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Education and critical consciousness: Freire, Freud and Hegel

Sloop, Joyce Honeycutt, Ed.D.

The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1987

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EDUCATION AND CRITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS:

FREIRE, FREUD AND HEGEL

by

Joyce Honeycutt Sloop

A Dissertation Submitted to
the Faculty of the Graduate School at
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Education

Greensboro
1987

Approved by


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APPROVAL PAGE

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Date of Final Oral Examination

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SLOOP, JOYCE HONEYCUTT, Ed.D. Education and Critical Consciousness: Freire, Freud, and Hegel. (1987) Directed by David E. Purpel. 170 pp.

This study is an examination of the concept of education as liberation. The premise of this study is that the potential for greatness and fullness of being, implicit as a premise within humankind, can be made an explicit reality through employing a pedagogy of liberation, a pedagogy developing critical thought through a dialogical methodology within a curriculum of dialectical consciousness interacting with existing historical situations. An analysis of the theories of Freire, Freud, and Hegel indicates the extent of internal and external limitations operating within consciousness and thus prohibiting the development of human potential but also reveals that a liberation from such limitations can be effected through integrating primal energies with the rational processes and through educating consciousness by the dialectical process. This dissertation is an examination of education as an ongoing process of dialogical encounters in which individuals continue a development of dialectical consciousness to create and recreate selves and social situations in which they are placed.

The purpose of Chapter I is to objectify Freire's banking concept of education as the pedagogy of the oppressor for its universal application so that an emergence from this pedagogy and a resistance to it can engender a movement into liberation from it. Chapter II is an analysis of Freud's theory of psychoanalytical thought as a means of recognizing and integrating primal energies with the rational process. Chapter III is a study of Hegel's insights into the spiritual force inherent in the dialectical process and instrumental in moving consciousness into succeeding higher modes of thought until fulfillment

becomes an actuality in Absolute Knowing. Chapter IV is an examination of Freire's pedagogy of liberation into becoming more fully human with particular emphasis on the nature of true dialogue and the transforming dynamics of dialectical interaction with existing reality. Chapter V is an overview of Hegelian and Freudian insights that support and illumine Freire's praxis and support the premise of this dissertation, that education as liberation is a continuing process of dialectical consciousness development that can make actual that which is potential for humanity and for society.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Although a dissertation is a personal statement, it is never written in isolation; it is at the same time a reflection of the tenor of the dissertation committee that supports and shapes such a statement. I appreciate fully the composition of my committee and wish to indicate, even briefly, the dynamics of this committee and the significance the essence of this group held for the development of this work.

I am especially grateful for the direction and support of Dr. David Purpel as chairperson. His confidence in me, his willingness to expend time and energy in authentic dialogue on vital issues, his asking me the right questions, his knowing where I was going before I did but allowing me time to arrive on my own, his prompting me with deadlines but creating the illusion of time when that illusion was needed, and his wisdom embodied in the compassion and intelligence of his writings, teachings, and relationships made the writing of this dissertation a special journey of intellectual and spiritual dimensions. It is Dr. Purpel's prophetic vision of education that inspires my own.

I am grateful for the contribution Dr. Fritz Mengert made to my work, to my spiritual understanding, and to my intellectual growth. It was he who first introduced me to Hegel and it was his challenging question that led me to discover Freud. Above all, it was Dr. Mengert's intellectual acceptance of my Hegelian views even when they were at variance with his Kantian world that enabled me to find the

intellectual courage to express my views of Hegel and my perception of liberation.

I appreciate the class teachings of Dr. Svi Shapiro that dissipated the illusions and assumptions I had concerning social reality. Such awareness of ideological hegemony was vital to the development of my vision of oppressive reality.

I am very appreciative of Dr. Charles Tisdale's consenting to be on the committee when he had already served as my thesis advisor. His sensitive reading of my work was invaluable to my intellectual/spiritual growth and self-affirmation.

The shaping of this dissertation reflects the committee but the actual creation of writing time is the contribution of my husband Robert who guarded my time during the snow days and weekends so that I could work without interruption. I appreciate his support and encouragement that kept me typing even when I wished to stop.

I am also grateful for my intuitive typist Dolly DeVane who transformed a poorly typed roughdraft into what I intended it to be. Her willingness to type long hours to meet deadlines stemmed primarily from her own growing intellectual involvement with Freud and Hegel. Thus her typing of my work precipitated an ongoing dialogue that constituted another journey as well.

PREFACE

Writing this dissertation is more than an intellectual exercise or a fulfillment of an academic requirement; it is the culmination of a search for meaning that has slowly evolved through years of public school teaching where erosion of humanistic ideals and subsequent dehumanization of both teachers and students reached a negative momentum that forced me to seek understanding of what had gone wrong by returning to the primal source of education--the university. Thus when I write of Freire's dehumanization of oppressor-oppressed, I write theoretically and personally. When I write of Hegel's dialectic and probe it to determine its transforming process and to reveal its power inherent in spirit, I do so on two levels. When I turn to Freud, it is again to find the lost humanity I note, to locate the soul that is silenced and estranged. There is always an awareness of the larger context of public schooling, of teachers reduced to depositors of knowledge, of students so molded into receivers of knowledge that they are unable to develop a critical consciousness, and of administrators so overwhelmed by bureaucracy they adamantly refuse to consider the risk of innovation. My search has been to find the reason for this state of education, to understand the negative consequences that further perpetuate this condition thereby intensifying its dehumanizing force with each new school year, and to find the means by which to effect change in a

moribund institution in need of new life. I cannot devote my energy to an ideal gone astray without seeking to contribute to its restoration or renewal. My own passion for the development of innate potential implicit but undeveloped within humans will not permit me to accept this state of education as a barrier, as what constitutes the nature of reality and hence must be accepted.

Writing this dissertation is then a statement of a faith in the potential of humankind to be more, to become all that is humanly possible, to be in Hegelian terms the full oak of which the acorn is only a potential oak awaiting full growth. Thus when I speak of a community of conscious life in which the solidarity and ongoing dialogue constitute the proper nutrients for the growth of the acorn, I am referring not only to Freire's concept but to my own belief in potential that has found nourishment for full growth in the Department of Curriculum and Foundations at the University. In this department is found the very community of consciousness about which Hegel and Freire speak in terms of a new birth, a new age. This community conveys a new beginning for education in its nurturing of minds and spirits, in its transcendence of alienating competition, in its sharing of thoughts, interests, and time. There are always those who want to listen and share, those who dialogue and clarify. This community of curriculum is one of such interconnection that it can diminish despair by sharing it and magnify a minor success into a true celebration. This community reflects and supports Freirean solidarity and ongoing dialogue; it exemplifies the renewing force of

Hegelian dialectic; it witnesses to Freudian concepts of souls speaking to other souls.

I am not referring to an abstract concept--an idealistic or Utopian community. This is a very human community containing within it human frailties and human passions that at times lead one to try to name the world for another. These aspects are significant only in that they indicate ferments of growth. They are in Hegelian thoughts the bud, blossom, and fruit that at each stage seem unrelated but are still necessary stages for development, for they belong to the organic whole. The result is then the Hegelian process of working out the purpose by breaking down fixed thoughts so that consciousness can transcend to new levels of thought and engender new responses of action to that thought. This curriculum department epitomizes all that Freire, Hegel, and Freud advocate for liberation into becoming more fully human.

Such a department is the creation of its chairperson. The genius of this department that shapes its curriculum, inspires its growth, guides its course offerings, and selects the professional colleagues that adhere to its ideals is that of Dr. David Purpel. He holds a vision of education that becomes a reality for all who participate in this curriculum--students, professors, and community members of global dimension. What Dr. Purpel has fostered and created within this curriculum department is in actuality the experience of the theory I find in Freud, Hegel, and Freire. What is happening in this department is a microcosm of what can be for education everywhere.

Thus my writing is a statement of faith and also one of witness to the actuality of which I speak. This dissertation is an intellectual seeking of the wisdom of others to clarify and formulate the meaning of liberation in education; it is also a recognition that what is written on the community of consciousness exists as an on-going reality in the curriculum department.

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INTRODUCTION

This study arises from an initial concern over the inability of mankind to develop into a fuller state of being through developing the latent potential for greatness of being inherent within human consciousness and evolves into a central recognition that such development of consciousness into wholeness of being is contingent first on the development of consciousness into a state of becoming more fully human and second on developing pedagogical methods and curriculum that can liberate human consciousness into self-becoming. This study recognizes Paulo Freire's philosophical tenet that "man's ontological vocation is to be more fully human" as basic to a consideration of the pedagogical means by which human consciousness can be shaped or educated so that human consciousness can develop its potential for fullness of being. The focus of this study is on the relationship of traditional pedagogy of education to the socio-economic interests and values of the larger society traditional education serves. An examination of this relationship reveals a limiting effect on the development of human consciousness into becoming more fully human through reducing the act of knowing to the method of imparting knowledge and through confining the act of knowing to a curriculum of unquestioned acceptance of material. The act of knowing as structured in this pedagogy prohibits the development of critical thought and thereby reduces the human

potential for creating and re-creating self and society in a dialectical relationship. This study recognizes the act of knowing as one of critical reflection on the experiences and thoughts of self and on the practices of society in a dialectical reciprocity of creation and re-creation of self and society. The purpose of this study is therefore to propose a dialectical-dialogical method of pedagogy and a curriculum of reflective and critical thought as a pedagogy of liberation for consciousness into the state of becoming "more fully human."

This study shares a concern of educators, philosophers, and poets that the individual on the average does not bring to fruition the promise or potential of fuller being contained as a promise within him/her. Writers and poets have pointed out, for example, the human tendency to be content to dwell in the illusion of limitation, to seek comfort in the pleasure of a meal or in the release of sleep, and to allow innate potential to slumber. Writers have urged mankind to awaken from this slumbering consciousness to a higher form of being. Chaucer, for example, prefaces most of his telling verses with the cry of "Awak!" as if to stir the reader into a higher and hence into an awakened understanding of greatness contained within as potential awaiting expression. Hegel the philosopher insists that mankind cannot fully be human until reason is developed and perceives mankind's tendency to keep "within the feeling-states" as a tendency that is "anti-human, the conditions of mere animals" (Hegel, 1807/1931, p. 127). Shakespeare challenges this unreflected state of being in Hamlet with his question of "What is man if the chief good and market of his time be but to feed and sleep?" and answers with "A beast, no more"

(III, viii, 11.33-35). Heidegger in his philosophical contemplation of what limits mankind perceives that the individual's refusal to accept responsibility for being results in giving the being away to the world so that the "they-self" of the world dictates action and becomes the conscience of the individual. Heidegger maintains that until the individual wrests his/her being back from the world that an authentic life of responsibility for developing the individual's being cannot be achieved. Implicit in all of these concerns is the assumption that the individual can awaken from this slumbering state, make life authentic by assuming control and responsibility, and consequently move from a state of limitation to a state of liberation.

This study proposes that the individual's life of limitation and inauthentic being has been created for him or her and that it is impossible to ask the individual to awaken to what is not and cannot be perceived. There must first be the individual's perception and awareness of the limiting historical-cultural situation in which he or she has been placed. Secondly, there must be the perception of the self as a Subject capable of emerging from this situation and acting upon that situation and consequently transforming it. Such transformation can only result from a change in consciousness, from a consciousness of an Object being acted upon to a consciousness of a Subject capable of acting. Inherent in this perception is the act of knowing itself. Consciousness is the experience of knowing and is at the same time the insight into the act of knowing. Paulo Freire, an educator whose work focuses on a liberating pedagogy in the revolutionary context of the

Third World, clarifies the liberating tendency in the act of knowing, of critical reflection, that applies to any situation:

In the revolutionary perspective, the learners are invited to think. Being conscious, in this sense, is not simply a formula or a slogan. It is a radical form of being, of being human. It pertains to beings that not only know, but know that they know. (1976/78, p. 24)

Freire adds that "knowing with the people how they know things and the level of that knowledge" involves critical thought. It involves

challenging them, through critical reflection, regarding their own practical experience and the ends that motivate them in order, in the end, to organize the findings, and thus to replace mere opinion about facts with an increasingly rigorous understanding of their significances. (1976/1978, p. 25)

Such knowing involves "increasingly rigorous understanding" of not only the self as a consciousness capable of knowing but also consciousness of the given reality as an historical situation that is not one of limitation or one of a given situation but one amenable to change and subject to transformation. Consciousness evolving in "critical reflection" also knows there is an underlying principle of identity between the individual and the situation and knows therefore that alteration in one necessitates alteration in the other as well. Until the act of knowing comes into the experience of consciousness with its critical reflection and perception and its attendant power to recreate knowledge, the relationship of individual to society remains one in which the individual is limited and ultimately dehumanized; at the same time the society which the individual helps shape or by which he or she is shaped remains limiting and dehumanizing as well. A liberation of consciousness into potential

to be more fully human releases creativity of thought and action so that the individual not only acts upon the historical-cultural situation to recreate it but is recreated by it.

Liberation into consciousness of being more fully human is not easily achieved. It is a liberation that cannot be told or given to another but it is a state of consciousness that the individual must be helped to achieve. This liberation must occur within the individual as a consciousness of the nature of the situation that limits him or her and as a consciousness of the self as a being capable of acting on and transforming that situation. To this end of liberating consciousness through the act of knowing there must be the help of a liberating pedagogy that employs dialogue as a catalyst. Equally needed and contained within this pedagogy as an inherent part is the dialectical process that the dialogue initiates. Hegel in his Phenomenology of Mind reveals that the dialectical process is the movement of all knowing and constitutes the nature of the development of reason through progression of knowing or consciousness states until consciousness reaches Absolute Knowing. According to Hegel's insight into the nature of knowing or the experience of consciousness, the inner reality of the world is Spirit or Mind that finds its highest expression in Reason and includes the ethical and the right of freedom and justice. It can consequently be understood that the individual consciousness in its liberation into being more fully human by critical reflection moves in its "increasingly rigorous understanding" of self and situation toward the justness and rightness of an ethical society. Reason in this sense is not the development of rules, creeds, or regulations

that constrict the individual but is the act of knowing in critical and dialectical thought that moves human consciousness into higher and more ethical states of being. Hegel makes clear that the development of consciousness, that of gaining insight into the act of knowing, will release the potentiality of being more fully human, will make explicit that which is implicit as potential:

While the embryo is certainly, in itself, implicitly a human being, it is not so explicitly, it is not by itself a human being; man is explicitly man only in the form of developed and cultivated reason, which has made itself to be what it is implicitly.
(1807/1931, p. 83)

Hegelian reason is thus not imposed but is cultivated and developed and carries with it a corresponding development of freedom. It is not to be confused with the distortion of reason that occurs when it is utilized as an instrument for political, social, and economic purposes. Richard J. Bernstein, in his Introduction to Habermas and Modernity, notes that the perception of social critics in Europe defines "instrumental reason" as one affecting and infecting "the entire range of social and cultural life encompassing economic structures, law, bureaucratic administration, and even the arts" (1985, p. 5). Bernstein adds that "the hidden logic of this form of rationalization is a logic of increased domination and repression" so that the "domination of nature turns into a domination of human beings over other human beings, and ultimately into the nightmare of self-domination" (Bernstein, 1985, p. 6). Although the European social critics are referring to a process of utilizing reason that culminates in a totalitarian state in which mankind is known to be

dehumanized, a democratically free society is not immune to a corresponding form of perverted rationality or corrupted reason. In fact, Bernstein observes that these social critics argue that the "seeds of instrumental reason" are contained in the "origins of western rationality" (1985, p. 6). His observation becomes even more significant in the recent American criticism of education that expresses a concern over not just what might be considered the seeds but what is the visible growth for a condition corresponding to instrumental rationality. This concern finds its main focus in the school of free society that transmits and perpetuates the ideology of the dominant power and hence serves the interests of this ideology.

Henry Giroux, in "Teacher Education and the Ideology of Social Control," analyzes ideology as a "set of beliefs, values, and social practices that contain oppositional assumptions about varying elements of social reality, that is, society, economics, authority, human nature, politics, and so on" (1983, p. 409). Giroux maintains that when the dominant society institutionalizes this ideology, the ideology loses its "oppositional power" and serves to "legitimize existing institutional arrangements and social practices" (p. 409). He further reveals that ideology reaching the influence of hegemony "presents private interests as public goods" and elevates "'common sense' to a universal truth" (p. 410). Charles Reich, in The Greening of America, analyzes how the social and historical rise of the Corporate State includes a concomitant rise of power over consciousness. Reich perceives the power that has evolved in a democratic society is one of consciousness control:

The fact is that America still has...a democratic form. Power is not exercised in this country by force of arms, as in some dictatorships. Power rests on control of consciousness. (1970, p. 307)

What Reich does denote is a power to which people consent unknowingly. There is no force involved in this control. Thus the power of the dominant group to perpetuate what Reich calls "a false consciousness" is not an act of overt repression; it is rather dominance that is accepted in general because it is covertly projected through the values, myths, assumptions, and traditions that are shaped and eventually institutionalized by those in power. This ideology becomes so much a part of the fabric of life as it is known and of reality as it is perceived that individuals are incapable of questioning its existence. It is impossible to question what is not perceived and what is accepted as normal or traditional. What has occurred in this free society then is a hegemony that affects consciousness. Joseph Femia in "Hegemony and Consciousness in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci" defines hegemony as a term referring to a "situation in which a social group or class is ideologically dominant" and to which other groups give consent:

Hegemony is therefore the predominance obtained by consent rather than force of one class or group over other classes; and it is attained through the myriad ways in which the institutions of civil society operate to shape, directly or indirectly, the cognitive and affective structures whereby men perceive and evaluate problematic social reality. (1975, p. 31)

Femia records Gramsci's analysis of domination as consisting of two types. One is overt control by "coercive organs of the state" and the other is covert control of hegemony in which "the moral and

intellectual leadership" is "objectified in and exercised through the institutions of civil society, the ensemble of educational, religious and associational institutions" (p. 30). As a further explanation of the power of hegemony to control consciousness development, Femia refers to Gwyn Williams' definition of hegemony contained in Williams' introduction to his work on Gramsci:

To be more specific, hegemony consists, according to Gwyn Williams' introductory definition, in "an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society, in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all tastes, morality, customs, religions and political principles, and all social relations in their intellectual and moral connotations." (1975, p. 30)

It can be determined that the ideology, projected in the many textures of hegemony, so invades all aspects of life and constitutes the milieu into which the individual is born and in which he lives that it would never be possible to question that which is accepted by all and has traditionally been in existence. Charles Pierce, in The Crack in the Cosmic Egg, reiterates the pervasiveness of cultural hegemony and proposes that it becomes in this pervasiveness the only reality known:

There is no escaping this rich web of language,
myth, history, ways of doing things,
unconsciously-accepted attitudes, notions, and
so on, for these make up our only reality. (1971, p. 4)

Pierce further adds that it is necessary to find the source, the loom, of this web before it becomes destructive:

If this social fabric tends to become our shroud,
the only way out is by the same weaving process,
for there is only the one. So we need to find out
all we can about the loom involved, and weave with
imagination and vision rather than allow the process
to happen as a random fate. (1971, p. 4)

The necessary step in a liberating process, however, is not to weave another hegemony more in keeping with justice but to know that the given reality woven by hegemony is not fixed and static but dynamic and alterable; it is to know that reality is an ongoing process. It is also to know what is the mode of consciousness resulting from this hegemony. Valerie Suransky analyzes the dominant mode of consciousness and the nature of social reality in "Phenomenology: An Alternative Research Paradigm and a Force for Social Change." Suransky recognizes that the "dominant mode of consciousness which characterizes our attitudes and values" is an "objective consciousness" in which humans have been reduced to objects. To the observation of reality as an ongoing process capable of being transformed, Suransky contributes her observation that "this objective consciousness" is only a result of a "present historical situation" and is not a static reality but an "arbitrary construct":

The myth of objective consciousness is an arbitrary construct, in which our society, in its present historical situation, has invested its sense of meaningfulness and value. Hence, like any mythology, it can be overturned and called into question by other milieus which find meaning and value elsewhere. (1980, p. 172)

To "overturn and call into question" in Suransky's view is not to replace one form of dominance with another or to weave another hegemony. It is not a solution but a process in which liberation continues in progressive degrees through a dialectical interaction with the historical situation found in society. It is "an open-ended pursuit of understanding":

Phenomenology leads us in a direction of critically unveiling the present codification system and presents us with a new humanistic attitude: based on the dialectical and committed to dealing with essences. It is opposed to the mechanized view of the human being and seeks to restore the latter to a central and active role in education, social science, and psychology. It has no "solutions" and no "product" to offer but is an open-ended pursuit of understanding based on dialogical encounter and the perception of socio-cultural relativism and its concomitant meaning-structures. (1980, p. 172)

"To overturn and call into question" the cultural hegemony that shapes consciousness is to become aware of the dehumanizing process resulting from this corruption of reason through shaping society, particularly schools, to justify socio-economic and political purposes. It is to liberate consciousness into the potential of being human in the Freirean sense of a "radical form of being" that exercises critical thought to "call into question" the existing historical reality or situation of limitation. It is ultimately to move into a dialectical relationship with reality as an ongoing process. There are indeed no "solutions," for liberation cannot be prescribed or given. There is instead the critical reflection that calls for action upon that reflection or what Freire calls "praxis" for a creation and recreation of reality and consciousness in solidarity and love with others. In this development of critical thought, liberation and cultivation of Reason bring mutual recognition, freedom, and community. Freire's concept of human potential rises from a deeper conviction that "man's ontological vocation is to be a Subject who acts upon and transforms his world, and in so doing moves towards ever new possibilities of fuller and richer life individually and collectively"

(Freire, 1970/1985, p. 13). It is to Freire the birthright of mankind to be helped to liberate consciousness into becoming more fully human and into self-becoming. To this birthright is added a universal dimension that Marcuse observes and that Habermas records:

If we appeal to humanity's right to peace, to the right to abolish exploitation and oppression, we are not talking about self-defined, special, group interests, but rather and, in fact, interests demonstrable as universal rights. (Habermas, 1985, p. 77)

This study posits the futility of lamenting the lack of developed potential in mankind and the equal pointlessness of formulating new educational goals of developing potential fully until there is a liberation of consciousness into the potential of being human. Being human is here used in the Freirean sense of a "radical form of being human" that exercises critical thought and is dialectically involved in the act of knowing. The purpose of this study then becomes one of offering to individuals the means by which the individual can achieve liberation into becoming more fully human. This study proposes such means through a humanizing pedagogy of dialogical-dialectical encounter with reality in the context of a curriculum based on reflective thought of self and situation.

This study is organized into five chapters. A brief indication of the content and focus of each chapter in developing the purpose of this study is contained in the following description of each chapter:

Chapter I examines the oppressive reality perceived by Freire as the underlying basis for the rise of hegemonic ideology that shapes consciousness. This examination turns to a further exploration of the

effects of oppressive reality on consciousness, as seen in the oppressor-oppressed consciousnesses that result from the dominant ideology. Chapter I concludes with the effects of the oppressive reality and the oppressive consciousness on the pedagogical methods and curriculum of public schools. The relationship becomes evident between the hegemonic ideology of oppressive reality and the shaping of consciousness through a pedagogy that serves the interests and reflects the values of this hegemony.

Chapter II narrows to a focus on the nature and characteristics of oppressed consciousness as presented in the Freudian theory of psychoanalysis. It is here in the realm of mind that the Ego-oppressor and the Id-oppressed divert the flow of being into channels of irrational behavior, into the by-paths of unintended language, and into the manifestations of physical symptoms of internal oppression and conflict. What occurs as oppression in the social structure of hegemony creates within the consciousness a battleground of oppression and expression. What results then in this conflict is not an unimpeded flow of being into a fully integrated human but a fragmented and alienated being who is less in development than what is implicitly contained within mankind as human potential. To this point

Hegel's concept of the flow of being into integration of consciousness is used to show parallel understanding between Freud and Hegel of the nature of consciousness and its development.

Chapter III continues a study of consciousness development but turns from oppression to liberation and from limitation to development. This chapter focuses on Hegel's concept of the dialectic as the source of all movement into higher forms of being. Hegel maintains in his Phenomenology of Mind that "the goal to be reached is the mind's insight into what knowing is" (1807/1831, p. 90). Hegel reveals that Spirit or mind is the only reality and that separation of subject and object does not exist in this reality. Hegel reveals the stages by which consciousness can educate itself into a higher form of being beginning with the birth of consciousness, moving to the development of self-consciousness, and arriving at universal self-consciousness. The emphasis in this chapter is on the progression of Spirit or Mind from self-consciousness to universal self-consciousness where freedom and consciousness are one, where Reason is truth and reality, where the inner consciousness and the outer form are one. The purpose of this chapter is to reveal that the act of knowing can lead to liberation into Absolute Knowing.

Chapter IV has two areas of concern: Freire's pedagogy of liberation and an application of that pedagogy in a free society. Chapter IV examines Freire's pedagogy for liberation for an understanding of the nature of a true dialogue, of the force of the dialectic, and for the growth of critical consciousness in reflective thought.

Chapter V is not proposing a detailed blueprint for a curriculum of liberation, for such a process is always ongoing as education is ongoing. What this concluding chapter does propose is that an understanding and application of Freire's method and curriculum generates a movement toward critical consciousness that is at the basis for a liberation of consciousness into being more fully human.

CHAPTER I

OPPRESSIVE REALITY, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND PEDAGOGY

Oppressive Reality

This chapter draws heavily on Freire's insights into the rise of oppressive reality as a social phenomenon, the cultural effects of this reality on the shaping of consciousness, and the methods and curriculum employed by this reality to preserve its power. Freire concentrates on revealing the existing reality obscured by cultural hegemony in all of his works. Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed focuses on the power of the oppressive reality to shape consciousness and reveals that the pedagogy of the oppressor is often used as an instrument by which this shaping of consciousness occurs. Freire's Cultural Action for Freedom offers insight into the structure of oppressive reality as a social phenomenon. Freire's work is central to this study, for he does not offer his concept of oppressive reality and its subsequent effects as a theory alone; he speaks with authority gained from his early experiences of this reality and of his later action to alter this oppressiveness. Freire has insight into this oppressiveness from his young encounter with what he calls the "culture of silence" in which the oppressed or underprivileged are overwhelmed by the power of the dominant elite. He moreover learns during his educational experiences that occurred within the "culture of silence" that education serves the interest of those in power, that the oppressed have no instrument by which to lift themselves from this oppression, and that it is impossible for the oppressed to develop an instrument of critical thought from their position of being submerged

within this oppressive reality. Thus Freire's authority rests on his reflection on his personal encounter with and later studies of oppression and on his action of forging the pedagogical instrument by which the oppressed can be liberated. In one sense Freire perceives with double vision the causes of oppression and the means for liberation; consequently his vision gains the force of praxis as it becomes a combination of personal experience, later studies and reflection, and subsequent action to create the instrument of liberation by which mankind can become more fully human.

Freire's work concerns the victims of the Third World, illiterate peasants who are born into oppression; his philosophy and practice of education, however, are universal in application and serve to unveil an oppressive reality of a world dichotomized into two classes of oppressors and oppressed. To those living in a free society, Freire's concept of oppressive reality might appear irrelevant and hence be dismissed as pertaining to a less civilized culture. It is in this civilized culture, however, that Freire's concept of oppressive reality is relevant, for it serves to unveil the myths, assumptions, and traditions that constitute the cultural ideological hegemony obscuring the existing oppressive reality. It is, however, easier to discern oppressive reality in the skeletal form of the Third World than it is to detect this oppressiveness through the complexities of a technological society with an attending complexity of sophisticated cultural hegemony. Whereas in the sophisticated culture of a free society violence would be defined

as bloodshed, Freire's examination of the Third World reveals violence as synonymous with oppression, for "an act is oppressive...when it prevents men from being more fully human" (1970/1984, p. 42). Freire furthermore extends violence to include any situation in which one group or individual exploits another or "hinders his pursuit of self-affirmation as a responsible person" (1970/1984, p. 40). It is thus violence extending beyond the customary definition of bloodshed that creates the "culture of silence."

In Cultural Action for Freedom, Freire analyzes the social structure that creates the "culture of silence" and hence explains what "silence" means as a form of oppression. Joao da Veiga Coutinho's introduction to this work provides insight into Freire's main concern, that of "divergent images of man, or more correctly, an already established image which its keepers are attempting to prescribe for others and a new image which is struggling to be (1970, p. vi). Freire's concept of human potential has at its center a faith that "no matter how 'ignorant' or 'submerged' in a 'culture of silence,'" every human being "is capable of looking critically at his world in a dialogical encounter with others" (1970, p. 13). Thus Coutinho's terms of "keepers" and "struggling to be" denote dehumanized beings who have the right to be more. Coutinho adds that Freire's philosophy has as its foundation the individual's right to be

more fully human:

The cardinal principle of that philosophy is man's vocation to be more-more, that is, than what he is at any given time or place. There are thus no developed men except in a biological sense. The essence of the human is to be in continual non-natural process. In other words, the characteristic of the human species is its repeatedly demonstrated capacity for transcending what is merely given, what is purely determined.
(p. vi)

In Cultural Action for Freedom (1970) Freire examines the marginal person as conveying an "already established image which its keepers are attempting to prescribe for others" within the social structure that seemingly denies the individual's "struggling to be" as an ontological vocation of mankind. In analyzing the irrational concept of marginal beings, Freire maintains that "illiterates have to be recognized as beings 'outside of,' 'marginal to' something, since it is impossible to be marginal to nothing" (p. 10). There must be a reality to which this person is marginal:

Those who consider them marginal must, nevertheless, recognize the existence of a reality to which they are marginal - not only the physical space, but historical, social, cultural, and economic realities - i.e., the structural dimensions of reality. (p. 10)

Freire furthermore contends that being marginal implies "movement of the one said to be marginal from the center, where he was, to the periphery," and therefore this movement has a presupposition of "not only an agent but also his reasons" (p. 10). In searching for the author of this movement, Freire reveals the illogic of its being the decision of the illiterates:

Admitting the existence of men "outside of" or "marginal to" structural reality, it seems legitimate to ask: Who is the author of this movement from the center of the structure to its margin? Do so-called marginal men, among them the illiterates, make the decision to move out to the periphery of society? If so, marginality is an option with all that it involves: hunger, sickness, rickets, pain, mental deficiencies, living death, crime, promiscuity, despair, the impossibility of being. (1970, p. 10)

If the choice is not to be marginal, then "marginal man has been expelled from and kept outside of the social system and is therefore the object of violence" (p. 10). It becomes clear in Freire's examination of marginality that the violence is not that of expelling the marginal being but the violence of keeping the marginal being as oppressed within the social structure:

In fact, however, the social structure as a whole does not "expel," nor is marginal man a "being outside of." He is, on the contrary, a "being inside of," within the social structure, and in a dependent relationship to those whom we call falsely autonomous beings, inauthentic beings-for-themselves. (1970, p. 11)

What the social structure accomplishes as a "keeper" of this being is the violence of dehumanizing the marginal person. Freire's further analysis of the marginal person indicates how the term dehumanization becomes vital to Freire's concept of oppression. These marginal beings exist in the world but are prevented from being with the world. Freire clarifies what "in" and "with" the world means:

It is as conscious beings that men are not only in the world, but with the world, together with other men... . Men can fulfill the necessary condition of being with the world because they are able to gain objective distance from it. Without this objectification, whereby man also objectifies himself, man would be limited to being in the world, lacking both self-knowledge and knowledge of the world. (1970, pp. 27-28)

Freire emphasizes his point with a comparison of human beings and animals, contending that "unlike men, animals are simply in the world, incapable of objectifying either themselves or the world." Furthermore, animals "live a life without time, properly speaking, submerged in a life with no possibility of emerging from it, adjusted and adhering to reality" (p. 28). Yet the description of the oppressed submerged within the culture of silence without an instrument by which to emerge from it and taught through education to adapt or adjust to it parallels the description of animals in the world and conveys the degree of dehumanization to which the oppressed have been subjected. It is through their reflective thought and action that humans have the capacity to humanize or dehumanize their world. It is "because they impregnate the world with their reflective presence," that only humans "can humanize or dehumanize" (1970, p. 31)

To understand the social phenomenon of how dehumanization occurs, Freire reveals the relationship of the superstructure to infrastructure in cultural-historical reality. Freire takes the "historical-cultural configuration" of the "culture of silence" and reveals that it is not artificially and deliberately

constructed by "keepers" but is a result of relationships:

We do not mean that the culture of silence is an entity created by the metropolis in specialized laboratories and transported to the Third World. Neither is it true, however, that the culture of silence emerges by spontaneous generation. The fact is that the culture of silence is born in the relationship between the Third World and the metropolis... . Thus understanding the culture of silence presupposes an analysis of dependence as a relational phenomenon which gives rise to different forms of being, of thinking, of expression, those of the culture of silence and those of the culture which "has no voice." (1970, pp. 32-33)

Freire explains that the "social structure is not an abstraction" but "exists in a dialectic between super and infra-structures" (p. 33). This dialectic produces a special form of consciousness:

This mode of culture is a superstructural expression which conditions a special form of consciousness. The culture of silence "overdetermines" the infrastructure in which it originates. (1970, p. 32)

Part of this rise of the social structure comes from what Freire calls the "introjection of myths":

It is true that infrastructure, created in the relations by which the work of man transforms the world, gives rise to superstructure. But it is also true that the latter, mediated by men, who introject its myths, turns upon the infrastructure and "overdetermines" it. If it were not for the dynamic of these precarious relationships in which men exist and work in the world, we could speak neither of social structure, or of men, nor of a human world. (1970, p. 33)

Freire also explains the consciousnesses arising from the relationship between the metropolitan society of the powerful and

the dependent society of the oppressed:

Both the metropolitan society and the dependent society, totalities in themselves, are part of a greater whole, the economic, historical, cultural, and political context in which their mutual relationships evolve. Though the context in which these societies relate to each other is the same, the quality of the relationship is obviously different in each case, being determined by the role which each plays in the total context of their interaction. The action of the metropolitan society upon the dependent society has a directive character, whereas the object society's action, whether it be response or initiative, has a dependent character. (1970, p. 33)

What occurs in this relationship is the "introjection by the dominated of the cultural myths of the dominator" (p. 33). Moreover, the "dependent society introjects the values of the life style of the metropolitan society" (p. 33). The resulting effect on the consciousness of the dependent or dominated society of this dialectical relationship with the superstructure is a duality:

This results in the duality of the dependent society, its ambiguity, its being and not being itself, and the ambivalence characteristic of its long experience of dependency, both attracted by and rejecting the metropolitan society. (1970, p. 34)

Freire's analysis of the social phenomenon of the oppressed consciousness is further aided by his explanation of the silence this consciousness denotes. Since the will of the director society shapes the "infrastructure of the dependent society," the "resultant superstructure, therefore reflects the inauthenticity of the infrastructure" (p. 34). The voice of the dependent society,

which by definition is a "silent society" or a "culture of silence," is "not an authentic voice but merely the echo of the voice of the metropolis" (p. 34).

Freire's discussion of the social structures reveals the depth of submergence so that the oppressed internalize the consciousness of the oppressor and become locked into this oppressive reality. Freire's analysis of the effects of the social structure in which the oppressed are submerged comes into greater focus with the details of the consciousness of both the oppressor and the oppressed in his Pedagogy of the Oppressed.

Oppressor and Oppressed Consciousnesses

Freire takes a more direct approach in Pedagogy of the Oppressed by revealing the oppressive reality as consisting of two classes: oppressors and oppressed. Freire describes the oppressors as the dominant class, the ones in power, comparable to the director society or metropolitan areas described in Cultural Action for Freedom. The oppressors have one interest, that of maintaining their power and central to the maintenance of power is wealth. Freire notes that to the oppressor "money is the measure of all things, and profit the primary goal" (1970/1984, p. 44). Freire cites the consciousness of the oppressor is "to have and to be the class of the haves" (p. 44). In the oppressor consciousness only the oppressors are human; the others are reduced to the status of "things." The oppressors dehumanize the

others by treating them as possessions and hence reducing them to objects. This treatment need not be an overt act of dehumanizing the oppressed. Such treatment becomes an accepted and normal way of life, one naturally belonging to those in power whose merit as ruler of the dominant class is accepted by oppressor and oppressed alike. The rise of the oppressor class as the established ruling class discloses a pattern of dominance that becomes embedded in cultural hegemony of tradition, myths, and assumptions and evolves into a hegemonic ideology that endows this ruling class with the right to rule as the natural rulers. Freire examines how accepted is the oppressor's way of life as naturally belonging to those in power:

Their behavior, this way of understanding the world and men, is explained by their experience as a dominant class. Once a situation of violence and oppression has been established, it engenders an entire way of life and behavior for those caught up in it - oppressor and oppressed alike. Both are submerged in this situation and both bear the marks of oppression. Analysis of existential situations of oppression reveals that their inception lay in an act of violence-initiated by those in power. This violence as a process, is perpetuated from generation to generation of oppressors who become its heirs and are shaped in its climate. This climate creates in the oppressor a strongly possessive consciousness-possessive of the world and of men. (1970/1984, p. 44)

The "strongly possessive consciousness" of the oppressor "tends to transform everything surrounding it into an object of domination" so that the "earth, property, production, the creations of men, men themselves, time - everything is reduced to the status of objects at its disposal" (p. 44). In revealing how extensive is the

possessive exploitation of the oppressors, Freire also reveals the different aspects of the social and cultural structure affected by this treatment. It becomes apparent that the ideology of the oppressor is truly pervasive, present in all structures and dominant in all institutions. Freire also reveals the violence of prohibiting an individual from becoming fully human that is disguised under myths, humanitarian images, and abstract ideological offerings. Thus in treating people as objects, the oppressors have inflicted the greatest of all violence: they have dehumanized them.

The oppressed respond to this ideology of domination and to this treatment of dehumanization by developing a consciousness of objects: "Within their unauthentic view of the world and of themselves, the oppressed feel like 'things' owned by the oppressor" (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 51). The oppressed thus exhibit a "colonized mentality" of being possessions. Bereft of belief in self or trust in others and filled with self-depreciation, the oppressed exert a horizontal violence on their own. The oppressed have so internalized the oppressor in their consciousness that the oppressed may exert violence on the internalized oppressor contained within them but they never inflict overt violence on the oppressor. The only model available to them of humanity is that of the oppressor so that "to be" is "to be like the oppressor" (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 51). Freire notes that "it is impossible for the oppressed to participate in their liberation as long as they live in the 'duality' in which 'to be' is 'to be like'" the oppressor (1970/1984, p. 33).

Thus freedom to the oppressed is limited to their moving into the power position held by the oppressor. Their submersion in the "reality of oppression" distorts their perception of themselves:

But their perception of themselves as oppressed is impaired by their submersion in the reality of oppression. At this level, their perception of themselves as opposites of the oppressor does not yet signify engagement in a struggle to overcome the contradiction; the one pole aspires not to liberation, but to identification with its opposite pole. (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 30)

Freire moreover reveals that the internalization of the oppressor within the oppressed determines the oppressed's view of freedom:

In this situation the oppressed do not see the "new man" as the man to be born from the resolution of this contradiction, as oppression gives way to liberation. For them, the new man is themselves become oppressors. Their vision of the new man is individualistic; because of their identification with the oppressor, they have no consciousness of themselves as persons or as members of an oppressed class. It is not to become free men that they want agrarian reform, but in order to acquire land and thus become landowners--or, more precisely, bosses over other workers. It is a rare peasant who, once "promoted" to overseer, does not become more of a tyrant towards his former comrades than the owner himself. This is because the context of the peasant's situation, that is, oppression, remains unchanged. (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 30)

The oppressed, "having internalized the image of the oppressor and adopted his guidelines, are fearful of freedom" (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 31). Freire makes clear that "freedom would require them to eject this image" of the oppressor and "replace it with autonomy and responsibility" (p. 31). Freire's examination of this fear of freedom that requires autonomy reveals that the "behavior of the oppressed is a prescribed behavior" (1970/1984, p. 31) that follows the "guidelines of the oppressor":

The "fear of freedom" which afflicts the oppressed, a fear which may equally well lead them to desire the role of oppressor or bind them to the role of oppressed, should be examined. One of the basic elements of the relationship between

oppressor and oppressed is prescription. Every prescription represents the imposition of one man's choice upon another, transforming the consciousness of the man prescribed to into one that conforms with the prescriber's consciousness. Thus, the behavior of the oppressed is a prescribed behavior, following as it does the guidelines of the oppressor. (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 31)

Freire notes that individuals "who have adapted to the structure of domination in which they are immersed and have been resigned to it, are inhibited from waging a struggle for freedom so long as they feel incapable of running the risk it requires" (p. 32) and "are apt to react in a passive and alienated manner when confronted with the necessity to struggle for their freedom and self-affirmation" (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 51). Since the oppressor is "housed" within the oppressed, the "resulting ambiguity makes them fearful of freedom":

They resort (stimulated by the oppressor) to magical explanations or a false view of God, to whom they fatalistically transfer the responsibility for their oppressed state. It is extremely unlikely that these self-mistrustful, downtrodden, hopeless people will seek their own liberation--an act of rebellion which they may view as a confrontation with destiny. (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 163)

Part of the difficulty of the oppressed's acquiring a critical awareness of oppressive reality, of a reality that contains the "contradistinction of men as oppressors and oppressed" (p. 36) is that the oppressed "fatalistically 'accept' their exploitation" because they are "unaware of the causes of their condition" (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 51). A further explanation is that "their ideal is to be men; but for them, to be men, is to be oppressors" (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 30). Thus the oppressed are submerged within this oppressive reality with freedom extending only to becoming oppressor. Myths, assumptions, and tradition of cultural hegemony convey a move into the power position of oppressor as a goal to be desired. Freire makes clear there is no liberation in such a move but only a continuation of the dehumanization suffered by the

oppressor and the oppressed. Only the oppressed can liberate both oppressed and oppressor. It is not in the interest of the oppressor to change or alter a power position. In order to insure the continuance of the domination the oppressors maintain, the methods and curriculum they employ in their pedagogy become the instrument of continued dehumanization.

Pedagogy of the Oppressor

Freire's insight into the creation of oppressive reality and its effect on consciousness extends to the very instrument by which such shaping of consciousness occurs, the pedagogy of the oppressor. Freire perceives the oppressor education as any education in which the methodology of narration and the curriculum of ideology are used. This education, in which students are shaped in consciousness to accept and not to question whatever the teacher deposits in them as knowledge, is particularly evident in public education. Freire knows from his subjection to a pedagogy of the oppressor and from his subsequent creation of a liberating pedagogy that "there is no such thing as a neutral educational process" (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 15). It is Freire's belief that schools serve to support and reproduce the ideology of the social and cultural structure for which they were created, in which they operate, and whose interests they serve. Freire makes a central point in his Pedagogy of the Oppressed in revealing how education is linked to the preservation of the dominant ideology so that all students and most educators participate in this oppressive atmosphere without being aware of the social and cultural purpose they serve:

Education as the exercise of domination stimulates the credulity of students, with the ideological intent (often not perceived by educators) of indoctrinating them to adapt to the world of oppression. (1970/1984, p. 65)

Social and cultural critics of American education comprehend what is happening and try to create a public awareness by selecting particular manifestations of this ideological oppression in order to magnify a particular symptom of the deeper malaise. These critics seek the why and how of oppressive education, but Freire determines the oppressive reality that constitutes the hegemonic ideology the public accepts as normal and the schools serve as traditional. Daniel Rossides, foreexample, in his article, "What is the Purpose of Education," represents in his thoughts what most social critics perceive as the underlying reality of the purpose of education:

History's diverse educational systems have one all-important similarity - they serve the interests of the powerful first and foremost. No understanding of American education is possible unless one first understands that the main outcome of education (in both agrarian and industrial societies) is the establishment and maintenance of class differences quite independently of any functional purpose. (1984, p. 16)

How education serves "the interests of the powerful first and foremost" is through the preservation of the dominant ideology of the ruling class of wealth. This ideology permeates the very structure of society so that it saturates the public consciousness

and hence makes individuals impervious to the reality of the situation in which they are placed. This pervasive way of viewing the world in turn obscures the true issues of society and the true purposes of education as supporting the ideology of society. Clarence J. Karier reveals in his research on the rise of the corporate liberal state and its increasing control of education how the resulting domination becomes one of such long standing and of such magnitude that individuals accept this domination as a normal condition that requires a normal manner of responding. In tracing the growth of the corporate liberal state and its corresponding growth of educational control, Karier notes an "array of bureaucratic regulatory agencies which cooperatively worked with business and labor to achieve that optimal balance of interests for all concerned" (1972, p. 129). Among the sectors that constituted the emerging corporate liberal state was a private sector of wealth that wielded great influence:

On the other hand, in the private sector relatively new organizations were created which effectively channeled corporate wealth toward the support of liberal progressive reform. Philanthropic foundations became a major stimulus for political as well as educational reform. (Karier, 1972, p. 129)

That ideology serves "the interests of the powerful first and foremost" becomes in Karier's following analysis the powerful influence wealth can achieve:

The practices of foundations initiating various kinds of activity and then allowing the public sector to assume control became common practice of the major foundations dealing with policy formation in America. The profound influence of foundations issues from their ability to flexibly employ large blocks of wealth for research, initiate new activities, and facilitate existing programs. (1972, p. 129)

The point Karier makes is that "for the most part, the philosophy behind the policy makers for the foundations appears to have been that of a liberal pragmatist who appreciated the need for survival" (p. 129). Thus the liberal corporate state originated in the interest of society, but its modest inception turned into a "development and creation of large corporate foundations" that were "very much a twentieth century phenomenon" that carried in this gigantic growth an equal influence over education. Karier gives empirical data as evidence of the gigantic growth and indicates a concomitant growth in power over educational policy:

Foundations of varied sorts grew rapidly in numbers from 21 in 1900 to a total of 4,685 in 1959. To the chagrin of many congressmen and taxpayers, the tax-exempt foundations in the United States also grew from 12,295 at the close of 1952 to 42,124 by the end of 1960. From the beginning of the century, the new philanthropic endeavors of corporate wealth were directed at influencing the course of educational policy. (1972, p. 120)

It is of interest that some resistance to this growth, especially in the influence over education, appeared in 1913 when "a concerned 62nd Congress directed the Industrial Relations Commission to investigate the role of foundations" and that after a year of testimony, the

conclusion of the Commission was not in favor of the control over education:

Nevertheless, after a year of testimony, the majority of the Commission concluded that, "The domination of men in whose hands the final control of a large part of American industry rests is not limited to their employees, but is being rapidly extended to control the education and social service of the nation."
(p. 130)

Even though the findings of the Commission "cut very close to the heart of the problem of power in the corporate liberal state," America's entry into World War I detracted from this issue of power with the result that "the corporate liberal state emerged from the war stronger than ever" (p. 130). It was not only that the corporate liberal state continued after the war but rather that it "became institutionalized" so that "henceforth, most social change would be institutionally controlled and the interest of government, corporate wealth, and labor more securely managed" (p. 130). The direct relationship of this corporate state to the purpose of public schools becomes evident in Karier's assessment:

The state which thus emerged included a mass system of public schools which served the manpower needs of that state. One of the most important ways that system served the needs of the state was through the process of rationalizing and standardizing manpower for both production and consumption of goods and services. (1972, p. 130)

Karier's research supports Rossides' detection of the power behind the formation and shaping of schools:

Ideology aside, it is clear that American education serves the needs of America's power groups. To protect and further interests, the middle and upper classes have created the myth that success in school is related to performance outside of school to the benefit of both individual and society. (1984, p. 18)

Detected in Karier's "process of rationalizing and standardizing manpower" and Rossides' reference to the "myths" that "protect and further interests," is the perversion of rationality as the "process of rationalizing" to justify the management of education to produce needed workers and consumers. Thus it is not "ideology aside" but ideology inside the methods and curriculum and ideology inside the myths to appease and make passive that emerge from the insights of both Karier and Rossides. Ideology finds in education the very material it needs to shape the culture that serves it needs and preserves its power. This ideology reproduces itself in myths and traditions within the classroom. Consequently the schools must in turn reproduce the values and demands of the social and cultural structure of society. Rossides suggests one myth, the correlation of academic success with later success in work. Freire's analysis of oppressive pedagogy reveals the depth of oppressive reality and the projection of myths that appease those in education who might grow restive and question. Thus the myth Rossides mentions, of success in school and success in life, becomes one of the myths utilized by the oppressors, the myth that all students can succeed if they stay in school and work hard. Here it becomes obvious how very much the oppressed have internalized the oppressor's consciousness to the

extent that "to be is to be like" those in power. What Freire is saying and what Rossides is noting as myth explain the tendency of the oppressed in American society to uphold the rights of the wealthy. It is in the interest of the oppressor class that their position of power and wealth be insured. Thus in the ideology they project the myths that shape consciousness to believe in these myths. Students do believe the myths that academic success conditions later success and do believe that staying in school results in the rewards of becoming successful, a term denoting acquiring the position of power and wealth. The myths are upheld by all in society so that students are powerless to question. Students accept the hegemony in which they are born and which rules their lives. They therefore accept the responsibility for any failure to succeed. Implicit in most educational myths is the assumption that working hard or doing what one is told will insure power and wealth. Students accept this myth and accept responsibility for any failure to succeed. Rothstein picks up this myth and indicates how unquestioned is the acceptance of the poor for their failure and subsequent poverty, a legacy given by schools and preserved in the structure of society:

If the poor believe that their poverty and alienation are the result of their own stupidity, their own failure to achieve, and their own unwillingness to stick it out in school, they will be less likely to squawk about their condition and less likely to question the occupational structure which assigns poverty and alienation to those who do the majority of the country's necessary work.
(1974, p. 63)

Rothstein makes clear the necessity of myths to produce the manpower the economic structure needs:

The economic structure of our society requires a system of vastly differentiated educational opportunities for those destined for different jobs; combined with the myth that the top educational opportunities are open to all who try to make it. (1974, p. 63)

The inability to succeed creates guilt for failure. In what amounts to ideological manipulation, the student never doubts who is responsible. This internalization of the oppressor's consciousness especially surfaces in the attitude of those who have failed toward those who have succeeded or have power. Slater (1983) in his "Democratization of Greed," reveals how attitudes internalized in school persist in later life and offer support to the dominant ideology: "Nothing, in fact, seems easier to manipulate than public sentiment, about the rich." What occurs in the acceptance of this myth is an aura of merit surrounding those who have succeeded so that the poor rarely "question motives and behaviors of those wealthier than they" (p. 132). It is the oppressors who shape education to support the dominant ideology and the oppressor who thus oppress the poor with this ideology. It is the oppressed poor, however, who in their domesticated consciousness accept the ideology so well that they look upon the wealthy oppressor with awe:

And given a choice between blaming the rich for their problems or blaming the poor, the mass of the population will blame the poor every time. (Slater, 1983, p. 140)

Freire relates this same attitude toward the oppressor exists in the Third World where peasants reveal "a diffuse magical belief in the invulnerability and power of the oppressor" (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 51). Freire reveals that part of this attitude stems from the lack of belief in self and the inability to trust others. The oppressed are told so many times how undeserving they are that they are filled with self-depreciation. The same method is used by the corporate liberal state in projecting myths of education and in supporting these myths through a testing program that is culturally biased to insure low scores among the oppressed classes and that is used to inform the student of his or her merit. Karier verifies that not only is this testing an attempt to structure education to fulfill the needs of society but it is the means by which a myth of merit is conveyed that the oppressed accept as reality. Of interest in Karier's analysis is the obvious perversion of reason to justify a social class system. Lewis Terman, for example, structured the Stanford-Binet intelligence test with questions related to the "hierarchical occupational structure" (Karier, 1972, p. 134). Karier notes "it was little wonder that IQ reflected social class bias" (p. 134). What truly reveals the extent to which the oppressed internalize the oppressor is seen in the oppressed's ability to internalize and make Terman's system work:

Terman's tests were based on an occupational hierarchy which was, in fact, the social class system of the corporate liberal state which was then emerging. The many varied tests, all the way from IQ to personality and scholastic achievement, periodically brought up-to-date, would serve a vital part in rationalizing the social class system. The tests also created the

illusion of objectivity which on the one side served the needs of the "professional" educators to be "scientific," and on the other side served the need of the system for a myth which could convince the lower classes that their station in life was part of the natural order of things. (Karier, 1972, p. 136)

Karier affirms the internalization of the oppressor so noted by Freire. The myth was so incorporated into the belief of the oppressed that it became a reality. As Karier states, "for many the myth had apparently worked" (p. 136): Karier reveals the extent of such educational control:

The lower class American adult was, indeed, a product of fifty years of testing. He had been channeled through an intricate bureaucratic educational system which, in the name of meeting individual needs, classified and tracked him into an occupation appropriate to his socio-economic class status. The tragic character of this was not only that the lower class learned to believe in the system, but worse, through internalizing that set of beliefs, made it work. It worked because the lowered self-image which the school and society reinforced on the lower class child did result in lower achievement. (1972, 136)

Testing employs a rationality that is perverted to justify social selection. Testing also serves to direct students into different curricular in elementary schools and into different tracks in secondary schools. Jean Anyon in "Social Class and the Hidden Curriculum" notes the different curricular offered to different social classes and the hidden purposes contained within each curriculum. The working-class schools reveal the strict control exercised by the teacher and the emphasis on the conformity of students to directions

and obedience to commands. Anyon observes that in the working-class schools "work is often evaluated not according to whether it is right or wrong but according to whether the children followed the right steps" (1983, p. 149). The middle class school includes following "directions to get the right answers, but the directions often call for some figuring, some choice, some decision making" (p. 153). Behavior is controlled through rules and consequences. The affluent professional school carries out negotiations with the student in regard to behavior and stresses analyses of correct answers rather than just finding the correct response. In this school, Anyon notes, "work involves individual thought and expressiveness, expansion and illustration of ideas, and choice of appropriate method and material" (p. 155). Use of critical powers of thought for development of minds accelerates as the social class is elevated. Thus in the executive elite school the emphasis is on "developing one's analytical intellectual powers" and on reasoning "through a problem, to produce intellectual products that are both logically sound and of top academic quality" (p. 159). These children in the elite school are not controlled by bells or rules; they learn to control. These are the children of the dominant elites who are being prepared for their leadership roles in the socio-economic world. Anyon notes how different is the curriculum offered to this elite group:

The executive elite school gives its children something that none of the other schools does: knowledge of and practice in manipulating the socially legitimated tools of analysis of

systems. The children are given the opportunity to utilize the intellectually and socially prestigious grammatical, mathematical, and other vocabularies and rules by which elements are arranged. They are given the opportunity to use these skills in the analysis of society and in control situations. Such knowledge and skills are a most important kind of symbolic capital. These are necessary for control of a production system... . Their schooling is helping them to develop the abilities necessary for ownership and control of physical capital and the means of production in society. (1983, p. 165)

The same differentiation of curriculum occurs on the secondary level in the form of tracking. Richard Rothstein reveals that tracking in the high school is an integral part of secondary education in that it serves the interest of the wealthy. The differentiation of curricular occurs on the secondary level for the same economic purpose. Richard Rothstein (1974) in "How Tracing Works" maintains that "tracking is not unique," for it is "similar to other systems whose purpose is to manipulate people to adjust to national economic policies" (p. 64). Tracking then becomes a manipulation of the school systems: "Tracking is the 'American or indirect' way of assigning occupational roles through manipulation of the school systems of the country" (p. 64). Furthermore, "the fundamental principle of the tracking system" is economically based, for "educational opportunities adjust to the needs of the occupation structure and not vice versa" (pp. 64-65). Students have internalized the myth of merit conveyed by hegemonic ideology to the extent that they believe they are assigned to the appropriate track that reflects their ability. In reality, however, these students are assigned to what the dominant class perceives as necessary for the economy, for "track sizes are

proportional to the job openings in the occupation to which these tracks lead" (1974, p. 64). Rothstein links the work opportunities to the different social classes in track assignments. Thus "students are assigned to reading groups, special classes, and special schools on the basis of income, race, and sex" (p. 64). Merit as projected in the myth of education has no influence in this tracking. Rothstein clarifies the illusion of meritocracy in the different curricular offerings for different classes:

The tracking system in American elementary and secondary education is not, however, meritocratic. In addition to the rational occupation channeling function of a meritocratic system, American educational tracking also serves a second function: the maintenance of rigidities in the social class, race and sex role divisions of American society. It is an essential purpose of the tracking system to prevent significant mobility between the rich and the poor, white and black, male and female. Tracks do insure that schools certify students for occupational openings in the required proportion, but they do this by insuring that the "upper" tracks leading to more prestigious occupations have proportionally more white, men, and rich students; and that the "lower" tracks leading to blue collar jobs include proportionally more blacks, women and poor or working class students. (1974, pp. 69-70)

The acceptance of the tracking program and of the testing that supports it as a rational act carries with it a "mystification of power" or a belief that those in power have a "higher knowledge" about the ability of a person than that person can have.

Fred Pincus' observations concerning the practice of tracking corresponds to Anyon's findings concerning the different curricular

in lower-class and elite schools, that is the lower class is easier to control and the elite conceptualize and make decisions. Pincus illuminates the purpose of channeling students into community colleges as one that serves the work force and hence serve the dominant elite in preservation of the ideology. Pincus notes that "an important role of the state in an advanced capitalist society is to promote profit-taking by large corporations through such means as lower labor costs by subsidizing job training through public vocational education." The purpose in shaping social and cultural forces of capitalistic society through education becomes clear in Pincus' assessment that a division of labor will in turn "increase the profits and control workers" (1980, p. 110). In Pincus' research, schools serve to reproduce the social and cultural structure and in doing so they serve the interest of capitalism:

In addition to receiving lower salaries, workers with less knowledge of the production process are easier to control: they are more dependent on others those who conceptualize and direct tasks to make decisions (1980, p. 110)

Although it is a public concept or myth that education serves to shape the future leaders of America, in reality education serves to shape the workers who can adapt to the society and who can serve those in control. Karier in "Business Values and the Educational State" notes that this use of education as an instrument by which the dominant ideology is served:

The school, as a formal vehicle of education, exists as an instrument of social and economic power for the

most influential elite groups as much as for the political and social organization through which the school is managed. (1973, p. 21)

These critics of education have in Freire's sense brought forth educational practices in order to "objectify" them. Only in achieving some distance from a situation can it be seen as a situation that is historical and cultural and hence capable of being changed. Karier moves from position of critic to take a visionary stance of perceiving "dilemma and promise in the present age" that demands a transformation to a "more humane age" in which the "dignity of man" occurs:

American society may yet move from the materialistic spirit of capitalism to a transformation of values. There might still be time and the possibility in the affluent cybernated age of the future to usher in a humane age that will enhance the dignity of man. (Karier, 1973, p. 21)

Pedagogy of Oppression: Banking Concept

It is just such an age that Freire proposes in his pedagogical efforts to provide the means by which mankind can become more fully human. It is toward Karier's perception of "a humane age that will enhance the dignity of man" (p. 30) that Freire devotes his energy and work. Freire gives the totality of the interconnection of education with the social and cultural forces and thus covers the particulars that American critics of education magnify. His insight into the depths of this oppressive reality enables him to focus on

the pedagogical methods and curriculum in Pedagogy of the Oppressed in order to "objectify" that which is regarded as traditional but which is oppressive. To "objectify" in Freire's understanding of liberation is to acquire a distance from a situation so that it can be perceived as a cultural-historical situation and not as a given reality incapable of change.

Freire unveils the nature of the pedagogy of the oppressor as the instrument or the means by which the oppressor class exerts control through a perpetuation of the ideology of domination. All that the oppressor does involves violence, but violence is particularly evident as the basis for a dehumanizing pedagogy. The school is a place where critical inquiry is neglected. Freire maintains that "any situation in which some prevent others from engaging in the process of inquiry is one of violence" (1970/1984, p. 73). The oppressor's pedagogy prohibits inquiry or any experiment in education that concerns critical thought. It is a systematic, narrative education in which the teacher deposits knowledge of his or her choosing into the students. In what Freire calls a "banking concept" of education, the students exist for the teacher. The students are ignorant and justify the existence of the teacher, for only the teacher possesses knowledge. In this method and curriculum, the students are made passive and hence become receptive to their oppressive reality:

In the banking concept of education, knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing. Projecting an

absolute ignorance onto others, a characteristic of the ideology of oppression, negates education and knowledge as processes of inquiry. The teacher presents himself to his students as their necessary opposite; by considering their ignorance absolute, he justifies his own existence. (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 60)

In this oppressor education the more the teacher "fills the receptacles (students), the better a teacher he is"; furthermore, "the more meekly the receptacles permit themselves to be filled, the better students they are" (p. 58). In this banking concept, "the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits." Employing a method of narration which involves a "narrating subject (teacher) and patient, listening objects (students)," the banking concept insures that students become "adaptable, manageable beings" (p. 60). Eventually these students are submerged within the pedagogy and consequently within a "culture of silence" in that they are denied the development of critical thought in order to have an authentic voice. Thus they "echo" the meaningless and irrelevant facts given to them each day. Freire notes how the pedagogy of the oppressor renders the students passive:

The more students work at storing the deposits entrusted to them, the less they develop critical consciousness which would result from their intervention in the world as transformers of the world. The more completely they accept the passive role imposed upon them the more they tend simply to adapt to the world as it is and to the fragmented view of reality deposited in them. (1970/1984, p. 60)

Freire reveals that the pedagogy of the oppressor must of necessity stifle inquiry or the development of critical thought. It is not in the oppressors' interest to have their world revealed:

The capability for banking education to minimize or annul the students' creative power and to stimulate their credulity serves the interests of the oppressors, who care neither to have the world revealed nor to see it transformed. The oppressors use their "humanitarianism" to preserve a profitable situation. Thus they react almost instinctively against any experiment in education which stimulates critical faculties and is not content with a partial view of reality but always seeks out the ties which link one point to another and one problem to another. (1970/1984, p. 60)

Freire expresses what is actually meant by an "educated" person who has been oppressed in development of critical thought. In Freire's view the "educated man is the adapted man" because the individual is "better 'fit' for the world"; furthermore, the concept of banking education suits the "purposes of the oppressors," whose "tranquility rests on how well men fit the world the oppressors have created and how little they question it" (1970/1984, p. 63).

Being passive in this manner results in estrangement from self and from others. It is necessary to note that "violence is initiated by those who oppress, who exploit, who fail to recognize others as persons" (p. 41). The oppressed are passive; they are also alienated and it is in the interest of the oppressors that this alienation occurs. Freire makes clear that it is not in alienation but in solidarity that humans are truly subjects and not objects. That alienation is a part of the classroom is illustrated in an analysis

that corresponds to what Freire detects in the Third World in the violence the oppressed inflict on each other and never on the oppressor:

Anger is always reactive. However, because the teacher is in a politically inaccessible position and because the teacher has formed a dependency relationship against the child, the child cannot risk very easily the teacher's rejection, for to do so would be tantamount to self-rejection, since in a parasitic relationship one's sense of self is unusually contingent upon the other's sense of oneself. Since the child cannot react to the violence of the teacher, i.e. vertical violence, he "displaces" his anger and aggression horizontally. (Pinar, 1975, p. 173)

The pedagogy of the oppressor not only manipulates, alienates, fragments, and dehumanizes students through its transmission of the cultural ideology that serves the interests of the oppressor, but it uses a perverted reason and ideological myths of education to justify, rationalize, and appease. The parallel between Freire's observation of the Third World and the schooling of a free society serves to "objectify" the pedagogy of the oppressor so that it can be perceived as a situation amenable to change. Since both oppressor and oppressed live in the culture which in turn contains oppressive reality, the oppressor cannot liberate. The oppressor who attempts liberation of the oppressed will at best move into a humanitarian approach of false generosity. The oppressed can only liberate themselves. Freire recognizes the difficulty of the oppressed to liberate themselves without the instrument or pedagogy by which they can objectify oppression and emerge from it.

It is to that end that Freire focuses on the traditional practices of the classroom of employing the banking concept of pedagogy as examples of the pedagogy of the oppressor. It is clear that Freire is attempting an objectification process in an universal sense. It cannot be an objectification process in the Third World sense, for Freire is working in a situation where peasants are illiterate and therefore have not been exposed to any pedagogy in the formal context of schooling. Thus in enabling these illiterates to emerge from their situation of limitation, through their recognition of the situation in which they are oppressed as one capable of being transformed and through their recognition of themselves as capable of effecting such transformation, Freire reveals the power of critical thought to objectify the situation and hence enable an individual to gain a recognition that leads to liberation. Freire therefore reveals that the traditional pedagogy of narration that prohibits or discourages the development of critical and reflective thought cannot be used for liberation. In offering what cannot be employed as an instrument by which the oppressed can liberate themselves, Freire at the same time reveals what is the instrument by which oppression is perpetuated. Thus Freire's concerns and messages of a pedagogy for liberation extend beyond the Third World to objectify the pedagogy of the oppressor that limits human development and to foster a recognition that liberation into being more fully human must employ a new pedagogy, one enabling all individuals to become more fully human. It is to this end that Freire creates a pedagogy for liberation.

The universality of oppressive reality must be considered before moving into the philosophical tenets that support Freire's pedagogy for liberation. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed Freire perceives a world of oppressive reality consisting of two classes, that of the oppressor and that of the oppressed. Freire's division of oppressive reality into two classes appears as stark division with deterministic overtones. It immediately formulates the question of how such liberation from this oppressive reality can occur if, as Freire affirms, liberation must arise from the oppressed for the liberation of both oppressor and oppressed but that the oppressed cannot lift themselves from their limited situation because they lack the instrument of critical thought obtainable within the pedagogy of liberation. Moreover, the oppressor cannot liberate the oppressed and has no desire to attempt what is detrimental to a power position. There is further acknowledgement that any attempt of the oppressor to liberate the oppressed degenerates into false humanitarianism. How then is critical thought to develop for liberation? It must be realized that Freire does not offer his division of oppressor and oppressed as an all-inclusive one; he also introduces a third segment of society in his dichotomized world, that of a classless segment of emancipators-educators who teach/learn with others to foster liberation for the oppressed and in this liberation restore to the oppressors the lost humanity they suffer. The emancipator-educator serves as the catalyst, as one who enables the oppressed to recognize oppression in a situation, emerge from it, recognize the changeable quality of oppressive reality, and recognize human potential within to overcome

and transform the limiting situation. Moreover, in Pedagogy in Process, Freire extends the role of emancipator-educator to the oppressors as well. What is of significance here is that the oppressors can be emancipators-educators if the oppressors can "die as a class" and "be reborn in consciousness" so that they are "learning always even while they teach" (Freire, 1978, p. 3). Freire explains how the oppressors can move into a new role of emancipators-educators:

Among these teachers, and especially among those who have taught before, there will always be those who perceive themselves to be "captured" by the old ideology and who will consciously continue to embrace it; they will fall into the practice of undermining, either in a hidden or an open way the new practice. From such persons one cannot hope for any positive action toward the reconstruction of society. But there will be others who, also perceiving themselves to be captive to the old ideology, will nonetheless attempt to free themselves from it through the new practice to which they will adhere. It is possible to work with these persons. They are the ones who "commit class suicide." (Freire, 1978, p. 15)

What is being suggested here is that there must be a new birth into becoming more fully human, of exercising critical thought that transcends class to create and recreate a classless society, one in which there is no oppressed and therefore one in which there can be no oppressor. Freire's vision of mutual recognition and solidarity stems from the power of critical thought.

The development of critical thought fosters ontological development into a "radical form of being" that reflects "beings that not only know but know that they know" (Freire, 1978, p. 24). Knowing focuses not only on the development of critical thought in order to question accepted practices and traditions but also on the role of recognition in engendering liberation. A consideration of the

universality of oppressive reality reveals that in one sense all who exist within this oppressive reality or culture without critical reflection on it and hence without critical recognition of it must therefore participate in it. In other words, not to question but to accept uncritically the hegemonic ideology of existing culture as what is normal and right is to participate in either the oppressor class, the oppressed class, or in both classes. Sharon Welch reveals a participation in both classes in her Communities of Resistance and Solidarity. Welch's critical reflection on her faith and on her situation in terms of that faith leads her to perceive and consequently state, "I am oppressor and oppressed" (Welch, 1985, p. ix). Moreover, Welch's elaboration of this statement reveals how an individual, not a marginal being of the Third World, but one living within a free society without economic oppression, can still participate in an oppressive reality involving both classes of oppression without knowing it until critical reflection objectifies this situation and hence brings recognition to the individual of such participation:

There is another aspect, however, to my experience of faith, one identified by the terms white, middle-class, and American. For me, to be a Christian is to become aware of the degree to which I am a participant in the structures of oppression, structures of race, class, and national identity. As a woman, I am oppressed by the structures of patriarchy. Yet as a white, I benefit from the oppression of people of other races. As a person whose economic level is middle-class, I am both victim and victimizer of others. As an American, I live within a nation whose policies are economically, politically, and environmentally disastrous for far too many of the world's peoples. (Welch, 1985, p. ix)

Freire's purpose in objectifying the pedagogy of the oppressor is to evoke a similar recognition of participating in oppressive reality in educators and within all of those who share a concern for the liberation of the individual into being more fully human but who have not examined the existing pedagogy for its contents of narration and its methods of banking or imparting facts as prohibiting the development of liberating critical thought. Welch furthermore supports Freire's work by affirming that recognition of a situation carries with it a resistance to that situation which in turn generates a movement into emancipation from the oppressive reality of the situation. Welch maintains that "even to resist implies a modicum of liberation and success" and that "domination is not absolute as long as there is protest against it" (1985, p. 39). It is to be remembered that Freire's own recognition of the oppressor's pedagogy as denying the development of critical thought arises from his being placed within the culture of silence and hence exemplifies the power of resistance to such limitation to engender liberation from such a situation. The recognition of what constitutes oppression, that of prohibiting humanity from developing critical thought by which liberation from oppression can occur, stems from a dialectic of Freire's own experience but becomes the impetus for him to extend his understanding of oppression in order to kindle universal recognition of the need for development of critical thought for liberation into becoming more fully human. In other words, when an educator who seeks the best for others and who has a faith in the capability of others to be more than they are, becomes aware or recognizes through

Freire's objectification of oppressor pedagogy of just what occurs when the banking concept of education is employed or the development of critical thought is omitted, then the educator of any culture is in the Freirean sense able to emerge from an unquestioned acceptance and utilization of traditional educational practices to become an emancipator-educator as well.

Thus both Welch and Freire, in their questioning of existing reality that brings recognition of the situation, resistance to its continuance, and liberation from its influence, indicate the powerful effects of critical thought to liberate self and others from oppression. In this respect, critical thought enables all who participate in such examination of a situation and of the self's limitation in that situation to emerge from that existing reality as one capable of effecting change in both situation and self. Freire is thus correct in projecting two classes of oppressive reality and in offering critical thought as the instrument of the pedagogy for liberation, for in the concept of critical thought lies the promise that there can arise another segment of society, that of those who belong to no class but who perceive that reality is, as Freire expresses it, "an ongoing process" and that education is "an ongoing process" as well. Education then extends for Freire beyond the classroom of the Third World to that in a free society; moreover, it extends beyond a formal classroom to be a universal part of the creative and recreative efforts of humankind to move into a more just and more ethical society and into the ontological vocation of "being more fully human."

When Freire moves from his general analysis of marginality submerged within a director society in Cultural Reform for Freedom (1970) to a more personal but yet more universal expansion of oppression in Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1973), and furthermore into an even more inclusive definition of emancipator in Pedagogy in Process (1978), Freire moves into a universal concern with ontological development of humanity that is connected with the act of knowing. In this movement, he joins others who share a similar concern for the individual's "ontological vocation to be more fully human" (1973, p. 13) and with those who equally perceive the development into fullness of being as contingent on the act of knowing. Thus for an understanding of what the implications are for Freire's pedagogy of liberation for ontological development through liberation of consciousness or knowing, it is necessary to turn to Freud's understanding of the act of knowing in terms of the unconscious and the oppression occurring within it and to Hegel's understanding of the act of knowing in terms of what educating the consciousness for liberation involves for both individual and for society. Freud and Hegel not only share a kinship in their ontological and epistemological concerns but both lend substance and depth to philosophical tenets of Freire's liberation pedagogy.

INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTERS II AND III

Chapters II and III expand Freire's ontological concern for liberation of the individual into fuller being by providing Hegelian and Freudian insights into the facets of liberation that in turn illuminate the philosophical basis for Freire's praxis. Freire's own account of his praxis reveals in full how he initiates his pedagogy for liberation so that the individual submerged within the oppressive reality can emerge from this existing reality through a recognition of it as a limiting situation that can be changed and of the potential within the self to bring about such transformation for self and society or reality. Chapters II and III, however, provide additional support for Freire's praxis through an elaboration on what is involved in the act of knowing on conscious and unconscious levels, what is the true nature of the dialectic, and what the praxis holds for creation and recreation of both self and situation. Chapters II and III thus address concerns that perhaps arise in examining Freire's praxis, questions indicated by the following: how can the dialectic, revealed by Freire as an interaction between the individual and the limiting situation, create a new awareness of the self as capable of effecting change in both self and society; how is it assumed that such creation or change will result in a more ethical, more just, and more emancipated self and society; how is it that such transformation necessitates that the pedagogy of liberation be an ongoing process; and furthermore, how can the depth of oppressive reality that has garnered strength and endurance through eons of existing

ideological beliefs and cultural practices be dissipated by praxis. It is in the next two chapters of this study that these concerns are developed, but it is the purpose of this introduction to provide an overview of how Chapters II and III are related to this development.

Chapter II turns to Freud, a scholar, scientist, and humanist of the twentieth century, placed within the context of psychoanalysis, who conveys the depths to which oppressive reality extends and the limiting effect on the development of being that it inflicts. Freud recognizes the conflicting forces within the soul of an individual and the oppressive consequences of civilization on the individual that must be considered when speaking of enabling an individual to liberate himself or herself into fuller being. Freud clarifies the nature of oppression inflicted by civilization as an unconscious force that limits full expression of being without the individual's awareness of its existence. Freud thus contributes to an understanding of the nature of oppression; at the same time Freud reveals that by bringing into recognition these unknown forces, the individual is enabled to begin an emergence from these inner oppressive forces into a liberation of a fuller and hence more integrated being.

Chapter III turns to Hegel, a philosopher of the nineteenth century, placed within the context of German Idealism, who conveys the creative power and force of the dialectic and thus lends significance to Freire's dialectic that enables individuals interacting with their environments in dialectic to create and recreate self and society. That a better self and situation must emerge from this dialectic, as Freire proposes, becomes clearer through Hegel's concept of the spiritual force of truth and reason inherent in the very nature of the dialectic.

CHAPTER II

FREUD: OPPRESSION AND LIBERATION OF THE SOUL

This chapter focuses on Freud's perception of the soul as consisting of the rational processes of the conscious, the dark passions and impulses of the unconscious, and the oppressive authority of the super-ego. A section is devoted to Hegel, for there is a kindred insight concerning the unconscious dimensions of the soul that Freud and Hegel share. Hegel's analysis of the soul's formation and of its contents lends support and insight to Freud's understanding of the primal energy residing within the unconscious that seeks expression but is repressed by the rational ego. Freud's work is directed toward the repression that exists within the unconscious of the id when the ego repulses it and thus limits and often distorts the individual's development of being. Psychoanalytical examination of inner forces becomes for Freud the critical thinking that makes what is unknown in the unconscious and hence uncontrollable become known and thus integrated into the rational processes. While Hegel perceives in the Feeling Soul the nature and possibilities of the contents within the unconscious, it is Freud who perceives the seething passions of the id that, if repressed or diverted from expression, turn upon the individual and prevent the individual's becoming more fully human. It becomes clear that the inner and often dark forces must be brought forth, examined, and liberated into integration with the rational processes, that the pedagogy for liberation or for enabling an

individual to become more fully human, must take into consideration this deeper oppression within the individual. Critical thought must turn to the self and examine what is dark and unknown because if this force is denied integration into being, it will seek its expression in irrational acts and fears and physical symptoms that limit the individual from becoming more fully human. When, however, this primal energy is integrated and the flow of being is unimpeded, the individual finds in this primal force the passions and energy to evolve into the fullest expression of being human. There can be no movement into this realm if the individual is alienated from the inner world and fragmented in being by powerful conflicts within. Thus Freud's insights are necessary for this study to gain a full understanding of what is involved in speaking of the pedagogy of liberation. To understand what Freud knows concerning the structure and nature of the soul, it is necessary to turn to Bruno Bettelheim. Bettelheim's reading of Freud is not only accomplished by knowing the nuances and subtleties of the original language but is also a reading of one who shares the same culture as Freud. Thus when Bettelheim illumines Freud's allusion, word choices, and metaphors, he also illumines the compassion arising from Freud and permeating his works.

Freudian Concepts: Bettelheim's Translation

Freud's great compassion for humankind, his concern for the ontological development of humanity into fuller being, and his stress on knowing the self on both conscious and unconscious levels are conveyed in Bruno Bettelheim's Freud and Man's Soul. Bettelheim reveals the meaning Freud intends to convey in his concepts but which

are not contained through translations from another language and another culture. Bettelheim, however, shares both language and culture and can therefore restore to Freud's metaphors the potency they have in the original writing. Bettelheim reveals that Freud carefully chooses metaphors and words to evoke responses within the reader on intellectual and emotional levels, thus stirring both conscious and unconscious memories. Moreover, Bettelheim conveys the personal nature of Freud's insights by revealing that Freud shares with his readers the journey of the soul he himself undergoes so that the readers may find a similar courage to make a spiritual journey within, a journey of self-discovery that holds as its destination a freedom from the controlling or oppressive forces within. Bettelheim observes how Freud's personal approach is a compassionate effort, becoming in one sense that of a soul sharing with other souls:

In the Interpretation of Dreams (1900), which opened to our understanding not just the meaning of dreams but also the nature and power of the unconscious, Freud told about his arduous struggle to achieve ever greater self-awareness. In other books, he told why he felt it necessary for the rest of us to do the same. In a way, all his writings are gentle, persuasive, often brilliantly worded intimations that we, his readers, would benefit from a similar spiritual journey of self-discovery. (1983, p. 4)

Bettelheim illuminates as well how deeply Freud's ontological concerns resonate with those of Freire and Hegel, for in Freud's concern for "the individual's becoming more human in emerging from the dark, unknown forces" (1983, p. 4), Freud seeks to enable the individual through psychoanalytical thinking to liberate the self from limitations deeply rooted within the unconscious:

Freud showed us how the soul could become aware of itself. To become acquainted with the lowest depth of the soul--to explore whatever personal hell we may suffer from--is not an easy undertaking. Freud's findings and, even more, the way he presents them to us give us the confidence that this demanding and potentially dangerous voyage of self-discovery will result in our becoming more fully human, so that we may no longer be enslaved without knowing it to the dark forces that reside in us. (1983, p. 4)

Bettelheim proffers a rare gift of Freudian insight to those of humanity who seek to understand the energies of the soul in order to integrate primal and rational energy for fullness of being. Bettelheim's presentation of Freud's insights into the workings of the soul refute the scientific, detached, and often mechanical aspects of a psychoanalysis that leans toward behavior adjustment and ignores the conflicts of the soul. Bettelheim's reference to a meeting of the American Psychological Association reveals the emphasis of adjustment American psychoanalysts uphold. According to Bettelheim, "one of America's foremost psychologists" affirmed that "of all the features of Freudian theory, the mechanisms of adjustment had become the most widely accepted in the United States" (1983, p. 40). Bettelheim's assessment that this statement reveals the "nature of American acceptance of psychoanalysis" because "Freud cared little about 'adjustment' and did not consider it valuable" (1983, p. 40) is also an assessment of the American culture. In all that Freire charges about the pedagogy of the oppressor, there is always the emphasis on the adjusted or adapted individual that has been shaped by the oppressor pedagogy. Bettelheim is thus correct in noting that a tendency toward adjustment reflects the values of the culture:

What is true, and what this American spokesman for psychoanalysis should have said is that the concept of adjustment was injected into the Freudian system because it was of primary importance in the American psychoanalysts' scheme of values, and that this alteration explains the widespread acceptance of psychoanalysis in America. If American psychoanalysts had shared Freud's concern for the soul and his disregard for adaptation or adjustment to the requirements of society, then the history of psychoanalysis in the United States would be entirely different, since psychoanalysis would have had to transcend the narrow confines of medicine. (1983, p. 40)

Not only does Bettelheim discern misconceptions of Freud's work in psychoanalysis but he also perceives misinterpretations of Freud's words and concepts in the English translations. Bettelheim therefore feels an urgency to break his silence of forty years to speak the truth concerning Freudian concepts and practices because there is very little time left to those who are both capable, in that they have the same nourishment of culture and language, and desirous, in that they feel the promptings of the soul to rectify what often becomes grave errors in translation:

Most of the people who lived in Freud's Vienna, and became familiar with his thoughts in that place and time, either have died or are now in their seventies or eighties, approaching the end of their lives. If, therefore, the mistranslations with which the Standard Edition unfortunately abounds are ever to be corrected by someone who shared Freud's cultural background and is closely acquainted with the language as Freud himself used it, it must be done now. That is why I have at last overcome the reluctance I have felt for so long. (1983, p. ix)

Bettelheim's work contributes to the focus of this study, for in clarifying and often redefining Freudian terms and the concepts they convey, Bettelheim reveals at the same time Freud's "deeply humane" nature that perceives the "guiding principle" of psychoanalysis as that of knowing the soul:

The guiding principle of psychoanalysis is that knowing oneself requires knowing also one's unconscious and dealing with it, so that its unrecognized pressures will not lead one to act in a way detrimental to oneself and others. (1983, p. 24)

Freud, like Hegel and Freire, perceives freedom of being as arising from the individual's own efforts and not as a quality or state that can be given to an individual. It must be understood that Freud perceives psychoanalytical thinking as the instrument of pedagogy by which the individual is able to liberate himself or herself from inner oppression. In this sense of enabling the individual to win liberation, psychoanalysis functions as a midwife:

To characterize the function of the analyst--someone who could greatly facilitate the emergence of a new personality, making the process of the change a safe one--Freud often used the simile of the midwife. As the midwife neither creates the child nor decides what he will be but only helps the mother to give birth to him safely, so the psychoanalyst can neither bring the new personality into being nor determine what it ought to be; only the person who is analyzing himself can make himself over. (Bettelheim, 1983, p. 36)

Freud facilitates the liberation of the individual from the inner oppression by seeking to communicate with the soul on both the unconscious and conscious levels. To this end he chooses his words with care. Bettelheim reveals that Freud's "use of the German language was not only masterly but often poetic" (1983, p. 4) and that in seeking the "mot juste," Freud's communication affects emotional and intellectual levels. Consequently, mistranslations or "clumsy substitutions and inexact use of language" become "all the more damaging to his ideas":

Deprived of the right word or the appropriate phrasing, Freud's thoughts become not merely coarse or oversimplified but seriously distorted. Slipshod translations deprive his words of some or most of the subtle sensory tones and allusion that he deliberately

evoked to permit the reader to understand what he had in mind, and to respond not only on an intellectual level but on an emotional one--not merely with the conscious mind but also with the unconscious mind. Only by comprehending his writings on both levels is it possible to grasp Freud's full meaning, all its subtlety and richness, and this is crucial for a correct understanding of psychoanalysis. (1983, p. 9)

It is in using metaphors that Freud conveys his concepts of psychoanalysis. As Bettelheim explains, Freud's metaphors connect "the hard facts to which psychoanalysis refers and the imaginative manner in which it explains them," for metaphors speak in symbols, the language of the unconscious:

Because of repression, or the influence of censorship, the unconscious reveals itself in symbols or metaphors, and psychoanalysis, in its concern with the unconscious, tries to speak about it in its own metaphoric language. (1983, pp. 37-38)

Moreover, metaphors provoke a depth of response:

Finally, metaphors are more likely than a purely intellectual statement to touch a human chord and arouse our emotions, and thus give us a feeling for what is meant. A true comprehension of psychoanalysis requires not only an intellectual realization but a simultaneous emotional response; neither alone will do. A well-chosen metaphor will permit both. (Bettelheim, 1983, p. 38)

Bettelheim affirms the necessity of the metaphor "soul" to denote Freud's deep ontological concerns for humankind:

His greatest concern was with man's innermost being, to which he most frequently referred through the use of a metaphor--man's soul--because the word "soul" evokes so many emotional connotations. It is the greatest shortcoming of the current English version of his works that they give no hint of this. (1983, p. xi)

Bettelheim furthermore reveals that the omission of the metaphor "soul" in English translations impoverishes the students of Freud who study his works in translation:

In his work and in his writings, Freud often spoke of the soul--of its nature and structure, its development, its attributes, how it reveals itself in all we do and dream. Unfortunately, nobody who reads him in English could guess this, because nearly all of his many references to the soul and to matters pertaining to the soul, have been excised in translation. (1983, p. 4)

Bettelheim also observes that the omission of the central metaphor "soul" and the "erroneous or inadequate translation of many of the most important original concepts of psychoanalysis" (1983, p. 5) make "Freud's direct and always deeply personal appeals" to "common humanity" appear "to readers of English as abstract, depersonalized, highly theoretical, erudite, and mechanized--in short, 'scientific'--statements about the strange and very complex workings" of the mind:

Instead of instilling a deep feeling for what is most human in all of us, the translations attempt to lure the reader into developing a "scientific" attitude toward man and his actions, a "scientific" understanding of the unconscious and how it conditions much of our behavior. (1983, p. 5)

Bettelheim does not base his observation on his reading of Freud exclusively, but also he refers to his experiences as director of the University of Chicago's Orthogenic School, for disturbed children, where he notes the staff members "were well read in Freud" and "were convinced they had made his ideas their own"; yet, their work was based on readings of Freud in translation that had not included the metaphor of soul and all it implies. Bettelheim observes that this translation without the metaphor of soul reduces psychoanalysis to an impersonal and scientific theory:

The considerable theoretical understanding of unconscious processes which they had acquired from studying Freud remained exactly that: theoretical. It was of little use in helping children afflicted by severe psychiatric disorders; often it was even an impediment. It was a

reasoned-out, emotionally distant understanding. (1983, p. 5)

Bettelheim makes clear that what was needed in this work was an understanding of the soul, an understanding not conveyed in the English translation:

What was needed was emotional closeness based on immediate sympathetic comprehension of all aspects of the child's soul--of what afflicted it, and why. What was needed was what Freud occasionally spoke of explicitly but much more implicitly: a spontaneous sympathy of our unconscious with that of others, a feeling response of our soul to theirs. (1983, p. 5)

Bettelheim can therefore declare that the metaphor "soul" and not its usual translation of mind or mental apparatus is central to an understanding of psychoanalysis and of Freud's humanism:

Of all the mistranslations of Freud's phraseology, none has hampered our understanding of his humanistic views more than the elimination of his references to the soul (die Seele). (1983, p. 70)

Freud uses the metaphor of soul to indicate all aspects of knowing, as conveyed in the following passage in which Bettelheim observes that Freud's use of soul not only denotes different dimensions of knowing but also reveals what contains the essence of humanity:

And in The Question of Lay Analysis, where he is conceptualizing the workings of the unconscious, and distinguishing the functions of the it, the I, and the above-I, he uses the term "soul" to describe what he regards as the overarching concept that takes in all the others. It seems natural to Freud to speak of man's soul. By evoking the image of the soul and all its associations, Freud is emphasizing our common humanity. Unfortunately, even in these crucial passages the translations make us believe that he is talking about our mind, our intellect. This is particularly misleading because we often view our intellectual life as set apart from--and even opposed to--our emotional life, the life of our fantasies and dreams. (1983, p. 71)

It is necessary to include at least one example of Bettelheim's comparison of words used by Freud and words used in an English translation. The passage is a crucial one in that the translation seriously distorts the connotation of soul and the original conveys Freud's important explanation of psychoanalysis as "treatment originating in the soul" and not treatment of the manifestation of the soul. The following is Bettelheim's translation that reveals Freud's intention in the original passage:

As early as 1905, in the opening passage of an article entitled "Psychical Treatment (Treatment of the Soul)," he wrote:

"Psyche" is a Greek word and its German translation is "soul." One could thus think that what is meant is: treatment of the morbid phenomena in the life of the soul. But this is not the meaning of the term. Psychical treatment wishes to signify, rather, treatment originating in the soul, treatment--of psychic or bodily disorders--by measures which influence above all and immediately the soul of man. (1983, pp. 73-74)

Bettelheim then presents the English translation of this passage which substitutes "mind" for "soul" and thereby renders impersonal what is personal in the original:

In the Standard Edition, the title of the paper is given as "Psychical (or Mental) Treatment," and the passage is translated:

"Psyche" is a Greek word which may be translated "mind." Thus "psychical treatment" means "mental treatment." The term might accordingly be supposed to signify "treatment" of the pathological phenomena of mental life. This, however, is not its meaning. "Psychical treatment" denotes, rather, treatment taking its start in the mind, treatment (whether of mental or physical disorders) by measures which operate in the first instance and immediately upon the human mind. (1983, p. 74)

Bettelheim's objection to the substitution of "mind" for "soul" becomes even clearer in his revelation that "soul" in German conveys spiritual richness that is in no way connected to the religious

connotation present "in common American usage" where the word "soul" is "more or less restricted to the sphere of religion" (1983, p. 76).

Bettelheim reveals that "in German the word Seele has retained its full meaning as man's essence, as that which is most spiritual and worthy in man" (1983, p. 76).

Since Freud chooses words with care for the meanings or symbols they convey, his choice of the Greek term "psyche" becomes significant in rendering the full meaning of soul. Bettelheim's observations reveal another aspect of the soul, that of fragility:

He knew that Psyche was depicted as young and beautiful, and as having the wings of a bird or a butterfly. Birds and butterflies are symbols of the soul in many cultures, and serve to emphasize its transcendental nature. These symbols invested the word "psyche" with connotations of beauty, fragility, and insubstantiality--ideas we still connect with the soul--and they suggest the great respect, care, and consideration with which Psyche had to be approached, because any other approach would violate, even destroy her. Respect, care and consideration are attitudes that psychoanalysis, too, requires. (1983, pp. 14-15)

These insights that Bettelheim provides into the meaning of soul as Freud uses the term make clear that Freud speaks of more than the reasoning part of the mind and that to accept this limitation of essence is to disregard, as Bettelheim maintains, "the nonthinking it, the irrational world of the unconscious and of the emotions" (1983, p. 76). Moreover, as Bettelheim further explains, the word "soul" includes depths beyond what is consciously known:

The idea of the soul, by contrast, definitely includes much of which we are not consciously aware. Freud wanted to make clear that psychoanalysis was concerned not just with man's body and his intellect, as his medical colleagues were, but--and most of all--with the dark world of the unconscious which forms such a large part of the soul of living man--or, to put it in classical terms, with that unknown netherworld in

which, according to ancient myths, the souls of men dwell.
(1983, p. 77)

Bettelheim notes that "nowhere in his writings does Freud give us a precise definition of the term 'soul'" because to provide a clinical definition would rob "it of its value as an expression of Freud's thinking" (1983, p. 77). Bettelheim perceives that the many connotations emanating from the term "soul" reflect its complexity and ambiguity:

I suspect that he chose the term because of its inexactitude, its emotional resonance. Its ambiguity speaks for the ambiguity of the psyche itself, which reflects many different, warring levels of consciousness simultaneously. (1983, p. 77)

In noting the complexity of the soul, Bettelheim observes that "by 'soul' or 'psyche' Freud means that which is most valuable" in an individual for the "soul is the seat both of the mind and of the passions" (1983, p. 77). An individual remains "largely unconscious of the soul"; yet it is the essence of what makes an individual human:

In important respects, it is intangible, but it nevertheless exercises a powerful influence on our lives. It is what makes us human; in fact, it is what is so essentially human about us that no other term could equally convey what Freud had in mind. (1983, pp. 77-78)

Bettelheim records the goal of psychoanalysis as one of integrating "the emotional life into the intellectual life" (1983, p. 71).

Bettelheim also includes a passage in which he translates what Freud himself declares as the goal of psychoanalysis, a goal that reveals Freud's emphasis on making the unconscious conscious or the unknown known for integration of soul with resulting fuller development of being:

As he wrote in a famous passage in the New Introductory Lectures, the purpose of psychonalysis is "to strengthen the I, to make it more independent of the above-I, to widen its field of perception and to extend its organization so that it can appropriate to itself new portions of the it," and he added, "Where it was, there should become I" (1983, p. 106).

Freud especially reveals a kinship with Hegel in this last statement, for the "I" is the rational aspect of soul and the "it" the unconscious or emotional or unknown aspect. When Hegel's education of consciousness enables the soul to move to the level of Reason, of Absolute Knowing, the "it" is completely integrated into the "I." Freud is therefore concerned with knowing in the sense that the soul can "become aware of itself" (1983, p. 4) and thus "no longer be enslaved without knowing it to the dark forces that reside within" but can make the "it" become the "I." It is this knowing that can result in integration of the "it" with the "I" and further result in the individual's "becoming more fully human" (1983, p. 4). Bettelheim observes that fullness of being develops from making the unknown known:

Freud's statement in the New Introductory Lectures was meant to indicate that in some instances, with respect to certain aspects of life that have been previously dominated entirely or largely by the it, the I ought to exercise its constructive influence and successfully control the undesirable outcroppings of the it. (1983, p. 62)

The significance for this study is that Freud works to liberate the soul from oppression and to integrate the unconscious and conscious so that development of being results. Hegel confirms what Freud does but moves from the initial integration to reveal how the rich primal energy of life and the spiritual essence can become a force for fullness of being when expanded and developed through the education of consciousness.

Before moving into the development of the id or it, the ego or I, and the super-ego or above-I, it must be stated that Bettelheim does not translate works of Freud; he only translates passages that contain key concepts and offers definitions nearer the meaning Freud originally intends. It is therefore necessary in this study to rely on English translations and to include Bettelheim's insights concerning Freud's intention when such references are available.

Freudian Id

Freud discovers the unconscious through working with what is repressed within the unconscious. His theory of "dynamic unconscious" evolves when he moves from the inadequacies of hypnosis in freeing unconscious thought to the method of using association of ideas or what is usually called "free association." In this method Freud discovers the processes of the unconscious that explain the formidable power of the complex to influence conduct. Freud creates three divisions of id, ego, and super-ego. In essence, however, there is only the id and the ego and super-ego are differentiations of the id. The id is the primal energy that accompanies the child at birth and is perceived by Freud as an unorganized chaotic mentality that seeks gratification of all needs but primarily those of hunger, self-preservation, and love. Freud's naming of the unconscious as the "id" needs to be included here in that Freud's explanation of his choice indicates to some measure his regard for this force and his understanding of its nature. Freud announces in The Ego and the Id that he is "following the suggestion of a writer who, from personal motives, vainly asserts that he has nothing to do with the rigours of pure science" (1923, p. 123). Freud is here

referring to George Groddeck, an author with whom Freud shares sympathetic views. The following explanation reveals the interpretation Freud places on the id:

I am here speaking of George Groddeck, who is never tired of insisting that what we call our ego behaves essentially passively in life, and that, as he expresses it, we are "lived" by unknown and uncontrollable forces. We have all had the impressions of the same kind, even though they may not have overwhelmed us to the inclusion of all others, and we need feel no hesitation in finding a place for Groddeck's discovery in the nature of science. I propose to take it into account by calling the entity which starts out from the system Pcpt. (perceptual system) and begins by being Pcs. (preconscious) the "ego," and by following Groddeck in calling the other part of the mind into which this entity extends and which behaves as though it were Ucs. (unconscious), the "id." (1923/1962, p. 13)

Bettelheim's explanation of what Freud intends by calling the unconscious the "id" is vital at this point for clarifying the personal aspects of the unconscious:

In naming two of the concepts, Freud chose words that are among the first words used by every German child. To refer to the unknown, unconscious contents of the mind, he chose the personal pronoun "it" (es) and used it as a noun (das Es). (1983, p. 53)

Bettelheim notes that the Latin equivalent of "id" in English translations does not connote what "it" does in German. The "it" is filled with emotional significance:

Still, even "the it" does not have the full emotional impact that das Es has in the original German. In German, the word "child" (das Kind) is of neuter gender. During their early years, all Germans have the experience of being referred to by means of the neuter pronoun es. This fact gives the phrase das Es a special feeling, reminding the German reader that this is how he was referred to before he learned to repress many of his sexual, aggressive, and otherwise asocial impulses, before he felt guilty or ashamed because of them, before he felt an obligation to resolve contradictions and bring logical order into his thoughts; in short, it reminds him of a time when his entire existence was dominated

by the it. These memories, even when he is not conscious of them permit a much more immediate empathy with what Freud meant when he used this term for the unconscious. (1983, p. 57)

Moreover, the force of this "it" often renders the individual incapable of controlling what is occurring so that the individual is, as Groddeck observes, "passively lived." Bettelheim's explanation of the nature of this force upon actions of the individual makes clear why Freud refers to Groddeck's observation of "unknown and uncontrollable forces" in naming this force the "it":

For example, when we say, "I went there," we know exactly what we were doing and why we did it. But when we say, "It pulled me in that direction," we express the feeling that something in us--we don't know what--forced us to behave in a certain way. When a person suffering from depression says "It got me again" or "It makes life unbearable!" he gives clear expression to his feeling that neither his intellect nor his conscious mind nor his will accounts for what is happening to him--that he has been overcome by forces within him which are beyond his ken and his control. (1983, p. 57)

Freud's description of the id, as contained in the English translation of The Ego and the Id, does not convey this personal or emotional connotation, but Bettelheim's insight into what Freud intends in naming the unconscious the "it" enables the reader of an English translation to keep in awareness what Freud means. Freud proposes a topographical description of the id in which the individual is regarded as a "psychical id, unknown and unconscious" (Freud, 1923/1962, p. 14). Upon the surface of this id "rests the ego, developed from its nucleus the Pcpt. system" (p. 14). Freud makes very clear that the ego does not cover the id but rests upon it as "the germinal disc rests upon the ovum" (p. 14). The ego has emerged from the id but remains a part of it: "The ego is not sharply separated

from the id; its lower portion merges into it" (1923/1962, p. 14). The material which the ego suppresses or represses as threatening becomes, then, a part of the id. The id is not therefore the repressed, for the "repressed merges into the id... and is merely a part of it" (p. 14). Although the repressed is a part of the id, it is separated from the ego: "The repressed is only cut off sharply from the ego by the resistance of repression; it can communicate with the ego through the id" (1923/1962, p. 14).

It becomes clear that the initial belief in the unconscious as that which is repressed must be expanded to include much of what controls the individual's life. Freud discovers that not only is there the unconscious that encloses the repressed as a small part but that the ego itself also has an unconscious:

We recognize that the Ucs. does not coincide with the repressed; it is still true that all that is repressed is Ucs., but not all that is Ucs. is repressed. A part of the ego, too--Heaven knows how important a part--may be Ucs., undoubtedly is Ucs. And this Ucs. belonging to the ego is not latent like the Pcs.; for if it were, it could not be activated without becoming Cs., and the process of making it conscious would not encounter such great difficulties. When we find ourselves thus confronted by the necessity of postulating a third Ucs., which is not repressed, we must admit that the characteristic of being unconscious begins to lose significance for us. It becomes a quality which can have many meanings.... (1923/1962, p. 8)

Ego Development

Freud makes clear in The Ego and the Id (1923) that all libido or sexual energy is initially located in the id: "At the very beginning, all the libido is accumulated in the id, while the ego is still in the process of formation or is still feeble" (1923/1962, p. 36). It is

to be remembered that the id, composed of primal energy, seeks expression through the pleasure principle of gratifying desires of hunger, love, and self-preservation. As the child grows physically and becomes aware of the environment through a development of the senses and at the same time becomes aware of the inexorable reality of the environment, this part of the awareness of the id is modified into the ego. Bettelheim indicates the personal element of the ego and its intricate relationship with the id. Bettelheim reveals that Freud's "it" gains its "full impact" when it is understood that Freud defines "these two concepts for the first time, as counterparts of each other" (1983, p. 53). Moreover, Bettelheim cites the removal of the personal element inherent in the pronoun "I" when this pronoun is replaced by the term "ego":

No word has greater and more intimate connotations than the pronoun "I." It is one of the most frequently used words in spoken language--and, more important, it is the most personal word. To mistranslate Ich as "ego" is to transform it into jargon that no longer conveys the personal commitment we make when we say "I" or "me"--not to mention our subconscious memories of the deep emotional experience we had when, in infancy, we discovered ourselves as we learned to say "I." (1983, pp. 53-54)

Moreover, in addition to this distancing of the "I," there is also the "pejorative" connotation of the usage of ego in present-day language:

The word "ego" was used in the English language in a number of ways long before Freud's translators introduced it as a psychoanalytic concept. These uses, which are still part of the living language, are all perjorative, such as "egoism," "egoistic," and "egotism." (A slang expression of more recent origin--"ego trip" is also pejorative.) This is likewise true of their German cognates--the noun Egoist and the adjective egoistisch. Freud, like all German-speaking people, was, of course, familiar with the derogatory connotation of selfishness that the root "ego" evokes. (Bettelheim, 1983, p. 54)

As has already been stated, Freud uses words with care, seeking those that will evoke an intellectual and an emotional response within the reader. Thus Bettelheim's explanation that the German "Ich" is invested with stronger and deeper personal meaning than the English 'I' conveys how deep is the personal expression of Ich:

When a speaker of English wishes to emphasize personal commitment, he is apt to use "me" rather than "I." For example, he'll say, "That is me," whereas in German one would use "I," as in "Ich bin es, der spricht" ("That's me talking"). (1983, p. 55)

Moreover, assertiveness of the "I" is not conveyed by the term "ego," as Bettelheim reveals in noting that the "I" speaks of a "total personality":

The assertiveness we often feel when we say "I" is an image of how the person's I tries to assert its will over what in the translations are called the "id" and "superego" and over the external world. This image gets lost when we talk about an ego. When I say "I," I mean my entire self, my total personality. Freud, it is true, made an important distinction here. What he called the "I" refers primarily to the conscious, rational aspects of oneself. In a way, we know that we are not always reasonable and do not always act rationally; psychoanalysis, more than any other discipline, makes us aware of the irrational, unconscious aspects of our mind. So, when Freud names the reasonable, conscious aspects of our mind the I, we feel subtly flattered that our real I is what we value most highly in ourselves. It gives us the intuitive feeling that Freud is right to name the I what we feel to be our true self, even though we know that we do not always act in line with that self. (1983, p. 56)

Bettelheim also notes that the "I" as a choice of words to depict the rational aspect of the mind tends to win the determination of the individual over to the conquering of irrational forces, thus the choice of "I" promotes integration:

In a subtle way, this choice of name for the conscious aspects of our mind strengthens our determination to win the battle against the chaos caused by the irrational in

us. During psychoanalytic treatment, that determination--that siding of the patient's I with the efforts of the therapist--alone can lead to success in dealing with the dark forces within us. The I, more than any other term of psychoanalysis, encourages us to make the unconscious become conscious and to think psychoanalytically. (1983, p. 56)

Moreover, Bettelheim demonstrates his point about Freud's choice of "I" with examples of how the "whole being" is conveyed in the "I":

We find it easy to say, "I won't any longer be run by my irrational anxieties" and when we say it after becoming acquainted with psychoanalytic thinking we know that this I about which we speak is essentially only our conscious mind, which tries to control the anxious outcroppings of our unconscious. Nobody can say, "My ego won't any longer be run by irrational anxieties," and mean it. When we say, "I'm trying to understand why I did this," our whole being is involved in the effort, although we know that it is our rational mind alone that is trying to understand why some unconscious pressure made us do something. (1983, p. 56)

It is with this understanding of how the I struggles with the irrational and impulsive actions of the it that this study turns to the struggle between ego (I) and the it (id) that Freud describes in his The Ego and the Id. Freud stresses that the ego mediates between the inner world of the organism and the outer world of civilization so that "no external vicissitudes can be experienced or undergone by the id, except by way of the ego, which is the representative of the outer world to the id" (1923/1962, p. 29). Immediately there is a struggle between the pleasure principle of the id and the reality principle of the ego:

Moreover the ego seeks to bring the influence of the external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies, and endeavours to substitute the reality principle for the pleasure principle which reigns unrestrictedly in the id. (Freud, 1923/1962, p. 15)

Freud's explanation that the "ego represents what may be called reason and common sense, in contrast to the id, which contains the passions" (1923/1962, p. 15), needs at this point a fuller treatment. What Freud means by passions or the pleasure principle is conveyed in his Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920/1961) as a matter of lowering tension:

In the theory of psycho-analysis we have no hesitation in assuming that the course taken by mental events is automatically regulated by the pleasure principle. We believe, that is to say, that the course of those events is invariably set in motion by an unpleasurable tension, and that it takes a direction such that its final outcome coincides with a lowering of that tension--that is, with an avoidance of unpleasure or production of pleasure. (p. 1)

This pursuit of the id for pleasure becomes more involved when it is understood that the complexity of the mental processes supports only an inclination toward pleasure that is opposed by other factors:

It must be pointed out, however, that strictly speaking it is incorrect to talk of the dominance of the pleasure principle over the course of mental processes. If such a dominance existed, the immense majority of our mental processes would have to be accompanied by pleasure or to lead to pleasure, whereas universal experience completely contradicts any such conclusion. At the most that can be said, therefore, is that there exists in the mind a strong tendency toward the pleasure principle, but that the tendency is opposed by certain other forces or circumstances, so that the final outcome cannot always be in harmony with the tendency toward pleasure. (Freud, 1920/1961, p. 4)

When the ego uses "reason and common sense" against the id, the ego is seeking self-preservation by employing the reality principle. The reality principle does not seek to eradicate pleasure but rather seeks an indirect route for its expression:

This latter principle does not abandon the intention of ultimately obtaining pleasure, but it nevertheless demands and carries into effect the postponement of satisfaction,

the abandonment of a number of possibilities of gaining satisfaction and the temporary toleration of unpleasure as a step on the long indirect road to pleasure. (Freud, 1920/1961, p. 4)

The ego curbs any impulse of the id that is in conflict with the dictates of the environment as the ego perceives it. In this struggle the flow of being from the primal energy of the id is repressed; when the ego feels those drives or impulses that are in agreement with the ego's concept of reality, then those drives are permitted to "combine into the inclusive unity of the ego" in its development:

Almost all the energy with which the apparatus is filled arises from its innate instinctual impulses. But these are not allowed to reach the same phases of development. In the course of things it happens again and again that the individual instincts or parts of instincts turn out to be incompatible in their aim or demands with the remaining ones, which are able to combine into the inclusive unity of the ego. The former are then split off from this unity by the process of repression, held back at lower levels of psychical development and cut off, to begin with, from the possibility of satisfaction. (Freud, 1920/1961, pp. 4-5)

It is to be noted that the reality principle of delaying pleasure is not one of perceiving pleasure when the repressed instincts do appear.

They are then perceived by the ego as unpleasure:

If they succeed subsequently, as can so easily happen with repressed sexual instincts, in struggling through, by roundabout paths, to a direct or to a substitutive satisfaction, that event, which would in other cases have been an opportunity for pleasure, is felt by the ego as unpleasure. (1920/1961, p. 5)

Although there is a struggle of the ego to preserve the self by repressing the impulses of the id, Freud cautions that "one must not take the difference between ego and id in too hard-and-fast a sense" because it must be remembered that the ego is not a separate entity but "is a specially differentiated part of the id" (1923/1962, p. 28). Freud further maintains that the "ego is first and foremost a bodily

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ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface" (1923/1960, p. 16). This concept of a "bodily ego" becomes clearer when Freud explains how sensations or stimuli "have played a part in bringing about the formation of the ego and its differentiation from the id":

A person's own body, and above all its surface, is a place from which external and internal perceptions may spring. It is seen like any other object, but to the touch it yields two kinds of sensations, one of which may be equivalent to an internal perception. (1923/1962, p. 15)

This concept of internal perception is essential to an understanding of the internal oppression that must be liberated for an individual to become more fully human. Freud reveals that from "examining unconscious processes," it is possible to state that "consciousness may be, not the most universal attribute of mental processes, but only a particular function of them" (1920/1961, p. 18). Freud reveals that the ego serves as a mediator between the outer and the inner worlds and in this capacity serves to govern or regulate stimuli:

What consciousness yields consists essentially of perceptions of excitations coming from the external world and of feelings of pleasure and unpleasure which can only rise from the mental apparatus; it is therefore possible to assign to the system Pcpt. Cs. a position in space. It must lie on the borderline between the outside and the inside; it must be turned towards the external world and must envelop the other psychical systems. (1920/1961, p. 18)

Freud then reveals how there can be memory-traces that are in other systems but not in consciousness, constituting a condition comparable to internal perception:

On the basis of impressions derived from our psychoanalytic experience, we assume that all excitatory processes that occur in the other systems leave permanent traces behind in them which form the foundation of memory. Such memory-

traces, then, have nothing to do with the fact of becoming conscious; indeed they are often most powerful and most enduring when the process which left them behind was one which never entered consciousness.... Though this consideration is not absolutely conclusive, it nevertheless leads us to suspect that becoming conscious and leaving behind a memory-trace are processes incompatible with each other within one and the same system. Thus we should be able to say that the excitatory process becomes conscious in the system Cs. but leaves no permanent trace behind there; but that the excitation is transmitted to the systems lying next within and that it is in them that its traces are left. (1920/1961, p. 19)

Thus the ego receives stimuli from the outside world and protects the organism by not allowing it to be overwhelmed by the tremendous force of stimuli coming from the outer world. Against the inner stimuli of equally tremendous pressure, the ego has no shield:

The situation of the system between the outside and the inside and the difference between the conditions governing the reception of excitations in the two cases have a decisive effect on the functioning of the system and of the whole mental apparatus. Towards the outside it is shielded against stimuli, and the amounts of excitation impinging on it have only a reduced effect. Towards the inside there can be no such shield; the excitations in the deeper layers, extend into the system directly and in undiminished amount, in so far as certain of their characteristics give rise to feelings in the pleasure-unpleasure series. (1920/1961, p. 23)

These inner impulses produce within the ego "a tendency to treat them as though they were acting, not from the inside, but from the outside, so that it may be possible to bring the shield against stimuli into operation as a means for defence against them" (1920/1961, p. 23).

Freud reveals that this shield mechanism of the ego is the "origin of projection which is destined to play such a large part in the causation of pathological processes" (1920/1961, p. 23). Freud thus clarifies how the battle between the ego and the impulses of the id results in limiting the individual. Whereas Freud is explicit in his

explanation of how oppression results from this inner conflict, it is Hegel who clarifies Freud's concept of the "bodily ego" and of the memory-traces that are not conscious but yet are powerful influences on the development of an individual.

Freud's perception of the soul starts with the ego that arises from but is still a part of the primal energy of the id. Hegel reveals an earlier unity of the soul with its natural surroundings and with the universal substance of which it was a part. Moreover Hegel reveals in his discussion of the evolvment of the soul that in one stage of development, that of the Feeling Soul, the feelings, emotions, and interconnections of the universal substance with the natural world and psychic impressions all constitute the inner perceptions of the individual's world.

Hegel perceives then an earlier stage in which the natural world or nature is created as the "other" of the Absolute Idea. It is at that time Spirit but when it emerges from nature it becomes universal soul or what Hegel perceives as a Natural Soul. At this point Natural Soul differentiates among the beings of the natural world and reduces the natural environment to something qualitative. These qualitative differences correspond to geographical climates and psychical moods of regions. When the Natural Soul can feel itself at one in nature and can reduce its multiplicity of parts to a single unity of self-feeling, it becomes differentiated into individual souls:

The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. But this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling out of the modes which nature gives: we find it as the special temperament, talent, character, physiognomy, or other disposition and idiosyncrasy,

of families of single individuals. (Hegel, 1827/1894, pp. 172-173)

Hegel's description of the early unity the soul experiences reveals something of the nature of memories contained within the unconscious. It is Hegel's "Feeling Soul" that relates to the emotions and to the memory-traces preserved within an individual's inner world. Hegel's definition of sensibility in general as the "healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the life of its bodily parts" (1827/1894, p. 177) reveals two spheres of feeling in which the internalization of the soul's corporeity occurs:

One, where what at first a corporeal affection (e.g. of the eye or of any bodily part whatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward, memorised in the soul's self-centered part. Another, where affections originating in the mind and belong to it, are in order to be felt, and to be as if found, invested with corporeity. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in the soul. (1827/1894, p. 177)

Hegel moreover states there is a "bodily form adopted by certain mental modifications, especially the passions or emotions":

We should have, e.g. to explain the line of connexion by which anger and courage are felt in the breast, the blood, the "irritable" system, just as thinking and mental occupations are felt in the head, the center of the "sensible" system. (1827/1894, p. 178)

What Hegel is describing here in sensibility is the dual means of feeling or of receiving stimuli, the outer and the inner. These are reminiscent of the stimuli Freud mentions occurring within the ego. Hegel's ego is still in rudimentary development although he concedes the "sensation, just because they are immediate and are found existing, are single and transient aspects of psychic life" (1827/1894, p. 178). They are "alternations in the substantiality of the soul" (p. 178):

But this self-centered being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is virtually a reflected totality of sensations--it feels in itself the total substantiality which it virtually is--it is a soul that feels. (1827/1894, p. 178)

When the Feeling Soul develops from the sensations that are amassed, Hegel's understanding of this soul becomes necessary to an understanding of Freud's inner perceptions and memory-traces. Feelings represent the obscure psychic connection to innumerable relationships to things and happenings, to the whole of an individual's personal world. Hegel suggests that there is a memory unknown to the conscious aspect of the mind that belongs only to the "implicit self":

Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations, ideas, acquired lore, thoughts, etc.; and yet the ego is one and uncompounded, a deep featureless characterless mine, in which all this is stored up, without existing. It is only when I call to mind an idea, that I bring it out of interior to existence before consciousness. Sometimes, in sickness, ideas and information, supposed to have been forgotten years ago, because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness, once more come to light. They were not in our possession, nor by such reproduction as occurs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession; yet they were in us and continue to be in us still. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him, should he have once forgotten them: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such, but only to his implicit self. (1827/1894, pp. 179-180)

Hegel's concluding statement to this passage concerning ideas stored within the Feeling Soul reveals how this inner world remains the individual's private universe:

And under all the superstructure of specialised and instrumental consciousness that may be subsequently added to it, the individuality always remains this single-souled inner life. (1827/1894, p. 180)

Much of what Hegel is here noting pertains to the unconscious that is not repressed but is very active and influential in the individual's development into fullness of being or into the limitation

of oppression. Hegel's description suggests Groddeck's belief that the "ego behaves essentially passively in life" and that individuals are "'lived' by unknown and uncontrollable forces" (Freud, 1923/1962, p. 13). Furthermore, Hegel's discernment that feelings, inner perceptions, and psychical interconnections that remain in the individual's "single-souled" life suggests as well the memory-traces that are unconscious but present within the unconscious. There is equally suggested a potentially creative force in the unconscious, as contained in Hegel's reference to the "infinite treasury" within the ego and the observation that the "ego is one and uncompounded" (Hegel, 1826/1894, p. 179). It is in this suggestion of creative force of the unconscious that Freud's observation of the ability of the unconscious mind to create answers to problems encountered by the conscious mind becomes revealing:

On the one hand, we have evidence that even subtle and difficult intellectual operations which ordinarily require strenuous reflection can equally be carried out preconsciously and without coming into consciousness. Instances of this are quite incontestable; they may occur, for example, during the stage of sleep, as is shown when someone finds, immediately after waking, that he knows the solution to a difficult mathematical or other problem with which he had been wrestling in vain the day before. (Freud, 1923/1962, p. 16)

Freud's speaking of the soul and "how it reveals itself in all we do and dream" (Bettelheim, 1983, p. 4) becomes clearer. Freud is also aware that the unconscious makes up most of the soul. As has been stated, the repressed must not be confused with the unconscious. When Freud notes that it is "the dark world of the unconscious which forms such a large part of the soul of living man (Bettelheim, 1983, p. 77), he suggests as well the sensitivity of the Feeling Soul, and thus lends even greater significance to his observation that the unconscious "can

have many meanings" (1923/1962, p. 3). From Freud's observation in The Ego and the Id (1923/1962) the unconscious does have many meanings in that it cannot be successfully produced unless it is repressed. He furthermore reveals that it is creative, as in the solutions to the problems. Thus Hegel's affirmation that the soul is the "totality of an individual" becomes even more significant in noting the power of the unconscious:

The soul is virtually the totality of its nature; as an individual soul it is a monad; it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world--that world being included in it and filling it up; and to that world it stands but as to itself" (1827/1894, p. 180)

Hegel's definition of the nucleus of sensitivity as being the "whole mental life" of the soul indicates that this life is distinct from the conscious: furthermore, this "sensitive nucleus" contains the genius "whose decision is ultimate" regardless of conscious intentions, suggestive of Groddeck's reference to the unconscious that controls actions. It is of significance that Hegel's definition of this nucleus be included:

But this sensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious, congenital disposition, but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retains also all further ties and essential relationships, fortunes, principles--everything in short belonging to the character, and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has not effectively participated. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing and actual play of his consciousness, his secular ideas, developed interests, inclinations, etc. As contrasted with those looser aggregates of means and methods, the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius, whose decision is ultimate whatever may be the show of reasons, intentions, means, of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 183)

Id and Soul

Although the nucleus of sensitivity remains in the soul, the soul reduces feelings so that it "has them and moves in them, without feeling or consciousness of the fact." (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 191). What results is that "when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own," the soul finds itself there "a single Subject" so that the body does not represent itself "but the soul, of which it is the sign":

In this identity of interior and exterior, the latter subject to the former, the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape, in which it feels itself and makes itself felt, which as the Soul's work of art has human pathognomic and physiognomic expression. (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 194)

Hegel's concept of the soul as the total individual with the body as the sign of the soul corresponds to Freud's regarding the soul as the total personality. There is, moreover, an interesting parallel between the emergence of the ego from the id and that of the soul from its natural life. Hegel records that when the "immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity," then "what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object" (1827/1894, p. 196). Furthermore, this separation from "its specific qualities--the soul's natural life--to an equal freedom as an independent object" is how the "ego is in the first instance aware (conscious) and as such it is Consciousness" (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 196).

What happens in this separation applies to the perceptions of both Freud and Hegel concerning the separation of consciousness from that realm in which it finds its natural life but which with the development

of consciousness of the ego becomes unconscious. Consciousness could not arise until the ego distinguishes itself as separate and apart from its inner life. Yet the memory of having once been immersed in this environment, be it id or natural substance of the soul, is sacrificed in this separation. Just as the ego arises from the id and then regards it as hostile and threatening in Freud's concept, the ego in Hegel's analysis regards "the soul's natural life" as alien. For Hegel's ego the content of nature or the natural life of the soul becomes the "other" and seems to the ego to have risen from "something dark and beyond it" (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 196). Thus Freud focuses on making the unconscious known so that the unity permits being to flow in its natural course. Hegel in turn seeks to educate consciousness to the force of the dialectic that reveals that subject and object are one. Hegel's comment applies to all stages of consciousness that have moved into unity with the object: "Hence consciousness, like reciprocal dependence in general, is the contradiction between the independence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one" (1827/1894, p. 196).

What is needed is the recognition of the separated parts that they have the same identity: "Ego, as this absolute negativity, is implicitly the identity in the otherness; the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object" so that "it is one side of the relationship and the whole relationship" (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 196). In other words, the separation of the id and the ego or of natural environment and consciousness must not remain such that one part regards its other as hostile and foreign to it. The dialectic can

bring about such unity so that ego recognizes itself in its object, in its other. In this manner, there would be the unity that Freud perceives as an integration of primal energy with rational processes; there would also be unity of self with its other, either object or person. When the unity occurs within and without, then the individual is liberated into being more fully human. In this unity would occur the flow of being that both Hegel and Freud perceive as resulting into the individual's development into becoming more fully human, into that of self-becoming.

In Hegel's insight, Spirit is the only reality but it is evolving and needs to have the experience by which Spirit can know itself in its object. This movement of Spirit from position of subject to object and back to subject releases potential for fuller being through the dialectic. Thus the seeming opposition or contradiction is overcome but not without the individual's moving into a higher mode of consciousness through its integration of subject and object. Such movement into fuller being involves using the unconscious of the Id in connection with the thrust of the Spirit that seeks expression and becomes actual through the dialectic. As long as the ego regards its other as hostile the dialectic is immobilized in the sense it is not involved in making Spirit actual within the consciousness of the individual. As long as the ego accepts in passive state the dictates of society, civilization, or authority without subjecting such dictates to the dialectical thought processes, the individual remains in what Hegel calls "uncomprehended immediacy" (Hegel, 1807/1931, p. 91). Freud's ego is so involved in suppressing the impulses of the

id that it in turn is oppressed by an unconscious force within it of which it is unaware, a force serving to oppress the ego with the authority of eons of history and the authority of important figures. This internal oppressor of which Freire is very much aware is the super-ego.

Super-Ego

The ideal ego is unknown to the ego; consequently Freud maintains this part of the psyche is the most difficult of all oppositions to remove. He adds that it is unconscious but not repressed, for if it were repressed the unconscious which seeks expression would respond to therapy:

The unconscious--that is to say, the "repressed"--offers no resistance whatever to the efforts of the treatment. Indeed, it itself has no other endeavour than to break through the pressure weighing down on it and force its way either to consciousness or to a discharge through some real action. Resistance during treatment arises from the same higher strata and systems of the mind which originally carried out repression. (Freud, 1920/1961, p. 13)

In The Ego and the Id Freud explains the powerful influence of this unconscious part of the psyche:

We have come upon something in the ego itself which is also unconscious, which behaves exactly like the repressed--that it, which produces powerful effects without itself being conscious and which requires special work before it can be made conscious. (1923/1962, p. 7)

Freud reveals in The Ego and the Id as well the origin of the super-ego as stemming from biological and historical sources:

If we consider once more the origin of the super-ego as we have described it, we shall recognize that it is the outcome of two highly important factors, one of a biological and the other of a historical nature: namely, the lengthy duration in man of his childhood helplessness and dependence, and the fact of his Oedipus complex, the

repression of which we have shown to be connected with the interruption of libidinal development.... We see, then, that the differentiation of the super-ego from the ego is no matter of chance; it represents the most important characteristics of the development both of the individual and of the species; indeed, by giving permanent expression to the influence of the parents it perpetuates the existence of the factors to which it owes its origin. (1923/1962, p. 25)

The power of the super-ego is related to the impulses of the id:

The ego ideal is therefore the heir of the Oedipus complex, and thus it is also the expression of the most powerful impulses and most important libidinal vicissitudes of the id. By setting up the ego ideal, the ego has mastered the Oedipus complex and at the same time placed itself in subjection to the id. Whereas the ego is essentially the representative of the external world, of reality, the super-ego stands in contrast to it as the representative of the internal world, of the id. Conflicts between the ego and the id will, as we are now prepared to find, ultimately reflect the contrast between what is real and what is psychical, between the external world and the internal world. (1923/1962, p. 26)

Freud reveals there are "two paths by which the contents of the id can penetrate the ego":

The one is direct, the other leads by way of the ego-ideal; which of these two paths they take may, for some mental activities, be of decisive importance. The ego develops from perceiving instincts to controlling them, from obeying instincts to inhibiting them. In this achievement a large share is taken by the ego ideal, which indeed is partly a reaction-formation against the instinctual processes of the id. Psychoanalysis is an instrument to enable the ego to achieve a progressive conquest of the id. (1923/1962, pp. 45-46)

The ego then owes "service to three masters" and is "menaced by three dangers: from the external world, from the libido of the id, and from the severity of the super-ego" (1923/1962, p. 46). It is of significance to observe Freud's explanation of these dangers, for they affect the ego's development into becoming more fully human. Freud maintains that "the ego is the actual seat of anxiety":

Threatened by dangers from three directions, it develops the flight-reflex by withdrawing its own cathexis from the menacing perception or from the similarly regarded process in the id, and emitting it as anxiety. This primitive reaction is later replaced by the carrying-out of protective cathexes (the mechanism of the phobias). What it is the ego fears from the external and from the libidinal danger cannot be specified; we know that the fear is of being overwhelmed or annihilated, but it cannot be grasped analytically. The ego is simply obeying the warning of the pleasure principle. (1923/1962, p. 47)

What can be specified is the fear of the ego concerning the super-ego.

It is important to realize the powerful influence through fear and conscience this ideal ego holds for the ego:

On the other hand, we can tell what is hidden behind the ego's dread of the super-ego, the fear of conscience. The superior being, which turned into the ego ideal, once threatened castration, and this dread of castration is probably the nucleus round which the subsequent fear of conscience has gathered; it is this dread that persists as the fear of conscience. (Freud, 1923/1962, p. 47)

Freud states that the super-ego is representative of that "higher nature" that is excluded from research into "what is repressed in mental life" (1923/1962, p. 26). Thus the super-ego "answers to everything that is expected of the higher nature of man":

As a substitute for a longing for the father, it contains the germ from which all religions have evolved. The self-judgement (sic) which declares that the ego falls short of its ideal produces the religious sense of humility to which the believer appeals in his longing. (1923/1962, p. 27)

The super-ego thus carries with it the power of authority as well as that of conscience:

As a child grows up, the role of father is carried on by teachers and others in authority; their injunctions and prohibitions remain powerful in the ego ideal and continue, in the form of conscience, to exercise moral censorship. The tension between the demands of conscience and the actual performances of the ego is experienced as a sense of guilt. Social feelings rest on identifications with other

people, on the basis of having the same ego ideal. (Freud, 1923/1962, p. 27)

Freud also reveals that "through the forming of the ideal, what biology and the vicissitudes of the human species have created in the id and left behind in it is taken over by the ego and re-experienced" (1923/1962, p. 26) as the ego ideal. Thus this formation of the ego ideal "has the most abundant links" with an individual's "archaic heritage":

What has belonged to the lowest part of the mental life of each of us is changed, through the formation of the ideal, into what is highest in the human mind by our scale of values. (1923/1962, p. 26)

In reference to the "phylogenetic acquisition" of each individual, Freud indicates that the super-ego "actually originated from the experiences that led to totemism" and that although it is not "possible to speak of direct inheritance in the ego," it must be remembered that the "ego is a specially differentiated part of the id" (1923/1962, p. 28) Freud therefore can affirm that "the question whether it was the ego or the id that experienced and acquired these things soon comes to nothing," for the id experiences the outer world "by way of the ego, which is the representative of the external world to the id" (1923/1962, p. 28). It thus becomes clear to Freud that the super-ego is an archaic inheritance:

The experiences of the ego seem at first to be lost for inheritance; but, when they have been repeated often enough and with sufficient strength in many individuals in successive generations, they transform themselves, so to say, into experiences of the id, the impressions of which are preserved by heredity. Thus in the id, which is capable of being inherited, are harboured residues of the existence of countless egos; and when the ego forms its super-ego out of the id, it may perhaps only be reviving shapes of former egos and be bringing them to resurrection. (1923, 1962, p. 28)

Freud's work with the super-ego, in determining its origin and its influence, lends insight into the nature of oppression and helps explain how the power of authority--in institutions or people--is often unquestioned by the ego that is born with a predisposition to accept this power. It also becomes clear for a study of Freire's pedagogy of liberation that being born into an oppressive reality brings with it the "residues of the existences of countless egos" that have suffered oppression "in successive generations" so that the impressions of being oppressed and of being possessed as objects "are preserved by heredity" as well. Freud's work illumines the difficulty with which Freire is faced in enabling individuals to emerge from the dictates of the internal oppressor and illumines the power of critical and psychoanalytical thought to enable an individual to surface for recognition of an oppressive situation that is amenable to the individual's creative efforts to transform that situation.

Flow of Being and Repression

The nature of oppression, however, is not confined to the oppressor as conveyed in the super-ego; it is a part of an individual's life in that the principles of pleasure-reality are in operation daily as the ego seeks to repress the impulses of the id toward pleasure by imposing the principles of reality. Although the "pleasure principle is proper to a primary method of working on the part of the mental apparatus," from the viewpoint of the ego, involved in its "self-preservation among the difficulties of the external world," the impulses toward pleasure arising from the id are regarded "from the very outset inefficient and even highly dangerous" (1920/1961, p. 4).

It becomes then not an encounter of wills but a true battle between an ever-encroaching force in the id and a never-relenting resistance in the ego to that force; it is a battle involving intense energy in what becomes a life-death struggle. It is to be expected that the effects of this struggle upon the individual serve to limit the individual's flow of being into integration. One effect of a limit upon the flow of being, a result of the opposition between two dynamic forces of impulse and resistance, is that of a neurosis, a means by which the ego preserves itself by withdrawing from the threatening impulse. A result of this withdrawal is to keep the id from access to consciousness as well as to keep it from physical expression. The id, however, retains its impulsive energy and seeks constantly for expression. Despite the vigilance of the ego, the repressed impulse of the id finds an outlet in irrational speech or action; its usual release for expression, however, is in some part of the body. The response of the body from this attack of the id is to manifest a symptom of this attack; and, once the symptom is established, the victim then engages in a struggle against the symptom, much in the same manner the ego initially struggles with the id impulse. In such constant engagement and diversion of energy, the flow of being is impeded.

Hegel's insight concerning the effects of blocking the fluid nature of being notes physical and mental effects:

But the main point in derangement is the contradiction which as feeling with a fixed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming the concrete consciousness. The mind which is in a condition of mere being, and where such being is not rendered fluid in its

consciousness, is diseased. (1827/1894, p. 189)

Hegel further notes how physical effects are manifested in the body from this impeded flow of being:

In considering insanity we must, as in other cases, anticipate the full-grown and intelligent conscious subject which is at the same time the natural self of self-feeling. In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its now free subjectivity and particularly which, instead of being "idealized" in the former, remains as a fixed element in self-feeling....Insanity is therefore a psychical disease, i.e., a disease of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from one more than the other, and so also may be the cure. (1827/1894, pp. 188-189)

Dreaming, Sleeping, and Awakening

Freud acknowledges that the unconscious is made known through what is repressed within it, but he also states that "the study of dreams may be considered the most trustworthy method of investigating deep mental processes" (1920/1961, p. 7). It must be remembered that the ego serves as a censor over the impulses of the id during the day; there is, however, a censorship still functioning at night in that the id must disguise itself in memories of the day or of immediate past to move by the relaxed but still watchful ego. Thus to the consciousness of the ego, the id is a separate and hostile entity that threatens the ego with impulses during the day and with dreams during the night. Furthermore, the id has no end in that it reaches back to the primeval memories of humankind. Freud maintains that "dreaming is on the whole an act of regression to the earliest relationships of the dreamer, a resuscitation of his childhood, of the impulses that were then dominant and the modes of expression which were then available (Freud, 1900/1950, p. 404). Freud then reveals how extensive is the dream in

regard to the past:

Behind this childhood of the individual we are then promised an insight into the phylogenetic childhood, into the evolution of the human race, of which the development of the individual is only an abridged repetition influenced by the fortuitous circumstances of life. (Freud, 1900/1950, p. 404)

Freud's concept of the id and of the dream material issuing from the id is clarified in his observation that "we are encouraged to expect, from the analysis of dreams, a knowledge of the archaic inheritance of man, a knowledge of psychical things in him that are innate" (1900/1950, p. 404). Bettelheim lends an insight to what Freud's work with the unconscious, especially in dreams, indicates for liberation from the oppressor within:

By inviting us to follow him into the seeming chaos of the world of darkness, of the unconscious and its irrationality, Freud intended to change our view of man; but this could be done only if we changed our view of ourselves and reached an understanding also, of the darkest aspects of our minds. If we did, we would discover that what went on there could be understood and would, in its own way, make good sense, teaching us a great deal about ourselves. Freud tried to correct and enlarge our ideas about our dreams and to instruct us about their meaning, hoping that familiarity with the hidden aspects of our souls would permit us a deeper, more complete understanding of ourselves. (1983, p. 69)

Freud notes the force of the id to find expression, its constant efforts to flow unimpeded, through disguising the impulses that stem from a primitive anarchic world with the memories of the day or of childhood. The disguise is often that of a hallucinatory state conveyed in the dream. There also issues from the id a healing state. From Freud's study of traumatic neuroses that are repeated through the dream process and carry with these repetitions the same fright the individual originally feels, he recognizes that they are not wish-fulfillment dreams. As Freud notes, dreams would be "more in harmony

with their nature if they showed the patient pictures from his healthy past, or of the cure for which he hopes" (1920/1961, p. 7). Freud suggests that "the function of dreaming, like so much else, is upset in this condition and diverted from its purpose" (p. 7):

It is necessary to examine this dream that repeats a traumatic event and thus continues to frighten the individual. Freud defines anxiety as preparation for flight. His definition of trauma indicates there is no preparation for this event:

We describe as "traumatic" any excitations from outside which are powerful enough to break through the protective shield. It seems to me that the concept of trauma necessarily implies a connection of this kind with a breach in an otherwise efficacious barrier against stimuli. Such an event as an external trauma is bound to provoke a disturbance on a large scale in the functioning of the organism's energy and to set in motion every possible defensive measure. At the same time, the pleasure principle is for the moment put out of action. There is no longer any possibility of preventing the mental apparatus from being flooded with large amounts of stimulus, and another problem arises instead--the problem of mastering the amounts of stimulus which have broken in and of binding them, in the psychical sense, so that they can then be disposed of. (Freud, 1920/1961, p. 23-24)

It then becomes clear that the unconscious, the inner feeling self, the inner world of the individual functions to bring about healing through allowing the individual through the repetitive dreams to experience the anxiety and hence make preparation that was absent when the trauma occurred. Freud explains the healing aspect and its relation to the pleasure principle:

The fulfillment of wishes is, as we know, brought about in a hallucinatory manner by dreams, and under the dominance of the pleasure principle this has become their function. But it is not in the service of that principle that the dreams of patients suffering from traumatic neuroses lead them back with such regularity to the situation in which the trauma occurred. We may assume, rather, that dreams

are here helping to carry out another task, which must be accomplished before the dominance of the pleasure principle can even begin. The dreams are endeavouring to master the stimulus retrospectively, by developing the anxiety whose omission was the cause of the traumatic neurosis. They thus afford us a view of a function of the mental apparatus which, though it does not contradict the pleasure principle, is nevertheless independent of it and seems to be more primitive than the purpose of gaining pleasure and avoiding unpleasure. (1920/1961, p. 26)

Hegel's discussion of the sleeping state parallels in some respects the dynamics of dreaming that Freud reveals. Hegel, however, integrates sleeping with waking and thus the images or pictures of the id become a vehicle of expression on a higher level of consciousness. In one sense, the therapeutic mission of the dreams in the trauma neuroses corresponds to the integration that occurs on an unconscious level within Hegel's stage of sleeping. It is necessary to refer to an earlier discussion of Freud's observation concerning the unconscious, that of the answers for problems too difficult to be solved without great effort during the day by the conscious mind but which are forthcoming during the sleeping period without the individual's awareness that this process was occurring. Hegel makes a similar observation that needs to be included, for it lends insight and support to what Freud says is "quite incontestable" (Freud, 1923/62, p. 16). It is thus of interest that Hegel too finds that the conscious mind is refreshed and strengthened by an encounter with the forces found within the sleeping state; thus Hegel lends insight to this process during the time the conscious mind sleeps. Hegel maintains that the "waking stage" includes "generally all self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realises its own distinctive self" (1827/1894, p. 174). Moreover, "sleep is an invigoration of this activity--not a merely negative rest from it,

but as a return back from the world of specialisation, from dispersion into phases where it has grown hard and still" (1827/1894, p. 174). Hegel clarifies that the waking results in becoming "hard and stiff" but in sleeping, there is a "return into the general nature of subjectivity, which is the substance of those specialised energies and their absolute master" (1827/1894, p. 174). Hegel can thus affirm that sleeping and waking are not "mere alterations, but alternating conditions":

This is their formal and negative relationship but in it the affirmative relationship is involved. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an "ideal" factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature, where they are implicitly as in their substance, are found by the waking soul, in its own self, and, be it noted, for itself. (1827/1894, p. 176)

Life and Death Drives

It is necessary to examine Freud's understanding of the death impulse and of the life impulse in that sexual energy is connected and it is with the ego with its object that both Freud and Hegel perceive a release of being. Freud also perceives a movement toward prolonging life. Hegel sees in the union of the ego with its other the concept of infinity occurring. Freud affirms at the offset of his discussion that the psychoanalytical view of the direction of mental events is "invariably set in motion by an unpleasurable tension" and the mental process takes a direction that will bring about a "lowering of that tension--that is with an avoidance of unpleasure" (1920/1961, p. 1). Involved here is an endeavor to "keep the quantity of excitation as low as possible or at least keep it constant" (p. 1). In connection with the constancy theory, Freud illuminates the nature of drives

within the id. Freud finds a conservative drive, that of a drive "toward the restoration of an earlier state of things" (1920/1961, p. 31). It follows that all life emanates from inanimate states so that the earliest state is death. It also follows that attempts at preserving life have a different function:

The hypothesis of self-preservative instincts, such as we attribute to all living beings, stands in marked opposition to the idea that instinctual life as a whole serves to bring about death. Seen in this light, the theoretical importance of the instincts of self-preservation, of self-assertion and of mastery greatly diminishes. They are component instincts whose function it is to assure that the organism shall follow its own path to death, and to ward off any possible ways of returning to inorganic existence other than those which are immanent in the organism itself. We have no longer to reckon with the organism's puzzling determination to maintain its own existence in the face of every obstacle. What we are left with is the fact that the organism wishes to die only in its own fashion. (Freud, 1920/1961, p. 32)

Freud then uses a biological reference frame to suggest that sexual impulses or drives are life-giving. Freud here refers to biological experiments that revealed a prolongation of life for organisms if the infusion of fresh stimulants occurred:

If two of the animalculae, at the moment before they show signs of senescence, are able to coalesce with each other, that is to "conjugate," they are saved from growing old and become "rejuvenated." Conjugation is no doubt the fore-runner of the sexual reproduction of higher creatures; it is as yet unconnected with propagation and is limited to the mixing of the substances of two individuals. The recuperative effects of conjugation can, however, be replaced by certain stimulating agents, by alterations in the composition of the fluid which provides their nourishment, by raising their temperature or by shaking them. (1920/1961, p. 42)

From various biological experiments Freud is able to perceive that the sexual drive within humankind is life-giving as well:

Let us, however, return to the self-preservative sexual instincts. The experiment upon protista have already shown us that conjugation--that is, the coalescence of two individuals which separate soon afterwards without any subsequent cell-division occurring--has a strengthening and rejuvenating effect upon both of them. In later generations they show no signs of degenerating and seem able to put up a longer resistance to the injurious effects of their own metabolism. This single observation may, I think, be taken as typical of the effect produced by sexual union as well. (Freud, 1920/1961, p. 49)

Freud can also perceive the conservative nature of the sexual impulses:

They are conservative in the same sense as the other instincts in that they bring back earlier states of living substance; but they are conservative to a higher degree in that they are peculiarly resistant to external influences; and they are conservative too in another sense in that they preserve life itself for a comparatively long period. They are the true life instincts. They operate against the purpose of the other instincts, which leads, by reason of their function, to death; and this fact indicates that there is an opposition between them and the other instincts, an opposition whose importance was long ago recognized by the theory of neuroses. (1920/1961, p. 34)

Freud compares the libido theory to the mutual relationship of cells:

One cell helps to preserve the life of another, and the community of cells can survive even if individual cells have to die. We have already heard that conjugation, too, the temporary coalescence of two unicellular organisms, has a life-preserving and rejuvenating effect on both of them. Accordingly, we might attempt to apply the libido theory which has been arrived at in psycho-analysis to the mutual relationship of cells. We might suppose that the life instincts or sexual instincts which are active in each cell take the other cells as their object, that they partly neutralize the death instincts (that is, the processes set up by them) in those cells and thus preserve their life; while the other cells do the same for them.... (1920/1961, p. 44)

Freud has here merged the sexual drive with the life-giving qualities evident in the coalescence of organism. He furthermore contends that Eros and sexual energy are one:" In this way the libido or our sexual instincts would coincide with the Eros of the poets and philosophers which holds all living things together" (1920/1961, p. 44).

Freud confirms that the opposition is "not between ego-instincts and sexual instincts but between life instincts and death instincts" (1920/1961, p. 47). With this distinction now made, it is necessary to turn to Bettelheim to see what Freud intends in using Eros in defining the sexual drive.

Eros

Bettelheim records Freud's statement in a preface to Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality that stresses "how closely the enlarged concept of sexuality of psychoanalysis coincides with the Eros of divine Plato" (Bettelheim, 1983, p. 11). Bettelheim's explanation of what Freud intends expands the sexual drive to the force of love:

For readers who, like Freud, were steeped in the classic tradition, words such as "Eros" and "erotic" called up Eros's charm and cunning and--perhaps more important--his deep love for Psyche, the soul, to whom Eros is wedded in everlasting love and devotion. (1983, p. 11)

Bettelheim then clarifies that such love involves beauty and "longings of the soul":

For those familiar with this myth, it is impossible to think of Eros without being reminded at the same time of Psyche, and how she had at first been tricked into believing that Eros was disgusting, with the most tragic consequences. To view Eros or anything connected with him as grossly sexual or monstrous is an error that, according to the myth, can lead to catastrophe....In order for sexual love to be an experience of true erotic pleasure, it must be imbued with beauty (symbolized by Eros) and express the longings of the soul (symbolized by Psyche). These were some of the connotations that Freud had in mind when he used words like "Eros" and "erotic." (1983, p. 11)

Love becomes more than sexual union with another; it becomes the union of the subject with its object in a wider sense. It becomes the union of which Hegel speaks, the union in which Spirit manifests itself in

concrete actuality. Bettelheim reveals how encompassing this love is and how it is imbued with a drive for life:

The sexual drive presses for immediate satisfaction; it neither knows nor cares for the future. Eros and Psyche do. Being aware of the tragic limits placed on our existence by our mortality and our destructiveness induces us to wish to see life continue after us. Awareness of the dark aspects of life makes us keenly conscious of the need to secure a better life for those we love, and for those who come after us--not only our children but the next generation as a whole. It was our love for others, and our concern for the future of those we love, that Freud had in mind when he spoke of "eternal Eros." The love for others--the working of eternal Eros--finds its expression in the relations we form with those who are important to us and in what we do to make a better life. (1983, pp. 109-110)

What is suggested here is the unity of libido with ego in concentrated energy to preserve and enrich life. In a conflict, better described as a battle, there are life-defeating tendencies. Energy is wasted in constant efforts of the id to express itself and of the ego to repress the id. In a conflict of this nature, there is no victory. There is only the depletion of energy in ever-demanding assaults and never-ending defenses in order to maintain some stability in battle. The repression not only dissipates the energy of the ego but diverts and detracts the creative power of the id. All that is contained within the unconscious is unknown, but what Freud has uncovered indicates intelligence and creativity.

Freud speaks of the solving of problems when the conscious sleeps, of the power of healing in the trauma victims, and of the connection suggesting universal unconscious that reaches back to the beginning of humankind and contains the "infinite treasury" of which Hegel speaks.

These tendencies that are known are creative and life-giving. Even the wish-fulfillment moves in support of life. There is an indication of vision within Freud that perceives power and creativity of being in the integration of the id with the rational processes of the ego. In the following speculative question, Freud reveals a philosophic kinship with Hegel, especially in Hegel's perception of unity with one's other, that of being "at home in one's other" (Hegel, 1817/1975, p. 137). Freud's question is not that of a psychoanalyst but that of a philosopher-poet who holds a vision within of the flow of being into fullness of being and who only questions for others what he already perceives:

Shall we follow the hint given us by the poet-philosopher, and venture upon the hypothesis that living substance at the time of its coming to life was torn apart into small particles, which have ever since endeavoured to reunite through sexual instincts? (1920/1961, p. 52)

Bettelheim's statement concerning the need to understand the dark impulses so they will not draw the individual "into their chaotic and often destructive orbit" is made in reference to his perception of what Freud means by the good life:

The good life, in Freud's view, is one that is full of meaning through the lasting, sustaining, mutually gratifying relations we are able to establish with those we love, and through the satisfaction we derive from knowing that we are engaged in work that helps us and others to have a better life. (1983, p. 110)

Thus the "ascendancy" of Eros is Freud's means by which the individual becomes more fully human for the fruition of what is described as a "good life":

Through recognizing the true nature of our unconscious, and the role it plays in our psyche, we may achieve an existence

in which Eros, the life drive, maintains its ascendancy over everything within us that is chaotic, irrational, and destructive--in short, over the consequences of what Freud called the death drive, to which we are also heir. (Bettelheim, 1983, p. 220)

CHAPTER III

HEGEL: EDUCATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The purpose of this chapter is to reveal that the act of knowing can lead to liberation of consciousness into Absolute Knowing. The focus of this chapter is on Hegel's dialectical method of movement into higher forms of being and on the education of stages by which Spirit has evolved as those series that constitute education for all consciousnesses. Although the primary purpose of this chapter is on Hegel's insight into education of consciousness for liberation, there is included for emphasis relevant points that correspond in both Hegel's and Freire's thoughts on the act of knowing. Freire shares basic tenets with Hegel but translates Hegel's theory into educational practices. It is hoped that an examination of Hegel's thought will illuminate the education of consciousness that is not only contained in Hegelian thought but is demonstrated by Freire.

Hegel reveals an affinity with Freire over what knowing is and over the limitations of mind the individual passively accepts. Both Hegel and Freire seek the means by which humanity can liberate consciousness into being more fully human, into self-becoming. Both propose a revolutionary concept of consciousness. Freire (1970/1984) affirms that the act of knowing should result in a "radical form of being" and designates this being as "being human" (p. 24). Hegel proposes a revolutionary perception of consciousness that annuls, preserves, and transcends limitations by transforming self and

object. It is moreover interesting that Hegel perceives as limiting to the development of consciousness those factors that constitute what Freire cites as the myths, assumptions, and traditions conveyed by cultural hegemony that are too familiar to be questioned. Hegel (1807/1931) cites the reliance on the familiar as limiting because the familiar is familiar:

It is the commonest form of self-deception, and a deception of other people as well, to assume something to be familiar and give assent to it on that very account. (p. 92)

Hegel (1807/1931) further reveals that the individual who thus relies on the familiar can question it only to the extent that the individual seeks the opinion of others to make certain they agree that this is the right thing to believe or do:

Apprehending and proving consist similarly in seeking whether every one finds what is said corresponding to his idea, too, whether it is familiar and seems to him so and so or not. (p. 92)

Hegemony fosters assumptions about life that become deeply embedded within an individual's consciousness to the extent that an individual upholds these assumptions through what appears to be a natural philosophy or common sense and through deep feelings surrounding and defending these assumptions. Hegel (1807/1931) maintains that a reliance on common sense is no more than relying on how an individual feels or on an inner author, "an oracle" with "the breast" (p. 126). The result is that the individual closes the mind to any other concept and "has just to explain that he has no more to say to anyone who does not find and feel the same as himself" (p. 127).

Hegel (1807/1931) clarifies the extent of such limitations on the development of consciousness into self-becoming, into becoming more fully human, for such a person "tramples the roots of humanity underfoot," revealing in adherence to feelings "the conditions of mere animals" that "communicate only by way of feeling-states" (p. 127).

In contrast, humanity exists in a "community of conscious life":

For the nature of humanity is to impel men to agree with one another, and its very existence lies simply in the explicit realization of a community of conscious life. (p. 127)

Hegel does not perceive accepting dictates, creeds, or propositions emanating from external institutions or ideologies as constituting the act of knowing. Even the universals that Hegel concedes are probably true come under his scrutiny, for the truth they contain has not been made actual within the individual's consciousness. In a discussion on the rise of universals and the need to break down determinate thoughts held about them, Hegel indicates the nature of his purpose. He (1807/1931) reveals how necessary this "acquiring of universal principles" is to the development of mankind:

Immediacy or naive psychical life has always to be made by acquiring knowledge of universal principles and points of view, by striving, in the first instance, to work up to the thought of the subject-matter in general, not forgetting at the same time to give reasons for supporting it or refuting it, to apprehend the concrete riches and fullness contained in its various determinate qualities, and to know how to furnish a coherent account of it and a responsible judgment upon it. (Hegel, p. 70)

What occurred in this method of "cultivating and perfecting the natural mind" was that by "testing carefully at all points, philosophizing about everything it came across," the ancient or early method created an "experience permeated through and through

by universals" (Hegel, (1807/1931, p. 94). Thus, this earlier stage, necessary in enabling natural consciousness to make the world intelligible, is but "merely one aspect of mental development." Hegel affirms the need to go beyond this development to a spiritual development. Hegel then illuminates the problem issuing from this early development of universals that now limits consciousness as one existing in his time and existing now, that of passive acceptance:

In modern time, however, an individual finds the abstract form ready made. In striving to grasp it and make it his own, he rather strives to bring forward the inner meaning alone, without any process of mediation; the production of the universal is abridged instead of the universal arising out of the manifold detail of concrete experience. (p. 94)

Hegel (1807/1931) then clarifies his own purpose in citing the task for modern philosophy as one of "actualizing the universal and giving it spiritual vitality by the process of breaking down and superseding fixed and determinate thoughts" (p. 94). This task is the one Hegel undertakes in his speculative philosophy. The individual undergoing the education of consciousness in this philosophy ceases to be one of "passive indifference" and becomes a being of "purposive activity" (p. 83), gaining "insight into what knowing is" (p. 90) and emerging into fullness of being through development of consciousness. Such insight and development of consciousness cannot be external to the individual, given in the form of authoritative dictates or institutional creeds; such development exists as a possibility within an individual's own consciousness. Both Hegel and Freire concur that freedom of consciousness cannot be given or bestowed; it must be won by the individual through consciousness.

Hegel envisions a new age for humanity, one of creativity and community, that corresponds to Freire's perception of a new age for liberated mankind. What Hegel is proposing is an education for consciousness for such an age. Whereas Hegel perceives the new age already in transition, Freire's concept of educating mankind for liberation is for the creation of a new age of humanization for all. Hegel (1807/1931) perceives as occurring within his own time a movement into such a new age:

... it is not difficult to see that our epoch is a birth-time, and a period of transition. The spirit of man has broken with the old order of things hitherto prevailing, and with the old ways of thinking, and is in the mind to let them all sink into the depths of the past and to set about its own transformation. (p. 75)

Hegel (1807/1931) perceives "the form and structure of the new world" as a qualitative change, comparable to the birth of a child:

But it is here as in the case of the birth of a child; after a long period of nutrition in silence, the continuity of the gradual growth in size, of quantitative change, is suddenly cut short by the first breath drawn--there is a break in the process, a qualitative change--and the child is born. In like manner the spirit of the time, growing slowly and quietly ripe for the new form it is to assume, disintegrates one fragment after another of the structure of its previous world. (p. 75)

Hegel's (1807/1931) conclusion to this metaphor is significant for the educating of consciousness for liberation:

But this new world is perfectly realised just as little as the new-born child; and it is essential to bear this in mind. It comes on the stage to begin with in its immediacy, in its bare generality. (p. 75)

Thus the old world of "mental cultivation" will "soon make way for the earnestness of actual life in all its fullness, which leads to a living experience of the subject matter itself" (p. 70).

Moreover, the "beginning of the new spirit" results from a "widespread revolution" in spiritual culture:

The beginning of the new spirit is the outcome of a widespread revolution in manifold forms of a spiritual culture; it is the reward which comes after a chequered and devious course of development, and after much struggle and effort. It is a whole which, after running its course and laying bare all its content, returns again to itself; it is the resultant abstract notion of the whole. (Hegel, 1807/1931, p. 76)

It is this "abstract notion of the whole" that must be experienced through the education of consciousness:

But the actual realization of this abstract whole is only found when these previous shapes and forms, which are now reduced to ideal moments of the whole, are developed anew again, but developed and shaped with this new medium, and with the meaning they have thereby acquired. (p. 76)

Hegel is here referring to a process of educating consciousness that will liberate consciousness to undergo "living experience of the subject-matter" by breaking down "fixed and determinate thoughts" and by undertaking the education of consciousness Spirit has experienced so that the abstract can become actual for the individual consciousness. This education for liberation constitutes a series of stages and has the goal of the "mind's insight into what knowing is" (Hegel, 1807/1931, p. 90). This new age is however "in its immediacy, in its bare generality" and Hegel proposes that "consciousness misses in the new form the detailed expanse of content" that was available in the old. Moreover consciousness needs "still more the developed expression of form by which distinctions are definitely determined and arranged in their precise relations" (p. 76). It is to the end of making education for consciousness in the new age accessible to everyone that Hegel undertakes his system of consciousness development for

liberation. Hegel further maintains that without this exposition "science has no general intelligibility" and "has the appearance of being an esoteric possession of a few individuals." He (1807/1931) observes that the spiritual cultivation of the new age must be one of community of consciousness, of accessibility to everyone, and of being exoteric in comprehension:

Only what is perfectly determinate in form is at the same time exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and possessed by everybody. Intelligibility is the form in which science is offered to everyone, and is the open road to it made plain for all.... For intelligence, understanding, is thinking, pure activity of the self in general; and what is intelligible is something from the first familiar and common to the scientific and unscientific mind alike, enabling the unscientific mind to enter the domain of science. (pp. 76-77)

Hegel (1807/1931) then affirms that the "systematic development of truth in scientific form can alone be the true shape in which truth exists" (p. 70). Since Hegel himself admits "the term system is often misunderstood" and since his usage of this term is central to his education of consciousness, it is appropriate at this point to refer to Hegel's Logic for an explanation of what he intends by this term:

The same evolution of thought which is exhibited in the history of philosophy is presented in the System of Philosophy itself. Here, instead of surveying the process, as we do in history from the outside, we see the movement of thought clearly defined in its native medium. The thought, which is genuine and self-supporting, must be intrinsically concrete; it must be an Idea; and when it is viewed in the whole of its universality, it is the Idea, or the Absolute. The science of this Idea must form a system. For the truth is concrete; that is, while it gives a bond and principle of unity, it also possesses an internal source of development. Truth, then, is only possible as a universe or totality of thought; and the freedom of the whole as well as the necessity of the several subdivisions, which it implies, are only possible when these are discriminated and defined. (1827/1973, p. 20)

Hegel (1827/1973) confirms the necessity of a system by indicating that "unsystematic philosophizing can only be expected to give expression to personal peculiarities of mind, and has no principle for the regulation of its contents" (p. 20). Hegel adds that unless the "interdependence and organic union" are given for truth, the "truths of philosophy are valueless, and must then be treated as baseless hypotheses, or personal convictions" (p. 20). Hegel's purpose then in "providing a systematic exposition of philosophy" is to make knowledge actual:

To help bring philosophy nearer to the form of science--that goal where it can lay aside the name of love of knowledge and the actual knowledge--that is what I have set before me. The inner necessity that knowledge should be science lies in its very nature; and the adequate and sufficient explanation for this lies simply and solely in the systematic exposition of philosophy. (1807/1931, p. 70)

Hegel (1807/1931) elaborates on the concept of truth as being the whole:

The truth is the whole. The whole, however, is merely the essential nature reaching its completeness through the process of its own development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only at the end is it what it is in very truth; and just in that consists its nature, which is to be actual, subject, or self-becoming, self-development. (pp. 81-82)

Hegel cautions that "we misconceive therefore the nature of reason if we exclude the reflection or mediation from ultimate truth" (p. 82), for "reason is purposive activity" (p. 83). Hegel's purpose therefore centers on the activity of consciousness in experience, of working out the purpose of Spirit:

For the real subject-matter is not exhausted in its purpose, but in working the matter out; nor is the mere result attained in the concrete whole itself, but the result along with the process of arriving at it. ((1807/1931, p. 69)

Thus "reason is purposive activity" and the "realized purpose, or concrete actuality, is movement and development unfolded" (p. 83).

The unity of inner and outer, of subject and object, of essence and form, connotes an organic unity contained within truth and presented in Speculative Philosophy:

What mind prepares for itself in the course of its phenomenology is the element of true knowledge. In this element the moments of mind are now set out in the form of thought pure and simple, which knows its object to be itself. They no longer involve the opposition between being and knowing; they remain within the undivided simplicity of the knowing function; they are the truth in the form of truth, and their diversity is merely diversity of the contents of truth. The process by which they are developed into an organic connected whole is Logic or Speculative Philosophy. (1807/1931, p. 97)

Hegel's purpose becomes one in this new age of spiritual cultivation of assisting consciousness in its liberation so that what is implicit as spirit is explicit as concrete actuality. Hegel's concern is centered on the individual's act of knowing, for it is his conviction that what is implicit for humanity within the embryo will not become explicit until there is development of purposive activity or reason within mankind:

While the embryo is certainly, in itself, implicitly a human being, it is not so explicitly, it is not by itself a human being; man is explicitly man only in the form of developed and cultivated reason, which has made itself to be what it is implicitly. (1807/1931, p. 83)

Hegel's observation becomes profound in its implications. It suggests that having the form of a human does not insure the attainment of being human, as noted in Freire's assessment of dehumanization in both oppressor and oppressed alike. Hegel makes clear that the embryo "is not by itself a human being" and suggests further that education is

needed for this phenomenon of being fully human. Freire notes that the oppressed cannot liberate themselves because they have not been allowed to develop critical thought. The narrative education in operation within schools as a traditional procedure fails to foster the development of the critical or reflective thought that in turn inspires action to transform. Yet when Hegel speaks of the birth of the new spiritual age that has broken "with the old ways of thinking" (p. 75), he does so within the context of change, of letting these old ways "sink into the depths of the past" and of allowing the mind to "set about its own transformation" (p. 75). Hegel (1807/1931) also notes that the individual is not fully human until that which is implicit is made explicit "in the form of developed and cultivated reason, which has made itself to be what it is implicitly" (p. 83). Hegel is clearly conveying liberation from limitations, for his reason is "purposive activity" or critical and reflective thought on what is perceived as reality. Hegel's purpose is then akin to Freire's purpose concerning the act of knowing, an observation that is further substantiated by Hegel's (1807/1931) acknowledgement of the mind's potential to create its own kingdom:

Mind, which, when thus developed, knows itself to be mind, is science. Science is its realization and the kingdom it sets up for itself is its own native element. (p. 86)

Hegel thus sets forth in his science or system of philosophy to realize his goal of making knowledge actual by revealing the many stages of consciousness that lead the mind into full development, into self-becoming. Hegel's assertion that "the kingdom it sets up for itself is its own native element" speaks of empowerment, of

control, and of fullness of being as only a kingdom can; at the same time, Hegel reveals that this kingdom is mind's "native element," thus making clear that the potentiality for such a kingdom can be developed into explicit form through the "developed and cultivated reason"

(p. 83) or through educating consciousness to gain insight into the act of knowing. Hegel's education of consciousness for liberation into fullness of being speaks of a new birth of humanity. The nature of this reality is Spirit and the means of working out the purpose is the dialectic.

Spirit as Reality

Any understanding of what Hegel means by the concept of Spirit is better attempted in the context of the following explanation Hegel (1807/1931) offers of Spirit:

Spirit is alone Reality. It is the inner being of the world, that which essentially is and is per se; it assumes objective, determinate form, and enters into relations with itself--it is externality (otherness), and exists for self; yet, in this determination, and in its otherness, it is still one with itself--it is self-contained and self-complete in itself and for itself at once. This self-containedness, however, is first something known by us, it is implicit in its nature; it is Substance spiritual. It has to become self-contained for itself, on its own account; it must be knowledge of spirit, and must be conscious of itself as spirit. This means, it must straightway annul and transcend this objective form; it must be its own object in which it finds itself reflected. (p. 86)

Spirit as "reality" and the "inner being of the world" becomes clear in noting briefly the evolvment of Spirit within the world and within minds of humanity. At first Spirit is implicit and exists as the Universal Soul which contains the latent ideality of nature. The Soul is not at this point individual but transcompasses all of nature. It reflects back into itself. The whole sense of the

material or extended body of nature is to be the "other" of the Natural Soul. When natural or Universal Soul "bestirs itself" and reduces the natural environment of nature into qualitative difference, these differences reflect the difference existing in geographical climates and modes of a people; these differences eventually permeate individuals so that from these specific characteristics, Natural Soul eventually divides into individual souls. Within the individual souls is a sensibility in which feelings or emotions are felt within the individual and without. Sensations are experienced within, as rage in the breast or as a pain within the head, as well as the physical sensations are felt on the surface of the body. This stage is the Feeling Soul that feels. The significant development is that the Feeling Soul through habit reduces these sensations within and without so that the body is no longer a material that houses the soul; the body becomes a "sign" of the soul (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 194). It is at this point that the ego can move into consciousness and distinguish itself from its environment in which it has been immersed. It is only by distinguishing itself from its natural life that the ego gains consciousness of itself; at the same time, however, the ego no longer perceives its natural life as being part of it. It consequently looks upon the environment or the natural substance as a foreign or alien opposition, as its other. When the ego moves into awareness of self and gains self-consciousness, Spirit can enter into a dialectical relationship for fuller expression. The dialectic then provides for Spirit to become actual in both object and subject, to become concrete through experiences of humankind. It is in this manner, then that Spirit is the "inner being" of the world but assumes "objective, determinate form" and becomes actual. (Hegel, 1827/1894, pp. 167-195).

Hegel gives an explanation in the History of Philosophy that is helpful in determining the nature of Spirit:

The nature of spirit may be understood by a glance at its direct opposite, matter. As the essence of matter is gravity, so on the other hand we may affirm that the substance, the essence of spirit is freedom. All will readily assent to the doctrine that spirit, among other properties, is also endowed with freedom; but philosophy teaches that all the qualities of spirit exist only through freedom; that all are but means for attaining freedom; that all seek and produce this and this alone. It is a result of speculative philosophy, that freedom. (1952, p. 160)

Spirit then tends toward freedom as naturally as matter moves toward gravity. The evolvment of humankind in the purposive activity of spirit also suggests a corresponding evolvment of freedom to be human:

Matter possesses gravity in virtue of its tendency toward a central point. It is essentially composite; consisting of parts that exclude each other. It seeks its unity; and therefore exhibits itself as self-destructive, as verging toward its opposite. If it could attain this, it would be matter no longer, it would have perished. It strives after the realization of its idea; for in unity it exists--ideally. Spirit on the contrary may be defined as that which has its center in itself. It has not a unity outside itself, but has already found it; it exists in and with itself. Matter has its essence out of itself; spirit is self-contained existence. Now this is freedom, exactly. (1952, p. 160)

Hegel then relates this freedom to the individual in freedom of independence, of not relying on others or of not being placed in a dependent position:

For if I am dependent, my being is referred to something else which I am not; I cannot exist independently of something external. I am free, on the contrary, when my existence depends upon myself. This self-contained existence of spirit is none other than self-consciousness, consciousness of one's own being. (1952, p. 160)

Hegel then refers this freedom made explicit in self-consciousness to the act of knowing:

Two things must be distinguished in consciousness: first the fact that I know; secondly, what I know. In self-consciousness, these are merged in one; for spirit knows itself. It involves an appreciation of its own nature, as also an energy enabling it to realize itself; to make itself actually that which it is potentially. (1952, p. 161)

Thus Spirit makes itself concrete through the experiences of consciousness. Through its movement from subject to object and back to subject, it releases its potential and consciousness transcends to higher modes of thought. A reference to Hegel's thoughts on freedom contained in his Logic adds support to this act of knowing and reveals consciousness as unified in thought and in freedom:

The mind is then in its own home-element and therefore free; for freedom means that the other thing with which you deal is a second self--so that you never leave your own ground but give the law to yourself. In the impulses or appetites the beginning is from something else, from something else which is not ourselves. The natural man, whose motions follow the rule only of his appetites, is not his own master. Be he as self-willed as he may, the constituents of his will and opinion are not his own, and his freedom is merely formal. But when we think, we renounce our selfish and particular being, sink ourselves in the thing, allow thought to follow its own course, and if we add anything of our own, we think ill. (1827/1973, p. 39 Zusatz 24)

Dialectic

Hegel perceives the dialectic as the force of all movement, for "wherever there is life, wherever anything is carried into effect in the actual world, the Dialectic is at work." Furthermore, the "dialectical principle constitutes the life and soul of scientific progress, the dynamic alone gives immanent connection and necessity to the body of science... and in a word, is seen to constitute the

real and true" in thought. Hegel maintains that "thought in its nature is dialectical" for when the "mind or spirit" is "sentient or perceptive" it finds its object in something sensuous. When the mind or spirit "imagines," the object is in a "picture or image." When the individual "wills," the object is in the "aim." In dialectical thought, however, when consciousness transcends itself, the mind seeks something higher:

But in contrast to, or it may be only in distinction from these forms of its existence and of its objects, the mind has also to gratify the cravings of its highest and most inward life. That innermost self is thought. Thus the mind renders thought its object. In the best meaning of the phrase, it comes to itself; for thought is its principle, and its very unadulterated self. (1827/1973, p. 15)

Hegel asserts that experience is the beginning of thought, for "everything that emerges in conscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation; for source and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears" (1827/1893, p. 176). The concept of the other begins then when the Actual Soul becomes aware of its surroundings and of itself as separate from these surroundings. It is the nature of the surroundings as objects that "moves the ego into consciousness":

The pure abstract freedom of mind lets go from it its specific qualities,--The soul's natural life--to equate freedom as an independent object.--It is of this latter, as external to it, that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious), and as such it is Consciousness. (1827/1893, p. 196)

There is then the concept of the "other" rising from what was formerly a part but which is now viewed as separate, as "something dark and beyond it" (p. 196); but there remains a reciprocity between subject

and object that is present in all stages of consciousness:

Hence consciousness, like reciprocal dependence in general, is the contradiction between the independence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. (1827/1893, p. 196)

The concept of the "other" requires an explanation of the relationship between the "other" and the concept of negation. In the concept of negativity, when the ego abstracts itself from its environment, is also contained the concept of infinity. Negation and infinity are central to the dynamics of the dialectic. Negation begins with Being since "mere Being as it is mere abstraction is therefore the absolutely negative... Nothing" (Hegel, 1827/1973, p. 128). In an inability to keep apart Being from Nothing and Nothing from Being, there evolves in the middle the state of Becoming so that "becoming is the first concrete thought and therefore the first notion" (p. 132). The result of this process "is not an empty Nothing but Being identical with the negation--what we call Being Determinate (being then and there): the primary import of which evident is that it has become" (1827/1973, p. 134). Negation then extends to the determinate being that establishes boundaries so that it can be distinguished from its surroundings. It therefore determines its existence as separate from the surroundings it has excluded. It is in this type of being, in space or having a place as here-and-then, that negation is no longer abstract but is equally determined:

Quality, as determinateness which is, as contrasted with the Negation which is involved in it but distinguished from it, is Reality. Negation is no longer an abstract nothing, but, as a determinate being and somewhat, is only a form of such being--it is as Otherness. (1827/1973, p. 135)

There develops then a being-by-self and a being-for-another. Hegel (1827/1973) points out that the "quality is Being-for-another" in that the limit has determined the self and the other as excluded from it. Being-by-self is determinate being in contrast with the other. It becomes clear that when the being is "implicitly made a negation, it is a Limit, a Barrier" (p. 136). It is seen that the "otherness is not something indifferent and outside it but a function proper to it" (p. 136). What is desired is the state of being-for-self. This state occurs through the dialectic when the being and its other negate the original negation. In this concept of unity there is also participation in infinity. Hegel (1827/1973) proclaims that to reach one barrier and find another barrier arising is the infinity that is false. It is merely the "ought-to-be eliminated" infinity. The true infinity that Hegel perceives is contained in the dialectic and needs inclusion here. In this negating the limit and in recognizing its Other and in the Other's eliminating its barrier and recognizing its other, the movement of the dialectic releases infinity so that spirit is actualized and the desired state of being-for-self occurs:

What we now, in point of fact have before us, is that somewhat comes to be an other, and that the other generally comes to be an other. Thus essentially relatives to another, somewhat is virtually an other against it: and since what is passed into is quite the same as what passes over, since both have one and the same attribute, viz. to be an other, it follows that something in its passage into other only joins with itself. To be thus self-related in the passage, and in the other, is the genuine Infinity. Or, under a negative aspect: what is altered is the other, it becomes the other of the other. Thus Being, but as negation of the same negation, is restored again: it is now Being-for-self. (p. 139)

What must also be included in this explanation for its simplicity of expression and depth of meaning occurs in the Zustaz, that true infinity "consists of being at home with itself in its other, or, if enunciated as a process, in coming to itself in its other" (1827/1973, p. 137, Zustaz 94). One more reference is needed to develop this dialectical process, that of the ideality of reality. Hegel (1827/1973) reveals that being-for-another, which is reality or exclusion of the barrier distinguishing one from another, in interaction with being-by-self or the self as distinguished from the other, becomes being-for-self which constitutes the implicit ideality as an explicit reality:

In Being-for-self enters the category of Ideality.
 Being-there-and-then, as in the first instance apprehended
 in its being or affirmation, has reality; and thus even
 finitude in the first instance is in the category of reality.
 But the truth of the finite is rather its ideality. (p. 140)

Hegel is thus indicating that "when reality is explicitly put as what it implicitly is, it is at once seen to be ideality" (p. 141).

Hegel's education for consciousness in working out the purpose of Spirit through moving into a progression for forms is to reach awareness that the "notion of ideality just lies in its being the truth of reality" (1827/1973, p. 141, Zustaz 96). Truth as "the essential nature reaching its completion through the process of its own development" (1807/1931, p. 82) becomes the force in the movement of the dialectical thought processes. It is thus the dialectic that works out the purpose of Spirit and in moving from one mode of consciousness to an always higher one, the dialectic carries with it a fuller expression of Spirit in actual form.

Dialectic of Sense-Consciousness

Since all thought originates in sense experiences, the beginning of dialectical thought is contained in the dialectic of sense-consciousness; moreover, this dialectic serves to illustrate the dynamics of the dialectic with clarity, especially in this study which seeks to reveal the relevancy of Hegel's insight to the liberation of consciousness. Hegel (1827/1893) maintains that all consciousness seeks certainty of self: "The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essence, to raise its self-certainty to truth" (p. 197). In sense-consciousness truth seems most certain in appearance of the concrete. Hegel (1807/1931) notes that sense awareness of an object, of a concrete material, appears to be the "richest kind of knowledge" and "seems to be the truest, the most authentic knowledge" (p. 149). Hegel (1807/1931) reveals, however, that "this bare fact of certainty" is "really and admittedly the abstractest and poorest kind of truth" (p. 149). All that can be said of sense experience is that "it is" (p. 150). The implicit truth surfaces when the sense-experience is the object of reflection. Hegel makes his point by showing the universality of the "I" and the "this" or the "here" of the object. The self finds certainty of truth in the object only in the evanescent moment of pointing out. Any attempt to say what the object is moves the particular "self" and the particular "object" into the universal. Language is the means that reduces this certainty, for it is impossible to say what is intended. The "I" that exists and the "here" of the object change into something else, into another "I" that sees and another "here"

that exists. Hegel (1807/1931) says that language has the "divine nature of directly turning the mere 'meaning' right round about it, making it into something else":

They "mean" this bit of paper I am writing on, or rather have written on: but they do not say what they "mean." If they really wanted to say...so, that is impossible, because the This of sense which is "meant", cannot be reached by language, which belongs to consciousness, i.e. to what is inherently universal. (p. 159)

Negation is involved in this process in that the "here" is a "not here" and the "I" is a "not I." Thus the particular passes into the universal:

By saying "this Here," "this Now," or "an individual thing," I say all Thises, heres, nows, or Individuals. In the same way when I say "I," "this individual I," I say quite generally "all I's," everyone is what I say, every one is "I," "this individual I." (p. 154)

Thus in the dialectic of sense-consciousness, the self perceives the first object but in looking again, the object has changed. The self reflects on this negativity of what constitutes the original perception and in this reflection on the negativity of what exists no longer, a new mode of thought occurs. It is this movement of the consciousness from its false perception into the creation of a second object of truth that contains or offers the tremendous possibility for creativity within consciousness. To include this explanation of the dialectic serves as a model for the dialectic occurring in the other modes of thought arising in the progression of consciousness through the phenomena of the mind, a progression of working out the purpose of Spirit and thus reaching evolving levels of consciousness. In this dialectical process the individual consciousness moves from a state of "passive indifference," which accepts what is given or told, into

the state of "purposive activity" by which the individual consciousness makes explicit the implicit spirit in this higher mode of consciousness. Hegel (1807/1931) says that in this state the individual will become conscious of his or her own consciousness:

For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the consciousness of the object, on the other, consciousness of consciousness of itself: consciousness of what to it is true, and consciousness of its knowledge of the truth.
(p. 141)

When consciousness discovers that the first object is also what it is not in appearance and that consciousness of the object is also another consciousness, one of experience of the first object, then consciousness recognizes the universality contained in this mediation. The negativity that drives consciousness back into itself to reflect on the deception of this first object produces an anguish over the destruction of what consciousness thought to be true; but, out of this movement, the mind seeks another connection and a new object is born:

But in the alternation of the knowledge, the object itself also, in point of fact, is altered; for the knowledge which existed was essentially a knowledge of the object; with change in the knowledge, the object also becomes different since it belonged essentially to this knowledge. (p. 142)

The question arises of how the truth of this perception is to be discerned. Hegel (1807/1931) confirms that usually the truth of an object is measured by another external object, but "consciousness furnishes its own criterion in itself and the inquiry will thereby be a comparison of itself with its own self":

In consciousness there is one element for an other, or, in general, consciousness implicates the specific character of the moment of knowledge. At the same time this "other" is to consciousness not merely for it, but also outside this relation, or has a being in itself, i.e. there is the moment

of truth. Thus in what consciousness inside itself declares to be the essence or truth we have the standard which itself sets up, and by which we are to measure its knowledge. (p. 140)

Hegel points out that consciousness is involved in the process and is unable to acquire a distance from the process in order to test its validity:

Since both are for the same consciousness, it is itself their comparison; it is the same consciousness that decides and knows whether its knowledge of the object corresponds with this object or not. The object, it is true, appears only to be in such wise for consciousness as consciousness knows it. Consciousness does not seem able to get, so to say, behind it as it is, not for consciousness, but in itself, and consequently seems also unable to test knowledge by it. (1807/1931, p. 141)

Hegel's further explanation becomes essential to understanding the relation of object and consciousness:

Should both, when thus compared, not correspond, consciousness seems bound to alter its knowledge, in order to make it fit the object. But in the alteration of the Knowledge, the object itself also, in point of fact, is altered: for the knowledge which existed was essentially a knowledge of the object; with change in the knowledge, the object also becomes different, since it belonged essentially to this knowledge. (1807/1931, p. 142)

Hegel concludes his explanation with an observation of the truth of the two objects and the experience of those objects:

Consciousness knows something; this something is the essence or what is per se. This object, however, is also the per se, the inherent reality, for consciousness. Hence comes ambiguity of this truth. Consciousness, as we see, has now two objects: one is the first per se, the second is the existence for consciousness of this per se.... Consequently, then, what this real per se is for consciousness is truth: which, however, means that this is the essential reality, or the object which consciousness has. This new object contains the nothingness of the first; the new object is the experience concerning that first object. (1807/1931, pp. 142-143)

There are several observations that Hegel makes concerning this new object that occurs in the dialectical process. For one consideration, the participant is unaware of the process; it is the observer who perceives a "coming into being." For a second consideration, "the new object is seen to have come about by a transformation or conversion of consciousness itself" (p. 143). It is true that "this way of looking at the matter" is the observer's contribution, for this awareness does not exist "for the consciousness we contemplate and consider" (p. 143).

What is revelatory in this second consideration is the concept contained within the dialectic, for in the result of the negation is contained "what truth the preceding mode of knowledge has in it":

...since what at first appeared as object is reduced, when it passes into consciousness, to what knowledge takes it to be, and the implicit nature, the reality itself, becomes what this entity per se is for consciousness; this latter is the new object, whereupon there appears also a new mode or embodiment of consciousness, of which the essence is something other than that of the preceding mode. (1807/1931, p. 144)

Hegel affirms that "it is this circumstance which carries forward the whole succession of the modes or attitudes of consciousness in their own necessity":

It is only this necessity, this origination of the new object- which offers itself to consciousness without consciousness knowing how it comes by it- that to us, who watch the process, is to be seen going on, so to say, behind its back. Thereby there enters into its process a moment of being per se or of being for us, which is not expressly presented to that consciousness which is in the grip of experience itself. The content, however, of what we see arising, exists for it, and we lay hold of and comprehend merely its formal character, i.e. its bare origination; for it, what has thus arisen has merely the character of object, while, for us, it appears at the same time as a process and coming into being. (1807/1931, p. 144)

In this rudimentary or elementary experience of sense-consciousness, that of perceiving an object, there appears not only the power of the dialectic to transform both consciousness and its object but also the microcosmic view of the progression of Spirit working out its purpose. This end result of the dialectical movement of consciousness, "pressing forward to its true form of existence," will be seen when consciousness reaches absolute knowing:

In pressing forward to its true form of existence, consciousness will come to a point at which it lays aside its semblance of being hampered with what is foreign to it, with what is only for it and exists as an other; it will reach a position where appearance becomes identified with essence, where, in consequence, its exposition coincides with just this very point, this very stage of the science proper of mind. And, finally, when it grasps this its own essence, it will connote the nature of absolute knowledge itself. (1807/1931, p. 145)

It is necessary to refer once again to Freire's belief in the human's ability to create and recreate situation and self (1970/1984) and to refer as well to Hegel's concept of the "kingdom" that is mind's "own native element" and to the mind's "putting away old ways of thinking" to transcend and to make "transformation" (1807/1931, p. 86, p. 75). In the dialectic, central to both Hegel and Freire for the liberation of consciousness, is contained the means by which the potentiality can become more fully human:

Consciousness, however, is to itself its own notion; thereby it immediately transcends what is limited, and since this latter belongs to it, consciousness transcends its own self. (1807/1931, p. 138)

In working the purpose out, consciousness transcends into "new modes of thought" so that the creativity extends to both consciousness and objects; alteration of knowledge brings alteration of object.

Moreover, the "what this real per se is for consciousness is truth" or spirit implicit made actual. Not only does Hegel indicate that consciousness transcends but that a "new object is seen to have come about by a transformation" as well. Although Freire speaks of acting upon a situation to create it, Hegel supplies the source for the vision of truth in this acting although the origin of this vision is not apparent to the consciousness involved. It is a process that is going on in consciousness "behind its back." Such a phrase suggests the "Subliminal door" of which William James speaks as the means by which higher powers or forces have access to human consciousness:

The hubbub of the waking life might close a door which, in the dreamy Subliminal might remain ajar or open.... If there be higher powers able to impress us, they get access to us only through the subliminal door. (James, 1936, p. 198)

James's concept parallels what occurs in the second object through the process of the dialectic. James Macdonald, in Curriculum offers a similar metaphor in conveying how sources not "explicable" might enter consciousness:

The "back door" or "front door" of human being... must be unlocked and left ajar.... The process draws its power and energy from sources that are not completely explicable. (1978, p. 113)

Added to this discussion to the formation of a new object in conscious and the transcendence of conscious in this dialectical process is Hegel's reference to the "infinite treasure" that contains the individual's world, cultivated during the time of the Feeling Soul. Hegel (1827/1893) maintains that "the ego is one and uncompounded, a deep featureless characterless mine" where treasures are "stored up,

without existing" or without being in consciousness (p. 179). Hegel adds that all that is contained within, as "sensations, ideas, acquired lore, and thoughts" constitute the individual's world, that they belong to the individual's "implicit self" and that "the individual always retains this single-souled inner life" (pp. 179-180). Hegel is here referring to the recollection which holds the phenomena or the "wealth of by-gone days" and which is involved in the process of the dialectic. The dialectic transcends but also preserves that which is transcended in recollection. This recollection reaches back to the age of the Feeling Soul and awaits intelligence qua intelligence to create from it. This "intelligence qua intelligence shows the potential coming to free existence in its development, and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness" (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 215). Hegel adds this "qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specialisation" (p. 215) and is a part of the deeper consciousness level involved in the dialectic:

Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this sub-conscious mine, i.e. as the existent universal in which the difference has not yet been realised in its separations. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. (Hegel, 1827/1894, pp. 215-216)

Since reality is Spirit, then the phenomena inwardised and recollected offer unlimited possibilities of expression and creation to the individual who experiences the creative force of the dialectic and undergoes the progression of forms that constitute the education of Spirit in past ages. The dialectic is then the dynamic force of movement that enables consciousness to transcend limitation through making that which is implicit in Spirit a reality

in explicit form.

What has been revealed within the dialectic of sense-consciousness is only the beginning of liberation into consciousness, for "knowing as it is found at the start, mind in its immediate and primitive stage, without the essential nature of mind, is sense-consciousness." For true knowledge to occur, Hegel (1807/1931) maintains a long journey of consciousness must be undertaken:

To reach the stage of genuine knowledge or produce the element where science is found,--the pure conception of science itself--a long and laborious journey must be taken. (p. 88)

Furthermore, this experience of the journey in that "consciousness knows and comprehends nothing but what falls within its experience; for what is experience is merely spiritual substance and moreover object of its self" (p. 96). Hegel reveals that the two aspects of conscious life, "cognition and objectivity which is opposed to or negative of the subjective function of knowing," occur at each stage in the evolution of mind (p. 96). Thus the "pathway" to be undertaken is the "conscious insight into the untruth of phenomenal knowledge, for that which is not real" is "only the unrealized nothing" (p. 136). Therefore, the journey is the "actual carrying out of that process of development" (p. 135). One more reference to the road to truth as a way of educating consciousness needs inclusion:

The series of shapes, which consciousness traverses on this road is rather the detailed history of the process of training and educating consciousness itself up to the level of science. (Hegel, 1807/1931, p. 136)

Hegel further maintains that on this journey "the exposition of untrue consciousness in its untruth is not a merely negative process" but is a "determinate negation," in which "a new form has thereby immediately arisen, "for in the negation the transition is made by which the progress through the complete succession of forms comes about of itself" (p. 137). The goal of this journey is as "fixed for knowledge" as is the "succession in the process" (p. 137). Furthermore, this journey is an ongoing process until "knowledge is no longer compelled to go beyond itself" but finds "the notion corresponds to the object, and the object to the notion" (p. 138). Although there are many stages on this journey, there are three divisions: consciousness, self-consciousness, and universal self-consciousness. The second level of self-consciousness brings in the appearance of spirit.

Dialectic of Self-Consciousness

Hegel reveals the progress of consciousness to self-consciousness as one of discovering the self to be reality:

What the object immediately was in itself--whether mere being in sense-certainty, a concrete thing in perception, or a force in the case of understanding--it turns out in truth not to be this reality; but instead, this inherent nature (Ansich) proves to be a way it is for an other. (1807/1931, p. 218)

The state of the consciousness that knows the reality of self is one of desire at first, for "convinced of the nothingness of this other, it definitely affirms this nothing to be for itself the truth of this other." Self-consciousness then "negates the independent object, and thereby acquires certainty of self, as true certainty, a

certainty which it has become aware of in objective form" (1807/1931, p. 225).

Since the object is for the ego, then self-consciousness is appetitive and assures the certainty of self by consuming the object which offers no resistance. Hegel notes in The Philosophy of Mind (1827/1894) this "appetite in its satisfaction is always destructive and in its content selfish" (p. 210). As soon as the object is consumed, "the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction" (1827/1894, p. 202).

Hegel can therefore declare that "self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness" (1807/1931, p. 226). In this encounter with another self-consciousness, there is not an object to be consumed but another ego:

A self-consciousness has before it a self-consciousness. Only so and only then is it self-consciousness in actual fact; for here first of all it comes to have the unity of itself in its otherness. Ego which is the object of its notion, is in point of fact not "object." The object of desire, however, is only independent, for it is the universal, ineradicable substance, the fluent self-identical essential reality. When a self-consciousness is the object, the object is just as much ego as object. (1807/1931, p. 227)

Hegel considers this encounter with another self-consciousness a "turning point" in the development of consciousness, for it is here that Spirit is most noted:

Consciousness first finds in self-consciousness--the notion of mind--its turning point, where it leaves the parti-coloured show of the sensuous immediate, passes from the dark void of the transcendent and remote super-sensuous, and steps into the spiritual daylight of the present. (1807/1931, p. 227)

It is to be observed that there could never be a movement into the other for the experience of true infinity as long as self-consciousness stays on the appetitive level. The object of the appetitive level is incapable of negating itself so that consequently the certainty of self, momentarily assured, rises in appetitive desire again. Humanity at this stage is a slave to the appetites. In the dialectic of one self-consciousness with another self-consciousness, the object as ego with its own desire for self-certainty cannot be consumed. The promise here is that there can be the negation of different consequences in that the object can negate itself for its other. What both self-consciousnesses desire is recognition of self, a mutual recognition that can only occur within the dialectic when object consciousnesses negate themselves for the other. What occurs, however, is a life-death struggle with either the loss of life or uneven results:

The relation of both self-consciousnesses is in the way so constituted that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle. They must enter into this struggle, for they must bring their certainty of themselves, the certainty of being for themselves, to the level of objective truth and make this a fact both in the case of the other and in their own case as well. (Hegel, 1807/1931, pp. 232-233)

In this even struggle there is risk of life or uneven results.

Hegel (1807/1931) clarifies the necessity of risk, a necessity that

Freire as well notes as essential for true liberation to occur.

Freire acknowledges the risk but maintains that freedom involves such a risk. Hegel makes a similar observation:

And it is solely by risking life that freedom is obtained; only thus is it tried and proved that the essential nature of self-consciousness is not bare

existence, is not the merely immediate form in which it at first makes its appearance, is not its mere absorption in the expanse of life... . The individual, who has not staked his life, may, no doubt, be recognized as a Person; but he has not attained the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness. (Hegel, 1807/1931, p. 233)

There can be no certainty of self issuing from a "trial by death" and no certainty of truth in the "truth which was to result from it" as being within the self. Hegel (1807/1931) notes that "death is the natural 'negation' of consciousness" (p. 233). What is needed in this confrontation is a negation that "preserves and maintains what is sublated, and thereby survives its being sublated" (p. 234). What occurs, however, is an uneven result, that of master and slave:

But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution, the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. While the one combatant prefers life, retains his single self-consciousness, but surrenders his claim for recognition, the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recognized by the former as his superior. Thus arises the status of master and slave. (1827/1893, p. 203)

Hegel perceives in this metaphor the master as the consciousness that "exists for itself." The slave is held in economic bondage to the master and the "master relates himself to the bondsman mediately through independent existence, for that is precisely what keeps the bondsman in thrall":

It is as well his chain, from which he could not in the struggle get away, and for that reason he proved himself to be dependent, to have his independence in the shape of thinghood. (1807/1931, p. 235)

Hegel (1807/1931), in this powerful metaphor, conveys the oppressor-oppressed concept that Freire upholds, for the "master... is the

power controlling this state of existence":

Since he is the power dominating existence, which this existence again is the power controlling the other (the bondsman), the master holds, par consequence, the other in subordination. (1807/1931, p. 235)

The master, however, "relates himself to the thing mediately through the bondsman" (Hegel, 1807/1931, p. 235). In this relationship, as in the oppressor-oppressed relationship, both master and bondsman are enslaved or dehumanized; neither is free. The oppressor possesses others and reduces them to objects; in dehumanizing others, the oppressor is dehumanized as well. Freire makes clear that there can be no oppressor unless there exists as well the oppressed. Hegel reveals the same reciprocal relationship in that the master appears to be independent but is in actuality dependent upon the bondsman:

In all this, the unessential consciousness is for the master, the object which embodies the truth of his certainty of himself. But it is evident that this object does not correspond to its notion; for, just where the master has effectively achieved lordship, he really finds that something has come about quite different from an independent consciousness. It is not an independent, but rather a dependent consciousness that he has achieved. (Hegel, 1870/1931, pp. 236-237)

Freire perceives the liberation from oppression for both oppressor and oppressed as occurring from the actions of the oppressed. It is they who must liberate themselves from dehumanization or enslavement and in so doing liberate the oppressors as well. The oppressed must find their own liberation and thus restore to the oppressors the humanity they have lost in assuming lordship over the oppressed. Hegel also perceives that it is not the master who perceives the limitations of the master-bondsman relationship. Thus it is the servant or bondsman who moves toward liberation from dependency on the master:

This other, the slave, however, in the service of the master, works off his individualist self-will, overcomes the inner

immediacy of appetite, and in this divestment of self and in "the fear of his lord" makes "the beginning of wisdom"--the passage to universal self-consciousness. (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 203)

What the oppressed and what the bondsman are moving toward in their struggle for liberation from oppression is the state of mutual recognition, where there is no distinction characterized by master and slave so that "as the other is for it, so it is for the other" (Hegel, 1807/1931, p. 232). Such mutual recognition occurs on the level of universal self-consciousness.

Universal Self-Consciousness

On the level of universal self-consciousness the flow of being is manifested through the concrete manifestation of Spirit. That which is a potential within humankind becomes an actuality. The relationship of master-bondsman is replaced by mutual recognition so that there is "the affirmative awareness of self in an other self" (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 204). The reciprocal relationship of ego and its other, that of implicit unity in what appears as a separation, is now a reality, an actuality. In universal self-consciousness there is true reciprocity of being:

Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective; each has "real" universality in the shape of reciprocity, so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman, and is aware of this in so far as it recognises the other and knows him to be free. (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 204)

On this level of being the solidarity which Freire maintains must exist for true liberation from oppression, for a true dialectical

creation and recreation of self and society, becomes in essence Hegel's community of consciousness. Mutual recognition in this community results in freedom. Hegel asserts in The Philosophy of History (1952) that the evolvment of consciousness is also an evolvment of freedom. He states, "For if I am dependent, my being is referred to something else which I am not" (p. 160). There can be no freedom in a dependent relationship. Freedom lies in the development of consciousness, in the act of knowing that liberates individuals from oppression. Hegel defines this knowing as one of knowing and of knowing what is known:

This self-contained existence of spirit is none other than self-consciousness, consciousness of one's own being. Two things must be distinguished in consciousness: first, the fact that I know; second, what I know. In self-consciousness these are merged in one; for spirit knows itself. It involves an appreciation of its own nature, as also an energy enabling it to relate itself; to make itself actually that which it is potentially. (Hegel, 1952, pp. 160-161)

Hegel affirms that universal self-consciousness, "the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal," is the basis for community life and of freedom; universal self-consciousness is the basis of "all true mental or spiritual life--in family, fatherland, state, and of all virtues, love, friendship, valour, honour, fame" (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 204).

Although this study focuses on the individual's liberation into being more fully human and not on all that being human contains, as revealed on the level of self-consciousness, some reference is needed here to the flow of being that results in speech and action. On the level of universal self-consciousness there is still the necessity to make the union of subject and object actual, but here it is "strictly

only a nominal passage over into manifestation, and is even there a return into itself" (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 207). There still exists, even on this level of knowing, the need to make knowledge real so that freedom is manifested:

So as far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal, the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfillment and thus at the same time produce its freedom. (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 207)

Intelligence unifies the feeling of the soul, that which Hegel calls "an inarticulate embryonic life" which has the "whole material of its knowledge" (1827/1894, p. 212), with consciousness of that feeling or intuition. Intelligence uses the feeling by attending to the parts and totality and by recollecting the material contained in the inner world or nucleus of sensitivity. Through this "intelligible unity" the energy that tumbles and pulsates out of the unconscious or the id, forces that Freud perceives as necessary to know and control for integration of being, now becomes, under the control and shaping of intelligence, the source of creation and imaginative reproduction, summoned at will and possessed and shaped:

Intelligence, as it at first recollects the intuition, places the content of feeling in its own inwardness--in a space and time of its own. In this way that content is an image or picture, liberated from its original immediacy and abstract singleness amongst other things, and received into the universality of the ego. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent, but stored up out of consciousness. (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 215)

Intelligence becomes then a "sub-conscious mine, i.e. as the existent universal in which the different has not yet been realised in its separations" (1827/1894, p. 215). Hegel then reveals how this inner material of intelligence is manifested:

To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations, yet without being in consciousness, is from one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete in the way we treat e.g. the germ as affirmatively containing, in virtual possibility, all the qualities that comes into existence in the subsequent development of the tree. (1827/1894, p. 215)

Hegel maintains that "intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property and dispense with external intuition for its existence in it":

The image, which in the mine of intelligence was only its property now that it has been endued with externality, becomes actually its possession. And so the image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable from the blank night in which it was originally submerged. (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 216)

Hegel further notes that "in this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation with intuition" (1827/1894, p. 210), the "intuition does not count positively or as representing itself, but as representative of something else":

It is an image, which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental representation. This intuition is the Sign. (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 219)

This sign becomes then the speech or language of the individual. No longer is there the irrational speech that Freud notes is an expression of the impulse of the id; there is now the unity of inner knowledge and outer expression:

This institution of the natural is the vocal note, where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utterance. The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas--speech and, its system, language--gives to sensations, intuition, conceptions, a second and higher existence in the ideational realm. (Hegel, 1827/1894, p. 221)

Not only speech in unity with inner being but action is as well. The impulse, often irrational and resulting in irrational acts or in

physical symptoms of illness, is now an impulse directed toward what ought to be. This impulse is unified with the ideal of what should be and becomes passion. Hegel reveals that "passion is neither good nor bad; the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul--his interests, talent, character, enjoyment,--on one aim and object" (1827/1894, p. 234). There is no action of greatness unless passion is involved: "Nothing great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion" (p. 235).

When the ideal of freedom to be more fully human is formed within the mind and this ideal is converted through passionate action to make this freedom a reality, then the dialectic in which Spirit is at work to express itself does indeed create and recreate self and reality. Freire's dialectic, initiated and maintained through an ongoing dialogue in solidarity of humankind and on an ongoing reality, not only liberates an individual into becoming more fully human; through Hegel's perception of dialectical movement of Spirit, it becomes evident that the individual also continues this development into fullness of being human and of possessing freedom.

CHAPTER IV

PEDAGOGY OF LIBERATION

Freire's pedagogy of liberation gathers strength and focus from the Hegelian and Freudian concepts of liberation that were presented in Chapters II and III. Hegel's dialectic clarifies the spiritual force at work with the dialectic that enables the individual participating in its creative process to move into a new mode of thought or consciousness and thereby find a new reality stemming from this perception. Hegel's dialectic thus lends strength to Freire's premise that it is not the existing situation itself but the individual's perception of that situation that is important for liberation from the limitations of that situation:

Thus, it is not the limit-situations in and of themselves which create a climate of hopelessness, but rather how they are perceived by men at a given historical moment: whether they appear as fetters or as insurmountable barriers.
(Freire, 1970/1984, p. 89)

Freire furthermore reveals that since individuals "exist in a dialectical relationship between the determination of limits and their own freedom" that perception of a situation leads to action. A perception that the situation is "insurmountable" results in passive acceptance of it; the perception of that situation as false in appearance and thus only limiting at the moment leads to decisive action upon it to transform it:

Men, however, because they are aware of themselves and thus of the world--because they are conscious beings--exist in a dialectical relationship between the determination of limits and their own freedom. As they separate themselves from the

world, which they objectify, as they separate themselves from their own activity, as they locate the seat of their decisions in themselves and in their relations with the world and others, men overcome the situations which limit them: the "limit-situations." Once perceived by men as fetters, as obstacles to their liberation, these situations stand out in relief from the background, revealing their true nature as concrete historical dimensions of a given reality. Men respond to the challenge with actions... directed at negating and overcoming, rather than passively accepting, the "given."
(1970/1984, p. 89)

Moreover, Freire's encompassing transformation of both self and situation gathers focus from Freud's analysis of the inner oppressor that controls being and the inner conflicts that fragment and alienate the individual within. Freud's emphasis on the critical reflection or psychoanalytical thinking on the correspondence between inner compelling motives and outer resulting action from these inner forces therefore underscores the dynamics of Freire's praxis that encompasses the inner dimensions of an individual as well as the outer reality in which the individual is placed. Freire's praxis is critical reflection on the self and on the situation; it is accompanied by a corresponding action upon the situation that not only changes, alters, and transforms the situation but also the self. It results in creating and recreating both self and reality of situation for higher levels of being and freedom in which self-becoming is possible.

In enabling adult illiterates of the Third World to emerge from an acceptance of a situation as a given reality, to perceive themselves in a new mode of thought that dissipates the power of the internal oppressor, and moreover to integrate new energy of self-awareness with new perception to create a higher level of being, Freire reveals the very force which empowers an individual involved in the

dialectical process. When Freire reveals the steps in developing the critical processes of dialectical thought in Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970/1984) and demonstrates the reality of these thoughts translated into action in Pedagogy in Process (1976/1978), he clarifies how the dialectic embodied within the context of a pedagogy can enable an individual to emerge from a limiting situation or gain distance from it for critical thought of it and transforming action upon it. What Freire demonstrates is that Hegel's "purposive activity" of reason, of breaking down "fixed and determinate thoughts" is indeed movement into new thought, into new levels of being more fully human, into making the implicit potential of being more fully human an explicit reality.

What Hegel does not include but Freire does is the method that can be used to bring the individual to the initial stage of liberation, that of being able to objectify the situation, to acquire needed distance from the situation to perceive that it is not a static one but an ongoing process, and to perceive that what is the reality in which he/she is immersed is an historical occurrence amenable to change. From that distance and from that perspective, the individual is then enabled to perceive the self as capable of effecting change. Hegel thus starts the dialectical process that empowers the individual with the recognition of false reality. Freire, however, starts at an earlier stage, that of the individual who has no perception other than that of the oppressor that has been internalized and that serves as the model to be emulated. Thus Freire starts with the emergence from the situation. It is of primary importance to begin an examination of the

pedagogy for liberation at Freire's starting point, that of enabling the individual to emerge from an unquestioned acceptance of a limiting situation. Freire concedes that initiating the liberational process through emergence from a situation is not a simple process, for true liberation engenders fear of responsibility; Freire, however, affirms it is not an impossible task, for critical reflection can enable the individual to achieve the necessary distance or the emergence to begin the liberation process.

The method Freire uses in his pedagogy is that of dialogue. The dialogue in turn initiates the dialectical process so that liberation replaces limitation, love replaces violence, and subjects replace objects. In essence the pedagogy of humanization overcomes dehumanization in both oppressor and oppressed. Before the nature of the dialogue can be brought into focus, it is necessary to examine the pedagogy of liberation from its inception, that of the emergence of individuals from the situation in which they are submerged.

Emergence from Situation

It must be recognized from the beginning in a discussion of the pedagogy of liberation as an instrument by which the oppressed can be enabled to emerge from the oppressive reality of a situation to begin a process of liberation, that the oppressed are locked into a reality created for them and inflicted upon them by the oppressors. Freire acknowledges in his Pedagogy of the Oppressed that the extent of oppressed consciousness makes liberation from this depth a difficult process, comparable to that of a birth:

Liberation is thus a childbirth, and a painful one. The man who emerges is a new man, viable only as the oppressor-oppressed contradiction is superseded by the humanization of all men. Or, to put it another way, the solution of this contradiction is born in the labor which brings into the world this new man: no longer oppressor, no longer oppressed, but man in the process of achieving freedom. (1970/1984, p. 34)

Freire maintains that as long as the oppressed "live in the duality in which to be is to be like" the oppressor, the oppressed cannot "contribute to the midwifery of their liberating pedagogy" (1970/1984 p. 33). They are at this point still immersed within the oppressive reality so that freedom to them is limited to their moving into the power position held by the oppressor. Freedom in any other definition generates fear within them:

The oppressed, having internalized the image of the oppressor and adopted his guidelines, are fearful of freedom. Freedom would require them to eject this image and replace it with autonomy and responsibility. (1970/1984, p. 31)

Freire realizes that individuals "who have adapted to the structure of domination in which they are immersed" are consequently "inhibited from waging a struggle for freedom so long as they feel incapable of running the risk it requires" (p. 32). The oppressed cannot feel capable of changing a situation until they are brought to a recognition of what constitutes the reality of that situation. Thus to move individuals of oppressed reality from that reality to a recognition of it, the oppressed must come to understand the causes of their passivity:

As long as the oppressed remain unaware of the causes of their condition, they fatalistically "accept" their exploitation. Further, they are apt to react in a passive and alienated manner when confronted with the necessity to struggle for their freedom and self-affirmation. (1970/1984, p. 51)

When Freire's attempt to enable the oppressed to emerge from their situation is examined within the context of what Freud describes as an unknown but powerful influencing factor of the internal oppressor, then the difficulty of Freire's beginning praxis comes into focus. Freire's perception that overcoming this internal oppressor is "one of the gravest obstacles" gains significance. It is not just that the internal oppressor controls thoughts and action; it is that the internal oppressor "absorbs those within it." At the same time, since Freire's praxis begins with critical reflection upon a situation, the power of critical thought to dissipate the control of the internal oppressor is implied as well. The following is Freire's expression of the difficulty encountered in enabling the oppressed to surface from this submergence within oppressive reality:

One of the gravest obstacles to the achievement of liberation is that oppressive reality absorbs those within it and thereby acts to submerge men's consciousness. Functionally, oppression is domesticating. To no longer be prey to its force, one must emerge from it and turn upon it. (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 36)

It is obvious that the oppressed cannot "turn upon" oppressive reality until they "emerge from it" and that the emergence requires that they be aware of themselves and of their world as existing in oppressive reality. Freire therefore indicates that it is necessary to make "oppression and its causes" the "objects of reflection by the oppressed" for only in that critical reflection will arise their "necessary engagement in the struggle for their liberation" (p. 37). Thus it is at this beginning of Freire's pedagogy of liberation that recognition must occur so that the oppressed can commit themselves to their own liberation from oppression. Freire indicates that this

initial commitment of the oppressed forms the basis of the pedagogy and that once the struggle for liberation is in process, the pedagogy itself will be in process of being "made and remade":

This pedagogy makes oppression and its causes objects of reflection by the oppressed, and from that reflection will come their necessary engagement in the struggle for their liberation. And in the struggle this pedagogy will be made and remade. (1970/1984, p. 33)

Freire's pedagogy thus begins with an objectification of the reality in which the oppressed are placed so that they can emerge from it. It is of significance that the oppressed are very much aware of being downtrodden. The problem is that they have a distorted perception of humanity as a result of being submerged within oppressive reality. Their perception of humanity to be emulated is formed on the only model they know, that of the oppressor:

Their ideal is to be men; but for them to be men is to be oppressors. This is their model of humanity. This phenomenon derives from the fact that the oppressed, at a certain moment of their existential experience, adopt an attitude of "adhesion" to the oppressor. Under these circumstances they cannot "consider" him sufficiently clearly to objectify him--to discover him "outside" themselves. (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 31)

Freire's pedagogy thus starts with objectification. From this objectification of oppressive reality, the oppressed emerge through recognition of the situation as an historical reality in which they are placed and not one to which they are fated. Recognition brings resistance to such limitation and fosters commitment of the oppressed to win their freedom. Freire insists that this concept of freedom must become part of the consciousness of the oppressed engaged in a struggle, that freedom must be won:

Freedom is acquired by conquest, not by gift. It must be pursued constantly and responsibly. Freedom is not an ideal located outside of man; nor is it an idea which becomes myth. It is rather the indispensable condition for the quest for human completion. (1970/1984, p. 31)

It becomes evident that Freire's pedagogy of the oppressed, that of liberation, is a "pedagogy which must be forged with, not for, the oppressed in the incessant struggle to regain their humanity" (1970/1984, p. 33). Thus to attempt a pedagogy for liberation by instructing or informing the oppressed of their condition is to resort to the pedagogy of the oppressor and thereby to continue the dehumanization of the oppressed. To tell the oppressed of their freedom is to relegate freedom to a myth or ideal or gift. It is to deny the oppressed the reality of freedom by keeping them from the development of critical thought that brings commitment to winning that freedom. The struggle for freedom begins for the oppressed when they emerge from the depths of oppressive reality to reflect critically on their situation and to understand that "they have been destroyed precisely because their situation has reduced them to things" (1970/1984, p. 55). Freire asserts on the basis of his praxis as a catalyst to begin the liberation process, that "the point of departure must always be with men in the 'here and now,' which constitutes the situation within which they are submerged, from which they emerge, and in which they intervene" (p. 73). Freire can furthermore assert on the basis of experience gained within the pedagogy of liberation that "a deepened consciousness of their situation leads men to apprehend that situation as an historical reality susceptible of transformation" (p. 73). When the oppressed can objectify the oppressor by removing themselves from

the oppressor consciousness, they discover "they have been the 'hosts' of the oppressor" and that "to regain their humanity they must cease to be things and fight as men" (p. 55). Freire furthermore reveals that a discovery of what has occurred through the oppressor domination enables the oppressed to start believing in themselves: "It is only when the oppressed find the oppressor out and become involved in the organized struggle for their liberation that they begin to believe in themselves" (p. 52). Freire points out that this belief in self is a "radical requirement" in that the oppressed "cannot enter the struggle as objects in order later to become men" (p. 55). The liberation of the oppressed is always a "liberation of men, not things":

Accordingly, while no one liberates himself by his own efforts alone, neither is he liberated by others. Liberation, a human phenomenon, cannot be achieved by semihumans. Any attempt to treat men as semihumans only dehumanizes them. When men are already dehumanized, due to the oppression they suffer, the process of their liberation must not employ the methods of dehumanization. (1970/1984, p. 53)

One important consideration must be noted here. Simply reflecting on the oppressive reality and thereby discovering they have been reduced to objects is not to make the oppressed into instantaneous Subjects or "men":

It would indeed be idealistic to affirm that by merely reflecting on oppressive reality and discovering their status as objects, men have thereby already become Subjects. But while this perception in and of itself does not mean that men have become Subjects, it does mean...that they are Subjects in expectancy--an expectancy which leads them to seek to solidify their new status (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 125)

Moreover, Freire stresses that in enabling the oppressed to gain the status of "Subjects in expectancy" there can be no employment of the banking concept of education:

The capability of banking education to minimize or annul the students' creative power and to stimulate their credulity serves the interests of the oppressors, who care neither to have the world revealed nor to see it transformed. The oppressors use their "humanitarianism" to preserve a profitable situation. Thus they react almost instinctively against any experiment in education which stimulates the critical faculties and is not content with a partial view of reality but always seeks out the ties which link one point to another and one problem to another. (1970/1984, p. 60)

It is also clear that Freire calls attention to the methods used in the pedagogy of the oppressor as those that do not bring about liberation. Moreover, Freire stresses that "education as the exercise of domination" renders students passive and prohibits the development of critical thought "with the ideological intent of indoctrinating them" (p. 65) so that they adapt or adjust to the demands of oppressive reality. Freire reveals that it is in marked contrast of method and purpose that the pedagogy of liberation is forged. To use the methods of the oppressor is to "negate" the "pursuit of liberation":

This accusation is not made in the naive hope that the dominant elites will thereby simply abandon the practice. Its objective is to call the attention of true humanists to the fact that they cannot use banking educational methods in the pursuit of liberation, for they would only negate that very pursuit. (1970/1984, p. 65)

Since the educational method of the oppressor, as indicated by Freire's concept of the banking educational method, is antialogical and antihuman, the method of Freire's pedagogy of liberation is dialogical and prohuman. It is necessary to examine the nature of the dialogue as Freire perceives it and the humanizing effects as Freire utilizes it in his pedagogy of liberation.

Dialogue

The pedagogy of the oppressed that Freire offers as the instrument of humanization or liberation is dialogical in nature:

The only effective instrument is a humanizing pedagogy in which the revolutionary leadership establishes a permanent dialogue with the oppressed. (1970/1984, p. 55)

Dialogue liberates, for it stimulates critical thinking. Freire affirms that "only dialogue which requires critical thinking is also capable of generating critical thinking" (1970/1984, p. 81). Freire also reveals that "any attempt to analyze dialogue as a human phenomenon" must discover "something which is the essence of dialogue itself: the word" (p. 75):

But the word is more than just an instrument which makes dialogue possible; accordingly, we must seek its constitutive elements. Within the word we find two dimensions, reflection and action, in such radical interaction that if one is sacrificed--even in part--the other immediately suffers. There is no true word that is not at the same time a praxis. Thus, to speak a true word is to transform the world. (1970/1984, p. 75)

In Freire's perception of the creative nature of the word, individuals naming the world are actually creating their world:

Human existence cannot be silent, nor can it be nourished by false words, but only by true words, with which men transform the world. To exist, humanly, is to name the world, to change it. Once named, the world in its turn reappears to the namers as a problem and requires of them a new naming. Men are not built in silence, but in word, in work, in action-reflection. (1970/1984, p. 76)

True dialogue consists in "an encounter between men, mediated by the world, in order to name the world" (p. 76); furthermore, since "apart from inquiry, apart from praxis, men cannot be truly human" (p. 58), "dialogue is an existential necessity" (p. 77) for gaining the significance of being human:

If it is in speaking their word that men, by naming the world, transform it, dialogue imposes itself as the way which men achieve significance as men. (1970/1984, p. 77)

Freire is not making these observations of dialogue in reference to the oppressed alone. He clarifies or reveals what comes into the universality of liberation as it concerns the oppressor:

The pedagogy of the oppressed is an instrument for their critical discovery that both they and their oppressors are manifestations of dehumanization. (p. 33)

In oppressing others into objects, the oppressors have at the same time dehumanized themselves. They cannot perceive this result of their action; thus it is left to the oppressed to restore humanity not only to themselves but to their oppressors as well:

As the oppressors dehumanize others and violate their rights, they themselves also become dehumanized. As the oppressed, fighting to be human, take away the oppressors' power to dominate and suppress, they restore to the oppressors the humanity they had lost in the exercise of oppression. (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 42)

Thus the dialogue as the method of a pedagogy of liberation is the means by which all individuals share so that no one prescribes for another:

Hence, dialogue cannot occur between those who want to name the world and those who do not wish this naming--between those who deny other men the right to speak their word and those whose right to speak has been denied them. Those who have been denied their primordial right to speak their word must first reclaim this right and prevent the continuation of this dehumanizing aggression. (1970/1984, pp. 76-77)

Dialogue constitutes the right of all humans:

But while to say the true word--which is work, which is praxis--is to transform the world, saying that word is not the privilege of some few men, but the right of every man. Consequently, no one can say a true word alone--nor can he say it for another, in a prescriptive act which robs others of their words. (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 76)

Freire maintains that "critical and liberating dialogue, which presupposes action, must be carried on with the oppressed at whatever the stage of their struggle for liberation" (1970/1984, p. 52). It is

therefore a continuing method of liberation that is a vital part of a continuing education for liberation:

Because liberation action is dialogical in nature, dialogue cannot be a posteriori to that action, but must be concomitant with it. And since liberation must be a permanent condition, dialogue becomes a continuing aspect of liberating action. (1970/1984, p. 134)

It must, however, be a genuine dialogue, one with a foundation of love, for only love can oppose the "lovelessness which lies at the heart of the oppressors' violence" (p. 29). Freire makes clear that the true dialogue is an act of love:

Dialogue cannot exist, however, in the absence of a profound love for the world and for men. The naming of the world, which is an act of creation and re-creation, is not possible if it is not infused with love. Love is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and dialogue itself. It is thus necessarily the task of responsible Subjects and cannot exist in a relation of domination.... Because love is an act of courage, not of fear, love is commitment to other men. No matter where the oppressed are found, the act of love is commitment to their cause--the cause of liberation. (1970/1984, p. 78)

True dialogue involves humility in that the world cannot be named by the arrogance of those who perceive the ignorance of others and cannot perceive their own. Authentic dialogue requires "an intense faith in man, faith in his power to make and remake, to create and re-create, faith in his vocation to be more fully human (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 79):

Faith in man is an a priori requirement for dialogue; the "dialogical man" believes in other men even before he meets them face to face. His faith, however, is not naive. The "dialogical man" is critical and knows that although it is within the power of men to create and transform, in a concrete situation of alienation men may be impaired in the use of that power. Far from destroying his faith in man, however, this possibility strikes him as a challenge to which he must respond. (p. 79)

Thus it becomes clear in examining Freire's dialogical method of pedagogy that the process of liberation requires the dialogue as a continuing encounter among individuals so that true communication

results in a resolution to the contradiction between oppressor and oppressed or teacher and student. Freire's explanation of the communication opened by the dialogue also indicates the dialectic that the dialogue initiates:

Without dialogue there is no communication, and without communication there can be no true education. Education which is able to resolve the contradiction between teacher and students takes place in a situation in which both address their act of cognition to the object by which they are mediated. (1970/1984, p. 81)

The dialectic is an integral part of authentic praxis. Freire maintains that "in dialectical thought, word and action are intimately inter-dependent" (p. 38). The dialogue initiates the dialectical process. In the content of the pedagogy of liberation, Freire uses generative themes pertaining to the world and the "reality which mediates men" (p.86):

It is to the reality which mediates men, and to the perception of that reality held by educators and people, that we must go to find the program content of education. The investigation of what I have termed the people's "thematic universe"--the complex of their "generative themes"--inaugurates the dialogue of education as the practice of freedom. The methodology of that investigation must likewise be dialogical, affording the opportunity both to discover generative themes and to stimulate people's awareness in regard to these themes. Consistent with the liberating purpose of dialogical education, the object of the investigation is not men, but rather the thought-language with which men refer to reality, the levels at which they perceive that reality, and their view of the world, in which their generative themes are found. (1970/1984, p. 86)

Freire also reveals that abstraction for a "coded" situation may be used. He furthermore asserts that if "men perceive reality as dense, impenetrable, and enveloping, it is indispensable to proceed with the investigation by means of abstraction" (p. 95). It is in this coded situation that Freire reveals the essential action of the dialectic:

This method does not involve reducing the concrete to the abstract (which would signify the negation of its dialectical nature), but rather maintaining both elements as opposites

which interrelate dialectically in the act of reflection. This dialectical movement of thought is exemplified perfectly in the analysis of a concrete, existential, "coded" situation. Its "decoding" requires moving from the abstract to the concrete; this requires moving from the part to the whole and then returning to the parts; this in turn requires that the Subject recognize himself in the object (the coded existential situation) and recognize the object as a situation in which he finds himself, together with other Subjects. (1970/1984, pp. 95-96)

Freire notes that "if the decoding is well done," then the movement from the "abstract to the concrete which occurs in the analysis of a coded situation leads to the supersedence of the abstraction by the critical perception of the concrete" (p. 96). Freire clarifies the interdependence of thought and action, of individuals and their world:

Men, as being "in a situation," find themselves rooted in temporal-spatial conditions which mark them and which they also mark. They will tend to reflect on their own "situationality" to the extent that they are challenged by it to act upon it. Men are because they are in a situation. And they will be more the more they not only critically reflect upon their existence but critically act upon it. ((1970/1984, p. 100)

Freire furthermore implies the dialectical nature of this interdependence of individuals and their world that in turn affirms the need for an ongoing dialogical pedagogy for liberation:

There would be no human action if there were no objective reality, no world to be the "not I" of man and to challenge him; just as there would be no human action if man were not a "project," if he were not able to transcend himself to perceive his reality and understand it in order to transform it. (1970/1984, p. 38)

Central to this human action of transforming the self and world is the act of knowing. In Pedagogy in Process (1976/1978) Freire defines the "radical" form of being more fully human as involving critical thought. These are then human beings who "not only know but know that they know" (1976/1978, p. 24). It is this knowing that the pedagogy of liberation undertakes through its dialogue and its praxis. Solidarity is insured in this liberation process for there is no distinction to

be gained. Furthermore, in the pedagogy there is no distinction between teacher and students, for they are both involved in recreating the world:

Teacher and students (leadership and people)...are both Subjects, not only in the task of unveiling that reality and thereby coming to know it critically but in the task of re-creating that knowledge. (Freire, 1976/1978, p. 56)

Freire holds the concept that the individual's potential to be more fully human, to become a "subject who acts upon and transforms his world," lies in the meaning of the act of knowing found in the true dialogue, the catalyst of liberating dialectic, the methodological instrument of Freire's liberating pedagogy:

Finally, true dialogue cannot exist unless the dialoguers engage in critical thinking--thinking which discern an indivisible solidarity between the world and men and admits of no dichotomy between them--thinking which perceives reality as process, as transformation, rather than as a static entity--thinking which does not separate itself from action, but constantly immerses itself in temporality without fear of the risks involved... For the critic the important thing is the continuing humanization of men. (Freire, 1970/1984, p. 81)

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS: AN OVERVIEW

In referring to Freud's concept of inner oppression and to Hegel's dialectic of consciousness for self-becoming, while at the same time examining Freire's pedagogy for liberation, it becomes clear that Freud, Hegel and Freire are emancipators-educators in that they share a concern for enabling the individual to liberate himself or herself from limitations into becoming more fully human with all that being human implies for development of potential. The complexity in Freud's and Hegel's concept of liberation reveals a corresponding complexity existing in Freire's praxis. Any overview cannot convey this complex texture of liberation in fullness; there can, however, be a sketch of interweaving of these concepts of liberation in order to give focus to the premise that consciousness of humanity can be educated, that consciousness can in this education be liberated from oppression or limitation, and that the potential for such liberation into becoming more fully human is the birthright of all individuals existing in any culture.

Freire's premise that it is an individual's "ontological vocation" to become more fully human through the development of critical thought places the development of being within the context of knowing. An examination of Hegel's ontological concepts reveals a similar assertion that critical reflection on the externals of reality enables the individual to be emancipated from that reality. The hegemony that makes up Freire's society of limitation is present in

Hegel's concept of knowing as well. Hegel maintains that accepting any external dictate or tradition limits the individual from developing into fullness of being. Whereas Freire looks to the immediate situation of social reality as limiting, Hegel perceives any external, even the abstraction of truth, as limiting if the individual accepts it without reflection on it, without working out its purpose in a dialectic so that it becomes actual for that individual. Hegel then agrees with Freire on the given reality as false if accepted uncritically but he clarifies that it is not the immediate result of the dialectic but the working out of the purpose to the end that makes spirit actual and truth whole. Still there remains the unconscious aspect of the individual that Hegel maintains holds the promise of spiritual richness for development of being if the rational processes are developed through the dialectic to utilize this energy. This spiritual reservoir is not under the control of the being restricted in development. It is here the study must turn to Freud for understanding of what this unconscious involves for the development of the individual into becoming fully human. Freud is also concerned with the ontological development of the individual into "becoming more human" (Bettelheim, 1983, p. 4). He too perceives the act of knowing as the means by which the unknown forces that limit the development of the soul can be integrated into being when liberation occurs. Thus knowing becomes for Freud a recognition of inner forces that limit development. It is Freud's premise that "by isolating and examining the neglected or hidden aspects" (Bettelheim, 1983, p. 12) of the soul that the individual can understand the influence they have in the individual's life and hence the individual can be liberated from such limiting

and controlling influence from within. Freud's ontological concern for full development of being centers on integrating this primal energy, on making the unknown known, so that the rational processes can direct this energy into the individual's becoming integrated for full expression of being. What Freud does is to reveal the depth of oppressive reality that must surface for recognition so that the limitation of being does not continue from this unconscious oppression. Psychoanalytic thinking is Freud's term for critical thought; it is the means by which the dark forces that limit development are brought into recognition for integration into rational thought processes. Bettelheim explains how liberation from limitation occurs when a confrontation with unconscious forces occurs:

Freud shows how... when we are able to confront dark forces with the power of our rational mind, unencumbered by unconscious pressure, the rationality wins out; and when rationality dominates our actions, we can overcome the destructive powers and free ourselves of their ability to harm us. (Bettelheim, 1983, pp. 25-26)

Freire proposes the dialectic as the means by which transformation of self and society become actual. The dialectic then results in an act of creation and recreation of self and situation. Freire's dialectic is immediate, employed to liberate self for fuller being from an oppressive situation. Hegel takes Freire's dialectic as a starting point for all dialectical thought. When Freire claims that the ontological right of an individual is "to be subject who acts upon and transforms his world, and in so doing moves towards ever new possibilities of fuller and richer life individually and collectively" (1970, p. 113), his concern is for immediate reality of a situation and for immediate release from an oppressive situation. In working with illiterates on the most

oppressed level of consciousness, Freire does not elaborate on what "a richer and fuller life" could ultimately be. He indicates, however, that it can become one of solidarity and love if the dialectic on reality is continued. Here is where Hegel provides the philosophical basis for Freire's premise and an explanation for his success with the dialectic in enabling these illiterates to emerge from their situation and begin to move into liberation of being. Hegel takes what is the beginning dialectic, when consciousness first recognizes the untruth of phenomena, and reveals the power operating within the dialectic to move consciousness into new modes of thought, into higher levels of being, and into new realities created and perceived by evolving consciousness. Thus Freire's adamant insistence on the ongoing process of reality that calls for education for liberation to be an ongoing process as well becomes a philosophically sound one, for Hegel's education for consciousness moves in constant dialectic of self and reality to annul the existing situation, preserve it for memory, and transcend it in creation of a new reality. Thus Hegel not only confirms the power of Freire's dialectic to effect change through creating and recreating self and society but Hegel also indicates that the inner force, perceived by Freire as creative, issues from a spiritual energy inherent in the nature of the dialectic. Hegel's education for consciousness moves in constant dialectic and follows in this dialectical thought the means by which Spirit, the force of the dialectic, has evolved. Hegel gives spiritual depth and validity to Freire's work. It must be toward a better, more just, and more ethical society and self that Freire's dialectic indicates, for in the dialectic as Hegel perceives it, the spiritual force that moves the

dialectic becomes in concrete form what it is implicitly. Moreover, Hegel organizes this education of consciousness and thereby moves from immediate creation of self and society to evolvment of self and society to the level of ultimate reason where fullness of being exists, where mutual recognition of the solidarity proclaimed by Freire exists among all, where freedom is expressed externally because it exists internally, and where the inequity of justice cannot flourish when individuals obey laws arising from within them and thus obey themselves. What Freire does is to translate Hegel's act of knowing that leads to fullness of being into Freirean praxis, where thought or awareness of a situation effects corresponding action on that situation. Freire confirms Hegel's premise that only in questioning critically, in reflecting on what is perceived as reality, can consciousness start its education into full liberation of being.

Oppression is the chief concern of Freire, perceiving as he does through the dialectic of his own experience and study, the oppressor class is a reality and it exists because there is also an oppressed class that serves it. Freire moreover recognizes how pervasive is the control of this oppressor class. It is one in which the oppressor is born and in which he or she is shaped with a resulting consciousness of the rightness to possess and control others. Freire also perceives that the oppressor consciousness can become internalized and become the oppressor within. It is here that Freud lends substance to what Freire is saying. Freud knows the oppressor is indeed within, existing as an unknown but an influencing part of the individual. Freud's premise is that there is "a controlling and often overcontrolling institution of

the mind which is created by the person himself out of inner needs and external pressures that have been internalized" (Pettelheim, 1983, p. 8). Freud's insight into the inner conflict of consciousness and the internal oppressor that is often shaped by the external oppression of civilization reveals that such struggle diverts spiritual energy from its integration and moreover dissipates the life force with resulting limitation of physical or mental development so that fullness of being is thwarted from development. What Freud does is to reveal the depth of oppressive reality that must surface for recognition so that limitation of being does not continue from this unconscious oppression. Freud moreover reveals how limitation of being occurs when the flow of being is impeded by unconscious oppression. Hegel serves to illuminate the fullness of being that can result when the flow of being develops through an ongoing process of dialectical knowing. Hegel takes this level of the soul and reveals what can be, what is ontologically possible, when the dialectic of critical thought releases being in that it enables consciousness to annul the existing situation and transcend into new creations of self and society.

A better self and society is a goal for Freire, Hegel, and Freud. Freire has no desire to build on the existing one. What he proposes is a new society, where oppressive reality and its classes are dissipated by an ongoing dialogue and dialectical process. What Freire is proposing is a revolutionary consciousness that examines reality in solidarity with others as an ongoing dialectic and creates/recreates self and society for a "richer and fuller life," where community of mind is reflected in and created by community of society. Hegel too

speaks of a community of consciousness and speaks as well of a new birth and of a new spirit where there exists mutual recognition or Freirean solidarity. Freud too speaks of the emergence of a new person, a new personality, through the critical reflection of psychoanalytical thought. Taken together, Freud, Hegel, and Freire reveal the possibilities inherent in humankind that can surface for expression and be released for development through the pedagogy of liberation that never gives freedom from oppression but aids in the birth of the new individual.

It becomes evident in examining Freire's pedagogy of liberation that both Freud and Hegel have relevancy for the full projection of Freire's thoughts and practices. This study attempts to show that both Freud and Hegel lend substance and insight to the tenets and praxis of Freire's belief in the pedagogy of liberation as an ongoing process; that Freire, Hegel, and Freud share a concern for the ontological development of humanity into becoming more fully human; and that all three recognize the act of knowing as vital to the development and liberation of the individual into fullness of being.

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