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Greenspan, P. S. *Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. 246; \$39.95 (cloth); \$19.95 (paper).

Practical Guilt contributes to the literature in two rapidly growing topics: on moral dilemmas and on the moral significance of emotions. It also presents an overall view of the nature of morality, much on moral motivation, and a discussion of moral realism.

Greenspan's first chapter presents a review of philosophers' treatment of dilemmas and why they are thought to be troublesome. She credits Lemmon and Williams with making the seminal contributions. Moral dilemmas are situations in which all alternatives available to the agent are wrong. Rather than regarding moral dilemmas as demonstrating incoherence, Greenspan suggests that they are explained by the "limitations of the mechanism" (p. 16), a mechanism designed by humans. Dilemmas do give rise to a serious issue about moral motivation—what Greenspan calls a "metaethical dilemma." Internalism, the view that moral belief is sufficient to generate necessary motivation for action, seems to make dilemmas impossible, since dilemmas involve incompatible obligations. Externalism is portrayed as holding that the motivational force of moral judgments depends on some extracognitive psychological state of the agent; this makes dilemmas too easy.

Chapter 2 deals with questions raised for deontic logic by dilemmas. Greenspan points out that if there are genuine dilemmas, we must give up either that "ought" implies "can" or the principle of agglomeration—that OA and OB imply O(A&B). Since the former of these principles is tied to morality's action-guiding function, Greenspan argues that dilemmas show that agglomeration should be rejected. Utilizing numerous examples, she suggests that genuine dilemmas are best understood in terms of prohibitions: no matter what the agent does, she will violate some moral prohibition. Greenspan focuses on the case of Sophie's choice as an illustration. In this and other genuinely dilemmatic cases, all alternatives are prohibited all things considered. All-things-considered judgments are made in light of the *total* body of evidence. Prohibition dilemmas are irresolvable; they admit of *no* morally acceptable resolution.

Chapter 3 presents an overall view of moral theory designed to show that we can allow for the reality of dilemmas and still answer the metaethical puzzle posed in the first chapter. Greenspan defends what she calls social artifact realism: morality is neither subjective nor does it ascribe properties to the world. Morality is *real*, but is *invented by people* to promote group flourishing. So though morality is dependent on humans, it is independent of any *particular* mind. Moral rules are based on what will promote group flourishing, and so are subject to certain restrictions—for example, they must be teachable. Dilemmas arise because these rules are not adequate to handle all possible cases; deadlocks occur. This seems to undermine the action-guiding function of morality, since in a dilemma the agent must violate at least one of morality's demands. But Greenspan argues that morality's *practical* function can be maintained, and she does this by defending a view she calls "general internalism" (which is actually a form of externalism). General internalism denies the internalist's assumption that the motivational force is part of a moral term's mean-

ing; but it also rejects the externalist's claim that force is a mere concomitant of moral terms. Instead, general internalism ties motivational force in general terms to the function of ought-statements. Society deliberately teaches moral judgments in a way that ties them to emotions and assigns them an illusory kind of force. This is why amoralism is possible, though rare; the amoralist is someone who has talked herself out of the feelings associated with moral teaching or is someone in whom moral teaching never took effect.

If morality is taught as Greenspan suggests, "moral residues" will result in certain situations; this is the topic of chapter 4, with the focus on guilt. Guilt is usually associated with the ethics of duty, described as an appropriate response to doing something wrong. Greenspan does not deny this, but she also thinks that guilt is an important part of virtue ethics. For guilt is sometimes an appropriate response of a good person; it ascribes something negative to the self and can serve as a goad, prompting one to become more virtuous. Guilt indicates that the agent has appreciated the seriousness of his moral lapses. In dilemmatic situations, no matter what the agent does, he will do something wrong. If the dilemma has arisen through no fault of the agent, others may have no right to assign blame. But the agent does not have a right to ignore the harm that he does, and so experiencing guilt is appropriate, even *obligatory*. According to Greenspan, this is what keeps dilemmas from undermining action-guiding ethics. Guilt does not resolve dilemmas; a "wrong plus guilt will not make a right" (p. 137). But emotions exhibit the motivational force of "ought" and in that sense are a "substitute" for action. Some reject "ought-to-feel" judgments because we lack direct control over motives and feelings. But Greenspan argues that some *actions* that are required cannot be accomplished directly by choice. Nevertheless, "ought-to-feel" claims do not rid us of dilemmas; indeed, they may exacerbate the matter by giving rise to second-order dilemmas. An example comes from Aeschylus: if Agamemnon were to allow himself the proper reaction to the murder of his own daughter, he could not function as a military commander and save the Greek fleet. Second-order dilemmas show that there is a limit to achievable virtue; perfection is not possible.

In chapter 5, Greenspan argues that guilt feelings are sometimes appropriate even in the absence of the judgment that one is guilty. This is important because in situations of dilemma a good person will experience guilt even though she is not culpable. Greenspan contends that guilt may be appropriate in a variety of situations. Examples include an unavoidable car accident (in which a driver kills another, through no fault of his own), guilt for undeserved benefits (such as survivor's guilt), and guilt for the acts of another (e.g., American guilt about slavery). So experiencing guilt feelings may be appropriate even when one is not guilty and other-directed blame is unwarranted. Indeed, a morally sensitive person will have doubts about her role in harming others.

Chapter 6 focuses on the metaethical position that emerges. Even though, on Greenspan's account, moral properties are not "out there" and instead are *projected* by humans, one can still be mistaken about moral judgments. Our own human nature constrains what we can admire, and what promotes group flourishing can correct existing moral codes. Emotions, properly trained, "register" values instilled in us and so provide moral knowledge. Greenspan acknowledges that there may be conflicting group practices and that each of

two groups with opposing practices may flourish equally well. In that case the matter is indeterminate and either code is equally viable.

One might expect that serious opposition to *Practical Guilt* will come from opponents of dilemmas. But it is not entirely clear whether Greenspan's argument is aimed at them. She is often critical of opponents of dilemmas—for example, Hare. Yet, at one point (p. 31), she says that she *assumes* that there can be dilemmas. If that point is assumed, rather than argued for, then this book is most charitably read as providing an account of how a moral theory can allow for dilemmas and still be realistic and action guiding. Greenspan is critical of standard deontic logic (pp. 58 ff) for failing to capture elements of ordinary moral reasoning and the problematic aspects of dilemmas. This seems unfair, however. Standard deontic logic is constructed on the assumption that there are no genuine dilemmas and that the "O" operator designates all-things-considered judgments. Ordinary moral reasoning and the problematic aspects of conflicts, on this view, will concern how we derive all-things-considered judgments from various prima facie obligations and that reasoning and its underlying principles will be different from and messier than standard deontic logic.

Though *Practical Guilt* is sometimes difficult to read, it is challenging and brings together diverse issues. Read not as an argument for dilemmas, but rather as a sketch of what the best theory that allows for dilemmas will look like, this book's main arguments are plausible and coming to understand it is rewarding.

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