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This thesis investigates how everyday people responded to the frames deployed by Peruvian elites during the protests against Dina Boluarte's presidency at the end of 2022 and beginning of 2023, with a particular focus on the reaction to *terruqueo*. This frame, utilized by economic and political elites, government agents and mass media, aims to demobilize, criminalize, and delegitimize protests by invoking the collective memory of the Peruvian internal warfare (1980-2000) to portrait protesters as violent.

Through the analysis of Twitter replies to posts from the accounts of congressmen, La Republica and El Comercio newspapers, and government agencies, the content analysis reveals that *terruqueo* functioned as a counterframe, an official frame and a media frame during the protests. In that sense, everyday people resisted to *terruqueo* in two ways: by drawing upon elements of collective memory to redirect blame towards politicians, media and government agents; and by questioning the broader use of the frame, including its inconsistencies and efficacy in demobilizing people. The finding of this study suggests a more dynamic outlook on social mobilization in Peru highlighting the agency of everyday people in challenging elites' narratives.

FRAMING PROTESTS IN PERU: THE RESISTANCE TO TERRUQUEO ON TWITTER

DURING DINA BOLUARTE'S PRESIDENCY, 2022-2023

by

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my parents, Ricardo Rodriguez Purisaca and María Bustamante Solís, my brothers Jair, Jari and Jared, my sister Vasti, my uncle Augusto and my grandfather Augusto Bustamante Coico. Thank you for all your support and prayers, you are a real God's gift to my life. Besides, I dedicate this work to the memory of my grandmother Juana Solís Chevez. You are always in my heart.

APPROVAL PAGE

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

In Peru, there have been a series of political crises in the last six years, during which six presidents have taken office. These crises have been characterized by continual conflicts between the executive and the Congress, marked by persistent attempts at presidential impeachment, Congress dissolution, and an attempted coup by former president Pedro Castillo on December 7th, 2022. At certain moments, strong social mobilizations have accompanied this period of political instability. It has been common to see the deployment of *terruqueo*, a *framing tactic* used by economic and political elites, mass media, and everyday people to stigmatize protesters and delegitimize their demands. In the literature on social movements and protests, frames serve as schemes through which actors immersed in these public dynamics focus discussions or promote collective action by emphasizing certain events, situations, experiences or sequences of actions, both *past* and present (Snow and Benford 1992, 137).

Terruqueo as a *frame* appeals to Peruvian collective memory due to its relation to the use of the word *terruco*—a neologism for 'terrorist' in the Quechua language—deployed during the internal warfare between the Peruvian State and the terrorist groups Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (MRTA) from 1980-2000. The internal warfare was the bloodiest violent cycle in Peruvian Republican history. According to Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR 2004), the internal warfare left around sixty-nine thousand dead and missing persons. 54% of these victims were attributed to Shining Path, a Marxist-Leninist terrorist group, whose founder and leader was Abimael Guzmán Reinoso, a university professor.

In their pioneering work on memory struggles in Peru, Barrantes and Peña (2006) argue that within the Peruvian public sphere, two competing narratives coexist, providing frames for

organizing and interpreting personal memories regarding the internal warfare: a *memory of salvation* and *a memory for reconciliation* (Barrantes and Peña 2006, 21). Those who deploy *terruqueo* are individuals or groups who align with the frames of the *memory of salvation*. This memory highlights the image of Alberto Fujimori, a Peruvian dictator, as the savior of Peru since he "defeated terrorism and brought peace to the country." According to the defenders of this narrative, the victims of the conflict were collateral damage of the internal warfare—"a necessary cost for the pacification of the country." In contrast, proponents of the frames related to the *memory for reconciliation* emphasize the significant numbers of victims of the internal warfare, the army's violations of human rights, and the political responsibilities of parties and governments during the conflict.

These frames are evident on social media. According to Manrique, "social media has brought a new scenario to the deployment of old tensions and conflicts of Peruvian society" (2016, 35). However, despite research on *terruqueo* that has focused on its origins, its features, its manifestations and deployment strategies, little is known about the reaction to this frame. By relaying on framing theory, which suggests that collective actors construct social realities by drawing elements of collective memory to emphasize certain aspects of past and present realities, this study seeks to know about how everyday people resist *terruqueo* and if in the process they also appeal to elements for the memory for reconciliation.

As a case study, I selected the period of protests against Dina Boluarte's presidency between December 7, 2022, and February 10, 2023. During this period of crisis, the Peruvian economic and political elites deployed terruqueo, appealing to Peruvian collective memory, to delegitimize and demobilize the protests that took place in the southern regions of Peru, as well as in the capital, Lima. Among the various demands, the protesters called for new elections, a

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new Constitution, and even the reinstatement of former president Pedro Castillo, who attempted a failed self-coup. The elites saw these claims as a serious threat to their legitimacy and to the neoliberal social, political and economic model implemented by Fujimori's presidency in the 1990s.

In the midst of this diversity of narratives, I found that everyday users utilized two main strategies to resist terruqueo: a strategy of turning terruqueo back on those who deployed it, framing the media, politicians, the army, and the police as terrorists; and a strategy of questioning the broad use of the frame. Both strategies brought to light debates regarding the memory of internal warfare and recent post-conflict history. In light of these comparisons, my objective is to contribute with another perspective to the dynamics surrounding terruqueo. This involves not only focusing attention on the political and economic elites and the media that deploy it but also placing emphasis on the agency of civil society and the everyday people who resist it.

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

Political and economic elites, mass media and everyday people deploy *terruqueo* to stigmatize those oppose to the neoliberal economic model implemented in Peru and the *memory of salvation*. The deployment of this frame has a special characteristic: it appeals to the collective memory of the bloody terrorist violence of the 1980s to *frame* protests and social movements as serious threats to the internal order and national security of Peruvians. In other words, the collective memory of Peruvians is used to classify any protest or citizen demonstration as violent and illegitimate, thus discouraging and criminalizing mobilization.

Framing overlaps with collective memory in several interesting ways (Kubal and Becerra 2014, 973). On the one hand, collective memory is "a socially constructed story about the past that emerges through a set of political and cultural practices" and "helps to constitute individual and collective identities" (Yazdiha 2023, 12). On the other hand, framing is dynamic meaning work by which various actors in the public sphere amplify existing meanings, *transform old meanings*, and generate new meanings to recruit and mobilize adherents based on certain demands (Snow and Benford 1992, 136).[1] These concepts are interdependent (Assmann 2010, 50). Frames not only depend on collective memory but also support, define, and reinterpret individual memories and their forms of articulation at the collective level.

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[1] Many authors have explored the concept of frame in the context of social movements, offering various perspectives on its extension and definition. Erving Goffman (1974) is recognized as the pioneer in applying this concept in sociology. He defined frames as primary frameworks or 'schemas of interpretation', that is, systems of entities, postulates and rules that allow individuals to make sense of the world around them (1974, 21). Later, Snow and Benford (1988) expanded the use of the concept to the study of social movements. In this context, the authors proposed the use of the verb framing, as it better characterized the dynamic of social movements' meaning work: "do frame or assign meaning to and interpret, relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists" (Snow and Benford 1988, 198).

Mobilizing Collective Memory

Various public and collective actors (i.e., politicians, activists, media, counter-movements, etc.) use collective memory for many purposes such as to legitimize political demands and gain collective support. As Yazdiha (2023, 37) mentions, "social movements are continually engaged in identifying and strategically directing cultural meanings 'out there' toward particular audiences to make convincing claims and garner political support." By establishing relationships with collective memory, these various actors seek to maximize the resonance of their messages and create continuity between past and present movements, with the aim of enrolling participants as well as demobilizing adversaries.

To achieve these objectives, social movements entrepreneurs construct what Snow and Benford call *collective action frames*—a series of "action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of social movement organizations" (2000, 614). In these efforts, two processes stand out: articulation and amplification. In the first process, social movement entrepreneurs build narratives that can provide a new or distinct perspective on the demands or problems to be addressed in the public sphere; in the second process, certain aspects or symbols are selected and emphasized to facilitate the communication of the message.

In both processes, according to Johnston and Noakes, the strategy of "framing is not much about the creation of new ideas or the presentation of the greatest truth, but [rather] the splicing together of *old* and existing ideas and the strategic punctuating of certain issues, events or beliefs" (2005, 8). Social movement entrepreneurs draw on past experiences of other social movements, symbols of the dominant culture, and even collective memory to achieve what Snow et al. (1986, 464) call *frame alignment*, "the linkage of individual and SMO interpretative

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orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary."

Studies of frames and social movements address the use of collective memory to mobilize specific people and groups. In a study about the 2011 Tunisian Uprising, Mohammad Yaghi (2018) describes how activists and insurgent groups activated and mobilized collective memory of people from poor communities in the interior of Tunisia, evoking the history of resistance against French colonization, the deliberate historical marginalization of these populations, and the government's unfulfilled promises. Likewise, Nikolayenko (2019), in her study of the framing of protests against Russia's intervention in Ukraine, identifies different interpretations of patriotism based on memories of World War II, as well as the use of slogans that drew a symbolic link between the 2014 Peace March and the 2011-2012 post-election protests in Russia (Nikolayenko 2019, 609, 612). By making use of these elements, activists develop motivational campaigns that contribute to the maintenance and spread of protests, as well as to gaining support from new adherents.

Framing Struggle and Constrain

A second relationship between framing and collective memory is that, although these collective actors take elements from the past to achieve their strategic goals, in the process, collective memory can constrain collective action . The task of gaining adherents and establishing collective action frames is not easy. Since social problems are complex, activists often struggle "to identify the causes and culprits of these social problems" (Skotnicki 2019, 303). Likewise, the difficulty is also associated to the fact that frame formation and amplification are dynamic and located in a contested terrain among many social actors with different narratives (Benford and Hunt 2003, 154).

Considering the construction of frames, they are situated within the processes of struggle generated by mobilizing groups that extend beyond formal social movements and activities (Yazdiha 2023, 12). This includes engagement in different forms of resistance and struggles, contending with other groups and counter-movements, as well as state institutions, and even everyday people (Noakes 2005, 90; Yazdiha 2023, 12). Among the different kinds of resistance and contestation processes, Benford and Hunt (2003:161) identify a process called *counterframing* – "attempts to rebut, undermine, or neutralize a person's or group's myths, versions of reality, or interpretative framework."

The characteristics of such processes include the intervention of institutional agents, media, counter-movements, and everyday people which deploy a set of frames to deny the existence of problems, offer different interpretations of who or what is to blame, propose alternative solutions to the problem, and even discredit and question the legitimacy of persons and groups involved in mobilization (Benford and Hunt 2003). That is why *official frames* are important. State managers, like social movement entrepreneurs, may draw on familiar repertoires of interpretation to construct official frames. State agencies may be well suited to serve as structures of abeyance—halfway houses sustaining master frames—in which frames are more likely to be given first, second, and third hearing than those advanced by social movement entrepreneurs, due to familiarity breeding acceptance rather than contempt (Noakes 2005, 97, 102).

In this regard, programs, values, and causes of some social movements may not necessarily resonate across the spectrum of social actors—*resonance* emphasizes the effectiveness and mobilizing power of proffered framings (Benford and Snow 2000, 619). When this is the case, new values can be planted or nurtured, but also "old meanings or understanding

jettisoned, and erroneous beliefs or 'misframing' reframed" (Snow et al. 1986, 473). As Clark's (2018) study on the BLM movement points out, there are certain movements that, although they base their narrative on past movements and even give honor to past struggles, these movements transform traditional forms of framing to include broader and more inclusive visions of their demands.

Terruqueo Frame in Contemporary Peru

The origin of the term *terruco* can be traced back to the population of the Ayacucho region, which was severely affected by the violence of the internal warfare. It likely emerged at the onset of the terrorist insurgency on May 17, 1980 (Aguirre 2011, 115). Subsequently, the armed forces appropriated the term to describe 'senderistas,' referring to the Shining Path militants, aiming to depict indigenous communities as violent and to reinforce their association with this extremist group (Aguirre 2011, 110, 118). In the 1990s, Alberto Fujimori strategically employed *terruqueo* as a tool of fear—a technique and rhetoric to delegitimize civil society, persecute political opponents, and target human rights activists, all with the objective of consolidating his power (Burt 2007, 189-211).

Alberto Fujimori was an outsider, who won the presidential elections in 1990, amid economic inflation, terrorist violence, and a crisis within traditional political parties in Peru. Following the self-coup of April 5, 1992, Fujimori's government implemented neoliberal adjustment measures, supported by the drafting of a new Constitution in 1993. These measures included policies following the Washington Consensus, such as opening to foreign private investment and reducing state powers to promote free market. In his second re-election campaign in 2000, amidst massive social mobilizations, corruption scandals, and severe human rights violations, Fujimori fled the country and resigned via fax. His resignation began a period of

transition and democratic alternation that, excepting Pedro Castillo's attempt to close congress in 2022, has continued without interruption.

Nevertheless, despite the fall of the Fujimori regime in 2000, the systematic deployment of *terruqueo* continues to occur in the Peruvian political scene and even in the daily conversations and relationships of the general population. The term has served as a political strategy of parties associated with the Peruvian right or economic elites to disqualify left-wing opponents, unions, or human rights defenders (Mendoza 2022, Escárzaga 2022). It has also served to criminalize the legitimate right for protest of indigenous and native peoples threatened by extractive activities in their territories (Silva-Santisteban 2016, Vásquez 2017, Mendoza 2021); and even to stigmatize students and graduates of national universities by family members and mass media (Jave, Cépeda and Uchuypoma 2015).

According to Mago (2023), terruqueo is motivated by two aspects: a political-ideological aspect and an ethnic-racial aspect. In its first manifestation, promoters and supporters of right-wing policies deploy *terruqueo* to delegitimize certain political groups in the public sphere that are related to agendas seeking to break with the establishment and the neoliberal narratives of the Peruvian political and economic elites. In its second manifestation, promoters and supporters of right-wing policies deploy *terruqueo* to delegitimize any person related to the indigenous and low socioeconomic sectors. Both uses of *terruqueo* perpetuate discriminatory colonial and classist policies, particularly with respect to indigenous populations, peasants, and non-white people (Mago 2023, 479).

In turn, those who appeal to terruqueo also seek to maintain an order of neoliberalism consistent with Fujimori's model. Velásquez (2022, 79-80) defines this social, economic and political order as *Fujimori's totality*, a development logic that privileges the market economy,

deactivates social organizations, and the privatizes public and natural resources. In this sense, those who deploy terruqueo as a frame appeal to the historical memory of Peruvians, bringing to the present the horrors experienced in the bloody internal warfare and the economic crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s. On deploying terruqueo, its promoters stigmatize, delegitimize, and demobilize any narrative opposed to the neoliberal-Fujimori's way of understanding Peru, its people, and the political, social, and economic processes underway.

Peruvian Memory Struggle

Recent deployments of terruqueo respond to a continuance of political violence since the internal warfare (Bedoya et al. 2021) and a period of battle or conflict between two narratives and memories: a neoliberal-Fujimori narrative, supported by the *memory of salvation* of Fujimorism and the army; and a narrative of human rights supported by the *memory for reconciliation*, based on the arguments of the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru (CVR) (Barrantes and Peña 2006, Milton 2011, Velásquez 2022).

First, the deployment of terruqueo maintain the policies initiated by Fujimori regime. This narrative is based on a memory of salvation, in which Alberto Fujimori and the army were solely responsible for the defeat of Shining Path and, consequently, defended democracy and brought order and security to Peru. In these terms, it is conceived that the neoliberal and political model imposed by Fujimori's regime must be defended at all costs and whoever opposes it is classified as a terrorist, terruco, filoterruco, among other linguistic representations of terruqueo (See Mago 2023). This frame delegitimizes other opposing narratives and memories and stigmatizes their opponents. The argument of people who deploy terruqueo is based on historical conspiracy arguments (Barrantes and Peña 2006, 22-28) or, as many of the tweets used in this research point out, a narrative that "sees terrorists everywhere."

Opposed to the neoliberal-Fujimori's narrative is one of human rights, supported by the *memory for reconciliation*, a term used by Barrantes and Peña (2006) to describe the memory constructed from the CVR Report (2003). The CVR report proposed a more comprehensive and complex view of violence in the period of democratic transition, based on the testimonies of almost 17 thousand people affected by the internal warfare. The commission incorporated in the report the "voices not heard or not attended to" in the official narrative of the conflict and severely questioned the governments under which the warfare developed. Besides, the Commission criticized the actions and responsibility of the army in relation to the violation of human rights of various rural communities in the country, especially in the high Andean areas. This narrative is more closely aligned with democratic and human rights values (Barrantes and Peña 2006, 20). In other words, the CVR report was a "meeting point" around various memories and demands around democratic discourses, in favor of the truth and against the impunity of Fujimori's authoritarian regime (Degregori 2004).

Currently, human rights organizations, environmental social movements supporting indigenous peoples, intellectual, religious, and progressive political sectors, organizations of victims of violence, student organizations, among others, promote the human rights narrative. These various groups have mobilizing capacity against the political and economic elites of the country and question the economic, social and political neoliberal model forced in Peru since 1990.

Defenders of the Fujimori regime direct terruqueo toward these various groups. By this, *terruqueo* frame fulfills a function of prevention and containment of this second narrative: "prevention because it aims to shore up social discipline by demobilizing and deactivating possible disruptions that question the neoliberal order and, with it – and this is the main thing—

to contain, block or weaken distributive, egalitarian demands" (Maldonado 2020). However, although the literature on terruqueo has focused on its origin (Aguirre 2011), characteristics (Mago 2023, Maldonado 2020), manifestations and deployment strategies (Mago 2023, Velasquez 2022, Mendoza 2022) little is known about the reaction or how the entrepreneurs of the second narrative respond or try to counteract this frame, whose deployers' objective is to limit, demobilize and stigmatize memory for reconciliation entrepreneurs' demands.

The Present Study

As explained above, *terruqueo* is a frame through which Peruvian political elites, mass media, and everyday people appeal to collective memory to portray protesters and protests as violent threats to the country's economic and social development. In this case, I examine the deployment of *terruqueo* in a period of protest and political instability where, according to the literature reviewed, its deployment is very likely. The use of the term 'terruco' is intended to demobilize collective action while seeking to stigmatize protesters and delegitimize their demands. In the case study, the demonstrations were held in regions with the highest poverty rates in Peru. The protesters, for the most part, had supported former president Pedro Castillo—a rural professor with a radical project contrary to the economic elites and policies of the country, who represented the rise of the peasant sectors to power (Watanabe 2023).

Since 2016, Peruvian Democracy has experienced recurring political instability in which six presidents have taken office. One political crisis occurred on December 7th, 2022. Pedro Castillo, elected president of Peru for the period 2021-2026, attempted to dissolve the Congress and stage a self-coup to avoid being charged with "vacancy due for moral incapacity". However, due to the breach of the constitutional order, various Peruvian state institutions denounced this action, and Castillo was arrested. In his place, as stipulated in the 1993 Constitution and through

a process known as presidential succession, Dina Boluarte, Castillo's vice-president, assumed office. Boluarte became Peru's first female president in two hundred years since the foundation of the Republic. However, before announcing that elections would not take place until May 2024, Peruvians took to the streets, especially the southern regions of Puno, Ayacucho, Apurimac, Cusco and Arequipa.

Among the protesters' demands, the resignation of Dina Boluarte, the dissolution of Congress, the immediate call for elections, the convening of a new Constituent Assembly, and the release of former president Castillo stand out (Rebaza and Tanno 2022, Olmo 2023, McClintock 2023). According to a survey conducted by the Institute of Peruvian Studies in 2022, between December 9th and December 14th, 83% of respondents nationwide viewed the call for new elections as more convenient. Additionally, 71% disagreed with Dina Boluarte assuming office, and only 15% approved of Congress' performance. 71% of respondents said they would participate in any protest whose organizers promote the call for new elections (IEP 2022).

Nevertheless, despite Peruvians disapproval of Boularte's continuation, the national police and the army violently repressed the protests. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (CIDH 2023) reported that, between December 2022 and January 2023, the army and the police committed serious human rights violations while repressing non-violent protests. At least 50 civilians were killed, and 821 civilians and 208 police officers were injured (OACNUDH 2023). The regions that witnessed the greatest number of deaths were Apurimac, Ayacucho, Puno and Arequipa, all located in southern Peru, where at least 41 demonstrators were killed. Additionally, social movements activists called for series of protests named "Taking over Lima." This initiative involved indigenous communities, neighborhood groups, and students from the South (Olmo

2023), whose goal was to bring the agenda of the Andean populations to the capital, the location of Peru's main economic and political institutions.

In this scenario, CIDH (2023) draws attention to the strong stigmatization based on ethnic, racial and regional factors during the protests. They highlight a deteriorated and polarized public debate. Some authorities and mass media outlets deployed *terruqueo*, perpetuating "the notion that peasant and indigenous people who were protesting have links to acts of terrorism." This created "an environment of permissiveness and tolerance of institutional violence and discrimination towards Peruvian peasant communities and native indigenous people" (2023, 18). Similarly, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OACNUDH 2023) documented the increase in the uses of terruqueo in the country during the protests.

I documented how state agents and media deployed *terruqueo* during a period of political instability. This allowed me to illustrate how everyday people resisted it. The case showed how they, in some cases, used the *memory for reconciliation* to counter this narrative. Considering the role social media played in reporting the events, the case allows me to understand the dynamics involved in the deployment of *terruqueo* on these platforms and how, in the framing process, actors also deployed elements from collective memory to resist it. Overall, this analysis demonstrates how everyday people deployed two strategies to resist *terruqueo*: by turning it against media, politicians, and the government; and by questioning the deployment of the frame by appealing to the narrative of *the memory for reconciliation* regarding the Fujimori government.

CHAPTER III: METHODS

This study involved a critical content analysis of tweets and replies from politicians, media, the police and everyday people on Twitter. On Twitter, multiple units of analysis can be distinguished, including individual tweets, hashtags and profiles (Small 2011, 2018, Mattan and Small 2021). My analysis incorporates individual and corporate tweets from three main sources: Peruvian Congressmen and the newspapers *La Republica* and *El Comercio*, along with the replies to these posts by everyday people; and tweets from the National Police of Peru (PNP). The materials I examined covered the period from December 7th, 2022, to February 10th, 2023.

Case Selection

Different social actors deploy *terruqueo* in Peru. For this study, I focused mainly on three social actors from which I collected posts regarding terruqueo: elected congressmen for the period 2021-2026, two of the main newspapers in Peru, and two state agents. Firstly, following Apoyo and Comunicación's report (2022), I selected the 10 congressmen with the highest levels of monthly participation on Twitter. This list was subsequently evaluated considering whether these congressmen were active on social media and whether they used the words *terruco* or *terrorist* to frame the protests. As shown in *Table 1*, the final list of congressmen was of four.

Table 1. Final Selection of Congressmen's Accounts for the Study

Congressmen	Twitter Account	Political Party	Tendency
Jorge Montoya	@Alm_Montoya	Renovación Popular	Right
Maricarmen Alva	@MaricarmenAlvaP	Acción Popular	Right
Rosangella Barbarán	@rosangellabr	Fuerza Popular	Right
Alejandro Cavero	@AlejandroCavero	Avanza País	Right

Source: Author's own elaboration using Apoyo and Comunicación's report (2022).

In relation to mass media, I chose the Twitter accounts of La República (@larepublica_pe) and El Comercio (@elcomercio_peru) newspapers. The choice of newspapers took into consideration two important aspects highlighted by Angulo and Bolo-Varela (2021, 9-10): (1) both newspapers belong to El Comercio Group and La República Group, which concentrate the largest amount of Peruvian journalistic production; and (2) both are reference newspapers, as they produce information for larger audiences and aim for higher quality in the presentation of information.

As part of the study, I identified that the newspaper editorial groups framed the protests differently. El Comercio, with a right-wing ideological affinity, focused on the country's economic losses and portrayed the protest leaders and protesters as violent, with alleged links to drug trafficking and terrorist groups. In contrast, La Republica, with a left-wing affinity, focused on the victims of the protests and maintained a distinction between the violence of some marches and the legitimacy of the protesters' demands.

Finally, I incorporated complementary tweets from the accounts of the National Police of Peru (@PoliciaPeru) and the Ministry of the Interior (@MininterPeru). The main purpose of this selection was to characterize the deployment of terruqueo by these institutions, as in the replies to congressmen and the media coverage, there were allegations directed towards these state agents as promoters of terruqueo.

Data Collection and Categorization

To collect reactions to terruqueo, I examined the tweets from the list of four congressmen, using Twitter's advanced search. I entered each congressman's account, selected the dates of the period under study, and identified those tweets that referred to terruqueo— i.e., those containing words like "terrorista" or "terruco." In total, I identified 36 tweets referring to

this frame. Those who used the term with this purpose were congressmen with a right-wing political tendency: Jorge Montoya (25 tweets), Rosangella Barbarán (6 tweets), Alejandro Cavero (4 tweets) and Maricarmen Alva (1 tweet). From these tweets (See *Table 2*), I collected 899 replies related to terruqueo, with 164 replies (18%) supporting the deployment of the frame and 735 replies (82%) questioning or resisting it. I kept the 735 replies questioning or resisting terruqueo to merge it with the replies to newspapers tweets.

Table 2. Distribution of Replies to Tweets of Congressmen

Congressmen	# tweets	Replies supporting terruqueo	Replies resisting terruqueo	Total replies
Jorge Montoya	25	109	473	582
Rosangella Barbarán	6	29	155	184
Alejandro Cavero	4	23	93	116
Maricarmen Alva	1	3	14	17
Total	36	164	735	899

Source: Author's own elaboration

In relation to the two selected newspapers, I carried out a similar process. I used Twitter's advanced search to collect tweets featuring the daily front pages of each newspaper. In total I collected 126 tweets. In the case of La República, I obtained the tweets of all the covers from December 7, 2022, to February 10, 2023— totaling 66 tweets. For El Comercio, I obtained 60 tweets during the same period. However, this newspaper did not publish the covers on Twitter on December 17, 2022, January 6, 11, 23, 25 and 29, 2023. In total, 5060 replies were collected from the tweets of both newspapers, which were processed in an Excel sheet.

I conducted a preliminary analysis of this 5060 replies using the text mining strategy in R software.[2] The aim of this analysis was to identify the frequency of the deployment of terruqueo in all the comments of both newspapers. I identified the deployment of terruqueo, i.e. the use of the words such 'terruco' and 'terrorist,' among the 20 most used words by users in the replies to the tweets of the front pages of both newspapers. Additionally, I analyzed the 126 front-pages from both newspapers in Atlas.ti. All the newspaper covers were processed to recognize if terruqueo was displayed in any section. The main purpose of this selection and processing was for describing how terruqueo worked during the period of protests and how media deployed it.

A second treatment of the replies was conducted in Atlas.ti. All replies to these front-page that contained some reference to terruqueo were analyzed. In total, I identified 628 replies referring to the frame: 190 from El Comercio newspaper (109 in favor of terruqueo and 81 against), and 438 from La República newspaper (411 attacking the newspaper by deploying terruqueo and 27 resisting this deployment). A list of all the comments resisting the frame was compiled (n=108). This list of comments was systematized together with the 735 replies to the congressmen tweets. In total 843 replies were organized in a Word document (See *Table 3*). The Word document was then uploaded to the Atlas.ti program. I read each of the replies, took notes, made comments, and wrote memos according to the patterns that emerged.

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[2] Text mining strategy involves the use of the tidytext package to analyze texts as data frames, enabling manipulation, summarization, and visualization of the characteristics of the text as a whole. For more details, refers to Silge and Robinson (2017).

Table 3. Distribution of Replies to Tweets of Congressmen and Mass Media

Social actor	# tweets	Replies supporting terruqueo	Replies resisting terruqueo	Total replies
Congressmen	36	164	735	899
Newspapers	126	520	108	628
State agencies	8	-	-	-
Total	170	684	843	1527

Source: Author's own elaboration

Finally, again using Twitter's advanced search, I collected five tweets from the account of the National Police of Peru (@PoliciaPeru) and three tweets from the account of the Ministry of the Interior (@MininterPeru). These tweets appealed to the memory of the internal warfare, deploying the term "terrorist" or "terrorism," as well as making references to DIRCOTE (Directorate against Terrorism of the National Police), during the period of protests. Although the recurrent deployment of terruqueo as a frame was not identified, the references to terrorism helped me to identify certain patterns of framing that these Peruvian state agents employed to contextualize and respond to ongoing protests. This information serves to complement the tweets from congressmen and media for descriptive purposes about terruqueo.

Limitations

Due to time limitations and the large amount of information on Twitter, as well as the absence of tools allowing for automated data collection, I considered only replies with text content, leaving aside other forms of resistance to *terruqueo*, such as the use of images or videos. Similarly, only publicly accessible replies on Twitter were accessed. Approximately, 10% of replies were available for each tweet. According to Twitter's estimations, at least 5% of these

responses might be generated by fake accounts or bots (Dang 2022). While this limitation exists, it raises the question of the contribution of these bots to the framing work. Klein et al. (2022) argue that online dynamics are driven by humans alone or by a combination of humans and bots, and that "both amplify attention and are appropriate targets for analysis" (2022, 3).[3] Therefore, having in mind this argument, I avoided analyzing replies coming from the same user across tweets or in the same tweet. This was done with the aim of mitigating the potential influence of fake accounts or bots on the results.

Additionally, another limitation in this study is due to the fact that Twitter users are primarily from the coastal regions and Lima, the capital of Peru. An IPSOS survey (2020) concluded that only 12% of the Peruvian population accesses Twitter, and according to Quantico (2022), 81% of users with the highest interaction on this social media platform are from Lima. In contrast, Peruvian scholars emphasize that the deployment of terruqueo is mostly related to racism against the rural and low economic population. Therefore, the majority of the resistance against terruqueo is likely to come from people from Lima rather than the Southern regions, where the protests took place. However, despite this limitation, it is important to highlight that the goal of the study is not to exhaustively represent all regional perspectives on reacting to terruqueo, but rather to understand its dynamics on this social media and how everyday users react to it. Although is necessary to recognize the contrasting dynamics of racism and its differentiation between dichotomous categories such as urban/rural and Lima/the provinces (Vich 2020, 223, 224).

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[3] The development of social bots, fake, or artificial accounts redirect attention to certain topics or trends, and spreads false information or news on social networks such as Twitter (Zhang et al. 2023).

CHAPTER IV: FINDINGS

Findings are organized in two ways. First, I explain how terruqueo was deployed in the context of protest by providing general data on how the distribution of replies addressed terruqueo in the studied period and by explaining the characteristic of how congressmen, newspapers, and the police deployed the frame during the protests. Second, I describe the ways in which everyday users resisted the frame by appealing to elements of collective memory related to the internal warfare and the opposing narratives. This does not necessarily imply that those who resisted terruqueo appealed to the memory for reconciliation, to the contrary, on using elements from the collective memory some of them aligned to this narrative.

Terruqueo as a Framing Issue

The deployment of terruqueo as a frame was associated with the onset of protests in southern Peru and their shift to the capital. Firstly, the analysis revealed an incremental trend in the deployment of terruqueo during the protests. As shown in *Figure 1*, an increase in comments related to the frame 'terruco' or 'terrorist' was observed on the replies to the tweets on the covers of both La Republica and El Comercio newspapers. This trend especially escalated during the resumption of protests in southern Peru, on January 10, 2023, to the migration of protests to Lima, between January 17 and January 22, 2023. Likewise, as illustrated in *Figure 2*, the deployment of *terruqueo* ranked second (n= 341), among the twenty most used words in the replies to the tweets of the front pages of La Republica and El Comercio newspapers.

Figure 1. Distribution of Replies to Tweets of "El Comercio" and "La República"

December 2022 - February 2023

Source: Author's own calculation using Twitter data.

Figure 2. The 20 Most Used Words in the Replies to Tweets of "La República" and "El Comercio" December 2022-February 2023

Source: Author's own calculation using Twitter data.

Secondly, the deployment of terruqueo assumed different characteristics during the chosen protest period for this study. Right wing congressmen, mass media and the police used terruqueo as *counterframing*, a strategy aimed at demobilizing or refuting the interpretive frameworks of social movements and protesters. *Terruqueo* exhibited the characteristics of an *official frame*, one utilized by state agents such as congressmen and agents from the police, to legitimize their supremacy. In the context under study, it legitimized state violence in the Southern regions and Lima. Additionally, it exhibited the characteristics of a *media frame*. Journalists employed the frame to delimitate, legitimize and to 'package' a narrative portraying the protesters and their demands as violent, including associating them with terrorist groups, drug trafficking, and illegal mining.

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Terruqueo as Counter Framing Process

The deployment of terruqueo evinced characteristics of *counterframing*. Conversely, the concept of counterframing refers to a process of contestation in which state agents, media, and any existing countermovements attempt "to rebut, undermine, or neutralize a person's or group's myths, versions of reality, or interpretative framework" (Benford and Hunt (2003, 161). The characteristics of this process include denying the existence of problems (problem denial), offering different interpretations of who or what is to blame (counter attributions), proposing alternative solutions to the problem (counterprognoses), and questioning the legitimacy of persons and groups involved in mobilization (attacks on the collective character of social movements).

After the failed self-coup attempt by Pedro Castillo, on December 7, 2022, and the subsequent takeover by Dina Boluarte, a series of protests began to develop throughout Peru with five demands that varied in levels of consensus, as reported by CIDH (2023): (1) new elections; (2) dissolution of Congress; (3) convocation of a constituent assembly; (4) resignation of President Boluarte; and (5) release of Pedro Castillo from prison. Over time, these demands evolved, with protesters eventually focusing on two main issues: the call for new elections and the resignation of President Dina Boluarte (CIDH 2023, 36). Considering Benford and Snow's proposition (2000) regarding key framing tasks—*diagnostic framing*, *prognostic framing*, and *motivational framing*[4] — these last two claims can be grouped as a diagnostic and prognostic

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[4] Benford and Snow (2000) identify three key framing tasks that enable agreements between actors to establish oriented-sets, thereby setting a problem or issue that people will be embrace for their collective action: (1) *diagnostic framing*, which involves the identification of a problem and its attributions, as well as the "victims" of a given injustice; (2) *prognosis framing*, which articulates a proposed solution to identified problem through the question what is to be done; and (3) *motivational framing*, which is related to "the call to arms" and the justification for engagement, including the construction of vocabulary related to motives.

framing. The problem identified was President Boluarte's refusal to resign, while the proposed solution was the call for new elections.

In the analysis of the congressmen's tweets, I identified that the deployment of terruqueo as a counter frame for these demands was aimed at offering a different interpretation of who is to blame for the country's instability and proposing a different solution to solve the crisis: the use of state violence to repress protests. In a tweet on December 14, 2022, Congresswoman Rosangella Barbarán used terruqueo to legitimize the *state of emergency* declared by the government in the regions where the protests began.[5] For the congresswoman, it was not the government, the president, or the congressmen who were responsible for the country's instability, but rather it was "a violent minority" that created "fear." Therefore, the decision to apply this measure throughout the country was necessary to "guarantee order and security for all Peruvians."[6] Likewise, she held only the protestors responsible , not the army or the police. In a tweet dated January 10, 2023, the congresswoman maintained the following: "It hurts when Peruvians confront each other in violence. It hurts no matter what region we are from. It hurts that the instigators who are in their homes serving terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal mining cause innocent Peruvians to lose their lives."[7]

By framing the protests as terrorism, the congresswoman held the protesters responsible for the country's instability, associating them with terrorist groups, drug trafficking and illegal

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[5] The state of emergency is a regime of exception established to reestablish public order in Peru. According to the Peruvian Constitution (Art. 137), in cases of disturbance of peace or internal order, this mechanism allows for the restriction or suspension of constitutional rights related to personal freedom and security, the inviolability of the home, and freedom of assembly and movement within the territory. However, in practice, there have been serious complaints against the Peruvian Army, as well as constant violations of human rights, when this regime has been applied in the context of protests or social conflicts (Remotti 2009).

[6] Rosangella Barbarán's Twitter page, accessed December 14, 2022, https://twitter.com/rosangellabr/status/1603083081057026050.

[7] Rosangella Barbarán's Twitter account, accessed Jan 10, 2023, https://twitter.com/rosangellabr/status/1612839559519248391.

mining. The protests and some cases of violence caused by protesters were classified as "an act of terrorism," against which the army must act immediately. According to Congressman Jorge Montoya, "the government must first give the legal tools to the army and then restore internal order. If they don't do it as soon as possible there will be no turning back. Today they must be deployed to the areas where the terrorists are burning and killing."[8]

For the congressmen from Avanza País, Fuerza Popular and Renovación Popular, right-wing parties, all of whom relied on the terruqueo frame, the solution to the problem was to reestablish internal order using the army and the police, to whom they owe "honor and glory" because "they fight daily to restore peace to the nation."[9] They believe that these forces are the ones who "must be on the side of democracy and the Constitution, along with the true patriotic, anti-communist and anti-terrorist Peruvian people."[10] In this way, those who deployed terruqueo sought not only to disqualify or refute the demands of the protesters but also to reinterpret and redefine those responsible for the crisis and instability of the country, delineating the limits on who are considered "true" Peruvians and those who are not. By describing the protesters as "unpatriotic" and "terrorists," state repression was justified as a necessary measure to demobilize the mobilized population and preserve the "supposed" stability and security of the country.

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[8] Jorge Montoya's Twitter page, accessed December 13, 2022, https://twitter.com/Alm_Montoya/status/1602602952661012480.

[9] Jorge Montoya's Twitter page, accessed December 19, 2022, https://twitter.com/Alm_Montoya/status/1605054142682001408.

[10] Alejandro Cavero's Twitter page, accessed December 7, 2022, https://twitter.com/AlejandroCavero/status/1600534385287217160.

An Official and Media Frame

Firstly, concerning its deployment, terruqueo during the period under study functioned as an official frame. An official frame is a frame used by state actors who, in relation to social movements, are actively immersed in the struggle for cultural supremacy (Noakes 2005, 101). In this case, state agents such as congressmen and representatives of the army and the police deployed this frame in response to the protests, viewing them as a threat to the country's order and/or questioning elites' legitimacy.

As demonstrated in the dynamics of terruqueo as counterframing, congressmen from parties associated with the right-wing used this frame to delegitimize the protests during the political crisis. However, the deployment of the frame also extended to other government agencies, particularly those related to the National Police of Peru and the Ministry of the Interior. Although the recurrent deployment of terruqueo as a frame was not identified, five tweets from the account of the National Police of Peru (@PoliciaPeru) and three tweets from the account of the Ministry of the Interior (@MininterPeru) appealed to the memory of the internal warfare, deploying the term "terrorist" or "terrorism" in their tweets as well as some references to DIRCOTE (Directorate against Terrorism of the National Police) during the period of protests.

A tweet from the Peruvian National Police account on Twitter mentioned a visit by a delegation of the Ecuador Police, who were informed "about the disastrous years of the 80s and 90s caused by terrorist organizations."[11] A tweet was also published showing the decoration of police officers "for their participation in the great anti-terrorist operation "Patriota" in the month

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[11] Policía Perú's Twitter page, accessed December 14, 2022, https://twitter.com/PoliciaPeru/status/1603180481037598729.

of August 2023."[12] Likewise, a tweet on the same account was published to deny the dissemination of a false video on social media about a terrorist attack in Huaraz city.[13] An important aspect during the deployment of this frame is that it was accompanied by arbitrary actions by police forces while protesters were processed in offices dedicated to the investigation of terrorism. For example, in two posts on January 21, 2021, during the eviction of protesters who were staying at the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos (UNMSM), a tweet was published with people detained in DIRCOTE (Directorate Against Terrorism of the National Police of the Peru);[14] in addition, the publication of a list of people arrested at this address was also published on Twitter.[15]

The tweets from the Ministry of the Interior, on the other hand, referred to a statement from the same Ministry that enabled an email to receive citizen complaints for "the crime of apology of terrorism on social media." [16] As shown in Illustration 1, in point number five, this measure appealed to "the collaboration of citizens to help identify the possible perpetrators of specific cases in which the crime of terrorism is exalted, justified or glorified." The main purpose of this regulation was to discourage participation in the protests and also to control dissidence and resistance on social media.

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[12] Policía Perú's Twitter page, accessed December 29, 2022, https://twitter.com/PoliciaPeru/status/1608628893740847105.

[13] Policía Perú's Twitter page, accessed December 17, 2022, https://twitter.com/PoliciaPeru/status/1604265398798614531.

[14] Policía Perú's Twitter page, accessed January 21, 2023, https://twitter.com/PoliciaPeru/status/1616895794593910788.

[15] Policía Perú's Twitter page, accessed January 21, 2023, https://twitter.com/PoliciaPeru/status/1616895794593910788.

[16] Mininter Perú's Twitter page, accessed February 6, 2023, https://twitter.com/MininterPeru/status/1622703016670384128.

Illustration 1. Tweet from the Ministry of the Interior Regarding Apology to Terrorism on Social Media

Source: Mininter Peru's Twitter page.

Continuing this systematic counterframing against the protests, a second tweet from this institution narrated the experience of a police officer who "lived through the most difficult years of the fight against terrorism" and "fought on the front lines to return peace to our country."[17] A third tweet summarizes the statements of the Minister of the Interior, Vicente Romero, who explains the eviction procedure of protesters who were housed in the UNMSM and confirms the transfer of the people detained in the DIRCOTE.[18] Though the terruqueo frame is not directly deployed in these tweets, the references to the collective memory about the internal warfare are present or are brought back to make sense of the current periods of protests.

[17] Mininter Perú's Twitter page, accessed February 8, 2023, https://twitter.com/MininterPeru/status/1623503108641898497.

[18] Mininter Perú's Twitter page, accessed January 21, 2023, https://twitter.com/MininterPeru/status/1616926626041708544.

Figure 3. Newspapers' Coverage of the Protests from Dec 2022 to Feb 2023

Front-page related to protests

El Comercio	%, 72.7%
La Republica	90.9%

Main Section of front-page related to protests

El Comercio	39.4%
La Republica	50.0%

Source: Author's own calculation using Twitter data.

Secondly, terruqueo also functioned as a media frame. Gitlin defined a media frame as "persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers, routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual" ([1980]2003, 7). During the protests, El Comercio was the newspaper that deployed terruqueo to frame certain events of the protests, though they did not always do so. Nevertheless, the newspaper's front pages emphasized the violence of the protests and established connections between the protesters and MOVADEF (Shining Path political party), Shining Path itself, and other actors related to the terrorist groups such as drug trafficking groups.[19]

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[19] There exists a connection between drug trafficking groups operating in the VRAEM (Valley of the Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro rivers) and factions associated with the Shining Path. For more details, refers to Niño (2020).

In comparison with La República, which included any issue related to the protests in 60 (90.9%) of its tweets on their front-pages during the studied period, El Comercio addressed the protests in 48 (72.7)% of its tweets on front-pages (*Figure 3*). Likewise, while La Republica framed the protests as the main title in 33 (50%) of its tweets, El Comercio framed the protests in 26 (39.4%) tweets on front-pages (*Figure 3*). The main issue related to the protests in El Comercio were violence and the economic losses the protests caused (25.8%). Meanwhile, La Republica related the protests to human victims of police brutality (24.2%) and violence (16.7%).

Regarding terruqueo, of the 66 El Comercio front-pages analyzed during the protest period, eleven covers (16.6%) directly accused some fractions of the protesters as being members of Shining Path, MOVADEF (Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights)[20] or of being related to radical groups or drug traffickers (narcos). For instance, in both tweets of December 13, 2022, and December 14, 2022, when the protests started to raise in the South, El Comercio emphasized the links of protesters and sub-prefects with MOVADEF, political arm of Shining Path. Likewise, in the tweets on the front pages of January 14, 15, and 18, 2023, some leaders and factions of protesters were linked to the Shining Path itself. On the front page of January 14, referring to the mobilizations in Ayacucho, it is reported about "arrested agitators" who "had subversive material in their homes" and were found with "magazines and flyers referring to Shining Path."[21] In the tweet on the cover of January 15, 2023, an interview with

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[20] MOVADEF is a movement made up of a significant number of people convicted for their affiliation with the Shining Path terrorist group. His followers recognize themselves as followers of *Gonzalo thought*, the ideological line of Abimael Guzmán, leader of Shining Path. The movement declares that its objective is not to resume the "armed struggle" but rather to seek to be recognized as a political party and participate in the elections, for further details (Valle-Riestra, 2018).

[21] El Comercio's Twitter page, January 14, 2023, https://twitter.com/elcomercio_peru/status/1614232109035540480.

Oscar Arriola, Police General, is announced. He pointed out that "Cusi", Rocío Leandro, president of the People's Defense Front of Ayacucho, "was in charge of give the coup de grace to the victims of Shining Path."[22]

Likewise, in the tweet referring to the cover of January 18, 2023, El Comercio published a section on the front-page mentioning that a "red faction of Shining Path is behind violence in Ayacucho." This section on the front-page of the newspaper published on Twitter addressed the information that an organization called the Regional Defense Front of Ayacucho was under the leadership of Elena Yparraguirre, historic leader of Shining Path.[23] In another section of the same cover, an interview with Rubén Vargas, former Minister of the Interior, is announced. This section highlights a fragment in which the former minister states that "behind the protests there are experts in stirring up extreme situations."[24]

Other front-pages of El Comercio emphasized the vandalism of the protesters and their relationship with drug trafficking and illegal mining sectors, which the paper connects to the legacy of Shining Path. The police arrest linked to drug trafficking is indicated taking place at the meeting place of the Peasant Confederation of Peru, where "explosives" were found, and one of the arrested persons was from the Valley of the Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro rivers (VRAEM).[25] The newspaper highlights the connection between "protest instigators" and drug trafficking was also highlighted. As mentioned in the newspaper's tweet, a MININTER report

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[22] El Comercio's Twitter page, January 15, 2023, https://twitter.com/elcomercio_peru/status/1615707250223366147.
[23] El Comercio's Twitter page, January 18, 2023, https://twitter.com/elcomercio_peru/status/1615707250223366147.
[24] El Comercio's Twitter page, January 03, 2023, https://twitter.com/elcomercio_peru/status/1610246314352340992.
[25] El Comercio's Twitter page, January 03, 2023, https://twitter.com/elcomercio_peru/status/1610246314352340992.

indicated that at least three of the promoters of the mobilizations in Ucayali, Ica and San Martín

are under investigations for the crime of drug trafficking, and in Puno, violence and road

blockades are being encouraged in a conclave of these traffickers in collaboration with teachers,

merchants and ronderos.[26]

Other sections highlight "radical coordination" of a group called "El Aymarazo," who

allegedly received dynamite from illegal miners,[27] and the coordination between radical sectors

that burned down the facilities of a mine in Apurímac[28] as well as the attack by "vandals" on the

Antapaccay mining facilities in Cusco.[29] Although these posts do not explicitly mention

terruqueo, the references to drug trafficking in the VRAEM sector and radical mining sectors

implicitly associate violence with marginalized and excluded sectors in the south of the

country—a characteristic of terruqueo, which portrays indigenous people as violent and irrational

(Aguirre 2011, 110).

Finally, regarding the protests in the capital, the chaos unleashed in the city of Lima

stands out. On January 21st, a section of the front page of El Comercio highlights the fire of a

building in Lima's downtown, followed by a section that mentions the connection of an

Ayacucho leader connected to Shining Path.[30] Similarly, in the main section of the front-page of

El Comercio on January 30th, the newspaper highlighted the violence against the police, and riots

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[26] El Comercio's Twitter page, January 08, 2023,
https://twitter.com/elcomercio_peru/status/1612075449290723330.
[27] El Comercio's Twitter page, January 12, 2023,
https://twitter.com/elcomercio_peru/status/1613512246574960640.
[28] El Comercio's Twitter page, January 13, 2023,
https://twitter.com/elcomercio_peru/status/1613871353987465216.
[29] El Comercio's Twitter page, January 21, 2023,
https://twitter.com/elcomercio_peru/status/1616770516659879938.
[30] El Comercio's Twitter page, January 21, 2023,
https://twitter.com/elcomercio_peru/status/1616770516659879938.

in the southern regions. The headline was as follows: "Vandals unleash chaos in Lima and attacked airports in three regions."[31] It is mentioned that protestors used stones, sticks, bottles, and chunks of concrete from tracks and sidewalks to assault the police. The editorial of this front-page emphasizes that vandalism is not protest: "it does not matter how many times they may try to convince us otherwise."

The Reaction to Terruqueo

Considering the reframing to terruqueo, I identified two types of strategies to resist it: a strategy of turning terruqueo against those who apply it, wherein individuals label those who use terruqueo as terrorists; and a second strategy focused on questioning the term. In both strategies, emphasis is placed on the broad and indiscriminate use of the frame, the contradictions within the narrative of the *memory of salvation* that considers "terrorism defeated," and appeals to elements of the *memory for reconciliation* that question the actions of the army, police forces, and mass media during Fujimori's government and the internal warfare conflict.

Blaming the *Terruqueadores*

The first strategy to resist the terruqueo frame is to attack those who use the frame to delegitimize the protestors. Blaming was directed to media, the army and the police, and politicians. First, the labeling of mass media as "terrorist media" refers to the manipulation of information by media to serve the elites. According to users, stigmatizing protesters is a way to "manipulate" and "misinform" the "uninformed people" about the protests. This manipulation is made possible because mass media owners have received "a few bills" from the government, businessmen or politicians. In this counterframing of terruqueo, users appeal to the memory of

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[31] El Comercio's Twitter page, January 20, 2023, https://twitter.com/elcomercio_peru/status/1616408538070360066.

"prensa chicha."[32] They argued that media has been a mouthpiece for the government and

political elites since the 90s. In some cases, words are even modified to associate El Comercio

(El Komercio) with Fujimorism or its leader Keiko Fujimori (See *Table 4*).

Table 4. Relation Between Media and Memory of "Prensa Chicha"

Relation to terruqueo	Tweet
	@PaoRuiz0716 ·Dec 14, 2022 The real information terrorists are you, the corrupt, sold press. What happened? Since Castillo started his government, they came out barking. He did not give them their millions that they received in previous governments?
Relation between "prensa terrorista", the manipulation of information and corruption	@ysaacbastos ·Dec 31, 2022 Terrorists are the press like you that misinform and sell themselves for a few bucks! @Juan88671309 ·Dec 19, 2022 Since when have drug traffickers been interested in the country's problems? The assassin press no longer knows how to misinform the people's protests. They think the people are stupid. The only thing they do is terrify and manipulate the uninformed people.
	⇓
	@s_czesar ·Dec 29, 2022 Terrorist press. Mercenary Press. They will be receiving mountains of money like in the times of Fuji and Vladi. @Santitos84 ·Dec 14, 2022 #GeneralElectionsNow. If with the national march of the #4Suyos We OUST a government that is a thief, a murderer, a drug and weapons trafficker, a kidnapper, etc. JUST LIKE TODAY with their #PrensaChicha they called us terrorists and PEACE arrived. TOGETHER we can repeat it.
Appealing to collective memory about "prensa chicha"	@sheverisa ·Jan 13, 2023 Perhaps these are not the same nonsenses of the Fujimonterrorista of the 90s, where their trash press sold false information to shield their masters who prostituted them in the SIN [National Intelligence Service] room. @Lenny_AC ·Jan 28, 2023 They also gave the #TerroristPress its quota to misinform, especially the chicha newspaper of #Komercio.

Source: Author's own interpretation using Twitter data.

In response to the government, the army and the police, Twitter users predominantly

framed their reactions in terms of state terrorism. They described this as "terrorism in uniform,"

wherein the government employs violence through the army and the police, it sought to

"maintain the status quo through fear" and suppress the population who "claims for their rights."

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[32] An "alternative press" in the form of a sensationalistic tabloids created by the Fujimori administration and supported by the intelligence services. This press served as pro-Fujimori propaganda and facilitated "scandalmongering carried out against opposition figures in the 90s" (Mauceri 2006, 58).

Users drew a parallel between this concept and the collective memory of repression during Fujimori's regime. They highlighted a continuity in the strategies of violence and repression, noting that it "does not change", "never changed" or "returns" with the support of the government and Fujimori's party (see *Table 5*).

Table 5. Relation Between Boluarte's Regime and Fujimori's Regime

Relation to terruqueo	Tweet
	@MilLima9 ·Dec 14, 2022 Terrorism is what the government's power does, using weapons to repress people. @ysaacbastos ·Dec 16, 2022 Sir, now you call him a terrorist, a terrorist who proposes a curfew when he knows that the protesters are in all the streets, that is called provoking.
Relation between "state terrorism" and police brutality	@Soledadre25 ·Dec 20, 2022 The state terrorism that you have imposed just for having power. The time will come when your actions have to be paid for. @radiosuper92 ·Dec 20, 2022 State terrorism that murders people who demand their rights. @sNaP_Augusto ·Jan 18, 2023 The only terrucos in Peru are uniformed and call themselves police, they are the only ones who spread fear.
	⇓
Appealing to collective memory about repression in Fujimori's regime	@saona_saona5·Dec 20, 2022 State terrorism never changes if you don't look at what is happening right under your nose. Now they will take care of all those murdered by the bad decision of Mrs. Dina Ercilia Boluarte and you who are now at the side and advising the murderer. @mariopinedovar2·Jan 13, 2023 But state terrorism has always existed since FUJIMORI came to power. Maybe they don't remember now, or suddenly, you weren't born yet. It is for this reason, everyone now acts that way, making smoke screens, or creating crying virgins or anything else. @LuisL48356855 ·Dec 31, 2022 We return to the 90s, political persecution, terruqueo, deaths, threats, disappearances. Planting false evidence. @HRomanoWy·Feb 11, 2023 Alberto Fujimori applied State Terrorism in his government... If his law removes the Fujimoristas from the political sphere, I support his law and if not, stop bothering.

Source: Author's own interpretation using Twitter data.

Finally, Twitter users called politicians the "true terrorists, who set the country on fire." They argued that by deploying terruqueo, politicians encouraged "hatred", legitimize "murder" of those "who fight peacefully," promoted "unjust laws for the people," and sought to "stay" and "hold on to power." This resistance draws on memories of past government practices, such as military commanders and Congress's support for repression during Fujimori's regime in the 90s.

Additionally, users referenced recent events, such as the murders of Inti and Brayan, two young people murdered during the protests against Manuel Merino's government in 2020, to evoke collective memory and counteract the terruqueo frame (See *Table 6*).

Table 6. Relation Between Terruqueo and Congress Corruption

Relation to terruqueo	Tweet
	@MendiKev ·Jan 23, 2023 The only person responsible for this continues to be the state, which with congressmen and ministers who encourage terruqueo, arbitrary arrests with unsubstantiated complaints, make more people outraged and confront the PNP[police], putting their lives and the population at risk by confronting them. @grapitix·Jan 10, 2023 It hurts that you talk about peace, while you are the ones who have negotiated with this murderous government and now pretend to be hurt... The worst in history Fuerza Popular and its satellites: Political terrorists.
Relation between "Congressmen terrorists" and Congress corruption	@billybillyoh·Dec 13, 2022 The terror is that you don't want to leave. We are asking in the streets to close the congress. There is an election of new congressmen. After the president resigns, she colluded with you. That is being requested in the streets. Is it difficult to understand? @vierohc ·Dec 13, 2022 Terror is what they plot every day, wanting to govern us and put "locks" on us to neutralize any legitimate claim. No law in favor of the people for health or education. All wrong. Leave and let more responsible people come. @ MariaElenaAngu1·Dec 15, 2022 You terrorist who enriches yourself with the sweat of others, get out and stop being the usual bloodsuckers. Have dignity and get rid of the power you don't want to leave behind. ⇓ @MargaritaYupan·Dec 13, 2022 Terrorists are those congressmen who incite hatred and murder for those who fight peacefully, if they do not want to leave and want to cling to power, they will act as they did in the 90's with acts of repression and by labelling all those who took to the streets as terrorists.
Appealing to collective memory about Politicians' corruption	@Richard_hyPeru·Dec 14, 2022 That is the school of Fujimori and Montesinos: to terrify everyone who wants to have their rights respected, thus legalizing crimes against humanity. But the true terrorists are those who cause terror and death to a person without weapons. @Pilpintucaro ·Dec 13, 2022 You covered up the violence that Merino exerted, and the death of Inti and Bryan went unpunished. Now you are the terrorist. @josephtiradoc ·Jan 18, 2023 Hahaha the terrorists are the ones who signed to place themselves under the orders of the state terrorist Montesinos, as seen in Vladivideo. Those are TRAITORS TO THE COUNTRY! On top of that, they live as parasites of the state.

Source: Author's own interpretation using Twitter data.

Questioning the Frame

The second strategy of Twitter users to resist terruqueo was to question the use of the frame. Users pointed out inconsistencies and conspiracy arguments in the narrative of the memory of salvation, as well as established differences based on their collective memory regarding the internal warfare to distinguish between who was a "terrorist" and who was a "vandal."

A first way to resist terruqueo is when users criticized the indiscriminate and broad use of the frame to indicate anyone involved in or in favor of the protests. The tweets of right-wing congressmen directly supported the intervention of the army and the police, framing the protests and violent episodes as terrorist acts.[33] Users responded that the police harmed many people, including children. Additionally, since the majority of the protesters were peaceful, the question was whether they could be considered "terrorists," or if a protester, farmer, student or a citizen expressing support for or involvement in the protests should be equated with terrorism. In doing so, they distinguished acts of vandalism from terrorism, and sought to determine who was truly responsible for such actions.

As *Table 7* shows, users mobilized aspects of their collective memory related to the subversive actions of Shining Path and how these disagreed with the protests of the period under study. Emphasis was placed on Shining Path's strategy of carrying out attacks against state institutions and public service assets, such as the explosion of car bombs in state institutions and residential areas, as well as explosions in high-voltage towers that left important sectors of the

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[33] Jorge Montoya's Twitter page, December 13, 2022, https://twitter.com/Alm_Montoya/status/1602602952661012480; Alejandro Cavero's Twitter page, January 22, 2023, https://twitter.com/AlejandroCavero/status/1617378072956895234.

population without electricity in the 1980s and 1990s. With this, users tried to differentiate

Shining Path's actions from those of the protesters.

Table 7. Questioning the Broader Use of the Frame

Relation to terruqueo	Tweet
	@LrzamoqrLuisito·Dec 12, 2022 Everything is terrorism for you, you see terrorists even in your soup. @LeitoVr·Dec 20, 2022 What! They have killed 30 Peruvian brothers, 4 of them children. Nobody believes your story about terrorism; we are no longer in the 90s. @martougaz·Dec 30, 2022 Logic then says that all those who vote against FP [Fuerza Popular Party] are terrucos or sympathizers of terrucos. There are several then.
Questioning the broad use of the term and conspiracy narrative	@rpbkm·Jan 10, 2023 In a previous tweet, you said they were terrorists. What is it finally? Are they innocent Peruvians or terrorists? @Joao89592697·Jan 22, 2023 A protest with stones, slingshots, sticks, bottles, cardboard, and burning tires is not terrorism. Nowhere. @ParafraseJo·Jan 22, 2023 It would be good if they could agree, Mr. Cavero. Of the 192 detained in San Marcos, how many captured "terrorists" are there? Have you decided to use that term for any act of violence and crime? They say terrucos, but when they are arrested, they do not find anything, nor do they typify it 🤷.
	⇓
Appealing to collective memory to distinguish about terrorism and vandalism	@Bladyssanchez·Dec 14, 2022 Sendero [Shining Path] came out with short and long-range weapons, rocket launchers and grenades. This is in no way Sendero[Shining Path]! It is the population that can no longer tolerate these politicians. @fnd2627·Dec 15, 2022 If they were terrorists, they would have already dynamited the congress, blown up some TV station, or brought down a tower. A terrorist wouldn't even throw stones and sticks. Ignorant. @ElmerAyala_PE·Jan 23, 2023 The terrorists dynamited and dismembered congressmen. No, they are not terrorists. The people defend themselves as best they can from the murderous repression of the Army or the PNP [police], who shoot at random, taking the lives of more than 60 Peruvians, most of them peasants and all of them terruqueados by people like you. @GabrielYnga·Jan 23, 2023 They are called vandalism, reprehensible acts, criminal acts that should be punished, but terrorism? It seems that you have not lived through the terrible time of terrorist barbarism in our country. You would have already realized the difference.

Source: Author's own interpretation using Twitter data.

One aspect to highlight is the relationship between the criticism regarding the broad use

of the term and the conspiracy argument identified by users in this narrative. By being used to

practically label all the protesters, users emphasized a recurring pattern about terruqueo: it is a

narrative that sees "terrorists everywhere" or that "overnight" or suddenly "makes terrorists

appear everywhere." This finding is related to Barrantes and Peña (2006, 22, 23), who identify arguments about conspiracy in the narrative of the memory of salvation. These arguments constitute a shield intended to support this narrative as well as delegitimize other versions of the internal warfare.

Table 8. Questioning the Efficacy of the Frame

Relation to terruqueo	Tweet
Questioning the efficacy of the strategy	@Evangel_sierram·Dec 12, 2022 Hahahahahaha, that talk of terrorists doesn't work anymore. @ParafraseJo·Dec 12, 2022 They intend to legitimize their speech of rebuke by describing the protests as terrorist acts, a low and basic resource of someone who does not know how to engage in political work of consensus and collaboration towards a common goal, not personal interests. @JennyLezameta·Dec 13, 2022 That's why they started with retaliation by the police, to say that it is vandalism. That was the purpose, to make it clear to everyone that they are terrorists. Typical form of Fujimorism. He doesn't remember anymore. So, change the script 😡😡😡👇. @Bladyssanchez·Dec 30, 2022 I was born before you. Unfortunately, fanaticism makes him say uncertain things. Nobody hates the dictator Fujimori who is in prison because there is justice. The soap opera of terrorism no longer resonates. @Elsa_Ch1·Dec 30, 2022 Nobody believes you about terrorism anymore, just by seeing you deface walls to make it seem that way. Step on the ground, do something that does not generate shame like until now. Realize that you leave your parents' last names unless they are responsible for your actions. ⇓
Appealing to collective memory of *terruqueo* in Fujimori's government	@IndyraLazo·Dec 29, 2022 The terruqueo thing no longer works, and what Montesinos taught him, that no longer works. We are no longer the same as we were in the 90s. Now, we no longer believe the sold-out press; they no longer manipulate us. Now, we realize the sowing and the harvest. @JeanDeVega·Dec 30, 2022 Of course, yes, it was the most corrupt and bloodthirsty government in history, which, with the story of terrorism, raped and murdered many women. They came to communities only to loot and steal our country's gold, all at the hands of the CIA. No one can deny that. @Marysol26896261·Dec 30, 2022 The old reliable, they talk to justify the murders. The same thing that Fujimori did in the 90s. @Pedroleonardor·Jan 26, 2023 The Fujimontesinista press (the same ones that supported Chino during his dictatorship) continue to give cover to this outdated fascist ex-military who follows the Doc's instructions to incite the Armed Forces and the population about the growing land invasion that will take everything from us and kill.

Source: Author's own interpretation using Twitter data.

A second way of resisting terruqueo was to question its effectiveness as a "strategy" in the context of social protest. Users described the deployment of the frames "terruco" or "terrorist" as a "talk that doesn't work" or a script that "no longer scares." On the contrary, this strategy for users "harms the country" and does not "seek the unity of Peruvians." This way of resisting the deployment of terruqueo was related to characterizing the frame as an authoritarian strategy that seeks to legitimize a discourse of "repression" and "hostility," instead of promoting "dialogue" and "concrete proposals for the solution of the crisis." These responses alluded to the Fujimori government's persecution political adversaries, cover up the death of opponents, and a perceived manipulation of media (*Table 8*).

Finally, a third element is the criticism of certain inconsistencies in the narrative of the memory of salvation by those who deploy terruqueo. On the one hand, users criticize this framing because it "resurrects" the "terrorist groups," which were "apparently" defeated by Fujimori in the 90s. According to the memory of salvation, Fujimori, in collaboration with the army, defeated terrorism and brought economic stability and social order to the country. However, when a political crisis occurs or the political and social legitimacy of those who govern is questioned, this apparent defeat becomes ineffective, allowing for the "reappearance," once again, of subversive groups.

On the other hand, users also users also criticized the distinctions made when a protester was from the capital or upper-class, and when the protester was from the province or lower-class. Terruqueo proposes a vision of "us and them" based on negative representations associated with the political-ideological sphere and ethnic, racial and cultural characteristics, where being an indian or a Cholo is associated with being a terruco (Mago 2023). In that sense, users highlighted this differentiation by identifying how the way of framing the protester differed when the subject

was from the "province," outside the "environment" of the economic or political elites of Peru, or was not in favor of the mobilization initiatives of the elites.

During the same period of protests, the National Police of Peru itself called for "marches for peace" throughout the country. A kind of countermarch aimed at "promoting peace" in the country and "restoring order" in response to the episodes of violence recorded in the southern regions and Lima.[34] From the point of view of this institution, these mobilizations were deemed legitimate and sought to unify Peru and support the work of the army and the police during the repression of the protests. However, as one user on Twitter pointed out (see *Table 9*), the alarming aspect of this is that the legitimacy of the protest was associated with the characteristics of the subject and the environment to which they belonged; a significantly different frame compared to when one is from the province and is classified as violent, disposable, and lacking legitimacy—in other words, labeled as a "terruco."

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[34] Policía Nacional del Perú's Twitter page, December 16, 2022, https://twitter.com/PoliciaPeru/status/1603952501769789440; Policía Nacional del Perú's Twitter page, December 16, 2022, https://twitter.com/PoliciaPeru/status/1603859597881663499; Policía Nacional del Perú's Twitter page, December 16, 2022, https://twitter.com/PoliciaPeru/status/1603857283011973120; Policía Nacional del Perú's Twitter page, December 17, 2022, https://twitter.com/PoliciaPeru/status/1604234589329043456; Policía Nacional del Perú's Twitter page, December 17, 2022, https://twitter.com/PoliciaPeru/status/1604253637664018434.

Table 9. Questioning the Inconsistencies of the Frame

Relation to terruqueo	Tweet
Questioning dichotomies and inconsistencies	@nurse_alexamaya ·Dec 12, 2022 Now because this protest is not from your surroundings, you call them terrorists. What about your small group's actions? @todos67016043 ·Dec 13, 2022 When Lima protest is considered legitimate but when provinces protest is terrorism. If everyone in the government has the same interpretation, there will be more deaths. @JennyLezameta ·Dec 13, 2022 Of course now you call it vandalism and terrorism, but when your elite group protested, it wasn't because the media didn't focus on what they were doing. How absurd! They are responding to the reprisals that you are ordering. @achahuasoncco ·Dec 16, 2022 This right-wing government has 21 deaths in less than a week, yet the cowards have resurrected "terrorism" to blame them for all the deaths.
	⇓
Appealing to inconsistencies in savior narrative	@Cjose111 ·Dec 13, 2022 And I thought Fujimori had exterminated all the terrorists! 🤔 Because that's what they keep saying! So, he deceived them. @jevs1960 ·Dec 20, 2022 So, the idea that Fujimori defeated terrorism is just a story because today, according to you, there are thousands of terrorists on the loose. @AkllaTika ·Dec 20, 2022 Are they all terrorists now? What kind of madness is this? Wasn't terrorism defeated by Fujimori? Don't scare Peru with that tall tale. The only terrorism is what you do, and it's called STATE TERRORISM. @RocioShirley16 ·Dec 30, 2022 You don't say that MOVADEF is made up of terrorists! Didn't your Fujimori finish them off? So who are MOVADEF? I mean, he never finished them. And why are there no more attacks? Of course, when it suits you, there are terrorists, like when people march, it's easy to terruquear them. @sofimiau2020 ·Jan 18, 2023 Terrorism? Are you implying that DIRCOTE has done nothing all these years, that terrorists appear out of nowhere? 🤔.

Source: Author's own interpretation using Twitter data.

CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION

Terruqueo, as I have demonstrated in the analysis of the tweets of congressmen with right-wing ideological affiliation and the front-pages of the El Comercio newspaper, has functioned as a counterframe, an elite frame and a media frame. As a counterframe, the defenders and entrepreneurs of the memory of salvation utilize this frame to refute, undermine or neutralize narratives contrary to the Fujimori's narrative, and therefore, demobilize those who attempt to challenge their power quotas or their justification for repressing the protests during the period under study.

In this sense, I found that during the protest period, politicians tried to delegitimize the protesters using various counterframing processes recognized in the literature on framing: counter attribution, counterprognoses, and attacks on the collective character of persons or groups (Benford and Hunt 2003, 161). Although, the congressmen generally acknowledged a state of instability in the country, they simultaneously offered different interpretations about who to blame for the crisis and suggested solutions involving repression. They directly attacked the legitimacy of individuals and groups by associating them with Shining Path or subversive factions of this terrorist group.

In the same way, the media, especially El Comercio editorial group, deployed frames associating the protesters with terrorist factions, illegal mining and drug trafficking. Although it cannot be denied that in some cases the violence of the protesters was exacerbated at certain moments of the protests, it is necessary to emphasize that, as Gitlin ([1980] 2003, 9) mentions, the media are a significant force in maintaining a globalized social and economic order. Therefore, the selection or omission of certain aspects of reality responds to the continuation of this order. In this way, it is necessary to remember one of the recommendations of the CVR

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report, where the media is urged "to fulfill their duty to inform truthfully and to form public opinion" (2003, 47). The experience of the internal warfare tells us that at the time, those who led and reported on these events in the media trivialized the tragedy suffered, "silenced it, simplified it or turned it into a spectacle" and even succumbed to multiple forms of corruption (CVR 2003, 47). Interpreting the events from the terruqueo perspective is not assuming this responsibility and subjects public opinion to the polarization and trivialization of violence, once again.

On the other hand, I was able to corroborate that terruqueo as a frame is also deployed by state agents, especially those belonging to the armed forces and police. This relates to Aguirre (2011), who maintains that the frame was internalized by the army and the police, in charge of the subversive fight; this has also contributed decisively to the formation of an authoritarian discourse and violations of human rights. This finding suggests a close relationship between frames and certain state institutions. Noakes defines these institutions as structures of abeyance, "which can be formal or informal institutions that function as 'halfway houses,'" that sustain master frames until a new period of mobilization makes them relevant once more (2005, 179). In this case, this relationship between terruqueo with the army and the police, as well as with certain sectors of the political right, deserves further investigation. Within these possibilities, it would be interesting to explore the formation processes of army institutions and the training processes within political parties and the editorial teams of mass media, to delve into the mechanisms and strategies that make possible the preservation of this kind of frames and their deployment in processes of political instability or social conflict.

Unlike other studies on terruqueo that address the strategies of its deployment or delve into the stigmatization of the terruqueo subject, I focused on the strategies for its resistance. It

was found that users on Twitter use at least two strategies to deal with it: a strategy that is based on turning the tables on those who display the frame; and another strategy that questions the breadth of the frame, the effectiveness of its deployment and the inconsistencies of its narrative. In both strategies, events, characters, symbols, etc., from the collective memory of the internal warfare and the Fujimori regime were deployed.

As I pointed out throughout this research, in framing processes, actors also take as reference or use frames, symbols, or elements of collective memory when a new period of mobilization occurs (Snow and Benford 1992, 136; Noakes 2005, 8). In that sense, terruqueo is a frame that appeals to collective memory to demobilize protests or threats to the Peruvian neoliberal establishment. According to Velásquez, terruqueo is deployed in a scenario where two narratives come into play, a narrative sustained in the *memory of salvation*, in which Fujimori is seen as the savior and peacemaker of Peru, as he defeated terrorism; on the other hand, a *memory for reconciliation*, which proposes a human rights narrative supported by the CVR report.

Considering this, the users' replies aimed to recall aspects of the memory of reconciliation while emphasizing a concern for the victims of the protests, as well as the responsibility of political elites, media, and the army and police forces in the repression of protests and in the polarization of civil society. Although the first strategy also resorted to branding those who deployed *terruqueo*, this is in no way a reversal of it. On the contrary, it is a reaction or an attempt to re-frame a violent and stigmatized way of framing the demands of low economic sectors of Peruvian society. Sewell points out that social actors are capable of applying a wide variety of different and incompatible schemes, which are transportable, that is, they can be applied in a wide and not fully predictable range of cases outside the context in which they are initially learned (1992, 17). In this aspect, it is necessary to discuss the relevance of concepts

such as state terrorism to social movement activism and citizens in general. According to Bedoya et al (2021, 12), this expression has seldom been used in Peru. However, Twitter users in this study have appealed to this concept to resist the deployment of terruqueo. Therefore, more research is required in this regard to understand how these forms of framing and counter-framing exhaust the possibilities of dialogue in moments of political polarization and social conflict in Peru. Additionally, it is necessary to publicly debate the inclusion of this type of concepts and their possibilities for transportability to other scenarios and frameworks.

Conclusion

As Benford mentions, "the relationship between the efforts framing of movements and the mobilization of potential constituents is highly dialectical" and "there is no such a thing as a tabula rasa or empty glass into which new alien ideas can be poured" (1997, 422). Various social actors, as subjects engaged in meaning work: interpreting, resisting, mobilizing, and reclaiming elements from the past and present to give meaning to the present and advocate for change in the public sphere. In this regard, this study has aimed to contribute to a better understanding of the narrative dynamics of framing and memory in contemporary Peru, considering the perspectives of everyday people on social media.

The study of these forms and strategies of resistance suggests a more dynamic and hopeful panorama regarding terruqueo subjects, who interpret and frame elements of collective memories and their daily experiences to resist dominant narratives. In doing so, they contribute to the strengthening of democracy and citizen participation. This is particularly noteworthy in a critical period of Peruvian society, characterized by corruption in political and economic spheres, obstruction of public institutions, lack of political representation, and erosion of narratives associated with human rights and reconciliation. Despite widespread social discontent and the

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absence of proposals that steer the country towards democracy and a more just and equitable society, there remains a 'resistance' that holds hope for leading Peru towards a path free of stigma, racism and discrimination.

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