

Leadership in Voluntary Associations: The Case of the “International Association of Women

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Abstract:

Three models of leadership in voluntary associations have been proposed in the literature: democratic leadership, oligarchy, and leadership by default. Through an intensive case study of leadership structure, differences in the attitudes of members and leaders at three hierarchical levels, and differences between the attitudes and behaviors of aspirants and nonaspirants to leadership in a women's service association, this article examines the degree of fit between these models and a specific organization. Data is drawn from questionnaires, annual reports, and interviews. The results fail to conform to any of the existing models, suggesting instead a fourth model, leadership for self-development—in which leaders are motivated primarily by a desire to develop administrative and interpersonal skills.

Keywords: leadership | voluntary associations | women | self-development.

Article:

INTRODUCTION

The ubiquity of voluntary associations has long been viewed as an important structural feature of U.S. society (Smith, 1973; Tocqueville, 1841; Van Til, 1988), and such associations are important in other societies as well (Wuthrow, 1991; Zimmer, 1996). Voluntary associations play important roles in leisure (Scheuch, 1993), defining and proposing solutions for social problems (Knoke and Wood, 1981; Van Til, 1988), linking interest-group goals to policy (Sahne, 1993; Smith, 1986), and providing social services (Smith, 1993). They outnumber other types of nonprofit organizations, and research findings from other nonprofits may not generalize well to them, as much of their work is accomplished by unpaid volunteers (Smith and Shen, 1996).

Various typologies of voluntary associations have been proposed (Knocke and Wright-Izak, 1982, Smith, 1993). None is completely satisfactory, but most converge around three broad types: (1) organizations that primarily benefit members – often by meeting social, spiritual, or recreational needs; (2) organizations that attempt to influence society or politics; and (3) organizations that provide services to the community.

Leadership is a crucial issue for voluntary associations, and the issues involved are somewhat different from those in the corporate sector or government (Blau and Scott, 1962; Drucker, 1990; Pearce, 1993). Leadership selection and succession are frequently less formal, and leaders often receive little or no monetary compensation. Candidates for leadership positions can be hard to find (Pearce, 1980, 1982; Rich, 1980), and those who aspire to leadership may be mainly interested in using the organization as a tool to advance a personal agenda (Miller, 1987) or as a path to material rewards, prestige, and power (Barber, 1965; Michels, 1962). Many voluntary associations are consequently dominated by an active minority of leaders (Michels, 1962; Rose, 1967). Leaders play an important role in building member interest and commitment (Etzioni, 1975; Pearce, 1993); however, member apathy or leaders' efforts to maintain their positions can create self-perpetuating leadership cliques (Michels, 1962; Styrjan, 1994), resulting in diminished influence and leadership opportunities for others and blocked communication between members and leaders. The result can be decreased member commitment and increased attrition, threatening organizational viability (Bass and Stogdill, 1990; Onyx, 1994) and effectiveness (Wiesenthal, 1993).

Despite the topic's importance, relatively little is known about voluntary association leadership, especially since studies of leadership in nonprofit organizations, where most of the work is accomplished by paid staff (e.g., Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997), may not generalize well to voluntary associations. Most existing research consists of relatively atheoretical studies of single associations, one type of organization, or comparative questionnaire studies of organizations in a single community (e.g., Adams, 1980; Black and Platt, 1978; Egri and Hermann, 2000; Rich, 1980; Widmer, 1985). Most examine only a few leader characteristics, and some fail to report members' responses for comparison. We could find only one (Black and Platt, 1978) that examines leadership above the local chapter level and none that looks at the characteristics and attitudes of those who aspire to leadership positions. In short, the existing literature is characterized by a descriptive and fragmentary approach.

This study helps to fill these gaps in the literature. We use questionnaire, interview, and documentary data collected in 1975 and 1992 from the local, regional, and headquarters levels of the "International Association of Women" (a pseudonym), a higher-status women's community service organization operating in the United States and several other countries, to evaluate how well three theoretical models of voluntary association leadership fit this organization. More specifically, we (1) examine key structural features of the association and its leadership, (2) compare the characteristics and attitudes of rank and file members with those of present and past chapter leaders and regional and headquarters leaders, (3) compare the characteristics and

attitudes of members who do and do not aspire to leadership roles, and (4) investigate possible consequences of our results for organizational efficiency and member satisfaction. Based on these analyses, we conclude that results from the “International Association of Women” (IAW) do not fit well any of the existing models. Our findings suggest instead an up to now undescribed fourth model, leadership for self-development, in which leaders are motivated primarily by a desire to use leadership position for the development of administrative and interpersonal skills. We also examine conditions that may have contributed to the evolution of this pattern within IAW and speculate about whether it might appear in other organizations as well.

THEORIES OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION LEADERSHIP

Three theoretical models of voluntary association leadership have been proposed: democratic leadership, oligarchy, and leadership by default. Each emphasizes the connections between leadership and problems facing voluntary associations.

The Democratic Leadership Model

In the democratic model, leaders are motivated primarily by desire to serve and commitment to the organization and its goals. They are selected by a democratic process based on their qualifications and platforms. Leadership turnover occurs regularly, as leaders voluntarily yield their positions to elected successors. Many members are willing to serve as leaders, even when doing so requires sacrifice. Leaders function as administrative specialists, but because most members are interested and committed, members inform themselves about the association and participate actively in decision making, providing them the chance to learn leadership skills. Members and leaders are highly satisfied, and membership turnover is low.

While democracy is widely espoused, research (Lipset *et al.*, 1956; Michels, 1962; Pearce, 1980, 1982, 1993; Selle and Stromnes, 1998) suggests that it is fairly rarely achieved and difficult to maintain—and then often at considerable cost to efficiency (Cox, 1994; Rothschild and Whitt, 1986). It is most likely to appear in organizations in which members are strongly committed to consensual decision making (Onyx, 1994). Such organizations discourage careerism in leadership and cultivate homogeneity and organizational commitment among members. Low reliance on specialized skills, small size, independence from outside pressures, and a supportive cultural milieu can also foster democracy (Kanter, 1972; Rothschild and Whitt, 1986; Styrcjan, 1989).

The Oligarchic Leadership Model

Based on his study of turn-of-the-century European unions and political parties, Michels (1962) formulated his famous iron law of oligarchy. It holds that, despite democratic ideologies and forms, such organizations almost always evolve toward rule by an entrenched elite. Subsequent research (Brulle, 2000; Hall, 1999; Scheuch, 1993) suggests that his model may be broadly applicable to voluntary associations.

Michels notes that voluntary association leaders receive prestige, various perquisites, and in some cases remuneration, so leadership can be attractive. But leadership is time consuming and can require expertise based on long experience and participation in networks of outside contacts. Experienced leaders thus become almost irreplaceable. Moreover, key decisions must sometimes be made quickly, making democracy cumbersome. Many rank and file members lack the interest, knowledge, skills, and time to participate actively in organizational decision making. Hence, they are usually willing to abdicate participation in democratic governance in favor of oligarchical leaders.

Members with charismatic qualities and extensive involvement in social networks are especially likely to rise to leadership. Once in office, they are generally reluctant to give up its rewards. They work to master the technical aspects of leadership, cultivate connections inside and outside the organization that enhance their credibility and effectiveness, and actively display their expertise and success. They emphasize the need for quick, informed decisions based on their well-informed judgment. They often pursue policies congruent with members' goals and seek to provide the rewards members desire, but, if necessary, they will dissemble and compromise their principles to remain in office.

Incumbent leaders use every mechanism available to control the selection of new leaders, manipulating ostensibly democratic procedures to perpetuate their rule. They seek to place their friends in leadership roles and insist that aspiring leaders serve long apprenticeships, providing time to shape aspirants' attitudes and assess their devotion to the status quo. Rising leaders thus come to emphasize the same material and prestige rewards that motivate existing leaders. Challenges to entrenched leadership are rare. Leaders view such challenges as serious threats and usually resist successfully, so leadership turnover is slow. Even when a challenge to leadership succeeds, the conditions that initially led to oligarchy soon reproduce it.

The Leadership by Default Model

Based on her study of leadership in six voluntary associations in the United States, Pearce (1980, 1982; see also Pearce, 1993) described an alternative model, leadership by default, and examples of this pattern also sometimes surface in case studies of other voluntary associations (e.g., Weinbach, 1998). Contrary to Michels, Pearce maintains that the most problematic aspect of voluntary association leadership is motivating *anyone* to lead. Most leaders are unremunerated or poorly remunerated and receive few perquisites. They typically have little influence over members, who can reduce their effort or resign if they are dissatisfied with leaders' goals or policies. Leadership offers little gain in autonomy, as members can already choose their own activities and involvement level. Leaders' efforts to achieve their goals are thus frequently frustrated, and they must often undertake much work themselves.

Most members have obligations that conflict with the demands of leadership, and their needs are often better met by participation as ordinary members than by administrative activity. Most members thus eschew leadership. Leadership devolves to members who have few conflicting obligations, see leadership as a social activity, or have relatively strong commitment to the organization's goals. Leaders see increased member participation in decisions not as a threat, but as a welcome opportunity to share the burdens of leadership. Leaders are usually more than willing to depart after serving their terms—if only a successor can be found.

Summary

Democratic leadership is a cultural ideal, enshrined in the bylaws of many voluntary associations (Knoke, 1986; Van Til, 1988)—and occasionally realized in practice (Kanter, 1972; Rothschild and Whitt, 1986; Styrjan, 1989). The oligarchic and leadership by default models were developed from research to describe typical patterns of leadership toward which voluntary associations often evolve (Michels, 1962; Pearce, 1980, 1982). The organizational structure and the attitudes and behaviors of leaders, aspirants to leadership, and rank and file members in each model typically occur together and are mutually reinforcing. Oligarchy and leadership by default, in particular, thus tend to perpetuate themselves. Under favorable conditions, this may also be true of democracy, but it is less stable and often devolves into one of the other two.

Distinctive characteristics of the democratic model include an abundance of aspirants to leadership, democratic leadership selection, steady and substantial leadership turnover, and decentralization of knowledge and power. Both leaders and members are committed to the association and its goals, devote considerable time and energy to the association, prefer decentralization of power, and are highly satisfied. Aspirants and nonaspirants to leadership are generally similar in terms of desired organizational rewards, competing role demands, knowledge of the organization, power in the organization, preference for decentralized power, amount and nature of involvement in the association, and level and sources of satisfaction.

The oligarchic model is characterized by a relatively small pool of aspirants to leadership, tight control of leadership selection by existing leaders, and slow leadership turnover. In comparison to members, leaders are much more motivated by material and prestige rewards; hold a near monopoly on knowledge of the organization and power; prefer more centralized power; devote much more energy and time to the organization, especially to administrative activity; dominate outside contacts; and are more satisfied, particularly with material and prestige rewards. Aspirants to leadership are much more motivated by self-aggrandizement than nonaspirants, are more likely to prefer centralized power, devote more time to the organization, and have more links to other associations. Because their high aspirations for material and prestige rewards have not yet been realized, they are less satisfied than other members with these rewards. They are likely to be somewhat better informed about the organization and have somewhat more power than ordinary members.

The leadership by default model is noteworthy for the almost total absence of leadership aspirants and the conscription of leaders, whose primary qualification is willingness to serve, often because of relatively limited role conflict. Because of widespread member disinterest in administration, leaders are more knowledgeable; devote more time to the organization, especially to administration; and have somewhat more power. They do not differ much from members in the rewards they desire from participation, but they prefer less centralized power. Heavy workloads make them less satisfied with their participation than other members.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA SOURCES

Research about voluntary association leadership is at a very early stage. Few studies exist, and many of these are atheoretical surveys of leaders using noncomparable instruments (e.g., Adams 1980; Black and Platt, 1978; Widmer, 1985). Leadership in many types of associations has not been studied at all, so no comprehensive quantitative baseline data exist. By contrast, the available theoretically informed research consists of case studies used to develop or refine the three existing models (e.g., Lipset *et al.*, 1966; Pearce, 1980, 1982; Rothschild and Whitt, 1986; Styrcjan, 1989). Such case studies do not provide quantitative baseline data about the entire population of voluntary associations, but they do offer empirically derived, testable predictions about association leadership. That is, they assert that specific conditions (e.g., in the oligarchic pattern, leaders motivated by personal aggrandizement, slow leader turnover, centralized power, etc.) occur together and support one another. We believe that, at the present stage of knowledge and in view of cost constraints, the most promising research strategy is a series of thorough case studies designed to determine whether the conditions described by the models actually occur together, to see whether the models display stability, and to explore the conditions favoring the development and maintenance of each.

In line with this strategy, this research provides a detailed case study of leadership in one voluntary association studied at two points in time. It provides point-by-point comparisons of the organization with key features of each existing model. Because the models are conceptualized as systems of mutually reinforcing variables, the data would be consistent with a model only if they showed that the association conformed to it in almost all of the key particulars—though not necessarily in every detail. Especially in the case of the oligarchy and leadership by default models, the data should also reveal stability of the pattern over time.

The Organization Studied

The “International Association of Women” is an international, young women’s organization with about 200,000 members in 300 chapters, the great majority in the United States and Canada. Its official goals are to provide service to the communities where it operates, develop members’ skills for volunteer work and community leadership, and promote volunteerism. Local chapters pursue these goals by (1) raising funds for dispersal to community programs or agencies, (2) operating community service projects of their own, (3) providing volunteers for community

projects, and (4) educating members about the community and training them for volunteerism and voluntary leadership. In recent years, the central organization and some local chapters have also initiated occasional efforts to influence public policy in areas of concern to members.

IAW is well known for its fund-raising prowess, and most of the funds at local chapters' disposal come from fund-raising efforts, such as operating resale shops, preparation and sale of cookbooks, or staging community events, and not from the United Way, government, or foundation grants. Although chapters often make direct financial contributions to various community agencies or charities, most of each chapter's work is centered around its own projects, which it supports with volunteers and funds. These are organized efforts toward ameliorating a community problem, often in cooperation with other community organizations, such as schools or nongovernmental social service agencies. The most frequent themes of projects are education, child health and mental health, child welfare, and cultural enrichment. IAW is thus best classified as a community service organization (Markham *et al.*, 1999). It does not identify itself as primarily a leadership-training organization, but training for community service and leadership is among its goals, and some members may be attracted for this reason.

Local chapters are governed by elected officers and a board of directors, which includes major officers. Committees of members plan, organize, and oversee work in such areas as fundraising, community projects, member recruitment and training, and communications. Each IAW member has one or more formal work assignments as a project volunteer, committee member, or officer. Only a few chapters have paid administrators, but most have some clerical assistance.

IAW has a history as an elite organization, with a membership centered in the upper class. Young women were "invited" to join only after being recommended by several current members. In recent years, it has steadily broadened its membership base. By 1992, membership was officially open to any woman with a commitment to volunteerism (Johnson, 1993). At present, a large majority of the members would be classified as upper middle class, but there is a significant number of upper class members, and a few from the lower middle class. Members are typically well-educated and from families with well-above- to far-above-average incomes. About two-thirds of members are employed outside the home, including about half who work full-time (Markham and Bonjean, 1996). Both employed members, and where applicable their husbands, typically hold positions in the business-oriented segment of the upper middle class, including management and managerial support occupations, law, business service occupations, insurance, real estate, finance, securities sales, and the medical professions. There are relatively few representatives of the intellectual "new middle class" and relatively few members of minority groups (Markham and Bonjean, 1995). Four-fifths of members are married, three quarters are in their 30s, and two-thirds have children (Markham and Bonjean, 1996).

Most new members enter IAW in their 20s or early 30s. After a short probationary period, emphasizing training about IAW and community, they become regular members. IAW assumes that their members will be functioning as trained, experienced volunteers by their early-to-mid

40s, so its chapters require “retirement,” usually at age 40–45. Retired members adopt a reduced role, paying dues with little formal participation.

In 1975, IAW had a well-developed regional level of organization. By 1992, regional staffs had been absorbed by the headquarters staff and regional offices closed, but regional boards of directors—renamed regional consultants and assigned purely consultative roles near the end of the 1992 study—continued to be seen as a level of leadership between the Headquarters Board of Directors and local chapters. The Headquarters Board includes all IAW officers and has responsibility for setting policy for the association and overseeing a substantial headquarters staff. The staff has gained somewhat greater influence in recent years, but the board retains the final say. There has also been concern about reduced chapter autonomy in recent years, but local chapters enjoy substantial autonomy in choosing fund raising strategies and community projects (Johnson, 1993), and members believe that local chapter boards have more influence than the national organization over what happens in their chapters.

Data Collection

Our data about ordinary chapter members and chapter board members come from questionnaires administered in a random sample of U.S. and Canadian chapters stratified by chapter size. All 12 chapters initially selected for the sample in 1975 agreed to participate, both in 1975 and 1992. Because most of the IAW’s growth was occurring in the southern United States, an additional randomly selected chapter from this region was added in 1992. In 1992, chapters varied from 112 to 486 members. They were located in metropolitan areas ranging from just under 100,000 to several million population.

The designs of the 1975 and 1992 studies were virtually identical. We administered questionnaires to all those present at general membership meetings of each chapter. Rank and file members and members of chapter boards of directors, whom we categorize as leaders, completed the same questionnaire. Absentees received questionnaires by mail. In 1992, response rates ranged from 53 to 97% (only one chapter was below 60%), with an overall rate of 74% (*N* D 1800). Fifteen percent of local chapter members were board members; 11% were former board members.

Because their perspectives might have been affected by their service, we treat the latter group separately in the analyses. Since they had only a few months as members, probationary members are not included in the analysis. We also administered modified versions of the questionnaire at meetings of the regional and headquarters boards of directors. In 1992, 100% of regional board members (*N* D 47) and 84% of Headquarters Board members (*N* D 36) were included. Most of our measures are available for all levels of leadership; however, the need to gather additional information from regional and headquarters leaders, coupled with constraints on questionnaire length, made it impossible to include a few of the measures on these questionnaires (the omissions are indicated by dashes in the relevant columns of Table I).

Several measures come from the annual reports published by each chapter. Reports vary in content and level of detail, but they are far more complete than those of most voluntary associations. We also use data from lengthy semistructured interviews with all chapter presidents and 12 of 13 presidents-elect in 1992.⁶

Measures Derived from Questionnaire Data

This section briefly describes measures constructed from questionnaire responses in the 1992 study. We used questionnaire data to assess two characteristics of IAW's overall leadership structure. *Number of aspirants* was determined by asking members if they would like to serve on the chapter board. *Rate of leadership turnover* was measured as board members' mean response to an item about time on the board.

Questionnaire data also provided information about differences in the behavior and views of leaders and other members and between aspirants and nonaspirants to leadership (reported in Tables I and II). Measures used in these tables are described in the following paragraphs.

Table I. Differences in Mean Responses of Members and Leaders at Local, Regional

Variable	η^2	Local members (N=1324)	Local board members (N=270)	Past local board members (N=206)	Regional board members (N=47)	National board members (n=36)	N
Desired rewards of participation							
Leadership and self-development	0.08 a	8.23	10.72 b	10.14 b	12.67 b	12.17 b	1862
Community involvement	0.01 c	14.98	15.52	15.13	16.60 d	16.71 d	1868
Status attainment and maintenance	0.01 a	2.70	2.93	2.79	1.85 d	1.78 b	1869
Organizational efficiency and flexibility	0.00	10.39	10.73	10.70	9.96	10.47	1869
Sociability and affiliation	0.01 c	5.49	5.87 b	5.48	5.11	5.33	1875
Interest in internal activities	0.10 a	2.70	4.15 b	3.31 b	—	—	1758
Interest in external activities	0.01 a	7.19	7.76 b	7.38	—	—	1739
Status concern	0.02 a	4.44	3.96 b	4.24	2.82 b	3.19 b	1832
Competing role demands							
Employed	0.01 c	0.67	0.59 b	0.70	0.76	0.62	1849
Number of children	0.04 a	1.35	1.68 b	1.87 b	2.19 b	1.91 b	1785
Child under age 6	0.02 a	0.47	0.46	0.37 b	0.20 b	0.06 b	1777

Perceived role conflict	0.00	5.70	5.86	5.99	5.27	5.34	1841
Knowledge of organization							
Knowledge of local chapters	0.37 ^a	6.26	10.23 ^b	9.60 ^b	7.85 ^b	8.58 ^b	1855
Knowledge of regional level	0.24 ^a	0.91	1.76 ^b	1.56 ^b	2.79 ^b	3.00 ^b	1871
Knowledge of headquarters level	0.12 ^a	1.37	2.40 ^b	2.09 ^b	4.21 ^b	—	1823
Knowledge of headquarters activities	0.15 ^a	5.95	7.92 ^b	7.64 ^b	10.91 ^b	12.80 ^b	1840
Exercise of power							
Participation in decisions	0.19 ^a	6.89	12.46 ^b	10.00 ^b	—	—	1750
Desired distribution of power							
Difference between desired member and chapter board control	0.01 ^a	0.36	0.40	0.28	-0.24 ^b	0.63	1865
Difference between desired member and regional headquarters control	0.08 ^a	-0.64	-1.36 ^b	-1.25 ^b	-1.57 ^b	-0.78	1839
Nature of organizational involvement							
Hours per week devoted to IAW	0.21 ^a	3.47	9.62 ^b	4.53 ^b	8.07 ^b	11.72 ^b	1796
Time spent on internal activities	0.31 ^a	1.38	4.17 ^b	2.80 ^b	—	—	1772
Time spent on external activities	0.05 ^a	3.57	4.99 ^b	4.86 ^b	—	—	1753
Involvement in other organizations							
Number of other memberships	0.11 ^a	1.32	1.88 ^b	1.95 ^b	2.52 ^b	2.59 ^b	1565
Number of other board memberships	0.08 ^a	0.16	0.72 ^b	0.47 ^b	—	—	1716
Satisfaction with organization							
General satisfaction	0.09 ^a	2.54	3.33 ^b	2.98 ^b	3.00 ^b	2.75	1877
Self-expression score	0.02 ^a	0.71	0.76 ^b	0.75 ^b	0.77 ^b	0.77 ^b	1589

Turnover intentions	0.04a	2.73	1.70b	2.29b	—	—	1781
Satisfaction with leadership and self-development	0.09a	0.67	0.81b	0.76b	0.84b	0.81b	1727
Satisfaction with community involvement	0.00	0.72	0.73	0.73	0.70	0.76	1760
Satisfaction with status attainment and maintenance	0.02a	0.72	0.78b	0.77d	0.83d	0.84d	1418
Satisfaction with organizational efficiency and flexibility	0.00	0.67	0.68	0.67	0.70	0.61	1810
Satisfaction with sociability and affiliation	0.03a	0.78	0.86b	0.84b	0.91b	0.88b	1832

Note. Data in cells for organizational levels reported as means. ^a $\eta^2 < 0:01$. ^bSignificantly different from local members $p < 0:01$. ^c $\eta^2 < 0:05$. ^dSignificantly different from local members $p < 0:05$.

Table II. Differences in Mean Responses of Local Leaders, Aspirants, and Nonaspirants to Leadership

Variable	Local board members (N=270)	Never member aspirants (N=500)	Never member nonaspirants (N=282)	η^2	Past member aspirants (N=123)	Past member nonaspirants (N=44)	η^2
Desired rewards of participation							
Leadership and self-development	10.72	9.54	6.67	0.10a	10.48	10.47	0.00
Community involvement	15.52	15.38	14.10	0.02a	16.05	14.23	0.03b
Status attainment and maintenance	2.93	2.89	2.53	0.01b	2.79	2.55	0.00
Organizational efficiency and flexibility	10.73	10.36	9.99	0.00	10.85	10.64	0.00
Sociability and affiliation	5.87	5.76	5.41	0.01b	5.45	5.43	0.00
Interest in internal activities	4.15	3.45	1.54	0.30a	3.99	1.71	0.28a

Interest in external activities	7.76	7.90	5.95	0.12 _a	8.16	5.61	0.14 _a
Status concern	3.96	4.51	4.39	0.00	4.54	3.93	0.01
Competing role demands							
Employed	0.59	0.67	0.66	0.00	0.73	0.70	0.00
Number of children	1.68	1.22	1.63	0.03 _a	1.82	1.81	0.00
Child under age 6	0.46	0.48	0.45	0.00	0.37	0.36	0.00
Perceived role conflict	5.86	5.03	6.46	0.07 _a	5.65	6.79	0.04 _b
Knowledge of organization							
Knowledge of local chapters	10.23	6.65	6.06	0.02 _a	9.79	10.04	0.00
Knowledge of regional level	1.76	0.98	0.88	0.00	1.62	1.68	0.00
Knowledge of headquarters level	2.40	1.35	1.46	0.00	2.05	2.39	0.01
Knowledge of headquarters activities	7.92	5.98	5.83	0.00	7.72	8.00	0.00
Exercise of power							
Participation in decisions	12.46	7.14	6.83	0.00	11.10	8.80	0.05 _a
Desired distribution of power							
Difference between desired member and chapter board control	0.40	0.35	0.36	0.00	0.29	0.27	0.00
Difference between desired member	-1.36	-0.73	-0.56	0.01 _b	-1.31	-1.18	0.00
Nature of organizational involvement							
Hours per week devoted to IAW	9.62	3.99	3.08	0.01	4.68	4.55	0.00
Time spent on internal activities	4.17	1.74	1.09	0.05 _a	3.16	2.64	0.02
Time spent on external	4.99	3.77	3.57	0.00	5.08	4.76	0.00

activities							
Involvement in other organizations							
Number of other memberships	1.88	1.33	1.45	0.00	1.93	2.11	0.01
Number of other board memberships	0.72	0.21	0.15	0.00	0.55	0.30	0.02
Satisfaction with organization							
General satisfaction	3.33	2.70	2.40	0.02a	3.09	2.77	0.02
Self-expression score	0.76	0.71	0.71	0.00	0.75	0.74	0.00
Turnover intentions	1.70	2.13	3.43	0.11a	1.94	2.82	0.04a
Satisfaction with leadership and self development	0.81	0.68	0.68	0.00	0.75	0.79	0.01
Satisfaction with community involvement	0.73	0.72	0.71	0.00	0.74	0.68	0.02
Satisfaction with status attainment and maintenance	0.78	0.74	0.71	0.00	0.79	0.72	0.02
Satisfaction with organizational efficiency and flexibility	0.68	0.67	0.67	0.00	0.69	0.64	0.01
Satisfaction with sociability and affiliation	0.86	0.80	0.75	0.01a	0.85	0.82	0.00

^a = $\eta^2 < 0.01$. ^b = $\eta^2 < 0.05$.

A number of items focused on members' "desired rewards of participation." Five measures of desired rewards were constructed based on factor analysis of a set of items that asked respondents to rate the importance of possible reasons for membership (Bonjean *et al.*, 1994). They tap the importance respondents attributed to *leadership and self-development* ($\alpha = 0.76$), *community involvement* ($\alpha = 0.74$), *status attainment and maintenance* ($\alpha = 0.58$), *organizational*

efficiency and flexibility ($\alpha = 0.69$), and *sociability and affiliation* ($\alpha = 0.59$). The member/chapter board questionnaire also asked respondents about their interest in seven chapter activities. Factor analysis suggested that items could be collapsed into two measures: *interest in internal activities* ($\alpha = 0.52$) and *interest in external activities* ($\alpha = 0.65$). We also included a measure based on three items from Kaufman's *concern with status scale* ($\alpha = 0.68$) (Kaufman, 1957).

Our questionnaires included four indicators of "competing role demands." *Employment status* is a dichotomous variable, coded positively for members with paid work. *Number of children* was coded from an open-ended question. We used information from a question about the age of the respondent's youngest child to construct a dummy variable for having *children under age six*. *Perceived role conflict* ($\alpha = 0.69$) is based on items about conflict between IAW activities and other obligations.

We also included items about "knowledge of the organization." Factor analysis suggested construction of four measures: (1) *knowledge of local chapters* ($\alpha = 0.85$), (2) *knowledge of the regional level* ($\alpha = 0.87$), (3) *knowledge of the headquarters level* ($\alpha = 0.87$), and (4) *knowledge of headquarters level activities* ($\alpha = 0.87$). Local members' and chapter board members' "exercise of power" within local chapters was measured using a modified version of Hage and Aiken's *participation in decisions scale* ($\alpha = 0.79$) (Hage and Aiken, 1967). A set of "control graph" items (Tannenbaum, 1968) about "desired distribution of power" over local chapter affairs was used to compute two measures, *difference between desired local member and chapter board control* and *difference between desired member and regional/headquarters board control*.

We also used the questionnaire to assess "nature of organizational involvement." All questionnaires included an open-ended question about number of *hours devoted to IAW activities* in an average week. The local chapter questionnaire also asked how much time respondents devoted to various IAW activities. We used this set of items to construct two measures: *time spent on internal activities* ($\alpha = 0.59$) and *time spent on external activities* ($\alpha = 0.64$). "Involvement in other organizations" was tapped by two measures. *Number of other organizational memberships* is the number of organizations listed in response to a question about the three organizations besides IAW to which respondents devoted the most time. The local chapter questionnaire for 1992 also included an item about how many *other board memberships* the respondent held.

We also developed several measures of "respondent satisfaction." First, all questionnaires included a single-item measure of *general satisfaction*. Second, using procedures developed by Bonjean *et al.* (1994), we computed an overall *self-expression score* for each respondent from her ratings of the importance of and her satisfaction with various reasons for membership. The score summarizes the extent to which the respondent was able to express her predispositions through IAW participation. Third, we developed a two-item measure of *turnover intentions* ($\alpha = 0.75$). We also computed separate self-expression scores for each of the five areas developed in

the analysis of reasons for participation (see above). These measures show how well respondents were able to meet their needs in each of these areas through IAW participation.

Measures Derived from Other Data Sources

We used Johnson's (1993) analysis of annual reports from 12 of the 13 chapters, supplemented by questionnaires mailed to each chapter, to establish each chapter's *mechanism of leadership selection*. Information from interviews with presidents and president-elects was used to determine their *number of years top leaders had held leadership positions*, an indicator of leadership turnover. We also used information from annual reports to measure the *elaboration of internal administration*. For the eight chapters that listed member work assignments in their 1992 reports, we computed the *proportion of members engaged in external activities* (e.g., community projects, public information campaigns, or efforts to influence public policy) versus internal assignments (e.g., member training, chapter administration, or internal communications).

RESULTS

We present our results in four sections. The first assesses how well the three models of leadership fit IAW's overall leadership structure. The second looks at whether differences between the attitudes and behaviors of members and leaders correspond to those predicted by each of the models. The third examines differences between aspirants and nonaspirants to leadership. Taken together, these results show that no existing model fits the data well. The final section explores the elaboration of administrative activity at IAW. It is a key feature of an alternative leadership pattern, leadership for self-development, which better explains our results.

Characteristics of Leadership Structure

Number of Aspirants to Leadership

Contrary to the leadership by default and oligarchic models, but in line with democracy, aspirants to leadership are plentiful at IAW; 38% of members who had never been on the chapter board aspired to serve, and 60% of former board members hoped to serve again.

Leadership Selection

Although they vary somewhat by chapter, leadership selection procedures corresponded best to the oligarchic model. In all chapters, candidates for top offices are selected by a nominating committee. In most chapters, this committee does solicit advice about possible candidates from members through a "straw ballot," but candidates for top offices were invariably single slated; that is, members must vote for the candidate proposed by the committee or write in someone else. In five chapters, all board members except officers were appointed by the president, executive committee, or a selection committee of incoming and outgoing officers. In the remaining chapters, members voted on at least some board slots, but only one chapter double-

slated any board candidates. Choices among competing candidates were more common in filling nominating committee slots, but even these positions were single-slated in three chapters.

Leadership Turnover

Mean length of board service among current chapter board members (2.1 years) was far shorter than the oligarchic model would suggest; only 8% had served over 4 years. The policy of mandatory “retirement,” at age 40–45 mitigates against long board terms. Questions about “job history” in interviews with chapter presidents and president-elects showed that, before their present terms, they had been major committee chairs, board members, or officers for an average of 3.8 and 3.0 years respectively. With rare exceptions, presidents and president-elects serve single 1-year terms. Chapter bylaws allow reelection, but established custom decrees 1-year terms, a practice congruent with democracy.

Differences Between Leaders and Other Members

Table I reports differences between the attitudes and behaviors of nonleaders and leaders for key variables in the models. Shown are the mean values for each of the variables among ordinary members, past chapter leaders, and current leaders at the chapter, regional, and headquarters levels. For each attitude or behavior, we report the eta-square statistic, the amount of variance explained by knowing which of these roles in the organization respondents occupy, and the *t* tests contrasting past chapter leaders, current chapter leaders, regional leaders, and headquarters leaders with rank and file members. We do not control for other variables because all of the models predict differences between leaders and members at the zero-order level, not differences that exist only when other differences between members and leaders are controlled.

Desired Rewards of Participation

Leadership in IAW offers no financial compensation, a major attraction for leaders in the oligarchical model. Leading a relatively high status organization can, however, provide prestige, which the oligarchic model suggests leaders would value more than other members. This prediction is not supported. Chapter board members report no more interest in status attainment and maintenance than nonleaders, and regional and headquarters leaders are *less* interested than the rank and file. Leaders also reported lower status concern than members. Leaders generally place slightly higher priority on community involvement, and local leaders report a bit more interest in externally oriented chapter activities, but the differences are small.

The most striking difference is instead one anticipated by none of the models: leaders’ greater desire for opportunities to develop and exercise leadership. Local board members place far more emphasis than nonleaders do on these rewards, and regional and headquarters leaders value them even more. Leaders’ strong desire to engage in administrative activity is also suggested by the large difference between nonleaders’ and chapter board members’ interest in internal chapter administration. This interest is evidently focused on occupying and playing administrative roles,

not—as the democratic model might suggest—on efficient administration, for leaders do not value organizational efficiency and flexibility more than ordinary members.

Competing Role Demands

Role conflict is a key variable for the leadership by default model, which suggests that the unattractiveness of leadership roles leads to the drafting of those who can be persuaded to serve—often because they face fewer role conflicts. The data fail to consistently support this idea. Chapter board members are slightly less likely than members to hold paid jobs; however, regional and headquarters leaders are just as likely as members to be employed. Leaders at all levels have more children than nonleaders, although regional and Headquarters board members are much less likely to have young children. All levels of leaders *perceive* no more conflict between IAW and other obligations than ordinary members.

Knowledge of the Organization

Contrary to the democratic model's ideal of a highly involved, well-informed membership, rank and file IAW members report much less knowledge about the organization than do leaders. Local board members are better informed about local chapters than are regional and Headquarters board members, while the pattern is reversed for knowledge of the regional and headquarters levels. This outcome is consistent with either oligarchy or leadership by default.

Exercise of Power and Desired Distribution of Power

That chapter board members participate far more in decisions than nonleaders do contradicts democratic norms of high member involvement, but the fact that not only members but also leaders view this as undesirable is inconsistent with oligarchy. All levels of leadership, except regional board members, agree with nonleaders that chapter board members should have only slightly more control over local chapter affairs than members. All levels also agree that regional and Headquarters board members should have *less* influence than chapter members over local chapters. This pattern of results is consistent only with leadership by default, in which power devolves to reluctant leaders.

Nature of Organizational Involvement and Involvement in Other Organizations

Leaders at all levels spend far more time than ordinary members do on IAW work, evidently mainly because they spend much more time on administration. This result is inconsistent with democratic ideals of high member involvement, but could be explained by the oligarchic model's image of leaders working to make themselves indispensable or by member's avoidance of administrative activity in leadership by default. Leaders also hold more memberships and board memberships in other organizations than do nonleaders, and the number increases with hierarchical level, a finding also consistent with oligarchy.

Satisfaction with Organization

Contrary to both the democratic model's predictions of high satisfaction among both leaders and members, and to leadership by default's image of leaders as overworked draftees, the results for both the single-item satisfaction measure and the more comprehensive self-expression measure show that leaders at all levels are more satisfied than nonleaders. They are also less likely to consider dropping their membership. Leaders' higher satisfaction appears consistent with oligarchy, but in oligarchy their greater satisfaction should stem primarily from greater satisfaction with material rewards. This is not the case. IAW leaders are unpaid, and leaders are only slightly more satisfied with the status rewards of membership. Instead, their higher overall satisfaction apparently stems primarily from satisfaction of their most important needs: the opportunity to function as leaders and develop leadership skills. Interestingly, this is not accompanied by satisfaction with organizational efficiency or flexibility. All levels of leaders report less satisfaction with this outcome than with any other. Leaders have more IAW friends and outside contacts than do nonleaders, so it is not surprising that they are also more satisfied with the social rewards of membership.

Ordinary members' and chapter board members' answers to 1992 open-ended questionnaire items about what they liked most and least about their IAW experiences generally echo these patterns, but provide additional insights. By far, the largest difference between leaders and members is once again the former's emphasis on enjoying the process of leadership; 37 and 32% of current and past board members respectively cited opportunities to lead and training in leadership, compared to just 10% of other members ($p < 0.01$). Thirty percent of board members and 27% of past members, versus only 14% of other members, mentioned self-development opportunities ($p < 0.01$). As one leader wrote, "I have *loved* the *vast wealth* of opportunities gained through my experiences ... [the] skills and training obtained as president provided me with the chance to utilize everything I had learned in the previous ten years." Respondents were much less positive about chapter efficiency and effectiveness. Twenty-five percent of those who identified experiences they liked least mentioned inefficiency, making it the single most frequently-cited problem. They said that there was too much bureaucracy and paperwork, too many and too rigid rules, and too much administrative activity. As one commented, "[IAW] is choking on its own bureaucracy." Others complained that the organization was so self-absorbed that it accomplished little. As one member put it, "too much time [is] devoted to what color of tablecloths to have at the General Meeting instead of what to do about abused children." Twelve percent of respondents also mentioned meetings that were numerous, long, unproductive, or unnecessary. One member's anecdote captures the flavor of these complaints: "When [one] committee conducted fast efficient meetings, we were held suspect by that year's executive committee of not doing our work because our meetings were not long enough. Good grief."

Differences Between Aspirants and Nonaspirants to Leadership

Table II, derived from the local chapter questionnaire, compares behaviors and attitudes of aspirants and nonaspirants to local board membership. To provide a clear contrast, we omit those who were "uncertain" about wishing to serve. Results are shown separately for those who have

never been on the board and those who have previously served. Chapter board members' responses are repeated from Table I for comparison. In interpreting the results, we focus on the democratic and oligarchic models. Leadership by default, which envisions vanishingly small numbers of aspirants, offers no predictions about their characteristics except that they would experience less role conflict.

Desired Rewards of Participation

The oligarchic model differs from the democratic mainly in predicting that leadership aspirants are more oriented to material rewards than are nonaspirants. Aspirants who have never been leaders do place slightly more emphasis on status attainment and maintenance and between status concern than nonaspirants, but only one of the four differences is significant. Moreover, the direction of the differences is reversed in some 1975 comparisons. Aspirants also place somewhat more emphasis on community involvement rewards, and they report considerably more interest in participating in the external community activities of their chapter. They are not, however, more interested in making the organization more efficient or flexible.

As in the comparison between leaders and members, the largest difference between aspirants and nonaspirants to leadership involves leadership and self-development. Among those who have never been on the chapter board, aspirants rate such opportunities as much more important than do nonaspirants. Past board members who wish to serve again do not differ much in this respect from past member nonaspirants; however, among both those who have never served on the board and those who have, leadership aspirants report much greater interest in participating in internal chapter activities, most of which involve administration.

Competing Role Demands

Results for the objective indicators of role conflict show clearly that employment is not an impediment to desiring leadership, while that the effects of family obligations are weak and inconsistent. Nevertheless, in all comparisons, nonaspirants clearly *perceive* more role conflict. The perceptual data are thus in line with leadership by default, but the objective data are not.

Knowledge of the Organization

In 1992, aspirants' knowledge of IAW was not consistently greater than the knowledge of nonaspirants, but in 1975 aspirants were more knowledgeable in all comparisons. The 1975 results would be compatible with oligarchical leadership, in which aspiring leaders seek information to prepare themselves to occupy and hold leadership positions, but the 1992 findings are not.

Exercise and Desired Distribution of Power

Leadership aspirants who have never been board members report no larger role in decisions than their counterparts who do not wish to serve. This appears consistent with democracy, but their

involvement is far lower than that of current board members, which fits better with oligarchy. Former members who wish to serve again participate more than those who do not, suggesting that they may continue to function informally as leaders. Both aspirants and nonaspirants prefer decentralized power, with little difference between them. This last finding is consistent with democracy.

Nature of Organizational Involvement and Involvement in Other Organizations

The oligarchic model suggests that—in order to acquire the expertise needed to claim and hold leadership roles—aspirants to leadership would devote much more time to the organization than other members. Aspirants do generally spend more time on IAW than nonaspirants, but the differences are small; aspirants, however, do not approach the time commitment of current board members. As the oligarchic model would predict, aspirants who have never been leaders also spend more time than their peers on internal chapter administration. Past leaders who would like to be board members also report continued high involvement in internal administration, suggesting again that some remain informal leaders. Leadership aspirants report neither more memberships nor more service on the boards of other associations than nonaspirants. This is inconsistent with oligarchy, which holds that such time investments are needed to develop the contacts that make leaders indispensable.

Satisfaction with Organization

Under oligarchic leadership aspirants to leadership are somewhat less satisfied than other members because they have not yet attained the leadership positions that can fulfill their needs for material rewards. Democracy, by contrast, predicts high satisfaction among both groups. Responses to the single-item indicator of overall satisfaction and the measure of turnover intentions among those who have never been leaders show somewhat higher satisfaction among aspirants. Aspiring to lead is unrelated to self-expression, and there is no significant difference between past leader aspirants' and nonaspirants' responses to the general satisfaction question. Comparisons of aspirants' and nonaspirants' self-expression scores for the five specific rewards reveals few differences, and aspirants are not less satisfied with status attainment and maintenance rewards. There were also few differences between aspirants' and nonaspirants' responses to open-ended questions about best- and least-liked IAW experiences.

The Elaboration of Internal Administration

Leaders' and aspiring leaders' strong motivation to participate in leadership for the sake of self-development and the large amount of time leaders devoted to internal administration imply that leaders' enjoyment of the leadership process might lead to the evolution of an elaborate administrative apparatus to fulfill these needs, which might then attract leadership aspirants with strong needs to administer. The resulting elaboration of administrative activity, in conjunction with leaders' lack of special interest in efficiency and flexibility, might also help to account for the many complaints about organizational inefficiency noted above.

There is ample evidence of elaboration of administrative activity in IAW chapters. In the eight chapters for which 1992 annual reports provide full information, an average of only 56% (range 33–80%) of members had *any* external work assignment. This means that, on average, *at least* 44% of members devote *all* of their energy to internal chapter activities. Moreover, some of those with an external work assignment also had an internal assignment.

Elaboration of administration is also apparent in descriptions of organizational structure in annual reports and in accounts of how decisions are made from officer interviews. Both reveal a pattern in which committees and meetings multiply, decisions pass through numerous committees, simple tasks require months to complete, elaborate arrangements are made for meetings, and much effort goes into publishing professional quality newsletters, slick monthly magazines, annual reports, and member directories.

Consider for example, the administrative structure of one chapter of about 150 members chosen at random. It has a nine-member Executive Committee, including five vice presidents, each of whom oversees several committees. The Board of Directors includes 30 additional women. Fifteen are chairs or co-chairs of the following committees: Member Training (11 members), Meeting Arrangements (13), Planning (10), Probationary Member Training (9), Publicity (6), Internal Affairs (10), New Member Recruitment (7), Nominations and Work Assignments (15), Community Needs Research (12), Headquarters (3), Ways and Means (9), Business Partnerships (7), and Newsletter (2). The Board also includes the president's assistant, secretary, annual report editor, chairs of two fundraising efforts, the chair of the Local Policy Impact Committee, two representatives to the State Policy Impact Committee, a director of Community Projects, a Community Boards Liaison, and three chairs of Community Conferences.

Officers' descriptions of decision-making processes provide additional evidence of administrative elaboration. The president of a chapter with only about 100 members explained how members' annual work assignments are made as follows:

Before the process begins, we produce a detailed brochure that lists and explains all the work assignments, both within the chapter and in the community. Each of the nine members of the work assignment committee is assigned as the Work Assignment Advisor for 10 to 15 members. Each member has an individual interview with her Advisor, where she ranks her top three choices of work assignments. The President-Elect, the incoming members of the Executive Committee, the outgoing and incoming chairs of the Work Assignment Committee, and the chair of the Nominating Committee are then constituted as a Selection Committee. They choose Board members, non-elected officers, and chairs of the fundraising committees. The outgoing and incoming chairs of the Work Assignment Committee and the President-Elect then meet to make work assignments for the remaining members.

Elaborate structure and procedures were also cited in many member's responses to the questionnaire item about what they liked least about IAW. One described her chapter this way: "Too much bureaucracy. By the time a committee decides to do something and it goes through the approval steps, half the year's gone." Another summarized the problems of an elaborate committee structure as follows: "The committee structure so often creates a bureaucracy that seems incapable of getting anything accomplished in a timely fashion."

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Our results conform to each of the three existing models in some respects, but they are incongruent with many key features of each. Contrary to the democratic model, leadership selection is not very democratic. Existing leaders are much more knowledgeable about the organization, more interested in its administration, and participate more in decisions than the rank and file, and they report greater satisfaction. In contrast to the leadership by default model, many members desire to lead. Leaders value leadership opportunities greatly; they are not unwilling conscripts distinguished mainly by fewer role conflicts. Leaders are more satisfied than members and find their experiences very rewarding. Rather than fleeing from leadership responsibilities at the first opportunity, former leaders remain involved in decision making. More than half desire to serve again.

IAW leadership also fails to conform to the oligarchical model. Most leaders serve a relatively short time, ruling out a permanent leadership clique. The organization's mandatory "retirement age" may act to inhibit formation of such cliques, and the customary 1-year "term limit" for presidents mitigates against their development (Styrjan, 1989). The long-term persistence of these aspects of organizational structure contradicts Michels' prediction of evolution toward oligarchy. Second, both leaders and leadership aspirants share ordinary members' desire for decentralized power. Third, leadership—even at the regional and headquarters levels—is unremunerated and provides few perquisites. Nor do leaders and aspirants report greater interest in prestige. Fourth, the large number of aspirants to leadership is inconsistent with Michels' argument that most members would not seek leadership roles. Finally, aspirants to leadership who have not yet obtained leadership roles are no less satisfied with their IAW participation than other members, suggesting that they expect the abundance of leadership positions and steady turnover of leaders to provide them with the opportunity to serve.

The discrepancies between our findings and the three existing models are thus too great to sustain the conclusion that any one of them is an adequate depiction of the structure and functioning of leadership at IAW. They suggest, instead, looking at whether there might be an alternative (and until now undescribed) model of leadership and at what factors might produce it. To be a viable alternative to democracy, oligarchy, and leadership by default, such a model would (a) need to be a comprehensive, internally consistent model of leadership, in which key variables reinforce one another to form a stable system, and (b) be applicable beyond IAW. In the following paragraphs we extrapolate such a model, which we call leadership for self-

development, from the IAW case study and speculate about the conditions that generate it and where else it might be most apt to appear. Some impressionistic data do suggest that this model may have applicability beyond IAW, but this hypothesis remains to be tested by future research.

In leadership for self-development, leaders and leadership aspirants differ from other members mainly in that they wish to play leadership roles, which they see as an enjoyable activity that contributes to personal development, not as a path to material rewards or prestige or as an onerous duty. The desire to exercise and develop leadership skills can, of course, motivate some leaders in any association, but in leadership for self-development, it is the preeminent motivation of most leaders. Leaders are keenly interested in administrative activity, but not for the sake of creating an efficient, flexible organization. Their focus instead lies in the exercising and development of administrative skills. They enjoy the administrative *process*—moving the organizational furniture from place to place—largely because such processes afford them these opportunities. Like oligarchy, leadership for self-development leads to the concentration of information, outside contacts, and decision making in the hands of leaders, but these outcomes result from their desire to administer, not from a lust for power, money, or prestige. An elaborate administrative structure is likely to result, since it provides many members with the leadership opportunities that they value and makes them highly satisfied.

In leadership for self-development, aspirants to leadership have predispositions similar to existing leaders, and some members are drawn to the organization because of the leadership opportunities it provides. Steady leadership turnover and a large number of leadership roles make it likely that most who aspire to lead will succeed. Hence, aspirants to leadership are more committed to the organization than are other members, less likely to consider resigning, and more apt to define their participation as involving little role conflict—even if they put in many more hours and do not face less demanding work or family situations. This is not to say that all members necessarily join such organizations in hope of developing their leadership skills, for the organizations often have other formal goals and offer members other rewards. Such members presumably find the other rewards that the organization provides adequate to sustain their involvement and provide a pool of followers.

Some aspects of leadership for self-development, like democracy, oligarchy and leadership by default, can hinder effectiveness. A great deal of time goes into administration, committees and meetings multiply, and procedures become increasingly labyrinthine. While this may meet some members' needs for leadership activity, others are apt to complain that time and resources are diverted from other goals, and both members and leaders are frustrated by the low flexibility and efficiency that result. Typical complaints are that meetings are too long, procedures are too complex, and attainment of stated goals is hindered by too much administrative activity.

There have not been enough careful case studies of voluntary association leadership to determine how widespread leadership for self-development might be, but several surveys of voluntary association leaders (Rich, 1980; Widmer, 1985) suggest that it exists elsewhere, as do the

numerous anecdotal accounts of faculty senates, neighborhood associations, and community theaters that discussions of our results with others elicited. Nevertheless, its prevalence remains to be established.

Available data are also insufficient to develop a complete account of the conditions that create and sustain leadership for self-development. Based on the IAW case study, we suggest the following organizational conditions as conducive to its development. First, the pattern is likely to appear when an organization has an overriding goal of leadership training. This is clearly not the case at IAW, where training community leaders is subordinate to community service; however, youth leadership training groups or groups designed to develop specific leadership skills, such as Toastmasters in the United States, might fit this description. Second, leadership for self-development might be especially likely to evolve when goals are vague and success hard to measure. IAW, with goals like community service and promoting voluntarism, fits this description well, but so do many other organizations, such as Junior Chambers of Commerce, college service sororities, or faculty senates – some of which do not include leadership training among their formal goals. Lack of clear, measurable goals makes it easy for an organization to drift toward leadership for self-development without giving up its stated mission, and makes it harder to criticize for inefficiency. Moreover, members attracted by the opportunity to display or develop leadership skills may be disinclined to levy such criticisms. Third, leadership for self-development may more often occur in organizations that offer relatively little access to tangible material rewards or real power. Unlike labor unions or political parties, IAW lacks the financial resources to pay its leaders or offer extensive perquisites. Nor does it have the clout to attract leaders who enjoy playing “power politics” in the community or society. Such organizations must use other inducements to attract leaders or risk the difficulties associated with leadership by default. Offering opportunities for acquiring and displaying leadership skills thus provides an avenue for attracting leaders, especially those who enjoy more genteel administrative activity. Finally, leadership for self-development may be likely to appear when organizational structures, such as mandatory retirement and short terms for officers, make it hard to develop entrenched leadership cliques.

The IAW case also implies that the probability that such organizational conditions will produce leadership for self-development increases when the pool of prospective members contains many individuals for whom this type of reward is particularly attractive because of lack of opportunity to develop or display leadership skills in other venues. This is a frequently cited explanation of higher status women’s high involvement in community organizations in the United States (Ostrander, 1984; Daniels, 1988), but it may apply equally well to relatively unsuccessful academics who make a career of university committee service or unsuccessful sales representatives or managers who compensate by a high level of involvement in clubs and associations (Kanter, 1993). Personality characteristics or a propensity to favor a particular leadership style may also be relevant. Organizations like IAW or Toastmasters, for example, may be most attractive to those uncomfortable with confrontational political or social movement

organizations (Daniels, 1988, Johnson, 1993). Finally people may seek out association leadership because they hope to parlay leadership skills developed in the organization into leadership positions in paid employment, other voluntary associations, or community networks. Though we cannot determine the direction of causation, our results show that IAW leaders do, in fact, hold more memberships and leadership positions in other associations than other IAW members.

The IAW case suggests that once in place, leadership for self-development tends to perpetuate itself. The elaborate administrative structure provides many opportunities to lead, and policies or customs that block the development of oligarchy and encourage leadership turnover may evolve. The focus on leadership for self-development also becomes institutionalized and legitimated by the organization's culture, contributing to the pattern's maintenance. To the extent that an organization develops a reputation for offering opportunities for aspiring leaders, it can attract a steady stream of members who desire leadership opportunities.

The discussion above provides good reason to think that leadership for self-development exists in organizations other than IAW, some of them possibly quite different in formal goals and membership composition. Additional case studies of organizations that conform to the conditions suggested above would thus be especially valuable. Estimation of the prevalence of various patterns of voluntary association leadership will, of course, require either a series of case studies or an exceptionally well-funded inquiry able to investigate a large sample of voluntary associations. Both case studies and larger sample research need to explore as well the effects of national context on the leadership structures of voluntary associations, since the claims to cross-national applicability that are implicit in all of the models have to date been examined only for the democratic and oligarchic models.

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Notes

1 The "International Association of Women" is, for reason of research ethics, a pseudonym of a leading women's service organization.

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6 As results from the 1975 survey were broadly similar, the 1992 result are emphasized in this article. Additional details, including information about the 1975 measures, wordings of underlying items in both years, and descriptive statistics for all measures are included in a longer working paper available on request.

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