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**GAME RULES AND MORALITY**

by

**Joyce H. Weiblen**

**A Dissertation Submitted to  
the Faculty of the Graduate School at  
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro  
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**WEIBLEN, JOYCE HOPE. Game Rules and Morality. (1972) Directed by:  
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This study investigated the premise that game rules can be used as instruments for teaching morality. Gowin's philosophic method of inquiry was utilized. It consists of the development of major hypotheses and their attendant sub-hypotheses. Major hypotheses were developed concerning the concept of morality, the nature of moral rules, the essence of games, the nature of game rules, the relationship of moral rules to game rules, and the use of games as a vehicle for teaching morality.

Concepts which emerged as a result of investigating the hypotheses suggested that all cultures have games and systems of morality of which rules are an essential part. However, game rules and moral rules are not philosophically congruent in either the play domain or the real world. Evidence suggested instead, that moral rules are analogous to implicit game rules, that morality is analogous to the spirit of the game, and that official game rules are congruent with real life laws. Although the official rules were not found to be the instruments through which games could be used to teach morality, games do contain moral elements in the form of implicit rules. It was therefore concluded that games could be instruments for teaching morality.

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## CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

Cultural change is occurring at an accelerated pace. This change has been attributed principally to technology, which has had a profound impact on social organizations and on ideologies. (13, 28, 38, 41, 44, 54) The concept of rapid change has not been restricted to a single culture but has spread to encompass many cultures. Mass communication has been largely responsible for an increased awareness of interaction in the global community.

In this milieu of rapid change, people, and particularly the young, have been challenging the belief and value systems of specific cultures, which are the rationale for the rules and laws which govern the conduct of people. It has been argued that cultural change today is too rapid to justify using rules of conduct and behavior which were applicable in more stable cultural configurations. (28, 54) However, this argument does not necessarily imply that societies can exist without rules to govern conduct. Anthropologists and sociologists insist that cultures must have rules and norms to survive. Without rules, cultures, and particularly those cultures in dynamic flux, would spin into unstable conglomerations and eventually collapse. (17)

Bombarded by ideas, unsettled by conflicting moralities, and confused by overchoice of products, most individuals in highly technological cultures need guidelines to organize their lives. (41) Toffler (41) suggested that whereas individuals in stagnant cultures have a psychological need for novelty and excitement, in cultures characterized by accelerative change the need might be to preserve some continuities. He recommended that social strategies need to be developed and provided to support "change-harassed" individuals in such volatile cultures.

Because of the development of these increasingly complex and mutable cultural patterns, rules of conduct are increasingly essential and necessary. If

existent rules are not appropriate for societies, then they need to be reappraised and possibly changed or even discarded.

Traditionally, rules originated in cultures usually from an assimilation of many experiences; thus, age has taught youth. But, Margaret Mead has stated that ". . . today the elders can no longer present with certainty moral imperatives to the young." (28:82) The source of rules may be important, but the existence of rules would seem to be more important. If the traditional sources of rules and norms are diminished, the culture will and must find other ways of prescribing what constitutes appropriate conduct in any specific culture. Conceivably games might be one such source.

Both games and cultures have rules, which have emerged as a result of many experiences by members of particular societies and by participants in particular games. Past experience, then, with a subsequent sifting out of meaningless experiences and the assimilation of meaningful experiences has been the usual pattern for establishing rules. Mead suggests this pattern is not viable in the prefigurative culture, a concept she advanced in her book *Culture and Commitment*.

In the context of anthropological theory, Mead viewed culture as being of three kinds—postfigurative, cofigurative, and prefigurative. In the postfigurative culture, elders and the past are the principal source of learning. Such a culture is predicated upon the existence of three generations living together. The older generation is the guiding force. It is the beliefs and values of the elders, their expectations and hopes, which become ingrained into the young. External cultural patterns are not verbalized and remain at the nonconscious level. Lack of questioning and lack of consciousness keynote such a culture. This cultural pattern seems to fit Harding's (55) concept that in change there is no change. Only an anthropologist outside the system might observe the changes which had occurred.

In the cofigurative culture, peers are the main source of learning for both adults and children. This is the "pioneer generation type" or "migration in space" in which the environment is new to adults as well as children.

Such a cofigurative culture appears when there is a break in the postfigurative culture of a catastrophic nature, such as migrating to a new land or being conquered and forced to adopt new ways of living. Comparisons can be made with the old environment. The awareness of difference offers the child a choice—the old way or the new way. The social structure of the family changes. Removal of the grandparents, in a physical sense, makes the past murky, and therefore it is easier to abandon the past. Since neither the past nor the future is clearly envisioned, behavior is regulated by peer groups. Mobility and adaptability characterize such a culture. Other agencies take over many of the traditionally parental roles, but the children “. . . are being reared to an expectation of *change within changelessness.*” (28:61) Peers become more practical models than elders who are unable to serve this function.

The prefigurative culture—which, Mead maintained, reflects our present period, is characterized by children being the prime source for learning. Such a culture is brought about by technological advances which create an environment in dynamic flux. Awareness of a world community has resulted, and Mead pinpointed World War II as the critical period which accentuated the generation gap. What makes this generation gap particularly unique is that youthful activism and revolt are occurring on a world-wide basis. Those born post-World War II live in an age—threatened by annihilation—which cannot be experienced emotionally by the older generation. Likewise, today's youth will never know the experiences of their pre-World War II elders. Mead employed the term “immigrants in time” to describe the pre-World War II or elder group. Mead has suggested that the war left its cultural mark with uncertainty and communication-breakdown keynoting this age. As a result of these difficulties and changes “. . . the elders can no longer present with certainty moral imperatives to the young.” (28:82) Change is occurring with such rapidity that “. . . the unborn child, already conceived but still in the womb, must become the symbol of what life will be like.” (28:88)

Societies need rules to govern the conduct of interacting individuals. Change, however, is forcing a re-evaluation of existent rules of conduct and the

source of such rules. Educators must find new ways of assisting individuals to cope with change, to understand the reason for rules of conduct, and to interpret and be guided by such rules.

*Premise.*

The premise of this study was that game rules can be used as instruments for teaching morality.

*Statement of the problem.*

The purpose of this study was to investigate the concept of morality, to analyze the relationship of moral rules to game rules, and to structure logical implications for the use of games to teach morality. Hypotheses and their attendant sub-hypotheses were developed. The tenability of the major and supportive hypotheses was deduced from examination and analysis of the pertinent literature. The major hypothesis concerning morality was that all cultures have systems of morality. Sub-hypotheses were developed concerning the definition of morality, levels of moral judgment, morality reflecting culture, and the codification of the concept of morality.

The second major hypothesis was that there are moral rules. The attendant sub-hypotheses were that moral rules are distinctive, have identifiable characteristics, can be classified, and serve societies.

The third major hypothesis was that all cultures have games. Sub-hypotheses included propositions that the play domain can be codified, that games can be defined, that there are levels of judgment in games, and that games reflect culture.

The fourth major hypothesis was that there are game rules. Sub-hypotheses included the considerations of game rules as being distinctive, having identifiable characteristics, being classifiable, and serving various functions.

The fifth major hypothesis was that moral rules and game rules are philosophically congruent within their respective domains. Three sub-hypotheses were developed as follows: 1) a concept exists which is basic to moral rules and game rules; 2) moral rules are to morality what game rules are to games;

3) morality and the spirit of the game are comparable phenomena.

The sixth and final major hypothesis was that games can be used to teach morality. Sub-hypotheses centered around the teaching of morality and the use of the spirit of the game as a vehicle for teaching morality.

*Method of approach.*

This study was approached utilizing Gowin's (105, 106) philosophic method of inquiry. Key *concepts* and their attendant *assumptions* and *pre-suppositions* were developed concerning: 1) the nature of morality, 2) the nature of moral rules, 3) the nature of games, 4) the nature of game rules, 5) the relationship of moral rules to game rules, 6) the use of games as a vehicle for teaching morality. In this manner, a *conceptual system* was developed.

*Definitions.*

For the purpose of this study, the definitions developed by Gowin (106) for philosophical inquiry were used.

An *assumption* is "a statement of proposition upon which other statements may depend. Something taken for granted, a supposition. Not tested, although it could be converted into a hypothesis for testing." (106:1)

A *presupposition* is "an assumption made in advance, a necessary antecedent condition in logic or fact." (106:1)

A *concept* is "a sign of an invariance in a situation." Its root meaning is thought. "Conceptual studies concern ordinary language and its uses . . . , and the logic of informal argument. . . ." (106:1)

A *conceptual system* is "a set of concepts logically related." (106:1)

Each key concept was developed as an hypothesis. Each hypothesis suggested questions which needed to be answered in order to verify the hypothesis. The most pertinent questions were developed as sub-hypotheses. Answering the questions posed by the sub-hypotheses permitted the intelligible answering of the questions suggested by the hypothesis. Pertinent literature within each area was examined, analyzed, and interpreted by the author. Evidence was cited either supporting or refuting the sub-hypotheses. (105, 106)

## CHAPTER II

### MORALITY

#### *Hypothesis.*

All cultures have systems of morality.

#### *Sub-Hypotheses.*

1. Morality can be defined.
2. There are levels of moral judgment.
3. Morality reflects culture
4. Morality can be codified.

#### *Introduction.*

The concept of morality is obtuse and difficult to identify. Much of the difficulty in studying morality stems from its broad, multi-dimensional nature. The concept of morality has concerned scholars in many ways. It has been studied as an individual phenomenon, as a social phenomenon, as a cultural phenomenon, as a systematic process based upon reason, and with views toward determining its essence.

Frankena (15) synthesized the various approaches which have been taken in analyzing morality and suggested that it can be studied in three ways: 1) descriptively, 2) normatively, 3) analytically. The descriptive, empirical, historical, or scientific method is used by anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and historians for the purpose of describing existent moral systems. The normative method is used for contemplating and asserting such concepts as right, good, and obligation. It is assumed that reasons can be given when a normative judgment is made. The analytical, critical, or meta-ethical method of inquiry excludes the former methods described. Attempts are made to answer logical, epistemological, or semantical questions, such as the following: What is

the meaning of justice? What constitutes morality? How can value judgments be justified? Morality, in spite of its complexity, can be analyzed and studied.

*Morality can be defined.*

Due to the vagueness of the concept of morality and to its multi-dimensional nature, there has not been agreement on a single synonym or a single definition of the essence of morality. Frankena pointed out that moral philosophers are currently engaged in attempting “. . . to grasp the nature of morality itself, as compared with law, religion, or science.” (52:2)

Frankena (52) further discussed the recent positions taken with regard to identifying the nature of morality. Within each position, there are divergent views. One position characterizes morality in formal and individualistic terms. According to this position, an individual has a morality if he has principles, formulated through moral reasoning based upon full factual knowledge of the situations, which he holds as supreme and is willing to see others hold as supreme. These conditions are formal or structural in nature; the content of the principles does not matter. In other words, such principles are moral not because of their content or their acceptance by others but because they fulfill those formal conditions stated above. A second position characterizes morality in formal and social terms. This position builds into morality an element of trans-individuality. It characterizes morality in formal terms, as specified above, but adds an interpersonal claim to the formal features of characterization. The other characterization necessary to make a judgment moral is a claim that others will sustain the judgment when they take the moral point of view. The third position characterizes morality in material and social terms. The material condition requires considering the concern of others and the common good. In this conception, morality, as a guide for human behavior, has certain formal conditions but by definition must include a material or social condition. Thus, moral reasoning is complete only if there is an appeal to a social goal or principle. It is not clear why Frankena did not characterize this latter position of morality in formal and material terms, as Baier (2) did.

Baier suggested that formal conditions alone can not characterize morality. The principles or rules should have a certain content. He defined that content as being ". . . for the good of everyone alike." (2:200) Morality can be characterized in formal and materialistic terms.

It would seem that morality can not be defined solely in individualistic terms or in social-materialistic terms. Generally, regardless of the position taken, there is agreement that morality involves distinguishing between the rightness and wrongness of certain actions. (2, 6, 15, 19, 26, 31, 32, 40, 51, 59, 93) Morality is a system of guidance. But, it is a system which is not legislated. (2, 15, 19, 51) Morality is a concept which can be interpreted by an individual or by a group. However, the group's interpretation of morality is bound to affect the individual, because the individual is taught the morality of the group before he understands the reasons for it. Thus, morality can not be studied solely on an individual level or on a societal level without losing some of its meaning.

Baier (2) established conditions under which the morality of a group is justified in prohibiting behavior. The conditions were the following: 1) The consequences of the behavior would be undesirable if everyone did it; 2) everyone was equally entitled to engage in the behavior; 3) engaging in the behavior was an indulgence, not a sacrifice. If the three conditions existed, then, Baier maintained, the morality of the group should prohibit such behavior.

Whether or not a group's interpretation of the concept of morality is the same as another group's interpretation does not seem to matter. What does matter is that some system for distinguishing between the rightness and wrongness of certain actions exists within a society. Interacting individuals need guidelines to govern their actions. Morality provides such guidelines. Thus, the action-guidance within the province of morality seems to center around the individual's interaction with others, for example, truth-telling, impartiality, protection of goods.

Analysis of the literature suggests that, although the definition of morality is obtuse and vague, it can be explained as a concept which distinguishes right conduct from wrong conduct. Thus, the sub-hypothesis that

morality can be defined is found tenable.

*There are levels of moral judgment.*

Philosophers, such as Falk (51) and Peters (64), made reference to levels of morality and moral judgment. Falk alluded to primary morality and mature morality. On the primary level, he defined morality". . . as authoritative action guidance whose function is to regulate the social order." (51:63) On the mature level, morality is conceived as a reason-guided concept of oughtness which exists for the orderliness of the individual. Peters supported a rational moral code which was intelligently applied. He differentiated between acting "in accordance with a rule" and acting "on a rule." Acting in accordance with a rule suggests obeying a directive for conduct. Acting on a rule suggests that the rule applies to a class of acts which encompass a wide range of actions all of which fall under the rule. Acting on a rule, according to Peters, requires intelligence and social sophistication.

The research of Piaget (33), Kohlberg (60, 108), and Hess, Minturn and Tapp (103) suggests that there are levels or stages of moral judgment and that these levels of development appear cross-culturally. From the research findings, it appears that individuals move through three levels of moral judgment. Level one is preconventional or ego-centered. A judgment is motivated by a view of avoiding punishment by an authority. Level two is conventional or conformity to societal roles and rules. Actions are consistent with societal expectations. Level three is postconventional or reworking of societal rules. Appeals are made to universal principles.

The emergent pattern of moral judgment development seems to be that initially the individual sees rules as absolutes to be followed to avoid punishment. Then, it appears that the rules are seen in broader perspective. An understanding develops that they serve a social function. Finally, there develops an ability to generalize the rules, to understand the reasons for their existence, and to question and change them if necessary.

Kohlberg (59, 82, 83, 108, 109), on the basis of his research, specifically delineated six stages of moral development. Within level one or the

pre-moral level, as Kohlberg described it, are stages one and two. Stage one judgments are motivated by punishment from and obedience to an authority orientation. Stage two Kohlberg called instrumental relativism. Judgments are motivated by attempting to fulfill quasi-physical needs. Within level two or the morality of conventional role-conformity are stages three and four. Stage three judgments are oriented towards receiving social approval while stage four judgments are oriented towards understanding the social order and one's role in it. Within level three or morality of self-accepted moral principles are stages five and six. Stage five moral judgments are based upon fulfilling social and legal contracts. Stage six morality is based upon the recognition of universal moral principles.

Kohlberg found evidence that individuals progress from level to level. However, most individuals never advance beyond level two, which is conformity to societal roles and rules. Coopersmith's (8) study involving value preferences supports the pattern found by Kohlberg that individuals seldom advance beyond level two. Coopersmith found that individuals generally employ value preferences which conform to the social norms of one's group rather than to independently derived standards. Kohlberg also found that an individual is generally unable to comprehend judgments which are more than one stage higher than his own.

Moral development, it appears, can be enhanced. (59, 60, 61, 108, 109) One hypothesis claims that if congruence can be established between stages, then progress through stages would be facilitated. In support of this hypothesis, it was found that children with mothers at level three tended to progress to level three. Another hypothesis suggests, with research support, that individuals will prefer judgments on a higher level when disputes between stages occur and when the shortcomings of lower-level judgments are pointed out to those possessing them.

Hampden-Turner and Whitten (77) took Kohlberg's model of sequential stages of moral development and applied it to the recent accentuation of political factions, i.e., conservatives, liberals, radicals, which had appeared in the United States. The model proved to be valid in explaining the views of those

within each group. For example, political conservatives referred to conformity to traditional roles (stage three) and to law and order (stage four) in making moral judgments. Radicals were divided between idealists whose judgments were based upon conscience and principles (stage six) and opportunists whose judgments were egocentric (stage two).

The acquisition of morality as a cognitive-developmental process which occurs within the individual is contrasted with a socialization theory which involves internalizing culturally transmitted external rules through reinforcement procedures. It would appear that if social factors can enhance moral development, then the developmentalists need to examine antecedent variables and cultural influences more closely. On the other hand, if the ultimate goal of morality is for the individual to participate in the moral argument of his time, as Brown (6) and Peters (64) suggested, then the proponents of the socialization approach to moral education need to examine ways which will not hinder fullest moral development. It would seem that the process of acquiring morality and of formulating moral judgments occurs in different ways and results in different levels of understanding. The sub-hypothesis that there are levels of moral judgment is found tenable.

*Morality reflects culture.*

Culture refers to the discernible way of life of a group of people who have learned to live together and who thus comprise a society. (37, 58) Basically, according to White (44), a culture has three dimensions as follows: 1) ideology, 2) social organizations, 3) technology. These dimensions which are the discernible products of group interaction are interrelated and form the essence of culture.

Morality is part of the belief and value system of a culture. The belief and value system of a culture is a group's attempt to establish a socially standardized idea about the universe and man's place in it. Commonly called a group's ideology, the belief and value system is the rationale and pervading spirit underlying the rules which govern the conduct of members of that group.

Cultural beliefs are assertions or concepts of what a group thinks is true. For example, the Bill of Rights espouses the belief system of the citizenry of the United States. However, evidence suggests that there is seldom a high positive correlation between stated beliefs and behavior. (6, 33, 61) Therefore, it is not unusual to find discrepancies between what people say they believe and what they do. To increase the correlation, Brown (6) stressed, is a lifetime task. Studying any phenomenon, such as morality, purely in theoretical as opposed to practical terms, or vice versa, is to lose some of its meaning.

Cultural values, according to Baier (47), are dispositions or attitudes for or against an activity or phenomenon which are manifested in behavior. The roots of such dispositions or attitudes stem from the belief that the realization of the goal to which the value points would benefit the individual, group, or society in some way. Baier suggested that values deal with the good life and ways of achieving it. The dominant value system of the middle class in the United States, according to DuBois, ". . . is rooted in the Protestant ethic and eighteenth century rationalism." (73:1232)<sup>1</sup>

In the United States, morality is more individualistically oriented than in most other cultures. (15, 75) According to Gillin (75), "inner-regulated morality" is believed to be a virtue of the American value system. Generally, each individual is thought to have a conscience resulting in guilt feelings for wrong doings. Individuals are encouraged to use reason in formulating moral judgments and to develop a kind of autonomy which calls for decision-making on one's own to the extent of criticizing societal rules when necessary.

As Brown (6) pointed out, there are a number of values, such as aesthetic, economic, and moral, all of which affect the various institutions and systems which are developed within a culture. Environmental conditions affect the realization of all values. For example, a drought or a war affects values. Moral values with the emergent moral system or code are no exception. They, too, are affected by existing conditions. The moral code developed by a group,

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<sup>1</sup>for other discussions of values see Gillin (75) and Rescher (65).

though distinctly serving a particular societal function, is interrelated with and influenced by other values and systems, which in turn are affected by existing conditions. These interdependent systems comprise the belief and value system of a culture of which the moral system is a part.

Thus, due to differing environmental conditions, as well as historical conditions, as the Durants (11) pointed out, systems of morality differ. To illustrate this point, the Durants suggested dividing economic history into three stages: 1) hunting, 2) agriculture, 3) industry. Logically, they argued, the moral code, which existed during the hunting stage when man had to fight and kill to survive, changed during the agricultural stage when man could plan his subsistence, and is rapidly changing during the industrial stage when technological discoveries are extending man's horizons.

Brown suggested that moralities ". . . change because of internal contradictions, because of the impact of foreign moralities, and because of the creation of new circumstances." (6:411) As long as conditions differ from culture to culture, systems of morality will differ. The sub-hypothesis that morality reflects culture is found tenable.

*Morality can be codified.*

Societies could not exist without a system for determining right conduct from wrong conduct. All cultures have been found to have general moral principles or standards upon which rules permitting or forbidding certain actions, such as truth-telling and incest, are based. The recognition of moral concepts and the development of moral rules allows for the stability and continuance of groups and maximizes the individual's security within the group. (63, 80)

Individuals within a society need guidelines to govern their behavior in relationship to one another. As a result of sharing a common belief and value system, the group interprets the concept of morality. The codifications of this concept are moral rules. Thus, moral rules guide behavior towards societally acceptable patterns of conduct. Traditionally, these rules or guidelines have developed through the experiences and wisdom of generations. (47, 91)

**As morality is codified, a system or code evolves.**

Since moral rules serve to assure security and foster confidence for members of the society, adherence to them is expected. In his analysis of values, Baier (47) distinguished a sub-class of values which he called "distributive." Distributive values, he suggested, are important to maintain the practice of morals. Distributive values, if maintained by an individual within a group, are believed to benefit the entire group. Moral rules serve society in such a way. Society demands compliance to moral rules because such compliance on the part of individuals benefits the group. Favorable attitudes are directed towards those members of the group who comply to moral rules, while unfavorable attitudes are directed towards those who do not comply. Baier (47) argued that societal pressure to conform to moral rules gives rise to psychological pressure within the individual to conform to moral rules. Related to Festinger's (14) theory of cognitive dissonance, group pressure induces guilt feelings or dissonance within the wrong-doer. To alleviate these feelings, the individual resolves the conflict by following what the moral rule advises. The dissonance is replaced by consonance, a state of equilibrium.

Durant summarized, "Morals are the rules by which a society exhorts (as laws are the rules by which it seeks to compel) its members and associations to behavior consistent with its order, security, and growth." (11:37) Thus, in their origins, functions, and sanctions moral rules are social in nature. The sub-hypothesis that morality can be codified is found tenable.

#### *Summary.*

Analysis of the pertinent literature led to the support and acceptance of the four sub-hypotheses as follows:

1. Morality can be defined.
2. There are levels of moral judgment.
3. Morality reflects culture.
4. Morality can be codified.

As a result of the evidence in support of the sub-hypotheses, the major hypothesis that all cultures have systems of morality is accepted as tenable.

### CHAPTER III MORAL RULES

#### *Hypothesis.*

There are moral rules.

#### *Sub-hypotheses.*

1. Moral rules are distinctive.
2. Moral rules have identifiable characteristics.
3. Moral rules can be classified.
4. Moral rules serve societies.

#### *Introduction.*

Societies can not exist without rules. Rules are necessary to govern conduct. They save time and effort since it is not feasible to judge each situation anew. (2, 15, 91) Inherent in all social situations are circumstances which can be generalized. Rather than dealing separately with each situation which arises, societies classify interpretations of similar situations. Rules are developed to guide actions in situations which occur with similar circumstances. Thus, to refer to a rule is to follow a guideline which was found helpful in dealing with similar situations. Moral judgments which find their reference in moral rules are not purely particular but instead are implicitly general.

The process of moral education depends, in part, upon the existence of rules. It is necessary to relate to a rule if any previous occurrence is to be related to the present. Without acknowledgment of a rule, there is no point of reference for conduct since each incident must find its rationale the moment it occurs. If there were no rules of conduct, there could be no transmitting of knowledge from one situation to another or from one generation to another. (15, 32) Rules are society's conscience codified.

Since societies must have rules to exist and survive and since, as has been established in Chapter II, all cultures have systems of morality, moral rules would seem irrefutable realities. Morality is a concept which distinguishes right conduct from wrong conduct. Moral rules are society's codification of that concept. Those rules which guide behavior towards acceptable patterns of conduct, then, are moral rules.

*Moral rules are distinctive.*

The word "rule" connotes different meanings and feelings. Black (4) suggested that "rules" can denote a flavor of regulation, of instruction, of advice, and of exhortation. He identified and classified rules into four categories and used synonyms to describe the sense of each category, as follows: (1) *Regulation* (2) *Instruction* (3) *Precept or maxim* (4) *Principle or general truth*.

Rules, when viewed as regulation, have histories and authors and also make references to time. In the category of regulation, Black put laws, ordinances, and the expected conduct for playing games.

Instruction rules have neither authors nor histories. They express some alleged means for achieving a purpose. Such rules are not put into effect, enforced, broken, rescinded, changed. Rules, in the instruction sense, can be said to be effective or ineffective, supported or unsupported by experience, useful or useless. An illustration of an instruction rule might be: In determining the form of address in greeting someone, consider your relationship to him and his status.

In the category of precept or maxim are rules of prudence and morality. Black explained that a person who states a precept or maxim rule gives advice and exerts influence. The individual receiving the advice can not lay the rule aside. Although the advisee may not want to follow the moral rule, he feels obligated to do what the moral rule advises. An example of such a rule is: Put charity before justice. (4:111)

Principle or general truth is the fourth category of the word "rule," which Black described. Such a rule does not identify a class of human

actions, as the previous senses of rule do; nor does it involve forbidding, requiring, or permitting something, as the others do. Rather, principle or general truth rules have truth values ("true" or "false") ascribed to them. Black suggested that, "Years like 1952 that are divisible by four are leap years," exemplifies such a rule. (4:113) This fourth category of rule seems to involve statements of fact.

Baier (2) distinguished six senses of the word "rule." He categorized rules into *regulations, mores, maxims and principles, canons, regularities, and rules of procedure*. He did not attempt to fit moral rules into one of his classifications. Whereas, moral rules concerning a society fall under Black's category of precept or maxim, Baier regarded rules in the sense of maxims and principles as being rules of an individual, not of a society. Baier indicated that only those tenets of conduct suggested by regulation and mores were social rules.

Regulations differ from mores in a number of dimensions, according to Baier. Regulations come into being through a system of formulation and adoption; mores through a process of customs which gain general social support. Regulations are changed by deliberate action invested in a duly authorized person or body; mores by new and different types of conduct being supported. Regulations are abrogated; mores cease existing by lack of support. Regulations are sanctioned in a highly organized, determinate manner, while relatively unorganized, indeterminate pressures are used to support mores. The speed limit is sixty miles per hour illustrates a regulation in Baier's classification of rules. Rules for good manners such as, one ought to shake hands when introduced to someone, fit the mores category, according to Baier. A moral rule such as, one ought to be honest, obviously fits Baier's mores category of rule concept rather than his regulation category.

It would not be accurate to suggest that Baier meant for moral rules to fit into the mores category. Baier did not fit moral rules into one of his rule categories because he believed moral rules are distinct from other rules. Baier argued that moral rules must be subjected to certain tests. His contention

was that moral rules can not be regarded as sacrosanct or unalterable. Moral convictions expressed in moral rules can be true or false, according to Baier; therefore, it must be possible for such rules to be altered and improved by examining their validity in light of other possible, improved rules based on social ideals. Then, according to Baier, a group has a morality or moral code rather than a set of taboos.

Rawls (91) distinguished between a summary conception of rules and a practice conception of rules. He suggested that moral philosophers tended to look at all rules using the summary conception. By summary conception, he was referring to rules as generalizations and guides. Such rules are formulated by applying the utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number to particular cases. The utilitarian principle suggests that through the experience of generations, certain rules or generalizations have developed to govern specific situations so as to provide the most benefits for the largest majority. Thus, in the summary conception sense, rules are classified as maxims and "rules of thumb." According to Rawls, most moral rules are of a summary conception. However, he cautioned that some moral rules suggest practices. For example, moral rules dealing with punishment and promise-keeping suggest that such practices exist. Thus, they do not fit the summary conception premise which is based upon establishing generalizations rather than defining practices.

Rawls differentiated between a summary conception of rules and a practice conception of rules. His distinction of rules of practice will be explained in Chapter V.

From the literature studied, four concepts pertaining to the distinctiveness of moral rules have been identified as follows:

1. Moral rules carry advice.
2. Moral rules guide behavior.
3. Moral rules are generalizations or "rules of thumb."
4. Moral rules are social.

These four concepts form a system against which a particular rule can be

compared to determine whether or not the rule is a moral rule. Rules which conform to the four concepts cited can be considered moral rules. Some rules may conform to some of the concepts, but this conformity does not qualify the rule as a moral rule. Moral rules can be distinguished from other rules only in so far as they fit all of the tenets of description; therefore, the sub-hypothesis that moral rules are distinctive is tenable.

*Moral rules have identifiable characteristics.*

Moral philosophers in discussing moral rules have alluded to certain characteristics which moral rules possess. Those characteristics have been analyzed and synthesized and have yielded eight identifiable characteristics.

1) Moral rules are not exactly defined. Black (4) defined moral rules as less circumscribed, less concrete than other rules. Singer alluded to the "indefiniteness," "vagueness," and "ambiguity" of moral rules. (40:133) Rees regarded them as "concealed conditional statements." (93:27) Hart referred to their "considerable area of 'vagueness' or 'open texture.'" (19:164)

The concepts with which moral rules deal include deceit, lying, gratefulness, promise-keeping. All these concepts have an air of vagueness and indefiniteness. As a result of such ambiguity, there is a degree of latitude for individuals to affix different meanings to the words and the concepts they suggest. Since moral concepts are indefinite, teaching the meaning of such concepts is varied, resulting in diffusion of meaning.

Due to the indefiniteness of moral rules, moral philosophers disagree with each other on which rules should be called moral rules. When there is agreement that the rules are moral in nature, there is often disagreement as to each rule's status within the hierarchy of value with which it is associated.

(19)

The vagueness or indefiniteness of moral rules is further complicated by allowable exceptions. One ought not lie, but white lies are sometimes acceptable. One ought not cause physical harm to another, but self-defense is allowable. In addition to these allowable exceptions, the complexity of a

particular situation sometimes makes it difficult to identify when a rule is applicable and the extent of its application; i.e., my working partner has become emotionally upset and asks for my help; my wife is home sick and needs me.

The general process of rule-formulation, as presented by Black (4), indicates the many variables with which rules in general and moral rules in particular are involved. His general pattern for rule-formulation suggested that rules be addressed to certain persons, doing or being forbidden to do certain actions in certain circumstances. It is the task of the discernor to identify the relevant aspects of any situation in order to determine which rule is applicable to the particular circumstance. The task is further complicated by the vagueness, ambiguity, and indefiniteness of moral concepts.

2) Moral rules contain ethical terms. (2, 15, 26, 31, 32, 51, 56, 59, 93) "Ought-ought not," "right-wrong," "should-should not" are ethical terms. Ethical terms are not neutral; they infer judgments about some actions. Since moral rules contain ethical terms, such rules, as Singer (40) suggested, permit, require, or prohibit certain actions.

The particular ethical terms or expressions used in formulating moral rules are not important. (2, 67) For example, lying is wrong. (67) "Tell the truth." (26:32) What is important is the guideline for or against an action. Killing is wrong; one ought not to kill; thou shalt not kill; all make the same claim though different ethical terms are used. (2) According to Baier, "What counts is not the expression used, but the point made." (2:172) From the examples cited, it is apparent that the structural form which moral rules take is not particularly important. Moral rules can be stated any number of ways. Regardless of the particular terms employed, moral rules are action-guiding and therein lies their essence.

3) Moral rules are social in nature. (2, 15, 19, 26, 40, 67) Moral rules are societal guidelines governing the interacting conduct of individuals in that society. Their origins, functions, and sanctions are all structured by the group.

It is the social nature of moral rules which sets them apart from rules of prudence. Rules of prudence involve self-interest. They are rules which govern one individual's relations to others. The individual formulates his own rules of prudence to guide his behavior towards others. Such a rule might be, I won't smoke around people who consider smoking distasteful. Moral rules are formulated to achieve continuity and establish grounds of commonality for living in a particular society. They are formulated by the society and are imposed on individuals. Naturally, there will be times when an individual's self-interests will have to be sacrificed. That is a price one pays for living in a society. Therefore, as Baier (2) argued, without society there would be no need to have moral rules for distinguishing between right conduct and wrong conduct.

4) Moral rules are not legislated. (2, 15, 19, 51) No formal organizations establish the moral code of a society. There are no publications or announcements which give notice of a moral rule going into effect. There is no magistrate, judge, or board of directors which is authorized to lay down moral rules. It is obvious, for example, that the rule, one ought not to lie, has not been legislated. Moral rules are not formal or arbitrary.

But, if moral rules are not legislated, how do they come into effect? Hart suggested that moral rules may be completely customary in origin. Ross, (36) for example, wrote of the existent body of moral convictions, or moral rules, being the cumulative product of the best people reflecting on moral questions over a period of many generations.

Baier theorized on the origin of morality as ". . . a comparatively sophisticated system of rules, . . ." (2:180) He suggested that at some point in time, societies come to a faint realization ". . . that the group's way of life is not altogether sacrosanct." (2:180) Methods are developed by the group to deliberately control social change rather than to have change occurring without forethought or control. At approximately this stage, according to Baier, morality developed out of taboo, religion superseded magic, and law grew out of custom. Moral rules are not legislated, and as such, their origins

are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to trace.

5) Moral rules impose obligations. (4, 33, 51, 56) Not all rules do so, as Black's "principle" category demonstrates, i.e. "Cyclones rotate clockwise, anticyclones anticlockwise." (4:113) But, if an individual is said to be under obligation, the existence of a rule is implied. "Oughtness," "rightness," and "wrongness" are words which imply obligation and duty. Moral rules, by recommending or condemning certain actions, impose obligations and suggest duties which ought or ought not to be performed.

Hart (19) suggested that the primary factor in determining whether or not a rule gives rise to obligations is the amount of social pressure exerted by a group towards compliance to the rule. When a rule is considered essential to the maintenance of social life, it is supported by serious social pressure. Rules prohibiting the unconditional use of violence are an example. Gradations away from the obvious, for example, rules for punctiliousness and rules forbidding deceit, likewise are enforced by social pressure, but to a lesser extent. Therefore, they impose lesser obligations.

According to Baier (47), a group is justified in assuring compliance to obligations imposed by moral rules. When an individual violates a moral rule, harm is done to someone. When an individual complies with the obligations imposed by a moral rule, the entire group is believed to benefit. Compliance doesn't counterbalance a violation; compliance outweighs the effect of a violation because of the benefits derived by the group.

Since obligations are imposed on individuals through societal enforcement, sacrifice or renunciation on the part of individuals can occur. It is not unusual for obligations imposed by social rules to conflict with the self-interest of individuals.

6) Moral rules can be violated. (19, 51, 67) According to Durkheim, moral rules ". . . prescribe certain manners of acting. . . ." (12:36) Embedded in the idea of prescribing certain actions is the idea that certain alternative actions are forbidden. Within any class of actions, there are a number of choices, but a moral rule prescribes the legitimate alternatives. When

an individual acts in a way which is not in accordance with a moral rule, he has violated or broken the rule even though the action may be justifiable.

As Hart (56) suggested, the normative vocabulary of morality suggests that there are actions which deviate from the prescribed pattern of actions. "Ought" suggests "ought not"; "right" suggests "wrong"; "should" suggests "should not." This vocabulary draws attention to a standard and to deviations from that standard. Thus, the vocabulary used to structure moral rules indicates that a possibility for action which violates the moral rule exists.

7) The violation of a moral rule requires justification. (2, 4, 26, 64, 67) Moral rules are important for the survival of a society. Since life within a society is more secure with rules, they are used. This function defends their existence. If the importance of the moral rule diminishes, with it goes its use and its defense for being a moral rule. A moral rule's use is its defense. Because moral rules are defensible, their violation requires justification.

Many authorities agree that morality should be based on reasons. (2, 6, 31, 32, 33, 40, 51) Society establishes moral rules to guide its members' behavior; it therefore follows that violating such rules requires explanation and reasonable rationale. So, when an individual breaks a moral rule, he must stand ready to give reasons for his actions.

Times arise when strict adherence to a rule is not the best course of action. If an individual tells a lie, he has violated the moral rule, one ought to be honest; but if he lied to save someone from bodily harm, then he might be justified in having broken the rule pertaining to honesty. His action is not considered wrong if the moral reasons given for violating the moral rule outweigh the moral reasons for following it. Moral rules tend to have a hierarchy.

8) Moral rules do not have physical sanctions. (2, 15, 19, 51) Since moral rules are not legislated, it follows that there is no defined, authorized system of enforcement or punishment. The sanctions imposed for breaches of such rules are not physical force or the threat of it. In other words, the sanctions have not been institutionalized as they have with lawbreaking.

Instead, the sanctions take the form of social pressure exerted verbally or nonverbally. (2, 4, 15, 51) Moral persuasion takes the form of smiles or frowns, acceptance or rejection, praise or blame. Appeals are made to respect the moral rule because the rule is considered important to the welfare of members of the society. (19)

Moral philosophers frequently make reference to moral rules. Some moral philosophers have described moral rules. Others have suggested or alluded to qualities which moral rules possess. Eight general characteristics of moral rules have been identified, thus enabling the sub-hypothesis to be found tenable.

1. Moral rules are not exactly defined.
2. Moral rules contain ethical terms.
3. Moral rules are social in nature.
4. Moral rules are not legislated.
5. Moral rules impose obligations.
6. Moral rules can be violated.
7. The violation of a moral rule requires justification.
8. Moral rules do not have physical sanctions.

*Moral rules can be classified.*

Peters (64) supported a rational moral code within which he defined 1) procedural rules, 2) basic rules, and 3) more-relative rules. Procedural rules would be based on higher-order principles, or principles that were more rationally justifiable and/or fundamental than others. Impartiality, liberty, and truth-telling exemplify higher-order principles, according to Peters. Such principles would allow the intelligent application of rules in light of relevant differences in circumstances. Also higher-order principles would permit revision of rules when changing circumstances and changing empirical knowledge regarding conditions and consequences were brought to light. Procedural rules would presuppose rational justification for such rules in practical discourse.

Basic rules would involve general rules which bind members of a society together. Such rules would be justified under any social conditions for

they would be considered essential to the existence of the society. Peters regarded rules about contract-keeping as basic. Exceptions to basic rules could be made rationally on the basis of procedural rules.

More-relative rules, Peters suggested, would depend on facts about particular social, economic, and geographical conditions for their justifiability. These rules would rely upon specific circumstances.

During a period of rapid change, according to Peters, a minimal number of basic rules along with procedural rules should be taught. Peters did not specifically indicate which basic rules might be considered essential enough to teach. More-relative rules would not be taught, but ways of appealing to procedural rules in decision-making on more-relative matters would be taught.

Singer (67) distinguished three classifications of moral rules as follows: fundamental rules, local rules, and neutral norms. Fundamental rules are, as the name implies, basic rules. They do not vary according to circumstances nor do they depend upon circumstances for their validity. They exist without regard to time and circumstance.

Local rules depend upon local conditions. Varying standards, customs, and traditions, which are peculiar to different groups, influence the development of such rules, and circumstances affect them. Singer cited some examples of local rules. One ought to pay taxes is applicable only where governments establish a tax system; standards of fair competition vary for different businesses; a particular ethical code applies only to those people in the particular profession.

Neutral norms are rules which, if their opposites were adopted, would make no moral difference. They are conventional in nature. Singer used as an example of a neutral norm the law requiring drivers to stay on the right side of the road.

Mabbott (26) suggested that moral rules differ to the extent that some moral rules are constitutive while others are regulative. Some constitutive moral rules are essential to the survival of any civilized society. Rules against killing and breaking promises are, according to Mabbott, this type. Other constitutive rules are essential to the existence of a particular institution within the society.

As an example he suggested rules for parental responsibility. Abolishing the rules making parents responsible for their children would mean a complete change in the family institution. Possibly, Mabbott suggested, the change might be to Plato's *Republic* scheme in which the government would assume the responsibility for infants.

Regulative rules, Mabbott contended, have alternatives and are alterable without destroying or changing the basic nature of a society. A rule changing the age at which children are no longer the responsibility of their parents would not destroy a society or completely change the family institution. In fact, Mabbott suggested that altering such regulative rules is legitimate and sometimes necessary. He based the validity for the change upon a consideration of the consequences.

Some philosophers, such as Baier (2), Kohlberg (82), and Singer (67), differentiated moral rules from moral principles. A principle is a fundamental truth and serves as a basis for developing more specific directives for conduct, hence rules. Thus, moral principles are more general than moral rules, but can be viewed as a classification of moral rules. When a differentiation is made between moral rules and moral principles, moral rules can be classified as specific moral directives and moral principles as moral concepts. Essentially, the meaning underlying moral principles coincides with Peter's procedural rule classification.

Three classifications of moral rules have emerged as follows:

1. Some moral rules are not affected by time or circumstances. Moral rules in this classification are, in effect, moral concepts.
2. Some moral rules are necessary to the existence and survival of societies. Moral rules in this classification are, in effect, societies' practical guidelines derived from moral concepts.
3. Some moral rules are specific in nature. Moral rules in this classification are affected by conditions and circumstances and as such are applicable only to certain situations.

The sub-hypothesis that moral rules can be classified is found tenable.

*Moral rules serve societies.*

A society is a group of interacting individuals who share certain grounds of commonality and who are united by the acceptance of certain rules. One of society's roles is to provide established patterns of behavior within which its members can live in confidence and security. (2, 26)

There are cultural activities or practices, such as rituals and magic, through which a society exerts pressure to regulate human behavior. Usually, such cultural activities serve a latent function, as described by Turner. (69) Latent function suggests that cultural activities exert subtle influences upon members of a society but that they are seldom thought by the members to serve a social function. Nevertheless, such activities are related to the belief and value system of the culture. The behavior observable in activities indicates what the group members believe to be of value to them. Their values are discernible in their behavior. (34) In effect, cultural practices serve to regulate human behavior. For example, the Ndembu circumcision ritual, through Turner's analysis, exposed the system of values underlying the Ndembu culture. In the American culture, spilling salt is associated with bad luck; a ritual has developed with the hope that the bad luck will not occur.

Moral rules serve a latent function. They distinguish between right and wrong conduct and guide behavior towards established societal patterns. Moral rules deal with a distinct class of actions, those involving "rightness" and "oughtness," yet the function they serve is basically the same as other devices which a society uses to regulate its members' behavior. Moral rules, as well as cultural activities, function as a glue for society even when this function may not be at the group members' level of consciousness. The cohesive function of moral rules, though it exists, need not be recognized by societal members. What is essential is that members recognize the function of moral rules as guidelines for distinguishing right conduct and wrong conduct. According to Piaget (33), the essence of morality is found in the degree of respect each individual develops for moral rules.

A society depends upon threads of commonality to exist. Vital to any group are recognized standards addressed to the rightness and wrongness of

particular actions. Moral rules distinguish socially approved patterns of rightness from socially disapproved patterns. As such, moral rules contribute a vital, distinguishable thread for strengthening a society and thus are of use to societies. The sub-hypothesis that moral rules serve societies is found tenable.

*Summary.*

Investigation of the pertinent literature led to the support and acceptance of the four sub-hypotheses as follows:

1. Moral rules are distinctive.
2. Moral rules have identifiable characteristics.
3. Moral rules can be classified.
4. Moral rules serve societies.

As a result of the evidence in support of the sub-hypotheses, the major hypothesis that there are moral rules is accepted as tenable.

## CHAPTER IV

### GAMES

#### *Hypothesis.*

All cultures have games.

#### *Sub-hypotheses.*

1. The play domain can be codified.
2. Games can be defined.
3. There are levels of judgment in games.
4. Games reflect culture.

#### *Introduction.*

Games are a part of the play domain, which consists of play-like movement, games, and sport. Play is a behavioral pattern sponsored by an attitude of fantasy, frivolity, and freedom. Its scope is universal. (24, 63, 83, 88, 97) No externally imposed rules exist in play. The only rules play knows are those of the individual's concoction.

When rules are imposed by outside forces upon the individual, play becomes games. Game rules are societal codifications of play rituals. Caillois (7) classified games into four groups: *agon* or games of competition, *alea* or games of chance, *mimicry* or games of pretense, and *ilinx* or games of vertigo.

Sport encompasses only a part of the broad spectrum of games. Agonistic games and sport are almost synonymous in that the concept of competition underlies both of them. However, bridge, an agonistic game, is not a sport, while skiing, an ilinxic game, is a sport.

The play domain, consisting of play-like movement, games, and sport, has a unique quality. Huizinga included in his definition of play ". . . the consciousness that it is 'different' from 'ordinary' life." (23:28) Holmes (79),

referred to the child's world of play. Piaget referred to "the sphere of play." (33:296) Weiss suggested that "The athlete's world is set over against the everyday world." (43:245) Caillois (7) called play make-believe. Zeigler referred to play as ". . . seemingly not concerned with the serious business of life." (46:102) "Games differ from serious considerations. . . ." Lucas suggested. (86:4) "Play thus transcends ordinary behavior," according to Norbeck. (88:48) It would seem that the play domain has a uniqueness which sets it apart from ordinary life in that it escapes reality by being a discrete world.

The uniqueness of the play domain seems to stem from the participant. The player enters the discrete world of play through an attitude. Huizinga called this attitude the "play-mood" or "play-spirit." (23:21) Caillois (49) called it freedom. Caillois considered freedom, which he defined as the need for relaxation, diversion, and fantasy, ". . . the indispensable prime mover of play." (49:50) The individual enters the play domain with an attitude of freedom ranging from joyous hilarity to contemplative enjoyment. The choice of entering this sphere is the player's own for he enters voluntarily. (7, 23, 79, 102)

Play forms, however, are observable. The attitude of freedom or play-spirit alone does not separate the play domain from ordinary life; behavior must result. When this attitude is manifested in patterned behavior, an individual can be said to be playing. Thus, behavioral patterns sponsored by the attitude of freedom originating in the individual separates the play domain from ordinary life and creates its uniqueness. To fully understand play behavior, the breadth of games, and/or the specificity of sport, the play domain must be analyzed.

*The play domain can be codified.*

Behavior in the play domain revolves around a theme; it forms a pattern. For example, the individual may ritualize his play by running around obstacles in a certain pattern, or a child may contrive some rules for himself to follow. Observe an infant, Piaget (33) suggested, and note the number of rites which are performed. Piaget believed that these rites anticipate the rules

of games the child will play in the future. In play, the individual creates the rituals and the rules he will follow. They are not externally imposed upon him. Play involves an internal process of rule formulation.

However, if each individual created his own rituals and rules, there could never be established standards against which other individuals might test themselves, as in bowling. Also, there would be chaos if two or more individuals wanted to play together. Thus, the need exists for mutually agreed upon rules or for the formalization of rules. The addition of externally imposed rules, which are a part of all games and sports, distinguish these play forms from play-like movements. Game rules are societal codifications of play rituals. They separate a game from the ordinary world by specifying the game's beginning and ending as well as giving it spatial boundaries. The rules create a common ground for playing. During the game, the rules become law.

Norbeck suggested that human play is unique when compared with play found in other species ". . . because it is molded by culture, consciously and unconsciously." (88:48) The culture consciously molds games and sport. Through a systematized process of rule formulation, games and sports are influenced by the culture within which they exist. Specified rules transform the play domain from a separate world governed by the individual into a discrete world affected by the culture. However, though cultural forces exert their influence on the play domain through rules, it remains a sphere set apart from ordinary life, seeking only in part to imitate reality.

To play a game, the individual must learn the rules and conform to them. The individual's play-like movement and attitude are his own, but his behavior is guided and restricted by rules which are externally imposed upon him. For example, in basketball an individual may shoot for a basket in a way which he chooses, but he may not travel with the ball prior to releasing it nor may he hit an opponent while attempting to shoot. Without acknowledging and abiding by the externally imposed rules, the individual would not be playing the game. If an individual does not like the rules of a

game, he may exercise a certain amount of pressure on the individual or group who formulates, changes, and rescinds the rules. However, if the rules are not altered to his liking, they still must be followed in order to play the game.

The sub-hypothesis, suggesting that the play domain can be codified, yielded six concepts. On the basis of the concepts listed below, the sub-hypothesis is found tenable.

1. In the play domain, behavioral patterns develop.
2. The individual creates rituals and rules which govern his play-like movements.
3. Society codifies play rituals.
4. The codification of play rituals results in rules which establish common grounds for playing.
5. In games and sport, the individual is specifically influenced by cultural patterns through rules which are externally imposed upon him.
6. Formalized rules structure the play domain by increasing cultural influences and decreasing the individual's freedom.

*Games can be defined.*

Caillois (7), reworking the seven characteristics of play developed by Huizinga, defined play as free (voluntary), separate (circumscribed by spatial and temporal limits), uncertain (neither the course of play nor its result is known beforehand), unproductive (it is an end in itself with no material gain), governed by rules (the law of the temporary world), and make-believe (a distinct reality). All of these characteristics are applicable to games.

Physical educators have classified games according to a number of criteria. Classifications have been made on the basis of the following: 1) the game's structure, for example, team and individual, 2) the emphasis given the game, for example, major and minor, 3) the season in which the game is played, for example, fall-winter and spring-summer, 4) the game's physical

environment, for example, land and aquatics, 5) the game's complexity, for example, low-organized and highly-organized.

In 1959, Roberts, Arth, and Bush defined game ". . . as a recreational activity characterized by: (1) organized play, (2) competition, (3) two or more sides, (4) criteria for determining the winner, and (5) agreed-upon rules." (96:597) This definition puts an emphasis on agonistic games by virtue of the competitive quality cited, but it excludes some agonistic games, such as bowling, golf and archery, which do not depend upon sides or opponents to be games. Many so-called games in ethnographic studies are excluded by this definition. (97) The Roberts, Arth, and Bush definition of games seems to be too precise and too specialized and does not acknowledge the broad gamut of games.

In the same study, Roberts, Arth, and Bush reviewed the distribution of game types in fifty societies and advanced a three-category classification of games. The three classifications included games of strategy, games of chance, and games of physical skills. The authors attributed the outcome of games to rational choices among possible alternatives (strategy), to guesses and uncontrolled artifacts such as dice (chance), and to players' motor abilities (physical skill). Games of strategy were related to social systems, games of chance to religious beliefs, and games of physical skill to environmental conditions.

Using as a basis the works of Caillois (7), Roberts, Arth, and Bush (96), Loy defined game as ". . . any form of playful competition whose outcome is determined by physical skill, strategy, or chance employed singly and in combination." (85:1) Loy indicated that "playful competition" means that the contest has at least one play characteristic, as Caillois distinguished play characteristics. Such an explanation permits professional sports to be considered games. There is reason to question Loy on this point. Professional sports or athletics violate the essence of the play domain. The professional athlete's "play" is not play but work, because his "play" reaps material gain. For sports to remain sport within the play domain, it must be viewed as a subset of games.

Games, then, encompass sport. Distinctions have been drawn between games and sport. Loy suggested that the principal criterion for distinguishing them is that sport demands ". . . the demonstration of physical prowess." (85:6) In other words, developed physical skills are required in sport. Also, Loy viewed sport ". . . as an institutionalized game." (85:6) By institutionalized, he was not referring merely to the formulation and enactment of a set of rules but to the existence of cultural patterns and social structure in sport. The patterns of culture and social structure existing in sport, Loy contended, include values, norms, sanctions, knowledge, and social roles and statuses. Furthermore, Loy suggested that an institutionalized game ". . . has a tradition of past exemplifications and definite guide lines for future realizations." (85:7) In reference to the institutionalized game concept, Loy admitted that exceptions, such as chess and bridge, exist. Thus, sport encompasses only a part of the broad scope of games. It includes only those games which demand the demonstration of physical prowess and which depend upon the concept of competition to determine its outcome. Sport is a subset of games, a very specific form of some games. Many games exist which are not sports; all sports have their roots in games.

Games exist within the play domain between the complexity of play and the specificity of sport. Games are a distinct entity set apart from ordinary life by the rules which define them and by behavioral patterns sponsored by the attitude of freedom in the participant. The sub-hypothesis that games can be defined is found tenable.

*There are levels of judgment in games.*

"Hey, that's not fair." "You can't play with us, you cheat." "You're not trying to win." "He's a bad sport." "Raise your hand, you hit it out." Statements such as these are often heard on the playground or echoing from the gymnasium. They suggest that there is an unwritten, yet supposedly understood, concept which underlies the official rules of the game. The "spirit of the game" has provided a convenient umbrella for this unwritten concept.

"Good sport" is the label usually attached to anyone who plays by this unwritten concept; violators are "bad sports." Cozens and Stumpf suggested that, "The spirit of sportsmanship becomes not so much a set of rules to be followed as an attitude of mind." (9:235) Underlying the written rules of the game appear to be the concepts of fair and unfair, right and wrong. These concepts seem to exist regardless of the written rules.

Searle (39) suggested that some rules are not peculiar to a particular game but are crucial to competitive games generally. As an example, he suggested that a rule in competitive games is the commitment by a player or team to try to win. There is another rule common to competitive games generally. While there is a commitment to win in competitive games, there is also a commitment to "play fair." Huizinga defined fair play as ". . . good faith expressed in play terms." (23:211) Braithwaite (5) suggested that fair play involves collaboration on common ground when the wants and goals of individuals are different. The common ground in games is the game rules. According to Singer (40), a player violates the rights of others if he violates the rules of the game because the rules determine when the game has been fairly played and who has fairly won. Cooperation, or agreement to follow the rules, then, is necessary to competition. Unless there is agreement to cooperate and follow the rules, there can be no game. Yet, with regard to the concepts of winning and playing fairly, no rules requiring such commitments have been formulated officially. These examples suggest the existence of an underlying spirit of the game and seem to make an appeal for understanding the reason for rules.

Piaget studied children playing games and found that they recognized the importance of following established rules but also developed ". . . a sort of ideal or spirit of the game. . . ." (33:73) It would seem that there are levels of judgment in games.

The opportunity to develop such judgment seems to occur in less institutionalized game activity, as on playgrounds and in backyards. In less institutionalized game activity where there is seldom an official to enforce the official rules, game rules tend to be changed and modified by the participants

to fit the circumstances. For example, in softball, pitchers frequently throw the ball slower when the batter can not hit well or has a physical handicap. Only one base on an error is a common modification. No stealing today, the catcher's arm is hurt. These rules are not written in an official softball guide, yet they appeal to a spirit which underlies the official rules. When individuals change the rules to fit the circumstances, they are playing "a" game of softball rather than "the" game of softball. Playing "a" game of softball implies that a modification of the official game is being played; the official game is not. However, even in less institutionalized games, once the rules are agreed upon by the participants, there can be no laying aside of the rules unless another mutual agreement has been reached.

As games become more institutionalized, more specialized, and more highly organized, the legislated enactments are followed more closely and without exception. Yet, the spirit of the game still exists to be recognized. A basketball player who has started a fast break but slows down because she sees that an opponent has fallen recognizes the spirit of the game. The rules do not govern her behavior in that instance. She is exercising her judgment based upon an understanding of the reason for rules.

Fair play, in its truest sense, is not created by a legislator's fiat; fair play is a concept. Underlying the play domain are the concepts of fairness and rightness. These concepts become an attitude, the spirit of the game. Deliberately breaking a game rule and using it to one's advantage or to a team's advantage destroys the game. Without the spirit of the game, the game loses its meaning and play perishes.

In light of the foregoing discussion, it appears that there are two distinguishable levels of judgment in games.

1. One level of judgment is based upon the recognition of established rules.
2. The other level of judgment is based upon an understanding of the reason for rules. This level has been identified as the spirit of the game.

The sub-hypothesis is found tenable.

*Games reflect culture.*

Recently, the emphasis in the study of games has shifted from attempting to establish their universality to considering them as cultural phenomena. (68) The relationship between culture and game forms is being studied increasingly. Hunt (24) has pointed out that the culture and traits of a people are revealed in the traditional games and sports which are played. For example, English folk games reflect the appreciation which the English have for tradition, while German games attest to Germanic adherence to austerity and their emphasis on developing physical strength. (24) Dundes suggested that "Games may be considered to be structural models of the adult world in a given culture." (10:315) Glassford (53) argued that a relationship exists between game forms and culture. Culture, Glassford stressed, should be viewed as a whole composed of interrelated parts, the parts consisting of behavioral codes, environment, and population. When culture is viewed as a totality, changes in one part of it tend to cause changes in other parts, thus changing the whole of culture. Glassford argued that games serve culture in the sphere of behavioral codes and in so doing should reflect changes which occur in the culture. Games, then, as a part of culture, change as other parts of the culture change.

If games reflect culture, evidence should suggest a positive relationship between the following: 1) the structure of a culture and the structure of games existing in that culture, 2) cultural changes and game changes. Investigation of such relationships should include less complex cultures which have minimally structured social orders and very little technology and more complex cultures which have multifaceted social orders and advanced technology.

As discussed in Chapter II, culture can be studied in terms of ideological, organizational, and technological dimensions. If games reflect culture, games should contain remnants of the beliefs and values, social structure, and technology which exist within the culture.

Unfortunately, as Damm (50) pointed out, published material on games in primitive cultures is incomplete and unevenly distributed globally. The

ethnographic studies which have been published, however, indicate that the games in the cultures studied tended to reflect the basic social organization existing within each culture. (48, 53, 74, 100, 101) Glassford, for example, who studied the traditional Canadian Eskimos, concluded that the games in that culture ". . . tended to reflect the maximum, cooperative patterns of organization which tended to prevail within their culture." (53:81) The Tangu culture of New Guinea, Burridge (48) reported, is based upon the concept of equivalence, a notion of moral equality which is practically expressed through exchanging equivalent amounts of foodstuffs. This difficult task, according to Burridge, can rarely be accomplished except through mutual agreement. *Taketak*, a game which is popular with the Tangu, has the same notion of equivalence expressed in it. Burridge also reported that other New Guinea cultures have the concept of establishing equilibrium in their games. In another study of primitive cultures, Dunlap (74) pointed out that when new games were introduced into the Samoan culture by foreign missionaries, the games were modified to conform more closely with the traditional play customs of the Samoan culture.

Reviewing the games of fifty tribes, Roberts, Arth and Bush (96) found that five tribes had no games at all. The cultures in which no competitive games existed were mainly Australian and South American. These cultures were kin homogeneous and very simple. It was suggested earlier in this paper that the Roberts, Arth, and Bush definition of games seemed too precise and too specialized, thus excluding some games. It is possible that games may have existed in those extremely simple cultures but in such simple forms that the definition excluded them, since Murdock, (63) an anthropologist, noted that games are a common denominator of all cultures.

Games in more complex cultures have been studied and comparisons made with games in less complex cultures. Sutton-Smith (68) distinguished between the ascriptive game culture and the achievement game culture. Ascriptive cultures, according to Sutton-Smith, are characterized by relatively fixed role statuses; in other words, role expectations are usually based upon imitating the

parent's role. Achievement cultures are characterized by considerable role flexibility; a variety of roles are tried. Sutton-Smith studied the historical changes of children's games covering the past one hundred years in New Zealand and then in the United States. His findings led him to observe, "The type of rule games with their considerable complexity which have developed over the past hundred years are apparently the natural successor to this increasing flexibility." (68:145) The complex organization of games in achievement cultures ". . . requires considerable role flexibility, role expectation and the understanding of the roles of others." (68:145) This role flexibility required in achievement game cultures was a shift from the particular roles which emerged within ascriptive game cultures.

Norbeck (88) discussed the relationship of play preferences to culture. As an example, he cited the Japanese whose engrained values and attitudes reflect a preference for avoiding physical contact and maintaining social decorum. The popular games in the complex culture of Japan, Norbeck maintained, preserve physical and social distance.

Roberts, Arth, and Bush (96), in a study discussed earlier, advanced a three-category classification of games. Games take the forms of physical skill, chance, and strategy employed singularly or in combination with each other. Games of strategy, such as chess and poker, were related to social systems. An hypothesis was advanced and supported that social systems should be complex if a form of expression, such as games of strategy, develops within the culture. Thus, less complex cultures with minimally structured social orders should not contain games of strategy. Roberts and Sutton-Smith (97), using the same classification of games, found at least one of the game forms missing in the less complex cultures. All the game forms were found in the more complex cultures.

Technology creates change and adds new variables; in other words, technology creates complexity. In more complex cultures, games increase in numbers and types. Some of these game changes are due directly to technological advances, for example water skiing and sky diving. As cultures

grow in complexity, games grow in complexity. As Luschen (62) noted, games in primitive, less complex cultures are more universal in their meaning and manifest functions than in modern, more complex cultures where the meaning and manifest functions are more specific and segmentary. Investigation of the structure of games in less complex cultures and more complex cultures seems to support a positive relationship between the structure of culture and the structure of games in that culture. Games contain remnants of the beliefs and values, social structure, and technology which exist within the culture.

If games reflect culture, then, as the culture changes, games should change. It is generally recognized that the less complex a culture, the more informal the rules. As the culture becomes more complex, the rules become more formal. If games reflect culture, the same pattern should exist in games. The less complex the game, the more informal are the rules; the more complex the game, the more formal are the rules.

Physical educators indirectly have alluded to such a pattern. In a discussion of women's competitive sport programs, Chapman (71) noted that as such programs develop there is a need for more precisely written rules. Van Dalen, Mitchell, and Bennett (42), in discussing the evolution of football, referred to football as a game and later as a sport. The inference was that as the game's rules continued to be modified, a sport emerged. Loy (85), as discussed earlier, suggested that such a pattern of game complexity related to rule formality exists although he carefully defined other emergent patterns in attempting to differentiate games from sport.

A pattern seems to emerge that a positive relationship exists between game complexity and rule formality. For example, sport, a group of very specialized games, is characterized by great rule formality. Football never ceases to be a game, but due, at least in part, to its great rule formality, it is categorized as a sport.

Evidence suggested a positive relationship between the following:

- 1) the structure of a culture and the structure of games existing in that culture,

2) cultural changes, as viewed through rules, and changes in games, as viewed through rules. The sub-hypothesis that games reflect culture is supported.

*Summary.*

Analysis of the pertinent literature led to the support and acceptance of the four sub-hypotheses as follows:

1. The play domain can be codified.
2. Games can be defined.
3. There are levels of judgment in games.
4. Games reflect culture.

As a result of the evidence in support of the sub-hypotheses, the major hypothesis that all cultures have games is accepted as tenable.

## CHAPTER V

### GAME RULES

#### *Hypothesis.*

There are game rules.

#### *Sub-hypotheses.*

1. Game rules are distinctive.
2. Game rules have identifiable characteristics.
3. Game rules can be classified.
4. Game rules serve various functions.

#### *Introduction.*

All games have certain common characteristics, one of which is that they are governed by rules. (2, 4, 7, 23, 26, 33, 39, 40, 43, 46, 79, 97) Games of *agon* have a commonality. In agonistic games, the player relies only on himself and concentrates all his efforts on doing his best. (7) The player's skill determines the outcome in agonistic games, as in sport. Since agonistic games encompass sport, the term "game rule" represents the rules governing both agonistic games and sports. Game rules distinguish the distinct reality called a game and control the behavior of those engaged in it.

#### *Game rules are distinctive.*

Philosophers have addressed themselves to the analysis of game rules. Baier (2) called game rules "rules of procedure." Rawls (91) fitted game rules into his practice conception of rules. Black (4) suggested their similarity to regulations. Searle (39) considered game rules to be constitutive.

Rules of procedure, according to Baier (2) constitute certain rule-determined activities. An individual can not engage in such activities unless

the rules are known. Examples of such rule-determined activities are playing a game, working on a university degree, or prosecuting someone.

Rawls (91) drew an analogy between game rules and a practice conception of rules. A practice conception of rules refers to rules which define a practice. To engage in a practice is to follow the appropriate rules. Unless an individual follows the rules which define the practice, he is not engaging in the practice. The practice conception explains rules which are used in a strict rather than summary sense.

To perform actions which are specified by a certain practice is to follow the rules defining the practice. When an action is specified by a practice, there can be no reason for a particular action by a particular person except by reference to the practice. For example, in softball, a pitcher must deliver the ball with an underhand action. The pitcher need not justify his action; he is simply doing what the rule defining softball pitching has established for that practice. If a group of softball players or followers believed that the underhand pitch was destroying the game of softball, they must aim their objections at the rule defining the practice of pitching underhand, not at the pitcher.

Rawls believed that the practice conception helped individuals to understand legal arguments more than moral arguments. However, he admitted that there are a number of border-line cases which are difficult, if not impossible, to classify.

Black (4) suggested that there are certain activities which are constituted by rules, such as games, and certain activities which are controlled by rules, such as driving a car. There is a distinction, according to Black. If there were no regulations pertaining to driving in a particular community, it would still be possible to drive. But, if there were no rules constituting a game, it would be impossible to play the game. The distinction can become blurred, Black indicated. For example, when activities are controlled by rules, there will be those individuals who obey the rules for driving and will consider such rules as constituting the activity of driving a car. So regulations, in Black's sense, are similar to game rules but are not analogous.

Searle (39) drew a distinction between "regulative" and "constitutive" rules. Regulative rules, according to Searle, control behavior which exists prior to or independent of the rules. Gentlemen are to wear ties to dinner, is a regulative rule because the activity of wearing ties to dinner can exist prior to or independent of the rule.

In addition to regulating behavior, Searle suggested that constitutive rules ". . . create or define new forms of behavior." (39:33) By new forms of behavior, Searle meant behavior which receives specifications or descriptions by virtue of the rules alone. The specification, they played volleyball, could not be made without rules. Twelve people could go through all the physical movements done in a volleyball game, but without rules there would be no game of volleyball.

The existence of a constitutive activity, then, is dependent upon constitutive rules; the rules create, as well as regulate, the activity. "Side-out" is called following the infringement of a rule by the serving team in volleyball, with the service being awarded to the opposing team. Such a rule, Searle argued, seems to define side-out. In other words, side-out exists because the rule established what side-out is. Thus, side-out in volleyball is achieved in a prescribed way, and it becomes a rule.

Searle noted that any system of constitutive rules has degrees of centrality. In other words, some rules form the core of a particular game and set it apart from other games. Eliminate the use of a net or prohibit the use of the hands, and the game of volleyball is drastically changed; it becomes a different game. Yet, neither the net rule or the rule establishing the legal use of the hands when considered separately constitute volleyball. Some rules, however, can be changed without greatly affecting the game. Double fouls could be eliminated in volleyball by requiring the officials to establish which team committed the foul first. Volleyball would not be drastically changed by eliminating the double foul rule. Searle called such a rule a "fringe" rule. Thus, game rules form a system with some rules being more important to the structure of the total game than others.

A major theme has permeated the pertinent literature regarding the distinctiveness of game rules. Game rules are distinct from other rules in that they constitute an activity called a game. Thus, the sub-hypothesis is found tenable.

*Game rules have identifiable characteristics.*

Philosophers, such as Hart (19), Rawls (39), and Weiss (43), have alluded to the similarity of game rules and law. The concept of law, as developed by Hart, was used as a starting point and model against which game rules were compared with law.

Hart (19) maintained that at the core of a legal system was a union of primary and secondary rules. Primary rules of obligation, according to Hart, are unofficial rules which are needed so that individuals can coexist in close proximity with one another. Restrictions are put on such things as the free use of violence, theft, and deception. In order to maintain primary rules of obligation, Hart stressed, a majority of the group must support the rules so that there is social pressure to conform to primary rules. Hart identified three defects of primary rules: 1) *their uncertainty*, 2) *their static character*, 3) *the inefficiency of diffuse social pressure toward conformity*. Primary rules are uncertain, because such rules are not easily recognized. The difficulty in identifying primary rules results from their not being formally written down, enacted, and enforced. The rules do not form a system as is possible when rules are legislated. Thus, the informality of primary rules leads to uncertainty. Primary rules are static in nature. Difficulty in changing them occurs because no one is granted the authority to change them. Primary rules are supported by diffuse social pressure. Since no one is empowered with the responsibility of enforcing primary rules and defining penalties for breaches of such rules, conformity to them is left to whomever cares to assume the responsibility. Inefficiency results. Thus, primary rules of obligation or customs, as they are frequently called, are unofficial rules which place restrictions on individuals so that social order might be maintained.

The defects of primary rules are rectified by secondary rules. Secondary rules are official rules, or law. When an authority, empowered by secondary rules, acknowledges primary rules, they become official. This "rule of recognition," as Hart called it, overcomes the uncertainty of primary rules. When an individual or body of persons is given the power by secondary rules to enact or repeal rules, "rules of change" are in effect. These rules of change overcome the static character of primary rules. When secondary rules confer power on someone to decide when a primary rule is broken and to define the procedure for imposing the penalty, "rules of adjudication" are in effect. These rules of adjudication overcome the inefficiency of diffuse social pressure characteristic of primary rules.

Law, then, according to Hart's concept, is characterized principally by an authoritative mark, legislative enactment, and centralization of social pressure. Although Fuller (16) criticized Hart's "rule of recognition" (Fuller maintained that the "rule of recognition" is a procedure and not merely a granting of authority), Hart's concept of law can be used as a basic criterion for analyzing game rules. Analysis of game rules, in light of Hart's concept of law, yielded five identifiable characteristics.

1) Game rules have an authoritative mark. Hart called this authoritative mark the "rule of recognition." Within the "rule of recognition" category, Hart distinguished between rules conferring legal powers and rules imposing duties. The conferring of legal powers implies that a person, board, commission, or body is given the rightful power to identify the specific rules which constitute the legal system or the game. When the authority acknowledges a rule, it becomes an official rule and is easily recognized. Since an official rule is specific, it imposes a specific duty. For example, a rule stipulates that the game of volleyball is played with a spherical ball. The rule includes specific qualifications as to what constitutes a volleyball. Players must use a spherical ball which conforms with the rule specifications if they wish to play officially the game of volleyball.

Hart pointed out that primary or unofficial rules do not form systems because such rules tend to be vague and uncertain. Secondary or official

rules can be made to form systems since the authority can specifically select rules in an orderly fashion in order to accomplish a specific purpose. Traffic laws are an example. Laws are enacted and enforced for the purpose of safeguarding individuals from the misuse of motor vehicles. A system of laws regulating driving has been developed. As it is with secondary rules, so it is with game rules, as Searle suggested. Game rules form a system called a game. When a number of rules are specifically designated as game rules by the rightful authority, a system develops. The rules become interdependent in order to serve their purpose.

2) Game rules are legislated. (4, 43, 71) The legislated rules are what is meant by the official rules. A governing body formulates, writes down, announces, and enacts the rules of a particular game. Thus, the histories of legislated rules can be traced, as Black (4) suggested, because such rules are made official at a particular time. The formal structure then permits the altering, changing, or rescinding of such rules through written suggestion and appeal to the governing body. A recent decision illustrates this process of changing a legislated rule. The rule specifying the number of players on a women's basketball team has been changed after extensive experimentation with the new rule. In the spring of 1971, the Joint Division for Girls and Women's Sports—Amateur Athletic Union Basketball Rules Committee officially adopted the rule that five players instead of six players constitute a women's basketball team. The newly adopted rule appears in the Division for Girls and Women's Sports *Basketball Guide 1971-72* as an official rule.

Legislated rules apply to all persons in a particular category. (2) The particular category when referring to games is everyone who participates in the particular game. The rules are used only for those who play the game; but once in the game, no one, including the legislators, is exempt from obeying the rules. According to Baier, when an order is addressed to a category of people, ". . . the first step in the direction of law is taken." (2:138)

An advantage of legislated rules lies in quickly and deliberately being able to adopt, alter, or abolish a rule if the rule is found to be beneficial,

ineffective, or harmful to the persons affected by the rule. (2, 19) It is impossible to assess, with any degree of accuracy, how long it would have taken for women to unofficially adopt the five player basketball game.

3) Game rules are enforced by a judge. Enforcement of rules by a judge are the "rules of adjudication" to which Hart (19) alluded. Baier (2) asserted that a legal system must have an individual or group of individuals who are recognized by the group as having the authority to judge if everyone is acting in accordance with the rules of the group and to administer the penalty stipulated by the rules for any offense. In games, the authorized judge of a player's actions is the official.

Officials must show evidence of written and practical knowledge of the game rules as well as techniques for overseeing play, recognizing infractions, and administering penalties within a specific game. When evidence of such competencies is shown, the individual is authorized by the game's governing body as an official "judge." The official must accept and enforce the official rules. (2) The official rules are the law of the game.

An official must make decisions as to whether or not the rules have been broken. Once a decision has been made, it is final. The violator has no defense, and the penalty is imposed by the impartial judge.

Hart (19) pointed out that, although an official's decisions are final, they are not infallible. Up to a certain point, incorrect decisions will be tolerated by the players, and the game can continue. According to Hart, when official aberrations become frequent, the players can either stop accepting the official's aberrant rulings, or they can accept them, and thus the game has changed.

Some game rules, such as in volleyball and softball, make provisions for legally protesting the decision of an official. Protests are allowed on rule interpretation or rule misinterpretation, not on matters of fact or on matters involving accuracy of judgment. For example, the umpire's accuracy in judging whether a pitch was a strike or a ball can not be protested, but the umpire's failure to impose the correct penalty for a specific violation can be

protested. In order to be valid, a protest must be made in the manner designated by the rules. The protest is sent to the individual or committee authorized by the governing body of the game. It then becomes the responsibility of the higher authority to act upon the protest by finding the protest valid or invalid.

Some game rules do not allow the official to make a decision until the request for a ruling is made by a player. This situation is defined as an appeal play. Baseball and softball, for example, have such a play. The game rules define specifically the situations which are governed by the appeal play. Batting out of order and a baserunner missing a base are two appeal plays. An appeal must be made to the official before the next pitch. If the defensive team appeals properly, it then becomes the duty of the official to render a decision by finding the appeal valid or invalid. If the official finds the appeal valid by agreeing with the defensive team, he administers the penalty defined by the rules.

4) Game rules have physical sanctions. Since game rules are legislated, it follows that there is a defined, authorized system of enforcement or punishment. Hart (19) called it the centralization of social pressure. In other words, the sanctions have been institutionalized; a governing body has established specific penalties for violations of specific rules. As a result of the institutionalization, sanctions are highly determinate and organized. Prior to breaking a rule, a player knows the penalty which will be imposed for violating a particular rule. Before the game begins, a basketball player knows that the consequences of "travelling" is loss of the ball to the opponents out-of-bounds.

The authorized consequences for a breach of a game rule are well defined and predictable. There can be psychological and physiological consequences of violations, as Baier (47) suggested, but such consequences are difficult to predict. For example, the violation of a rule during some crucial part of a game may cause a psychological let-down or a psychological commitment to play better by individual players or by an entire team. Thus, the authorized consequences of violating a rule are well defined and predictable while the

psychological and physiological consequences of violations are varied and unpredictable.

5) Game rules are exactly defined. Formality and specificity characterize the nature of game rules. The fact that such rules are legislated verifies their formality and specificity. In addition, the terms and expressions used in particular games are defined. Official guides or rule books contain a rule which defines the terms of the game. An "ace" in tennis and the "infield fly" in softball are defined by the rules.

Exceptions are written into game rules. (2, 91) As Rawls suggested, an exception to a rule of practice takes the form of ". . . a qualification or of a further specification of the rule." (91:27) In basketball, for example, jump balls are usually taken between the opposing players involved in the play. There are, however, times when this procedure for taking jump balls is not followed. The exceptions are when injury or disqualification occurs to one of the jumpers and, under specified circumstances, when any two opposing players are allowed to participate in the jump ball. Thus, the rule governing jump balls includes stipulations for jump ball occurrences which do not fit the basic pattern established by the jump ball rule.

In order to assure the definitiveness of rules, other services are usually provided by the governing body of the game. When difficulty in understanding certain rules is anticipated, a section on the clarification of rules is occasionally added to the publication of the rules, as in the guides published by the Division for Girls and Women's Sports. For example, in field hockey, the rule governing corners stipulates where the ball is to be placed for a corner and penalty corner but makes no reference to the position of the player taking the corner hit. This haziness is clarified with a section prior to the official rules which notes that the player taking any ". . . corner hit may stand with her feet in any position, provided the ball is placed in accordance with the rule." (25:78) In addition, the governing bodies usually provide a committee which functions to interpret the meaning of specific rules upon request.

Using Hart's concept of law as a model, game rules were analyzed. Through this analysis, five basic characteristics of game rules have been identified, enabling the sub-hypothesis to be found tenable.

1. Game rules have an authoritative mark.
2. Game rules are legislated.
3. Game rules are enforced by a judge.
4. Game rules have physical sanctions.
5. Game rules are exactly defined.

*Game rules can be classified.*

Searle (39) noted that constitutive rules, under which game rules fall, can be classified into two categories. First, constitutive rules create or define new forms of behavior. This role of constitutive rules has already been examined. In review, certain actions receive new meaning when performed under constitutive rules. In other words, constitutive rules create meaning. The rules of tennis must be followed in order to play the game of tennis. The rule for "side-out" defines side-out in volleyball. Second, Searle suggested that "X counts as Y in context C." (39:36) Substituting words for symbols, field goal ("X") counts as points ("Y") in basketball (context "C").

"X counts as Y in context C" has two qualifications, according to Searle. This statement applies to the entire system of constitutive rules and not to individual rules within the system. Abiding solely by the rule, a volleyball team is composed of six players, does not constitute playing volleyball. But, when all the rules or a large enough subset of the rules are followed, then the game of volleyball is played. This qualification, according to Searle, suggests that within constitutive rule systems, "Y" indicates consequences to the "X" terms. For example, touchdown ("X") counts as points ("Y") in football ("C"); offsides ("X") causes a penalty ("Y") in field hockey ("C").

Mabbott (26) classified game rules into two categories: constitutive and regulative. Constitutive rules determine the game; for example, each batter gets three strikes in softball. Constitutive rules do not need to be justified,

Mabbott claimed. If an individual does not like the rules, he does not have to play the game. Regulative rules, according to Mabbott, can be altered without changing the entire nature of the game. If the rule for offsides in field hockey was altered, field hockey would still be played.

Hart (19) indicated that there exists a contrast within the rules of a game. There are those rules which specify the ways of scoring and winning. Other rules within the same game veto certain actions and establish penalties for the violation of such rules.

In support of the sub-hypothesis, two distinct classifications of game rules have been extracted from the literature.

1. One class of game rules is constitutive and as such defines particular games.
2. The other class of game rules is regulative and as such governs conduct in games by permitting or forbidding certain actions and establishing penalties when violations occur.

*Game rules serve various functions.*

It has been established that all games are governed by rules and that game rules should be studied as systems rather than individually. Game rules serve four specific functions. First, rules constitute games. (2, 4, 19, 26, 39, 91) Without rules there could be no games. Second, the behavior of game participants is regulated by rules. (19, 26, 39, 40) Third, game rules are cultural influences on the play domain. Fourth, agonistic game rules equalize opportunity.

Rules constitute games. Since games are constituted by certain rules, following the rules is essential to the existence of a game. Black (4) pointed out that following the rules means knowing the rules, using them as motives for actions, and citing them as defenses for actions. If an individual refuses to pay attention to the rules, he can not be said to be playing a game.

The constitutive quality of game rules suggests that the rules, or at least some of the rules, specifically define the game. Rules which establish

the spatial and temporal boundaries, designate the equipment to be used, state the aim of the game, and stipulate how to score are all definite in nature.

In defining a game, the rules also give specific meaning to certain actions. Sliding into a "bag" becomes moving to a base in softball. Tossing a ball through a hoop becomes scoring a field goal in basketball. (39, 91)

Another function of game rules is that of regulating the behavior of players. Acting in accordance with the rules requires a thorough knowledge and understanding of the game rules. When the rules are followed, the game proceeds without interruption; but, when a player's behavior transgresses a rule, the game temporarily stops, and a penalty, defined by the rules, is imposed. Since rules define a game, Rawls (91) argued that appeals can be made to the rules in order to correct the behavior of players.

Following the rules does not mean that the rules explain the details of techniques and skills necessary to play the game. The rules may define some skills, such as an air dribble or pivot in basketball, but such definitions are only for the purpose of clarifying the limitations of such skills. The latitude and freedom of players' behavior while acting in accordance with the rules is dependent upon the players' ingenuity and ability. The rules set limits, and the players play according to their nature, needs, and desires within those limits.

Game rules, as a third function, act as cultural influences on the play domain. An authorized group of individuals, all of whom have been influenced by their society and by pervading cultural forces, create, enact, and rescind game rules. Thus, the rules of a game reflect the culture in which the rules originated. Since rules constitute games, games reflect culture. Knowledge of the origin of a game through its rules would seem important in attempting to understand the nature of a particular game. For this reason, baseball, which originated in the United States, was partially used as an instrument to teach the Japanese about democracy after World War II. (57) The system of game rules which comprise baseball carries with it the cultural patterns of those who formulated the rules.

A fourth function is that agonistic rules equalize opportunity. According to Caillois (7), agonistic game rules equalize opportunity by creating equality of chance from the beginning of the contest and by making adjustments relative to participants' abilities. For example, at the start of each game, all external elements, such as boundaries and equipment, are defined and limited by the rules. Some game rules allow for handicaps to be assigned to players with superior skill, thus removing another inequality.

Throughout the game, rules provide equalization in yet another way. Rule transgressors are penalized. The administration of a penalty restores the game and sets opponents on an equal basis again.

By equalizing opportunity, it is assumed that the winner is best because, according to Caillois (7, 49), victory was determined by superior skill resulting from extensive training, arduous effort, a desire to excel, and the will to win. In agonistic games, everyone is given an equal chance to win so the victor's superiority is indisputable. Ellen Griffin (107) summarized the equalizing function of game rules well, "Rules don't make everyone equal, but everyone is equal under the rules."

An examination of the pertinent literature yielded four functions of agonistic game rules, as follows:

1. Game rules constitute games.
2. Game rules regulate the behavior of players.
3. Game rules serve as cultural influences on the play domain.
4. Game rules equalize opportunity.

The sub-hypothesis that game rules serve various functions is found tenable.

#### *Summary.*

Examination of the pertinent literature led to the support and acceptance of the four sub-hypotheses as follows:

1. Game rules are distinctive.
2. Game rules have identifiable characteristics.
3. Game rules can be classified.

**4. Game rules serve various functions.**

**As a result of the evidence in support of the sub-hypotheses, the major hypothesis that there are game rules is accepted as tenable.**

**CHAPTER VI**  
**THE RELATIONSHIP OF MORAL RULES TO GAME RULES**

*Hypothesis.*

Moral rules and game rules are philosophically congruent within their respective provinces.

*Sub-hypotheses.*

1. A concept exists which is basic to both moral rules and game rules.
2. Moral rules are to morality what game rules are to games.
3. Morality and the spirit of the game are comparable phenomena.

*Introduction.*

Rules are the interpretations of many acts which have similar characteristics or which occur under similar circumstances. Moral rules are societal codifications of the concept of morality. Game rules are societal codifications of play rituals. If a philosophical congruency is found between moral rules and game rules, there may be reason to suggest that games could be used to teach morality.

*A concept exists which is basic to both moral rules and game rules.*

The basis of morality, hence of moral rules, is the concept of what constitutes rightness and wrongness. Moral rules are society's codification of that concept. The way in which the underlying concept of rightness and wrongness is codified and sanctioned determines in part, whether the interpretation is legal in nature or moral in nature. When institutional procedures exist to promulgate, administer, and enforce this concept, laws exist. Moral rules have no such institutional procedures to codify and sanction them; they exist without legislated enactment and enforcement. (2, 19, 51)

Underlying games and game rules are the concepts of right and wrong, fair and unfair. It has been established earlier that game rules serve four functions. Two of the functions of game rules are of particular importance here. Game rules regulate the behavior of players, and game rules equalize opportunity. The determination of right behavior and wrong behavior and the equalization of opportunity are based upon interpretations of the concepts of right and wrong, fair and unfair. When institutional procedures are used to promulgate, administer, and enforce these concepts, game rules exist. Game rules become the law in games.

Besides the official game rules, a concept identified as the spirit of the game exists. The basis of this spirit is a concept of what constitutes rightness and wrongness. Feelings of honesty, fairness, and integrity are expressions of this concept. The spirit of the game is not a legislated system but is a code of behavior to which individuals subscribe by virtue of its pervading spirit of rightness.

Thus, two interpretations of the concept of rightness and wrongness appear in games. One is legal in nature, the other is moral in nature. Game rules are legal. The spirit of the game is moral. However, although the process of interpreting the concept of rightness and wrongness differs, basic to both moral rules and game rules is a concept of rightness and wrongness. The sub-hypothesis is found tenable.

*Moral rules are to morality what game rules are to games.*

A concept of what constitutes rightness and wrongness has been identified as basic to both moral rules and game rules. However, the processes of codifying and sanctioning moral rules and game rules seem to differ immensely. Eight characteristics of moral rules were identified in Chapter III, and five characteristics of game rules were identified in Chapter V. A comparison of the identifiable characteristics should indicate the degree of relationship between moral rules and game rules.

Moral rules are characterized by vagueness and indefiniteness. They are neither written down nor formally announced; informality surrounds them.

In addition, the concepts with which moral rules deal make them difficult to define. Game rules, on the other hand, are exactly defined. They are written down and announced. The inclusion of precise specifications and stated exceptions thoroughly defines the meaning and scope of the game rules.

Moral rules contain ethical terms, such as ought-ought not, right-wrong, should-should not. In other words, moral rules give advice and guide action. Game rules contain action-guiding words, such as shall-shall not, may-may not. The structural form of moral rules is not as important as the purpose of moral rules, which is to guide action. The classification of game rules which regulate the behavior of players seems to contain terms which give advice and guide action, as moral rules do.

Moral rules are social in nature. Since game rules are societal codifications of play rituals, it would seem that game rules are social in nature also. Game rules are imposed by social forces upon the individual. They establish standards so that the game can be repeated any number of times yet within the same boundaries and with the same restrictions on everyone who plays. An impartial judge is given the power to see that the rules are followed. The official rules of the game do not permit personal game rules to exist. Since the rules constitute the game, the official rules which are externally imposed upon the individual must be followed if the game is to be played. Thus, game rules are social in nature.

Another characteristic of moral rules is that they are not legislated. The moral code of a society is not established by a formal organization as is the case with game rules. Rules of a game become official by a legislator's fiat.

Another identifiable characteristic of moral rules is that they impose obligations. Since all rules which govern human behavior impose obligations, game rules should be no exception. Essentially, the purpose behind moral rules and game rules is to establish guidelines within which interacting individuals can live and play safely and confidently. Without acknowledgment of the rules by societal members and players, confusion and chaos would reign. Thus, the purpose behind rules fosters the obligation to follow them. However,

individuals seldom completely understand the reason behind rules; therefore, forces external to the individual are needed to assure compliance to the rules. Compliance to the obligation imposed by moral rules is a function of the group. Diffusion of social pressure, however, tends to make this process inefficient for assuring conformity to moral rules. Compliance to the obligation imposed by game rules is more specific and efficient. An individual or group of individuals is given the authority to enforce the rules of the game and to administer penalties for offenses. Thus, game rules impose obligations as moral rules do, but the process of assuring compliance to game rules is more specific and efficient than for moral rules.

Moral rules can be violated. When rules are established to guide behavior towards certain standards, the need for such rules suggests that the possibility for alternative choices of actions exist. Just as moral rules prescribe certain actions, game rules do too. Thus, when an individual acts in a manner which deviates from the actions prescribed by a moral rule or game rule, he has violated or broken the rule regardless of his reasons for doing so.

The violation of a moral rule requires justification. Because moral rules are vital to the continuance of a society, they exist. Institutional procedures are not used to promulgate, administer, and enforce moral rules; their use defends their existence. Thus, violating moral rules requires explanation and reasonable rationale. Game rules are essential to the existence of games, just as moral rules are essential to the existence of societies. However, in the case of game rules, institutional procedures exist for the promulgation, administration, and enforcement of the rules. Penalties for violations are well defined and allow no exceptions unless stipulated in the rules. Game rules can be changed or rescinded through defined channels, but until a game rule is changed or rescinded, it is an official rule. Violation of a game rule does not require an explanation and a reasonable rationale, as is the case with moral rules; rather, violation of a game rule results in the specified penalty.

Moral rules are characterized by a lack of physical sanctions. No authorized system of enforcement or punishment exists for the breach of

moral rules. Rather, they are enforced by persuasion, appeals, smiles, and frowns. The sanctions are not haphazard and nebulous for game rules. A defined, authorized system of enforcement or punishment exists for the violation of game rules. Before a player breaks a game rule, he knows the consequences of his action. Thus, the sanctioning of moral rules and game rules differs greatly.

The essence of morality defies legislated enactment and enforcement. Thus, the rules which comprise the moral code of a society defy legislation also. Games, on the other hand, have a legal system and a moral aspect. The rules which constitute a game are a legislated system. The spirit of the game is the moral aspect. The sub-hypothesis that moral rules are to morality what game rules are to games is rejected as untenable. See Figure 1.


In their respective provinces, game rules are not analogous to moral rules. To what then, if anything, are game rules analogous in real life situations? In Chapter IV, Hart's (19) concept of law was used as a model against which game rules were compared. Law, according to Hart's concept, is characterized principally by an authoritative mark, legislative enactment, and centralization of social pressure.

Game rules have an authoritative mark, as laws have. Legal powers are conferred upon a person, board, commission, or body. This authorization gives the individual or group the rightful power to establish the rules which constitute the game and regulate the behavior of players.

Game rules are legislated. In other words, the legislated rules are the official rules. The authorized individual or group formulates, writes down, announces, and enacts the rules of the game. This formal structure permits game rules to be altered, changed, or rescinded through appeal to the governing body. The same system is true of law.

Game rules are enforced by a judge. A legal system must confer power on someone to judge whether or not everyone is acting in accordance with the established rules. In games, the authorized judge of players' actions is the official.

**Figure 1**  
**The Relationship of Moral Rules To Game Rules**



Game rules have physical sanctions. Penalties for violating the rules and procedures for imposing the penalties are well defined and organized. Hart called this defined, authorized system of enforcement and punishment the centralization of social pressure. Before violating a rule, an individual knows the penalty which will be imposed.

The characteristics of law are applicable to game rules. It would seem that the official rules of a game are analogous to the laws of a culture.

*Morality and the spirit of the game are comparable phenomena.*

Games include an element identified as the spirit of the game which seems to be analogous to morality. If morality and the spirit of the game are analogous, there should be evidence in games of rules, other than legislated rules, which correspond to moral rules. In other words, since moral rules are societal codifications of morality, rules ought to exist in games which codify the spirit of the game.

Black (4) suggested the possibility of the existence of uninferred rules that are unformulated. He concluded that there are implicit rules, meaning that such rules are not ". . . logically inferrible from explicitly formulated rules." (4:131)

According to Black, in order to test the possibility of an uninferred or implicit rule existing, it is essential to have a set of explicit laws in effect so that comparison of behavior in observance of implicit law can be made with behavior in observance of explicit law. An explicit or official rule exists in field hockey prohibiting advancement of the ball with the feet by any player except the goalkeeper. Generally, players in field hockey, when they know that they have advanced the ball with their feet, will not contact the ball again until an opposing player has contacted it. Such behavior is the observance of an implicit rule. If the implicit rule was not followed, other behaviors, such as the umpire's intervention, might result. The implicit rule is not found written in the field hockey rule book. Examination of the official rules leads to the conclusion that the rule must be implicit. In

golf, the official rules do not permit a player to seek or ask advice. However, if a player uses a four-iron from the fairway and the ball falls short of the green due to wind or to some other external condition, the player will show his three-iron to the next golfer. This gesture indicates to the next golfer that he should use the three-iron. This action results from the recognition of an implicit rule.

Black proposed some indicators which would suggest the existence of an implicit rule: 1) conformity of behavior towards the supposed rule, 2) admonitions not to behave against the rule, 3) a form of punishment for violating the rule. If everyone on the field hockey team behaved the same way when "advancing" occurred, if the players warned each other not to hit the ball because an unfair advantage would be gained, and if violation of this agreement resulted in frowns of disapproval, according to Black's criteria, an implicit rule would exist. The final test for checking if a rule fits the definition of an "implicit basic rule" would be, Black suggested, if the implicit rule was formulated and offered to the individuals involved ". . . they would accept it as codifying their previous practice, and that after such acceptance their behavior would not be substantially changed." (4:131)

Games are saturated with implicit rules. These rules suggest that a player should admit hitting the ball out-of-bounds, ought not hoard the ball, should not slide into bases with the spikes up. Other implicit game rules suggest that men should bat on their non-dominant side of home plate in mixed-sex softball games. A badminton player ought to call her carries. A baseball player should not fling the bat. A foul in basketball ought not to be with the intent of hurting another player. An opponent should be congratulated for an outstanding play. A runner should finish the race though far behind. These examples are a small sample of a large number of implicit rules found in games.

Many game participants might agree with the author that the rules cited above are implicit rules. Some may not agree with the particular rules cited due to the unofficial nature of implicit rules. Other individuals may argue that such rules are only applicable in less institutionalized games, as when there is no official, or that the breaking of such rules is part of

good strategy. The lack of definiteness characteristic of implicit rules creates an air of ambiguity and vagueness.

The existence of explicit or official game rules does not negate the existence of implicit rules. Implicit rules are distinguishable, as Black (4) pointed out, in light of explicit rules. Implicit game rules are the codification of the spirit of the game. The official rules create artificial equality, as suggested by Caillois. (7) Implicit rules are based upon an understanding of the reason for official rules. Equality recognized in implicit rules is based upon respect of one's opponent. Recognition of the equality of one's opponent is expected regardless of whether or not an explicit rule requiring it exists. Equality based upon respect of one's opponent is less artificial, more genuine, less externalized, more internalized than the equality created by explicit or official rules.

Implicit game rules codify the spirit of the game, just as moral rules codify morality. Moral rules have eight identifiable characteristics. Replacement of the words "moral rules" with the words "implicit game rules" yields the following: 1) Implicit game rules are not exactly defined; 2) implicit game rules contain ethical terms; 3) implicit game rules are social in nature; 4) implicit game rules are not legislated; 5) implicit game rules impose obligations; 6) implicit game rules can be violated; 7) the violation of an implicit game rule requires justification; 8) implicit game rules do not have physical sanctions. It can be concluded from the analysis of implicit rules that the identifiable characteristics of moral rules characterize implicit game rules as well. Moral rules and implicit game rules seem to be analogous phenomena within their respective provinces. See Figure 2.

Since moral rules codify morality, just as implicit game rules codify the spirit of the game, morality and the spirit of the game would seem to be analogous phenomena within their respective realms. Instead of using institutional procedures for codifying and sanctioning moral rules and implicit game rules, more nebulous procedures, such as appeals to what is fair, smiles, and frowns are used. The essence of morality defies legislation in both real and game situations. The sub-hypothesis that morality and the spirit of the game are comparable phenomena is found tenable.

**Figure 2**

**The Relationship of Moral Rules To Implicit Game Rules**


<b>Real World Morality</b>	+	<b>Play Domain Games</b>
<b>Moral rules are not exactly defined</b>		<b>Implicit game rules are not exactly defined</b>
<b>Moral rules contain ethical terms</b>		<b>Implicit game rules contain ethical terms</b>
<b>Moral rules are social in nature</b>		<b>Implicit game rules are social in nature</b>
<b>Moral rules are not legislated</b>		<b>Implicit game rules are not legislated</b>
<b>Moral rules impose obligations</b>		<b>Implicit game rules impose obligations</b>
<b>Moral rules can be violated</b>		<b>Implicit game rules can be violated</b>
<b>The violation of a moral rule requires justification</b>		<b>The violation of an implicit game rule requires justification</b>
<b>Moral rules do not have physical sanctions</b>		<b>Implicit game rules do not have physical sanctions</b>

*Summary.*

Comparison of the theoretical structure of moral rules and game rules led to the support and acceptance of the sub-hypothesis that a concept exists which is basic to both moral rules and game rules. However, a comparison of the identifiable characteristics of moral rules and game rules led to the rejection of the sub-hypothesis that moral rules are to morality what game rules are to games.

Evidence suggested a relationship between morality and the spirit of the game. Analysis of this relationship led to the support and acceptance of the sub-hypothesis that morality and the spirit of the game are comparable phenomena. As a result of the philosophical analysis, the major hypothesis that moral rules and game rules are philosophically congruent within their respective provinces is rejected as untenable.

**Figure 3**  
**The Relationship of Analogous Elements**  
**Within The Real World And**  
**The Play Domain**



## CHAPTER VII

### PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

#### *Hypothesis.*

Games can be used to teach morality.

#### *Sub-hypotheses.*

1. Morality can be taught.
2. The spirit of the game is the vehicle through which games can be used to teach morality.

#### *Introduction.*

Traditionally, moral rules and rules of conduct were established through a process of reflection by many generations on the rightness and wrongness of certain patterns of behaving. Mead (28) has suggested that this process is no longer applicable to cultures which are characterized by rapid social change. The traditional sources of rules are themselves changing and must continue to change in order to keep abreast with technological changes; for example, the creation of life *in vitro*, the decreased need for physical strength in performing work tasks, and genetic control all are concepts which strain traditional change agents. (11, 35, 54) However, in spite of severe cultural mutation, evidence does not support the idea that moral rules and rules of conduct are no longer necessary in complex, rapidly changing cultures. The pattern seems to be, as Hart (19) suggested, that as cultures increase in complexity and as stability decreases, the need is increased for formal, official rules. Moral rules are not official, legislated rules; however, if the need for official rules increases in complex cultures, it is apparent that the need for knowledge and understanding of the concept of morality and societal codifications of that concept must be manifest. Regardless of whether or not the prefigurative culture, as

described by Mead (28), becomes reality, it is obvious that societies need to find new vehicles for teaching morality in addition to the ones they already have.

Games may be one such vehicle, for games reflect culture, as established in Chapter IV. Thus, technological changes within culture are reflected in games. For example, as the role of women is changing in society, it is reflected in games, as evidenced by the inclusion of women on previously all-male teams, and the opportunity for women to publicly participate in what traditionally have been regarded as all-male sports. Since games include moral principles which seem to be related to a society's moral code, games might be studied in relation to their moral flavor, as well as in relation to their social directive.

*Morality can be taught.*

It was established in Chapter II that there are levels of moral judgment. The emergent pattern of moral judgment development is that individuals progress from stage to stage; however, an individual can seldom comprehend judgments which are more than one stage higher than his own. Individuals need to be taught the conventional moral code to which the larger part of the society subscribes, but the moral experiences need to be sufficiently open-ended so that individuals learn to understand the reasons for the moral code. Individuals are taught certain patterns, such as right and wrong, good and bad, fair and unfair, before they understand the reasons for those patterns and the rules pertaining to them. (13, 64) Peters (64) called this predicament the paradox of moral education. The predicament, according to Peters, concerns the question of how to teach individuals sound moral habits while not stultifying the development of a rational moral code.

Particularly in cultures characterized by rapid social change, it would seem feasible to keep the teaching of morality as general and open as possible. (2, 64) In other words, the creation of new and different circumstances demands reflection, not blind adherence to rules, when making moral decisions.

As Peters (64) suggested, it requires intelligence and social sophistication to act on a rule rather than in accordance with a rule. To act on a rule suggests that a number of different actions fall under an abstract rule. Moral rules are action-guidelines, not action-mandates which have no exceptions. They are implicitly general and should be taught in that light.

Kohlberg suggested that the teaching of moral concepts ". . . is the asking of questions and the pointing of the way, not the giving of answers." (82:3) Kohlberg has experimented with and established procedures for teaching the nature of morality or the nature of virtue, as he called it. Initially, a student is exposed to moral conflict situations for which his moral concepts have no adequate solution. Then, the student is exposed to different points of view about solutions to these situations. When conflict occurs within the student, he tends to become dissatisfied with the rules or principles upon which he based his judgment and chooses to be motivated at a higher level of judgment. For example, students at stage two who are motivated to fulfill quasi-physical needs when faced with a moral dilemma would be exposed to disagreements and arguments of students at stage three who are motivated by a concern for social approval. When new moral conflict situations were posed, stage three students would face stage four arguments oriented toward understanding and maintaining the social order. The teacher, Kohlberg suggested, would support and clarify the higher-level judgments.

An analysis of the pertinent literature seems to indicate that morality can be taught. However, the ways of best accomplishing such a complex task are not established, although Kohlberg has advanced some procedures which could serve as a guide. The sub-hypothesis that morality can be taught is found tenable.

*The spirit of the game is the vehicle through which games can be used to teach morality.*

Lucas (86), a philosopher, has argued that games are not amenable to teaching real world situations. He reasoned that games have fewer relevant features than serious situations have. With less relevant features, the same

game can be played at different times and still resemble previous games. Real world situations with more factors affecting them are less likely to resemble previous situations, he argued.

The rules of the game do set limits and possibly exclude some of the factors which might influence real life situations. However, the exclusion of some factors as not applicable to games may be an advantage for the use of games as a teaching vehicle. If some factors are excluded from game situations as irrelevant, it is possible that these same factors fog the discernment of the relevant features in real world situations. Since games contain a moral aspect called the spirit of the game and a legal aspect called game rules against which implicit game rules can be tested, the features which are germane to the teaching of morality seem to exist in games. Games as microcosms of the culture within which they exist have a sufficient number of features which are applicable to real world situations to warrant their utilization as agents of transition. The study of games with emphasis upon game spirit might be used for teaching real life values and behaviors and might bring the process of rational choice into play.

Piaget (33) suggested that mere experiences are not enough to guarantee the learning of moral values and concepts, the experiences must be moral in nature. If this suggestion is related to games, merely playing a game does not guarantee the learning of moral values. But, when playing experiences include knowledge of the moral aspects contained in games and decision-making regarding the use of such knowledge, it is reasonable to assume that the learning of moral values and concepts might be realized in game situations.

The spirit of the game encompasses the concepts of right and wrong, fair and unfair, just as morality does. However, teachers need to emphasize the morally relevant aspects in games. The congruency of game rules to law, of the spirit of the game to morality, and of implicit game rules to moral rules should be established, discussed, and understood. It must then be tested by experience.

The teacher should set up hypothetical game situations which require decision-making based upon an understanding of morality. Haskins and Hartman (20, 21) have provided some hypothetical game situations. They developed

two sets of twenty incidents which might occur in various sports and provided five alternative actions for each situation. For example,

A baseball player trapped a fly ball between the ground and his glove in what appeared to be a spectacular catch. Such action is called "Trapping" and is against the rules. The player wasn't sure the umpire saw him.

- a. The player should have immediately confessed that he illegally trapped the ball.
- b. The player should wait for the umpire's decision and abide by it.
- c. If the umpire ruled his catch illegal, he should disagree on the grounds that he felt that the umpire could not see the play.
- d. If the umpire asks him if he trapped the ball he should say he did.
- e. If the umpire asks him, he should say he did not trap the ball. (21:8)

Such a hypothetical situation could provide the springboard for decision-making with regard to morality. Perhaps hypothetical game situations should be presented without a list of choices. Individuals would be encouraged to identify, clarify, and justify their moral values and judgments. The teacher would be prepared to ask questions, to discuss alternatives, to lend insights, and to elucidate societal postures, without imposing personal values upon the students.

Real game situations could then be used for moral reflection. How does the excitement of play and winning affect moral judgments? Is it "fair" to consider morality in the fever of play? Is stated behavior consistent with playing behavior? Do moral considerations become more or less important when there are officials? What happens to the tenor of play when one team deliberately breaks implicit rules for its advantage? When is strategy cheating?

The understanding of what constitutes right and wrong for interacting individuals in societies characterized by greater complexity and by ever-increasing change becomes increasingly important. The spirit of the game with its accompanying implicit rules is the vehicle through which games can be used to teach morality.

Usually, physical education teachers and coaches have waited for a "teachable moment" to discuss moral judgments; that is, they have waited until a situation presented itself by chance. If the sub-hypothesis that the spirit of

the game is a teaching vehicle for morality is to be realistically tenable, it is strikingly apparent that moral concepts and values must be taught rather than caught. Only as there is the actual realization of such a concept can the validity of the abstraction be found tenable.

*Summary.*

Examination of the pertinent literature led to the support and acceptance of the sub-hypothesis that morality can be taught. Logical implications as to how games might be used to teach morality were drawn. The sub-hypothesis that the spirit of the game is the vehicle through which games can be used to teach morality was supported and intellectually accepted. In light of the support of the sub-hypotheses, the major hypothesis that games can be used to teach morality was found tenable. The practicality of such a hypothesis rests upon the commitment to teach morality by those who are responsible for the future. Physical educators have an important place in such a scheme.

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