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**Procedural justice in dispute resolution: Effects of interrelatedness,
trust and penalty on procedural preferences**

Wang, Maureen Aimei, Ph.D.

The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1989

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PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
EFFECTS OF INTERRELATEDNESS, TRUST
AND PENALTY ON PROCEDURAL
PREFERENCES


by

Maureen A. Wang

A Dissertation Submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School at
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Approved by



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APPROVAL PAGE

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Five studies were conducted to (1) determine the roles which degree of interrelatedness (multiplex or simplex), level of trust (trusting and nontrusting), and size of penalty play in procedural preferences and to (2) investigate the use of the laboratory community for the study of dispute resolution. Interrelatedness alone was not responsible for producing differences in procedural preferences. Rather, it mediated the perceptions of the penalty and offense, with subjects in the multiplex communities perceiving the offense and penalties as more severe. Level of trust--regardless of the degree of interrelatedness--affected procedural preferences: subjects in the trusting communities were generally more nonadversarial than subjects in the nontrusting communities. Trust, however, interacted with the size of the penalty in two interesting ways. When subjects' perceptions of the offense and penalty were "anchored" by stating the offense explicitly and exposing subjects to all levels of the penalties, they became increasingly adversarial as the penalty increased. Subjects in both the trusting and nontrusting communities became more adversarial as penalty increased; however, subjects in the trusting community were always less adversarial than their counterparts in the nontrusting communities. When subjects' perceptions were

not anchored--as was the case when they were exposed to only one level of the penalty--the size of the penalty had interesting non-linear effects on preferences. Finally, all five experiments produced understandable but different preferences and therefore demonstrated the success of a laboratory community for studying dispute resolution. These studies also support a person x situation interaction approach to an understanding of dispute resolution.

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The social psychological examination of dispute resolution or of "justice" is conventionally broken up into two areas of study: procedural justice and distributive justice. Procedural justice is defined by its focus on the perceived fairness of the disputing procedures themselves; while distributive justice is defined by its focus on the perceived fairness of the distribution of the outcomes or goods which are achieved by the parties involved in a social relation (Lind, Kurtz, Musante, Walker, and Thibaut, 1980). This paper deals largely with the former.

Following the seminal work of Thibaut and Walker (1975), most of the social psychological research on procedural justice has focused primarily on two different models of dispute resolution--the adversarial and nonadversarial models of judicial procedure (e.g., Houlden, LaTour, Walker, and Thibaut, 1978; Lind, Erickson, Friedland, and Dickenberger, 1978; Lind, Lissak, and Conlon, 1983; Lind, Kurtz, Musante, Walker, and Thibaut, 1980; Thibaut and Walker, 1975, 1978; Tyler, 1984; Walker, Lind, and Thibaut, 1979). In the adversarial model, the disputants retain their own counsels--a fact which affords them a high degree of control over the presentation of their

individual cases. In the nonadversarial or inquisitorial procedure, on the other hand, a single judge and his or her agents retain control over the proceedings (e.g., presentation of the issues and evidence).

Data obtained on procedural preference have shown that subjects, by and large, prefer the adversarial to the nonadversarial procedure, perceiving the adversarial procedure as the fairer of the two. Additionally, cross-cultural studies in France and West Germany, countries whose legal systems are nonadversarial, also yielded similar data (Lind, Erickson, Friedland, and Dickenberger, 1978). Altogether, these findings led Thibaut and Walker (1975, 1978) to conclude that the greater degree of process control and the greater perceived fairness inherent in the adversarial model is responsible for its greater attractiveness. Thus, this research indicated that control and perceived fairness are determinants of procedural preference.

Thibaut and Walker's model was not, however, without its critics. For example, Hayden and Anderson (1979) have attacked it for, among other things, being culturally-biased and for restricting their analysis to those procedures used in advanced western societies. Although a generally valid criticism, it is, in some respects, an unwarranted one. Thibaut and Walker (1975, p. 117) stated that, "Our special concern has been with procedures for litigation in developed

societies [emphasis added]," thus, never purporting to have evidence for anything more than the evaluations and perceptions of these procedures in but advanced societies. Yet, critics of the model seem to be using this limitation as the means of evaluating the conclusions of the model, demanding that it include in its analysis non-western, traditional cultures and the procedures used in these societies. Nonetheless, despite the questionable basis of these criticisms (in regard to the Thibaut and Walker, 1975 model), they do provide useful advise for further research. Anthropologists (Gulliver, 1979; Nader and Todd, 1978), for example, at the opposite end of the spectrum, examined diverse societies and collected data on a variety of methods of resolving disputes--processes which range from the tacit, uninstitutionalized to those which are institutionally-bound and sanctioned. Nader and Todd (1978) enumerated several different procedures, pointing out that these "...same basic procedural modes are used worldwide in attempts to deal with grievances, conflict, or disputes: adjudication, arbitration, mediation, negotiation, coercion..., avoidance, and 'lumping it'" (p. 9).

Nader and Todd (1978), also discuss anthropological analyses of dispute resolution and suggest additional factors for consideration in a procedural justice model. According to the structural-functional approach to procedural justice, a crucial variable in determining

procedural preference is the complexity of the interrelations between the participants (and likewise interrelations within the community and the society in general). The structural-functional model specifies two types of relations: "simplex", single-interest relations and "multiplex" relations. Simplex relations are usually typical of more differentiated societies in which a person's relationship to others is confined to a single interest (e.g., doctor to patient, shopkeeper to customer, employee to fellow employee). Multiplex relations, on the other hand, are, as the term implies, more complex, and one finds members of such relations "connected" to each other by more than functional aspects alone. For example, in the multiplex relations of the Bartose society, "...nearly every societal interest serves many interests...The headman is related to his villagers by political as well as kinship bonds" (Nader and Todd, 1978, p. 12). Another characteristic of simplex relations is that they may also be less permanent than multiplex ones. Gluckman (Nader and Todd, 1978, p. 12) notes that, "This multiple membership of diverse groups in diverse relationships is an important source of quarrels and conflicts, but it is equally the basis of internal cohesion in any society."

With regard to dispute resolution, the structural-functional model predicts that disputants in multiplex or continuing relationships will choose procedures such as

negotiation and mediation--procedures which will lead to compromise outcomes and consequently to the maintenance of ingroup harmony. Conversely, disputants in simplex relationships will tend to choose procedures such as arbitration or adjudication, which are more likely to lead to win-or-lose decisions (Nader and Todd, 1978). Hence, this model and the reasoning upon which it is based attempts to examine and include other contextual variables which may play a role in procedural preference.

Thibaut and Walker's model also began to be expanded upon by researchers in social psychology. For example, Thibaut, Friedland, and Walker (1974) attempted to examine other social determinants (specifically, the effects of correspondent and noncorrespondent relations) on compliance to rules. Cross-cultural studies conducted in non-western societies found that Japanese subjects, contrary to previous findings in Western cultures, preferred the nonadversarial procedure (Benjamin, 1975; Tanabe, 1963). More recently, Leung (1988) and Leung and Lind (1986) found that Chinese subjects from Hong Kong also preferred the nonadversarial procedure. Meanwhile, Earley and Lind (1987) suggest that justice judgment effects are not, as suggested by Thibaut and Walker's (1978) model, mediated by perceived control. Cross-cultural and other findings of this nature lead researchers to look for other contextual factors--perhaps cultural ones--to explain procedural preference.

Recent research points to an important cultural factor that may influence procedural preference (e.g., Benjamin, 1975; Leung, 1988; Leung and Lind, 1986). According to these authors, preference for the nonadversarial procedure in non-western societies may be understood using the cultural dimension of collectivism-individualism. According to Hofstede (1980, 1983), collectivism is the "preference for a tightly knit social framework in which individuals are emotionally integrated" (1983, p. 295) into their group--be it an extended family, clan, or other social or racial group. Individualism, on the other hand, is the preference for a "loosely knit social framework in which individuals are supposed to take care of themselves and their immediate families only." Thus, while collectivism is characterized by a greater concern for in-group members and a greater likelihood to sacrifice personal interests to the welfare of the group, individualism is characterized by inner-direction, self-orientation, independence, and personal achievement (Bond, 1984; Leung and Bond, 1984; Leung and Lind, 1986). People from individualistic societies (U.S., France, West Germany, Great Britain) have been found to prefer the adversarial procedure, while people from collective societies (Japan, Hong Kong) have been found to prefer the nonadversarial procedure.

The relationship between the collectivism-individualism dimension and people's preference for different models of

procedural justice models remains to be clarified and examined. At this point, however, it is interesting to note some convergence with regard to work done on distributive justice (that is, the perception of fairness of the distribution of outcomes and goods). Deutsch (1975), in his analysis of distributive justice, proposes that different societal values underlie the preference for any system of justice. Deutsch asserts that people in societies in which economic productivity is of primary importance will use the equity norm as the dominant principle of distributive justice. On the other hand, people raised in societies or groups which place a primary value or importance upon maintaining harmony and good social relations will use the equality norm. And in a third case, members of societies in which both personal development and welfare are highly valued will use need as the principle of distributive justice.

It is clear that Deutsch's first classification (societies which value economic productivity) corresponds roughly with the cultural dimension of individualism, while the second corresponds to the dimension of collectivism. The third classification (importance of both personal development and welfare) seems to correspond to aspects of both individualism and collectivism. In any case, if the norms of equity, equality, and need do in fact underlie the

systems of justice in different groups, then perhaps these values also affect procedural preference.

Leung and Bond (1984), for example, suggest that in allocation of rewards an equality-based solution should be preferred by collective societies in which interpersonal sensitivity and harmony are highly valued and that an equity-based solution would be preferred by individualist societies which place a higher value on productivity, competitiveness, and individual achievement. They did in fact find support--though not unequivocal--that Chinese (collectives) subjects will be more likely in general to prefer and to allocate rewards using an equality norm, especially when allocating to in-group members.

In the procedural justice literature, Leung (1988, Leung and Lind, 1986) examined different cultural variables which he believed affect preferences. He found that Chinese subjects, or collectives, tended to prefer the nonadversarial, animosity-reducing procedures more so than their American (individualistic) counterparts. He hypothesized that since ingroup harmony is important to collectives, they will actively strive to avoid confrontation with in-group members. And the nonadversarial procedure allows the disputants to avoid confrontation (since both process and decision control are vested in a third party) and thus to maintain harmony. Leung (1988) therefore suggests that in addition to Thibaut and Walker's

factors of process control and fairness, the factors of animosity reduction and favorableness must also be considered when determining procedural preference. He concludes that although collectivism is not directly related to procedural preference, its effect on preference may be mediated by the subjects' perceptions of the different models.

In the present series of experiments we attempt to expand on this general line of research. The experiments reported and proposed herein address two equally important issues. One issue is methodological and entails the creation of a community (or "microculture") within which we will investigate procedural preference. The second issue--which follows from the first--is the examination of the different contextual factors which may add to our understanding of procedural preference and dispute resolution.

The creation of a laboratory community may be achieved through a method conceptually similar to Walter Mischel's (1981; Mischel and Peake, 1982) approach to the study of personality variables. For example, in his study of the delay of gratification in children, Mischel first identified variables correlated with the phenomenon (e.g., maturity, socioeconomic class, trust, social responsibility, etc.), tested these variables in the laboratory, and consequently

examined the person-by-situation interaction involved in this phenomenon.

One possible interpretation of this research would be that Mischel was able to change behaviors reflective of seemingly stable personality characteristics, and his manipulation of the context yielded changes in this personality variable (i.e., delay of gratification). Perhaps a conceptually similar methodology may be applied to the study of cultural variables. In such a paradigm, culture would be the conceptual equivalent of the context--a "macrocontext" if you will. Each culture produces people with varied behaviors and preferences (e.g., perceptions of optical illusions, personal space, mother-infant interactions, sex roles, and procedural preferences). These cross-cultural differences can likewise be conceptualized as person-by-situation interactions, the results of which are not necessarily invariant nor immune to laboratory experimentation.

In the cross-cultural literature, Triandis (1964) and Lonner (1980) discuss the results of research on perceptual responses, categorizations, and aesthetic judgments which support this type of conceptualization of culture. Triandis (1964, p. 13) notes that:

Eriksen (1963), after a review of fifteen years of research, concluded that values, needs, and expectations affect only the responses that subjects make. Perceptual responses, according to Eriksen, are modified by both the frequency of

occurrence of a particular stimulus (the more frequent stimuli are recognized more easily) and by kind of previous reinforcements received in the presence of the stimulus. Therefore, according to this reasoning, the failure of members of one culture to observe an optical illusion which is observable by members of another does not mean that the perceptual systems or mechanisms of the people in these two cultures are fundamentally different. Rather, the inability or ability to perceive the illusion can be explained as a person-by-situation interaction in which familiarity of the stimulus may greatly affect perceptual responses.

As an example, this type of reasoning may be applied to an explanation of the Mueller-Lyer illusion. Researchers found that non-Europeans are unable to experience the full impact of the illusion. According to the carpentered world hypothesis, the illusion is caused by the perception of line and angle peculiar to people growing up in carpentered environments and is therefore most vivid to these people (that is, Europeans and other members of western-influenced cultures). Likewise, and according to the reasoning suggested above, people living in non-carpentered environments may experience the illusion not with straight lines and acute angles, but rather with non-linear lines and curves--the more frequently occurring and therefore familiar aspects of their particular environment. A finding of this sort would demonstrate, at least in part, that both Europeans and non-Europeans have similar visual mechanisms, and that reinforcement, frequency of occurrence, and familiarity of visual experiences play a large role in our

interpretation of illusions and reactions to cues in the environment.

This idea, as applied to the cross-cultural work on judicial procedure, would posit that variables affecting preferences may be identified and then tested in a laboratory setting. Through the manipulation of contextual/cultural variables and the examination of the resultant behaviors, we may be able to determine the extent to which cross-cultural differences are the result of person-by-situation interactions. If the key variables are identified, then manipulation of these variables should modify preferences, and, in essence, we should be able to evoke responses or behaviors found in another. Thus, in this manner, we should be able to achieve a laboratory study of the variables important to procedural preference.

In sum, current cross-cultural studies of procedural justice are yielding intriguing data which beg further investigation. The present series of experiments is an attempt to extend this literature in two ways: (a) methodologically through the idea of a "laboratory community" and (b) conceptually through the controlled testing of different variables which may affect preferences. In Experiments 1-3, we examined the effects of three different variables on preferences: degree of interrelatedness of ingroup relationships, degree of

interpersonal and community trust, and severity of the penalty associated with a guilty verdict. In Experiments 4 and 5 we investigated the effects of these three variables on the perceptions of the severity of the penalty and offense.

CHAPTER II
EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2

Introduction

In experiments 1 and 2, one of our primary interests was the creation of different communities in the laboratory. Two variables--degree of interrelatedness and level of trust--were manipulated to create the two different types of communities of interest: a cooperative, neighborly community and a competitive, self-serving one.

According to the structural-functional model (Gulliver, 1979; Nader and Todd, 1978), the nature of the interrelations among the members of a culture play a large part in determining how disputes are resolved. This model predicts that members of societies characterized by multiplex relations (in which members are highly interrelated by complex relational connections) would be more likely to choose dispute resolving procedures which lead to compromise outcomes and which therefore do not threaten the fabric of these relations. On the other hand, members of societies characterized by "simplex relations" (i.e., "simple" relations which are largely confined to a single interest)--possibly because of the lack of relational and social interconnections--will be more likely to choose win-or-lose procedures to settle disputes.

In other words, knowing that one will interact with the same people in the same group for much of one's life may greatly influence the type of legal actions one takes; and in communities typified by multiplex relations, it becomes important to maintain harmonious relations with one's ingroup. (Additionally, it may be important to note that in a close-knit, long-standing community, any crime or deviation from the community's standard may be perceived as a threat to a peaceful existence as well as a serious breach of community values.) In Experiment 1, we introduced a highly interrelated community. We maximized interrelations by making the communities long-standing, which in turn had the effect of decreasing intergroup mobility. And in Experiment 2 we created a simplex community--one which was not long-standing and thus less interrelated.

While interrelatedness may be one possible determinant of procedural preferences, other research on procedural justice (Leung, 1988; Leung & Lind, 1986) suggests that aspects of the collectivism-individualism dimension may mediate preferences. For example, one distinction between collective, group-oriented and individualistic, self-oriented cultures is the importance placed on the maintenance of the group and thereby on harmonious, trusting relations among group members. Since collective and individualistic societies may differ with regard to the value placed on interpersonal relationships, we examined the

hypothesis that one dimension on which collective societies differ from individualistic societies is that of interpersonal trust. Thus, in Experiments 1 and 2 we attempted to create our two different communities by manipulating (in addition to the degree of interrelatedness) the degree of trust existing between the participants in the legal dispute and within the community in general; creating one community more cooperative and trusting in nature and another, the nontrusting one, more self-serving and highly competitive.

According to a structural-functional analysis (Gulliver, 1979; Nader & Todd, 1978), the degree of interrelatedness is important in determining procedural preferences; however, according to our interpretation of the collectivism-individualism dimension, interpersonal trust may provide an explanation for the cross-cultural differences found in procedural preferences. Whether these differences in preferences are explicable from the perspective of interrelatedness or from the dimension of trust is not clear. We therefore examined both factors in relation to each other. Experiment 1 examined trust in multiplex communities, while Experiment 2 examined trust in simplex communities. We attempted to assess the effects of these communities by producing differences in subjects' procedural preferences. In other words, we wished to develop contexts which might induce our subjects to respond

to dispute situations in ways not typically American (i.e., by demonstrating preferences other than the adversarial).

The third variable which we examined within this paradigm was that of the magnitude of the penalty. Unlike the first two variables, the magnitude of the penalty was not instrumental in the creation of the communities per se, but was more directly related to aspects of the dispute itself. The "penalty" associated with a dispute is one type of cost. And anthropological approaches (Nader and Todd, 1978) suggest that "cost"--whether it is sociological or psychological (e.g., social stigma attached to the implication of having committed a transgression, social stigma attached to either engaging or not engaging in the disputing process) or economic (e.g., loss due to an unfavorable ruling, physical distance from court, loss of hourly wage, etc.)--is a factor which should be considered in analyses of dispute resolution. Experiments 1 and 2, therefore, also tested the effect of the magnitude of the penalty on procedural preference.

In sum, Experiments 1 and 2 were undertaken to assess the creation of a laboratory community and specifically to test the effects of (1) the degree of interrelatedness (multiplex vs. simplex), (2) the level of trust in the community, and (3) the effects of the magnitude of the penalty on procedural preferences. Based on the analyses discussed above (Gulliver, 1979; Leung, 1988; Leung & Lind,

1986; Nader & Todd, 1978), we can make the following predictions for each of the three variables. For the variable of interrelatedness, we predict that since the maintenance of harmony is relatively more important to members of multiplex than to members of simplex communities, subjects in the multiplex community should choose to resolve disputes in a non-confrontational manner.

For the variable of trust, we would predict that subjects in the trusting community will prefer the nonadversarial procedure over the adversarial. This may be due to the overall confidence in and willingness to give up personal control which subjects in the trusting communities have relative to those in the nontrusting communities.

Finally, for the variable of penalty, one prediction might be that as consequences are increased, the defendants will be more likely to use a tit-for-tat strategy in which they become increasingly adversarial as the penalty--and hence, by implication, the aggressiveness of the accuser--increases. However, we may also find penalty x trust interactions. For example, despite increases in the severity of the penalty in a trusting community, defendants may continue to act to reduce the potential for confrontation by choosing more cooperative, animosity-avoiding ways of resolving the dispute. Subjects in the nontrusting communities, however, may react to the

increasing severity of the penalty by becoming increasingly adversarial.

Method (Experiment 1)

Subjects and Design

144 female students from the introductory psychology class at the University of North Carolina-Greensboro participated in the study in return for experimental credit. The design included two levels each of two between-group factors: trust and penalty associated with a guilty verdict. All four communities were multiplex in nature. Repeated measures were taken on the procedural variable (adversarial, nonadversarial).

Materials

The materials consisted of a single packet of descriptions and questions. Page one of the packet contained the description of one of four different communities or scenarios: one trusting community with a low penalty associated with a guilty verdict, another trusting community with a high penalty associated with a guilty verdict, the third community was nontrusting with a low penalty, and the fourth community was nontrusting with a high penalty associated with a guilty verdict. (Of note is that the descriptions of the communities represent extreme scenarios. Hence, the descriptions of both the trusting, cooperative and cohesive community, and the nontrusting,

competitive and self-serving community are pronounced and extreme.) (See Appendix A for the materials.)

The next two pages of the packet included the descriptions of the two hearing procedures: adversarial (labelled "L") and nonadversarial (labelled "J"). The order of presentation of the two procedures was counterbalanced. The general format of the descriptions of the offense and legal procedures ("J" and "L") were adapted from Leung and Lind (1986). (See Appendix B for the descriptions of the hearing procedures.)

The next page in the packet of experimental materials assessed the subjects' preferences for the hearing procedures. The subjects were asked to rate their preference for each procedure using a 20-point scale with the stipulation that each procedure be assigned a unique rating (forced choice). The next page of the packet, once again as per Leung and Lind (1986), included an open-ended question which asked subjects to explain their evaluations of the three procedures. Next, there were ten more questions, also adapted from Leung and Lind (1986), which asked the subjects to indicate: how much they felt each procedure favors them, how likely they think each procedure will lead to a workable settlement, to what extent each procedure provides them with the opportunity to present evidence, provides their opponent with the opportunity to present evidence, how fair the procedures are, how much

control the judge has over the presentation of evidence, how much control the subject has over the evidence, how much control their opponent has over the evidence, how likely it is that the procedures will result in a fair outcome, and how likely it is that each procedure will represent the true facts of the case. The subjects indicated their answers by rating the procedures in each question using a 20-point scale.

Procedure

Subjects were run in a large classroom in groups of 12 to 20 students. After being seated, the experimenter handed them a packet of materials which described a legal dispute and then instructed them to read the packet carefully and to try to imagine themselves in the situation described. Subjects were then told to read the hearing procedures carefully and to feel free to flip around to any portion of the packet in order to answer the questions at the end of the packet. Subjects were debriefed and thanked at the end of the experiment.

Method (Experiment 2)

Subjects and Design

120 female students from the introductory psychology class at the University of North Carolina-Greensboro participated in the experiment in return for credit. All communities were simplex in nature. The design was a 2 x 2

x 2 between and within design. The two between-subjects factors were trust (low and high) and magnitude of penalty associated with a guilty verdict (low and high). Subjects' procedural preferences (adversarial and nonadversarial) were the within-subjects factor.

Materials

The materials were presented in a packet identical to that in Experiment 1 except for a single modification. The following two lines were deleted from the beginning of the text in order to decrease the interrelatedness of the communities; "We would like you to imagine that you have grown up and plan to remain in the community which is described below. It is a rather small community and you know and are known to most of its members." These sentences were replaced with the following, "We would like you to imagine that you are a member of the following community." The questions which followed the description of the two legal procedures (whose order was counterbalanced) were identical to those in Experiment 1.

Procedure

Subjects were run in a large classroom in groups of approximately 15 to 20 each. They were seated four each around a long rectangular table. The instructions were identical to that of Experiment 1.

Results and Discussion (Experiments 1 and 2)

For Experiment 1, the analysis of variance for procedural preferences revealed the following significant effects: a main effect of trust $F(1, 140) = 12.92, p < .0005$; a main effect of procedure (adversarial vs. nonadversarial) $F(1, 140) = 68.88, p < .0001$; and a procedure x trust interaction $F(1, 140) = 6.60, p < .02$. This significant interaction indicates that subjects in the nontrusting communities preferred the adversarial procedure ("L") more than they preferred the nonadversarial procedure ("J") in both low- and high-penalty conditions.

Subjects in all communities preferred the adversarial procedure to a relatively greater degree than the nonadversarial procedure; however, subjects in the trusting communities preferred the nonadversarial procedure (in both penalty conditions) relatively more than subjects in the nontrusting communities (both low- and high-penalty conditions). In other words, subjects in both trusting communities (that is, either high or low in objective penalty) preferred the nonadversarial procedure more than their counterparts in both of the nontrusting communities.

Thus, interrelatedness seems to have mitigated the effects of the magnitude of the penalty; however, it was not responsible for all the differences which were found in preferences. Of relevance is the fact that subjects in the nontrusting, multiplex communities preferred the

nonadversarial mode of dispute resolution to a much lesser degree than did their counterparts in the trusting communities--showing instead a relatively greater preference for the adversarial procedure. This is an indication that the effect of context on preferences does not seem to have been limited to the variable of interrelatedness alone. Specifically, if the type of interrelatedness alone were responsible for differences in preferences, then we should have found no differences in preferences between the trusting and nontrusting communities.

The analysis of variance for Experiment 2 revealed a significant main effect for trust $F(1, 116) = 5.32, p < .03$; and for procedure (J or L) $F(1, 116) = 73.25, p < .0001$. These main effects were, however, qualified by two interactions. The first was a marginally significant procedure x penalty interaction $F(1, 116) = 3.91, p < .051$; in which preferences for the adversarial procedure decreased as the penalties increased, and preferences for the nonadversarial procedure increased as the size of the penalty increased. The second significant interaction was a procedure x trust x penalty interaction $F(1, 116) = 5.0, p < .03$.

According to this three-way interaction, subjects in the nontrusting communities preferred the adversarial procedure more than they preferred the nonadversarial--regardless of size of the penalty. On the other hand,

subjects in the trusting and high-penalty community preferred the nonadversarial procedure relatively more and the adversarial procedure relatively less than subjects in any of the other three communities (including the trusting, low-penalty condition). In other words, subjects in the trusting high-penalty community preferred the nonadversarial procedure relatively more than subjects in the trusting and low-penalty community--who preferred the adversarial procedure. (The means for subjects' procedural preferences are depicted in Table 2.)

It seems that interrelatedness (multiplex or simplex) alone is not responsible for predicting the manner in which disputes are resolved--as the structural-functional model might predict. Instead, in the present studies, interrelatedness interacted with the level of trust in determining procedural preferences. Additionally, some aspect of interrelatedness may also have mediated the effect of "penalty"--for whereas in the multiplex communities we obtained no effect of penalty, we were able to find significant penalty interactions in the simplex-type communities.

Furthermore, what is particularly interesting is the apparent absence of a "tit-for-tat" type strategy (in both Experiments 1 and 2) with respect to increases in the size of the penalty. Specifically, none of the subjects in any of the communities (trusting or nontrusting, multiplex or

simplex) became more adversarial as the penalty associated with a guilty verdict increased. In fact in the trusting and simplex community of Experiment 2, subjects were actually less adversarial in the high-penalty condition relative to the low-penalty condition.

Perhaps the perception of the severity of the offense or transgression may have been affected by the size of the penalty (and hence by interrelatedness as well). For example, a higher penalty may be an indication that a more severe transgression was committed. Thus, in the simplex, trusting communities, we find an interesting penalty effect which may be due in part to the fact that the offense in the high-penalty condition may have been perceived as being more severe than the supposed offense committed in the low-penalty condition. As such, we may be comparing the procedural preferences of people who have committed different crimes in very different contexts (as it seems possible that many aspects of the scenario may be changing with differences in the penalty).

By the same token, if offenses committed in multiplex communities are perceived as relatively more severe than those committed in simplex communities, then, by implication, so too may be the penalties. This is evidenced, in part, by the fact that we found no significant effect for the size of the penalty in the multiplex communities, but instead found significant penalty

interactions in the simplex communities. Perhaps "interrelatedness" may have mitigated the effect of the penalty in that all penalties in the multiplex communities were perceived as relatively severe. For example, in multiplex societies in which there is a high degree of interrelatedness any transgression posing a threat to the relative harmony of the group--no matter how large or small--may be perceived as relatively severe. Thus, in these communities, the penalties or consequences may not have been perceived as being very different from each other. And if in multiplex communities more or less severe transgressions are seen as having equally severe consequences, one would expect the members of these groups to behave similarly with regard to a wide range of penalties--judging the entire dispute situation according to social standards that are not solely determined by the personal, material costs incurred by potential loss.

In sum, given the data obtained in Experiments 1 and 2, it seems that subjects' perceptions of the offense and of the penalty may have been differentially affected by the interrelatedness of the community and level of trust. Experiments 3, 4, and 5 were designed to explore these hypotheses. In Experiment 3 we tested these assumptions by (1) anchoring subjects' perceptions of the penalty and (2) anchoring perceptions of the offense by making it explicit.

In Experiments 4 and 5 we tested subjects' perceptions of the offense and of the penalty.

CHAPTER III
EXPERIMENTS 3, 4, AND 5

Introduction

As we have shown in Experiments 1 and 2, any legal issue or dispute takes place within an entire social context. Decisions of how one should proceed are based upon many different aspects of one's social context. Hence, a familiarity with the advantages of different hearing procedures will not in and of itself be sufficient to predict what or how a person will choose to settle a dispute. It is safe to assume that, once accused of an offense or transgression, the defendant may do any one (or all) of the following: search him/herself to decide whether there is justification for the accusation (if the charge is not, in fact, clear), search his/her social context to ascertain the aggressiveness of his/her accuser, attempt to find out the exact severity of the supposed offense (other than those "moral" transgressions for which there are more clear-cut judgments of their severity), attempt to determine the nature of the legal system and legal aid, find out what one might potentially lose or what one is legally liable for, etc.

Ascertaining the relative severity of the transgression and the reasonableness of the demanded compensation may be

influenced by the nature of one's judicial system. The American judicial system, unlike that of France or West Germany, is based on precedents (Thibaut and Walker, 1975)--cases which are brought to court are decided upon by comparing the case in question to previous similar cases. Hence, this type of system is based not so much on absolute judgments of right or wrong, but on what judgment was made previously in a similar case. When litigating, it is not uncommon for the participants in cases to probe and seek advice to ascertain the size of the compensation the accuser should ask for or what the defendant is justifiably responsible for. These issues are addressed both before and during the courtroom proceedings. Whether this type of probing is the by-product of our particular justice system or whether these are processes in which all people engage, no matter what their legal orientation, is not known.

However, these factors are important to litigants when deciding how to proceed with a case. As discussed above in Experiments 1 and 2, presenting the dispute within a social context may not have been sufficiently explicit with regard to information of the severity of the offense and what a reasonable penalty should be. Experiment 3 provides more specific information about the offense in the context of a within-subjects design. The within-subjects design should enable us to anchor the severity of offense as well as to

provide more information about the potential penalties associated with the it.

This type of design would accomplish the anchoring of offense and penalty by enabling the subject to interpret all the penalty scenarios in relation to each other. Hence subjects are able to see (1) what the offense could potentially mean in terms of size of compensation (and by implication, what the offense means to the accuser), (2) what constitutes a reasonable versus an unreasonable request, and (3) that the same offense is being litigated in each penalty condition. Once the offense is anchored by making it explicit and allowing subjects to understand it in relation to several different levels of demands for compensation, subjects should be able to make clearer interpretations of the legitimacy of the dispute and (or in relation to) the aggressiveness of the accuser. Hence, we might find defendants matching the aggressiveness of their accuser by becoming increasingly adversarial themselves.

In other words, when subjects in a within-subjects design are able to see the penalties in relation to a more explicit offense and in relation to each other, we may expect to see an overall tit-for-tat (or matching) strategy used; wherein defendants become increasingly adversarial with the perceived increasing aggressiveness of the accuser (increases in penalty). We should not, however, see this same pattern of responding on a between-groups design (as in

Experiments 1 and 2) because of the shifting perceptions of the severity of the offense and (by implication) the meaning of the penalty. And, in fact, we did not find subjects using this matching strategy in those studies. Apparently, then, when the perceptions of the offense and penalty are not anchored (as in a between-groups design), it becomes difficult to predict subjects' responses to dispute situations, because it is difficult to determine whether subjects are reacting to what they perceive as the aggressiveness of the accuser or the severity of the offense. Additionally, whether this matching strategy will be used in both the trusting community as well as in the nontrusting community is not clear.

Method (Experiment 3)

Subjects and Design

76 female students from the introductory psychology class at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro participated in the study in return for experimental credit. The design included the between-groups factor of trust (low and high) and the two within-subjects factors of size of compensation or penalty (low, moderate, and high) and procedural preference (adversarial and nonadversarial).

Materials

The materials, once again, consisted of a single packet of descriptions and questions. The first page of the packet

described either of two different communities: one trusting and the other nontrusting. Both communities were simplex in nature. The descriptions of the communities were the same as those used in Experiments 1 and 2; however, this time the offense was made explicit. Subjects read that they had been accused of infringing upon someone else's business property by failing to trim and take care of the (the defendant's) shrubbery which grows on the border of the business properties.

Pages 2 and 3 of the packet included the descriptions of the two hearing procedures (adversarial and nonadversarial). The next three pages of the packet included, on each page, the description of one of the three levels of compensation for the supposed offense (in the low penalty condition the subject paid 25% of the fees; in moderate, the subject paid all the fees; and in high, subject was sued for the property upon which the trees and shrubs grew). The description of the penalty (compensation) was followed by questions which assessed the subjects' preferences for the two hearing procedures. The presentation of the penalty descriptions was counterbalanced so that each penalty condition appeared in the first, second, and third position a third of the time.

Procedure

Subjects were run in a large classroom in groups of 12 to 30 students. After being seated, the experimenter handed the subjects a packet which described a legal dispute and then instructed them to read each scenario carefully and to try to imagine themselves in the situations described. The subjects were debriefed and thanked at the conclusion of the experiment.

Results and Discussion (Experiment 3)

Two different analyses were performed on these data. The first analysis was performed on the measures of procedural preferences for only the responses to the first penalty scenario of every packet. In other words, although each subject experienced every level of the penalty, the present analysis looked only at their first response--i.e., at only one level of the penalty per each subject. Only one significant effect was found for level of trust $F(1,70) = 5.50, p < .03$. However, an analysis of variance performed on only the low- and moderate-penalty conditions (this comparison is analogous to the analyses made between the low- and high-penalty conditions in Experiment 2) yielded significant effects for procedure x trust $F(1,47) = 4.27, p < .05$, and a marginally significant procedure x trust x penalty interaction $F(1,47) = 3.23, p = .075$. The means for these data are depicted in Table 3.

This marginally significant procedure x trust x penalty interaction is a partial replication of the same interaction which was found in Experiment 2. Specifically, subjects in the trusting communities in both Experiment 1 and in the between-groups analysis of the penalty in the present experiment became relatively less adversarial as the penalty increased. However, these results were qualified by the analysis presented below.

A second analysis of variance for procedural preferences was performed using all three levels of penalty as within-subjects variables.¹ (The means for these data are depicted in Table 4.) This analysis revealed a significant between-groups effect of level of procedure x trust $F(1,74) = 6.90, p < .02$; that is, as we found in Experiments 1 and 2 as well as on the between-groups design, subjects in the trusting community were relatively less adversarial than subjects in the nontrusting community. Also found was a significant within-subjects effect of procedure x size of penalty $F(2,148) = 14.18, p < .001$ --as the penalty increased in size, preference for the adversarial procedure also increased. In other words, when all three levels of the penalty were presented to the subjects (i.e., subjects understood the penalties in relation both to the offense and in relation to each other), we found a linear increase in preference for the adversarial procedure. This finding is not entirely in line with the

results of Experiments 1, 2, and the between-groups analysis (above) of these data; where in Experiment 1 we found no effect of penalty, and in Experiment 2 and in the between-groups analysis we found subjects in the trusting community becoming less adversarial with increasing penalties. An analysis of only the low-penalty and moderate-penalty conditions (here as within-subjects factors) revealed significant effects for procedure x trust, $F(1,74) = 5.34$, $p < .03$; and a significant effect of procedure x penalty, $F(1,74) = 15.40$, $p < .001$; but no procedure x trust x penalty interaction was found. Thus, the within-subjects analysis of these data produce a different pattern of responding from the between-groups analysis above.

Taken together, these different analyses portray an intriguing situation. Given the results of the within-subjects analysis, these data can be understood from a different perspective. The significant within-subjects main effect for penalty reveals that the subjects became increasingly adversarial with increases in the magnitude of the penalty. And this effect was found in both trusting and nontrusting communities. Once the offense was made more explicit and the penalties anchored relative to the offense and to each other, the subjects responded to the situations using a tit-for-tat strategy which was not evidenced in the studies which used a between-groups design (e.g., Experiments 1 and 2 and the between-groups analysis of

Experiment 3). It appears as though, after being able to see the penalty in relational terms (i.e., in terms of several requests of differing magnitudes), subjects responded to what may have been perceived as the accuser's increasing aggressiveness or self-interest by becoming more adversarial themselves.

Both the between-groups and the within-subjects results demonstrate interesting aspects of dispute situations. For example, subjects' decisions in the between-group designs are analogous to situations--which often do occur--in which an individual has only a few bits of information upon which to make his or her decision (Kelley, 1972). (An individual may act upon limited information for several different reasons: (1) he/she is the type of person who does not seek out additional sources of information, (2) the situation itself limits what can be known, (3) the individual involved feels that he or she must act upon the situation quickly, (4) the individual feels that he/she knows the situation and accuser and therefore does not need to seek out more, etc.) And given this limited information, the individual is therefore not the perfect attributer, using instead what little information is at hand. In the case of our communities it is interesting that the subjects seemed to use aspects of the context to understand the meaning of the offense, the intention of the accuser, and of what the dispute situation could mean to them. As the amount of

information increased (as was the case in the within-subjects design) the subjects had even more information upon which to base their decisions, and therefore did not infer the meaning of the offense and the severity of the penalty from the larger context.

Thus, perhaps because of the shifting perceptions of the crime and the interpretation of the penalty, subjects in the between-groups designs did not understand the dispute situations in the full context of the possibilities of outcomes and the meaning of the offense. In Experiment 2, subjects in the trusting and low-penalty community may have perceived their accuser not as generous (for having asked for only a small compensation) but as even more adversarial for having taken the defendant to court over what may be a trivial matter.

In other words, results from this experiment (the between-groups analysis in relation to the within-subjects analysis) seem to indicate that perceptions of the severity of the penalty and severity of the offense were in fact covarying across interrelatedness, trust, and magnitude of penalty in Experiments 1 and 2. Once these perceptions were anchored (in a within-subjects design), however, we obtained results which indicated that subjects in both communities, when allowed to understand the whole dispute within a more complete context, take a tit-for-tat stance in terms of litigation. These data do not support a confrontation-

avoidance explanation, but provide a nice framework in which to begin to understand cross-contextual aspects of dispute resolution. Experiments 4 and 5 attempt to test directly (within the paradigms of Experiments 1 and 2) the assumptions that perceptions of the severity of the penalty and severity of the offense were covarying across Experiments 1 and 2.

Method (Experiment 4)

Subjects and Design

42 female students from the introductory psychology class at the University of North Carolina-Greensboro participated in the study in return for experimental credit. The design included 2 between-groups factors: interrelatedness (multiplex and simplex) and size of penalty (low and high). All communities were trusting in nature.

Materials

The descriptions of the multiplex and simplex communities as well as the description of the dispute and penalties were exactly like those given in Experiments 1 and 2. The scenarios were followed by two questions which asked subjects to indicate (1) how severe their accuser felt that the supposed offense was and (2) how severe, given that they were in fact guilty, the subjects felt the infringement was. Subjects indicated their responses on an 11-point scale.

Each subject read about and answered questions for only one of the four scenarios.

Procedure

Subjects were run in a large classroom in groups of 10 to 15 each. The procedure was the same as that used in Experiments 1-3.

Results and Discussion (Experiment 4)

The analysis of variance on the accuser's perception of the severity of the offense revealed a significant effect for the size of the penalty $F(1,38) = 6.98, p < .02$; subjects believed that the accuser felt the offense associated with the high penalty was more serious than the offense associated with the low penalty. The analysis of variance for the subject's/defendant's perception of the severity of the offense revealed significant main effects for interrelatedness, $F(1,38) = 9.16, p < .01$; and size of penalty, $F(1,38) = 6.70, p < .02$. In other words, subjects believed that the offense committed in the multiplex community was more serious than the offense committed in the simplex one. Additionally, subjects also felt that the offense associated with the higher penalty was also more serious.

These results indicate that the size of the penalty did indeed affect subjects' perceptions of the severity of the supposed offense. Furthermore, the interrelatedness of the

community also affected the perceived severity of the offense. Offenses committed in the multiplex communities were perceived as more severe than those committed in the simplex communities. Thus, in the between-groups design in Experiments 1, 2, and 3², perceptions of the severity of the offense were indeed covarying with the size of the penalty and interrelatedness. These perceptions, however, were also better anchored in the within-subjects design of Experiment 3.

Experiment 5 was undertaken to test perceptions of the severity of the penalty, and provides, in part, a manipulation check for "penalty". Additionally, however, Experiment 5 also tests the effects of interrelatedness on perceptions of the penalty; wherein, we would expect the consequences of litigating to be much higher in a multiplex than in a simplex community.

Method (Experiment 5)

Subjects and Design

50 male and female students from the introductory psychology class at the University of North Carolina-Greensboro participated in this experiment for research credit. Subjects were run in groups of 17-20. The twenty females and thirty males were distributed more or less evenly throughout the five experimental conditions.

The design included five different communities which differed in degree of interrelatedness, level of trust, and

magnitude of the penalty. The communities were as follows: (1) multiplex, trusting and low in size of penalty, (2) simplex, trusting and having a high penalty associated with a guilty verdict, (3) simplex, trusting and having a low penalty, (4) simplex, nontrusting and having a low penalty associated with a guilty verdict, and (5) simplex, nontrusting, and high in size of penalty.³

Materials

The materials were presented the same way as in the previous experiments. Page one of the packet represented the description of one of five different communities. The descriptions of the communities were identical to those in Experiments 1 and 2; however, the last paragraph of the scenarios in Experiments 1 and 2 (the details of choosing different types of legal procedures) was omitted from these scenarios.

The scenario on page one was followed by ten questions. Subjects responded to each question by indicating their answers on an 11-point scale. The two questions of interest asked subjects to rate the probability that a guilty verdict would change their position in the community and to rate the severity of the perception of consequences given a guilty verdict. Once again, subjects read about and answered the questions for only one of the five scenarios.

Results and Discussion Experiment 5

The means for Experiment 5 (perceptions of the penalty and community) are depicted in Table 6. A one-way analysis of variance on the perceived severity of the consequences associated with a guilty verdict was conducted to obtain the mean square error term for computing the planned comparisons of interest. (The analysis of the question approached significance, $F(4,45) = 2.17, p = .088.$) Planned comparisons performed on only the trusting communities indicated that there was no significant difference between the multiplex, low-penalty community and the simplex, high-penalty community, $F < 1$. The planned comparison performed on the multiplex, low-penalty and the simplex, low-penalty communities, however, indicated that there was a significant difference between the two communities, $F(1,45) = 6.00, p < .05$. Consequences were perceived as more severe in the multiplex than in the simplex community--this despite the fact that both communities were described as having the same objectively low penalties associated with a guilty verdict.

The analysis of variance for the likelihood that a guilty verdict would change one's position in the community was significant $F(4,45) = 3.30, p < .02$. Planned comparisons performed only on the trusting communities indicated that the multiplex, low-penalty community was not significantly different from the simplex, high-penalty community, $F < 1$. In other words, the subject's position in the community was

equally likely to change (as the result of a guilty verdict) in the low-penalty and multiplex scenario as in the high penalty and simplex scenario. Planned comparisons of the multiplex, low-penalty community with that of the simplex, low-penalty community revealed a marginally significant difference between the two, $F(1, 45) = 3.93, p < .06$; that is, subjects in the multiplex and low-penalty community believed that a guilty verdict was more likely to change their position in the community than did subjects in the simplex and low-penalty community.

These results indicate that the perceived severity of the penalty increased with the size of the penalty. Additionally, increases in the interrelatedness of the community 1) increased the perceived severity of the crime and 2) increased the risk to the subject's position in the community as well. Therefore, increased interrelatedness (as in the multiplex communities) increased some of the other (perhaps social consequences) associated with the transgression. This, in turn, increased the severity of the penalty (the likelihood that the subject's position in the community would change), which thereby may have also decreased the perceptions of the crime's severity. Thus, committing a crime in the low-penalty but highly interrelated community was more likely to change both the perceived severity of the offense and therefore the subject's position in the community than if the crime had

been committed in the less interrelated community (with low objective consequences). Interestingly, committing an objectively low-penalty offense in the highly interrelated community was equally likely to change the subject's position in their community as committing a high-penalty offense in a less interrelated community. Hence, through changing the interrelatedness we were able to alter perceptions of the penalty's severity.

Together, Experiments 4 and 5 indicate that the communities (of which the subjects imagined themselves members) affected their perceptions of the penalty and offense. This has interesting implications for dispute resolution as addressed by the between-groups designs in Experiments 1 and 2. For example, given a limited set of information to act upon (as is not unusual in real-life situations), it appears that aspects of an individual's context affect and are used in the individual's decisions. Thus, the context in which a person finds him- or herself contributes to decisions of dispute resolution through its affect on the perceptions of the nature of the severity of the dispute and the severity of its outcomes. (By implication, the nature of the context--and hence of the offense and penalty--gives the subject information about the nature of the accuser.)

Thus, in the between-groups designs, consequences and offense were covarying with interrelatedness and size of

penalty; only when the offense was stated more explicitly and the penalties interpreted in relation to each other (e.g., the within-subjects design) were these perceptions "anchored". And only when this occurred did we find subjects using a matching or "tit-for-tat" strategy in which they showed a linear and increasing preference for the adversarial procedure as the penalty increased in size.

CHAPTER IV
GENERAL DISCUSSION

Five studies were conducted to (1) determine the roles which interrelatedness, trust, and magnitude of penalty play in procedural preferences and to (2) investigate the use of a laboratory community for the study of dispute resolution.

Interrelatedness (multiplex and simplex types of interrelations) alone was not solely responsible for producing different procedural preferences. It did, however, mediate the perceptions of the penalty and offense; subjects in the multiplex communities perceived the offense and the consequences and potential outcomes of engaging in litigation to be more severe than subjects in the simplex communities. Apparently violations of standards and codes of conducts in communities which are highly interrelated, long-standing, and less permeable (i.e., members have little mobility, usually planning to remain in the community for long periods of time) are perceived as being more threatening to the fabric of the group and (importantly) to one's position in the group. Violations in less interrelated and more permeable, "looser" groups may likewise be perceived as less severe since one need not be as concerned about interacting with the same (perhaps unpleasant) people for years on end--always having the

option, if worse comes to worse, of leaving. Hence violations of community standards in a simplex community would be perceived as relatively less severe.

Interrelatedness, therefore, has the interesting effect of reducing more "aggressive" interactions (e.g., the choice of an adversarial hearing procedure to litigate) by mediating group members' perceptions of the severity of the offense. Furthermore, interrelatedness also affects the perception of the potential threat which a transgression poses to the harmony of the group and to the security of the individual's position within the group. Thus, out of fear of rejection, community members will be less willing and likely to be aggressive in dispute situations.

Interestingly this interpretation corresponds roughly to a confrontation-avoidance explanation (Leung, 1987) as one mechanism responsible for the relative nonadversarialness witnessed in members of collective societies. A fear of rejection or the fear of damaging one's position or reputation in one's community may be one of the reasons why people avoid confrontations.

The level of trust, regardless of the interrelatedness of the community, affected procedural preferences. Subjects in the nontrusting communities were consistently more adversarial than subjects in the trusting communities. Thus, it seems that interpersonal and ingroup trust may be an aspect of the collectivism-individualism dimension which

mediates the ways in which a person chooses to settle a dispute. And although we derived the idea of "trust" from this cultural dimension, it seems to mediate preferences not through confrontation-avoidance, but through a process conceptually more akin to animosity-reduction. For example, an "animosity-reduction-type" process may operate by mediating the defendant's perceptions of the intentions of his/her accuser; so that, for example, the defendant in a trusting community will be more likely to have positive expectations of his/her accuser and of the whole legal system in general. And if participants have more positive expectations of one another's intentions, then they will be less likely to even perceive the dispute as being a dispute.

Thus, animosity may be avoided or reduced not because the litigants choose to be cooperative in settling the dispute, but because they would be less likely to interpret the situation as a dispute in the first place. In a trusting environment, the defendant will probably be much more likely to allow that his/her accuser has a good reason for bringing the issue to bear; whereas in a nontrusting environment, even the best of intentions may be interpreted as self-serving (from the very outset), and litigants will likewise behave towards each other in a less cooperative manner. In this manner, animosity will be reduced or induced at the level of interpretation of intentions⁴.

Furthermore, if a defendant in a dispute were more likely to have a positive interpretation of his/her accuser's intentions (as in the trusting community), the defendant may be more likely to consider the extent to which he/she may possibly be at fault (at least partially) or what he/she may have done to foster that belief in another.

Another aspect of "trust" as it was portrayed in our scenarios is that the trusting and nontrusting communities represented extreme (but certainly not unheard of) instances of the variable. We were, however, able to make subtle comparisons within trust through an examination of the effects of interrelatedness on trust. Thus, in the trusting communities alone, we found differences in perceptions and procedural preferences depending upon whether the community was multiplex and trusting or simplex and trusting. This seems to be an indication that the strength of "trust" manipulation was not absolutely overpowering.

Another possible concern about our manipulation may center on the positivity and negativity of the trusting and nontrusting communities respectively. In other words, perhaps the differences in procedural preferences may have been due to the overall positivity or negativity of the community. We find evidence to the contrary when we examine the variables of penalty and interrelatedness. For example, in the simplex-trusting community, we found subjects to be relatively less nonadversarial in the low penalty condition

and relatively more nonadversarial in the high penalty condition; thereby indicating that differences in preferences were not the result of positivity-negativity alone. Additionally, the preferences evidenced between multiplex-trusting and simplex-trusting communities also argue against a positivity-negativity explanation.

Finally, the variable of trust also interacted with that of the magnitude of the penalty. And two interesting effects were found for "penalty"--one as revealed by the within-subjects design and the other as revealed by the between-groups design. First, in the within-subjects design, we found that once the offense and penalty were anchored, subjects in both the trusting and the nontrusting communities used the same tit-for-tat strategies. Subjects in both communities preferred the adversarial procedure more as the size of the requested compensation increased. This pattern of responding was not apparent when (1) the offense was less explicit and (2) the penalty was not presented in the context of the offense and in relation to several potential sizes of requests. In other words, when the subjects had a broader understanding of the context of the dispute, they were able to be more "perfect" attributers and thus reacted to increasing levels of cost in a predictable manner.

Specifically, knowing about the different sizes of requests in relation to the explicit offense, enabled the

subjects to determine, through implication, the adversarialness of their accuser. The more demanding the accuser and the more outlandish the demand, the more adversarial the defendant. It is important to note that this process takes place within and in relation to the community (interrelatedness and level of trust) as well. So, for example, in the simplex, trusting, and low-penalty community, the small demand was perceived as unreasonable because of the subject's expectation that a member of such a wonderful community--unless an aggressive person--would not take a community member to court over such a trivial matter. Hence, a person could actually demand a small compensation for an offense and still be perceived as aggressive.⁵ Thus, until the penalties were anchored in the within-subjects design, attributions ranged from interpretations of whether the issue being disputed was a trivial one or whether the accuser was in fact being nonadversarial and generous. Thus, all elements of the context provide information which the subjects used in their determination of how adversarial or nonadversarial they would be. As such, an outlandish and aggressive demand would be interpreted as being more unjustified and inconsistent in a trusting than in a nontrusting group. Thus, while the level of trust and interrelatedness of one's community would mediate how adversarial a person might be, these variables would not change the "tit-for-tat" strategy or process--especially

after a more complete context for the dispute is provided and known.

By the same token, we found in the between-groups experiments that given a limited range of information, subjects reached conclusions and made attributions based on single bits of information (Kelley, 1972). And just as we often seek out information upon which to base our judgments, there are certainly many instances in which we do not. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate how and what kinds of attributions subjects make when limited in their knowledge.

In sum, when the severity of a crime or offense is not absolutely clear (as is often the case), litigants will seek more information, using the whole community and legal system as information which helps them to determine how to proceed with settling a dispute. Thus, the different features of one particular hearing procedure versus another are but a small part of the total information which a person uses in deciding how to litigate.

Finally, with regard to the laboratory community, all five experiments produced understandable but different preferences and therefore demonstrated the success of the microculture in testing aspects of dispute resolution. Specifically, these communities enabled us to investigate, through systematic manipulation, variables which may be relevant to a full understanding of procedural justice. Thus, one implication of these studies is a paradigm based

upon the idea of a person x situation interaction may indeed provide an additional method of studying dispute resolution. Our success in producing different procedural preferences is an indication that our subjects were capable of freeing themselves from their contexts and responding to dispute situations as members of different communities.

In conclusion, in addition to showing the effects of interrelatedness, trust, and magnitude of penalty, we were also successful in creating a microculture in which we could examine different variables of dispute resolution. Our approach of the microcultural examination of contextual variables coupled with cross-cultural studies, should increase our theoretical understanding of dispute resolution.

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FOOTNOTES

1. In other words, the "between-groups" design explained above was a between and within (mixed) design, with penalty considered a between subjects variable (i.e., only the subject's response to the first penalty scenario was analyzed) so that the design included two between factors: trust (trusting or nontrusting) and size of the penalty (low, moderate, or high); and one within-subjects variable: procedural preference (adversarial and nonadversarial). The "within-subjects" design explained here is also a between and within mixed design; however, this time all the penalty scenarios which were presented to the subject were included in the analysis. Therefore, the design now included only one between-groups factor of trust (trusting or nontrusting) and two within-subjects factors: penalty (low, moderate, and high) and preference.
2. That is, for Experiment 3, the first analysis was a between-groups analysis.
3. The long-standing community had only a low consequence condition since the comparisons of interest were the between this community and the low and high consequence conditions of the less interrelated communities.
4. This is a significant point as it may help explain, at least in part, why people from some societies (e.g., Chinese and Japanese) choose the nonadversarial model for small as well as serious offenses. For example, Tanabe (1963) points out that for the Japanese, lawyers were once looked upon with disdain, and merely going to court was a disgrace--no matter what the severity of the crime. Thus, the variable of trust, within a community typified by multiplex relations, produced different preferences for judicial procedures. Subjects in communities high in trust preferred the nonadversarial procedure to a greater degree than subjects from communities high in distrust. Is there, nonetheless, a scenario or community in which cost or consequences would affect preferences for different procedural models?
5. 10 undergraduates were asked, in a within-subjects design, to indicate how likely it would be for the average person in each of four different communities (trusting-low

penalty, trusting-high penalty, nontrusting-low penalty, and nontrusting-high penalty) to take someone to court. We obtained significant main effects for trust, $F(1,9) = 32.43$, $p < .001$ and penalty, $F(1,9) = 10.44$, $p < .02$. Subjects felt that the average person in the nontrusting communities were more likely to litigate than the average person in the trusting communities. Furthermore, subjects felt that a person in the high penalty condition would be more likely to litigate than someone in the low penalty condition.

Appendix A: Descriptions of the Multiplex communities

Trusting community--Low penalty

We would like you to imagine that you have grown up and plan to remain in the community which is described below. It is a rather small community and you know and are known to most of its members. Your community and its legal system are made up of very fine, upstanding citizens. There is a feeling of trust here; you trust your neighbors, and they, in turn, trust you. Honesty, integrity, and concern for others are values which are very important to you and your neighbors, with many of the citizens of your community supporting and volunteering time in service organizations such as the Red Cross, the march of Dimes, organizations for the homeless, and neighborhood watches. Furthermore, people know that they can depend on you and you on them--in cases of emergency as well as for little everyday matters. These factors have led to the development of a strong sense of neighborhood pride and unity; and these are indeed qualities which you all strive to preserve. Likewise the participants in the following scenarios, that is the judge, lawyers, and the legal system in general, also represent and strive to uphold the qualities of this community.

Now, we would like you to imagine that you are involved in a dispute with another person. This other person has charged you with infringing upon this person's property. The other person, the accuser in this dispute, has asked that you pay damages for your infringement, but you do not believe that you have done anything wrong. Some cases are public and some are private. Whether a case is public or private is determined randomly. Your case will be a private, closed trial.¹ Consequently, your community at large will be unaware of the procedure, progress, and outcome of your trial. If you were found guilty, you would stand to lose an insignificant amount of your material assets.

As the accused, you have some choice in deciding how your dispute will be resolved; that is, what procedure will be used to determine whether the other person's accusations are justified and whether you will have to pay damages. We are going to present you with two ways of resolving your dispute and deciding whether the charges against you are correct. Read each of the procedures carefully, as though they were actually going to be used to decide whether you should pay damages; try to imagine yourself in the situations described here. After you have had a chance to look at the two procedures, we would like you to answer some questions about the procedures.

Trusting community--High penalty

We would like you to imagine that you have grown up and plan to remain in the community which is described below. It is a rather small community and you know and are known to most of its members. Your community and its legal system are made up of very fine, upstanding citizens. There is a feeling of trust here; you trust your neighbors, and they, in turn, trust you. Honesty, integrity, and concern for others are values which are very important to you and your neighbors, with many of the citizens of your community supporting and volunteering time in service organizations such as the Red Cross, the march of Dimes, organizations for the homeless, and neighborhood watches. Furthermore, people know that they can depend on you and you on them--in cases of emergency as well as for little everyday matters. These factors have led to the development of a strong sense of neighborhood pride and unity; and these are indeed qualities which you all strive to preserve. Likewise the participants in the following scenarios, that is the judge, lawyers, and the legal system in general, also represent and strive to uphold the qualities of this community.

Now, we would like you to imagine that you are involved in a dispute with another person. This other person has charged you with infringing upon this person's property. The other person, the accuser in this dispute, has asked that you pay damages for your infringement, but you do not believe that you have done anything wrong. Some cases are public and some are private. Whether a case is public or private is determined randomly. Your case will be a private, closed trial. Consequently, your community at large will be unaware of the procedure, progress, and outcome of your trial. If you were found guilty, you would stand to lose a significant amount of your material assets which could include a great deal of your savings.

As the accused, you have some choice in deciding how your dispute will be resolved; that is, what procedure will be used to determine whether the other person's accusations are justified and whether you will have to pay damages. We are going to present you with two ways of resolving your dispute and deciding whether the charges against you are correct. Read each of the procedures carefully, as though they were actually going to be used to decide whether you should pay damages; try to imagine yourself in the situations described here. After you have had a chance to look at the two procedures, we would like you to answer some questions about the procedures.

Nontrusting community--Low penalty

We would like you to imagine that you have grown up and plan to remain in the community which is described below. It is a rather small community and you know and are known to most of its members. Your community and its legal system are made up of people of questionable character. There is a feeling of distrust here, and crimes are not an uncommon occurrence. The citizens of your community are largely concerned with getting ahead, "earning a buck", and looking out for number one. You are aware that some of your neighbors are racially prejudiced (some perhaps even having past associations with the Ku Klux Klan). Businessmen in your community are known to be corrupt. Many of the politicians are generally reputed to take kick-backs and work for various special interest groups. People keep to themselves--it's the safest thing to do. These factors have all contributed to the feelings of distrust and lack of unity which pervade your community. Likewise, the participants in the following scenarios, that is, the judge, the lawyers, and the legal system in general, also reflect these feelings and represent the general character of your community.

Now, we would like you to imagine that you are involved in a dispute with another person. This other person has charged you with infringing upon this person's property. The other person, the accuser in this dispute, has asked that you pay damages for your infringement, but you do not believe that you have done anything wrong. Some cases are public and some are private. Whether a case is public or private is determined randomly. Your case will be a private, closed trial.¹ Consequently, your community at large will be unaware of the procedure, progress, and outcome of your trial. If you were found guilty, you would stand to lose an insignificant amount of your material assets.

As the accused, you have some choice in deciding how your dispute will be resolved; that is, what procedure will be used to determine whether the other person's accusations are justified and whether you will have to pay damages. We are going to present you with two ways of resolving your dispute and deciding whether the charges against you are correct. Read each of the procedures carefully, as though they were actually going to be used to decide whether you should pay damages; try to imagine yourself in the situations described here. After you have had a chance to look at the two procedures, we would like you to answer some questions about the procedures.

Nontrusting community--High penalty

We would like you to imagine that you have grown up and plan to remain in the community which is described below. It is a rather small community and you know and are known to most of its members. Your community and its legal system are made up of people of questionable character. There is a feeling of distrust here, and crimes are not an uncommon occurrence. The citizens of your community are largely concerned with getting ahead, "earning a buck", and looking out for number one. You are aware that some of your neighbors are racially prejudiced (some perhaps even having past associations with the Ku Klux Klan). Businessmen in your community are known to be corrupt. Many of the politicians are generally reputed to take kick-backs and work for various special interest groups. People keep to themselves--it's the safest thing to do. These factors have all contributed to the feelings of distrust and lack of unity which pervade your community. Likewise, the participants in the following scenarios, that is, the judge, the lawyers, and the legal system in general, also reflect these feelings and represent the general character of your community.

Now, we would like you to imagine that you are involved in a dispute with another person. This other person has charged you with infringing upon this person's property. The other person, the accuser in this dispute, has asked that you pay damages for your infringement, but you do not believe that you have done anything wrong. Some cases are public and some are private. Whether a case is public or private is determined randomly. Your case will be a private, closed trial.¹ Consequently, your community at large will be unaware of the procedure, progress, and outcome of your trial. If you were found guilty, you would stand to lose a significant amount of your material assets which could include a great deal of your savings.

As the accused, you have some choice in deciding how your dispute will be resolved; that is, what procedure will be used to determine whether the other person's accusations are justified and whether you will have to pay damages. We are going to present you with two ways of resolving your dispute and deciding whether the charges against you are correct. Read each of the procedures carefully, as though they were actually going to be used to decide whether you should pay damages; try to imagine yourself in the situations described here. After you have had a chance to look at the two procedures, we would like you to answer some questions about the procedures.

¹Some subjects in both Experiments 1 and 2 were told that their community would be aware of the proceedings and outcome of their trial while other subjects in these experiments were told that their community would be unaware of it. The variable "awareness," however, is not reported since it did not affect preferences. The data were analyzed without the variable; and statistically, the results did not differ when the awareness variable was included in the analysis.

Appendix B: Hearing procedures

Hearing Procedure J

Judge. Under this procedure, the dispute will be resolved in a hearing held by a judge with the help of one investigator. The judge will base his decision on the information supplied by the investigator; he may not consider information from any other source. At the hearing, the judge may ask questions about what the investigator has presented. Following the investigator's presentation, the judge will close the hearing, decide on and announce his decision.

Investigator. There is one investigator, who is assigned to this case by the judge. The investigator is working for the judge and not for either of the parties to the dispute.

The duty of this investigator will be to find out the facts of the case from both the accuser (the other person) and the accused (you). He will ask the accuser and the accused questions about the facts of the case, and he will also collect information about the case on his own. At the hearing the investigator will present a report to the judge containing the facts he has found. The investigator has the responsibility to decide which facts go in the report and which do not.

Parties. Before the hearing, the accuser and the accused will provide the facts requested by the investigator.

Hearing Procedure L

Judge. Under this procedure, the dispute will be resolved in a hearing by a judge with the help of two investigators, who will represent the two parties to the dispute. The judge will base his decision on the information supplied by the investigators; he may not consider information from any other source. At the hearing, the judge may ask questions about what each investigator has presented. Following the investigators' presentations, the judge will close the hearing, decide on, and announce his decision.

Investigator. The two investigators, who are chosen by the two parties to the dispute, are very similar. The investigators are working for the parties to the dispute and not for the judge.

The duty of each investigator will be to find out the facts of the case favorable to the party represented by the investigator. He will ask the accuser and the accused questions about the facts of the case, and he will also collect information about the case on his own. At the hearing each investigator will present a report containing the facts he has found for his side of the case. The investigators may disagree with each other's presentations by asking and answering questions of one another. The investigators have the responsibility to decide which facts go in the reports and which do not.

Parties. Before the hearing, the accuser and the accused will each meet with their representative to discuss the facts of the case.

Appendix C: Tables

Table 1

Procedural Preference as a Function of High Interrelatedness, Trust, and Penalty

Community	Penalty	
	High	Low
Trusting		
Adversarial	13.39	13.28
Nonadversarial	9.60	8.86
Nontrusting		
Adversarial	13.42	13.69
Nonadversarial	6.03	5.51

Table 2

Procedural Preference as a Function of Low Interrelatedness,
Trust, and Penalty

Community	Penalty	
	High	Low
Trusting		
Adversarial	12.83	15.90
Nonadversarial	10.18	6.58
Nontrusting		
Adversarial	14.51	14.17
Nonadversarial	6.73	6.80

Table 3

Preferences as a Function of Trust and Penalty--Penalty as a Between-groups Factor

Community	Penalty		
	Low	Moderate	High
Trusting			
Adversarial	12.5	10.5	13.2
Nonadversarial	9.6	11.2	12.2
Nontrusting			
Adversarial	13.0	15.4	15.2
Nonadversarial	9.5	6.5	9.2

Table 4

Preferences as a Function of Trust and Penalty--Penalty as a Within-subjects Factor

Community	Penalty		
	Low	Moderate	High
Trusting			
Adversarial	11.2	12.7	13.4
Nonadversarial	12.2	10.0	9.2
Nontrusting			
Adversarial	13.5	14.9	16.1
Nonadversarial	9.6	7.4	6.6

Table 5

Perceptions of Severity of Offense as a Function of Interrelatedness and Penalty

	Accuser's Perception of Severity of Offense	Subject's Perception of Severity of Offense
Multiplex		
Low Penalty	7.55	5.27
High Penalty	9.09	8.18
Simplex		
Low Penalty	6.75	3.63
High Penalty	8.42	4.92

Table 6

Perceptions of Offense and Community as a Function of Trust, Interrelatedness, and Penalty

Community	Change position in community	Perceived severity consequences
MULTIPLEX		
Trusting		
Low Penalty	7.15	6.9
SIMPLEX		
Trusting		
Low Penalty	4.7	4.0
High Penalty	7.15	6.5
Nontrusting		
Low Penalty	3.95	5.45
High Penalty	7.25	6.85

Appendix D: Raw Data

Experiment 1--Multiplex community

Trusting--Low penalty			Trusting--High penalty		
S No.	Nonadv	Adv	S No.	Nonadv	Adv
1	5	15	1	15	7
2	0	15	2	20	10
3	10	15	3	8	16
4	8	15	4	16	10
5	18	5	5	6	11
6	17	12	6	6	15
7	0	10	7	15	19
8	12	19	8	0	20
9	17	15	9	9	12
10	8	12	10	1	15
11	15	5	11	5	15
12	8	20	12	17	5
13	12	5	13	5	15
14	5	12	14	15	6
15	10	15	15	10	15
16	5	15	16	10	15
17	5	15	17	10	15
18	0	20	18	12	10
19	15	5	19	15	20
20	1	20	20	5	15
21	10	17	21	10	7
22	15	14	22	7	13
23	1	18	23	10	19
24	8	17	24	3	20
25	2	18	25	10	17
26	7	15	26	18	5
27	15	12	27	5	15
28	5	15	28	3	16
29	10	15	29	10.5	14.5
30	17	5	30	18	10
31	12	5	31	15	5
32	10	17	32	0	20
33	2	18	33	15	7
34	15	8	34	2	18.5
35	5	14	35	3	15
36	4	5	36	6	14

(Experiment 1, cont.)

Nontrusting--Low penalty

S No.	Nonadv	Adv
1	8	13
2	2	18
3	10	15
4	2	15
5	7	14
6	0	12
7	1	10
8	5	17
9	12.5	10
10	0	15
11	2	8
12	5	17
13	3	13
14	7	15
15	10	15
16	4	12
17	2	14
18	5	15
19	0	18
20	5	20
21	13	6
22	0	20
23	15	5
24	18	11
25	3	19
26	1	0
27	0	12
28	20	18
29	0	10
30	7	15
31	2	8
32	5	15
33	4	16
34	0	17
35	10	20
36	10	15

Nontrusting--High penalty

S No.	Nonadv	Adv
1	5	15
2	5	18
3	2	10
4	2	18
5	15	5
6	0	20
7	5	17
8	5	15
9	5	12
10	0	18
11	8	15
12	5	15
13	8	15
14	9	8
15	5	15
16	20	5
17	8	13
18	3	13
19	0	10
20	17	14
21	3	20
22	6	17
23	5	18
24	10	4
25	0	20
26	8	3
27	0	10
28	0	15
29	10	19
30	16.5	5
31	3	15
32	8.5	10
33	10	16
34	4	13
35	1	12
36	5	15

Experiment 2--Simplex community

Trusting--Low penalty

S No.	Nonadv	Adv
1	10	17
2	7	18
3	3	19
4	12	18
5	5	15
6	3	16
7	10	10
8	10	10
9	16	8
10	2	16
11	2	20
12	14	5
13	4.5	17
14	10	8
15	15	10
16	0	20
17	10	10
18	4	10
19	10	17
20	10	8
21	3	15.5
22	4	12.3
23	14	18
24	8	10
25	10	19
26	0	17
27	2	18.8
28	10	10
29	2	20
30	0	15

Trusting--High penalty

S No.	Nonadv	Adv
1	2	18
2	14	9
3	12	16
4	10	10
5	0	16
6	17	11
7	1	19
8	17	10
9	4	16
10	9	19
11	4	16
12	20	5
13	10	17
14	0	17
15	2	19
16	5	12
17	10	15
18	15.5	10
19	15	10
20	13	4.5
21	14	9
22	12	18
23	8	12
24	2	10
25	0	0
26	5	20
27	10	18
28	16.5	8.5
29	8	15
30	4.5	14.5

(Experiment 2, cont.)

Nontrusting--Low penalty

S No.	Nonadv	Adv
1	1	20
2	17	9
3	6.5	17.5
4	8	13
5	5	14
6	12	5
7	0	10
8	12	6
9	5.5	10
10	10	12.5
11	1	14
12	3	14
13	3	17
14	15.5	10
15	10	20
16	3	8
17	10	17
18	6.5	12.5
19	9	11.5
20	6	16
21	13	10
22	17	7
23	10	13
24	4.5	20
25	2	18
26	0	20
27	10	8
28	4	18
29	14	10
30	2	17

Nontrusting--High penalty

S No.	Nonadv	Adv
1	2	16
2	0.5	19.5
3	5	15
4	10	15
5	6	13
6	7	12
7	4.5	11.5
8	10	15
9	5	18
10	0	17.5
11	10	5
12	20	10
13	12	15
14	11.3	11.3
15	10	0
16	4	17
17	2	18
18	4.5	15.5
19	5	15
20	5.5	15.5
21	5	18
22	15	4
23	3	17
24	3	16
25	5	16
26	6	16
27	5	15
28	14	5.5
29	0	20

Experiment 3--Within-subjects, penalty

Trusting Community

Level of Penalty

S No.	<u>Low</u>		<u>Moderate</u>		<u>High</u>	
	Nonadv	Adv	Nonadv	Adv	Nonadv	Adv
1	15	7*	9	17	3	20
2	10	20	13	20	13	20
3	2	17	9	10	5	17
4	10	16	4	1	1	3
5	10	6	10	6	7	9
6	9	11	7	14	5	16
7	3	18	5	17	1	20
8	10	15	10	16	7	20
9	17	8	9	15	5	19
10	16	6	16	8	18	5
11	14	10	14	10	14	10
12	3	18	3	18	3	18
13	6	10	8	14	6	13
14	16	8	15	10	3	17
15	5	10	5	10	5	10
16	15	5	16	5	15	5
17	13	4	7	13	6	17
18	19	3	19	3	19	3
19	7	13	6	14	7	13
20	9	10	7	12	9	10
21	20	5	18	10	3	20
22	19	9	17	9	9	15
23	16	4	16	5	16	4
24	7	16	7	16	7	17
25	15	6	6	15	6	15
26	15	7	7	15	6	15
27	17	12	2	17	4	16
28	15	20	5	20	10	20
29	12	20	10	20	14	20
30	14	10	17	14	14	10
31	18	3	18	3	16	3
32	18	13	14	5	16	7
33	16	8	5	17	12	9
34	10	17	10	17	10	18
35	7	19	4	20	12	18
36	15	6	14	7	14	7
37	10	18	10	18	10	17
38	8	13	7	15	9	16
39	15	17	10	19	17	10

*Boldfaced numbers indicate the first scenario of each packet.

(Experiment 3, cont.)

Nontrusting Community

Level of Penalty

S No.	<u>Low</u>		<u>Moderate</u>		<u>High</u>	
	Nonadv	Adv	Nonadv	Adv	Nonadv	Adv
1	3	19*	4	18	7	19
2	12	18	13	18	2	3
3	9	15	7	18	5	19
4	17	6	2	20	3	20
5	4	18	3	18	3	18
6	7	18	1	18	1	20
7	13	6	6	15	3	18
8	7	14	7	14	7	15
9	10	16	9	13	16	9
10	5	15	5	15	7	16
11	18	5	10	18	3	20
12	9	6	7	17	1	18
13	3	17	6	14	14	6
14	4	18	4	16	2	18
15	3	18	3	18	3	18
16	17	6	6	15	3	17
17	18	19	12	19	18	13
18	10	11	3	18	3	18
19	14	10	5	17	6	20
20	18	9	18	9	10	18
21	1	20	1	13	1	20
22	5	19	7	13	3	17
23	2	18	3	18	1	20
24	4	14	7	15	4	15
25	10	20	10	15	10	17
26	15	10	6	14	15	5
27	20	7	20	11	14	20
28	15	6	18	3	12	17
29	3	17	3	18	3	17
30	10	18	10	18	10	17
31	14	10	14	10	14	10
32	8	14	9	15	7	18
33	17	10	4	10	5	20
34	15	7	15	7	15	10
35	5	16	5	16	5	15
36	8	13	7	11	7	15
37	3	18	3	18	3	18

*Boldfaced numbers indicate the first scenario of each packet.

Experiment 4--Perceptions of Severity of Offense

MULTIPLEX COMMUNITIES

S No	<u>Low Penalty</u>		S No	<u>High penalty</u>	
	Accuser's Percept'n	Subject's Percept'n		Accuser's Percept'n	Subject's Percept'n
1	8	10	1	10	8
2	7	6	2	10	10
3	9	3	3	10	7
4	7	3	4	10	8
5	9	3	5	9	10
6	3	7	6	7	9
7	9	6	7	8	9
8	9	9	8	6	8
9	4	3	9	10	10
10	8	7	10	10	8
11	10	1	11	10	3

SIMPLEX COMMUNITIES

S No	<u>Low Penalty</u>		S No	<u>High penalty</u>	
	Accuser's Percept'n	Subject's Percept'n		Accuser's Percept'n	Subject's Percept'n
1	10	1	1	6	8
2	5	1	2	9	3
3	8	6	3	10	8
4	2	2	4	9	3
5	9	3	5	9	4
6	8	4	6	8	2
7	9	9	7	8	2
8	3	3	8	8	7
			9	9	2
			10	8	5
			11	9	10
			12	8	5

Experiment 5--Perceptions of Severity of Penalties

SIMPLEX-TRUSTING COMMUNITIES

S No	Low Penalty		S No	High penalty	
	Change Position	Perceived Conseqnc		Change Position	Perceived Conseqnc
1	2	2	1	5	7
2	8	7	2	6	5
3	4	5	3	10	10
4	7	8	4	7	5
5	10	5	5	8.5	8
6	4	7	6	10	7
7	2	2	7	9	6
8	0	0	8	8	6
9	9	4	9	3	7
10	1	0	10	5	4

SIMPLEX-nonTRUSTING COMMUNITIES

S No	Low Penalty		S No	High penalty	
	Change Position	Perceived Conseqnc		Change Position	Perceived Conseqnc
1	10	8	1	8	8
2	6	6	2	10	8
3	1	10	3	10	6
4	2.5	4.5	4	9.5	8.5
5	7	4	5	7	4
6	5	7	6	8	8
7	1	5	7	6	8
8	1	0	8	5	2
9	0	3	9	6	8
10	6	7	10	3	0

MULTIPLEX-TRUSTING COMMUNITIES

S No	Low Penalty	
	Change Position	Perceived Conseqnc
1	4	0
2	7	6
3	8	6
4	9.5	9.5
5	5	3
6	5	10
7	8	8
8	7	7
9	9	10
10	9	9.5