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Political parties are one of the most important social groups in modern America. Research in political science has shown that an individual's political identity is more than just an indicator of ideological opinions. A political party can indicate a number of other social characteristics at play, even going so far as predicting favorite TV stations or favorite grocery stores. Despite this overarching effect on social life, the study of homogamy as it pertains to political identity has not historically been considered in a social context. Previous research has tended to focus on the individual preferences of prospective dates. While this aspect is important it only a portion of the bigger picture. This thesis was created in order to broaden the scope of political homogamy. I created a survey using theory from sociology, political science, social psychology, intergroup contact theory, and theory on homogamy in order to collect data on the dating habits of various political partisans. The survey received 217 total responses and included responses from across the United States and multiple racial and political groups. What was found was that in general the more closely attached an individual is to their political party, the less likely they are to date members of other parties. The same result holds true for dating people with different opinions on abortion. However not every party shares this relationship and some are not affected by political attachment at all. Additionally, racial attachment in general was shown to decrease willingness to date between races, even though this relationship was evident in all racial groups. In order to fully consider dating in a social context I also measured how the relationships of friends to the respondent effected inter-group dating as well as copartisan disapproval and perceived marginalization. Friends having relationships with non-group members has been shown to increase willingness to date between groups while the disapproval

of copartisans has shown to decrease willingness. Marginalization was unique in that the intended measurement tool did demonstrate that as the perception of marginalization increases, the willingness to date also increases.

MORE THAN A PARTY: HOW PARTY AFFILIATION AFFECTS INTERGROUP DATING

by

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## CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Party polarization in America is a hotly debated topic from academic circles to bar room banter. Despite this, one aspect of polarization that is understudied is the effect that party identity has on one's dating life. While there has been some research as to whether or not one's party choice is a factor on potential dates (c.f. Klofstad, McDermott, and Hatemi 2012; Brown 2020, Huber and Malhotra 2017; Kofoed 2008) what has not been researched is the effect that one's political identity has on dating outside of one's own social group. The research that has been collected has primarily only looked at the respondent's choice of political party, or looked at personality factors of prospective daters that may indicate a person's political identity (Klofstad, McDermott, and Hatemi 2012; Klofstad, McDermott and Hatemi, 2013; Easton and Holbein 2021; Nicholson et al. 2016; Huber and Malhotra 2017) . The quintessential problem with this approach is that modern political parties are not monolithic identities. Contemporary American political parties have become increasingly aligned with various other social identities and an individual's actions may be affected by these identities a person holds dear to them. With this thesis I will be researching: "How does the level of party attachment affect the willingness to date out-group members?". In order to complete this research, I conducted survey research that will measure the attachment to the respondents' party, the importance of the respondents' social identities as well as their willingness to date out-group members.

I will analyze this relationship in several ways. Research conducted here will primarily focus on individuals who are dating. The reason for this is because a person who is dating is in the process of choosing a potential mate and is actively weighing factors that contribute to the selection of potential mates, such as the various social identities of the other person.. As such,

this research can be considered to be primarily concerned with the concept of *homogamy*. Homogamy is the phenomenon where individuals will enter in romantic interpersonal relationships with individuals who share similar traits to themselves. However, the primary aim of this research is to take one's political identity and measure not only how one's own attachment to their political identity affects willingness to date out-group members but also how the perception of those who share that political identity will affect that same willingness. By doing this the research will place the process of dating within a social context instead of being affected strictly by individual preferences. In addition to measuring whether respondents would date only out-group party members, I will also measure willingness to date members of groups who do not share other social identities, primarily race, religion, and abortion preferences. The reason for this is that as parties have become increasingly homogeneous ideologically, they have also become increasingly sorted by social identities, many of which by themselves have strong evidence for homogamy, but have not been measured with a control for the political sorting that has occurred.

The reason that this is a pertinent topic to study is due to the fact that political identity does not stay strictly political. The central hypothesis of this research is that

*H1: As party attachment increases there will be a decrease in willingness to date members of an out-group.*

In other words, a negative correlation is expected between party attachment and willingness to date out of group. If this hypothesis would be proven true, it would mean that political identity does not just impact our political relationships, but also our prospective relationships with apolitical social identities. However due to the nature of dating it is important to control for effects that will affect dating such as preference and group pressure. As such the

attachment to individual social identities will also be measured against willingness to date various outgroups. Additionally, the perception of intergroup members and the perception of marginalization must also be considered in order to evaluate the effect that social setting has on daters.

To explain how political parties are being understood and defined for the purposes of this research, I draw upon political psychological views on the interpretation of political parties. Due to the nature of how the interaction between groups will need to be measured, I will also be drawing upon research from conflict studies as well as research and theory such as intergroup contact theory. Just as political identity is not monolithic, neither is any other social identity, and in order to properly understand dating more holistically there remains the need to have measures to control for other identity attachment. But first, I turn to a discussion of social and demographic theories of *Homogamy*; the tendency for people to date and marry people similar to themselves.

### ***Homogamy***

There has been a great deal of research analyzing homogamy and what its potential causes could be. Homogamy, the concept that members of one group will choose similar members as themselves to date and marry, is also known as “positive assortative mating.” Within this model mating is consistently aligned with agreed upon preferences or character traits (Belot and Francesconi, 2013; Buss and Barnes 1986). Preferences can take a wide variety of forms and the research that has been collected has been shown that homogamy exists in several various types of social groupings. Homogamy has been shown in age (Atkinson and Glass, 1985; South 1991; and Belot and Francesconi, 2013), race (Fishman et al. 2008; Labov and Jacobs, 1986; South 1991), religion (Glenn, 1982), education (Belot and Francesconi 2013), and political preferences (Klofstad et al. 2013; Easton and Holbein, 2021). The last of which will be

elaborated upon more thoroughly later. For the purposes of this research race, religion, opinions of abortion, and political identity are the primary forms of homogamy to consider.

One explanation for homogamy is that it is a result of personal preferences; that is, people prefer to date people like themselves. It has been found that for race, even in the most progressive populations there is still a great deal of racial preference. Additionally, where one has lived is equally as important as where they currently live when explaining racial preferences (Fishman et al. 2008). There has also been evidence that both males and females prefer partners of similar age and education (Belot and Francesconi, 2013). However, as many factors can be accounted for as individual or social preference, there still remains the issue of whether or not their physical or social environments have an impact on homogamy.

It is very important to recognize that the environment in which dating is occurring is equally as important as one's dating preferences or social pressures. In 1964, Alan Kerckhoff explained the importance of differentiating between structural opportunities in and normative adherence to better understand homogamy. One example of a structural inhibition is the fact that the pool of potential partners that an individual interacts with is directly influenced by institutional factors. One such approach to looking at homogamy through an institutional outlook is the marriage market approach. In this instance a "market" is being referred to as all of the places an individual may go where they can meet a potential mate. Within the framework of the marriage market approach, research has found that a person is more likely to engage in a homogamous relationship if they are to engage with same group members on a day-to-day basis (Belot and Francesconi, 2013). This is because social environments where spouses are typically chosen, such as work or school, are typically also homogeneous and thus can lead to homogamy even if one's personal preferences are not homogamous (Lee and Reiss, 1988). However even in

non-homogamous environments individuals still tend to lean towards homogamous relationships. In fact, even in environments where it is possible for each member to equally meet each other member, positive sorting will still occur along aligned preferences (Belot and Francesconi, 2013). It is also important to note that although many groups have a strong preference of homogamy, that also does not indicate that homogamy is synonymous with mate selection and it is for this reason that personal preferences must always be considered (South, 1991).

One issue that is apparent with the prior research is that the work focuses on couples who are already married instead of considering people who are actively dating or those who are single but are actively looking for a partner. I add to this prior research by focusing on how homogamy preferences might shape dating and relationship formation. Limited research on this topic has found that the sorting criteria that have been found in married couples have also been shown to be the same among couples who are dating, although dating couples tend to be somewhat less homogamous than married couples due to a “winnowing” process in which homogamous couples are more likely to keep a relationship intact and proceed to the next stage of a relationship (Blackwell and Lichter, 2004). However, the underlying nature of sorting among married and dating individuals that results in homogamy are a result of the same process; examining dating preferences therefore also illuminates the underlying processes which may lead to homogamous marriages..

### ***Parties and Partisanship***

Although the United States has had the same two major political parties for over a century the nature of these parties and even how the term “party” is understood has been changing amongst academic scholarship. Historically, a political party has been understood as a group that individuals attach themselves to due to a common understanding of ideology or policy

goals (Iyengar, Soods, and Lelkes 2012). However, recent literature in political science has noted that in the United States the notion of the political party being wholly ideological is no longer entirely accurate. Instead, it has been proposed that political parties can themselves be understood as a social identity integral to a person's perception of being. A social identity in this context is understood as a collection of certain aspects of an individual's self-image that are derived from the social categories to which they perceive themselves as belonging to (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). For political parties this means a collection of various social identities such as but not limited to race, religion, and education that all interact with each other to create a very strong connection to the party itself.

The first attempt to create a different model of understanding political parties outside of the typical ideological view was the Michigan model proposed by Angus Campbell. According to this model partisan identification is a psychological identification and an affective orientation (Campbell, 1960). However, the Michigan model is insufficient for describing contemporary parties. A more pertinent explanation is to understand them as a conglomeration of multiple social identities. Furthermore, because of the intersection of multiple identities, political parties are instead chosen and understood as an intersection of these social identities (Kane, Mason, and Wronski 2021). In other words, that both major parties in the United States are better explained by being a coalition of other social identities rather than a group of individuals combined with the same policy goals. This explanation goes as far as saying that a vote, while demonstrating partisan preference, can also be indicative of a person's religion, race, ethnicity, gender, neighborhood, and even their favorite grocery store (Mason, 14). The idea that parties are ideologically driven is further broken down by the fact that partisan ideological attachment

is, at best, a secondary effect on attitudes that changes according to what issue is being discussed (Strickler, 2018).

One particular fact of political identity is that there is an additional layer for political parties in regards to how their perception of belonging to a party can affect their affective attachment regardless of ideology. For Democrats for example, there is a difference between someone who is holding liberal policy positions and someone who is self-identifying as ‘liberal’ (Mason, 21). Similarly, it is important to note that just because someone is self-identifying with a group, it does not necessarily indicate that they are going to hold more of those opinions. As Liliana Mason stated, “feeling more strongly connected with a group called conservatives does not automatically mean that a person holds more conservative policy positions.” (Mason, 21). For these reasons it is not suitable to treat political parties as ideologically driven groupings. Rather, they should be understood as a larger social group to which people self-identify with regardless of their ideological predispositions. Interestingly, the effect of the political parties sorting into specific types of grouping has resulted in political parties not being just a group consisting of people like the individual, but of people that the individual likes (Kane, Mason, and Wronski 2021). In this way there is an additional psychological layer attached to parties that also cannot be accounted for by only looking at them ideologically. To partisans in America, a political identity is an integral part of their being. However, this is not because the average partisan holds policy positions that are integral to their being, but rather because their other social identities that are important to them have been absorbed into the party identity while also surrounding them with people whom they want to be around.

Another way to say all of this is that there are two ways of defining what a “party” is. The first is the social definition which focuses on people’s feelings of social attachment to a group of



others, not their policy attitudes, also understood as affective polarization. The second is the issue-based definition which is limited to only individual policy attitudes and excludes group attachments (Mason, 17). With both of these explanations there can be a variety of partisan attachment levels however one of the most important levels of attachment is one where the party social identity is very salient, also known as a “social partisan”. Social partisans are not only aware of their political identity, but also the combined ideological and various other social identities and as such are critical for understanding the partisan definitions. In fact, these partisans are important since they are often known for demonstrating less reciprocity for outgroup arguments and more reciprocity toward their own party (Strickler, 2018). However, there is a major problem with the issue-based definition that prevents its utility in this research. That, by its very nature, the issue-based definition treats parties as monoliths by excluding additional group attachments. This is an issue since no person is ever a single identity and in order to understand one identity, such as political identity, it is important to measure how that interacts with other identities such as race, gender, ethnicity, etc.

There are several ways that polarization has been defined and each of these explanations may address different areas that polarization occurs. Thus, indicating different ways that polarization is manifested. This research is most interested in polarization among interpersonal relationships of American citizens. Specifically, there are two concepts that were used: affective polarization, which put simply is that both parties, Republicans and Democrats, consider the other to be hypocritical, selfish, and close-minded (Iyengar and Krupkin, 2018) and the Group Sentiments Model of Partisanship (Kane, Mason, and Wronski 2021), which suggests that an opinion of the party is not solely influenced by the party but also by the groups associated with the party. In other words that partisans choose their political identity based on their own group

identity, but that also they adjust their political choices when informed by which groups are associated with each party. Importantly, this type of partisanship informs that it is the sentiment of the other groups rather than explicit membership of the group that is driving polarization. (Kane, Mason, and Wronski 2021). This is important because of how the parties are being sorted. While it is true that the identities within the GSMP can vary from ascribed attributes to achieved attributes, how this model of partisanship reflects dating life has yet to be researched. Specifically, how the sentiments of aligned groups change willingness to date an outgroup member.

The primary parties in American politics have become more and more socially sorted, meaning that certain groups are more frequently aligning with specific parties. The particular point of concern here is how that may affect the relationships between the social identities that are now more and more associated with political parties. As parties become more homogenous, not just in ideology, but in race, class, geography, and religion, partisans on both sides become increasingly connected to these groups that divide them. (Mason, 40). It is important to note that the mere act of identifying as a member of a party is sufficient enough to trigger negative attitudes towards the opposing party (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes 2012). In fact, being a member of a party can also cause significant differences in preferences of the two parties even when the policy position of the individual conflicts with those of the party (Mason, 53). Furthermore, since the 1980s, partisan opinions, that being the opinion of party identifiers, have declined whereas ideological opinions have more or less stayed the same (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes 2012). What this research has shown is that there is a real statistical basis stating that party identity is not solely ideologically driven. If it were the same or similar decrease in ideological attitudes that was present within the changes of party attitudes would be present. Since the parties have been

organized around social identities rather than their ideological preference, parties can be considered to be primarily affective attachment. This type of attachment has created a culture of us-against-them tribal politics where both parties harbor negative feelings towards one another and stereotypes have become increasingly differentiated (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes 2012). This is not to say simply that the parties do not like each other. Rather that the responses are typically more visceral and tribal when encountering opposition.

The partisan anger towards one another has been only exacerbated by the increased sorting within each party as well. What had kept partisanship from getting to the level that it is at today in the past were cross-cutting cleavages, also known as social cleavages. An individual's identity is not singular and within one person there are multiple identities that someone may hold whose groups may have conflicting interests, this is a cross-cutting cleavage. For example, a Democratic partisan who is also a supporter of unrestricted gun ownership. The Democratic party is known for its promotion of gun-control whereas an outlook that supports gun ownership without government intervention is most commonly associated with the Republican party. The prevalence of cross-cutting cleavages reduce intolerance towards outgroups by providing partisans the capacity to see that there is more than one side to an issue and that the political conflict is a legitimate controversy with rationales on both sides (Mutz, 2002). As the parties became increasingly sorted between each other, the amount of distinct cross-cutting cleavages that would typically allow for lower partisanship began to decrease. In fact, several decades ago the divisions between Americans in party, ideology, religion, class, race, and geography did not align neatly (Mason, 25). The importance of this is that the structure of the parties are inherently different now and the parties are more aligned not only ideologically but also by the groups that

also identify with a given party. This type of alignment is causing greater political and social division.

Politically, the partisan preference towards one party has steadily increased since 1984 to a total of 10 percentage point difference (Mason, 51). Socially, partisans are less likely to want to interact or even be around members of another party. Democrats and Republicans alike would rather spend time with members of their own party than members of the opposing party (Mason, 55). In 2016, a poll conducted by Pew showed that in response to a hypothetical question regarding someone moving into their neighborhood 61 percent of Democrats and Republicans agreed that it would be easier to get along with the new member of the neighborhood if they shared the same party (Pew, 2016). Additionally, the more sorted that Americans become, the more likely they will want to pull away from one another (Mason, 72). The disconnection of Americans from one another also breaks down the type of conversations that can break down partisanship and create more intergroup interaction. Interpersonal discussion of political issues has decreased between groups making engagement between divergent perspectives more difficult (Strickler, 2018).

Conflicts between parties increase when racial and religious prejudice align with political identity. The sorting that has occurred has linked racial and religious prejudice directly to partisan preferences and has allowed for political opinions to be driven by increasing social divides (Mason, 73). This is not to say that partisanship does not have its place in the political process. Partisanship can be necessary at times for the government to organize and streamline decision making for the citizens. However, contention between partisans tends to increase when partisanship is also invoking racial, religious, or other social identities as well (Mason, 60). Due to this it is expected that highly sorted partisans will be biased against their outparty friends,

neighbors and romantic interests no matter what they think about political issues (Mason, 72). This phenomenon of partisanship has been documented by Liliana Mason in her 2015 work where she states

“

“That a partisan behaves more like a sports fan than a banker...Partisans feel emotionally connected to the welfare of the party; they prefer to spend time with other members of the party’ and when the party is threatened, they become angry... the connection between partisan and party is an emotional and social one, as well as a logical one.”

She goes on further to say that influences that determine party affiliation are largely associational or psychological. These influences cause the individual to feel more strongly towards a party because that party also encompasses a larger or more familiar swath of their social world. Furthermore, this social partisanship affects political interactions as well as their understanding of the political world. In turn, the self-sorting that partisanship causes in turn generates greater partisan bias, activism, and anger (Mason, 2015). Self-sorting is understood as when a partisan also sorts their own social identities other than party into their political identity as well. These relationships that generate bias, anger, and activism are becoming increasingly dependent on how well identities align with one another. In addition, the more sorted that Americans become, the more emotionally attached they will become to their party identities (Mason 2016).

Even as political preferences are shown to be more complex than solely ideology, there is one ideological issue that seems to be an exception of sorts, abortion. While it has been shown that party ID is not a measure of solely ideological issues, abortion remains a salient issue among partisans. What is unique about abortion identity is that the proponents and opponents have both

generated labels for their stance (Mason, 114). This creates an additional social identity even greater than party identity. Research has shown that mean levels of identification among Pro Life and Pro-Choice individuals are generally higher than partisan identification (Mason, 115). Since the spring of 2022 when the landmark Supreme Court Case *Roe v. Wade* was overturned, there has been little research done addressing how attachment to one's abortion identity is important to their dating life.

One important note is that not every American will identify as Democratic or Republican and as such the level of political based strain may be different depending on your personal identities. There is a great deal of citizens who opt to side with neither and adopt the title of Independent. However, this decision does not necessarily remove them from partisan bias. Although an increasing number of Americans call themselves political independents, partisan allegiance is often retained due to the social identities connected the parties remain intact (Klar and Krupnikov, 2016). As such, despite an individual describing themselves as independent they still may harbor a certain level of partisan prejudice. What is interesting about the type of partisan prejudice that is exhibited is derived from the same impulses that drive racial and religious prejudice (Mason, 16). However, despite this there is one major caveat that it is nearly impossible, in most natural social situations, to distinguish discrimination fueled by real or perceived threats between the groups and discrimination based on attempts to establish a valued distinctiveness for one's own group (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). In other words, although partisan prejudice can clearly be observed, it is incredibly difficult to distinguish whether such discrimination is in reaction to a threat or if it is based upon a shared identity with one's own group. An additional danger that arises with the separation of partisans from one another is the exaggeration of conflicts. When partisans are separated and exposure to outgroup members are

limited, perceived differences are often pronounced to the extent that the perceived threat of imaginary conflicts begins to rival genuine conflicts (Mason, 14). What can be said is that as the emotional connection becomes stronger that political bias will impact areas of life that could be considered non-political.

It has been shown that individuals will discriminate based on party attachment even in contexts that suggest that party identity should not matter. That even when individuals are presented with a more relevant group identity to the situation, that partisan discrimination continues to occur. In fact, the mention of party attachment is sufficient enough to shape outcomes in nonpolitical settings. Currently the party-centric context of partisanship is chronically salient. In fact, even the mention of partisan attachment is sufficient for it to shape outcomes in nonpolitical settings (Engelhardt and Utych 2020). However, it has yet to be determined whether or not partisanship exists where it is not mentioned at all. One such apolitical setting can be the realm of dating. A setting is considered apolitical when the conversations or controversies of contemporary politics is not a primary function of the interactions. Dating can be considered an apolitical process because while there are certainly trends of similar political identities among spouses, daters do not typically present their political identities during the initial dating process (Klofstad, McDermott, and Hatemi 2012).

Additionally, the research that has been conducted regarding spillover itself has not focused on romantic relationships. That is not to say that there has been no research on the topic however.

### ***Homogamy in Political Dating***

Since party is being understood as a socially driven force rather than an ideologically driven force, in order to correctly analyze dating within this format I first needed to understand how homogamy functions among political identities. Overall, it is understood that humans tend

to choose partners based on resemblance of a particular attribute. For most traits the correlation between mates is positive. However, the degrees of similarity will vary widely (Alford et al. 2011). In order to accurately research how partisanship affects dating the most pertinent factor to measure is political identity.

In 2020, Pew Research had conducted a poll to determine whether or not Democrats or Republicans would date an individual who had voted for either Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump. What they had found was that both parties were unwilling to date someone who voted for the representative of an opposing party. In this survey it was discovered that 71 percent of those who identify as Democrats or lean towards the Democratic party would probably or definitely not date someone who voted for Donald Trump (Brown 2020). In fact, 45 percent of those who identify with or lean towards the Democratic party stated they would definitely not date someone who voted for Trump. Interestingly, among those who identify with the Republican Party or lean towards the Republican party, only 49 percent stated they would probably or definitely not date someone who voted for Hilary Clinton, including the 19 percent who said they would definitely not. Interestingly, this research also investigated the effects of interparty dating and found that while there was reluctance to date members of other parties, the resistance does not reach the same levels as when asked about dating another person who voted for particular candidates. 61 percent of Democrats would not date a Republican and 49 percent of Republicans would not date Democrats. (Brown 2020). In other words, Democrats were typically unwilling to date an individual who voted for Donald Trump and almost half of Republicans were unwilling to date an individual who had voted for Hilary Clinton .

The research that has been collected on the dating and marriage habits of partisans has found that many members of different parties have become increasingly unwilling to marry one



another. Data collected in 2011 shows that 52 percent of American partisans declared they would either definitely or would probably not marry a member of an opposing party (Mason, 55). Similar results were found in 2010 where 50 percent of Republicans and 30 percent of Democrats stated that they would be very unhappy if their children married an outgroup partisan. What makes this particularly interesting is that 60 years ago in 1960 less than 5 percent of partisans were opposed to their children marrying outgroup members at all (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, 2012). There have been several theories as to why partisans tend to sort homogeneously. One such attempted explanation is that partisan homogeneity is an effect of social homogeneity. This idea posits that since partisans are sorted into aligned categories, the effect of partisan homogeneity is a representation of individuals marrying within their own other social groups that are related to their party. As Alford and his colleagues have shown though, there is little empirical support to this explanation. The only type of spousal concordance is within education and that is better explained by the connection between education and attitude firmness (Alford et al 2011). However, one critical failure of this research is the same as the failure that the traditional understanding of parties also had. That current research of political homogeneity treats political identity solely through party without regard to additional social relationships. In order to achieve a better understanding of how partisan dating has changed, factors such as race, education, age, religion, etc. must be accounted for. Additionally, as political parties have become more sorted, it is critical to understand whether or not a political party is also causing a decrease in other outgroup relationships such as interracial or inter-religious marriage.

What is worth noting is that previous research has indicated that party affiliation is typically not used as a means to attract a mate. Individuals in long term relationships typically do share their political attitudes, however these attitudes are not displayed when actively dating.

People often make mate selections based on non-political means that correlate with political attitudes (Klofstad, McDermott, and Hatemi 2012). Additionally, the nonpolitical traits that those on both the right and left assort on have shown to have a role in political assortment when dating (Klofstad, McDermott and Hatemi, 2013). Part of this reason is that humans seek compatibility in relationships, and with the nature of parties that would include critical stances on politics (Klofstad, McDermott, and Hatemi 2012). However, what is interesting is it has also been shown that liberals and conservatives tend to gravitate towards specific demographic dimensions that are correlated with certain political preferences. If this trend of assortative mating continues then the political gaps will continue to widen. (Klofstad, McDermott, and Hatemi 2013). Within the study of spousal relationships, similar results have been found that show a strong correlation between political attitudes and spousal choice based on assortative mating (Alford et al. 2011). It has also been found that despite this information, that politics only plays a modest role in romantic relationships. Furthermore, the individual's own party has a role in influencing how they evaluate people of the same or different party (Easton and Holbein 2021). Despite this information indicating a limited effect of one's political identity on dating, it has also been documented that politics also affects whom people find attractive. That regardless of party, both Democrats and Republicans tend to rank members of the other party as less attractive. What is particularly interesting about this is that when politics is not involved, both parties tend to agree on physical attractiveness (Nicholson et al. 2016). All of this to say that although the impact often varies, there is at least some level of influence that one's political identity plays on the dating process.

In fact, there has been very useful research in attempting to understand political assortative mating by analyzing spousal relationships. Positive assortative mating, as opposed to

similar explanations for homogamy such as social homogamy or the assimilation hypothesis, has shown to cause more political concordance among spouses (Alford et al. 2011) One explanation that has been provided as to why politically based assortative mating occurs is that in polarized time periods the animus toward out-party members is sufficient enough to create social distance between the parties, thus leading partisans to further associate with like-minded individuals (Iyengar, Konitzer, and Tedin 2018). What this means is that party identification is enough for partisans to avoid association with a member of another party, thus increasing the chances of same party marriage. In addition to this, research has indicated that there is no support for the idea that members marry for non-political means that are associated with party ID or that individuals marry and then grow more alike each other politically over time. The importance of this is that party focused assortative mating in turn creates an echo chamber within the household, increasing effective partisanship (Iyengar, Konitzer, and Tedin 2018). In fact, as a consequence of assortative mating, there is not a political orientation on which greater husband-wife agreement is achieved than partisanship (Beck and Jennings, 1991).

The issue with what has been stated creates is that with the nature of parties being more or less tribal teams, as affective polarization increases from positive assortment, it can be theorized that the level of strain between not just parties themselves, but several other groups that associate with specific parties to equally increase. Despite all of the information above, it must be noted that all of the research conducted revolves around examining the party strictly from the individual level. It does not address how party in-group members and the perception of party allies may impact the dating process. Additionally, the research has been mostly based on analyzing spousal relationships, the effects of party on the dating process has had limited

research. As such this research was designed to produce additional information to aid in the analysis of how party effects specifically the dating process.

### ***Ingroup Attitudes and Intergroup Relationships***

There has been a notable gap on the social effects of political parties on intergroup contact. Due to this in order to study these relationships a certain understanding of intergroup contact must be understood. The most crucial aspect of understanding intergroup contact is to first understand how humans tend to perceive both the ingroup and the outgroup, and how these groups are defined. Additionally, it is important to recognize that holding the same view as another is not sufficient enough to declare that a group exists. Rather that shared opinion needs to become a part of a social identity (McGarty et al. 2009). When these social groups are created, it has been found that it is human inclination to prefer and even privilege members of their ingroup (Mason, 12). However, it must be stated that favoring one's own group is not a conscious process. That most often people will automatically preferentially process information related to their ingroup over the outgroup (Scheepers and Derk, 2016). In politics this would take the form of favoring one's own party over the others subconsciously. Within research pertaining to the contact between two or more groups that attempt to explain how the groups interact with each other one method of analysis that has been adopted is an injunctive analysis. What this means is that instead of analyzing what members of groups do, participants are instead asked about how certain actions will be perceived and how they think about certain group interactions. What has been discovered is that intergroup contact experienced by other in-group members will also affect intergroup attitudes. For example, indirect friendship has shown to have a stronger influence on attitudes than direct friendship when both were included (De Tezanos-Pinto, Bratt and Brown 2010). Additionally, it has been found that prejudice can be reduced in the presence

of intergroup friendships and that even indirect contact, such as mass media or knowing a friend of a friend in an opposing group, can be sufficient to reduce prejudice (Pettigrew et al. 2011). Including this type of relationship research into the literature of political affective dating has allowed me to determine the effect that the party group influences the individual.

Expansion on intergroup contact theory research has also been conducted that was useful for this research. The Extended contact Hypothesis states that the mere knowledge that an ingroup member shares a close relationship with an outgroup member can be sufficient to improve intergroup attitudes (Paterson, Turner, and Connor 2015). This was tested on cross-group romantic relationships. What was found was that members in cross-group relationships perceived greater friend and familial disapproval of their relationship than same group relationships. However, that knowing an ingroup member in a cross-group relationship romantic relationship predicted greater relative ingroup approval of cross group dating (Paterson, Turner, and Connor 2015). For this research the definition of cross-romantic relationships that is used states a cross-group romantic relationship can be defined as any romantic relationship between individuals belonging to different social groups (Orta 2013).

However, it is not always the case that cross-romantic relationships will decrease the tensions between two or more groups. In some instances, having a cross-political romance can lead to relatively less positive intergroup attitudes. This is explained by the researchers as being because romantic relationships are more capable of coming in contact with conflict than other types of relationships. What is particularly interesting was that the researchers did not find the same strength correlation with friendships. In this way, the researchers have concluded that political life may be an exception to intergroup contact theory (Buliga et al 2021). However, this

is the only research that proposes this idea. Nonetheless it must still be considered as an explanation if the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

In addition to determining the perceptions of the members on intergroup dating, I had to determine whether those relationships are themselves marginalized. This is because the level of perceived marginalization by ingroup members may necessarily affect a member's willingness to engage in a cross-group romance. In particular, it has been found investing in a marginalized relationship may be perceived as fueling prejudice and discrimination (Lehmiller and Agnew 2006). What this means for this research is that an individual may be less likely to date an outgroup member if they believe that it would increase levels of prejudice.

Group identities however do not exist in a vacuum and while most research has treated any given identity individually it is important to expand the research and try to understand group interaction in the context of multiple social identities. To begin, it is important to remember that although a person may have multiple social identities, that does not mean that any two are the same. In order for humans to be attached to one group, there needs to be a level of disconnection. In other words, human beings have two competing needs, inclusion and differentiation, that drive group attachment. That humans want to "fit in but not disappear from the group" (Brewer, 991). A major issue that arises is that there has been very little research into how multiple social identities work with each other and are aligned. Identities are aligned when large portions of the members of one group are also members of another group. Political parties, as stated prior, represent this alignment in that a strongly identified Democrat or Republican can also be a man, woman, conservative, Christian, or even as far as a graduate from a specific college or university (Mason 61). All of these identities exist within a single person and they all inform who that person perceives themselves to be.

This understanding of identity alludes to the notion of identity politics. However, current understanding of identity politics falls into the same issue that other forms of identity research have found. Identity politics as a concept can be much more powerful if instead of treating identities as singular, research be shifted to treating identities in concert with one another. This is not to say that a single identity cannot have powerful effects, it very much can. However, the existence of multiple identities all working in tandem can cause even greeted social and cultural divides (Mason 19). This is especially pertinent in politics given that even an individual who is not particularly driven by political issues can still exhibit partisan bias. This is the case when someone who does not particularly care about any given partisan issues still identifies with racial or religious groups aligned with that party (Mason, 70) What is important to note here is that the levels of partisan bias and partisan prejudice that has been shown may not occur simply out of partisan disagreement. Rather, it is also completely possible that the prejudice that exists, especially within aligned identities, comes from a lack of exposure to people unlike oneself (Mason, 62). As such the contact of two groups cannot alone be considered. It must be the case that when considering two groups in contact that there are multiple other identities working along with the primary identity all fueling the interaction that is occurring.

The research that has been done on intergroup contact has almost entirely excluded the issue of partisanship. As such this research adds the effect that intergroup contact has, especially in regards to relationships and dating, to the existing literature. Since there has been some research conducted but that research also only focuses on apolitical groups. However, this is not enough to understand dating as, with American politics, the party choice is influential on even apolitical instances. Additionally, the work that has analyzed inter party dating has focused primarily on the two major parties in the United States, the Democrats and the Republicans,

while ignoring the effect that party has on smaller parties. My thesis has expanded upon this prior research by examining membership in additional parties.



## CHAPTER II: METHODS

The primary means of data collection for this thesis was through an original survey that I designed, collected and analyzed. The reason I had chosen this method is to demonstrate quantitatively the extent to which party has an effect on dating in the US through various statistical tests. The data was collected via an online survey created and monitored through Qualtrics. In order to answer all of the necessary research questions, most survey questions directly address the points to which need to be asked regarding identity, perceptions of marginalization, the influence of close friends, the influence of co-partisans and other co-group members, and the level of attachment to each aspect of social identity. In addition to this data, demographic information including education, gender, transgender identity, party identification, race, and abortion opinions, religion, and State of residence were also collected for further analysis.

The survey was conducted entirely online through an opt in system after being published. In order to gather respondents, the survey was shared on several social media sites including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Snapchat.

The survey was collected through Qualtrics in order to protect the data from over contamination and protect the validity of this data. Since Qualtrics tracks IP data from the users, it was possible to filter out any attempts of respondents trying to complete the survey multiple times and contaminating the data. In the threat that an individual may attempt to create a bot to corrupt the data by taking the survey multiple times, there were two attention check questions included in the survey. All respondents that failed these were filtered out of the dataset for analysis.

An additional threat to the validity of this research is that the internet is a global system and as such presents the threat of people who do not live in America taking the survey. In order to prevent contamination from citizens of countries outside America I included a question at the beginning of the survey asking if respondents are American residents. Respondents that failed to answer or answered that they are not American residents were filtered out of the data set for analysis.

The first section of the survey was focused on collecting demographic information about the respondents. Information on race, gender, education, religion, religious service attendance, sexual orientation, state of residence, and whether the respondent considers themselves Pro-Life or Pro-Choice was collected. These specific groups were chosen as they are all used to determine if there are any statistically significant relationships between specific social groups and party identity, thus indicating the presence of aligned identities.

Considering parties are also associated with one's other social identities, those social identities must also be included in the measurements. Specifically, how attachment to specific social groups vary. The purpose of creating this distinction of identity intensity is in order to create an accurate measure of how varied levels of social attachment can vary willingness to date outgroup members. The questions in order to analyze how attached each respondent is to their respective group were as follows “ How important is being [ID] to you?”, responses listed as Extremely, Very, Moderately, Not Very, Not at all, coded from 5-1; “How well does the term [ID] describe you?”, responses listed as Extremely, Very, Moderately, Not Very, Not at all, coded from 5-1; “When discussing [ID] how often do you use “we” instead of “they”?”, responses listed as Extremely, Very, Moderately, Not Very, Not at all, coded from 5-1; “To what extent do you consider yourself being [ID], responses include Great Deal, Somewhat, Very

Little, Not at all, coded 5,4,2,1 respectively. The IDs that were asked are race, gender, religion, and sexual orientation. During analysis, these results were combined into an average score per respondent to indicate the total level of attachment. Their total attachment for each group varies from 1 being lowest possible attachment and 5 being greatest possible attachment.

Race was presented in the same categories that the US Census lists races. Including White, African-American, Asian, Alaskan or Native American, Hawaiian or Polynesian, Latino/Latina/Hispanic. Gender was listed as man, woman, or non-binary/agender. Additionally, respondents were asked if they identify as transgender, non-binary, or gender queer. These were chosen because they are the simplest division while also being all inclusive. Education was broken up into some High School, High School or GED, Some College, Associate's Degree, Bachelor's Degree or 4-year equivalent, Master's Degree or Equivalent, Doctorate or Equivalent. Religion was listed as a text entry due to the large variety of religious beliefs. Religious attendance was asked as "How many times per month do you attend religious services?" and the answers were multiple choice of 0,1,2,3, and 4 or more. Sexual orientation was listed as heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual/pansexual, and asexual. Similar to gender, they have chosen these categories in order to keep them as simple as possible while also attempting to be all inclusive. The State for state of residence was a dropdown list of states in alphabetical order coded from 1-51 with 51 indicating Washington, DC since that is a unique jurisdiction. Lastly, respondents were asked "Would you consider yourself Pro-Choice or Pro-Life?" and responses included Pro-Choice, Neither/Indifferent, Pro-Life.

Relationship status and history was asked next in the survey. Respondents were asked to select a category from the following that most accurately describes their relationship status: "Single and not looking for a relationship, Single and looking for a relationship, Currently

dating, Living with an unmarried romantic partner, Married” . Respondents were next to be asked if they have ever dated someone of a different party/race/religion/abortion stance, coded Yes, Unsure/ Do not Know, No, Not applicable. The next few questions were dedicated to asking respondents if they have ever broken up with a partner/s due to political preferences, racial preferences, religious preferences, or abortion preferences, coded as Yes, No, and Not Applicable. In post-survey analysis No and Not applicable were combined into a single category in order to simplify the results.

The next set of data that was collected was to measure the respondents party affiliation as well as their attachment to the party. Party affiliation was coded as the respondent’s choice of party from a given list including Democratic, Republican, Independent, Libertarian, Green Party, Democratic Socialist, and Other. The category “other” also included a text entry to allow respondents to provide their selected political identity. Party attachment is being defined as the level to which the respondent holds strong positive association with their chosen party. This was measured as to further breakdown the effect of party on dating life by allowing comparison between strong party members and weak party members. In order to properly measure the strength of party identity, the same model used by Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes that measures each group from strong to weak and unaffiliated by leaning was adopted. (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012).

Since an injunctive analysis was performed, I also measured how insulated respondents are within their respective groups. An injunctive analysis is where the analysis is based on the respondents’ own perceptions of inter-group dating rather than describing how respondents react to inter-group dating. Due to the nature of this the frequency of respondent interactions with in-group and out-group members is what was measured. Since the respondent’s perceptions of both

in-groups and out-groups are what is being measured, it is important to collect the measure of insulation to determine whether or not increased or decreased interaction can affect willingness to date. Due to this the questions to quantify this information were similarly pulled from intergroup contact theory. The respondents were asked to the best of their knowledge, do their immediate family share a political affiliation. Specifically, it is important to ask what the affiliation of their parents are. Party socialization happens a great deal from within the family and it has been found that the parental partisan legacy remains substantial even as children become adults (Beck and Jennings, 1991). This is important to measure as not only show the transference to political identity but also can be used to control whether family agreement on party has a valid effect on interparty dating. This question was broken up so that the respondent would respond according to their parents and siblings, if they have any. In order to structure the survey, the respondents were asked whether their parents are in live and if they are still in contact with them as well as whether or not they have siblings and how many they have earlier in the survey. For each question the answers were broken into "Yes" and "No".

However, family is not the only social group individuals are a part of and intergroup contact theory has shown that friendships as well as family can change levels of prejudice. Due to these facts, it is imperative to also test the influence that friends and friendships have on intergroup dating. Friend groups can be both homogeneous and heterogeneous, in order to measure respondents' friend groups, they were asked "How many friends who you believe share a party/race/religion with you do you have?" How many friends who you believe do not share a party/race/religion with you do you have?". By asking both of these questions it can be measured how more or less insulated individuals are. An additional question that was asked to measure

indirect contact as well as direct contact was “How many of your friends who share a political identity with you have friends from another political party?”.

Informed by the work by Tezanos-Pinto and their colleagues there were several questions asked in order to properly understand how group identity influences intergroup contact. The first set of questions were to measure norms against contact: “I believe that friends who share my political identity prefer that I would not date members of another party.” “ I believe that friends who share a political identity with me think it is a bit uncool if I hang around with people from another party.” I believe that friends who share a party identity think it is cool if I have a close friend from another party”. These were all coded on a scale of 1-7 with 1 being completely disagree and 7 being completely agree.

An additional factor that could contribute to changes in intergroup dating is whether or not the individual believes that dating outside groups is unacceptable. A test for marginalization was then implemented in order to test for this effect. The questions for these were as follows: “My relationship has general societal acceptance”, “My family and friends who share the same race/religion/party approve of my relationship.” “I believe that most other persons (whom I do not know) who share the same race/religion/party would generally disapprove of my relationship” “My family and/or friends who share the same race/religion/party as me are not accepting of this relationship”. The questions are listed with slashes here but there were three separate questions in the survey. Each of these questions was coded on a scale of 1-7 with 1 being completely disagree and 7 being completely Agree. The questions, “I believe that most other persons (whom I do not know) who share the same race/religion/party would generally disapprove of my relationship” and “My family and/or friends who share the same

race/religion/party as me are not accepting of this relationship” are then reversed in analysis and then all the responses were combined to get an average score of in-group approval.

The next set of questions that were to be asked were used to measure intergroup dating itself. Respondents were asked simply “How willing are you to date a person who is a member of a different [ID]?”/ Answers were coded as Not Willing at all, Unwilling in Most Cases, Indifferent in Most Cases, Willing in Most Cases, Very Willing. Additionally, due to the unique time of me collecting this data, I had also asked respondents what their willingness to date an individual with different abortion beliefs was prior to the overturning of *Roe v. Wade*, coded in the same manner. Answers are coded so that 1 is the lowest amount of willingness and 5 is the highest amount of willingness.

## CHAPTER III: RESULTS

### *Demographics*

The survey received 217 responses in total, however several of these had to be removed in the initial analysis due to not agreeing to informed consent, failing attention tests, as well as respondents not being American residents. Overall, I received responses from a decent variety of people. The final sample therefore had 193 people. Table 1 shows the difference in Race, Gender, and Transgender identity. Table 2 indicates the various religious groups. Table 3 shows the breakup of state residency. Table 4 demonstrates the different sexual orientations and Table 5 shows the different levels of education.

**Table 1: Race, Gender, and Transgender Identification (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis)**

<b>Race</b>	<b>N (Percent)</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>N (Percent)</b>	<b>Transgender I.D</b>	<b>N (Percent)</b>
White	158 (81.9)	Man	81 (42.4)	Transgender	32 (16.6)
Black	15 (7.8)	Woman	101 (52.3)	Nonbinary	13 (6.7)
American Indian or Alaska Native	12 (3.2)	Prefer Not To Say	1 (.5)	Genderqueer	14 (7.3)
Asian American	13 (6.7)			Other	5 (2.6)
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	7 (3.6)			Prefer not to say	3 (1.6)
Latino/Latina/ Hispanic	10 (5.2)				
<b>Total</b>	<b>193</b> <b>(100)</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>193</b> <b>(100)</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>193</b> <b>(100)</b>



**Table 2: Religion (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis)**

Religion	N (Percent)	Religion cont.	N (Percent)
Agnostic	1 26.9	Methodist	1 (0.5)
Anglican	1 (0.5)	Mormonism	1 (0.5)
Atheist	14 (7.3)	Non-Denominational	3 (1.6)
Baptist	2 (1)	Not Religious	4 (2)
Buddism	2 (1)	Pagan	2 (1)
Catholic	11 (5.7)	Protestant	1 (0.5)
Christian	29 (15)	Quaker	1 (0.5)
Deist	2 (1)	Reform Judaism	1 (0.5)
Episcopal	6 (3.1)	Roman Catholic	2 (1)
Islam	1 (0.5)	Secular Buddhist	1 (0.5)
Jain	1 (0.5)	Singularian Simulationist	1 (0.5)
Jewish	7 (3.6)	Spiritual	1 (0.5)
LDS	1 (0.5)	Unitarian	1 (0.5)
		Total	193 (100)

**Table 3: States of Residency (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis)**

State	N (Percent)	State cont.	N (Percent)
AL-ALABAMA	2 (1)	MN-MINNESOTA	2 (1)
AK-ALASKA	3 (1.6)	MO-MISSOURI	5 (2.6)
AZ-ARIZONA	4 (2.1)	NE-NEBRASKA	1 (0.5)
AR-ARKANSAS	4 (2.1)	NV-NEVADA	1 (0.5)
CA-CALIFORNIA	7 (3.6)	NM-NEW MEXICO	2 (1)
CO-COLORADO	7 (3.6)	NY-NEW YORK	8 (4.1)
CT-CONNECTICUT	2 (1)	NC-NORTH CAROLINA	74 (38.3)
DE-DELAWARE	3 (1.6)	OH-OHIO	2 (1)
FL-FLORIDA	4 (2.1)	OR-OREGON	1 (0.5)
GA-GEORGIA	4 (2.1)	PE-PENNSYLVANIA	4 (2.1)
HA-HAWAII	3 (1.6)	TX-TEXAS	2 (1)
ID-IDAHO	2 (1)	UT-UTAH	3 (1.6)
IL-ILLINOIS	7 (3.6)	VT-VERMONT	1 (0.5)
IN-INDIANA	4 (2.1)	VI-VIRGINIA	6 (3.1)
IO-IOWA	3 (1.6)	WA-WASHINGTON	2 (1)
KS-KANSAS	4 (2.1)	WV-WEST VIRGINIA	1 (0.5)
KT-KENTUCKY	1 (0.5)	WI-WISCONSIN	2 (1)
ME-MAINE	1 (0.5)	WY-WYOMING	1 (0.5)
MD-MARYLAND	3 (1.6)	WASHINGTON, DC	5 (2.6)
MI-MICHIGAN	2 (1)		
		Total	193 (100)

**Table 4: Sexual Orientation (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis)**

<b>Sexual Orientation</b>	<b>N (Percent)</b>
Heterosexual (Straight)	119 (61.7)
Homosexual (Gay/Lesbian)	23 (11.9)
Bisexual/Pansexual	45 (23.3)
Asexual	6 (3.1)
<b>Total</b>	<b>193 (100)</b>

**Table 5: Education (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis)**

<b>Education</b>	<b>N (Percent)</b>
Some High School	1 (.5)
High School or GED	13 (6.7)
Some College	38 (19.7)
Associate's Degree	22 (11.4)
Bachelor's Degree or 4-year Equivalent	65 (33.7)
Master's Degree or Equivalent	33 (17.1)
Doctorate or Equivalent	21 (10.9)
<b>Total</b>	<b>193 (100)</b>

The results indicate that respondents are mostly white, straight, or members of a Judeo-Christian faith. Additionally, most responses came from North Carolina. However, despite this I have still collected responses from every racial category, every gender identity, and every sexual orientation that was listed as a potential response. While a large variety of responses were collected for religious groups, due to the low number of responses of several categories, most analysis was only conducted on the largest categories: Agnostic, Atheist, Catholic, Christian, Episcopalian, and Jewish. Similarly, there is a wide variety of categories but low response count for State Residency, limiting my ability to conclude countrywide trends. However, I have a decent spread of responses from educational attainment levels with all categories except for

Some High school and High School/ GED being accounted for. Race and Religion have also been expanded into additional tables to further demonstrate the diversity of respondents.

**Table 6: Race and Gender (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis)**

Race	Men	Woman	Nonbinary/Agender	Prefer Not To Say
White	65 (75.6)	87 (75.8)		1 (12.5)
Black	4 (4.7)	9 (7.8)		2 (25)
American Indian or Alaska Native	5 (5.8)	5 (4.3)		1 (12.5)
Asian American	5 (5.8)	7 (6.1)		1 (12.5)
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	4 (4.7)	2 (1.7)		1 (12.5)
Latino/Latina/Hispanic	3 (3.5)	5 (4.3)		2 (25)
Total	86	115	0	8

Table 6 and Table 7 show the breakdown of race/religion and gender. From these tables it is apparent that for race there is only a significant difference between men and women for Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islanders and Black respondents. This is because for both of these categories has at least twice as many responses from men to women or vice versa. Other than these there is an even distribution between men and women among racial groups.

Party identification and abortion opinions were collected next and those responses are shown by Table 8 and Table 9. The responses to the survey were mostly completed by Democrats at 89 responses and were overwhelmingly self-placed in the Pro-Choice category at 151 responses. The next largest political party is tied three ways by Republicans, Libertarians, and Democratic Socialists all at 28 responses. The difference between these two groups is that Democrats had over three times the responses as any other political party. Similarly, the second

largest group of abortion opinions is 24 responses, indicating that pro-choice had six times the amount of respondents than the next largest category.

**Table 7: Religion and Gender (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis)**

Religion	Men	Woman	Nonbinary/Agender	Prefer Not To Say
No Response	25 (33.3)	23 (22.8)	0	0
Agnostic	16 (19.8)	26 (25.7)	2 (2.5)	1 (1.0)
Anglican		1 (1)		
Atheist	7 (8.6)	6 (5.9)	1 (1.25)	
Baptist		2 (2)		
Buddism		1 (1)	1 (1.25)	
Catholic	5 (6.2)	6 (5.9)		
Christian	18 (22.22)	11 (10.9)		
Deist	1 (1.2)	1 (1)		
Episcopal	1 (1.2)	5 (5)		
Islam		1 (1)		
Jain		1 (1)		
Jewish	3 (3.7)	3 (3)	1 (1.25)	
LDS		1 (1)		
Methodist		1 (1)		
Mormonism	1 (1.2)			
Non-Denominational		3 (3)		
Not Religious		3 (3)	1 (1.25)	
Pagan		1 (1)	1 (1.25)	
Protestant	1 (1.2)			
Quaker		1 (1)		
Reform Judaism		1 (1)		
Roman Catholic		2		
Secular Buddhist	1 (1.2)			
Singularian Simulationist				
Spiritual			1 (1.25)	
Unitarian		1 (1)		
Total	81	101	8	1

**Table 8: Party Identity (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis)**

Political Party	N (Percent)
Democrat	89 (46.1)
Republican	28 (14.5)
Independent	9 (4.7)
Libertarian	28 (14.5)
Green Party Membe	11 (5.7)
Democratic Socialis	28 (14.5)
Total	193 (100)

**Table 9: Abortion Opinions (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis)**

Abortion Opinion	N (Percent)
Pro-Choice	151 (78.2)
Indifferent	18 (9.3)
Pro-Life	24 (12.4)
Total	193 (100)

Gender and religion are broken down differently than this however. Among religious groups, women make up a larger variety of religious choices whereas men chose religious a smaller selection of religious groups. Women as a group chose 22 religious groups and men chose less than half of that at 10 groups. Women in this study are mostly Agnostic while men are mostly Christian. Nonbinary/Agender respondents selected 6 different categories with no category having more than 2 responses.

The next two tables, Table 10 and 11 show the breakdown of race/gender and transgender identity. The respondents that this subject applies to are overwhelmingly white. No other race

exceeds 4 responses in any category listed. For Table 11 the plurality of respondents did not leave a text response to indicate their religious identity. Of those that did leave a response the largest group among transgender, nonbinary, or genderqueer respondents are Agnostic. The second religious group with the most members is Christians with 4 responses. This is consistent with the proportions of the general population since Agnostic and Christian were the first and second largest religious groups that were collected in the survey.

**Table 10: Race and Non-Traditional Gender ID (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis)**

Race	Transgender	Nonbinary	Genderqueer	Other	Prefer not to say
White	22 (66.7)	7 (50)	11 (73.3)	5 (83.3)	3 (100)
Black	4 (12.1)	2 (14.3)	1 (6.7)		
American Indian or Alaska Native	3 (9.1)	2 (14.3)	1 (6.7)		
Asian American	3 (9.1)	1 (7.1)	1 (6.7)		
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander		1 (7.1)		1 (16.7)	
Latino/Latina/ Hispanic	1 (3)	1 (7.1)	1 (6.7)		
Total	33	14	15	6	3

**Table 11: Religion and Non-Traditional Gender (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis)**

Religion	Transgender	Nonbinary	Genderqueer	Other	Prefer not to say
No Response	27 (84.4)	7 (53.8)	6 (42.9)		1 (33.3)
Agnostic		2 (15.4)	3 (21.4)	3 (60)	
Atheist			2 (14.3)	1 (20)	
Baptist			1 (7.1)		
Buddhism			1 (7.1)		
Christian	4 (12.5)				
Islam	1 (3.1)				
Jewish		1 (7.7)			
Mormonism					1 (33.3)
Not Religious		1 (7.7)	1 (7.1)		
Pagan		1 (7.7)			
Protestant					1 (33.3)
Roman Catholic				1 (20)	
Spiritual		1 (7.7)			
Total	32	13	14	5	3

Tables 12 and 13 show the same breakdown of race and religion among party and abortion opinions. Amongst every group measured, white respondents are the largest and often the majority. This is to be expected as white individuals also make up the largest respondents in general. Within each party there is a decent variety of races with Democrats and Libertarians being the only two parties with all races having at least 1 respondent. The next most diverse party is the Republican party with all but American Indian/ Alaskan Native. Green, Independents, and Democratic Socialists all have only responses from three racial groups, making these three the least racially diverse parties included.



**Table 12: Political Identity and Race (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis)**

	<b>Democrat</b>	<b>Republican</b>	<b>Independent</b>	<b>Libertarian</b>	<b>Green Party Member</b>	<b>Democratic Socialist</b>
<b>White</b>	75 (74.3)	21 (75)	7 (63.6)	22 (64.7)	8 (72.7)	24 (82.8)
<b>Black</b>	8 (7.9)	1 (3.6)	2 (18.2)	1 (2.9)		3 (10.3)
<b>American Indian or Alaska Native</b>	5 (5)	2 (7.1)		4 (11.8)	1 (9.1)	
<b>Asian American</b>	5 (5)	1 (3.6)	2 (18.2)	4 (11.8)	1 (9.1)	
<b>Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander</b>	5 (5)			2 (5.9)		
<b>Latino/Latina/Hispanic</b>	3 (3)	3 (10.7)		1 (2.9)	1 (9.1)	2 (6.9)
<b>Total</b>	101	28	11	34	11	29

**Table 13: Abortion Opinion and Race (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis)**

	<b>Pro-Choice</b>	<b>Indifferent</b>	<b>Pro-Life</b>
<b>White</b>	129 (78.7)	13 (48.1)	16 (53.3)
<b>Black</b>	10 (6.1)	2 (7.4)	3 (10)
<b>American Indian or Alaska Native</b>	6 (3.7)	5 (18.5)	1 (3.3)
<b>Asian American</b>	9 (5.5)	1 (3.7)	3 (10)
<b>Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander</b>	4 (2.4)	3 (11.1)	7 (23.3)
<b>Latino/Latina/Hispanic</b>	6 (3.7)	3 (11.1)	
<b>Total</b>	164	27	30

The next several tables listed below further breakdown political identity by religion, gender, transgender identity, education, and abortion opinion. Table 14 shows that, excluding those who did not leave a response, that Democrats and Democratic Socialists are Agnostic whereas all other parties are mostly Christian. Most of the religions with the highest responses also only have responses from half of the listed parties. Atheists, Catholics, Christians, Episcopalians, and Jewish people all have respondents in three or less parties.

Table 15 shows a similar trend with the largest religions. Agnostic and Christian respondents make up Pro Life, Pro Choice and indifferent responses. However, Atheists, Episcopalians and Jewish responses are all entirely Pro Choice. Meanwhile Catholic respondents are either Pro Life or Pro-choice with no one claiming indifference on the matter. Furthermore, Christians are the only religion without a clear majority of responses. While all other religions are majority if not tied for majority to be Pro Choice, Christians possess a more even spread on the matter with the largest group, Pro-Choice, reflecting only 44.8 percent of total responses.

**Table 14: Political Identity and Religion (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis)  
(Chi-Square: 0.001)**

	Democrat	Republican	Independent	Libertarian	Green Party Member	Democratic Socialist
No Response	11 (12.4)	10 (35.7)		16 (57.1)	9 (81.8)	6 (21.4)
Agnostic	28 (31.5)	3 (10.7)	2 (22.2)	2 (7.1)		10 (35.7)
Anglican		1 (3.6)				
Atheist	9 (10.1)				1 (9.1)	4 (14.3)
Baptist	1 (1.1)					1 (3.6)
Buddhism		1 (3.6)		1 (3.6)		
Catholic	7 (7.9)	3 (10.7)	1 (1.1)			
Christian	9 (10.1)	9 (32.1)	4 (44.4)	6 (21.4)	1 (9.1)	
Deist				1 (3.6)		1 (3.6)
Episcopal	5 (5.6)					1 (3.6)
Islam						1 (3.6)
Jain	1 (1.1)					
Jewish	6 (6.7)					1 (3.6)
LDS	1 (1.1)					
Methodist	1 (1.1)					
Mormonism				1 (3.6)		
Non-Denominational	3 (3.4)					
Not Religious	2 (2.2)					2 (7.1)
Pagan	1 (1.1)					1 (3.6)
Protestant		1 (3.6)				
Quaker	1 (1.1)					
Reform Judaism			1 (1.1)			
Roman Catholic	2 (2.2)					
Secular Buddhist, Singularian Simulationist			1 (1.1)			
Spiritual				1 (3.6)		
Unitarian	1 (1.1)					
<b>Total</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>28</b>

**Table 15: Abortion Opinion and Religion (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis)  
(Chi-Square: 0.003)**

	Pro-Choice	Indifferent	Pro-Life
No Response	40 (26.5)	6 (33.3)	6 (25)
Agnostic	41 (27.2)	3 (16.7)	1 (4.2)
Anglican	1 (0.7)		
Atheist	14 (9.3)		
Baptist	1 (0.7)	1 (5.6)	
Buddhism	1 (0.7)		1 (4.2)
Catholic	8 (5.3)		3 (12.5)
Christian	13 (8.6)	6 (33.3)	10 (41.7)
Deist	2 (1.3)		
Episcopal	6 (4)		
Islam			1 (4.2)
Jain	1 (0.7)		
Jewish	7 (4.6)		
LDS	1 (0.7)		
Methodist	1 (0.7)		
Mormonism		1 (5.6)	
Non-Denominational	2 (1.3)		1 (4.2)
Not Religious	4 (2.6)		
Pagan	2 (1.3)		
Protestant			1 (4.2)
Quaker	1 (0.7)		
Reform	1 (0.7)		
Judaism	1 (0.7)		
Roman Catholic	2 (1.3)		
Secular Buddhist, Singularian Simulationist	1 (0.7)		
Spiritual		1 (5.6)	
Unitarian	1 (0.7)		
<b>Total</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>24</b>

**Table 16: Political Identity and Gender (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis)  
(Chi-Square: 0.134)**

	<b>Democrat</b>	<b>Republican</b>	<b>Independent</b>	<b>Libertarian</b>	<b>Green Party Member</b>	<b>Democratic Socialist</b>
<b>Men</b>	26 (29.2)	14 (53.8)	5 (55.6)	19 (67.9)	6 (54.5)	11 (39.3)
<b>Woman</b>	58 (65.2)	12 (46.3)	4 (44.4)	7 (25)	4 (36.4)	16 (57.1)
<b>Nonbinary/Agender</b>	4 (4.5)			2 (7.1)	1 (9.1)	1 (3.6)
<b>Prefer Not To Say</b>	1 (1.1)					
<b>Total</b>	89	26	9	28	11	28

Table 16 shows that the Democratic party and the Libertarian party were both very uneven with the genders of respondents. Where Republicans, Greens, and Democratic Socialists all had the men and women responses fairly even, the Democrats and Libertarians did not. Democrats had 58 women compared to 26 men where Libertarians were the opposite with 19 men and 7 women. Only Republicans and Independents did not show to have any member be nonbinary or agender.

**Table 17: Abortion Opinion and Race (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis)  
(Chi-Square: 0.401)**

	<b>Pro-Choice</b>	<b>Indifferent</b>	<b>Pro-Life</b>
<b>Men</b>	57 (47.9)	11 (52.4)	13 (54.2)
<b>Woman</b>	54 (45.4)	9 (42.9)	11 (45.8)
<b>Nonbinary/Agender</b>	7 (5.9)	1 (4.8)	
<b>Prefer Not To Say</b>	1 (0.8)		
<b>Total</b>	119	21	24

Table 17 also shows a large unbalance of responses between men and women albeit with the category of Pro Choice. This category has 84 women compared to 57 men. The other two

options, indifferent and Pro Choice are all majority men but have a closer spread between the genders. No respondent that is nonbinary or agender claimed to be Pro Life.

**Table 18: Party and Non-Traditional Gender I.D (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis) (Chi-Square: 0.265)**

	<b>Democrat</b>	<b>Republican</b>	<b>Independent</b>	<b>Libertarian</b>	<b>Green Party Member</b>	<b>Democratic Socialist</b>
<b>Transgender</b>	3 (23.1)	6 (54.5)		13 (61.9)	7 (63.6)	3 (30)
<b>Nonbinary</b>	4 (30.8)	1 (9.1)		4 (9.1)	1 (9.1)	3 (30)
<b>Genderqueer</b>	3 (23.1)	1 (9.1)	1 (100)	3 (14.3)	3 (27.3)	3 (30)
<b>Other</b>	3 (23.1)	2 (18.2)				
<b>Prefer not to say</b>		1 (9.1)		1 (4.8)		1 (10)
<b>Total</b>	13	11	1	21	11	10

Prior to Table 18 the largest category has typically had the majority of each response. That is to say that Democrats and Pro-Life individuals have typically had the greatest responses in prior tables. However, among different party identities, Democrats have the least number of transgender responses as well as tie other parties for the largest amount in most instances. The largest number of transgender individuals are Libertarians with 40.6% of responses. Democrats and Libertarians are tied each with 4 responses or 30.8 percent on nonbinary respondents. Genderqueer is more evenly spread amongst the parties with 4 of the 6 parties having 3 responses.

**Table 19: Party Identity and Educational Attainment (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis) (Chi-Square: 0.001)**

	Democrat	Republican	Independent	Libertarian	Green Party Member	Democratic Socialist
Some High School		1 (3.6)				
High School or GED		5 (17.9)		6 (22.2)		2 (8)
Some College	14 (19.2)	5 (17.9)	4 (50)	7 (25.9)	4 (36.4)	4 (16)
Associate's Degree	3 (4.1)	4 (14.3)		7 (25.9)	4 (36.4)	4 (16)
Bachelor's Degree or 4-year Equivalent	38 (52.1)	10 (25.7)	2 (25)	7 (25.9)		8 (32)
Master's Degree or Equivalent	18 (24.7)	3 (10.7)	2 (25)		3 (27.3)	7 (28)
Doctorate or Equivalent	16 (21.9)		1 (12.5)	1 (3.7)		3 (12)
<b>Total</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>25</b>

**Table 20: Abortion Opinion and Educational Attainment (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis) (Chi-Square: 0.054)**

	Pro-Choice	Indifferent	Pro-Life
Some High School			1 (6.3)
High School or GED	10 (8.9)		3 (18.8)
Some College	29 (25.9)	5 (38.5)	4 (25)
Associate's Degree	13 (11.6)	4 (30.8)	5 (31.3)
Bachelor's Degree or 4-year Equivalent	50 (44.6)	6 (46.2)	9 (56.3)
Master's Degree or Equivalent	29 (25.9)	2 (15.4)	2 (12.5)
Doctorate or Equivalent	20 (17.9)	1 (7.7)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>16</b>

Table 19 demonstrates that most members of each party have gained a level of education above High School or GED attainment. Democrats have the highest number of respondents from Some College, Bachelor's or 4-year equivalent, Master's Degree, and Doctorate Degree. Of these only Some College is not a majority with 36.8 percent of responses. Libertarians have the plurality among Associate Degree attaining respondents. The highest level of education among

Republicans and Greens is Masters since each other party has at least one response in the Doctorate category. Some College is also in the only category to have responses from every party. The only response for Some High School is in the Republican category.

Table 20 shows that among abortion opinions there are at least one respondent who consider themselves Pro Life, indifferent, or Pro Choice in 4 of the 7 selections. Those being Some College, Associate’s Degree, Bachelor, and Master’s. Pro Choice is the majority of responses in every category where there is a response, which is 6 of the 7. The only category where Pro Choice has a response but does not have 70 percent of the responses is respondents who reported their highest education being an Associate’s Degree, where they still maintain 59.1 percent of the total responses.

**Table 21: Political Identity and Abortion Opinion (Total Number and Percentages in Parenthesis) (Chi-Square: 0.001)**

	Democrat	Republican	Independent	Libertaria n	Green Party Member	Democratic Socialist
<b>Pro-Choice</b>	82 (92.1)	12 (42.9)	7 (77.8)	17 (60.7)	8 (72.7)	25 (89.3)
<b>Indifferent</b>	4 (4.5)	5 (17.9)	1 (11.1)	5 (17.9)	2 (18.2)	1 (3.6)
<b>Pro-Life</b>	3 (3.4)	11 (39.3)	1 (11.1)	6 (21.4)	1 (9.1)	2 (7.1)
<b>Total</b>	89	28	9	28	11	28

The final table that will be shown for demographics is the breakdown of Party and Abortion opinion. Table 21 shows that Democrats are overwhelmingly Pro Choice whereas Republicans are more evenly dispersed between Pro Choice and Pro Life, with Pro-choice being the larger of the two with 12 responses as compared to 11 Pro Life respondents. Despite this internal difference, Republicans retain the largest group of Pro-Life responses. The second largest group is Libertarians, who are mostly Pro-Choice on the matter. In fact, Republicans are the only party where Pro Choice is not the largest group by a large margin.



**Group Attachment**

The next series of tables will reflect how race, party, religion, and abortion groups are all closely attached to their party. Each of these tables are mean comparisons meant to reflect the average attachment of each given category (y-axis) and each given group (x-axis). The average attachment score was calculated by averaging the responses of 4 sets of questions for each group. For these scores 1 indicates the lowest level of attachment and 5 indicates the highest level of attachment. The average attachment will be listed on top of the number of responses in each table.

**Table 22: Means of Racial, Political, Religious, and Abortion Attachment (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

	Racial Attachment	Political Attachment	Religious attachment	Abortion Attachment
Mean	3.2239	3.5443	3.9767	3.2239
(N)	(186)	(193)	(140)	(172)

Table 22 is the average attachment of all respondents across each category. Religion is the group that has the highest level of attachment where Abortion attachment and Racial attachment are the lowest level of group attachment. Political attachment was the second strongest form of attachment.

**Table 23: Means of Racial, Political, Religious, and Abortion Attachment by Race (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

Race	Racial Attachment	Political Attachment	Religious attachment	Abortion Attachment
White	3.144 (158)	3.6019 (158)	3.2675 (114)	4.0757 (142)
Black	3.7833 (15)	3.45 (15)	3.4167 (12)	3.7308 (13)
American Indian or Alaska Native	3.2917 (12)	3.6292 (12)	3.3889 (9)	3.5714 (7)
Asian American	3.6923 (13)	3.3654 (13)	3.525 (10)	3.5 (12)
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	3.4896 (8)	3.6429 (7)	3.75 (6)	4.375 (4)
Latino/Latina/Hispanic	4.175 (10)	3.3 (10)	3.675 (10)	3.9167 (9)
Anova: P-Value	0.003	0.26	0.926	0.003

Table 23 has the same categories but measures across racial groups. Despite White respondents making up the largest group in the survey, they do not have the highest-level attachment among any category. In fact, white respondents have the lowest level of Racial and Religious attachments. However, the highest attachment among white respondents are Political attachment and Abortion attachment. Black, American Indian/ Alaskan Native, and Asian American respondents also do not have the highest level of attachment in any category. Among black respondents the highest average attachments are in Racial attachment and Abortion attachment. American Indian/ Alaskan Native respondents have their highest level of attachment in Political attachment and Abortion attachment. Asian Americans are mostly attached to their race and their religion while having the lowest attachment to abortion among any group. Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islanders have the highest level of Political attachment, Religious attachment, and Abortion attachment. Latino/Latina/ Hispanic individuals have the highest level of racial attachment among any group and also the lowest political attachment among any group.

**Table 24: Means of Racial, Political, Religious, and Abortion Attachment by Political Identity (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

Political Party	Racial Attachment	Political Attachment	Religious attachment	Abortion Attachment
Democrat	See Table 24.1	3.5522 (89)	3.2276 (78)	4.2321 (84)
Republican	See Table 24.1	3.4393 (28)	3.7059 (17)	3.5357 (21)
Independent	See Table 24.1	3 (9)	3.4772 (9)	3.4375 (8)
Libertarian	See Table 24.1	3.664 (28)	3.7083 (12)	3.3913 (23)
Green Party Member	See Table 24.1	3.5636 (11)	3.3750 (2)	3.5278 (9)
Democratic Socialist	See Table 24.1	3.5443 (28)	2.875 (22)	4.3333 (27)
Anova: P-Value	0.001	0.121	0.062	0.001

**Table 24.1: Means of Racial Attachment by Party (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

Political Party	White Attachment	Black Attachment	American Indian or Alaska Native Attachment	Asian American Attachment	Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander Attachment	Latino/Latina/ Hispanic Attachment
Democrat	3.1974 (76)	4.3125 (8)	3.3 (5)	4.15 (5)	3.3611 (6)	3.9167 (3)
Republican	2.8571 (21)	3.25 (1)	3.125 (2)	3 (1)		4.75 (3)
Independent	2.5357 (7)	1.625 (2)		3.5 (2)		
Libertarian	3.3977 (22)	2.75 (1)	3.375 (4)	3.5625 (4)	3.875 (2)	3.5 (1)
Green Party Member	3.4375 (8)		3.25 (1)	3 (1)		4.5 (1)
Democratic Socialist	3.144 (24)	3.7833 (3)				3.875 (2)
Anova: P-Value	0.007	0.017	0.963	0.308	0.43	0.529

Table 24 and 24.1 show the attachment of each party to each given category. Between Democrats and Republicans, Democrats have higher Political attachment and higher Abortion attachment. Republicans on the other hand have a higher level of Religious attachment. However, neither party has the highest level of attachment in any category. Libertarians have the highest level of Political Attachment and Religious attachment. Although the difference between Libertarians and Republicans is incredibly small. Democratic Socialists have the highest level of Abortion attachment. Additionally Democratic Socialists have the lowest level of Religious attachment. Independents have the lowest level of Political attachment and Libertarians have the lowest level of Abortion attachment.

Table 24.1 specifically is broken down by each racial category since parties are all heavily White the attachment to whiteness may skew the overall results. Between Democrats and Republicans, the Democrats have higher average attachments in every racial category except Latino/Latina/ Hispanic attachment. In that category Republicans not only have a higher racial attachment than Democrats, but also have the highest level of Latino/Latina/ Hispanic

attachment across all political parties. The highest level of White Attachment is from the Green party, followed by the Libertarian party. The highest level of Black Attachment is found in the Democratic party, who is also the party with the highest level of Asian American Attachment. The Libertarian party has the highest level of both American Indian/ Alaskan Native attachment and Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islanders attachment. However American Indian/ Alaskan Native attachment is very close between all parties. The largest discrepancy between any group is among black Democrats and black Independents, who have the lowest level of attachment to any group.

**Table 25: Means of Racial, Political, Religious, and Abortion Attachment by Religion (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

Religion	Racial Attachment	Political Attachment	Religious attachment	Abortion Attachment
Agnostic	See Table 25.1	3.6 (45)	2.875 (44)	4.2744 (41)
Atheist	See Table 25.1	3.5857 (14)	3.0714 (14)	4.2692 (13)
Catholic	See Table 25.1	3.1591 (11)	3.1136 (11)	3.9091 (11)
Christian	See Table 25.1	3.35 (28)	3.7768 (28)	3.5795 (22)
Episcopal	See Table 25.1	3.8333 (6)	3.9167 (6)	4.5417 (6)
Jewish	See Table 25.1	3.2786 (7)	3.6786 (7)	4.2857 (7)
Anova: P-Value	0.437	0.682	0.013	0.002

**Table 25.1: Means of Racial Attachment by Religion (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

Religion	White Attachment	Black Attachment	American Indian or Alaska Native Attachment	Asian American Attachment	Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander Attachment	Latino/Latina/Hispanic Attachment
Agnostic	3.1802 (43)	4.5 (2)	3.25 (2)	4 (1)	3.25 (2)	4.5 (1)
Atheist	3.0208 (12)			4.25 (1)		4.5 (1)
Catholic	3.5866 (6)		3 (1)	3 (1)	4 (2)	4.875 (2)
Christian	3.0263 (19)	3.5833 (6)	3.5 (3)	3.5 (1)	4.25 (1)	4 (2)
Episcopal	2.75 (6)					
Jewish	2.833 (6)			4 (1)		
Anova: P-Value	0.194	0.615	0.412	0.04	0.16	0.716

Tables 25 and 25.1 take the same attachment categories and compare them against the six religions with the most responses. Episcopalians have the highest levels of attachment in every category. Agnostics and Christians are the two religions with the highest total respondents. Between these two faiths, Agnostics have the higher Political and Abortion attachments while Christians have the higher religious attachments. Atheists have the second lowest level of Religious attachment which is interesting since Atheism, which is necessarily the disbelief of religion, atheists are more firmly committed to their religious beliefs than Agnostics. However, more surprising is that Catholics have a very close level of attachment to Atheists.

In Table 25.1 Episcopalians do not retain having the highest attachment amongst all categories. In fact, Episcopalians who answered the survey were entirely white and had the lowest level of racial attachment. Due to the spread and response rate of different races there is not as even of a spread among religions as there was with political parties. Christians who are Black and Latino/Latina/Hispanic have the lowest level of racial attachment Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islanders who are catholic have higher levels of racial attachment. Latino/Latina/Hispanic

attachment is the only category where every religion has an attachment of 4 or above, with Catholics having an attachment of 4.875, nearing maximum possible attachment. Catholics who are White also have the highest level of racial attachment. The religion with the highest racial attachment among Black respondents is the Agnostics while among American Indian/ Alaskan Native’s racial attachment is highest among Christians, and Asian American attachment is highest among Atheists.

**Table 26: Means of Racial, Political, Religious, and Abortion Attachment by Abortion Opinion (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

Abortion Opinion	Racial Attachment	Political Attachment	Religious attachment	Abortion Attachment
Pro-choice	See Table 26.1	3.6066 (151)	3.1318 (110)	4.0135 (148)
Neither/Indifferent	See Table 26.1	3.2639 (18)	3.5833 (12)	
Pro-Life	See Table 26.1	3.3625 (24)	4.0556 (18)	3.75 (24)
Anova: P-Value	0.236	0.042	0.001	0.124

**Table 26.1: Means of Racial Attachment by Abortion Opinion (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

Abortion Opinion	Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander					
	White Attachment	Black Attachment	American Indian or Alaska Native Attachment	Asian American Attachment	Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander Attachment	Latino/Latina/Hispanic Attachment
Pro-choice	3.1977 (129)	3.775 (10)	3.375 (6)	3.8611 (9)	3.7917 (4)	4.4583 (6)
Neither/Indifferent	2.8654 (13)	3.875 (2)	3.25 (5)	3.5 (1)	3.1875 (4)	3.5 (1)
Pro-Life	2.9375 (16)	3.75 (3)	3 (1)	3.25 (3)		3.833 (3)
Anova: P-Value	0.094	0.994	0.786	0.391	0.271	0.32

Table 26 shows that those who are Pro Choice have the highest levels of Political attachment and Abortion Attachment while Pro Life respondents have the highest levels of Religious attachments. Pro Choice similarly has higher attachment than Pro Life respondents in every category in Table 26.1. However, the difference in attachment varies widely. Black

attachment has a much smaller difference compared to any other category. The highest level of attachment on Table 26.1 is Latino/Latina/Hispanic attachment among those who are Pro Choice. That level of racial attachment is also the only on the table to reach above 4.0. Among Pro Choice and Pro-Life respondents, the only instance where attachment is below 3.0 is White attachment among Pro Life respondents. The only instance where neither of these categories have the largest average is Black attachment where those who are indifferent to abortion have the highest level of attachment.

### ***Copartisan Influence and Perceptions of Marginalization***

The next set of data collected will demonstrate the levels of copartisan influence and to what extent each group considers inter group dating to be marginalized within their group. Each of the tables presented will be mean comparisons in the same format as the section above. The primary difference in the following tables is that marginalization is measured on a 7-point scale rather than a 5-point scale.

Copartisan influence is the measurement of to what extent people who share a party, but do not know the respondent intimately have on the respondent's perception of interparty dating. In each instance it is specifically measured to indicate levels of negative influence, or disapproval by the same party members. The higher the measurement indicates that there is a greater perceived disapproval among those who share a political identity.

Perceptions of marginalization is similar except it measures the extent to which the respondent believes that a given intergroup relationship will be unapproved of, be considered taboo, or otherwise frowned upon by society as a whole rather than just same group opinions. The first set of tables that will be discussed will address copartisan influence and the second table will address perceptions of marginalization.

**Table 27: Mean of Copartisan Influence (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

	<b>Copartisan Influence</b>
Mean	4.1676
(N)	(176)

**Table 28: Mean of Copartisan Influence by Race (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

<b>Race</b>	<b>Copartisan Influence</b>
White	4.2641 (142)
Black	4.3 (15)
American Indian or Alaska Native	3.2917 (12)
Asian American	3.5417 (12)
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	3.4289 (7)
Latino/Latina/ Hispanic	3.55 (10)
Anova: P-Value	0.307

**Table 29: Mean of Copartisan Influence by Political Identity(Total Number in Parenthesis)**

<b>Political Party</b>	<b>Copartisan Influence</b>
Democrat	4.3813 (80)
Republican	3.625 (24)
Independent	3.7778 (9)
Libertarian	3.6964 (28)
Green Party Member	3.5 (11)
Democratic Socialist	5 (24)
Anova: P-Value	0.001

Table 27 is the average effect of Copartisan influence across all groups collected from, on a scale of 1 to 5. Tables 28 and 29 break down the effect of copartisan influence along racial and party divisions. Among racial groups, both White and Black respondents report higher average influence from copartisans. In comparison, all the other racial groups report levels of influence below the general average of 4.1676, with the lowest being Latinos/Latinas/Hispanics. As for



political identities, the group that reports the largest affects is Democratic Socialists and then followed by Democrats. Both of these groups report levels of influence greater than the general average with Democratic Socialists being the second highest level of any group tested at 5.0. All other parties report levels below the general average with none of them breaking 4.0.

**Table 30: Mean of Copartisan Influence by Religion (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

Religion	Copartisan Influence
Agnostic	4.3333 (42)
Atheist	5.2778 (9)
Catholic	3.55 (10)
Christian	3.6964 (28)
Episcopal	5.2 (5)
Jewish	4.7857 (7)
Anova: P-Value	0.076

**Table 31: Mean of Copartisan Influence by Abortion Opinion (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

Abortion Opinion	Copartisan Influence
Pro-choice	4.3713 (136)
Neither/Indifferent	3.4722 (18)
Pro-Life	3.4773 (22)
Anova: P-Value	0.001

Table 30 has the highest level of copartisan influence among any group tested. Atheists show that they believe that copartisans will have decently strong negative feelings about dating between parties. Additionally, over half of these religions listed show levels of influence that are above the general average. The other groups other than Atheists being Agnostics, Episcopalians, and Jewish respondents. The only groups that are not above the general average are Catholics and Christians. Table 31 in contrast only has one group that is above the general average, being

those who are Pro Choice. Those who are indifferent and Pro Life have levels of influence that are very close to each other while Pro Life’s level of influence is almost an entire point above either.

The next set of tables presented are measurements of the perceptions of marginalization to various intergroup dating categories. Table 32 is the general average for each type of intergroup dating measured in the survey.

**Table 32: Mean of Party, Race, Religion, and Abortion Marginalization (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

	Party Marginalization	Race Marginalization	Religion Marginalization	Abortion Marginalization
Mean	3.9964	4.2784	4.1703	3.9565
(N)	(185)	(182)	(182)	(176)

This table indicates that respondents to the survey believe that interracial relationships are perceived to be the most marginalized type of intergroup relationships. The second most is dating between religions, then interparty dating, then dating between abortion opinions. However, each of these measures are close to one another, the range only being about 0.3 points, indicating that all relationships are considered marginalized.

**Table 33: Mean of Party, Race, Religion, and Abortion Marginalization by Race (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

Race	Party Marginalization	Race Marginalization	Religion Marginalization	Abortion Marginalization
White	3.9845 (151)	4.3288 (148)	4.2342 (148)	3.9600 (146)
Black	4.1556 (15)	4.1778 (15)	4.2222 (15)	4.133 (15)
American Indian or Alaska Native	4.1944 (12)	4.611 (12)	4.1667 (12)	3.889 (12)
Asian American	3.7222 (12)	4.1389 (12)	3.9444 (12)	3.8333 (12)
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	4.5268 (7)	5.4286 (7)	4.8571 (7)	3.9048 (7)
Latino/Latina/ Hispanic	4.2333 (10)	4.8 (10)	4.4 (10)	3.9 (10)
Anova: P-Value	0.616	0.723	0.831	0.979

Table 33 looks at the same relationships but along racial lines. Among racial groups the highest level of inter-party marginalization is among Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islanders and the lowest is among Asian Americans. Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islanders also have the highest level of inter-racial marginalization and inter-religious marginalization. The lowest level of perceived marginalization for inter-racial relationships is among Black respondents and the lowest for inter-religious relationships is among Asian American respondents. Asian Americans also report the lowest level of inter-abortion marginalization. Additionally, for inter-party, inter-racial, and inter-religious marginalization most responses are above the general perceived average of marginalization. Between these three categories over half of the racial groups report higher levels of marginalization. For inter-party these show among all racial groups except Asian Americans. For inter-racial the racial categories that show the above average results are White, American Indian/ Alaskan Native, Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islanders, and Latino/Latina/Hispanic. Inter-Religious marginalization is highest among White, Black, Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islanders and Latino/Latina/Hispanic respondents. Inter-abortion is the only category where marginalization is generally below average.

**Table 34: Mean of Party, Race, Religion, and Abortion Marginalization by Party (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

<b>Political Party</b>	<b>Party Marginalization</b>	<b>Race Marginalization</b>	<b>Religion Marginalization</b>	<b>Abortion Marginalization</b>
Democrat	4.2941 (85)	4.5476 (84)	4.556 (84)	4.124 (82)
Republican	4.0533 (25)	4.44 (25)	3.88 (25)	3.9333 (25)
Independent	3.8148 (9)	4.4815 (9)	4.3704 (9)	4.1481 (9)
Libertarian	3.6548 (28)	3.7738 (28)	3.6786 (28)	3.6667 (28)
Green Party Member	2.8788 (11)	3.1818 (11)	3.3636 (11)	3.1818 (11)
Democratic Socialist	3.8765 (27)	4.1867 (25)	4.0000 (25)	4.0267 (25)
Anova: P-Value	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.005

According to Table 34 inter-party marginalization is greatest among Democrats and Republicans, with the lowest score coming from the Green party. The same Green Party score is also among all parties among all categories. Inter-racial dating and Inter-religious marginalization is highest among Democrats and is lowest among the Green party as well. Inter-abortion marginalization is the only category in which Independents are the highest, however the Green party is still the lowest. Additionally, Democrats have higher levels of marginalization than Republicans in every category.

**Table 35: Mean of Party, Race, Religion, and Abortion Marginalization by Religion (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

<b>Religion</b>	<b>Party Marginalization</b>	<b>Race Marginalization</b>	<b>Religion Marginalization</b>	<b>Abortion Marginalization</b>
Agnostic	4.3721 (43)	4.5659 (43)	4.3721 (43)	4.2143 (42)
Atheist	3.75 (12)	4.6667 (10)	4.2667 (10)	3.85 (10)
Catholic	4.6061 (11)	4.697 (11)	4.0909 (11)	4.4333 (10)
Christian	4.1724 (29)	4.2989 (29)	4.3103 (29)	4.046 (29)
Episcopal	3.8889 (6)	4.8 (5)	4.8667 (5)	3.6 (5)
Jewish	4.5714 (7)	4.5714 (7)	4.9048 (7)	4.1429 (7)
Anova: P-Value	0.002	0.015	0.02	0.046

Among religious groups, the highest level of Inter-party marginalization is among Catholics and the lowest is among Atheists. Catholics also have the highest perceived marginalization among inter-racial relationship however Christians have the lowest score in this category. Jewish respondents show the highest mean for inter-religious marginalization while Catholics have the lowest levels of inter-religious marginalization. Inter-abortion marginalization is highest among Episcopalians and lowest among Catholics.

**Table 36: Mean of Party, Race, Religion, and Abortion Marginalization by Abortion Opinion (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

Abortion Opinion	Party Marginalization	Race Marginalization	Religion Marginalization	Abortion Marginalization
Pro-choice	3.9861 (144)	4.2816 (141)	4.2317 (141)	3.9269 (139)
Neither/Indifferent	4.0556 (18)	4.3889 (18)	4.3148 (18)	4.1852 (18)
Pro-Life	4.0145 (23)	4.1739 (23)	3.6812 (23)	3.9565 (23)
Anova: P-Value	0.95	0.774	0.024	0.477

The last table for perceptions of marginalization are between opinions of abortion and intergroup dating. All responses for inter-party dating are close, however indifference has the highest level and pro-choice respondents have the lowest. This trend is similar among all other categories except that the lowest for inter-racial and inter-religious marginalization has Pro Choice as the lowest levels of marginalization while inter-abortion maintains pro-choice respondents as the lowest level of marginalization.

***Inter-group Dating Willingness***

The tables shown here will be indications of how willing each group is to dating members of another group. Similar to the other tables presented these will be comparisons of the average score for each category with the number of respondents listed below the mean. These will also be presented to show how the scores differ among race, political party, religion, and opinions on abortion. Scores are listed on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being completely unwilling and 5 being very willing. Table 37 provides the general average for each category.

**Table 37: Means of Willingness to Date Between Party, Race, Religion, Abortion, and Abortion Prior to Roe v. Wade Overturning (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

	Inter-Party	Inter-Racial	Inter-Religious	nter-Abortio	Inter-Abortion (Pre-Roe)
Mean	2.55	3.83	3.33	2.23	2.25
(N)	(193)	(193)	(192)	(192)	(193)

This table shows that on average abortion and party are the two instances where people are the least willing to date a person outside of their own group. Inter-racial dating on the opposite

spectrum demonstrates the greatest willingness among respondents. For each of these tables, abortion will have two categories: Inter-Abortion and Inter-Abortion (Pre-Roe). The latter is to develop an indication of how willingness to date was changed after Roe v. Wade was overturned.

**Table 38: Means of Willingness to Date Between Party, Race, Religion, Abortion, and Abortion Prior to Roe v. Wade Overturning by Race (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

Race	Inter-Party	Inter-Racial	Inter-Religious	Inter-Abortion	Inter-Abortion (Pre-Roe)
White	2.54 (158)	3.96 (158)	3.35 (157)	2.13 (158)	2.20 (158)
Black	2.27 (15)	3.2 (15)	3.13 (15)	3.78 (15)	2.53 (15)
American Indian or Alaska Native	3.08 (12)	3.17 (12)	3.33 (12)	2.75 (12)	2.42 (12)
Asian American	2.69 (13)	3.54 (13)	3.23 (13)	2.42 (12)	2.46 (13)
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	2.86 (7)	3.71 (7)	3.71 (7)	2.14 (7)	2.29 (7)
Latino/Latina/Hispanic	2.9 (10)	4.4 (10)	3.4 (10)	2.7 (10)	2.6 (10)
Anova: P-Value	0.315	0.001	0.808	0.158	0.678

Table 38 indicates the willingness to date in between groups broken up by race. American Indian/ Alaskan Native are the most willing to date between parties whereas Black respondents are the least likely. For inter-racial dating American Indian/ Alaskan Native become the least willing to date between races while Latino/Latina/Hispanic people become the most willing. As for inter-religious dating Table 38 demonstrates that Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islanders are the most likely to date between religious and Black respondents are once again the least likely. White and Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islanders are roughly tied for least likely to date people of differing abortion opinions both currently and before Roe was overturned. Black respondents are the most likely to date someone of a differing opinion on abortion both currently and before Roe was overturned. The most dramatic shift between contemporary inter-abortion and pre-Roe overturn willingness is among Black respondents as well, with respondents becoming more willing. Among racial groups there is no consistent change between these two

categories. White and Asian Americans show a decrease in willingness while each other group shows an increase in willingness.

**Table 39: Means of Willingness to Date Between Party, Race, Religion, Abortion, and Abortion Prior to Roe v. Wade Overturning by Party (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

Political Party	Inter-Party	Inter-Racial	Inter-Religious	Inter-Abortion	Inter-Abortion (Pre-Roe)
Democrat	2.65 (89)	4.29 (89)	3.7 (89)	2.06 (88)	2.18 (89)
Republican	2.75 (28)	3.32 (28)	2.70 (27)	2.50 (28)	2.39 (28)
Independent	3.44 (9)	4.44 (9)	3.67 (9)	2.78 (9)	3.00 (9)
Libertarian	2.61 (11)	2.75 (28)	2.64 (28)	2.86 (28)	2.64 (28)
Green Party Membe	2.36 (11)	2.64 (11)	2.73 (11)	2.36 (11)	2.09 (11)
Democratic Socialist	2.07 (28)	4.25 (28)	3.57 (28)	1.68 (28)	1.75 (28)
Anova: P-Value	0.009	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.007

The highest willingness for inter-party is Independents while the lowest is Democratic Socialists according to Table 39 which measures willingness by party. For Democrats and Republicans, the scores are close, however Republicans show slightly more willingness. This is not the case for interracial dating as Democrats are much more willing to date other racial groups than Republicans. However, the group most willing to date inter-racially is the Independents and the least willing is the Green party. Democrats are also much more willing to date inter-religiously than Republicans while also maintaining the highest willingness. Republicans are the second least willing, with Libertarians being the least willing overall to date a member of another religion. Democratic Socialists are the least likely to date a member of a different abortion opinion in both abortion categories. In the first the most willing is Libertarians while in the second it is Independent. The largest shift in willingness to date another abortion group comes from Green party members who became more willing by almost 0.3 points.

**Table 40: Means of Willingness to Date Between Party, Race, Religion, Abortion, and Abortion Prior to Roe v. Wade Overturning by Religion (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

Religion	Inter-Party	Inter-Racial	Inter-Religious	nter-Abortio	Inter-Abortion (Pre-Roe)
Agnostic	2.42 (52)	2.94 (52)	2.98 (52)	2.46 (52)	2.29 (52)
Atheist	2.07 (14)	4.71 (14)	3.43 (14)	1.69 (14)	1.79 (14)
Catholic	3.27 (11)	4.27 (11)	3.82 (11)	2.45 (11)	2.55 (11)
Christian	2.86 (28)	3.41 (28)	2.76 (28)	2.59 (28)	2.41 (28)
Episcopal	1.67 (6)	4.83 (6)	3.83 (6)	1.17 (6)	1.17 (6)
Jewish	2.43 (7)	4.14 (7)	4.57 (7)	2.14 (7)	2.14 (7)
Anova: P-Value	0.178	0.001	0.007	0.048	0.14

According to Table 40 the greatest willingness to date inter-party among religious groups are the Catholics with the least being the Episcopalians. Interracially the greatest willingness is among the Episcopalians while the lowest willingness is among Agnostics. Agnostics remain the lowest level of willingness among interreligious dating as well while the greatest changes to Jewish respondents. Among the abortion measures Episcopalians are the lowest in both categories, and the lowest measurement of willingness in any category across every table. Additionally, their willingness does not change between Roe being overturned. The largest current willingness on inter-abortion dating is with Christians while the largest pre-Roe is among the Catholics. The largest change was among the Christians who became more willing.

**Table 41: Means of Willingness to Date Between Party, Race, Religion, Abortion, and Abortion Prior to Roe v. Wade Overturning by Abortion Opinion (Total Number in Parenthesis)**

Abortion Opinion	Inter-Party	Inter-Racial	Inter-Religious	nter-Abortio	Inter-Abortion (Pre-Roe)
Pro-choice	2.46 (151)	4.01 (151)	3.49 (150)	2.11 (150)	2.15 (151)
Neither/Indifferent	3.17 (18)	3.33 (18)	3 (18)	3.06 (18)	3.06 (18)
Pro-Life	2.71 (24)	3.12 (24)	2.58 (24)	2.38 (24)	2.29 (24)
Anova: P-Value	0.012	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002



The willingness of dating intergroup by abortion opinion is demonstrated by Table 41. Those who are indifferent to abortion have the highest willingness to date between Party and Abortion, both pre and post Roe's overturning. Pro Choice respondents are the least willing to date between parties, both pre and post. They are also most willing to date between racial groups. Pro Life respondents never are never most willing to date between groups and are most unwilling to date between race and religion. The most significant change to dating came amongst Pro Life respondents as they had an increase in willingness to date after the overturning of Roe v. Wade.

### ***Correlations and Hypothesis Testing***

Within this thesis I have examined the question, "How does party attachment affect the willingness to date outgroup members?" using literature from political science, social psychology, and family studies. The primary hypothesis that was tested is as follows:

*H1: As party attachment increases there will be a decrease in willingness to date members of an out-group.*

Since identity is a multilayered concept and there can be several factors that influence the relationship between dating and identity a second hypothesis that was tested is listed below. This hypothesis was created in order to compare the willingness between party and other tested groups. The first step to test this hypothesis was to test for a correlation between each of the types of inter-group dating and each of the various party attachments. The correlations are shown in Table 42.

**Table 42: Correlation Between Intergroup Dating and Party Attachment**

	Political Attachment	Democrat Attachment	Republican Attachment	Independent Attachment	Libertarian Attachment	Green Attachment	Democratic Socialist Attachment
Inter-Party	-.394**	-.297*	-.415	-.809±	-.281	-.131	-.234
Inter-Racial	-.101	.026	-.109	-.43	-.117	-.116	.225
Inter-Religious	-.081	-.007	-.355	.154	-.516**	-.917**	-.04
Inter-Abortion	-.261**	-.291*	-.293	-.624	.042	-.724*	-.413*
Inter-Abortion (Pre-Roe)	-.222**	-.217	-.312	-.878*	.115	-.831*	-.226

±p<0.10; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01

Overall, the correlations indicate mixed support for the first hypothesis. There are several instances in which attachment to one’s party shows a significant influence on willingness to date a member of an outgroup. Each of the instances where there is a statistically significant correlation the trend matches the trend described in the hypothesis as well. However, the majority of instances indicate that there is no significant influence of party attachment to willingness to date members of a different group identity.

The first column is the correlation of general political attachment and each of the types of inter-group dating. In general, there is a correlation between Political Attachment and inter-party dating, inter-abortion dating, and inter-abortion dating prior to Roe being overturned at a p<0.01 level. There is no significant effect on inter-racial or inter-religious dating. The next several columns show each attachment to the parties and their effects. Among Democrats, the attachment to party on inter-party and inter-abortion dating was significant at a P<0.05 level. The extent of the correlation for inter-party is lower than average while the extent for inter-abortion is slightly above average. Republicans do not show a significant effect of party attachment on any of the inter-group dating categories. Independents show a marginally significant correlation between party attachment and inter-party dating at a p< 0.1 level and inter-abortion prior to Roe at a p<0.05 level. Libertarians show a significant correlation between party attachment and inter-religious dating at a p<0.01 level. Green party attachment has a significant correlation with both

inter-abortion categories at a  $p < 0.05$  level and with inter-religious at a  $p < 0.01$  level. Lastly, Democratic Socialists have a significant correlation with only inter-abortion dating and party attachment.

Since dating is complex and one singular attachment may or may not have an influence on willingness to date, a second hypothesis was tested in order to determine if racial or religious effects would have a similar reaction to intergroup dating. The second hypothesis is as follows:

*H2: As racial/ religious/ abortion attachment increases there will be a decrease in willingness to date members of an out-group.*

Table 43 presents the correlation tests for the second hypothesis.

**Table 43: Correlation Between Intergroup Dating and Racial, Religious, and Abortion Opinion Attachment**

Dating Willingness	Racial Attachment	White Attachment	Black Attachment	American Indian or Alaska Native	Asian American Attachment	Native Hawaiian or Pacific	Latino/Latina/Hispanic	Religious attachment	Abortion Attachment
Inter-Party	-.084	-.035	-.146	-.498	.006	-.804	-.183	-.830	-.278**
Inter-Racial	-.194*	-.208**	-.439	-.161	.216	-.892*	-.489	-.990	.285**
Inter-Religious	.759	-.067	-.107	-.110	.540	-.007	-.438	-.237	.089
Inter-Abortion	-.046	-.010	-.423	-.659±	-.292	-.901*	.119	-.093	-.664**
Inter-Abortion (Pre-Roe)	-.089	-.065	-.355	-.437	-.347	-.968**	.002	-.080**	-.465**

± $p < 0.10$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$

Similar to the first hypothesis, there is mixed support for the second hypothesis. There are a few correlations that have statistical significance and all but one of these correlations demonstrate a relationship that is described by the second hypothesis. The only one that does not is between Abortion Attachment and inter-racial dating. Most of the relationships tested however do not show a statistically significant relationship.

Just with Table 42 the first column is a measurement of general racial attachment and the next six columns are dedicated to each racial group. The last two columns are dedicated to religious attachment and abortion attachment. Racial attachment in general only has a significant effect on inter-racial dating, at a  $p < 0.05$  level. Religious attachment has a significant effect on

inter-religious dating at a  $p < 0.01$  level. Abortion attachment has a significant effect on the willingness to date inter-party, inter-racial, and both inter-abortion categories at a  $p < 0.01$  level.

White attachment only has a significant effect on the willingness to date inter-racially at a  $p < 0.01$  level. Black attachment, Asian American attachment, and Latino/Latina/Hispanic attachment do not show a significant relationship with any type of inter-group dating. American Indian/ Alaskan Native attachment and Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islanders attachment are the only other two groups to have significant effects on inter-group dating. American Indian/ Alaskan Native attachment has a marginally significant effect on inter-abortion willingness at a  $p < 0.10$  level. Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islanders attachment has a significant correlation with inter-racial dating willingness and inter-abortion willingness at a  $p < 0.05$  level. This attachment also has a significant correlation with inter-abortion prior to Roe being overturned at a  $p < 0.01$  level.

One of the significant failures of prior research on political dating is that it more often than not does not consider the social aspects of dating life. Instead, researchers tend to focus on the desires and preferences of only the prospective dater without regard to how both their internal circle of friends as well as the overarching social groups they consider themselves a part of will influence the dating process. As such, two more hypotheses were created to account for the social aspects of dating life.

Hypothesis three is listed as the following:

*H3: As the amount of contact with in-group members among R and R's friends increases, there will be a decrease in willingness to date members of an out-group.*

This hypothesis specifically measures the contact of friends who share a social identity with the respondents against willingness to date specific groups. Additionally, the idea of

extended friends, or “friends of friends” will also be tested in order to understand how much of an influence a person two connections away from the respondent will have. Similarly, whether or not friends of the respondent date members of outgroups will also be tested to determine that effect on willingness to date. Table 44 and Table 45 present the correlation coefficients for Hypothesis three.

**Table 44: Correlation Between Intergroup Dating and Relationships of Party and Racial Friends**

	Same Party Friends	Same Party Friends -Extended	Same Party Dating	Same Race Friends	Same Race Friends-Extended	Same Race Dating
Inter-Party	-.279**	.162*	.219**	.024	.148±	.144±
Inter-Racial	.124±	.177*	-.050	.042	.427**	.067
Inter-Religious	-.208	.087	.128±	.012	.240**	.157*
Inter-Abortion	-.235**	.153*	.203**	-.010	-.051	.027
Inter-Abortion (Pre-Roe)	-.223**	.134±	.132±	-.039	.009	.033

±p<0.10; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01

The tables present mixed support for hypothesis three as well. There are several statistically significant relationships, however they are not all consistent with the relationship defined by hypothesis three.

The first three columns on Table 44 show the effect of those close to the respondent who also share political identities and willingness to date. The amount of friends who share a political identity has a marginally significant effect on inter-racial willingness at a p<0.1 level and a significant effect on inter-party and both inter-abortion categories at a p<0.01 level. When friends of the respondent also have friends of different political identity there is a marginally significant correlation with inter-abortion post Roe at a p<0.01 level. Additionally, this category also has significant relationships with inter-party, inter-racial, and inter-abortion at a p<0.05 level. Similarly, whether or not copartisans are dating members of other parties has statistically significant relationships with inter-party, inter-religious, and both inter-abortion categories. Inter-

party and inter-abortion are significant at  $p < 0.05$  level while inter-religious and inter-abortion pre-Roe are significant at  $p < 0.01$  level.

The next three columns measure the same effects but for race instead of party. There are no statistically significant relationships between friends with the same race and willingness to date. However, there are two relationships for same race friends who are also friends with other races and same race friends who are dating other races. For the former there is a marginally significant correlation between Same Race Friends-Extended and inter-party willingness to date at a  $p < 0.10$  level and between inter-racial dating and inter-abortion dating at a  $p < 0.01$  level. For same-race friends who are dating members of other races there is a marginally significant correlation between it and willingness to date inter-party at a  $p < 0.10$  level and a significant correlation between it and inter-religious dating at a  $p < 0.05$  level .

**Table 45: Correlation Between Intergroup Dating and Relationships of Religious and Abortion Friends**

	Same Religion Friends	Same Religion Friends-Extended	Same Religion Dating	Same Abortion Friends
Inter-Party	.067	-.032	.031	-.157*
Inter-Racial	-.153*	.282**	.004	.160*
Inter-Religious	-.223**	.128±	.152*	.133±
Inter-Abortion	.097	-.004	.023	-.288**
Inter-Abortion (Pre-Roe)	.037	-.018	.008	-.270**

± $p < 0.10$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$

The first three columns on Table 45 measure these same effects but for religion. There are not as many significant effects for religious friends as with other categories. Number of friends who share a religion has a significant effect on inter-racial dating at a  $p < 0.05$  level and with inter-religious dating at  $p < 0.01$  level. Friends of the same religion who also have friends of a different religion has a marginally statistically significant effect on inter-religious dating at a  $p < 0.10$  level and a statistically significant effect on inter-racial dating at a  $p < 0.01$  level. The last

measurement, friends who date members of other religions, has a significant effect on inter-religious dating at a  $p < 0.05$  level.

The final column measures the effect of same abortion friends on willingness to date an outgroup. What is shown is that there is a significant effect across every type of inter-group dating tested. The relationship with inter-religious dating is significant at a  $p < 0.01$  level, inter-party willingness and inter-racial willingness are significant at a  $p < 0.05$  level, and finally both abortion categories are significant at a  $p < 0.01$  level.

The final hypothesis that was created for this thesis was to test the overarching social influence of members with the same social identity as the user. The important distinction between this hypothesis and hypothesis three is level of interaction as well as perception of the relationships. Hypothesis three was used to examine one form of intimate relationships with respondents whereas hypothesis four will be used to examine the effect of people who may share a group identity with the respondent but are not in a form of relationship with the respondent. In other words, hypothesis four is used to determine how the respondents believe that an intergroup relationship will be perceived by same-group members. In order to do this there were two types of factors that were tested. First was a correlation between the perceived disapproval of copartisans on dating habits and willingness to date out group members. The second was the correlation between perceived marginalization of inter-group relationships and willingness to date out group members. In both of these circumstances it was expected that the same type of relationship would occur, as such hypothesis four was as listed below. Table 46 shows the results of the correlation tests

*H4: As the perception of dating an out-group member increases there will be a decrease in the willingness to date members of an out-group.*

**Table 46: Correlation Between Intergroup Dating and Intergroup Marginalization**

	Disapproval of Copartisan's	Inter-Party Marginalization	Inter-Racial Marginalization	Inter-Religion Marginalization	Inter-Abortion Marginalization
Inter-Party	-.473**	.086	0.033	.133±	.250**
Inter-Racial	.152*	.186*	.317**	.235**	.170*
Inter-Religious	-0.088	.110	.152*	.284**	.179*
Inter-Abortion	-.354**	-.019	-.156*	-0.092	.145±
Inter-Abortion (Post-Roe)	-.360**	.082	-0.031	0.042	.227**

±p<0.10; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01

Based on the correlation tests that were conducted there is support for aspects of disapproval but no support for the perception of marginalization. Four of the five types of inter-group dating that were tested show a significant correlation whose relationship matches what is presented by the hypothesis. For each of the inter-group marginalization categories there are significant relationships but each of these relationships do not have the relationship that would have been expected by my hypothesis.

For the first column of Table 46, in which the relationships between expected copartisan disapproval and willingness to date are tested, there are four statistically significant relationships. The relationship between copartisan disapproval and inter-racial dating is significant at p<0.05 level and the relationship with inter-party and both abortion categories is significant at a p<0.01 level.

The remainder of the tests that are significant, with one exception, are all reflective of relationships that are contrary to the hypothesis. There is a statistically significant correlation between inter-party marginalization and inter-racial dating at a p<0.05 level . Among perceptions of inter-racial marginalization there is a significant correlation with inter-religious and inter-abortion at a p<0.05 level and with inter-racial willingness at a p<0.01 level. There is a marginal significant relationship between perceptions of inter-religious marginalization and inter-party dating at a p<0.10 level. Additionally, there are significant relationships with this perception of



marginalization and inter-racial willingness and inter-religious willingness at a  $p < 0.01$  level. The last column, inter-abortion marginalization has a significant effect on each of the types of inter-group dating. at a  $p < 0.10$  level there is a correlation with inter-abortion dating. At a  $p < 0.05$  level there is a correlation with inter-racial marginal and inter-religious dating willingness. At a  $p < 0.01$  level there is a correlation with inter-party and inter-abortion prior to Roe overturning.

Each of these hypotheses reflect a different aspect of political dating behavior in the common political landscape. Despite the plethora of data collected, there is only mixed support for each of these hypotheses.

## CHAPTER IV: DISCUSSION

A great deal of data was collected for this thesis. While there has been mixed support for each of the tested hypotheses there has nonetheless been a great deal of information that can be extrapolated from the results of the survey. Firstly, the differences in willingness to date among parties are worth noting. Prior research has shown that political homogamy is likely and that partisans are, in general, unwilling to date one another. The research that was conducted here reinforces that conclusion.

### *Inter-Party Dating*

Overall and across every party questioned there is a consensus of unwillingness to date members of different political identities. It has been shown that between the two major parties in the United States, Democrats are more unwilling to date other political members than Republicans, although the difference in unwillingness is small. However, I found that between the two parties only Democrats show a significance between party attachment and willingness to date between parties. Although both parties are unwilling to date members of another party, only Democrats can be partially explained by their attachment to their party. Additionally, Republicans do not show to have a high level of copartisan influence, which indicates that copartisan disapproval is not a reason for the low willingness. Republicans also show that the majority of respondents have dated members of other parties and that most of them did not break up over political differences, showing that relationship history does not seem to have an effect.

The only potential explanation of this difference from the data collected may come from their immediate friends. There is a significant relationship showing that the more friends of a same political identity someone has, the less willing they are to date someone who belongs to another party. Additionally, whether or not Republicans have friends who also have friends of

other parties, as well as if those friends are dating outside of their political identity may have an impact. In both of these circumstances there is an increase of willingness to date members of other parties. Due to the lack of relationships in other tests, it is plausible that Republicans are affected by their immediate friends while Democrats are influenced by their attachment to their party. However, that is not to say that Democrats are only influenced by their political identity. Rather, political identity itself has a more significant role to Democrats in dating than it does to Republicans.

Similar to Republicans, the Libertarians and Greens do not show a significant effect of their political attachment to dating. Both of these parties also have below average copartisan disapproval as well as most members reported to not have broken up previous relationships due to political differences. This indicates that both of these parties are also affected by their immediate friends the greatest similar to Republican respondents. What is particularly interesting about this is that the Green Party has the second lowest level of willingness among any party. This indicates that not only can immediately friends and their relationships affect dating, but that those relationships can have a very strong effect on dating.

None of these parties examined prior makeup the greatest or smallest level of unwillingness among political identities. It is the case that independents have the greatest amount of willingness to date between parties while Democratic Socialists have the least amount. While Independents show a very strong relationship between their attachment to their political identity, their average level of attachment is the lowest of any political identity. This is particularly interesting because it leads to the conclusion that although independents are the least attached to their political identity on average, they have the strongest changes to inter-party dating

preferences as attachment increases. However political attachment is not sufficient by itself to explain the differences in willingness to date members of other parties.

While Democrats have a willingness to date between parties around the general average, Democratic Socialists have the least amount of willingness but do not have the highest attachment to their party. In fact, Democratic Socialists had only the third highest level of party attachment and did not show a significant correlation to their attachment and willingness to date other party members. This indicates that dating between parties is affected by more than just one's political identity. For Democratic Socialists it very well could be an effect of copartisan disapproval over other factors. There is a decently strong effect that the assumed disapproval of copartisans has on willingness to date members of other parties. This relationship is that as the respondent believes their copartisans opinions disapproval of inter-party relationships will increase, that the willingness to date another member will decrease. Democratic Socialists have the highest average score of copartisan disapproval. This may indicate that for Democratic Socialists, the social influence of same party members has the greatest impact on the political identity of people they wish to date. However, because Democratic Socialists is a smaller party in American politics, it could also be the case that they are more attached to specific ideologies instead of a particular party. There is a significant relationship between abortion attachment and inter-party dating and Democratic Socialists have the largest measurement of attachment to their abortion opinions. While this is just one of many potential policy positions it still stands to reason that, at least for Democratic Socialists, their attachment to specific ideological or political opinions may have a greater effect on inter-party dating than just political identity.

### *Inter-Racial Dating*

None of the parties that were tested for this thesis show a significant relationship between their political attachment and their willingness to date other races. That means that although partisan sorting has increased in the United States, the effect of racial sorting has not extended to interracial dating among the parties. However, this does not mean there is zero influence of partisanship on inter-racial dating. There is a relationship between friends of the same party, as well as extended friends on the willingness to date inter-racially. What this relationship shows is that actually the more friends and extended friends of the same party a respondent has the more likely they are to date friends of different races. This could likely however just be an effect of the diversity of racial groups in the parties. The demographics collected at the beginning of the survey show that four of the six parties have at least one member in half of the racial groups tested for.

With this in mind it might instead be the case that inter-racial dating is most affected by racial attachment or by contact with members of other races. In general, this seems to be the case as attachment to a racial group increases, there is a decrease of willingness to date another race. When this relationship is examined by each race though, there are only two racial groups that show a similar relationship, White respondents and Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander respondents. This is particularly striking for White respondents because they are the largest racial group in the United States and that they have a lower level of racial attachment on average compared to every other racial group. In other words, this means that every other racial group has a higher level of racial attachment, almost all of these racial groups do not have their higher levels of attachment increase their willingness to date inter-racially. Similar to political attachment, this means that racial attachment alone cannot explain this relationship. Black

respondents, for example, have the highest level of racial attachment, the second lowest willingness to date interracially, but racial attachment is not a factor. However, this relationship is consistent for every other non-white racial group except for Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islanders. Prior research has concluded that, all things being equal, racial groups will tend to marry within those same racial groups. However, what this research has demonstrated is that this type of homogamy is not always due to the attachment to one's racial group. It could be the case that racial homogamy might instead be a result of a non-racial factor. Religion, particularly friends and extended friends of the respondent's religious group are shown to have a significant effect on willingness to date inter-racially. As the number of friends who share a religious identity increases there is a decrease in willingness to date inter-racially. What this could mean is that religion has become racially homogamous and that instead it could be a better determinate of inter-racial dating among certain groups over racial attachment. However, that is outside the purview of this specific thesis topic so additional research would have to be conducted.

### ***Inter-Religious Dating***

Among all of the parties that were analyzed for this thesis there are two where their political attachment has a significant impact on their willingness to date inter-religiously. For both the Green Party and the Libertarian party as their attachment to their political identities increase there is a decrease in willingness to date inter-religiously. Additionally, both of these parties have average religious attachments that are below average, with the Green party having the third lowest attachment of all parties tested. Libertarians however are the second highest religiously attached party, just behind Republicans. Both of these parties also have two of the three lowest average willingness to date inter-religiously. There is also no data supporting the

idea that religious attachment has an effect on inter-religious dating. The Green party also has a low number of members attached to established religions at all within this survey group.

What these factors together mean is that when considering whether or not to date someone of a different religion, attachment to their party may be a greater indicator than attachment to their religion. This is less of the case for Libertarians than for the Green party due to the differences in religious attachment. It could also be the case that both of these parties could have internal homogeneity with religious identity and that could lead to low willingness to date inter-religiously. In other words, that specific religions could be associated with the party and that in turn changes how party members view inter-religious dating. However, there is not enough data to support this theory for both parties. When considering the demographics of both parties the largest group for each party did not leave a response at all, therefore I am unable to develop a finite conclusion if religion has been sorted into each party to the extent that it is affecting dating behavior.

Although both of these parties show a significant effect of political attachment, neither of them demonstrate the highest or lowest levels of willingness to date members of other religions. Republicans and Democrats are the lowest and highest average willingness, respectively. These relationships are best understood under the context of religious attachment. Republicans have the lowest level of willingness to date members of other religions and also have the highest level of attachment to their religions. Democrats show the opposite effect by having the second lowest attachment and the highest level of willingness. The only group to have lower attachment than the Democrats are the Democratic Socialists who have the third highest willingness to date outside of their religion. One potential issue with this explanation is that there is no general relationship between religious attachment and inter-religious dating. As such it would also be

plausible that the parties contain different proportions of religious groups which lead to the differences of willingness. As members of the parties have more members who share a religion then the less likely they are to date other religions. While the Republican party respondents in my sample are mostly Catholic, there are other religious groups in the party and the combination of those members equals the number of Catholic responses. Democrats on the other hand have the largest religious group being Agnostics and have a larger variety of religions associated with the Democratic party. Although Agnostics are the largest group numerically, they do not equal or outnumber the rest of religious groups combined, starkly different than the Republican demographics. Since the Democratic party consists of a larger variety of religious groups as well as smaller proportions of those groups, partisans may be more likely to engage with members of other religions. Republicans on the other hand are less religiously diverse and therefore less likely to engage with members of other religions. The religious outlook of each party could mean that they are more or less likely to interact with other religious viewpoints, thus affecting their willingness to date members of different religions.

### ***Inter-Abortion Dating***

Due to the overlap of abortion positions and political ideology that is typically present in American politics, I had expected there to be a large impact of political identity on willingness to date members of different abortion opinions, both pre and post the overturning of *Roe v. Wade*. This assumption held mostly true for the political parties. Members of the Democratic party, the Green Party and the Democratic Socialists all have their attachment to their political identity impact their willingness to date people who have different opinions on abortion.

At initial glance it is peculiar that the Republican party did not have a partisan effect on the willingness to date in this instance, however upon further research it is likely because unlike



the parties that do, the Republican party respondents do not have a clear party line decision on abortion. Republicans who responded to the survey are split roughly fifty-fifty between pro-life opinions and pro-choice opinions. Due to this split, the party identity does not have a clear goal thus allowing the respondents to consider abortion outside of partisan attachments. The Democrats, the Greens, and the Democratic Socialists are all overwhelmingly pro-choice. Which indicates there is a clear party-abortion connection and as expected the party attachment will decrease the willingness to date outside of one's opinion of abortion. Additionally, the Democratic and Democratic Socialist parties are much more attached to their opinions on abortion than the other parties, which could also affect their willingness to date outside their chosen group.

The two groups with the largest willingness to date other abortion opinions are the Independents and the Libertarians. Both of these groups are generally unwilling, however they are the least unwilling of any party tested. Additionally, they have the least amount of attachment to their opinions of abortion. This further supports the conclusion that abortion attachment has a large effect on willingness to date between abortion opinions.

At the time of developing and writing this thesis, the largest change to abortion policy in this generation occurred when *Roe v. Wade* was overturned by the Supreme Court of the United States. Due to this change there could be potentially large ramifications to dating life in the US. As such willingness to date other those with other opinions of abortion prior to this event were collected.

In general, political attachment has had an effect both before and after the Supreme Court's decision. This also seems to be the case for members of the Green Party. However, for the Democrats and the Democratic Socialists political attachment was not a significant indicator

of willingness prior to the Roe overturning. For Democratic Socialists the decision also caused a large increase in the effect that party has on willingness to date people of different opinions on abortion. These changes are likely an effect of how the issue of abortion is positioned within the political spectrum. The decision by the Supreme Court was undeniably a win for pro-life advocates and a loss by pro-choice advocates. With the Democrats and the Democratic Socialists being overwhelmingly pro-choice it stands to reason that the decision further reinforced their opinions on abortion with political identity, thus causing a larger influence of political identity on inter-abortion willingness. For both of these parties their willingness was higher prior to the court's decision than after. However, that is only one potential explanation. As has been demonstrated there are several different factors that could have also caused this change and further research would need to be conducted to confirm any explanation definitively.

The only other change between willingness in dating between abortion groups that was affected by political attachment is among the independents. Prior to the decision, independent political attachment did have a statistically significant effect on their willingness to date. The reason for this is one I am not sure of. It could possibly be explained by changes in political attachment between the events. It is possible that the decision of the Supreme Court caused independents to be less concerned with political attachment and align themselves more ideologically. After the court's decision Independents were less willing to date members of other abortion opinions, however there is not a longitudinal measurement of political attachment so I cannot be sure if there was a change there that could have caused this change in willingness. Similarly, it could have been an effect of friend group dynamic changing, but I do not have the data to confirm.

One group's change in willingness before and after Roe v. Wade was overturned and is particularly interesting in context of the other party changes is the Republican party. If the court's decision is considered to be a political polarizing event, the opposite is occurring among Republicans looking to date. In the wake of the court's decision Republicans have become more likely to date members of different abortion opinions. Similar to the change that occurred with Independents there is not enough data here to conclude why this occurred definitely.

### *Marginalization*

One topic that was measured but has not been discussed yet is the topic of marginalization. I had expected that the relationship between marginalization and willingness to date would be negative. In other words, as marginalization would increase the willingness to date another group would decrease. The logic behind this is simple, that if an individual perceives a potential relationship has been marginalized then they should be less willing to pursue that given relationship out of fear of ostracization.

What I found indicated a positive relationship amongst every statistically significant category. This means that the correlation tests would indicate that as the perception of marginalization increases then so does the willingness to date that particular group. This relationship was found across all types of inter-group relationships that were tested, however that explanation does not seem logically coherent. Due to this I believe it is actually the case that these correlation tests have instead measured a different relationship: whether or not being in an inter-group relationship increases perception of marginalization. From the data collected I believe it to be the case that instead of marginalization increasing the willingness to date other groups, that people who are or already dating other groups perceive greater levels of marginalization. For instance, someone who is not dating another group may indicate lower

levels of marginalization but someone who is dating a member of another group may report higher levels of marginalization due to the difference in actual dating experiences. Additional research would have to be conducted to confirm this however.

### ***Limitations***

Although I had a large number of responses and I was able to discover some interesting relationships there are still several limitations to my findings. Firstly, and most predominantly is the sample sizes of certain political, racial, and religious groups. The primary question that I wanted to answer was concerned with how political identity affects dating behavior. I included six political parties that could be chosen by respondents. I received a good deal of responses from most of them, however for Independents and the Green Party the response number was much lower than the rest. There were only nine Independents and eleven responses for the Green Party. These low numbers indicate that any statistically significant effects found involving these respondents may not be indicative of larger social phenomena, and phenomena that exist in the larger social group may not be picked up in this sample.

This similar limitation is found among the racial groups that were selected. I was able to collect a large number of responses from White individuals, however this is not also the case for all the other racial groups. None of the racial groups other than White that were available for respondents to select received more than 15 responses at most. The least number of responses that were received were for Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islanders at seven total responses. Just as with the small number of responses for Independents and Green Party members the relationships found among non-white respondents may not be indicative of large social trends.

The last limitation was a lack of data collected from the survey. There were several instances when data analysis when I realized that additional questions should have been asked

when they were not. Most notably was that I had asked about copartisan disapproval but did not include similar questions for race, religion, or abortion. Additionally, questions asked on extended friends of abortion or friends who date other abortion opinions were not included. Future research should explore these topics

## CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

This thesis was created in order to collect data on and then explain how partisan identity can affect specific dating behavior. Specifically, the idea of dating outside of one's social group. Prior research conducted has shown that people who are married tend to choose partners within their own social groups whether that be political, racial, or religious. I decided to take this research further and analyze whether or not the attachment to certain groups will affect that effect of homogamy. Additionally, with the changes of the American political climate over the last several decades there has been recent literature to suggest that Americans are becoming more and more socially sorted within their parties. This means that specific social groups such as race or religion are becoming increasingly aligned with political identity. With that in mind I wanted to know if the increased social sorting affected how political partisans dated members of other groups that were not inherently political in name, but could be considered politically aligned with one exception. At the time of developing this thesis the Supreme Court of the United States issued a ruling that would overturn *Roe v. Wade*. As such I also included questions regarding the opinions of abortion to understand how dating habits among people who hold these opinions may have changed.

I had expected that as partisan attachment would increase, then the level of willingness to date between parties, races, religions, and abortion. There was mixed support for this hypothesis as political attachment did show to have an effect among certain groups but not all. Democrats showed that their partisan attachment decreased their willingness to date inter-party, but no other party shared this relationship except for Libertarians, whose response rate was so low that it may not be indicative of a larger social effect. The only group that was shown that partisan identity had an effect on dating and had the response count to potentially support a larger phenomenon

were the Independents attachment on dating other religious groups. Due to the mixed results my first hypothesis has had mixed support.

In order to test if that party attachment was or was not an effect of social sorting, the attachments of racial, religious, and abortion attitudes were all also tested against dating behavior. I have found that as racial attachment increases then people are less willing to date members of other races. This is most prominent among White respondents however attachment alone was not sufficient to explain that behavior. If it was then Black respondents, who had the highest attachment to racial attitudes, should have also been expected to have a correlation between their attachment and willingness to date inter-racially, but there was no relationship discovered. In general, there is no indication that religious attachment has an effect on intergroup dating, except for willingness to date someone with a different opinion on abortion prior to *Roe v. Wade*'s overturning. How strongly attached to their opinion of abortion however has a significant effect on willingness to date between party, race, and abortion opinions. My second hypothesis also has had mixed results.

One failure of prior research was that dating amongst politics has not been placed within its respective social context. As such I also had tested if immediate friends and their relationships as well as perceptions on copartisan approval and marginalization had an effect of inter-group dating. The primary purpose of including this type of research was to draw conclusions of why willingness might be low but is not affected by group identity, such as among Republicans. When an individual has friends who share a political identity with themselves, they are less likely to date between parties, races, and abortion opinions. This relationship is not found among having friends of the same race however it is found among sharing religious friends. The more friends that a person has that share a religious identity, the less willing they are to date other

races and other religions. What is interesting is that when testing if friends that share an abortion opinion have an effect on willingness to date, there are mixed relationships. Greater friends in this manner decrease likelihood of dating different parties and abortion opinions, but increase the willingness to date other races and religions.

However, it is not only immediate friends that may have an effect, so whether or their friends who share an identity are engaging in cross-group friendships were also tested. Having extended friends of different parties increases the willingness to date between parties, between races, and between abortion opinions. Extended friends of different races have shown to increase willingness to date other parties, races, and religions. As an individual has more extended friends of different religions, they are more willing to date other races, and other religions. Similar to extended friends, whether or not friends that share a social identity are dating other social identities are shown to have an effect on certain intergroup dating preferences. When friends who share a political party also date members of other parties there tends to be an increase in willingness among dating other parties, other religions, and other abortion opinions. Friends who are the same race but date interracially show a similar effect by making it more likely to date different political identities and other religious identities. Friends dating other religions has shown to increase the willingness to date other religions as well. However, there are also instances where friends' behaviors have no effect on dating behavior, as such there is mixed support for the third hypothesis.

Friends are not the only social factor that can influence dating and so the effect of perceived copartisan disapproval and marginalization were also accounted for. The effect of copartisans has been shown to be large. Respondents who believe that their copartisans, of whom they do not know, will disapprove of their relationship tend to have less willingness to date



between parties, between races, and between abortion opinions. However, one of the most interesting relationships that was found was that the correlation tests indicate that as perceived marginalization increases, then individuals will be more likely to engage in those types of relationships. This idea seems contrary to internal logic that an individual would be more likely to engage in a relationship that is marginalized. As such it is my belief that the marginalization measurements actually measured the extent to which people who have been in inter-group relationships believe them to be marginalized. With this idea in mind it can be concluded that inter-group relationships are generally perceived as more marginalized by those who are actually engaging in these types of relationships. Due to these results, hypothesis four also has mixed results.

Overall though this research demonstrates that there is a wide variety of influences on dating life. Some groups are strongly affected by their attachment to their social group, whereas others may be more affected by their friends or opinions of copartisans. What has been shown is that despite the increased social sorting in the US, it is rare that political affiliation has a large effect on willingness to date social groups presumed to have been sorted into specific political parties.

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