in fact chosen
to delimit and diminish human concerns and ensure con­
straints. As such, emphasis is given towards developing
these pseudo-communications; creating categories and
variations of categories of communiqués which are
directed towards hiding and devaluing one's personal
curriculum and restraining collective potentialities.
We all pay quite a price for the fundamentally oppres­sive human effort that is required to organize our
social practice in a way that corresponds with "the
simplified situation" that John Rawls depicts.

To make this perspective clear, we need to show how
it can, in principle, illuminate a particular aspect of
institutional life. We are in agreement with John Dewey, when he argued in *Reconstruction in Philosophy* that, in the end, "what we want light upon is this or that group of individuals, this or that concrete human being, this or that special institution or social arrangement".\(^{23}\) And while the point of view we have began to build could never be applied to particulars as one might apply paste to one's favorite automobile, for now, let us select outstanding motifs from the particular institutional context of the school for the limited purpose of exemplifying the framework we are just beginning to develop.

In schools, grades are used as judgements, surface expressions of a complex interactional experience serving as the Newtonian equation of the lived experience; obviously, we have communiqués in the name of efficiency. Where efficiency in reflection seeks the human connection, grades may be expressed in or joined with commentary of the experience from the perspective of the person-as-institutional-agent: the "Teacher". That this communiqué carries more data need not be denied, but that it is a communication concerning trust must be. For, such a communication simply requires the relative observations of those involved; the persons who, created and shared the experience must be acknowledged. And while there is uncertainty, these efforts must be
directed towards a meeting ground, if they are to express one's freedom and reaffirm one's effort towards quality. However, that we continue to view the educational environment within the prism of liberal doctrine means that we respond to bodies and not persons or ideas, and are in perverse point of fact justified in using the Newtonian/Hobbesian model. Teachers and students, labels to suggest falsely that one group knows what the other wants to know, are assigned to rooms and times as if time and space were not contiguous and relative to the person and his/her thoughts, as if space were defined by the number on the door and time by the additive collection of the "school day" and not by the esthetic quality of the phenomenological experience.  

It is interesting to note in this connection that Dewey, in his contribution to the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, went so far as to refer to Hobbes' philosophy as "the science of bodies".  

What makes this situation so profoundly destructive to the persistence of the human presence, is the contradiction between the constructed reality of the institution, which carries the burden of locating the last vestiges of the public space, and the current well-intentioned emphasis upon therapeutics. Such is the stuff from which many a traumatic moment follows, when persons come up against this powerful contradiction.
I'm sure that each of us has a story to tell in this regard. Again, I will locate this story "in school":

The story concerns a student, Carol, who came to see me at my office at the University some three years ago. She was crying uncontrollably, and thoroughly upset. As we tried to piece together what had happened, it became clear that she had just returned from a local elementary school, where she was helping out as a teacher's aide. The school prided itself on its "open classrooms", and boasted the latest modular furniture and so forth. On this day, in Carol's class, there was a particular boy who, upon finishing his drawing, had called her over to share his excitement. As she came towards him, he placed his hands around her, and this made Carol happy. Only, just then the principal arrived upon the scene, and chewed out that child mercilessly for having the audacity to touch a teacher.

I wondered in my own mind why Carol was so broken-up by this. Surely it was a vulgar experience, but why did it appear to be one from which she would not completely recover? Was it that Carol experienced the boy coming up against a powerful vise -- a contradiction between the institutional and the interpersonal reality that was all the more telling in this case because of the fact that it occurred in a so-called "open" environment? Obviously, I cannot say with any certainty, but we do
recognize, in communications theory, that the strength of a message varies proportionately with its unexpectedness, and when the principal said "we don't touch teachers here", we can only imagine how profound a communication it was. We see as well the basic dynamic of institutional communications at work. In the absence of a communication that is open to locating the relative experience of those involved, and oriented towards the human meeting ground, the form and content of language are disjointed; in the case of schools, the form is of the appearance of learning, while the content is something else again. Just what the content is, we are not prepared to speak about as yet, but now that the question can be raised, it will occupy our attention for the balance of this Dissertation.

We realize that once we can speak of a rather undifferentiated social space, we can begin to talk about the adequacy of that space and the kind of lives that transpire within it. Here is where the "content" of liberal political theory becomes relevant. I want to consider liberal political theory as curriculum content because such a perspective forces us to grapple with it as a concrete presence in the world. In forcing its "thing-like" character into the open, we must recognize the obvious -- a "theory" is not a "thing". However, over time, important ideas do leave their mark on the
world. We say that the architect erects a building in his mind before he literally builds it. We all aspire to "make our ideas a reality" -- whether it is our dream house, the fantastic journey we hope to take to some faraway land, or the more humble aspirations we have for everyday projects of work and family.

Similarly, we've been taught to think of social collectivities as "bringing-forth" different kinds of "things". In history classes, back in high school and even before, we were taught to memorize the distinctive contributions of Greece, Rome, The Stone Age, the New Deal, and so forth. Unfortunately, to learn that Pericles bequeathed the theatre, Augustus the sports arena, the stone age man his tools, and FDR the social security office, is simply not the kind of thinking that can take us very far. But, when we step out from underneath an interpersonal world-view, these matters become, at first, maddeningly complex, and hopelessly vague. How do we begin to seek out the meaningful connections?

At this juncture, I think we have established that liberal doctrine represents a powerfully relevant idea-structure that can help us to come to grips with present circumstances. Having sedimented itself into our personal and collective practice over the past three centuries, we encounter it as if it was the world, as
if it was "the content of our curriculum", (and this despite the persistence of events and meetings that do not "fit", and tell us that somehow "it's all terribly wrong").

If we are to make sense of this encounter -- of the special world that it presumes -- I suggest we begin by considering the possibility that this murky predicament has an intentional character to it. This does not mean that we must attribute to the vast, vague complexity we participate in a single cause. To my mind, this would be ridiculous. On the other hand, a meaningful interpretation must be rendered. To imply that the world we "come up against" is simply random and directionless is a prescription for complete passivity and thorough confusion. When we speak of liberalism as an historical project, we usually refer to the enlightenment as a human epoch; to its struggles, its hopes, its achievements, and its failures. Though we still may speak of it in past tense, we must recognize, first, that it's grounded in a distinctive interpretation of the inter-personal situation: the contract. The contract refers, not only to an idealized vision of the proper relationship between free individuals, but projects as well as peculiar social tapestry, and indeed implies a particular kind of
relationship between this basic social structure and the
institutions whose task it becomes to manage it.

In this connection, it becomes at least suggestive
to note that the generation which proposed this contract
was the generation which, as Richard Sennett points
out,\(^27\) was also the first to self-consciously identify
the bifurcation of everyday life of which I have been
speaking. It was just as industrial capitalism was
beginning to erect a structure of \text{private} industry, and
as Stephen Lukes points out, "the basic ideas of
individualism" were being formed,\(^28\) that we find Butler
(1723) in his \textit{Sermons} making the remarkable and pro-
foundly prophetic observation "every man is to be
considered in two capacities, the private and the
public".\(^29\) It was this generation whose sons, and as
we've begun to understand, whose daughters as well, set
out to concretize this project -- given its most power-
ful treatment by Thomas Hobbes, sculptured by what
Peter Gay calls "the enlightenment philosophies
(despite the philosophical divergences),\(^30\) and so many
others -- and make it present for Western Civilization.
Two hundred and fifty years later, Butler's distinction
remains central to our "rough and ready" epistemology,
but the lives we live "in both capacities", as he might
have put it, have suffered greatly from an increasing
lack of connectiveness, to the point where neither
capacities can be explored today in a way that satisfies our sense of a human destiny.

Hannah Arendt locates historically the "memory of human experiencing" (Chapter I, Section 1, page 59) which we draw upon when we use expressions such as "A Human Destiny". The Human Condition, she argues, grows limpid when it comes to deny its essential publicity. In the absence of a "public sphere" which free persons enter into to do great deeds and thus transcend their mortality, there is, concomitantly, a loss of the kind of recognition we need to sustain our private experiencing. The public sphere can be portrayed through the metaphor of a table, concrete and solid enough to both separate us in our unique seats, and unite us in our common meeting. Arrendt's sense of contrast captures a powerful analytic and aesthetic pivot, as she derives this quintessential praxis of human being from the associative forms of Greek life, and interprets the development of these forms through the course of Western history. She is most persuasive in arguing that the systematic diminution of labor, work, and action is given an enormous impetus by the enlightenment. In many respects, the fate of contemporary Israel seemed to exemplify for her the tragedy and the possibility of these times. While she applauded the achievements of the pioneers (i.e., the kibbutzum and
The Hebrew University) as an inspiration for those who believed "the table" could be rebuilt, and as a symbol of a new kind of political action, she was an early critic of the manifestly political leadership of Israel, which blundered into the unenviable position of having "to choose between a homeland and a state", and then proceeded to make the wrong choice. In effect, the associative forms of human being do not "wither away"; they are systematically plundered to construct the foundation for a new kind of social order, where the "sense of connectedness" becomes, too often, a romantic fantasy.

The imagery of blue, convolution, worldlessness -- lack of connection -- must be recognized as something more than an apt amalgamation of contemporary complaints. It signals a hiatus that is at once cultural, practical, and ontological. Approaching a critical understanding requires that the temptation to regard past efforts as unconditionally pernicious becomes integrated into our comprehension of the scope of the contemporary distress. In Chapter II, Section 2, we will argue that this is especially evident in education. Moreover, our review of proceedings of the National Herbart Society will demonstrate that the generation of professionals that established Schools of Education in America sought "a science of pedagogy" that would be grounded in an
integrated, encompassing, normative interpretation of culture in its dynamic inter-relationship with human development. That the search for "missing connections" was quickly abandoned as a central educational task testifies to the importance of focusing directly upon the ever-present dimensions of human relationship and expression, as opposed to exigencies of structural mediations such as schools (or, for that matter, the NIE), if we are to understand and re-form the content of our curriculum. That it has become something of a non-event to characterize educational research as largely ahistorical does not mollify the anxiety or the perversity of blindly participating in a form of activity that expresses historically specific intentions which may or may not be congruent with the researcher's suggestions for an assessment of particular interventions or research programs. Yet, we must also recognize the need to break with the epistemology of liberal doctrine if we are to achieve meaningful connections. Indeed, the experience of "breaking away" can give us at least a visceral sense of the private dimension of the intentionality that has held us back so long.

Returning to our "enlightened" forefathers, we can say that what they expressed may best be understood as a prepolitical understanding, which conditioned a new
generation; a rising bourgeoisie equipped now to make effective use of the techniques and arguments developed and prefigured by a now flourishing intelligensia. Indeed, what is particularly significant here is the convergence of the intellectual with the entrepreneur, the priest with the politician and the farmer with the statesman, a convergence which we celebrate in schools as part of the more general act of reverence we undergo each year as we continue to mystify the roles our Founding Fathers played in the course of human history.

Thus, if we are to begin to conceptualize the liberal political theory as curriculum content, our first task must be to attempt to identify an historical intention:

To tame the chaos at loose in the world, to free-up the rising bourgeoisie and the new material capacity, to establish a secular state which honors a fundamentally protestant devotion.

Surely this analysis will not suffice, but the idea is that all of us must begin by seeking some understanding of this historical intention. For, when we accept the taken-for-granted definitions of our situation as our starting point, we can presume that we are acting to support and extend it. And while we will be primarily concerned in the latter sections with the consequences of this for the practice of curriculum theorizing,
these consequences obtain in all spheres of human endeavor. While we can provide a broad, literary interpretation of these consequences, it must be emphasized that the concrete identifications of consequence can only be made in authentic self-and-other-reflecting dialogue; the genuine prescription for re-form is a creature of the word that is spoken.

Secondly, to understand the liberal political theory as curriculum content, we must seek out the prevailing methodology, the historically specific way in which experience translates itself into forms of symbolism and substance. A prevailing methodology answers the question "How do we go about doing what we do?", whether we refer to the activities of scholarly inquiry, civic improvement, or family living. When we speak of liberal political theory, we refer to the technique of management; a powerful technique for translating certain kinds of goals, values, or objectives into material reality, projecting man-as-master -- over political instability, unfortunate climatic conditions, "old fashion" modes of production and distribution of both knowledge and material, inappropriate affect, and other forms of "spurious" devotion. It's a technique that regards aesthetic, ethical and metaphysical mediations as superfluous diversions; a habit of mind captured by the term
diagnosis, for some, while good study habits, cleanliness, punctuality, order and predictability suffices for the others -- and only if they can attain it. Herbert Marcuse called it a technological rationality -- a rationality of means applied to given ends -- as he sought to understand how it is that we have become One Dimensional Man. In Academe, the method, as Habermas has demonstrated, dissolves epistemology into philosophy of science, and the practical task of achieving "the good life" into the technical task of shaping the behavior of "actors", now comprehended as private, abstract individuals, as they come into relationship with the exigencies of a rapidly expanding, all-encompassing, institutional apparatus. Within the educational profession, it is the methodology that inspired the development of a distinctive field of inquiry and action that called itself "curriculum". Elizabeth Maccia comprehends this development as "praxiology", and it refers to the efforts of Bobbit, Charters, and more recently Tyler, Taba, Stratemeyer, and to the debt these curriculum workers owe to the development of management theory, from its roots in scientific management to its recent flirtation with the "open system". Curricular history begins as a sub-discipline of management theory. It focuses upon a rationalization of administrative plans. It raises
questions about the relationship between administrative plans, classroom events and student experiences but the management framework seeks not to understand but to control these relations. Thirty years later, Virgil Herrick could look back and correctly begin his analysis by noting that what we mean by curriculum is "a plan for a plan". Of course, it is possible for us now to trace the roots more precisely, and locate the "curriculum engineers" in particular, and the social engineers in general, within a methodological tradition that has its roots in the Newtonian enlightenment.

Within the methodological content of liberal political theory, there lies a special problem that may help us conceptualize how the whole is made present for those of us who come of age in advanced industrial society. Roberto Unger speaks here of an anomaly; an impossible but somehow necessary relationship between rules and values. The liberal methodology presumes that rules and values translate themselves through the actions of persons into material product in much the same manner. But, are not values and rules to be identified and defined in profoundly different ways? What really now is the difference between values and rules? In Section 2, we implied that both values and rules are part of a larger historical development within the liberal epistomology, which we called the will, or desire. As
such, the liberal epistemology dictates that the meanings of both rules and values must take on much the same form. One might conclude from this that they ought to carry the same, or almost the same meanings. But, if values are to be understood as subjective, because as Locke claimed, the "mental substance" that is mind is as ineffable as it is universal, how then can we have just rules, much less fair ones? And aren't rules supposed to represent something very different than values? Rules, one might think, should derive from and signal what we collectively value, which is something quite different from an additive collection of what each of us finds in his/her unique situation to be important. In other words, to construct rules by simply quantifying individual preferences, and correlating these now purely abstract qualities and imposing the calculation as a universal result backed up by the force of the state, would seem to ensure the violation of the integrity and meaning of our value commitments. But, where is the language (much less the structure) that might allow for the constant, organic translation of values into rules (and back again) our democracy would seem to require? Where, even after the struggle of a Dewey and those who worked steadfastly to erect his model, is the public dialogue -- the citizenship democracy which virtually all liberal political
theorists acknowledge to be essential if we are to make the translation of what they call subjective values into objective and fair rules?

Doesn't the hope for this translation presume the existence of shared meanings, at least as a possibility? I think we can see from this that the translations from the private to public attitude and back again are not an area that has received much consideration. The neglect is not benign, and the consequences as particularly evident in schools, where the private and public attitudes constantly intermix and the ambiguity of the transitions are particularly debilitating. Schools are public institutions; we call some of them public schools. But the staff is expected to intervene in private relationships, especially in disputes. This is part of the "public role". We tend to call this intervention into the interaction between students, imposing upon private encounters the arbitrary but authoritative rules that make them public, "discipline".

Disciplining students is one way that the transactions between private and public consciousness are signaled in schools. Teaching may be considered another (although this is not the time and place to attempt to decipher what the profession regards as teaching nowadays). In any case, the transactions are continuous; the patterns are, of course, historically
specific. To pursue this avenue of ethnographic inquiry would do more than provide a fascinating insight into contemporary definitions of what is private and what is public and of how the translation between value and rule is effected. It could locate those moments of school life that are particularly problematic, and contribute to our critical understanding of the quality of life.

Still, we say that peace must be established and maintained by rules. For the rules to be objective (read impersonal) and fair, they can only be established within a liberal framework, in one of two ways.

Either we have a person whose political situation is such that she/he is presumed disinterested, whether this be Hobbes' sovereign or Hegel's bureaucrat, jurists that are appointed for life (or, in the minds of many of last generation of Americans, a millionaire such as Rockefeller or an "expert" such as Kissinger) or by a vote coupled with a rigorous search for a powerfully motivating apparatus for developing and articulating issues -- a search that must extend to all sectors of society. In both cases, the epistemological problems are obscured. From whence come the standards? Of what substance or content is the "disinterested interest"? What is conveyed when the "issue articulation apparatus" comes up against a consciousness that responds, in countless ways, "no, I
prefer not”? By this we do not refer specifically to the percentage of voter turnout in elections, but to overwhelming apathy that we bring to our private experiencing, to all those who have chosen to opt out of life itself, to the uncountable thousands that do not show up in the United States Census, and to the literally millions whose bodily presence belies an ontological absence.

And so, liberal political theory, as curriculum content, makes itself present to us fractured, scarred, flawed, always ambiguous. Whether we speak of the power relationships in a classroom, or the social relationships that construct the knowledge which forms its context, for most Americans, young and old, the world fades into an ever-lighter shade of pale. Or, as one of my students on the south side of Chicago so powerfully expressed it to me one rainy Friday afternoon: "As fast as I can figure out where it's at, they've moved it."

Finally, liberal political theory as curriculum content is context. It is the schools wherein we receive instruction, it is the offices, the factories, the shops where we hold down jobs, it is the homes, the appartmentments, the condominiums where we rest, and perchance, we play. Of course, the context encompasses more than the architecture. It refers
simultaneously to the existential experience of persons as they come up against the structures of their sociality, and the culturally and politically assembled forms of knowledge and practice which mediate the encounter -- whether we attend to it with an eye towards the intra-personal, the inter-personal, or the socio-political, dimension of curriculum content.

Reference to dimensions of curriculum content could, I suspect, offer the curriculum theorist access to a syntax that is not wholly a prisoner of liberal doctrine. It has served here as a picturing model that has helped me to maintain the tension between liberal doctrine as curriculum content and curriculum content per se. To speak of intrapersonal, interpersonal, and socio-political dimensions of curriculum content is to employ a syntax that does not arbitrarily define what is or can be our curriculum content, how it is or can be made present, and where it is or can be located, as separate problems, and thus has some potential for opening up new dimensions of theory and practice. While it is not my intention here to develop this mental picture into a fully articulate "curriculum theory", I must do more than merely allude to it if I am to share with you my reflections upon the context we have developed in this chapter. Perhaps this re-presentation can help:
Our critique of liberal doctrine as curriculum content reveals three interrelated, contiguous dimensions which cut across particular institutional settings and inhere in each as "what we come up against in life".

**THE INTRAPERSONAL DIMENSION OF CURRICULUM CONTENT**
- The communicative relations between the person and his/her consciousness in a distorted inner space.

**THE INTERPERSONAL DIMENSION OF CURRICULUM CONTENT**
- The private relationships that occur when persons come up against other persons in a distorted social space.

**THE SOCIO-POLITICAL DIMENSION OF CURRICULUM CONTENT**
- The pattern of communicative relations that construct an institutional life-world in a distorted public space.

Based upon our discussion thus far, we can conclude that liberal doctrine can help us to make sense of a pervasive, taken-for-granted immersion in the interpersonal dimension which leads us to construct environments that limit access to inner spaces, masks the impact of institutional communications, and diverts the potentialities of collective effort. Chapter II will survey the consequences of this for the practice of curriculum theorizing.
CHAPTER II
IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRICULUM THEORIZING

The Institution of Education as the Methodology of
Liberal Doctrine: A Perspective on the
Curriculum Theorist's Situation

Decker Walker began his recent reconsideration of
the 26th NSSE Yearbook (a recognized "classic in the
field" devoted to the question "What should we teach in
schools?") and the practice of curriculum theory by
summoning the imagery of Robert Frost who saw the man
standing in the hay he was trying to lift; straining to
lift himself. I hope that having passed through
Chapter I, the image you retain is somewhat more
complete. We see the "hay" -- liberal doctrine as
curriculum content. Perhaps we have achieved some under­
standing of how it is that while we stand in it, we
cannot lift it; nor can we lift ourselves. Indeed, the
tragedy discloses itself when we come to truly under­
stand ourselves as haymakers; when we understand how
our activity brings forth what we do not want, and
mires us higher and deeper as we strain all the more
intensely. For those who do not, or prefer not to
understand the consequences of their practice, thinking
perhaps that they can submit in comfort, there is the
eerie world of disassociation. Think of the man who, trying to survive in his own mind, decided to take a canoe trip down the river. He gets his canoe into the water, drops his paddle down, and, lo and behold, there is no connection! No matter which way he holds or strokes it, there is no movement -- the paddle appears to come up against nothing. Suddenly, the thought occurs to him that perhaps he does not have a paddle. "How do I know I have a paddle in the water?", he asks, and the regressive logic begins. For if he cannot prove the existence of his paddle, what then of the canoe, or the body that occupies it? And so it is that "the search for the paddle" becomes an increasingly desperate occupation.

Here in Chapter II, we will concern ourselves with exploring the meaning of this situation for the practice of curriculum theorizing. The title of this section suggests the avenue of approach that we shall adopt to begin to connect the all-encompassing framework of Chapter I to a more particular concern for the field.

When I suggest that we can understand the Institution of Education as the methodology of liberal doctrine, I mean this in three ways. First, while the profession cannot as yet render anything like a complete answer to the question "What do schools
teach?", to say that schools intend to teach the liberal methodology to the young cannot be very far from the truth of the matter, whether we examine the explicitly valued intentions, or the implicit, latent, or hidden ones. Second, the method can locate for us the organizing principles that govern the whole of this institutional life -- its formative structure. Finally, the values that are articulated by those who live and work within the institution become the expressions of the method, in the sense that the educator's talk, even his/her critical talk, functions to legitimize the whole affair. In other words, we will begin by entertaining the idea that the methodology of liberal doctrine functions via the Institutions of Education (broadly conceived) to reproduce the form of life we described in Chapter I.

For example, in Section 2 of Chapter I, we saw that the Newtonian model has generated a view of knowledge emphasizing the connection of mind to matter in the narrow view that our bodies are in a purely abstract, public Newtonian space. We've seen in Section 2 of Chapter I that in real life this view of knowledge is inexorably intertwined with a psychological and political situation that presents us with a given world. Let us bracket, for the moment, these connections. In other words, although liberal
method represents, in its fullest development, the moving force of an actual circumstance, if we focus strictly upon its intellectual component, the liberal methodology can be reduced to an empirical-analytic research program.

Marshall Gordon calls this the "Hypothetical-deductive Model of Inquiry". This characterization emphasizes the idea that the deductive logic which moves down -- begins with a hypothesis; a creative, personally liberative act of insight, but continues from there along the kind of deterministic path we associate with a Newtonian mechanics. Once the machine gets rolling, the deductive steps down the latter of knowledge attain a kind of privileged, logical status. The memory of the distinctly human insight that created and shared this "line of inquiry" as an experience is insulated from those who "catch the ring in midflight". This is because the inquiry model is designed to present only the results -- conclusions as scientific products -- and thus shares with all the dimensions of the liberal methodology, and with its "congealed actuality", the disposition to regard as superfluous those mediations -- ethical, aesthetic, metaphysical -- which might mitigate against a contemporary common sense that believes "the shortest distance between two points is a straight line".
of course these conclusions are expressed in the seemingly objective, impersonal language of the Newtonian public space: they are communiqués. As well, at each step down the deductive series, the communiqué contains smaller bits of information. In other words, since (as we have noted) the amount of information in a "bit" varies proportionately with its unexpectedness, "what comes down" is very boring.

And so it is that this kind of knowledge presents itself to educators, who in turn, present it to the young, as if it were a "given thing". This does not mean there is no room for discussion. Certainly there is discussion, and we will surely return to this aspect of school practice in a moment. For now, we need to see that the boundaries of the discussion that occurs are actually closed. The teachers cannot know them, indeed, even curriculum specialists and many theorists regard themselves not as creators of knowledge, but as persons who utilize knowledge and build "learning environments" for the young.

Extending this very simplified picture, we see the chain of command that leads down from the university-based curriculum person, to the subject matter specialist, to the teacher, enters into the middle of the descending ladder of knowledge, both bureaucratically and historically, and extends to the child, who
is at the bottom. Each link on the chain is assigned its task, although the persons involved cannot know, concretely, just what the task is as the fundamental and sustaining logic of the assignment was derived "from above". Depending upon the institutional style, the person more or less makes his/her own task up based upon the knowledge available to him/her, and takes orders that neither she/he nor the "instructor" are in a position to truly justify. As Michael Apple and Nancy King have shown, children learn at a very early age to distinguish between explicitly assigned tasks, and tasks they assign themselves, (very significantly, these tasks are also consistent with the "instructions"), as, respectively, "work" and "play". Indeed, they argue that in an important sense this is what kindergartners are taught. For the adult, we might say that this distinction comes to be redefined as one between "job" and "work". However, to develop this image further is not really germane here, rather, we might do better to conclude this very limited hermeneutic with a more comprehensive picture, one that draws upon both the latent and manifest intentionality to help us see the liberal methodology at work in a particular way. (Recall the intention at this stage is primarily to lend a measure of plausibility to our
bold assertions about the relationship between liberal methodology and the institution of education.)

Let us, then, reconsider the case of the young child, and suppose that she/he is about to encounter his/her first real reading lesson. It is mid-morning, and though the constitutive structure of the interpersonal environment on this day may well be of the sort that King and Apple suggest, manifestly, the child seems "free" to paint his/her sun yellow, blue, or grey; to walk around the room pretty much as she/he pleases, to imagine the blocks in this corner of the room are really spaceships, or look through the cardboard kaleidoscope in that corner, and feel somehow musically intuned -- perhaps with his/her favorite Super-Hero. Suddenly, everything changes. Out of the corner of his/her eye, the child encounters the glance of the adult, let us say twenty feet away. The adult is somehow not the same person she/he was only moments ago. Perhaps the adult has a book in his/her hand, perhaps not -- but what we are witnessing here is the child-as-student, coming up against the adult-as-teacher, who has decided it is time for the child to have his/her first reading lesson.

To say that the lesson must take place in the Newtonian public world is simply to acknowledge that the printed messages of the book organize themselves on
a straight line, must be read "one way" (from left to right), and like riding a bicycle or driving a car, there is a certain edge to the encoding and decoding of printed messages that lacks the intuitive quality of coming to speak, or to walk, to paint, etc. Let us say this certain quality of attentiveness must be "taught". By this, we simply mean that the adult must invite the child to join him/her in the public space. But, unlike the bike or the car, the printed message is literally that which carries the historicity of human kind. This moment we are witnessing, then, can be seen as quasi-archetypical. It is probably the closest we come in America to a cultural initiation rite -- it is when the past is made present for the future.

For our purposes here, it is crucial to understand that, from the perspective of the "School System", what occasions the "need" for this encounter, indeed what comes to define it, (and as an encounter, never a meeting) is that quality of the reading experience that is skill -- the technical edge. Here "the shortest distance between two lines", the perversely common sense that is liberal method, directs our attention to the superficial edge of a truly profound, rooted experience, and tends to hold it there, both despite and because of our collective concern for the
experience. In the public schools, what we explicitly teach, by and large, and almost always test for and group in terms of, is the ability to decode and encode printed messages. This is the necessary but not sufficient condition for engaging the reading experience, but the necessary and sufficient condition for achieving the rite of passage into a public world whose essential qualities are delimited by the liberal doctrine. This encounter, taken as interpersonal content, is the most "perfect" example I know of the liberal methodology at work, with the implications (indeed the meaning) hidden by the smooth veneer of rationality, and with the essentially antiseptic quality that Rawls prefigures very much in evidence. This is one way to begin to seek an understanding of how it is that the public world which is made present for the young, as they come up against it, is the public world of liberal doctrine.

Moreover, our interpretation can be profitably extended to account for the phenomenon of "back to basics" and the corresponding fascination with the language of competency and accountability. Here the common sense of public opinion seems to present us with the affect of negation in the form of an insistence upon the status quo. That is to say, our critique of liberal political theory has outlined how
the dominant structures and values condition popular discontent, and transform it into what is effectively a prescription for consolidating the perceived injustice. While it may be tempting to respond by asking "where did the basics go?", and in so doing, recognize that despite the progressive rhetoric for which the profession is famous, the facile assimilation of the person into the culture has been the quintessential activity of schooling, this sort of response is insufficient. On the one hand, it justifies the kind of righteous attitude that is the true mark of the parish, who looks with contempt upon the unmediated expressions of anger, resentment, and alienation on the part of the people, and finds his own distruct confirmed when they turn against his cherished vision, and on the other hand, it offers the sympathetic practitioner, who may desperately believe that she/he has more to offer than yesterday's medicine repackaged as today's technology, little more than a prescription for anguish and resignation. What I am suggesting is that the failure of the educational fraternity to seize upon the underlying sense of betrayal as an unprece-dented opportunity to demystify the reality of schooling and build a new vision that could effectively compete with the techno-ethic of the liberal method can only be fully understood as a reflection of the
pervasive immersion in the Inter-personal Dimension.

Antonio Gramsci's interpretation is instructive:

The individual expects the organism to act, even if he does not do anything himself, and does not reflect that precisely because his attitude is widespread, the organism is necessarily inoperative. Furthermore, it should be recognized that, since a deterministic and mechanical conception of history is very widespread... each individual, seeing that despite his non-intervention something still does happen, tends to think that there indeed exists, over and above individuals, a phantasmagorical being, the abstraction of the collective organism, a kind of autonomous divinity, which does not think with any concrete brain but still thinks, etc.4

With this in mind, I ask you to join me in rethinking through the situation of the educational theorist in America. Sometimes it is the obvious that is most important. What is most obvious about the theorist's situation is its infancy. There are probably still those among us whose teacher's teachers were among the first to graduate from schools of education in America, and from the beginning there has been the overwhelming expectation, which persists today, that somehow his/her activity would, could, or should directly change the school. While I have been asked how my activity would (could or should, etc.) change the schools, on countless occasions and in countless ways, and I make it a practice to try to snatch a few tense moments to clarify the question in what is nearly always a perverse interchange, I genuinely
end up, having assured myself I understand the questioners' use of language, thoroughly convinced there must be some mistake.

The way the question is usually put situates it in Harry S. Broudy's *Real World of the Public Schools*. Let me quote from one of his more trenchant images:

> Imagine, if you will, an army of about 46 million troops engaged in a campaign under the direction of about 2 million officers. Each of the soldiers serve anywhere from 8 to 12 years in the army, so that there is a constant replacement of veterans by recruits. On a smaller scale, there is a constant renewal of the officers. The campaign plans were drawn and revised little by little. Imagine now what it would take to alter the campaign or the movement of the army in a significant way.

Moreover, the presumption is that the theorist is a general in this army; the questioner really wants the theorist to unveil his battle plans. The interpersonal conception of the problem is as apparent as it is impossible, but it persists nonetheless, with several nontrivial consequences.

First, a strategic concern for the survival of the field comes to dominate the theorist's attention, as individuals continue to float proposals which must somehow seem to offer the hope of meeting the impossible expectations in order to achieve public support, while at the same time offer the field and its members a legitimate avenue for development. As the story of the man in the canoe suggests, the "search for the paddle"
leaves the canoe increasingly at the mercy of the water's current. The field seems unable to really get behind and pursue any of the projected research programs, since none of them can satisfy the contradictory structural, personal, and intellectual demands. It would be silly to conclude from this that curriculum theorists are especially weak or short sighted. Rather, we might suggest that they have chosen an avenue of pursuit where the anguish of the liberal psychology is particularly apparent. That their discourse has been centered by the question "What should be taught in schools?" does not mean the research has all been unabashedly prescriptive in its style, since there are a variety of indirect ways of responding to the concern for content as it is usually defined. But it does mean, as an interpersonal matter, that the discussion begins within the institutional context of the liberal doctrine, and it begins as a problem of value. The predicament of (or shall we say the pretension to) objectivity, which all university professors must somehow confront, becomes debilitating for the curriculum theorist who is to regard his work as valuable, but not because she/he believes in it. The theorist who finds it impossible to establish a direct, positive relationship between his/her activity and school practice writ large and for this reason judges his/her field
moribund and impotent, yet chooses to continue the conversation, must make that choice on the basis of another sort of knowledge which tells him/her "yes, this is important". But of this kind of knowledge, she/he has difficulty speaking.

Second, the practitioner is left to pursue his/her craft without benefit of a reasonably well articulated, ethically compelling, politically viable framework for an evolving theory of practice and is often without the time or disposition to develop his/her own, or even recognize what is missing. Allegiance to code words such as competence, openness, progressive, achievement, effectiveness, (and their requisite techniques) circumscribe the avenues to substantial reflection, and the day-to-day demands of classroom teaching tend to leave even these attenuated directions unpursued. The committed practitioner reasons, understandably, that she/he can't possibly understand the totality of his/her situation, but must do what she/he can to teach what must be taught. If the school environment is too distorted to be comprehensible, if it becomes impossible to join with students in critically reflecting upon it and drawing upon their relationship with this world as the instructional ground, the teacher must provide another. But while simulations, movies, roleplays, etc., may seem to work, the problems of relating to
what has transpired gets worse. Potentially important insights, events, and meetings become relegated to the world of the hypothetical and the somewhere else, and do not provide the impetus to clarify, investigate, or challenge actual relationships. Just as the liberal political theory posits a simplified situation that is manageable but neglects to comprehend the ongoing consequences of imposing this systematically distorted situation upon the world, the practitioners' addiction to gimmickery and technique conceals more than it reveals. "Making hay" is more than the idle pastime of populist demagogues, it is the occupation of committed, frustrated people everywhere.

Having situated the liberal methodology in the context of The Institution of Education, and re-introduced some of the more graphic psychological and political connective tissue, let us draw upon the whole of Chapter I to conclude this interpretation of the theorists' predicament.

In Chapter I, we were able to move from liberal psychological theory to liberal political theory, and from historical intention to method, and finally to context. The path was not easy, but the connection was there and some understandings were achieved. Recognizing The institution of education as the methodology of liberal doctrine leads us to grasp how the theorist, as
a creature of this method, seeks to comprehend the consequences of his/her activity. On the one hand, our discussion of liberal doctrine as curriculum content establishes this relationship for us -- one hand feeds the other, so to speak. One way to reconstruct this for our purposes here would be to say that the method builds the context, which in turn expresses the historical intention. Yet, we see as well that this connection is literally a blur for those who attempt to make it with respect to their own practice. The presumption that curriculum content is the response to the question "What do we teach in schools?", as opposed to "What do we come up against in life?", indicates that this activity begins within the institutional context of liberal doctrine, a house of mirrors from which it is difficult to escape. Our discussion of the phenomenon of institutional communications showed us how the surface aesthetic of the institution presents what we called a "form" that can project the appearance of meaningful, legitimate activity for those who "take the bait", and our interpretation of the reading experience indicates that this form is nothing more than the technical edge of potentially profound, human experience. However, access to substantive dimensions are blocked by the maddeningly vague opacity of a public world that forces us back into a private, interpersonal world view
through which the intentionality of the liberal doctrine remains unchallenged. As the rationalization of this institutional life-form continues, and the odious consequences become more apparent, the need for theory becomes great, while the task of achieving it becomes more difficult.

On the Avenues of Approach

In Chapter I, we pointed towards three interrelated, contiguous dimensions of curriculum content whose significance remains hidden by our immersion in liberal doctrine. In Section 1 of this chapter, we were able to offer a suggestive interpretation of the consequences of this predicament for the contemporary curriculum theorist. Here in Section 2, we turn our attention to an analogous attempt to portray the status of his theory. What follows should not be confused with a survey of the literature. The two texts I have chosen to focus upon are neither popular nor especially representative of what is being done by university-based theorists in North America today. However, they strike me as the best of their genre. Undeniably impressive achievements in their own right, they hold promise to establish, upon our critical scrutiny, the necessity for reconceptualizing curriculum content.
At first glance, the proceedings of the National Herbart Society (1895-8) might seem a most unlikely place to look for help in clarifying the contemporary problematic. Yet, when we reflect that the major contributors to this text -- The MacMurrays, C. C. Van Liew, Charles DeGarmo, John Dewey -- constitute "the first family" of university-based educational professionals in America, and that they maintained an explicit focus upon the question President DeGarmo posed in the 1st Yearbook's "Opening Remarks" (1895) -- "What should the Public Schools teach?"; our choice becomes less surprising. But it is their avenue of approach to this problem that establishes the relevance of their inquiry to this investigation. The Herbartians evidenced no ambivalence in their belief that the problem could and should be approached theoretically. They wanted to develop appropriate principles for determining the mutual interrelation of the course of study. That is, to say, theirs was not (for the years 1895-8) simply a search for ways to mold the disparate ideas, values, or interests of the educational constituency into a politically viable consensus that could release schools from previous constraints on what could be taught. As the first generation of university-based professionals, they seemed to have assumed that the task of identifying "scientific" principles had intrinsic practical rele-
vance. What I wish to suggest here is that the example of the Herbartians has potential for signifying the possibilities and limitations of what curriculum theorizing can achieve within the liberal constellation. Perhaps, their position as trailblazers meant that they could simply assume the role of generals in the sense we have discussed, in any case, in this hothouse of illusion, the discussions that are recorded in the early yearbooks coalesce to form a coherent body of reflection that we can respond to.

We might begin by recognizing that the special language which was developed to form the nucleus of the hoped for science of pedagogy "is best expressed by the word relations" (Charles MacMurray's italics). In this sense, the Herbartian quest is not unlike our own. However, our critique of liberal doctrine allows us to anticipate that these relations would not be the actual, distorted relations of the world we live through together. Rather, the Herbartians sought to grasp as harmonious the relationships within and between three ideational spheres: the cultural development of Species Man, the valued forms of social character, and the development of individual mental capacity. Presumably then, the instructional program would be able to embody and impose this intellectual harmony upon the child's school environment.
This leaves us with a remarkably apropos conception of the task of the theorist. When approaching the course of study, Herbartians were willing to tolerate clear intellectual distinctions, but not task-oriented practical ones, between developing its objective, logical relations, and showing how, in principle, these relations become a part of the "apperceptive mass" of persons. Here, I believe we can locate an enduring strength, because whether we see our challenge as one of prefiguring the course of study out of our ideational reflection and moral deliberation, or responding in re-creative ways to the course of study "in place", a recognition that the concern for the course of study must extend to both structural and phenomenological relations is central. But while it remains possible, given the continuing survival of the norms of academic freedom, to explore these relations on a purely ideational level, the limits of liberal doctrine would have to be surmounted for these relations to be recognized as practical ones.

Thus, if we made a "Herbartian approach" through these spheres of reflection beginning with the logical relations in and of a course of study as proposed, we might choose to select a subject, element, motif, or generic relationship first and build the rest from or around it (this was called an "objective concentration"),
or we might think more relationally (today we might say "ecologically") about the whole affair, and seek to grasp possibilities for "objective co-ordination", but we could not just stop their and say we had solved the problem. As Frank MacMurray put it "the fact is that he has only just reached it, it began where he left off . . . the (objective) relations have always actually existed as they do now, but children have not discovered them. . ..". In effect, one must have in mind simultaneously the logical relations between and among the elements of the course of study and the psychological relations that exist both in the child and in its relations with this content (this was signified by the language of "apperceptive mass"). It is in each of these aspects and in its entirety that one was to strive for unity, that is to say, actual concentration or correlation.

In other words, the Herbartians recognized that the course of study only makes sense to the extent that it makes sense as an apperceptive unity. However, instead of asking as we have in this Dissertation "How is it that the course of study does not make sense?", locating this as a concrete historical circumstance, setting our sights upon achieving conditions where we might, as liberated autonomous adults, "make sense together" and extend a coherent invitation to the new-born in all of
us, the Herbartians sought what C. C. Van Liew called a "paramount regularitive principle" that could contemplate the three spheres of ideational reflection as an integrated, vital process. This paramount regularitive principle, commonly known as the cultural epoch hypothesis claims:

..a parallelism of the psychical development lying back of the specific products which the race has offered in its history, on the one hand, and the manifestation of the growth of the child on the other. Hence while it claims that the boy, for instance, has and evinces at certain stages of his development traits that, in given environments, have produced in the history of the race, say, the bandit, the cowboy (in the less desirable sense) or the pirate; it by no means claims what would be a foolish trifling with the idea of education, that every boy should be a pirate or bandit to be rightly developed. But it would claim that these same instincts, the source of wholesome as well as degenerate developments, should be seized and rightly utilized at the height of their development. It would seek to determine what stages have been essential to the development of the race; it would eliminate those that have been non-essential, and it would present, in the light of the ethical aim of education, that material of culture which is the product of the great movements of human development.

But we do not have to concern ourselves with assessing the validity of this "hypothesis" to recognize a very important precedent for our work. A coherent body of prescriptive theory simply requires
recourse to some integrating conception as the arbiter for value disputes. The Herbartians, as we see here, held that culture locates the ground for any such arbitration. And while the image of human development may seem crude to us, the interpretation of culture still holds a certain timeliness. Indeed, it is the epitome of the liberal faith in progress and human purpose:

Van Liew's quote from Rein is paradigmatic.

Culture comprehends the entire sphere of human labor, everything that man has ever felt, experienced, thought out, and attempted in the fields of either humanistic effort or natural science -- an immense treasure, which men have thus far amassed, and which, day by day, they set about increasing unto infinity in order constantly to enhance their power over the life of Man and Nature. Into this powerful stream, which taken at its depth, reveals but a single movement, while on its surface, the most varied currents rush side by side, often begetting eddy and whirlpool or crowding one another, -- into this stream is placed the unfolding human being with the hard requirement of making its power his own that he may in turn contribute to the power of the whole. 12

It's a wonderful story, though hardly connected in a critical way with the lived experience of schooled life. But it served the Herbartian well in articulating his values, justifying them by "the demands of culture", expressing them in the slogan "the aim of education is
the development of character", guiding him to consider "which stages in the development of the race are essential", and "what cultural intentions and forms" (Dewey) or "material products" (McMurray) best express these stages. Here was a discourse that could stretch from the elementary to the esoteric at the drop of a hat, but never lose its balance. For example, when Colonel Parker with the support of Professor Jackman (neither of whom could be considered Herbartians in terms of our interpretation) pressed the view in open discussion that nature study understood as ethnology, as opposed to geography, history or literature (the Herbartian favorites) should be central; he asserted that "ethnology is the central study . . . (in that) history is a report of ethnology". Only later did the polemics begin: "Through history and literature, the child can be adjusted to the Society, State, and Government; through the proper study of nature he can only be adjusted to the truth of God". The point is that despite the lively polemic that ensured, with speakers interrupting each other and appealing to every kind of argument they could think of, the expectation is that the ultimate way you would move a Herbartian away from geography, literature and history as the central foci was to question his interpretation of the development of culture, or his assumption that the
discourse should move from cultural (and not some
cultural commitment) to course of study (via the
child). I am convinced that a fair reading of the
debate cannot help but confirm the impression that the
Parker proposal was considered along the lines that
President DeGarmo suggested that it be considered; as
presenting as an alternative principle to guide
reflection a "philosophical conception of energy working
through matter in accordance with universal law"\(^{18}\)
(1895). Accordingly, it was rejected by the Herbar-
tians, and indeed this decision has stuck, because it
was felt to be a moral imperative that the educational
profession ground its practice within the limit
situation that culture provides.

That the Herbartians developed an elegant avenue
of contemplation is not be be denied. As well, we
have attempted to recognize in our interpretation a
number of procedures that make good sense for anyone
constructing school curricula to consider. But still
the question remains, if the course of study does not
make sense, and if we mean by this the course of study
that is actually lived and experienced by real concrete
persons, how is this to be understood and overcome? Is
this to be understood as a problem that is endemic to
schools, and are schools the only context to which "the
course of study" is to refer? What gave the Herbartian
the idea that pure, rarefied, nondistorted materials or forms of culture were available to be transported to the schools, or that the schools were like a black box into which these embodied meanings could be poured? While Herbartian reflection was concerned with more than the psychology of learning, we that they did not really explore what we have called the dimensions of curriculum content much less critique them, but presumed that they could be located in abstract ideational space and simply appropriated for use in the schools. In the process, they misunderstood the character of curriculum content and schools, accepting the tenor of their times uncritically. However, they leave behind a body of reflection that captures, albeit purely in that reflection, something of the artfulness of the curriculum enterprise; the necessity of attending simultaneously to the structural and phenomenological realm. Given our discussion in Chapter I, it should not be surprising that, over time, even this sense of artfulness, this commitment to an integrating intelligence, becomes the exception and not the rule in theoretical attempts to respond to the question "What should we teach in schools?".

The text I have chosen to scrutinize in this regard comes from Paul H. Hirst, of the University of Cambridge. It is a collection of essays entitled
Knowledge and the Curriculum. While it should be possible, for present purposes, to select any contemporary piece that organizes itself as a theoretical response to the question "What shall we teach in school?", the virtue of this particular selection lies in the author's unquestionable ability to argue his position forcefully, systematically and thoroughly. What we will be doing here is putting Hirst's thought up against both the Herbartians and the understandings we have achieved in this study. This procedure is meant to call attention to my view that we have a rather clear choice in curriculum theory. Either we retain the present conceptualization of content, in which case the Herbartian heritage can serve as a model for our work, as the breath of its intellectual commitment remains unmatched, or we can decide that the direction of our work lies in the reconceptualization I have tried to point towards.

Let us begin by summarizing the opening points that Hirst organized in his first essay, constructed as a kind of introduction to the collection:

1. Curriculum means a program of activities designed so that pupils will attain by learning certain specifiable ends or objectives.

2. All knowledge is differentiated into a limited number of logically distinct forms or disciplines . . . there is simply no such thing as knowledge which is not
locatable within some such organization, and what that location is is not a matter of choice or decision.

3. While the social organization of the school and the pattern of its general life both in and out of class need to be seen as the vehicles of learning they truly are . . . only the most elementary achievements are articulated in the situations encountered in everyday social lives and . . . the more sophisticated forms are part of extremely complex rule-governed structures of thought and practice. 20

We have here a rather pervasive set of starting points, although the precision with which they are articulated is exceptional. From the Herbartian frame of reference, the initial approach to critique would be to question whether Hirst was interested in more than the "objective" aspects of the correlation-concentration problematic. I base this view on more than imagination, as this was the tack they took in rejecting W. T. Harris' Committee of 15 Report of 1895 which argued that the valued cultural heritage organizes itself into five categories of knowledge. While the Herbartians had no quarrel with this sort of philosophizing per se, they argued that we cannot understand either the elementary or more complicated forms as separate from the student-life to which they must ultimately be related. Thus their example would compel us to look beyond the formal, technical edge of human activity. Hirst does not. As well, the Herbartians would remind us to pay attention
to the axiological structure that Hirst develops; the pattern of valuing that grounds his exposition at each step and in its entirety. As well, we can see that both the Herbartians and Hirst hold that the everyday-life situations in school and presumably elsewhere do not carry with them the potential to encounter a meaningful course of study, but they do not inquire further into this problematic. In effect, we are to build out of these situations something meaningful and coherent without attempting to understand the situation itself, thus neglecting to concern ourselves with the part we play in it.

These elements of Hirst's thought make themselves present for us in his famous essay "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge", but only if we are prepared to negotiate the complex language systems he is working through. The situation is forced upon us, because his understanding of the forms of knowledge, the way he connects these forms to "the curriculum", and the value frame that sustains the enterprise are "all of a piece", and that which they are a piece of is crucial to understand. There is, first-off, a decidedly paradigmatic series of reflections that lead us from the three simple starting points towards what should be by now a rather familiar "liberal" view of the most fundamental questions man can ask of himself, his neighbor, and his
world, which it is Hirst's special talent to make fairly clear for us. And there is also to be found and charted the relationship between his thought and the Herbartians, along the lines we have indicated.

In "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge", Hirst has taken the platonic idea of education (which he also labels liberal, but the term means something very different in this context) stripped of its metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics, as the starting point for a contemporary conception of liberal education (liberal now in a sense that is consistent with our treatment). In this sense, Hirst's argument recapitulates the central dynamic we have been concerned with. We see that Plato understood the pursuit of knowledge as THE ultimate WAY; it locates for man the good, the true and the beautiful. One need not be concerned with the relationship between knowledge, course of study, and person; in coming to know we are assured of an intuitive harmony that inheres in its pursuit, transcending all such distinctions or distortions. In other words, Hirst takes the Greek experience as a kind of Garden of Eden, and draws the following conclusion:

... thus, there has arisen the demand for an education whose definition and justification are based on the nature and significance of
knowledge itself, and not on the predilections of pupils, the demands of society or the whims of politicians. 21

But, once the vision, the music, and the force of mind that sustained this promise has been lost, is it responsible to accept a demand for an educational experience that is not "contaminated" with the world we live through together? What, then, would we mean by knowledge, and how, outside the kingdom of the forms, or some such essential unity, are we to establish this meaning? Without hope for the intuitive harmony of the aesthetic quest, what now are we to make of the very real distortions between and among the "stuff of the curriculum", and what are the consequences for our work? Let us listen once again to Hirst:

What is being suggested, rather, is that the "harmony" (his quotes). . .is a matter of the logical relationship between the concept of mind and the concept of knowledge. . .Further, whatever private forms of awareness there may be, it is by means of symbols, particularly in language, that conceptual articulation becomes objectified, for the symbols give public embodiment to the concepts. 22

We see that while the Herbartians opted for a lush cultural harmony that could be found at the bottom of the stream of history man has created, as this history is recapulated by the new-born, Hirst's harmony belongs to the empty, abstract world of Newtonian "public space". While the Herbartians saw the demand for liberal education in terms of the development of socially valued
character, without questioning what kind of character that would turn out to be, Hirst sees it in the development of a pattern of logic that has no ethical character whatsoever. Knowledge then, for Hirst, is a socially constructed "objectivity" that we locate and verify by performing logical operations upon its manifestation -- language. His investigation of language leads him to argue that all we have come to know can be reduced, upon analysis, to approximately six logically autonomous forms (the empirical, mathematical, moral, religious, aesthetic, and the sociological/historical). Each form is mediated by certain categories that change only under the influence of Kunian paradigm shifts, and it is from these categories that the substantive concepts which we use and change (and teach) can be derived.

Understood along these lines, the structure of knowledge has very definite logical implications for constructing a curriculum, as Hirst defines one. It does not provide us with specific syllabi or particular teaching strategies, as there is no one-to-one relationship presumed between the logical features of a "language game", and the psychological situation of the child. The Herbartians would agree, and go on to say that the artful reconstruction of this relationship is part of our task, and signifies what they might have
regarded as a special kind of interpretative knowledge -- actual correlation or concentration. However, for Hirst, the "rules of the game" are to dictate to others (Hirst speaks most often of "empirical psychologists" and "manpower specialists") the parameters within which they are to organize the curriculum. The knowledge base is presumed objective as it can be rendered transparent by the specially trained analytic philosophers. One imagines a sophisticated new knowledge-delivery system, creating several new steps along "the ladder of knowledge", with the analytically trained administrators boasting to a grateful television audience of their success in delivering knowledge more efficiently than the bureaucrats across the street deliver health care or welfare. The new day will dawn once we cleanse the teachers' minds of "crazy fuzzy thinking", and the theorist can turn the realm of practice over to the psychologists and the manpower specialists secure in "the knowledge" that there really isn't much of consequence for them to muck about with. And what will they be doing? Outside the Platonic cave, there would stand the liberal jig puzzle. The puzzle depicts six complex and distinctively designed towers of most intricate construction arising out of a common base, with surrounding scenery and sky that throws them into high relief. The people split into
two approved factions. One group insists that each distinct and intricate tower should be constructed first and only afterwards should the common base, sky, and people walking around be filled in. The second group believes they ought to begin with the common base, and slowly work up from the bottom to the top, filling in each tower and the spheres in between all at the same time.

Both groups could be supported and honored by a "Hirstian administration". Only those who feel that the puzzle is of such a kind that any variety of pictures could be made from it, and proceed to force the pieces together according to their own idiosyncratic whims would be rejected. Thus, as long as they stay within the rules of the game, what these people actually do would be none of Hirst's professional business, as it is beyond the scope of logical theory.

I'm not sure how the Herbartians would respond to the metaphor of the jigsaw puzzle, as they seemed blissfully unaware of it. Upon first glance, it is tempting to see the argument between the two approved factions as a reenactment of the Herbartian debate between concentration and correlation. However, I don't think that such a view captures the significance either Hirst or the Herbartians. On the one hand, it is clear that Hirst's theory of the structure of knowledge is
far more sophisticated than anything the Herbartians had discovered. And, we may legitimately suppose that Dwayne Huebner was correct when he recently observed "we are presumably much more informed about the process of learning than we have been at any time in our collective past". On the other hand, we must recognize that the single integrated intellectual project the Herbartians sought has been thwarted by the exigencies of a liberal doctrine that separates and mitigates against those who seek to integrate, an intention that settles increasingly upon control, as its agenda lies more and more in the past and not the present, a methodology that subordinates the aesthetic appreciation that seeks connections and achieves understanding to a praxiology that seeks through management to achieve logical, but not actual correlation, and a context that makes education and schooling increasingly contradictory categories. But while we have noted that the spheres of reflection the Herbartians pointed towards can still be explored, and this is a possible vision of the future of curriculum theory, the thrust of my argument is that we are simply constrained from achieving the understandings the Herbartians sought so long as we retain their taken-for-granted definition of curriculum content and let the liberal doctrine do our work for us. The relations McMurray spoke of (and he was right to claim that
students do not grasp them, but we are entitled to ask "Who has?", do not situate themselves in a school, any more than a hospital, or a church, etc. In truth, the phenomenon we seek to understand extends throughout the culture, and our opening question ("What do we teach in schools?") hides that significant truth. When we start our thinking inside school doors, we literally blind ourselves to what is occurring within, between, and among us, and constrain ourselves from developing the conceptual power (much less the practical wisdom and communicative competence) to influence this institutional life form -- and we cannot understand it apart from how we act and influence it. To reconceptualize curriculum content as "what we come up against in life" amounts to a commitment to exploring, in our dialogue with ourselves and with each other, and in the work that must be done to establish, nourish and extend this dialogue, "How we live together"; to sharing what we think/believe; to listening to the stories others have to tell, and to the world that reverberates in-between. It is only in this kind of praxis that we can open up the dimensions of curriculum content and work to identify and overcome distortions.

That what defines the problem of education is nothing less than the spirit, the direction in which everything is moving in a particular time and place, is the central theme that has come through for me during
the course of this exploration. A quality of relationship so utterly concrete that it eludes contemporary habits of minding, we express our concern for education in our way of being with ourselves and with each other, in the world we construct and in the world we witness.

That these forms of expression are inter-related means that the choice between a strategic concern for school practice and a theoretical concern for reconceptualizing curriculum content is a false one. The gap between conscious purpose and actual circumstance cannot be closed by prepackaged technique or utopian proposal, but can be disclosed to reveal a sea of intentionality we must cross together. For the field of curriculum theorizing, it's now "sink or swim"; as issues become redefined, new avenues of relationship emerge that must be seized upon if they are not to disappear.

While it would be folly to expect particular strategic proposals for school curricula to generate the critical consciousness we seek, efforts which address the distortions we have located in liberal doctrine, and seek to provide access to the intra-personal and/or the socio-political dimensions of curriculum content deserve more than our critical reappraisal; they deserve our support and encouragement. However, our understanding of the network through which these intentions must travel should restrain us
from equating the fate of such proposals with the fate of the discipline "curriculum". It is an approach that demands failure. It leads us to regard the phenomenon that persons come up against in schools as somehow unique to that setting, thus misunderstanding the phenomenon and schools. It tends to close off from our horizon other action contexts from which we have much to learn and much to contribute, and provides us with a convenient excuse for failing to pursue lines of inquiry and action to points of fruition.
EPILOGUE

We have taken the position that curriculum theorizing is a field of study that draws its coherence from the pattern of contemporary efforts on its behalf, as opposed to a specific discipline with its own method and precise object. Recognizing this pattern of effort in terms of "generating a theoretical base for restructuring curriculum content" involves a reconceptualization of curriculum content that sheds light upon the fundamental structures that must be transformed.

In so doing, we come up against a potentially debilitating duality. The Prologue called attention to two views of emancipation. One stresses the potential of persons to go beyond where they have been, and while the blocks are understood to have socio-political implications, they are portrayed in terms of a biographic transformation. The other point of view emphasizes the structural relations that locate the personal situation, and insists that emancipation refers to the transformation of the ensemble of social relationships. From the perspective of "liberal doctrine as curriculum content", what we have here are two sides of the same coin; partial critiques of liberal doctrine. Singular efforts to
transcend the psychological categories of liberal doctrine are, in the end, limited by socio-political circumstance, while even the most organized, concerted effort to restructure the liberal political categories amounts to an oppressive deception if it leaves the psychological categories intact (e.g., the USSR).

Our examination of the Herbartians and Hirst indicates that the taken-for-granted conception of curriculum content sheds light on neither the biographic nor the political limit situations of everyday life, not even in schools. This fits rather well with an overwhelmingly interpersonal picture of educational practice. It reminds us, as teachers, that the situations we come up against are almost always taken as interpersonal ones; neither the intrapersonal nor the socio-political meanings are commonly explored. The institutional life-form works in both realms simultaneously, destroying at the same time the inner integrity of the psyche and the outer community of relation.

We might say then, with Kariel:

In short, we can take more account of what is repressed within the liberal order and within ourselves at every moment. The very process of making repressed interests public will constitute the alternative beyond liberalism... Thus its contours are defined not by some blueprint for utopia but by increasingly penetrating pictures of both prevailing institutions and our current images of them.
Yet, it is necessary to conclude with the recognition that the process of generating a theoretical base for restructuring curriculum content has barely begun. It is still impossible to predict what form this theoretical base will come to take, to say nothing of its potential impact.

Essentially what this study contributes is a series of topics, generated out of the intrapersonal and socio-political dimensions of "liberal doctrine as curriculum content". The topics, and their preliminary exploration, provide a healthy avenue for further research into the intrapersonal and socio-political potentialities of a particular course of study, and to the extent that such inquiry reflects back upon its own form, we can expect it to move us further down the path of developing an adequate theoretical base.

Even as we look ahead, it seems clear that the relation between personal and political development will remain a central theoretical problem. In representing this relationship, we must work our way through conceptually distinct intellectual categories and language traditions. However, the recognition that all situations are simultaneously personal and structural, that these dimensions inform and interpenetrate each other, requires us to continue the search for ways of talking and acting
that honors the significance of both. So long as we are willing to judge this work in terms of its emancipatory potential, we are sure to develop more powerful, challenging insights into the quality of life in America. Yet, as contemporary mappings of the field suggest, the role of theory in bringing about personal and political emancipation is neither fixed nor given. And as we begin to grasp what is involved in developing and sharing a critical, self-hermeneutical frame of reference that challenges the limit situations of our common sense interpretations, and directs our attention in practical as opposed to technical directions, there are also bound to be moments of doubt and despair. Let us remember that what is at stake may be nothing less than the survival of the human spirit.
REFERENCES CITED

PROLOGUE


3 Ibid., p. 174. 4 Ibid., p. xv.
5 Ibid., p. 225. 6 Ibid., pp. 43-53.
7 Ibid., pp. 57-102. 8 Ibid., p. 74-84.
9 Ibid., pp. 104-109. 10 Ibid., pp. 135-159.
11 Ibid., p. 167. 12 Ibid., p. 168.

14 Ibid., p. 178. 15 Ibid., p. 185.
16 Ibid., p. 192. 17 Ibid., p. 193.
18 Ibid., p. 194. 19 Ibid., pp. 195-200.
In English the word "reflect" tends to mean, aside from "mirror", either "bend back" or "recurve" or the mental operation of reflecting on something (albeit the self) that is external to the act of reflection. In German usage, particularly as developed by German Idealism and its dialectic of subject and object, the word "reflect" expresses the idea that the act in which the subject reflects on something is one in which the object of reflection itself recurves or bends back in a way that reveals its true nature. The process through which consciousness reflects back upon itself, insofar as it reveals the constitution of consciousness and its objects, also dissolves the naive or dogmatic view of objects; thus they themselves are reflected through consciousness.

22 Ibid., pp. 199-205.

23 Jeremy Shapiro, in his English translation of Jurgen Habermas' Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 319, contributes an extended note that clarifies what reflection (reflektieren) means in the context of this study. He writes:


25 Ibid., p. 235.

26 Ibid., p. 224.

27 The Reconceptualists, op. cit., p. viii.

28 William Pinar, "The Reconceptualization of Curriculum Studies" (presented to the 1977 meeting of the American Educational Research Association Convention in New York City) for a more extended treatment of these ideas.


30 James B. Macdonald, "Curriculum Theory as Intentional Activity" (presented to the Curriculum Theory Conference in Charlottesville, Virginia, October, 1975).

31 Ibid., p. 1.

32 Ibid., p. 1.

33 Ibid., pp. 2, 3.

34 Ibid., p. 3.

35 Ibid., p. 3.

36 Ibid., p. 4.

37 Ibid., p. 4.

38 Ibid., p. 5.

40 Bernstein, op. cit., p. 224.


44 Apple, op. cit., p. 15.


47 Pinar, "The Method of Currere".


49 Pinar, "The Concrete and the Abstract in Curriculum Theorizing".


51 Ibid., p. 9.


54 Ibid., p. 214.
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid.  

59 George Posner and William Schubert have been working on a computer model of the genealogy of the incomplete, and does not extend far back enough to decide the question.
1 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Knowledge and Politics, (New York: The Free Press, 1975). While I will refrain from noting all but direct quotes and paraphrasing of this work as they appear in Chapter I, this procedure does not fully reflect the debt to Unger's formulations, which is considerable.


4 Unger, p. 31: Trothrop, pp. 77, 78.

5 Northrop, p. 83.

6 Unger, pp. 36, 37. 7 Ibid., pp. 38-42.


I do not offer an independent interpretation of the significance of Hobbes for a contemporary understanding of liberal doctrine. Rather, I accept the view of Unger (supported by Northrop) with respect to his role as the first to make explicit the psychological and political consequences of Newtonian physics. In Section 3, I find collaboration in Jurgen Habermas' view as expressed in Theory and Practice (see Prologue) op. cit., of Hobbes-as-examplar for the emergence of a "science of politics", supported by Frank Coleman's view, expressed in Hobbes and America (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1977) of the Hobbesian influence in American political life.


10 Unger, pp. 42, 43.

11 Ibid., pp. 43-46, 49-55.


17 Ibid., p. 119.

18 Frank Coleman, *Hobbes and America*.

19 Ibid., p. 121. 20 Rawls, op. cit., p. 154.


24 William Pinar began his doctoral dissertation by introducing "Dorothy and Paul", two children whose experience stands in profound contradiction with the "Teacher's" taken-for-granted perceptions. See his "Sanity Madness and the School" in *The Reconceptualists*, (op. cit.), Ira Weingarten, interpreting this sort of "everyday life" situation, conceptualized what he called a hidden, hidden curriculum, in the 1975 course of "Conceptualizing the Reconceptualists", (Eric Doc #106180, 1975). In contradistinction with the hidden curriculum, this world was located as "the layer of reality we can have immediate access to").


27 Sennett, op. cit., p. 83.


29 Sennett, p. 95.

30 Stephen Gay, Volume I.

31 Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*. For the metaphor of "the table" see p. 53.


33 Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man*.

34 Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*.


37 Unger, op. cit., pp. 81-99.

38 To illustrate the point, I might note that it has been brought to my attention that this message has become the centerpiece for a presently popular poster. Now that we all "know" about this, I am told, it ceases to be a problem! (I guess "it's moved again").
CHAPTER II


4Taken from Carl Boggs' Gramsci's Markism (London: Pluto Press, 1976), p. 64.


7While this theme is manifest throughout the early yearbooks, the language was taken from Charles McMurry, ed., "Reply to Whites Paper", II, p. 18.

8Ibid., p. 19.


12C. C. Van Liew, "The Educational Theory of the Cultural Epochs" (op. cit.), p. 76.

13The theme is first stated in the introductory remarks of DeGarmo (op. cit.) p. 96, but is present throughout. Indeed the third yearbook is, as Charles McMurry writes in the preface "given largely to the discussion of a single topic - Moral Education".


Ibid., "Discussion", I, p. 178.

Ibid., "Discussion", I, p. 183, (The speech is Colonel Parker's.).


Ibid., I have drawn these statements by summarizing "Philosophy and Curriculum Planning", pp. 1-15. I have retained Hirst's language in this fashion to provide the simplicity of a summary, but still give the reader a feel for Hirst's syntax.

Ibid., p. 32.

Ibid., p. 39.

This jigsaw metaphor is a considerably shortened, considerably edited version of a story that was attributed to Hirst by Allen Brent. See his Philosophical Foundations of Curriculum, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978).

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